Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11276-020-02292-5 (0123456789().,-volV)(0123456789().
,- volV)

Inter-slice handover management in a V2X slicing environment using

bargaining games
Nadia Mouawad1,2 • Rola Naja1,2 • Samir Tohme2

Published online: 16 March 2020

 Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2020

Abstract
This paper provides a V2X slicing logical architecture based on Software Defined Networking. We devote a special
concern to inter-slice mobility management. In this context, we propose a complete mobility solution that handles
resources management through the use of bargaining games enhanced by a heuristic and particular swarm optimization
algorithm. More specifically, this work proposes a resource borrowing scheme to readjust resources of an overloaded slice
in case of a inter-slice handover. The borrowing procedure is modeled via two bargaining games. Performance analysis
shows that our proposed solution guarantees fairness between V2X slices, reduces the probability of call dropping and
blocking probabilities and enhances resource utilization. Moreover, a comparative study between the proposed games is
provided and analyzed.

Keywords Network slicing  Vehicle to everything  Mobility management  Inter-slice handover  Bargaining game 
Resource borrowing

1 Introduction Network slicing [4] is recognized by the research com-

5G networks are conceived to provide increased perfor-
mance in terms of throughput, latency, reliability, and
mobility while meeting various user quality of service
(QoS) requirements for a rich portfolio of applications.
One of the most important key drivers of 5G networks is
the automotive vertical that entails the Vehicle-to-Every-
thing (V2X) communication [1–3] category. V2X umbrella
covers a multiplicity of use cases, characterized by diverse
service requirements. Thus, 5G architecture should be
enhanced in order to meet the highly demanding V2X
requirements.
& Nadia Mouawad
mouawad.nadia@gmail.com
Rola Naja
rola.naja@ul.edu.lb
Samir Tohme
samir.tohme@uvsq.fr
1
Doctoral School of Science and Technology, Lebanese
University, Beirut, Lebanon
2
Li-Parad Laboratory, University of Versailles Saint Quentin,
Versailles, France
munity as a prominent solution to fulfill the challenging
V2X requirements. In fact, network slicing is defined as a
concept of running multiple logical end-to-end networks as
independent and isolated networks on a common physical
infrastructure. This concept requires a high degree of
flexibility and programmability that can be provided by the
emerging Software Defined Networking (SDN) [5] to
achieve better resource utilization and cost efficiency.
In this 5G V2X slicing environment, the high mobility
of vehicles causes the need to frequently change the Point
of Attachment (PoA); this issue triggers a slice handover.
The latter refers to a process where a user served by a
current slice, should connect, due to mobility, to a target
slice. We consider noteworthy to differentiate between two
different types of slice handover: intra/inter slice handover.
The former occurs when the user changes its PoA to a
target PoA in the same operator domain, thus the vehicle
remains connected to the same slice. While the latter refers
to the handover occurrence within a different operator
domain raising the need to connect to a new network slice.
In this case, the target slice needs to perform an admission
control in order to decide about the acceptance of the
incoming handover request.

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Admission control consists of checking the availability
of resources in the Radio Access Network (RAN). More
specifically, in case there are no resources to accept a
handover request in a slice, an efficient resource manage-
ment should be achieved between slices before the han-
dover occurrence. Admission control becomes very critical
in a V2X environment. In fact, dropping handover requests
should be avoided since exchanged data carry urgent road
safety messages. Thus, an efficient admission control with
a resource management scheme should be carefully
studied.
The main concern of this work is to study the inter-slice
handover management by deriving an admission control
with an efficient resource management scheme. More
precisely, we focus on the case of inter-slice handover
while the target slice is overloaded. A resource borrowing
from other available slices is performed in this case, in
order to be able to accept the handover request. The
problem is modeled using two different bargaining games.
Moreover, a simulation is conducted in order to validate
the resource borrowing scheme. A comparative analysis is
provided in order to understand each proposed game
characteristics and draw pertinent conclusions on the
advantages of each proposed game.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2, we
overview literature works related to our problem and shed
the light on our contributions. Section 3 presents 5G ref-
erence slices and introduces V2X slices. We present the
adopted 5G slicing architecture in Sect. 4 and dedicate
Sects. 5 and 6 to give a detailed explanation about our
solution. Section 7 is conceived to evaluate our proposed
algorithms. Finally, we conclude our paper in Sect. 8.
2 Related works
As mentioned earlier, resource management can help
improving the call admission procedure. Network slicing is
envisioned by two different models concerning the
resource management: dedicated resources model and
shared resources model. In the former, each slice is
assigned a fixed amount of resources isolated from other
slices. This can ensure isolation among slices and guar-
antee a committed amount of resources to each slice.
However, it reduces the slice elasticity and can limit
multiplexing gain. The second approach (shared resources
model) allows the slice to share its physical resources. This
approach exploits statistical multiplexing. Despite that,
sharing resources will raise outstanding challenges in terms
of QoS guarantee, fairness among slices and mobility
support. In this context, many researchers focus on finding
a wise resource management scheme for network slices.
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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
In [6], authors formulate a new network model for
providing 5G network slices computational and storage
resources in order to guarantee QoS requirements. The
slicing mechanism is based on an auction model designed
to maximize network resources.
Authors of [7] introduce a resource management
framework that aims at provisioning and auto-scaling slices
in real time. This scheme uses a utility function subject to
network bandwidth and cloud processing capabilities.
In [8], authors implement static and dynamic resource
management schemes for different slices supporting vari-
ous services. The proposed algorithm considers the fluc-
tuations in network traffic load conditions in different
network slices. It dynamically shares available radio
resources based on a pre-defined sharing agreement.
A solution named Resources nEgotiation for NEtwork
Virtualization (RENEV) is proposed in [9]. The algorithm
aims at achieving an efficient mapping of radio virtual
network elements onto the radio resources of the existing
physical network.
In [10], authors introduce two schemes to allocate LTE
resources to Machine-to-Machine emergency deployments
in an adaptive manner. These schemes ensure that the
resource allocation responds to the changing needs of the
underlying emergency application.
In [11] authors propose a dynamic bandwidth slicing
and resource allocation problems to support a mixture of
IoT (Internet of Things) and video streaming services. This
is achieved by employing Lyapunov optimization method
with time-scale separation approach. Authors formulate
algorithms for long time-scale bandwidth slicing, and short
time-scale IoT device scheduling, power allocation (for IoT
service) and quality decision (for video streaming service).
In [12], a Network Slicing Resource Management
(NSRM) mechanism is proposed. NSRM aims to ensure the
isolation of allocated resources, fair resource sharing and
customized slice configuration. Authors propose a novel
architecture framework for virtualizing the LTE network in
order to maximize network resources utilization.
The work in [13] provides an analysis of a well-known
model for resource sharing, the ’share-constrained pro-
portional allocation’ mechanism, to realize network slicing.
This mechanism enables tenants to reap the performance
benefits of sharing, while retaining the ability to customize
their own users allocation. This results in a network slicing
game in which each tenant reacts to the user allocations of
the other tenants so as to maximize its own utility.
Authors of [14] propose Hap-SliceR: a novel radio
resource slicing framework for 5G networks with haptic
communications. An optimal slicing strategy, based on a
reinforcement learning approach is proposed. It consists of
allocating radio resources to different slices while taking
into account the dynamics and utility requirements of
Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
different slices. Second, Hap-SliceR provides customiza-
tion of radio resources for haptic communications over 5G
networks.
In [15], a resource reservation and allocation (RRA)
with uncertain demands of mobile users is formulated as a
robust optimization model. Logarithmic utility functions
are defined to capture the mobile users satisfaction, which
show how to match the allocations between radio resources
and virtual machine resources according to the resource
demands of the mobile applications.
In classical wireless networks, several research works
have tackled resource management and channel reservation
strategies while taking into account mobility constraints.
The latter are designed by either reserving a fixed number
of channels or managing the reservations dynamically. The
fixed reservation schemes ([16, 17]) are very simple with
no computation overhead. Nevertheless, these schemes are
not flexible to cope with load fluctuation and induce an
inefficient use of network resources.
Dynamic reservation schemes are proposed to overcome
the disadvantages of the fixed reservation schemes. In [18],
the number of reserved channels is related to the requested
bandwidth of the ongoing connection. Each base station
monitors the handover call dropping probability and
channel utilization to adapt the channel reservation.
In [19], channel reservation is adjusted according to a
prediction method that aims at provisioning handover
probability based on handover occurrences history.
Authors in [20] present an adaptive QoS (AQoS) algo-
rithm that consists of reducing QoS levels of traffic calls, in
order to accept handover calls requests.
In [21], a flexible resource-allocation (FRA) strategy is
designed. It consists of prioritizing QoS of particular ser-
vice types over the others. FRA aims at releasing band-
width from the low priority calls based on a prioritized call
degradation policy to accept higher priority call requests.
Authors of [22] design an algorithm to reserve resources
with neighbor cells by exchanging information related to
movement and direction of users.
In [23], channel borrowing is proposed by dividing
traffic into two classes: real time traffic and non-real time
traffic. The scheme attempts to allocate desired bandwidth
to every connection, and considers that in case of insuffi-
cient bandwidth, resources will be borrowed from existing
connection.
In [24], authors investigate the offloading policy in
heterogeneous wireless networks. In this paper, a queue
model is built to formulate the mobile users workload
offloading problem and Lyapunov optimization framework
is proposed to make trade-off between system offloading
utility and queue backlog.
In [25], authors propose a scheme that dynamically
allocates guard channels for handover requests and
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introduces the concept of channel borrowing strategy. The
proposed scheme allocates the guard channels for handoff
requests dynamically, based on the traffic load for certain
time period. Moreover, a new originating call can use these
guard channels if they are unused. More precisely, when a
new originating call arises and if all the available channels
are occupied it will check for the guard channels. If the
latter are unused, the new call will occupy a guard channel.
In this approach, the number of allocated guard channels
is determined through optimizing certain performance
goals with service quality constraints. When a base station
experiences high handover call dropping rate, the number
of guard channels will be increased until this rate drops to
below a predefined threshold. When a base station does not
get to use a significant portion of the guard channels over a
period of time, the number of guard channels is gradually
decreased until most of the guard channels are used fre-
quently. We note that in this scheme, requests are buffered
over a certain duration in order to check if available
resources are released.
Several resource management works proposed in liter-
ature are based on bargaining games. In [26], a novel
bargaining approach for dynamic spectrum management
(DSM) based on alternating-offer bargaining games is
proposed. The scheme introduces a trading agent (TA), a
changing bargaining ability and a revenue-sharing mecha-
nism to facilitate the spectrum trading.
The authors in [27] introduce a dynamic bargaining
game for radio resource sharing among the primary users
(the licensed mobile operators) and the secondary users
(Mobile virtual operators). The study also suggests that the
secondary users relay the primary users’ traffic. This model
allows both licensed and virtual mobile operators to offer
higher data rates to their end-users.
Authors of [28] model datacenter bandwidth allocation
as a cooperative bargaining game, with two main objec-
tives: 1) guarantee bandwidth for virtual machines based
on their bandwidth requirements, and 2) share residual
bandwidth in proportion to the weights of virtual machines.
The before mentioned works can be discussed as
follows:
• For the resource management works in slicing envi-
ronment, the dynamic aspect of these schemes relies on
load fluctuation and bandwidth availability only. In
these research papers, a slight effort is devoted to
mobility which is a challenging concern for V2X slicing
environment. In fact, in a vehicular architecture, users
mobility requires a reduced handover call dropping
probability. This is achieved by an efficient resource
management scheme.
• The resource management schemes in wireless net-
works cannot be applied in a slicing environment. In
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fact, network slicing consists of isolating the resources
of a physical base station, aiming at guaranteeing high
degree of QoS for each slice. Thus, the concept of
reserving bandwidth from ongoing connections or
reducing QoS of lower priority connections is contra-
dictory to the slicing concept.
Moreover, in a vehicular environment, bandwidth
reduction may not be always efficient. In fact, ongoing
sessions may be related to safety and remote controlling
vehicles. Thus, non of the latter services can handle a
QoS reduction in order to accept more requests.
• Bargaining games based approach are used to achieve
fairness among users. However, all the mentioned
approaches, based on bargaining games for resource
management, do not consider mobility constraints.
Table 1 compares the various resource management
schemes proposed in literature.
Motivated by the before mentioned issues, we orient our
efforts to derive an admission control with a resource
management scheme dedicated to a V2X slicing architec-
ture. Unlike the aforementioned papers, our work aims at
considering mobility of users in V2X slicing environment.
The novelty of our proposed scheme is based on a resource
management scheme that can guarantee the best QoS of
V2X messages (specially tele-operated driving messages),
while reducing the handover call dropping probability.
More precisely, if a handover request cannot be accepted in
a slice due to the lack of resources, a resource borrowing
from other available slices is performed in order to guar-
antee the acceptance of the handover request. The bor-
rowing mechanism should respect several constraints such
as QoS of lender slices, and should guarantee fairness
among these slices. Our contributions are listed as follows:
Table 1 Resource management schemes comparison
Paper Environment Mobility Resource
consideration management
[6–15] Slicing 7 Dynamic
[16, 17] No Slicing 4 Static
Classical wireless
networks
[18–25] No Slicing 4 Dynamic
Classical wireless
networks
[26–28] Based on bargaining 7 Dynamic
games
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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
• We provide a V2X slicing logical architecture that
details the different components involved in 5G vehic-
ular networks.
• We propose a complete mobility solution in a V2X
network slicing environment.
• We shed the light on inter-slice handover management
solution. More specifically, we present a resource
borrowing scheme based on bargaining game.
• We distinguish between two different formulation of
bargaining games in order to resolve the problem of
overloaded slices. Moreover, in an attempt to reduce the
complexity of games solutions, we propose a heuristic
and apply particle swarm optimization.
• We validate our platform by studying the following
performance parameters: handover dropping probabil-
ity, new call blocking probability and resource utiliza-
tion; the studied scenario tackles a tele-operated driving
use case where vehicles are communicating to a
monitoring center.
3 Network slices types
3.1 5G reference slices
The Fifth Generation Public Private Partnership (5G-PPP)
[29] defines three reference slices: enhanced Mobile
BroadBand slice, massive Machine-type Communications
slice, and Ultra-Reliable and Ultra-Low Latency
Comments
Resource allocation based on load factor and user
requirements
Simple, with no computation complexity
Cannot cope with load fluctuation
Mobility consideration, with a priority to handover calls
QoS reduction of ongoing sessions.
Fairness among users
No mobility consideration
Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
Fig. 1 5G references slices
Communications slice. These slices are described as fol-
lows (Fig. 1):
• Enhanced mobile broadBand (eMBB) slice requires
very high data rates to fulfill requirements of multime-
dia content, like ultra-high definition video streaming.
• Massive machine-type communications (mMTC) slice
This slice should sustain the massive traffic load of
connected devices, transmitting non-delay sensitive
information, e.g., sensor networks deployed in smart
cities.
• Ultra-low latency communications (URLLC) slice this
slice should provide services that are extremely sensi-
tive to latency, such as autonomous driving, tactile
internet and augmented reality. It requires reliability,
low latency, and security.
3.2 V2X slices
The variety of V2X services do not allow a straightforward
mapping into the aforementioned reference slices. In fact,
safety applications, autonomous driving, and vehicular
remote controlling should be simultaneously supported.
Each type of these services present different requirements
in terms of QoS and mobility support. This raises the need
to design network slices dedicated for each V2X use case.
V2X network slices are proposed and elaborated in
papers [30–33]. Authors in [32] shed the light on the
benefits of using network slicing in V2X to increase the
possibility of creating smart and secure traffic. In [33], a
network slicing based communication model for vehicular
networks is proposed. Authors have modeled a multi-lane
highway scenario with vehicles having heterogeneous
traffic requirements. Messages are sent through two logical
slices created on a common infrastructure: autonomous
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driving slice (exchanges safety messages) and infotainment
slice (provides video stream). Authors in [30] present four
sets of V2X slices according to the variety of V2X use
cases. These slices, listed as follows (Fig. 2), are used in
our work:
• Autonomous driving slice This slice is concerned with
two types of communication. First it supports ultra low-
latency V2V communication. Second, low-latency and
reliable video/data exchange needs to be supported with
a V2X Application Servers (AS) deployed at the
network edge.
• Tele-operated driving slice This slice should ensure
ultra-low latency and highly reliable end-to-end con-
nectivity between the controlled vehicle and a tele-
operation station which is hosted outside the Core
Network (CN).
• Vehicular infotainment slice This slice should guarantee
the high throughput infotainment data and services
exchanged with an infotainment V2X AS.
• Vehicle remote diagnostics and management slice This
slice is configured to support the exchange of low-
frequency data between many vehicles and remote V2X
AS outside the CN.
4 V2X slicing architecture
Inspired by the slicing concept proposed in 5G NORMA
[4] project and ETSI logical architecture [34], we propose
the following slicing architecture depicted in Fig. 3 . The
latter consists of three planes: the infrastructure plane, the
control plane and the service plane. In addition, we add
orchestration capabilities for NFV MANagement and
Orchestration (MANO) on the top of this architecture.
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3888 Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903

Fig. 2 V2X slices

4.1 The infrastructure plane

The infrastructure plane consists of all physical network

infrastructure spanning from the RAN to CN. It encom-
passes the following elements: RAN nodes and devices,
transport network and storage and computing nodes.

4.2 The control plane

The control plane encapsulates the logical network

Fig. 3 Network slicing logical architecture
More specifically, our adopted architecture planes are
detailed as follows:
behaviors that control a slice.
The control plane consists of two main SDN based
control entities: Dedicated SDN Controller (D-SDNC) and
Shared SDN Controller (S-SDNC). On top of the S-SDNC
reside some shared network functions among all available
slices. These functions, implemented as SDN applications,
are listed as follows: load balancing between slices, inter-
slice mobility management and slice selection. Moreover,
each slice presents some dedicated functions implemented
as applications over the D-SDNC. These functions are the
following: intra-slice mobility management including
admission control, authentication and security.

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4.3 The service plane
The service plane includes services and use cases of each
vertical market for which slices are designed.
4.4 The management and orchestration (MANO)
plane
The MANO plane is responsible of the slice description,
instantiation and life-cycle management. The MANO plane
consists mainly of an SDN controller named Software
Defined Orchestrator (SDO). The latter enables the bro-
kering of resources among multiple slices of the same
operator. Moreover, SDO exchanges information with peer
entities of other mobile network operators to enable
seamless inter-slice handover among operators.
4.5 Interfaces
The interfaces between the architecture elements (Fig. 4)
are listed bellow:
– Interface 1 This interface allows the interaction
between orchestration plane of different operators.
– Interface 2 It guarantees the communication between
the SDO and S-SDNC/D-SDNC. More specifically,
S-SDNC can report computational resources needs to
Fig. 4 Inter-Slice handover management architecture
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the SDO via Interface 2. At the same time, SDO can
configure these resources via this interface.
– Interface 3 This interface ensures the exchange between
S-SDNC and D-SDNC. This exchange is related to
attachment, or mobility issues.
– Interface 4 It provides interaction between S-SDNC/D-
SDNC and forwarding elements in order to achieve
path configuration and radio resources management.
4.6 Physical architecture
This paper considers geographical areas owned by different
operators (Fig. 4). Each operator deploys two technologies,
namely IEEE 802.11p [35], LTE-V [36]. Moreover, oper-
ator PoAs are connected to the available slices; each slice
is controlled by a D-SDNC. It is noteworthy that all slices
in one operator domain are under the control of a S-SDNC.
5 Mobility management in V2X slicing
environment
The following section is dedicated to present our proposed
mobility management solution.
A vehicle is initially connected to the current slice. The
vehicle is supposed to send its destination to a V2X
Location Server (LS), such as a GPS navigator, in order to
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download the route from its current location to its desti-
nation. When a signal degradation is detected, the vehicle
sends a Signal Going Down Message to the D-SDNC. LS
periodically forwards the calculated route information to
the D-SDNC that can predict if intra/inter slice is
imminent.
According to the prediction results, the mobility man-
agement proceeds as follows (Fig. 5):
1. When an intra-slice handover is imminent, a network
selection procedure is performed within the same slice.
The selection of the target PoA is based on QoS
metrics and the estimated load of available networks.
The handover to the selected PoA is achieved as
follows: after the choice of the target PoA, the vehicle
Fig. 5 Inter-slice handover management procedure
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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
will be connected to the previous and target slice
simultaneously (the vehicle is considered with two
interfaces). A make before break handover is achieved
in this case, by adjusting network settings before the
disconnection from the previous PoA. Packets dupli-
cation is used to guarantee a seamless handover. This
procedure is elaborated in our previous work in [37].
2. Whenever inter-slice handover is about to happen,
D-SDNC sends a request to the S-SDNC via Interface 3
which transfers the request to the MANO plane SDO
via Interface 2. A communication between operators
SDO is performed via Interface 1. In this case several
scenarios should be considered:
Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
• Whenever the target operator possesses the same
slice type than the current slice, the D-SDNC of this
slice performs admission control in order to check
the resources availability:
– In case of the estimated load is sufficient, the
target slice D-SDNC prepares and config-
ures path to the handover request in the new
slice. Path configuration and handover execu-
tion is achieved according to our work in [37].
– In case of congestion in the target slice, the
S-SDNC of the target operator executes a
resource borrowing procedure. This is achieved
with the help of target operator SDO that is
responsible of resources brokering among
slices. The resource borrowing algorithm will
be detailed in the next section.
• If the target operator does not have the same slice
type, a slice selection should be achieved in order to
choose the most adequate slice that can guarantee
QoS requirements of the imminent handover
request. This idea is studied in [38].
It is noteworthy that we are interested in solving the inter-
slice handover between operators since we are working in a
vehicular environment. In fact, vehicular networks will be
deployed and operated by Mobile Virtual Network Oper-
ators (MVNO) which are deployed in specific geographical
regions. In this case, the inter-operator handover occurs
frequently.
Moreover, we note that the resource borrowing
scheme presented in this paper could serve to solve the
intra-operator resource management. More precisely, when
a slice is overloaded, it can borrow resources from other
available slices of the same operator.
The main focus of this paper relies on the inter-slice
handover management, where the target slice is overloaded
and a resource borrowing should be achieved from other
slices.
The resource borrowing scheme is based on bargaining
games. The main goal is to reduce the probability of han-
dover failure in the overloaded slice, while respecting the
following constraints. First, the QoS of the handover ses-
sion should be guaranteed. Second, the load constraint of
lender slices should not be violated. Third, the amount of
offered resources among slices should be fair. Finally, the
handover failure should not increase in lender slices. These
constraints present conflicting interests. Thus, in an attempt
to achieve the best performance, a compromise should be
considered. To this end, we formulate two different for-
mulation of bargaining games. The main purpose is to give
operators several deployments choices according to their
needs. The first game (Game I) has as main objective to
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guarantee all the amount of resources required for the
handover request in the overloaded slice. This game is
mainly concerned in the first and second constraints related
to QoS of the handover request and slices load. The second
game (Game II) proposes a compromise between the
required resources for the imminent handover request and
the available resources of the lender slices. Thus, it slightly
reduces QoS of handover sessions. This game combines the
first, second and fourth constraints. Concerning the third
constraint related to fairness, we will show that Nash
Bargaining Solution (NBS), used as game solution, can
achieve fairness among slices. Our main purpose is to study
the performance of each formulation in order to draw
important conclusions concerning the best resource bor-
rowing strategy to be deployed.
After a performance study and a comparative analysis of
the proposed games, we will provide a discussion in order
to draw conclusion about the advantages and disadvantages
of this game.
6 Resource borrowing between slices using
bargaining game
6.1 Game theory
Game theory [39] is a theoretical framework that models
the interaction between entities with conflicting interests.
This model follows an action plan designed by each entity
aiming at achieving satisfactory gain from the situation.
Games are classified into cooperative and non-cooperative.
In cooperative games, the focus is on the global outcome
resulting from the coalitions between players. In non-co-
operative games, players are considered individually and
all possible actions are modeled.
A game in strategic-form (or normal-form) is charac-
terized by three elements:
• The set of players f1; . . .; K g.
• The space of pure strategies Sk ¼ fs1 ; s2 ; . . .; sK g for
each player k 2 f1; . . .; K g.
• Utility functions for each player k and each profile of
strategies: Rk ðs1 ; . . .; sK Þ.
With cooperative games, the main interest is to fairly dis-
tribute the outcome to each player according to their con-
tributions to make joint agreements. Therefore the
cooperative game model is attracting network resource
management problems. One type of cooperative games is
the bargaining problem defined as follows.
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6.2 Bargaining games for resource borrowing
Our proposed scheme is based on resource borrowing
between slices in order to guarantee the acceptance of a
handover call while taking into account QoS constraints. In
this context, due to the selfishness [40] of lender slices and
the scarcity of spectrum resources, the problem of realizing
fair and effective resources borrowing has become of a
primordial importance. In fact, the rational behavior of
slices will make them offer a small amount of resources,
making other slices offer a higher amount. This may
damage the overall benefit of the system. Therefore, rele-
vant constraints need to be established among the slices to
enable them to cooperate with each other and to improve
the overall efficiency of the system as much as possible.
In daily life basis, people can negotiate about goods or
transactions in order to achieve their satisfaction. Similarly,
in a resource borrowing problem, network slices can
negotiate about their offered resources in a way to achieve
a common agreement and maximize their gains. This idea
motivates us to model our problem using bargaining games
([41, 42]) described as follows.
6.3 Bargaining game definition
Bargaining game is a cooperative game in which players
have the opportunity to reach a win-win situation. In this
game, there is a conflict of interest among the participants.
If one player cannot accept the bargaining solution, the
overall agreement will not be reached.
Let K ¼ f1; 2; . . .K g be the set of players. Let S be a
closed and convex subset of RK that represents the set of
feasible payoff that the players can get if they cooperate.
Let Rmin be the minimal payoff that the kth player would
k
expect in order to participate in the game and cooperate.
 
Suppose Rk 2 SjRk  Rmin k 8k 2 K is a nonempty boun-
ded set. Then, with Rmin ¼ ðRmin min min
1 ; R2 ; . . .RK Þ, the pair
min
ðS; R Þ , is called a K-person bargaining problem [43].
6.4 Nash bargaining definition
Within the feasible set S , the notion of Pareto optimal is
defined as a selection criterion for the bargaining solutions
[43].
A utility vector ðR1 ; R2 ; . . .RK Þ is considered as Pareto
optimal, if and only if there is no other R0k such that
R0k  Rk , i.e., there exists no other distribution that results
with a higher utility for some players (slices) without
causing a utility degradation for other slices.
There may be several Pareto optimal solutions. Thus, in
order to find a unique result, a criterion could be added to
the problem: the fairness. The latter refers to a fair result
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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
among bargaining players, i.e, in our case each involved
slices will offer a fair amount of resources. One proposition
to achieve this concept is max-min method [44], where the
performance of the worst case player is maximized.
However, this can penalize players with better conditions
and thus can generate a reduced overall system perfor-
mance. In this paper, we use the Nash Bargaining Solution
(NBS) that can provide a unique and fair Pareto optimality
solution if it satisfies six axioms listed in [45]. The coop-
erative bargaining problem solution maximizes the Nash
product as follows:
Y
K
max ðRk  Rmin
k Þ ð1Þ
k¼1
Since the ln is a continuous strictly increasing function,
solving the problem in Eq. (1) is equivalent to the fol-
lowing solution:
!
YK XK
min
maxln ðRk  Rk Þ ¼ max lnðRk  Rmin
k Þ ð2Þ
k¼1 k¼1
Indeed, maximizing the sum in Eq. (2) is more simpler to
implement than maximizing the product in Eq. (1).
6.5 Bargaining game for resource borrowing
As mentioned earlier, whenever an inter-slice handover is
imminent, and the estimated load of the target slice is
beyond a predefined threshold, the resource borrowing
algorithm should be triggered. We model the resource
borrowing between slices using a bargaining problem.
The slices that can participate in the bargaining game,
i.e, slices that can offer resources to the overloaded slice
should respect the following conditions:
• Let Bktotal is the amount of resources allocated for slice
k 2 K.
• A slice can be considered as a lender slice if
Bk  Bktotal :b, where Bk is the actual amount of resources
of the slice k and b is a load factor.
• Bkfree the amount of free resources of slice k where
Bkfree ¼ Bktotal  Bk .
• Each slice k presents a priority ak , where 0\ak  1.
The higher the priority of the slice is, the lower ak is.
• The amount of offered resources should be limited in
order to avoid an overload occurrence in the slice itself.
To this end, we define a borrowable window bk for each
slice k calculated as follows: bk ¼ Bkfree :ak :x, where x
is the borrowing factor. It is to be noted that slices with
higher priority will present a small borrowable window.
Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903 3893

• Let L ¼ fk 2 Kjbk 6¼ 0g be the set of slices that can slice, by respecting the borrowable window and required
offer resources to the overloaded slice. We consider resources constraints.
thus L lender slices. Complexity of NBS The NBS is conventionally found
• xk is the amount of offered resources by slice k. based on the exhaustive search, i.e., all feasible utility
• xreq is the amount of resources required by the values in the entire feasible utility set are examined.
overloaded slice. However, the exhaustive search becomes significantly
inefficient when the feasible utility set becomes large, in
In our case, we consider that Rmin as a null vector, thus
terms of a higher number of slices and larger borrowable
ðL; 0Þ defines the bargaining problem.
windows. Hence, in order to reduce the search complexity,
we present in the following, a low complexity heuristic in
6.6 Game I formulation
order to solve NBS for bargaining game I.
Low complexity heuristic In the following, we give a low
We consider that the players are the lender slices that aim
complexity heuristic in order to solve NBS for bargaining
at maximizing their utility while offering an amount of
game I.
resources in order to guarantee xreq .
In order to render the model tractable, we consider that
6.6.2 Low complexity heuristic algorithm
the utility function depends only on the utility of each slice
k 2 L offering an amount of resources xk . The utility of
We propose a heuristic (Algorithm 1) that aims at solving
each slice k is formulated as follows:
problem in Eq. (6) and reducing its complexity.
Rk ¼ Bkfree  xk ð3Þ For the sake of simplicity, we consider the following
assumption: all lender slices have the same borrowable
Additionally, in order to guarantee the handover request
window b ¼ minðbk Þ8k 2 L. This is done in order to
requirements, all players should obey to the following
reduce the amount of offered resources from each slice.
constraint:
The algorithm proceeds as follows.
X
L
xk ¼ xreq ð4Þ 1. Let Sb be the set of all possible values of xk , that is
k¼1 Sb ¼ f1; 2; 3; . . .; bg.
2. Let S0b the subset of Sb where
Moreover, each slice should respect the borrowable win- n X o
dow constraint that is formulated as follows: S0b ¼ xk jxk 2 Sb ; xk ¼ xreq and CardðS0b Þ ¼ L :
0  xk  bk 8 k 2 L ð5Þ
6.6.1 Nash bargaining solution for game I

The game results in the amount of resources offered by

each slice to the overloaded slice in order to accommodate 3. Each set S0bj is considered individually and sorted in the
the incoming request in the overloaded slice. In fact, each decreasing order. For each slice k, the heuristic
slice aims at reducing the amount of offered resources in calculates the marginal utility
order to keep more resources for incoming connections and dki ¼ Rk ðS0bj ½iÞ  Rk ðS0bj ½i þ 1Þ. This is to determine
avoid overload. Therefore, all the slices are supposed to how much a slice is going to loose if it offers higher
cooperate in the game. amount of resources. After calculating the marginal
Nash Bargaining Solution is formulated as follows: utilities of all slices, S0bj ½i is assigned to slice k where
X
maxxk lnðRk ðxk ÞÞ ð6Þ dki is minimal. This step is repeated this until all
k elements of S0bj are assigned to the lender slices.
X
L 4. The procedure is repeated for all subsets S0bj .
s.t. xk ¼ xreq ð7Þ 5. We collect the different assignments obtained and
k¼1
choose the assignment that gives the highest global
0  xk  bk 8 k 2 L ð8Þ utility for all slices.
The NBS is a Pareto optimal solution that ensures fairness
among players (lender slices), by following the axioms
mentioned in [45]. Thus, in problem (6), the NBS formu-
lation results in a fair amount of resources offered by each

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3894 Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903

overloaded slice, while preserving some flexibility to the

offered amount of resources.
The offered amount of resources follows the equation:
X
xk  xm ð9Þ

In addition, the offered amount of resources from each

slice should respect its borrowable window, following the
condition given in Eq. (5).

6.7.1 Nash bargaining game II

The game solution if formulated as follows:

 X  X L

Heuristic complexity In the proposed heuristic, we aim maxxk ln u xk þ lnðRk ðxk ÞÞ ð10Þ
k¼1
at reducing the borrowable window. Moreover, unlike the X
combinatorial problem imposed by NBS, we propose to s.t. xm  xk  xreq ð11Þ
decompose the feasible set into several feasible subsets.
The complexity of this heuristic is OðL2 CardðSb ÞÞ. The 0  xk  bk 8k 2 L ð12Þ
algorithm has linear complexity in the number of subsets Where Rk and bk are defined in Eqs. (3) and (5)
and quadratic complexity in the number of slices, and thus respectively.
could be easily implemented in real-time. The NBS obtained by solving problem (10) aims at
achieving a compromise between the lender slices and the
6.7 Game II problem formulation overloaded slice. The amount of resources offered to the
overloaded slice is obtained according the sigmoid utility
In this game formulation, we consider that the players are function. Moreover, a fair amount of resources is offered
the lender slices, in addition to the overloaded slice. The from each lender slice. In this case, lender slices will offer
utility of each slice k is given by Eq. (3). While the utility a reduced amount of resources compared to game I solu-
of the borrowing (overloaded) slice is given by the fol- tion, and the overloaded slice will obtain a fair amount of
lowing sigmoid utility function: resources that can guarantee the QoS of the ongoing ses-
8  
>
> xreq  x c sion in request.
>
> As mentioned earlier, the NBS is very complex since it
>
<1  xreq  xm
  if xm \x  xreq involves an exhaustive search. Thus, in order to reduce the
uðxÞ ¼ xreq  x c
>
> 1þ search complexity of Game II solution, we propose to use
>
> xreq  xm
>
: the Particle Swarm Optimization algorithm defined in the
1 if x [ xreq
following paragraph.
Where c and n values determine the steepness of the utility
curve and make it possible to model the slice sensitivity to 6.7.2 Particle swarm optimization
nðxreq xm Þ m xa Þ
amount of resources. c ¼ xm xa and n  maxð2ðx
xreq xm ; 2Þ.
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [47] is a heuristic
Moreover, xm is the minimal acceptable required resources
optimization algorithm, characterized by few parameters.
that can satisfy the need of the incoming handover request,
PSO is based on social behavior and presents a solution set
while xa is the threshold value, that is for a number of
called a swarm, and each solution in the set is referred as
resources less than xa , we obtain a null utility. Further
particle. Particles move in the problem search space
explanation about this utility function can be found in [46].
striving to reach the optimal solution. This is similar to the
This utility function is a non-decreasing function of x:
P collective behavior of birds and fish, that exchange their
the amount of borrowed resources where x ¼ xk .
knowledge of the search space to find the best solution.
Additional resources result in a higher utility value.
At each iteration, PSO ensures that each particle’s
Moreover, the improvement of the utility fades when the
velocity Vk and the amount of borrowable resources xk are
offered resources reach xreq . This implies the concavity of
updated as follows:
u(x) for x greater than a given value. Moreover, it is to
indicate that this utility function is chosen in order to Vktþ1 ¼ k  Vkt þ c1 ðPbestk  xtk Þ þ c2 ðGbest  xtk Þ
conserve a good QoS for the handover request in the xtþ1 ¼ xtk þ Vktþ1
k

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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
Where t is the iteration number and c1 ; c2 are learning rates
coefficients representing the weight of memory of a parti-
cle’s best position: Pbestk , toward the memory of the swarm
best position: Gbest . k is the weighting value that indicates
the effect of the previous velocity on the velocity update.
A particle keeps track of its coordinates in the search
space and aims to reach Gbest . The best solution is deter-
mined by the value of the fitness function, which is the
utility function to be maximized (Eq. 10) The PSO fitness
function, F, for the resource borrowing problem of game II,
is described in Eq. 13:
(P P PL
k lnðRk ðxk ÞÞ þ lnðuð xk ÞÞ if k¼1 xk  xm
F¼ P P  PL
k lnðRk ðxk ÞÞ þ lnðuð xk ÞÞ þ g xm  k¼1 xk otherwise
ð13Þ
where the penalty value g [ 0. The penalty value accom-
modates the practical constraint that the sum of offered
resources should exceed the minimum threshold value xm .
7 Performance evaluation
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed
algorithm, we conduct a set of simulation batches. We
implement the network elements using mininet-wifi [48]
and the controllers using Ryu controller program [49].
The map size of the simulation area is about 2  2 km2 ,
covered by two LTE-V eNodeBs and 10 RSUs. The radio
transmission range of each eNodeB is 1km respectively to
300 m for each RSU. eNodeBs and RSUs are equally
distributed among two operators domains. Each operator
deploys 4 end-to-end V2X slices.
We use the Simulator for Urban MObility 0.32.0
(SUMO) [50] to capture the authentic mobility of vehicles
on roads. Moreover, the Krauss Model [51] is used as
Sumo car-following model . Each vehicle is assigned a
3895
speed ranging between 50 km/h and 80 km/h, in order to
specify the amount of time that will be spent in each cell.
This paper focuses on a specific V2X use case: the tele-
operated driving where a vehicle is supposed to commu-
nicate with a tele-operation station. The communication
requires extreme real-time and exhibits tight requirements
for the network to ensure fast vehicle control and feedback.
It should guarantee ultra-reliable and low latency com-
munication. In order to guarantee these requirements,
mobility management should be carefully studied.
The load and arrival rate in this slice are adequately
adjusted, in order to obtain an admission control denial and
thus trigger the resource borrowing algorithm.
Table 2 presents the parameters values used in the
simulation.
We proceed the evaluation as follows. First, the fairness
obtained by using NBS is evaluated. Second, a comparison
of Game I and Game II is conducted. Third, some network
performance parameters such as the handover call dropping
probability, the new call blocking probability and resource
utilization are evaluated. And finally, the effectiveness of
using PSO as a method to solve Game II NBS is validated.
7.1 Fairness of the bargaining game
In the following, we study the fairness of the bargaining
game by comparing results to the max-min approach [44].
In fact, as mentioned in Sect. 6.4, max-min solution is
proposed to achieve fairness among players by maximizing
the performance of the worst case player. However, this
can penalize players with better conditions and thus can
generate a reduced overall system performance. To this
end, we measure the fairness index and the amount of
resources offered by each slice in order to show the dif-
ference between NBS and max-min fairness.
7.1.1 Fairness index
The proposed bargaining solution consists of engaging
slices in lending resources to the overloaded slice. In this
context, it is primordial to investigate the fairness among
lender slices in terms of the amount of resources offered by
each lender slice. To this end, the Fairness Index (FI) [52]
is calculated as follows:
!2 !
XL XL
2
FI ¼ Rk ðxk Þ = L  ðRk ðxk Þ Þ
k¼1 k¼1
Where L is the number of lender slices.
We compare FI obtained by the max-min solution and by
NBS1 and NBS2. In this case x is set to 0.25. Figure 6
demonstrates that NBS1 results in a more fair resource
borrowing than the max-min method. This is due to the
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3896 Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903

Table 2 Simulation parameters

Parameter Notation Value
values
Slices Parameters K 4
Slice priority ak Autonomous driving slice: 0.4
Tele-operated driving slice: 0.3
Infotainment slice: 0.5
Remote diagnostic slice: 0.6
b 85%
Utility function parameters xm 20 Mbps
xreq 25 Mbps
n 2
PSO parameters c1 2
c2 2
g 0.6
k 0.6

Fig. 7 Amount of offered resources

Fig. 6 Fairness index 7.2 Comparison between NBS1 and NBS2

mathematical formulation of the NBS that aims at In the following, we compare the utility of borrowing and
achieving fairness. lender slices obtained with each NBS1 and NBS2.
The arrival rate is fixed to 15 vehicle/min.
7.1.2 Amount of offered resources

In order to assess the effectiveness the fairness of NBS, we

evaluate the amount of offered resources in each lender
slice and compare the results with the max-min approach.
Results are illustrated in Fig. 7.
In this figure, we can notice that max-min solution
results in an unbalanced amount of offered resources
among lender slices. Moreover, due to its mathematical
formulation, NBS2 results in a lower amount of resources
than NBS1. However, the amount of resources in NBS1
and NBS2 are balanced between the 3 slices, which
demonstrate the fairness provided by NBS.

Fig. 8 Lender slice utility

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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903 3897

5. Nash Bargaining solution for game II referred as

NBS2.
It is to be noted that, the performance parameters are
obtained as follows:
• The tele-operated driving slice is the overloaded slice
that should reduce the handover call dropping proba-
bility. Thus, the handover call dropping probability is
obtained for the overloaded slice only.
• For the new call blocking probability, we have consid-
ered the lender slices that have given resources to the
overloaded slice in case of NBS1 and NBS2. The final
result is obtained as the average value of the new call
blocking probability in these slices. For the other
Fig. 9 Borrowing slice utility
schemes, i.e, static, static guard and dynamic guard, the
new call blocking probability is calculated as the
Figures 8 and 9 show that NBS1 gives higher utility for
average value for the slices that were considered as
borrowing slice (utility of the handover request) than
lender slices in case of NBS1 and NBS2.
NBS2, since it aims at guaranteeing the required band-
• The resource utilization is obtained as the average value
width. While giving a lower utility for borrowing slices,
of all slices in the networks, i.e, we measure resource
NBS2 results in an improved utility for the lender slices,
utilization of each slice and give as a final value the
since its formulation leads to a more relaxed borrowing
average resource utilization of all slices in the network.
strategy.
Moreover, although NBS1 produces a larger utility for
borrowing slices than NBS2, the percentage of decrease in 7.3.1 Handover dropping probability
borrowing slices utility with NBS2 is lower than the per-
centage of increase of the lender slices utility in NBS2. For The main goal of our studied scenario is to reduce the
example, at x ¼ 0:3, NBS1 results in a borrowing slice failure of handover requests in the tele-operated driving
utility 23% higher than NBS2. On the other hand, NBS2 slice. Thus, in order to validate the effectiveness of our
results in 40% increase in the lender slice utility. proposed schemes, we evaluate the handover call dropping
This confirms that NBS2 could be considered as a probability in this slice. For this purpose, we vary the
compromise between achieving QoS of borrowing slice arrival rate of vehicles.
and guaranteeing a good QoS for lender slices. Figure 10 shows that the static resource allocation
results in high handover dropping probability. This is
7.3 Network performance parameters explained as follows: with a high number of handover
occurrences, the static allocation may fail to accommodate
We consider as performance parameters: the handover and accept all the handover requests due to the lack of
dropping probability, the new call blocking probability, the resources. This is caused by the fixed amount of resources
handover latency and resource utilization. In this case, we
consider x ¼ 0:25. We compare the following schemes:
1. Static resource allocation scheme where a static
amount of resources is dedicated to each slice, with a
total isolation between slices and no possibility to
borrow resources. This scheme is referred as static
scheme.
2. Static resource allocation scheme with a guard channel
in each slice, where 10 % of resources of each slice are
reserved for handover requests. This scheme is referred
as guard scheme.
3. Dynamic Guard Scheme A dynamic guard channel is
adjusted in each slice according to the method
proposed in [25].
4. Nash Bargaining solution for game I referred as NBS1. Fig. 10 Handover call dropping probability

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3898 Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903

dedicated for each slice, and the lack of handover requests

prioritization.
The guard static scheme can reduce the handover call
dropping probability since it gives priority to handover
requests by reserving resources in each slice. However, the
static aspect of this method results in a higher handover
requests dropping ratio than the dynamic schemes;
dynamic guard scheme, NBS1 and NBS2.
For a low arrival rate, the dynamic guard scheme, NBS1
and NBS2 provide very low handover call dropping
probability. However, with an arrival rate increase, NBS1
and NBS2 outperform the dynamic guard scheme method.
This is due to the fact that NBS schemes are based on
resource borrowing between slices, while the dynamic Fig. 11 New call blocking probability in lender slices
scheme is limited with the dedicated resources in each slice
only. Thus, we can deduce that allowing resource bor- slices. This can reduce call blocking probability in lender
rowing between slices can be beneficial in terms of slices compared to other approaches. Moreover, comparing
reducing the handover failure. NBS1 and NBS2, the latter provides lower call blocking
Besides, comparing NBS1 and NBS2, we can see that probability since it aims at reducing the amount of
the latter provides the lowest handover call dropping resources offered by lender slices while trying to meet
probability because with this solution, the lender slices handover requests QoS guarantee.
offer a lower amount of resources than the amount given in Indeed, we can deduce that the static scheme results in
NBS1. In this case, more requests could be accepted in the the lowest call blocking probability. This is explained by
tele-operated driving slice. While for NBS1, with a high the fact that this scheme do not prioritize handover
arrival rate, the handover call dropping probability requests, contrarily to our approach that tries to minimize
increases, since this method aims at offering all the the handover call dropping probability at the expense of the
requested amount of resources to the handover request and new call blocking probability.
therefore this will reduce the amount of available resources
that could be offered to accept more incoming requests. 7.3.3 Resource utilization

7.3.2 New call blocking probability in lender slices Resource utilization is a primordial parameter that can
evaluate a resource management scheme. In fact, an ade-
Another metric to evaluate our solution is the new call quate scheme should maximize the resource utilization in
blocking probability in lender slices. In fact, the lender order to avoid their inefficient use.
slices are supposed to offer an amount of resources to the Figure 12 confirms that our proposed method results in
overloaded slice (tele-operated driving slice). This may high values of resource utilization. This is due to the fact
cause a reduction in the available bandwidth of these slices, that static and static guard schemes are based on a static
and thus, may cause a high call blocking probability. To
this end, we evaluate the call blocking probability in these
slices.
Figure 11 shows that static guard scheme results with a
high new call blocking probability. This is due to the static
reserved amount of resources offered to the handover
requests and that cannot be used by new requests. For the
dynamic guard scheme, with a low arrival rate, the new call
blocking probability is low, since the number of guard
channels reserved for handover calls is low in this case.
With the arrival rate increase, the dynamic guard
scheme results in higher call blocking probability than our
approach, since this scheme will reserve more guard
schemes for handover calls. However, our proposed
schemes can manage resources dynamically between slices
while taking into account the load constraint of lender Fig. 12 Resources utilization

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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
allocation and thus for a low arrival rate, resources are not
used efficiently.
Moreover, with the dynamic guard scheme, resource
utilization is near to the static resource allocation
scheme results. This is due to the fact, that despite the
guard channels reservation used in dynamic guard
scheme method, the latter allows the use of these reserved
resources by new calls. Our proposed method outperforms
the dynamic guard scheme. This is due to the fact that our
proposed resource borrowing method allows a resource
exchange between slices. While with the dynamic guard
scheme method, even though this method adjusts the guard
channel dynamically and allows resource borrowing for
new calls, some reserved resources may not be used effi-
ciently due to the isolation of resources between slices.
More precisely, if a request arrives to a slice and all the
resources are used in this slice, the request will be dropped/
blocked. Meanwhile, other slices may have available
resources that are not used efficiently. It is to be noted that,
the resource utilization is obtained as the average value of
resource utilization of all slices in the network.
Regarding NBS1 and NBS2, we can see that NBS1
results with a higher resource utilization since it aims at
offering more resources than NBS2.
7.3.4 Handover latency
In order to evaluate the handover duration, we present first
an analysis about the handover duration. To this end, we
define the following parameters in Table 3.
We can obtain the handover duration of each scheme as
follows:
Tstatic ¼ Tcheck þ Tconfig þ Tatt
Tstaticguard ¼ Tcheck þ Tconfig þ Tatt
Tdynamic ¼ Tcheck þ Tconfig þ Tatt þ Tbuffer
TNBS ¼ Tcheck þ Tconfig þ Tatt þ Tsignaling þ TNBSC
Table 3 Handover duration
Symbol
parameters
Tcheck
Tconfig
Tatt
Tbuffer
Tsignaling
TNBSC
Tstatic
Tstaticguard
Tdynamic
TNBS
3899
As we can notice, NBS scheme induces additional delays
due to the computation and signaling overhead. In order to
measure the handover latency and the overhead brought by
NBS scheme, we present simulation results illustrated in
Fig. 13.
As we can see in this figure, NBS presents the highest
handover latency among other schemes. This is due to the
additional computations to obtain NBS and signaling
exchanged between D-SDNC and S-SDNC, in order to
determine the number of offered resources. The dynamic
guard scheme presents lower handover latency since it
includes distributed decisions, without signaling overhead
between S-SDNC and D-SDNC. Moreover, the static and
static guard schemes present the lowest handover latency
since no additional computations should be done for the
handover execution.
Despite the fact that our approach causes an increase in
the handover latency, we can see that this latency reaches
12 ms for a high arrival rate. This shows that the our
approach respects V2X latency constraints [30], and does
not violate ultra reliable and low latency communication
requirements for a V2X tele-operated driving use case.
7.4 Studying the impact of x
We evaluate the impact of the borrowing factor x on the
new call blocking probability and handover call dropping
probability. Results are illustrated in Figs. 14 and 15. It is
remarkable that varying x reduces the handover call
dropping probability in the tele-operated driving slice.
However increasing x results in increasing the new call
blocking probability in lender slices, since the latter need to
release more resources; this reduces their available
bandwidth.
Definition
Duration of checking resources availability and taking decision
Duration of changing network settings before handover execution
Duration of attachment to target PoA
Duration of queuing a request until available resources are released
Duration of signaling between S-SDNC and D-SDNC
Duration of NBS calculation
Handover duration of static scheme
Handover duration of static guard scheme
Handover duration of dynamic guard scheme
Handover duration of NBS scheme
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3900
Fig. 13 Handover latency
Fig. 14 Handover call dropping probability in terms of x
Fig. 15 New call blocking probability in terms of x
7.5 Effectiveness of PSO
In order to assess the effectiveness of using PSO, we
measure the utility u defined in Eq. (3) of the handover
request, obtained by the PSO algorithm and compare
results with a well known search heuristic: the Genetic
Algorithm (GA) solution [53]. The following values are
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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
assigned to GA algorithm: Crossover probability=0.9,
Mutation probability=0.1.
As shown in Fig. 16, the utility obtained by the PSO
algorithm is higher than the GA. Moreover, when
increasing the number of iterations this utility increases
further. This shows that PSO can achieve better results in a
smaller number of iterations (maxIterations).
7.6 Discussion
Performance analysis allowed us to draw important con-
clusions on the formulation of resource borrowing between
slices. In this paper, we proposed two bargaining games in
order to model the resource borrowing. The comparative
study between NBS1 and NBS2 pointed out the following:
• NBS1 reduces handover call dropping probability while
inducing an increase in handover call dropping prob-
ability. With NBS1 QoS of handover request is totally
guaranteed and resource utilization is improved.
• NBS2 presents a compromise between the handover
call dropping probability in the overloaded slice and the
load utility in the lender slices. The handover call QoS
is slightly reduced in terms of the offered resources,
compared to NBS1. And the resource utilization is
lower than NBS1.
The main purpose of proposing those two games is to give
more choices for the operators according to their needs and
objectives. More precisely, it depends if the objective is to
give a guaranteed QoS for the request, than game I should
be used. However, if the considered use case can tolerate
QoS variation, game II can be used in order to achieve all
the mentioned goals and obtain a compromise between
QoS and handover dropping probability.
Fig. 16 Utility of handover request obtained using PSO and GA
Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a mobility management
scheme for V2X slicing environment. Our solution focused
mainly on resource borrowing between slices, in case of an
overloaded slice, aiming at reducing the handover call
dropping probability. The problem solution is formulated
using two different bargaining games (Game I and Game
II) and solved using Nash bargaining solution. The pro-
posed schemes are coupled with an efficient heuristic and
PSO to reduce computation complexity. Moreover, simu-
lation was conducted to evaluate the proposed solution by
considering a tele-operated driving scenario.
Results confirmed that our proposed scheme outper-
forms the static resource allocation in slicing environment
by reducing the handover call dropping probability in the
tele-operated driving slice. Moreover, simulation results
show that the Nash Bargaining gives more fairness among
slices compared to the max-min approach. Furthermore,
the analysis showed the effectiveness of using PSO to solve
Game II. Besides, a comparative study was conducted
between Game I and Game II, it showed that our first game
formulation (NBS1) can reduce handover call dropping
probability while maximizing resources utilization at the
expense of new call blocking probability in lender slices.
This game could be used in case of critical use cases that
require a guaranteed QoS. While the second formulation
(NBS2) presents a compromise between handover call
dropping probability and new call blocking probability
while preserving an acceptable value of resource utiliza-
tion. This game could be used for flexible use cases that
can tolerate QoS variation.
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Wireless Networks (2020) 26:3883–3903
Nadia Mouawad earned a Ph.D.
in Telecommunications at
University of Versailles and
Lebanese University. Her
research studies lie in the area
of mobility management and
Quality of Service provisioning
for 5G vehicular networks. She
received her bachelor in
Telecommunication and Com-
puter Engineering at the Faculty
of Engineering II , Lebanese
University, Lebanon and a
Masters in Technology of
Information and Communica-
tion Systems at the Doctoral School of Science and Technology,
Lebanese University, Lebanon.
Rola Naja earned a Ph.D. in
Computer Networking at Tele-
comParitech-Paris and a HDR at
University of Versailles. Her
research studies lie in the area
of resource allocation and
mobility handling in wireless
multiservice networks and
intelligent transportation sys-
tems (ITS). She has published
several papers in International
journals and conferences deal-
ing with network modeling and
performance, network adapt-
ability and quality of service
provisioning. She has edited and co-authored a book in ITS with
3903
Springer. Actually, she is associate professor at Lebanese University.
She is as well researcher at Li-parad Laboratory at University of
Versailles.
Samir Tohme was born in
Damascus, Syria, in 1949. He
graduated from the
EcoleSupérieured’Electricité
(1975), Paris, in Electrical
Engineering, and received the
Doctorat Degree from the
EcoleNationaleSupérieure des
Télécommunications ENST,
Paris, in 1979. After having
been with HP and SITA for five
years where he worked in the
distributed system field, he
joined the EcoleNa-
tionaleSupérieure des Télécom-
munications in 1984 where he was appointed Head of the Networks
Department between 1988 and 1998. He joined the University of
Versailles in 2003 where he was Director of PRISM Laboratory
between 2003 and 2013. His is presently in leave within VEDECOM
Institute since January 2015 where he is in charge of the C2X
Telecommunication Activities. Author of one hundred and fifty
published research papers, his main research activities concern mobile
networks, satellite networks, C2X communications, high speed net-
works and traffic control.Professor Tohmé is an IEEE senior member.
123