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Remembering Intergroup Conflict

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 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN

CH A PT E R

Remembering Intergroup Conflict

8
Rezarta Bilali and Michael A. Ross

Abstract
Philosopher George Santayana is probably best known today for his aphorism, “Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” Variations of this quote appear frequently when
countries, ethnic groups, or individuals engage in conflicts over economic, legal, or territorial issues.
The version of history provided by one’s own side is depicted as a true account of the past, whereas
contrasting versions provided by one’s opponents are deemed to be lies. In the current chapter,
we examine bases of conflicting narratives of the past. We document how individual- and group-
level factors (e.g., needs, goals, motives) shape historical memories, and how historical memories
exacerbate conflict. In the final section of the chapter, we consider how memories can be used
promote reconciliation rather conflict.
Key Words: Intergroup conflict, historical memories, historical injustices, harm-doing, victimization,
apologies, reconciliation

Individuals often suppose that they know the
history of the ethnic, religious, and national groups
to which they belong. Their historical memories
include details and interpretations of past events that
they did not personally experience. These historical
memories are to group identity what personal mem-
ories are to individual identity. Historical memory is
the glue that connects group members, events, and
ideas through time and space. Regardless of their
accuracy, historical memories provide the bases of
people’s understanding of the origins, story, and
characteristics of a group (Billig, 1995; Halbwachs,
1950/1980). Historical memories help establish
and support individuals’ beliefs about their group’s
uniqueness and standing relative to other groups.
There are many sources of historical memory,
including societal influences conveyed through his-
tory books, education, TV, films, novels, and plays
(Bar-Tal, 2000; Schumann, Akiyama, & Knauper,
1999; see also Iyer & Blatz, this volume). Historical
memories are embedded and reinforced in the images
people encounter in their everyday lives. Important
historical figures and events are featured in coins,
banknotes, street names, and public monuments.
The combination of various forms of remembering
makes historical memory resistant to extinction.
Periodic commemorations celebrate important days
in each group or nation’s history providing group
members with a particular version of the past.
Beyond these overarching societal influences,
cognitive and motivational factors influence how
members of particular groups attend to, process, and
retrieve the available historical information (Blatz &
Ross, 2009). In fashioning stories of the past, both
ordinary people and professional historians go
beyond the simple cataloging of major events and
dates. As the term “story” implies, historical memo-
ries are narratives that include appraisals of individu-
als and groups, as well as inferences about how they
acted and why. Even the narratives of professional

123

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 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN
historians are fictions to varying degrees. Often
dependent on inconsistent or incomplete sources,
professional historians forge meaningful stories by
imposing their own interpretations and coherence
on the information available (Trouillot, 1995).
Different versions of a group’s history serve the
interests of different groups. The transmission of his-
torical memories is an ongoing process of negotiation
among ideological and interest groups to promote
their favored interpretations of the past. For instance,
in some states in the United States there are ideo-
logical and religious disputes over the depiction of
American history in school texts. Dominated by con-
servative Christians, the Texas Board of Education
recently changed the state curriculum to provide a
more religious and Christian orientation to American
history (McKinley, 2010). The revised curriculum
specifies that the Founding Fathers intended to build
a Christian nation and downplays the contributions
of Thomas Jefferson, who advocated the separation
of church and state. Whatever one thinks of such
amendments, the changes illustrate the importance of
historical memory. Groups attempt to use the teach-
ing of history to advance their beliefs and values.
Members of the same religious, ethnic, or
national groups typically access the same sources
for their historical knowledge. Consequently, group
members often possess overlapping memories of
history that can differ in content, appraisals, and
interpretations from the shared memories of other
groups. When different groups possess conflicting
narratives of the same events, they often regard their
own side’s historical narrative as accurate and accuse
their opposition of distorting or ignoring history.
This intergroup disparity in accounts of the past is
particularly evident in recollections of conflict, the
focus of the current chapter.
We identify the main characteristics of histori-
cal memories of intergroup conflict and examine
the influence of historical memories in perpetuating
intergroup conflicts. We document how individual-
and group-level factors (e.g., needs, goals, motives)
shape historical memories, and how historical mem-
ories exacerbate conflict. We focus less on accuracy,
which can be difficult to determine, and more on
the content and functions of people’s stories of the
past. In the final section of the chapter, we consider
how memories might be used to promote reconcili-
ation rather than conflict.
Historical Memory and Intergroup Conflict
The study of historical memory contributes to
an understanding of intergroup conflict, in part,
124 remembering intergroup conflict
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 124
because memory is prescriptive as well as descriptive
(Halbwachs, 1950/1980; Mead, 1929). Historical
memories shape people’s current beliefs, foster col-
lective action, and maintain and intensify group
conflicts. In an ethnographic study of Hutu refugees
who escaped the 1972 genocide in Burundi, Malkki
(1995) demonstrated how conflict memories can
shape beliefs. Malkki compared refugees’ historical
narratives to Bible stories. Refugees’ historical mem-
ories included strong moral lessons and implica-
tions. After telling a story, people would discuss its
moral implications as well as the lessons it provided
for the present and future (Malkki, 1995). Hutu
refugees used their historical narratives of conflict
to educate people about the world, both past and
present.
Historical memories inform not only the under-
standing of the present, but also influence expec-
tations for the future. Historical experiences serve
to identify one’s current foes and allies, as well as
identify and interpret current and future threats
(Liu & Hilton, 2005). Memories of past griev-
ances alert group members to potential threats and
dangers. Historical victimization can also result in
the development of a siege mentality (Bar-Tal &
Antebi, 1992), a belief that much of the rest of the
world opposes the ingroup. People endorsing this
mentality perceive the ingroup to be vulnerable in
an extremely dangerous world. In this sense, histori-
cal victimization serves as a lesson for the ingroup,
so that past tragedies can be avoided in the future.
Stories of historical grievances can bring about
moral obligations for the present and future. For
instance, the defeat of Prince Lazar in the battle
of Kosovo in 1389 is the most important event
in Serbian historical memory. To many Serbs, the
defeat at the battle of Kosovo affirms that their
group has been historically victimized. The lessons
they derive from the battle of Kosovo include the
need for solidarity, group cohesion, and protective
actions. Another example is the memory of the
battle of Masada, which portrays the last Jewish
resistance toward Romans after the fall of Jerusalem
in a.d. 73. As defeat became inevitable, the Jewish
fighters in the Masada fortress committed mass sui-
cide to avoid capture. This event signifies the impor-
tance of group members’ commitment and sacrifice
for the group (Schwartz, Zerubavel, & Barnett,
1986).
Decades and even centuries after their group’s
victimization, memories of the incident can evoke
strong emotional reactions among group mem-
bers. Often, the historical trauma is relived during
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 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN
commemorations of the ingroup’s past. The reen-
actment of past victimization through rituals elic-
its emotions that are shared by ingroup members
(Liu & László, 2007). Such emotions include grief,
shame, rage, fear, anger, and sometimes humiliation
(Frijda, 1997; Rice & Benson, 2005). During ongo-
ing intractable conflicts, these emotions contribute
to perpetuating cycles of violence (Bar-Tal, 2000).
For instance, feelings of anger and humiliation
(Lickel, Miller, Stenstrom, Denson, & Schmader,
2006; Pick, 2001) are associated with a desire for
retribution (see also Lickel, this volume).
Mobilizing Collective Action and
Justifying Ingroup Aggression
Historical memories play a role in mobilizing
collective action. Reviving and revoking historical
memories has been crucial for waging wars, build-
ing nations, as well as inspiring resistance and civil
rights movements (Apfelbaum, 2000). For exam-
ple, Edward Said (2000) attributed the failure of
Palestinian national project to the failure to create
a powerful historical narrative that would bring
Palestinians together around a common goal. By
contrast, he attributed the establishment of the
state of Israel to the creation of a strong histori-
cal narrative that matched the goals of the Zionist
movement (Said, 2000).
Historical memories are often used by elites to
justify intergroup conflict (Berlin, 1979; Mack,
1983; Ramanathapillai, 2006). Historical memories
of violence can contribute to current conflicts by
evoking threat and fear. By affirming that the adver-
sary is dangerous, memories of conflict elicit mis-
trust and delegitimize the adversary (Bar-Tal, 2007;
Bar-Tal & Hammack, this volume). Such historical
memories might drive groups to engage in preemp-
tive wars (strike first) to protect themselves from the
threatening outgroup (Staub, 1998). Group mem-
bers are likely to perceive their group’s aggression as
a response to provocation (Bandura, 1990; Staub,
1989) and regard aggression in response to provoca-
tion as justifiable (Dodge & Coie, 1987; Wohl &
Reeder, 2004).
In a study of historical memories of Armenian
massacres at the beginning of the 20th century,
Bilali, Tropp, and Dasgupta (in press, Study 1) found
that Turkish participants viewed Turkish aggression
as a response to provocation by Armenians. Similar
findings were observed in a study examining histori-
cal memories of conflict between Tutsis and Hutus
in Burundi (Bilali et al., in press, Study 2). When
asked about the history of the violent conflict in
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 125
Burundi, each group blamed the outgroup for pro-
voking the violence, and depicted their ingroup’s
violent actions as self-defense.
Emphasizing prior victimization serves to legiti-
mize current conflicts and justify negative actions
against outgroup members (Vollhardt, this volume),
even when the targeted outgroup did not partici-
pate in the original victimization. In a recent study
of this phenomenon, psychologists asked Israeli par-
ticipants about Israel’s war (2008–2009) in Gaza.
In one condition participants were reminded of the
Holocaust prior to answering questions about the
conflict in Gaza. Participants who were reminded of
the Holocaust were more likely to justify Palestinian
civilian casualties. Reminders of the Holocaust
increased justification for Palestinian civilian casu-
alties specifically among Israeli participants who
endorsed right-wing ideologies (Hirschberger &
Pyszczynski, in press).
Similarly, Wohl and Branscombe (2008) exam-
ined how remembering the historical victimization
of the ingroup influenced emotional reactions to
aggression against a current adversary. American
Jews who were reminded of the Holocaust reported
less collective guilt for the plight of Palestinians than
did American Jews who were not provided with this
reminder. Similarly, Americans reported less collec-
tive guilt for their group’s harm-doing in Iraq after
they were reminded of either the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor or the 2001 terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center.
Apparently, historical memory does not simply
increase enthusiasm for retribution against a prior
enemy. Instead, reminders of ingroup victimization
seemed to legitimize an ingroup’s actions against
any enemy and decrease sympathy for outgroup
suffering.
Disparate Memories of Conflict
Psychological research at the individual level
has revealed that victims emphasize the negative
and lasting consequences of the harm and perpe-
trators’ responsibility for the act. Victims often
neglect to mention, however, potential mitigating
circumstances that might have contributed to the
transgression. By contrast, perpetrators minimize
the consequences of their actions, focus on mitigat-
ing circumstances, and depict victims as overreact-
ing (e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell, & Wotman, 1990;
Baumeister & Catanese, 2001).
Similar differences in perpetrator and victim per-
spectives were evident in the hearings of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa
bil ali, ross 125
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(see Hamber, this volume). Perpetrators tended to
present their transgression as unrelated to previous
or subsequent assaults, whereas victims tended to
depict the incident as part of a continued series of
assaults against them. Also, while admitting that
their acts were morally wrong, perpetrators justified
their violence; in contrast, victims described the
violence as incomprehensible (Kraft, 2009).
Parallel differences in perpetrator and victim
perspectives occur for group-based harms. Groups
and individuals tend to focus on the harm inflicted
on the ingroup while minimizing the harm they
inflict on others (Pratto & Glasford, 2008). The
media focuses primarily on the suffering of the
ingroup while downplaying the outgroup’s misery
(e.g., Fishman & Marvin, 2003). Emphasizing the
ingroup’s own suffering and victimization rather
than its hostile actions fosters a favorable and moral
image of the ingroup (Nadler & Saguy, 2004; Noor,
Brown, & Prentice, 2008).
As this focus on ingroup suffering occurs on both
sides of a conflict, each group perceives itself as vic-
timized. Interestingly, an emphasis on past victim-
ization is observed not only among groups that have
been the main victims of violence (e.g., Hutus in
Burundi), but also among groups that are judged to
be the main perpetrators of violence by third-party
observers (e.g., Turks in the context of the massacres
against Armenians). For instance, in Bilali et al.’s
(in press) study of Turks’ historical memories of
Armenian massacres, Turkish participants acknowl-
edged the suffering of Armenians. However, they
emphasized accounts of Turks’ victimization during
the Balkan Wars (which preceded the massacres of
Armenians), and also produced narratives of Turks’
suffering at the hand of Armenians. The amplifica-
tion and focus on the ingroup’s suffering serve to
legitimize the harm done to Armenians.
Such preoccupation with ingroup victimiza-
tion often leads to a competition regarding which
group has suffered more harm (Nadler & Saguy,
2004; Noor, Brown, & Prentice, 2008). This com-
petition may have implications for reconciliation
(see Nadler, this volume). In a series of studies of
conflicts in Chile and Northern Ireland, Noor et al.
(2008) found that the more individuals competed
over which group has suffered more, the less likely
they were to forgive the outgroup for the past harms
committed, and the less willing they were to recon-
cile with the outgroup.
Members of victim and perpetrator groups have
also different views regarding the presence or absence
of “privity”—whether the ongoing economic or
126 remembering intergroup conflict
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 126
social disadvantages of the victim group can be linked
to the original injustice (Brooks, 1999; Matsuda,
1987; Starzyk & Ross, 2008). Contemporary mem-
bers of previously victimized groups are more likely
to perceive a link between past mistreatment and
current suffering than are members of the nonvic-
timized majority (Ross, Banfield, & Blatz, 2011).
In turn, members of a nonvictimized majority
are more likely to perceive members of a victim-
ized group as personally responsible for their fate,
thus legitimizing the current system (Kay, Jost, &
Young, 2005) and avoiding experiencing collec-
tive guilt (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004; Wohl,
Branscombe, & Klar, 2006).
Cleansing and Glorifying History to
Maintain Positive Group Identity
Why do conflicting groups develop very disparate
memories of conflicts? One answer is that historical
memory forms an important part of a group’s iden-
tity. Group identity is enhanced if, on looking back,
people are proud of their group’s actions (Volpato &
Licata, 2010). But all groups have engaged in at least
some actions that seem shameful from the perspec-
tive of current societal standards and group ideals.
Perpetrator groups can strive to maintain favorable
social identities by constructing pasts consistent
with their preferences. To support positive views of
their groups they may erase or alter accounts of past
harms. They may also dehumanize the victims. We
discuss each of these responses in turn.
Silencing
To preserve a favorable image of their group in
the face of shameful episodes, groups may remem-
ber the past in ways that eliminate humiliating
events altogether from their historical narratives.
Fitzgerald (1979) analyzed American school his-
tory texts. Until the civil rights era in the 1960s,
texts presented slaves as appearing “magically” at
some unspecified time and disappearing after the
Civil War (p. 83). Textbook writers failed to men-
tion that slaves were forcibly abducted from their
families and homes.
Silencing of shameful historical episodes is also
evident in Canadian textbooks. Backhouse (1999,
p. 278) commented on the “stupefying innocence”
of Canadians about the history of racism in their
country. She attributed the ignorance of Canadians
to the lack of discussion of racism in educational
curricula and the media. This silencing seems
designed to help Canadians maintain an image of
themselves as fair and tolerant.
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Such cleansing and glorification of history is
perhaps particularly common with regard to violent
conflicts and military events. In war, individuals
engage in behaviors that would be unthinkable in
peace. At times, groups deal with wartime events
that violate their norms and values by refusing to
think or talk about them. In recent years, Japanese
government officials announced that they would
eliminate references to how their army forced civil-
ians to commit mass suicide during the Battle of
Okinawa. Japanese officials also proclaimed that
they would stop discussing their army’s involvement
in the creation of the “comfort women” system
(Onishi, 2007).
Altering the Past
Sometimes groups modify rather than suppress
unthinkable events. US military officials recently
provided a fictionalized account of the death in
Afghanistan of Pat Tillman, an ex-NFL football
player who was depicted as a hero in the media for
quitting a lucrative career to fight for his country.
According to media reports after his death, Tillman
died heroically under enemy fire (Herbert, 2007;
Krakauer, 2009). In reality, a fellow American sol-
dier accidentally killed Tillman. An official inquiry
later revealed that high-ranking military officials
were responsible for attempting to cover up details
of Tillman’s death and distributing the false story to
the media (Krakauer, 2009).
The cleansing of history occurs not only at the
group level by elites, but also at the individual
level. Social identity theory is particularly relevant
to understanding responses at the individual level
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986). According to social iden-
tity theory, people derive their self-concepts, in part,
from their membership in social groups. Their self-
evaluations reflect their assessments of the groups
to which they belong. Because people are gener-
ally motivated to regard themselves favorably, they
are also motivated to view their groups favorably
(see Roccas & Elster, this volume). Social identity
theory does not directly address historical memo-
ries, but the implications are clear. People should
prefer favorable historical portrayals of their groups
because they can then think well of themselves.
Group members are thus motivated to reinterpret
or silence events that could reflect poorly on their
group and by extension, themselves (Baumeister &
Hastings, 1997).
Trouillot (1995) reported relevant findings with
respect to the Haitian Slave rebellion in 1791. For
contemporary European observers, a slave rebellion
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 127
was unthinkable. Slaves were supposedly satisfied
with their conditions, unable to organize them-
selves, incapable of imagining or desiring free-
dom, and perhaps most important, incapable of
defeating sophisticated, well-armed French forces.
Despite all of these supposed disadvantages, the
Haitian slaves defeated the French by using supe-
rior tactics. Confronting the impossible, contem-
porary European observers derived explanations
for the rebellion that better fit their expectations
(e.g., French forces suffered from yellow fever). In
the aftermath of the rebellion, silencing occurred
(Trouillot, 1995). Details of the rebellion were
omitted from Western histories.
Dehumanization
People sometimes defend the ingroup and the
status quo by dehumanizing victims or subordinate
groups. For instance, people can legitimize earlier
aggressive acts against an outgroup by viewing its
members as subhuman (see Bar-Tal & Hammack,
this volume, for an extended discussion).
Castano and Giner-Sorolla (2006) presented
American participants with a passage that empha-
sized that white settlers had killed large numbers of
Native Americans either deliberately through mili-
tary campaigns or inadvertently through the spread
of contagious diseases. Participants evidenced
stronger dehumanization of Native Americans
when the killing was deliberate. Apparently, par-
ticipants relied on dehumanization to protect the
image of their ingroup when its members deliber-
ately caused great harm. Because standards of fair-
ness and morality don’t apply to the same degree to
subhuman species (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006;
Clayton & Opotow, 2003; Kelman, 1973; Leyens,
et al., 2000; Opotow, 1990; Hafer & Olson, 2003),
aggression toward them is not perceived as a serious
moral violation.
In addition to legitimizing past violence, dehu-
manization of the outgroup renders violence against
it more likely today. When outgroup members are
described as vermin or insects, destroying the out-
group becomes a moral imperative. For instance, in
Rwanda, the hate radio during the genocide called
for the killing of the cockroaches—the dehuman-
izing label applied to Tutsis (Melvern, 2006). Each
war seems to generate a list of dehumanizing labels
that serve to legitimize the killing of enemy soldiers
and civilians.
When outgroups are dehumanized, perpetrator
groups may acknowledge rather than deny harms
and glorify rather than disparage the aggressors.
bil ali, ross 127
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In the aftermath of the war in Serbia, Ratko Mladic
and Radovan Karadzic who ordered the massacres
of thousands of people in Bosnia were celebrated as
national heroes and had children named after them
(Ramet, 2007).
Social Psychological Motives Underlying
Cleansing of and Glorification of History
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)
proposes that people’s motivation to enhance their
group’s history should be related to the strength
of their association with a group (Baumeister &
Hastings, 1997). Consistent with this hypothesis,
Sahdra and Ross (2007) found that, relative to low
identifiers, individuals who identified highly with
their ethnic group recalled fewer incidents of inter-
group violence and hatred committed by ingroup
members. In an investigation of Americans’ histori-
cal memories of Pearl Harbor attacks, Bilali (2010)
reported that participants for whom American
identity was central to their self-concept reported
more anger toward Japan, more sympathy toward
American victims, and perceived Pearl Harbor
attacks as more important to US history. Higher
identity centrality also predicted attributions of
more responsibility to Japan and less responsibility
to the United States for the Pearl Harbor attacks.
In considering group identity, it is possible to
distinguish glorifying a group from feeling attached
to it. The glorification dimension of ingroup iden-
tification, not group attachment per se, predicts
denial of ingroup responsibility for wrongdoing
and legitimization of past ingroup harms (Roccas,
Klar, Liviatan, 2006; Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, &
Giner-Sorolla, 2010; see also Roccas & Elster, this
volume). In a study of historical representations of
American Thanksgiving, Kurtis, Adams, and Yellow
Bird (2010) demonstrated a bidirectional link
between ingroup glorification and historical memo-
ries. High glorifiers preferred accounts of American
Thanksgiving that omitted violence against indig-
enous peoples; in turn, accounts that failed to men-
tion the violence led to increased glorification of the
United States.
The reciprocal relation between identity and
memory is also evident in research on memories
for severe forms of violence against the ingroup,
such as genocide, or slavery or unexpected defeats.
Recollecting such events enhances ingroup solidarity
and identity (Devine-Wright, 2003; Irwin-Zarecka,
1994). Recollections of past victimization increase
people’s perceptions of a shared common fate with
other group members (Vollhardt, this volume) in
128 remembering intergroup conflict
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 128
ways that may solidify the boundaries dividing the
ingroup and the outgroup.
Motivations relevant to the cleansing of and
glorification of history also involve processes of
social dominance. Social dominance theory (SDT,
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) suggests that humans have
a general tendency to form and maintain group-
based hierarchies. Individuals and institutions
adopt social myths and ideologies that legitimize
and enhance these hierarchies (hierarchy-enhancing
ideologies) (Sidanius, Laar, Pratto, & Levin, 2004).
SDT implies that people would prefer interpreta-
tions of the past that legitimize structural hierar-
chies. Not surprisingly, the tendency to maintain
hierarchy-enhancing ideologies and beliefs may be
stronger among members of dominant groups who
benefit from their higher social status, than among
members of subordinate groups who are disadvan-
taged by their status (see also Cohrs, this volume).
In the context of New Zealand, Sibley, Wilson,
and Robertson (2007) observed that members of
the majority group (Pakeha) who were high in the
desire for group-based dominance were more likely
to negate Pakeha’s responsibility for historical injus-
tices inflicted on Maoris (the indigenous people of
New Zealand). In turn, the refutation of historical
responsibility served as a legitimizing myth justifying
the social inequality between Pakeha and Maori.
In contrast, subordinate groups sometimes tell
historical stories that seem designed to undermine the
legitimacy of current hierarchies. For instance, one of
the first tasks of the women’s movement in the 1970s
was to highlight the history of women’s important
contributions to society (Apfelbaum, 2000). Similarly,
Alex Haley’s (1976) novel Roots, which was allegedly
based on the genuine history of his own family, had
a significant impact in expanding the meaning and
understanding of African Americans’ experience of
slavery and led to the reevaluation of slavery as a con-
sequence of white domination (Apfelbaum, 2000).
These stories challenged the essentialist perspectives
underlying sexist and racist ideologies that viewed
gender and race inequalities as natural. The accuracy
of Haley’s historical scholarship has been questioned
(e.g., Mills & Mills, 1984), but our point is not that
stories of the past provided by dominant or subordi-
nate groups are necessarily accurate. Instead, we focus
on the use of historical stories to bolster or under-
mine the status quo.
Promoting Reconciliation
Historical memory poses one of the most chal-
lenging obstacles to peaceful resolution of conflicts.
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 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN
Divergent interpretations of history evoke hatred
and produce violence (Kriesberg, 2004). Because of
this destructive potential, for a long time, historical
concerns have been intentionally ignored in conflict
resolution approaches. More recently, research and
practice in the field of reconciliation (e.g., Brooks,
1999; Lederach, 1997; Minow, 2002) suggest that
addressing, rather than ignoring the past, is crucial
to reconciliation (see also Hamber, this volume).
We discuss two approaches to confronting the past:
Public government apologies for historical injustices
and more direct interventions aimed at fostering
reconciliation for recent or ongoing conflicts.
Government Apologies for Historical
Injustices
We have detailed numerous ways in which peo-
ple hide, deny, and justify past harms committed
by members of their group. However, governments
sometimes respond to ingroup harm-doing by
acknowledging government responsibility for earlier
injustices. Although relatively rare, such acknowl-
edgment has become more common in recent
decades, as evidenced by the increasing number of
public government apologies for wrongs committed
decades or even centuries earlier (Blatz, Schumann,
& Ross, 2009; Brooks, 1999; Schumann & Ross,
2010; see also Iyer & Blatz, this volume). For exam-
ple, the United States and Canada apologized for
the internment of American and Canadian Japanese
during World War II, Australia apologized for
forcibly removing Aboriginal children from their
families between 1915 and 1967, seven American
state legislatures apologized for their state’s role in
African American slavery (Blatz et al., 2009), and
most recently Mississippi Governor Haley Barbour
apologized to civil rights workers who were assaulted
and imprisoned in 1961 (retrieved online from the
Commercial Appeal, May 25, 2011).
When do governments acknowledge past harms
rather than deny or justify them? Schumann and
Ross suggested that governments are more likely to
acknowledge and apologize for historical injustices
when victimized groups or their allies have political
clout, the majority of voters do not strongly oppose
an apology, and some but not too much time has
passed. The first factor is political, but the remain-
ing ones have psychological components and are
worthy of further comment.
Politicians sometimes hesitate to acknowledge
government supported historical harms committed
against minorities because they fear the opposition
of many members of the nonvictimized majority.
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 129
For instance, former US President Bill Clinton
refused to apologize for slavery, citing potential
hostile responses from white Americans (Brooks,
1999). Public opinion polls support Clinton’s con-
cerns: In a recent poll, 53% of white Americans
opposed a federal apology for slavery (Polling
Report, 2008). Public opinion on government
apologies is malleable, however. After governments
apologize for historical injustices, public support for
the apology tends to rise dramatically (Schumann
& Ross, 2010). This shift in public opinion proba-
bly occurs for a number of reasons (e.g., the content
of the apology stresses the innocence of the victims
and the value of even a belated apology), but it is
also consistent with system justification theory (Jost
& Banaji, 1994). Members of the nonvictimized
majority can support the current system by justify-
ing a lack of an apology before one is offered and
subsequently justifying an apology after it occurs. In
any event, the data suggest that governments need
not be overly concerned about the possibility of a
majority backlash against apologies for historical
injustices.
Government apologies tend to follow a certain
time course. Most obviously, they often occur in
bunches. The Canadian apology for the Japanese
internment occurred within weeks of a similar
US apology; the Australian apology for the stolen
generations followed the Canadian apology for
similar actions by slightly more than a year; and
the apologies by seven American states for slavery
occurred within a year of each other after almost a
century and a half without any formal state apolo-
gies. It seems likely that the grouping of apologies
for similar injustices is not due to chance. Earlier
apologies for similar injustices probably increase
political and moral pressures for an apology from
victimized groups and their allies in other coun-
tries or states, provide governments with models for
how to apologize (including what to offer by way
of material compensation, if anything), and perhaps
increase a government’s courage by demonstrating
that apologies do not appear to have a serious politi-
cal downside.
Analyzing a set of government apologies,
Schumann and Ross (2010) found that the median
interval between the end of the injustice and gov-
ernment apologies was 59 years. There are probably
a variety of reasons for the delay. Societal attitudes
need to change so that discriminatory actions that
were once viewed by the majority as socially, mor-
ally, and legally justified (e.g., African American
slavery, Japanese internment, forced participation in
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 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN
native residential schools) are viewed as abhorrent
and illegal by more modern standards. The change
in attitudes toward the discriminatory actions is
typically accompanied by a shift in attitudes toward
the minority group, such that its members are no
longer viewed as subhuman and beyond the scope
of justice. Second, with the passage of time, govern-
ment and legal officials who initiated, endorsed, or
supervised the injustice are no longer in positions
of power, and those now in charge can dissociate
themselves from the injustice and experience less
psychological need to defend it. As well, with the
passage of sufficient time, most of the original direct
victims of the injustice will have died. Material
compensation to individuals is typically directed
only at direct victims of injustice, not their descen-
dants (Brooks, 1999; Starzyk, Blatz, & Ross, 2009).
This was the case for example, for US and Canadian
government reparations offered to individuals for
the Japanese internment. If most of the original vic-
tims are dead, there is likely to be less demand for
material compensation and any compensation offer
should be relatively inexpensive. Because a delayed
apology is less likely to be costly to government and
taxpayers, it should face less opposition. The other
side of the coin is that if the delay is too long the
injustice may seem like ancient history to members
of both the victimized and perpetrator groups and
a present-day apology will seem inappropriate and
unnecessary. There is no gold standard, however, as
to what constitutes “too long.”
Proponents of government apologies argue that
apologies promote intergroup reconciliation as well
as allow victim groups to heal and put the harms
behind them (e.g., Brooks, 1999; Minow, 2002).
Despite the growing enthusiasm for public govern-
ment apologies, there is little research that directly
assesses their effectiveness. To this point, the lim-
ited amount of research is equivocal. For example,
Brown, Wohl, and Exline (2008) found that govern-
ment apologies for past injustices increased victims’
forgiveness, whereas Philpot and Hornsey (2008)
reported that apologies had no effect on forgiveness.
The appropriate question is not whether govern-
ment apologies are effective, but rather what kinds
of apologies are beneficial and for what historical
injustices and outcomes (e.g., forgiveness, trust, lik-
ing, acceptance, etc.). Research by psychologists on
emotional responses to injustices and on the effects
of different ways of framing of injustices provides
some potential answers.
Individuals who regard members of their group
as responsible for past transgressions may experience
130 remembering intergroup conflict
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 130
guilt and shame (Branscombe & Doosje, 2004;
Branscombe & Miron, 2004; Doosje, Branscombe,
Spears, & Manstead, 1998; Heider, 1958). These
emotions can occur even when historical injustices
occurred decades or centuries earlier (Branscombe,
Doosje, & McGarty, 2002; Iyer, Leach, & Crosby,
2003). The experience of guilt predicts increased
support for reparations for past harms (e.g., Doosje
et al., 1998; Zebel, Doosje, & Spears, 2004). For
example, Iyer et al. (2003) demonstrated that guilt
about white Americans’ racial discrimination pre-
dicted support for affirmative actions to compensate
African Americans for slavery.
Conversely, the experience of shame is associ-
ated with actions aimed at defending the ingroup’s
image rather than ameliorating the damage inflicted
on an outgroup (Branscombe, Slugoski, & Kappen,
2004; Lickel, Schmander, & Barquissau, 2004). For
example, in a study of Italian colonialism, Mari,
Andrighetto, Gabbiadini, Durante, and Volpato
(2010) found that shame for the violence perpetrated
against the colonized people predicted reparation
strategies that attempted to enhance Italy’s public
image, whereas guilt predicted reparation strategies
designed to aid immigrant African workers.
While research on members of perpetrator groups
has focused mostly on emotional responses to his-
torical injustices, research on victimized groups has
tended to examine the effects of how the injustices
are framed. For example, Wohl and Branscombe
(2005) assessed the effects of depicting the Holocaust
as a general human tendency toward violence rather
than German violence against Jews. As expected,
when Germans and Jews were depicted as part of
an inclusive group (i.e., humans—a superordinate
category) as compared to two distinct social groups
(Germans vs. Jews), Jewish participants were more
willing to forgive Germans for the past atrocities.
In related research, Vollhardt (2009) argued that
people understand their group’s past victimization
by relating it to other groups’ experiences. When
the past victimization of the ingroup is perceived
as unique and distinct, victimized groups show an
increased tendency to seek revenge. However when
the ingroup’s experience is construed as similar to
the experiences of other groups, participants from
various victimized groups demonstrated a desire to
help other victim groups around the world, and were
more willing to engage in collective action on behalf
of other victims (see also Vollhardt, this volume).
The effectiveness of government apologies in pro-
moting intergroup reconciliation may thus depend,
in part, on the type of emotion (shame versus guilt)
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 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN
that apologies generate or assuage among mem-
bers of the perpetrator group, and how they lead
members of the victimized group to construe the
injustice. An analysis of the content of previous
government apologies would suggest that govern-
ments attempt to avoid eliciting either shame or
guilt in current members of the perpetrator group
(Schumann & Ross, 2010). Instead governments
often strive to engender pride among members of
both perpetrator and victim groups. Moreover, the
apologies seem to focus on the horror and unique-
ness of the injustice, rather than its universality. All
of the apologies, however, emphasize the innocence
of the victims and some point to the important con-
tributions of both members of the victimized group
and the perpetrator group to the greater society. In
doing so, government apologies may promote feel-
ings of belonging to a common group among mem-
bers of both the victimized and perpetrator groups
(e.g., Wohl & Branscombe, 2005). Although this
approach entails both strengths and limitations (see
Dovidio, Saguy, West, & Gaertner, this volume),
such feelings should enhance reconciliation and
lead group members to focus less on their tumultu-
ous history and more on their shared future.
Reconciling Groups Engaged in Recent
and Ongoing Conflicts: Transitional
Justice Measures
Reconciliation marks a transition from a violent
to a peaceful society by promoting peaceful coex-
istence between previous enemies. Because each
group blames the other for its own violent acts
(Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003), a change in each group’s
beliefs about past conflict and about each other is
important for long-term reconciliation (Bar-Tal,
2000; Nadler, this volume). Seeking a common
narrative about the past has become a core ele-
ment of reconciliation as it is viewed as necessary
for healing the wounds of the past (Gibson, 2004).
To achieve these goals, many countries undergoing
regime change have set up transitional justice mea-
sures (e.g., prosecution of perpetrators, compensa-
tion of victims, or truth-seeking mechanisms) to
address past wrongs (Hamber, this volume; Hayner,
2000). Numerous historical and truth commissions
have been established around the world to investi-
gate and document past transgressions and abuses
(Freeman & Hayner, 2003). An important goal of
these commissions is to provide a historical account
that reduces intergroup biases at different stages of
memory construction: fact creation, fact assembly,
and fact retrieval (see Trouillot, 1995). Rigorous data
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 131
collection through private interviews with witnesses
and victims, data analysis, documentation, and dis-
semination of the findings through public hearings
and reports help to achieve this goal (Freeman &
Hayner, 2003). This process is important as it docu-
ments the causes and patterns of violence, includ-
ing the role of individuals and institutions in the
violence (Dimitrijevic, 2006).
As with any other regime, the new system with
its focus on reconciliation needs historical accounts
that legitimize the new norms and relations between
groups. Truth commissions endorse a clear moral
attitude toward the past (Dimitrijevic, 2006). For
the new historical narrative to be successful, soci-
ety members should be convinced of its veracity
(Zerubavel, 1994). According to Gibson (2004),
South Africa’s Truth Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) was successful in achieving this goal.
Gibson’s (2004) research revealed that the truth
about apartheid promulgated by the TRC included
three central elements: (1) apartheid was a crime
against humanity, (2) both sides committed gross
offenses and human rights abuses, and (3) apartheid
was criminal because of the actions of both indi-
viduals and institutions (pp. 72–74). By revealing
the misdeeds that both sides committed, the TRC
had people question the morality of their side and
challenged the “good versus evil” view of the con-
flict (Gibson, 2004). However, the process of seek-
ing the truth about the past, particularly in contexts
of extreme forms of violence, might also have unin-
tended consequences (see Hamber, this volume).
Brouneus (2010) in a study of the effects of truth-
telling in the Gacaca trials (the traditional truth and
reconciliation commissions in Rwanda) found that
witnessing the Gacaca trials led to negative psycho-
logical outcomes such as increased depression and
PTSD symptoms.
Additionally, projects on teaching history
have been developed in various regions around
the world. For instance, the Joint History Project
(Koulouri, 2005) critically examines historical
texts in Southeast Europe, trains teachers to over-
come nationalistic depictions of history, and aims
to develop a joint history for the whole region.
In Israel, social psychologists have worked with
Palestinian and Israeli teachers to develop a joint his-
tory textbook, which depicts both groups’ historical
narratives (Adwan & Bar-On, 2004). These proj-
ects endorse two different approaches in address-
ing history. The first attempts to produce a shared
memory, whereas the latter aims to have each group
acknowledge the other’s narrative. Should groups in
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 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN
conflict work toward producing a shared memory,
or can they coexist peacefully while acknowledging
divergent memories? Such questions are difficult to
answer. Psychology can contribute to these debates
by assessing the impact of each approach on people’s
attitudes and behaviors.
Psychologists can also help design programs that
effectively address historical memories of conflict in
ways that lead to reconciliation, rather than perpet-
uation of cycles of violence. For instance, Shnabel
and Nadler (2008) suggest that harm-doers and
victims have different psychological concerns and
needs: Victims need to restore their lost power and
status, whereas perpetrators need to restore their
positive identity (see also Nadler, this volume).
Similarly, Pratto and Glasford (2008) identified
psychological needs relevant to ingroup harm-
doing and ingroup suffering. Addressing historical
memories in ways that meet the needs of the victim
and harm-doing groups might be an important step
toward reconciliation.
Future Directions
In this chapter, we outlined different ways in
which historical memory is biased by group goals and
motivation, including how past episodes are silenced,
glorified, or legitimized. We also demonstrated that
historical memories play multiple functions in inter-
group conflict: they serve to enhance group identity
and group cohesion; sometimes, historical memories
are activated purposively and used as legitimizing
myths to maintain or undermine a group’s position
in society; other times, historical memories give
meaning to current events, provide expectations for
the future, and motivate groups’ actions.
Great strides have been made in addressing the
role of historical memory in conflict, yet the condi-
tions and the processes that modulate these differ-
ent outcomes and different functions of historical
memories are not well understood. An overarch-
ing theoretical framework on the psychological
underpinnings of historical memory is lacking.
Particularly, the interaction between the societal
and individual-level processes in the construc-
tion of historical memories is not well understood.
Developing a framework that links processes and
concepts at different levels of analyses (individual,
group and societal), which could be used to make
predictions about the relationships among these
variables is important.
Investigations of the functions of historical
memories can serve as the basis for developing and
testing hypotheses about mechanisms that reduce
132 remembering intergroup conflict
08_Tropp_Chapter 08.indd 132
the negative impact of historical memory on indi-
viduals’ well-being and on intergroup relations. The
large number of interventions around the world that
address the past to promote peaceful coexistence
between groups evidence similar goals. However,
the theoretical and empirical support behind such
efforts is lacking, and proof of their success is largely
anecdotal (Barsalow, 2008; Mendeloff, 2004).
Research is needed to examine the impact of such
interventions on attitudes and behaviors. Because
these interventions attempt to produce psychologi-
cal and behavioral change, psychological theory and
methods are particularly relevant to addressing such
issues.
The potential contributions of psychology are
both methodological and theoretical. The major
strengths of the psychological approach include
experimental methods, a careful attention to the
measurement and statistical analysis of relevant
variables, as well as theories that can prove useful
in explaining the content, functions, and effects of
historical memories.
To study historical memory and reconciliation,
however, psychologists will need to go beyond tra-
ditional methods (e.g., laboratory experiments,
student samples) to incorporate less common meth-
odologies such as field experiments, qualitative
research, longitudinal research, and more represen-
tative samples in real-world conflicts (see Paluck,
this volume). The study of historical memories calls
for a historically and socially contextualized social
psychology (Pettigrew, 1991).
Conclusions
Philosopher George Santayana is probably best
known today for his aphorism “Those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” It
should now be clear that Santayana’s faith in the
lessons to be derived from the past is often unwar-
ranted. Santayana assumes a single, consensual
past. When conflicting groups disagree about his-
tory, they will draw divergent lessons from it. As a
consequence, a focus on history can exacerbate and
perpetuate ongoing, intergroup conflicts. In such
instances, one could argue that those who remem-
ber the past are doomed to repeat it. At the same
time, ignoring or silencing the past has proved to
be ineffective or even destructive. Also, a focus on
the past can sometimes promote reconciliation and
help groups avoid repetition of past mistakes as the
Santayana quote implies.
The question is not whether groups should
remember their pasts. Historical memories are
3/8/2012 5:45:54 PM
 OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRST-PROOF, 03/08/12, NEWGEN
inevitable, because they are vital to the psychol-
ogy and understanding of group members. More
important questions concern how should groups
remember and the types of remembering that could
potentially benefit intergroup relations.
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