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MARINA STARODUBSKA
Managing Partner, TLFRD Consultancy, Adjunct Professor, Kyiv-Mohyla Business
School

National culture – a roadmap

forward or an enternal trap:
what the world is dealing with
in this war with Russia
FRIDAY, 18 MARCH 2022, 20:45

5848

Numerous Western analysts have openly admitted

not having considered the ‘logic’ Russia was
following for years before its unprovoked and unjust
war against Ukraine. Moreover, the democratic world
still attempts to analyze Russia’s actions from the
cognitive and cultural paradigm which is radically
different from that of this country’s mentality. The
said two paradigms are as different as the world of
Alice from Lewis Carroll’s famous novel and the
‘through the looking glass’ world, in which she has
found herself one day.

Cross-cultural studies, underpinned by psychology

and sociology, provide a framework, parsimonious
enough to better understand the actions of Russian
rulers and people. Cross-cultural science studies the
mechanisms of interaction between national
Ми використовуємо cookies Погоджуюсь
cultures and institutions, which regulate behavior
and decision-making in respective countries.

Identical institutions will not only operate differently

in different countries, but will diverge in structure,
legitimacy, and level of influence.

Using Russia as an example, further in the article the

impact of national culture on the country’s
institutions will be analyzed, along with the
subsequent behavioral patterns.

Culture and institutions: chicken or

the egg?
Every country, and separate regions of it, possesses
peculiar values of national culture, which have been
forming for a long time under the influence of
geographical (landscape, climate, location), historical
(ruling regimes, wars), social (societal stratification
and interaction), and other factors. Researchers
postulate that the formation of such values begins in
the family to further be completed through regular
societal interactions and are passed from generation
to generation. For instance, cross-cultural studies
show that the level of collectivism[2] correlates with
the complexity of conditions, in which the country
has been developing. The more severe the
conditions, the more collectivist and mutually
dependent the society is and the higher the impact
of the group and the significance of belonging to the
group in it.

National culture manifests on the following three

levels:

(1) underlying assumptions (mental templates, which

the society replicates ‘by default’) – change during
~100 years;

(2) values and beliefs (key principles that ‘signal’ tow

to interact with one’s environment) – change during
~10 years;

(3) norms (societal expectations of desired and

undesired behavior) – change during ~2-3 years.

What’s important to understand is that national

culture changes only if the underlying assumptions
do. Temporary shifts in behavior or imitating other
beliefs and values (even under pressure) does not
cause deep changes in the national culture.

For instance, one of the underlying

assumptions of Russia’s culture is the mutual
distrust between the elites and the people,
bordering on hate. For this reason, Russia is
one of the most atomized (divided,
incongruent) societies in the world, where an
individual has no agency to exercise
systematic impact and does not believe in
their ability to have one. Basically, Russia is a
large geographic territory, populated by
people with too weak a connection between
them to unify them sufficiently for causing
anything resembling a mass movement of any
kind. In such conditions, among the key
beliefs and values in Russia are: pessimism /
passivity (‘what can I do?’), messianism
(‘people ‘upstairs’ know better what to do and
where to go), and aggression (‘coercing
instead of convincing’). Consequently, the
expected norms in Russian culture include
silent dissent, tolerance of inappropriate
behavior as highest manifestation of loyalty,
 and leaders’ expectation of blind faith and
obedience (instead of informed participation)
from followers. This is, certainly, not an
exhaustive list of underlying assumptions,
beliefs / values, and norms of Russian culture.

Given the longevity of the underlying assumptions,

research shows that it’s the national culture that
primarily shapes the country’s institutions, which
scholars define as ‘mechanisms through which
societal choice is defined and made, political
influence is distributed, and behavior regularity is
ensured’. Institutions can be formal (rules, laws, and
their enforcement mechanisms) and informal (self-
regulation, codes of ethics and conduct, conventions,
deeply embedded social norms). However, when the
institutions have developed and matured, they begin
‘steering’ national culture as the riverbed ‘steers’ the
river, thus, hindering rapid culture change. Therefore,
timely institutional evolution is critical for the
country to avoid getting ‘stuck in national culture
silo’ and to end up with the culture, irrelevant to the
current interactions in society and between
societies.

For instance, Russian government institutions

may appear as modernized on the surface, but
on a deeper level they are still gravitating
towards the soviet traditions of governance,
based on strict hierarchy, blind following of
orders from ‘upstairs’, and myth-making via
propaganda and re-writing of history. By the
way, Russia is the only authoritarian country
in the world that has had a short democracy-
 ish period, compared with the much longer
period of authoritarian rule. Even if,
hypothetically, Russia’s national institutions
were magically replaced with the modern
ones, with the ‘right’ people in them, until the
society’s underlying assumptions shift, these
institutions won’t be effective – the national
culture will reject them as an ‘alien’ object. For
this reason, even when consuming Western
content, goods, and services, Russians still
hold mentally ‘contrarian’ attitudes to the
‘despised West’.

Understanding Russia through

cross-cultural analysis
There is a range of flagship national culture analysis
and classification systems, among the most scholarly
and empirically valid of which are Hofstede, GLOBE,
Trompenaars, Lewis, Schwartz, Triandis, Hall. All
these systems use longitudinal studies, surveys, and
statistical analysis to determine the key ‘dimensions’
through which national cultures manifest in the key
societal processes. The level and the character of
these dimensions allows to understand why certain
decision-making and behavioral logic is peculiar to
some countries and not peculiar to the others. To
avoid the deep ‘dive’ into the cross-cultural domain,
further in the article the focus will be on the
dimensions that are mentioned in all systems of
classifying national cultures and serve as grounds
for cross-cultural analysis, regardless of the system
and its authors.

INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM. This dimension shows

the level of priority given in a society to interests of
a group as a ‘monolith’ or individuals in that group.
The more collectivist a society, the less encouraged
and acceptable is ‘going against the current’ or
expressing thoughts that contradict the majority’s
‘line of thinking’. Individual achievements in a
collectivist society are less significant than the group
ones and are not considered separately from those.
Interestingly, a large part of the developed
democracies is moderately or highly individualist:
USA, UK, Germany, France, Netherlands, Switzerland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, etc. While a soviet-time
phrase ‘Ya [Я] is the last letter of the alphabet’ is a
vivid illustration of collectivist thinking. Among the
most collectivist cultures in the worlds are
Mediterranean, Asian, Latin American, Arab, and Sub-
Saharan African.

Russia is a highly collectivist society, in which

belonging to a group that ‘legitimizes’ one as
a society member is critical. As well as the
‘approval’ of one’s behavior by the ‘right’ and
‘respected’ people. In collectivist cultures the
level of societal trust beyond family or friends’
circles is ultra-low. Consequently, the morals
in such cultures are not ‘generalized’: one is
encouraged to act responsibly and ethically in
individualist societies towards everyone, while
in collectivist ones – only towards one’s ‘in-
group. The ‘out-group’ people do not deserve
either fair treatment, or beneficial
cooperation, or truthful information, or, in
extreme cases – compassing and a right to
life.
INDEPENDENCE-INTERDEPENDENCE. In
independence-oriented cultures, individuals view
themselves as separate from the ‘societal whole’ and
social institutions encourage autonomy, self-
expression, and self-direction in decision-making,
life planning, and job search. Connections and
acquaintances as a means of attaining the desired
results in such cultures are viewed as corruption,
while voicing unpopular thoughts is encouraged.
Vivid examples of independence-oriented countries
are USA and UK, but overall independence
orientation is peculiar to the countries with working
democracies and institutions, allowing individuals to
use the system without the ‘lubricant’ of connections
and acquaintances. In interdependence cultures, on
the contrary, individuals view themselves as
integrated in the complex and interwoven systems of
societal connections and relations, without which
the institutional systems do not work effectively.
Consequently, without these ‘networks’, individuals
in such societies are unable to plan their lives and
obtain the desired results. Interdependence
orientation is highly pronounced in Mediterranean,
Latin American, Arab, Asia-Pacific, and South-East
Asian countries. There, one maintains critically
important relationships which serve as ‘proxy’ to use
the institutional systems that are frequently
dysfunctional if used directly. Naturally, in such
cultures one does not express ‘radical’ thoughts and
‘sits out’ the difficult times until the stability of the
‘lubricating’ networks is re-established.

Russia is an interdependence-focused society

– among historical reasons, due to the
ineffectiveness of most its institutions that
 haven’t much evolved (on the level of
underlying assumptions) since the soviet
times. Since childhood, an average Russian is
embedded in myriads of connections and
acquaintances which not only provide for
getting into the ‘right’ school / company /
influential group but serve as ‘insurance’ when
the need arises for ‘help’ or ‘a word of
protection’ in a difficult situation. Naturally,
Russians are incapable of creating mass
movements of any kind, since that would ruin
their systems of life-supporting connections,
without which they would be facing the
ineffective bureaucracies of their country’s
institutions. They can complain, run away, ‘sit
out’ the difficult times, complain, tolerate,
rather than unite against anything that
threatens them in any way.

ANALYTICAL-HOLISTIC THINKING. The type of thinking

in a national culture defines the perception of visual
content, as well attention breadth and focus of
people in it. Historically and due to the specifics of
institutional formation, analytical thinking has
become predominant in Western Europe, North
America, and Scandinavia, focused on the object, not
the context. For instance, when a President of a
country at war is speaking, the analytically oriented
cultures analyze his / her words, facts and figures,
compare what they know to what’s being said, and
address the experts on matters beyond their
expertise. In the rest of the world, holistic thinking is
predominant – with focus on the context, not the
object. In the same example with the speaking
President, such cultures will be focused on the
‘hidden motives’ for speaking, previous actions and
decisions, perception of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’
actors in this situation, and the embedded relations
preceding the speech. Words alone for such cultures
carry little meaning and without the ‘right context’
do not evoke trust.

Russia is a holistic thinking culture. Everything

that’s said by Ukrainians or representatives of
other countries involved in today’s situation,
Russian rulers and people do not perceive
through the lens of logic, facts, and figures.
Their perception is guided by the
considerations of ‘in-group’ or ‘out-group’,
‘respects / does not respect us’, ‘friend or
enemy’, ‘cultured or primitive’. The
combination of interdependence orientation
with holistic thinking in Russian mentality
produces the ‘allowance’ to not honor
commitments, not disclose full and factual
information, not fulfil obligations, and
encroach on the territory and even life of
those who are considered ‘out-group’,
‘enemies’, ‘not friendly’, ‘not worth existing’.

VERTICAL-HORIZONTAL ORIENTATION. This dimension

measures how strongly national cultures gravitate
towards status, influence, and dominance (vertical
orientation) or to more egalitarian, dialog-based
interaction (horizontal orientation). It also includes
the level of tolerance towards some groups or
individuals possessing exponentially more power
than others in a society (power distance). Strongly
horizontally-oriented cultures are concentrated in
Scandinavia and Western Europe, moderately
horizontally oriented – in USA and UK. The rest of the
world is comprised of moderately or highly vertically
oriented cultures, with Asian region (including
Central and South-East Asia) leading in the world by
this dimension. When combined with individualism
or collectivism, the type of orientation in a culture
steers the society either towards achievement
(important to work better than others, doing good
work, relying on oneself) or towards upholding
decisions made by the referent group (important to
not doubt and fulfill the decisions of the group I
trust, rely on people relations with whom are
important to me).

Russia is a vertically oriented culture with

power distance indicators among the highest
int the world. The modern Russians are not
bothered by the decades of dictatorship,
under which they’ve been living because they
‘traded’ freedom for the desired level of
comfort. Combined with collectivism and
interdependence orientation, vertical
orientation in this country leads to the
‘automatic’ silent perception of diminishing
personal freedoms and atrocities that are ‘too
far away’, ‘somewhere over there’. It goes
without saying that only silent approval /
condoning of the dictatorial regime gives
access to the ‘useful’ connections allowing to
resolve important life problems and to get
ahead in society. Another effect of such
combination is the maniac obsession of those
in power with ‘saving face’ and the illusion of
‘victorious victory’ at any cost.
TIGHTNESS-LOOSNESS OF SOCIAL NORMS. Social
norms ‘signal’ the individuals in a society how
acceptable or unacceptable certain daily behaviors
are. Is it appropriate to smile to strangers (yes – in
the USA, no – in Ukraine)? Should one apologize
before causing others discomfort (yes – in Japan, no
– in Germany)? If social norms are clearly (often –
formally) defined, and the same behaviors across the
country are considered deviant and unacceptable,
it’s a culture with ‘tight’ norms. Among the world’s
‘tight’ cultures are China, Germany, France, Mexico,
India, Japan, Singapore. If social norms in a country
are flexible, informal, and may differ in various
regions, it’s a country with ‘loose’ social norms.
Among the world’s ‘loose’ cultures are Hungary,
Brazil, Australia, Belgium, Israel, New Zealand, USA.

Russia – is a country with ‘loose’ social norms.

Because of Russia’s size and the gaping
cultural diversity, there simply cannot be
similar social norms to unite them all.
Consequently, the behavior frowned upon in
one region or federal district will be perfectly
acceptable in the other. Combined with
collectivism, vertical and interdependence
orientations, and holistic thinking, the
‘looseness’ of social norms in Russia allows its
rulers to find large enough groups of
population to support any decisions they
make. And on the ‘sample’ of 140 million
people, these ‘support groups’ of the country’s
atrocious actions can be quantitatively large.

HIGH-LOW UNCERTAINTY AVOIDANCE. Ability and

preparedness to tolerate future uncertainty and
unpredictable change determines the society’s
gravitation towards perceptions of control and
ability to effectively function in fluid conditions.
Interestingly, the countries united by other cultural
dimensions frequently score differently on
uncertainty avoidance. Particularly, in Western
democracies high uncertainty avoidance is peculiar
to France, Spain, and Italy (among others), and low –
to USA, Canada, and UK (among others). Uncertainty
avoidance in Asia, South Korea and Japan is high,
while in Hong Kong, Singapore, and China it’s low.

Russia is among the world’s leaders in high

uncertainty avoidance, which means low
ability to function in rapidly changing
conditions, further slowed down due to the
interdependence, power distance, and vertical
orientation. At the same time, on the level of
top decision-makers, risk aversion is low (due
to the systemically embedded lack of
accountability), so doing something ‘for the
heck of it’ or without logical calculations is
the norm. The desire to control the future in
Russia is ultra-high, while combined with the
low trust to ‘out-groups’ and ‘enemies’ often
makes dialogue based on logic and
argumentation – impossible.

HIGH-LOW LONG-TERM ORIENTATION. This dimension

shows how important it is in a culture to: ‘deal’ with
the past to move on to the future; focus on the long-
term goals; be able to adapt one’s views and
traditions as demanded. This dimension also
measures to what degree truth / non-truth and good
/ evil are fixed or situational in a culture. The higher
the long-term orientation, the more situationally a
culture approaches ethics and traditions, the more
dependent the truth is on it being ‘beneficial’, the
‘greyer’ the divide between good and evil is –
especially when a ‘greater goal’ is considered. The
lower the uncertainty avoidance, the more important
traditions and societal obligations’ longevity is, the
clearer the divide between what’s appropriate and
inappropriate, the clearer the distinction between
truth and non-truth. However, this dimension alone
is not parsimonious – what’s important is its
combination with other cultural dimensions:
individualism / collectivism, vertical / horizontal
orientation, independence / interdependence
orientation, tightness / looseness of social norms,
and institutional effectiveness (especially formal).
Other cultural dimensions ‘balance out’ long-term
orientation when it’s high and ‘strengthen’ it when
it’s low. Among the developed democracies, the
lowest long-term orientation is demonstrated by
USA, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Poland,
Denmark, Norway, Finland, Israel. Democracies with
high long-term orientation include Switzerland,
Germany, UK, Netherlands, France, Latvia, Estonia,
Japan, South Korea.

Russia has among the highest indicators of

long-term orientation in the world, which,
combined with collectivism, interdependence,
holistic thinking, vertical orientation, and
loose social norms, produces an ‘explosive
mix’ of legitimized substitution of truth with
myths, re-writing of history with no
retribution, justified failing to uphold any
 agreements considered non-beneficial at the
moment, and condoning atrocities or
inappropriate behaviors if they are committed
for ‘greater good’ or ‘higher purpose’.

Conclusions and practical

implications
‘Dimensions’ of national culture shape and define
the institutional landscape of a country, which then
regulates and encourages specific patterns of
behavior, peculiar to this country’s society.
Therefore, cross-cultural profiling of the key
geopolitical players is no longer an academic
exercise, but a practical necessity. Thus, the
fundamental change in approach to dealing with
Russia on the level of international relations,
geopolitical and security considerations, has been
long overdue. Especially critical such change is
considering the ongoing unprovoked and unjust war
Russia has launched against Ukraine. Cross-cultural
analysis shows that Russia is incapable and has no
intention to function as a democracy of Western
format. Moreover, Russia considers Ukraine, which
has proved with its citizens’ lives the adherence to
the democratic vector, a country ‘not worth existing’.
Therefore, Ukraine’s victory in this war is critical,
without exaggeration, to all democratic world. And
the more pragmatically Ukraine speaks about the
threats of the Russian aggression to the rest of the
world, the more systemic and actionable global
resistance will be to this system of destruction,
which Russia is trying to impose on the democratic
world.

Marina Starodubska, Managing Partner, TLFRD

Consultancy, Adjunct Professor, Kyiv-Mohyla Business
School.

Ukrainian Pension Alleviate people’s Help from the United

System at the suffering and bring States. The COVAX
Crossroads this crisis to an end vaccine is already in
Ukraine
SERGIY HELGA
SAVCHUK MARIA
KRISTINA
National SCHMID
KVIEN
Coordinator OSCE
Chargé
of Secretary
d'Affaires,
International General
a.i., U.S.
Labour
Embassy
Organization
Kyiv
in Ukraine

US diplomat: Russian Undermining the

 US diplomat: Russian Undermining the
proxies and oligarchs fight against
block Ukraine's corruption is no way
European integration to improve human
rights for Ukrainians
KRISTINA
KVIEN
Chargé
d'Affaires,
a.i., U.S.
Embassy
Kyiv

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