Burggraaff, Winfield J. - Regionalism and The Rise of Táchira

Venezuelan Regionalism and the Rise of Táchira
Author(s): Winfield J. Burggraaff

Source: The Americas, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Oct., 1968), pp. 160-173
Published by: Academy of American Franciscan History
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/980281
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VENEZUELAN REGIONALISM AND THE RISE OF
TACHIRA
underwentthree great nineteenth-centuryrevo-

VENEZUELA
lutions. The first was the extended for inde-
struggle political
pendence from Spain (1810-1821), which transformed the
colony into a sovereign state. The second was the Federal War (1859-
1863), which, by stepping up sharply the trend toward social democ-
racy, had a lasting effect on the conduct of Venezuelan politics. The
third, and the least studied, was the 1899 Revolution of the Liberal
Restoration, which integrated the Andes into the political mainstream
of the nation.?
The Andes, during the decades from Independence to the end of the
nineteenth century, was the forgotten and neglected region of Vene-
zuela. It remained politically impotent until 1899, when General
Cipriano Castro swept the andinos into power by force of arms.
Since the early eighteenth century, Caracas had been the administra-
tive, business,and cultural capital of Venezuela. It had been the principal
city in colonial times and the home of both the peninsular and creole
elites. It is not surprising that Caracas was the birthplace of Francisco
de Miranda, Sim6n Bolivar and other revolutionary leaders, as well as
the center of agitation against peninsular rule.
In the post-Independence period Caracas continued to serve as the
strategic hub of the nation. It also produced its share of nineteenth-
century Presidents: Jos' Maria Vargas (1835-1836), Carlos Soublette
(1837-1839, 1843-1847), Manuel Felipe de Tovar (1859-1861), An-
tonio Guzmin Blanco (1870-1877, 1879-1884, 1886-1888), and Juan
Pablo Rojas Pa1il (1888-1890). But even when the presidential palace
was not occupied by a caraquefio, the landed and commercial elites of
Caracas and the Center generally controlled the machinery of govern-
ment.
A second geographical source of leadership was the vast grassland
plains known as the llanos. This was the great cattle-raising region
where the laneros, a tough breed of men, spent most of their waking
hours on horseback. They were skilled riders, and proved to be a
nearly invincible cavalry force when welded together by a charismatic
1 See Rafael Pinz6n, "Tres revoluciones en Venezuela," Sumario de occidente, I
(September, 1945), 171-231.
160
WINFIELD J. BURGGRAAFF 161
leader. The first such caudillo during the Independence Wars was
Jos6 Tomis Boves, who persuadedthe laneros to fight with the royalists.
His fierce horde of cavalrymen helped preserve Spanish rule until
Boves' death left his forces scattered and leaderless. When Jos6 Antonio
P~ez reorganized his fellow llaneros and joined them to the army of the
Liberator, the tide of battle turned against Spain.
Following Independence, General Piez used his military position as
a base for national leadership and governed Venezuela for two decades
on behalf of the mantuanos, the Conservative elite. Later, other Presi-
dents were to come from the llanos, most notably the late nineteenth-
century caudillo, Joaquin Crespo (1884-1886, 1892-1898). Neverthe-
less, the Ilanos did not materially benefit from having local strongmen
in positions of national authority, for the caraquefio elite continued to
monopolize the administrationand economy of the country.
During the course of the nineteenth century, the coastal region west
of Caracasalso shared the presidency in the person of the gallant Feder-
alist general, Juan Cris6stomo Falc6n (1865-1868). But the populous
Andean states of Tichira, M6rida, and Trujillo together did not produce
a single President until 1898. Why were the Andes of such marginal
political importance for so long? What provoked the turn-of-the-
century Andean rebellion?
The eastern extension of the Venezuelan Andes cuts through the
three states of Tichira, Merida and Trujillo, an area combining snow-
capped peaks, temperate climate, and fertile, subtropical valleys. As a
whole, the Andean region is one of the nation's most productive
agricultural areas.
Despite general physiographic similarities, all three Andean states
experienced differing patterns of colonial development. Trujillo soon
became the locale of large haciendas worked by completely dependent
peons. The pattern of each hacendado ruling as cacique of the sur-
rounding district, established in colonial days, continued through the
nineteenth century.2
More aristocratic still was the province of M6rida. The city of
Merida, the administrative headquarters of the Venezuelan Andes,
developed a civil and ecclesiastical hierarchy of some importance. It
became, in turn, the seat of a far-flung diocese and, from the eighteenth
century on, a university center. Although society in M rida was highly
2Domingo Alberto Rangel, Los andinos en el poder (Caracas,1965), pp. 59-61.
Although tending strongly toward an economic-determinist viewpoint, this is the
most penetratingand comprehensivestudy to date of Taichira'srise to power.
162 REGIONALISM AND TACHIRA
stratified, its rugged topography prevented an hacienda-debt peonage

system from flourishing on the same scale as in Trujillo.3
Colonial Tichira differed from both Trujillo and M6rida, and it is
on regional developments in Tichira that this article will focus. In the
period of the conquest, the Tichira area was inhabited by more than
a dozen small tribes of the Chibcha-Muiscagroup. A relatively advanced
culture, they possessed a social organization superior to most other
aboriginal groups in Venezuela.4
From 1559, when Nicholas Federman first invaded the area, the
Venezuelan Andes were crisscrossed by various conquering expeditions
from Bogoti and the Caribbean coast. Tichira's capital, San Crist6bal,
was founded by Captain Juan Maldonado y Ord6fiez in 1561. Fifteen
years later Francisco de CQceres established La Grita, second in im-
portance to San Crist6bal during the colonial era. From the outset,
T~chira was included within the territorial jurisdiction of M6rida,
which formed part of the Audiencia of Bogota. In 1777 Merida
province was incorporated into the Captaincy General of Venezuela,
whose capital was Caracas.
T~chira's socio-economic development differed radically from the
Spanish colonial stereotype. Both the semi-feudal social system and
encomienda were largely absent. The original conquistadors entered
the region searching for precious minerals, but when they failed to
discover any, they often moved on to the higher and more alluring
mountains of M6rida.5 Later conquerors had little more success, for
although the aborigines they encountered were well-organized, seden-
tary agriculturalists, they did not exist in large enough numbers to
sustain a full-fledged encomienda or labor-repartimientosystem."
In contradistinction to the fabled quest for El Dorado elsewhere,
Mariano Pic6n-Salas has suggested that the settlement of the Vene-
'
zuelan Andes represented the " anti-Dorado." By this he meant that
the Spaniardswho penetrated the area colonized rather than conquered.
8Ibid., pp. 12-13. See also Carlos Siso, La formacidn del pueblo venezolano: estudios
socioldgicos (2 vols.; Madrid, 1953), II, 225.
4 Emilio Constantino Guerrero, El Tachira fisico, politico e ilustrado (Caracas, 1943),
p. 11. General information on Indians of the region may be found also in Julian H.
Steward, ed., Handbook of South American Indians (6 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1948),
IV, 18-19,429-430.
5 Rangel, p. 9.
6 Gonzalo Ramirez Cubillin, " 'Qu6 somos los andinos?," La Esfera (Caracas),
January 20, 1965.
7 Ibid.
They were a different breed entirely. They devoted themselves to a

life of honest toil rather than a desperate search for quick wealth. Since
a few men were sufficient to grow food for subsistence needs and for
local markets, large amounts of Indian labor were unnecessary. With
almost no subject class below and no significant hierarchy above, the
Castilians, Asturians, and Basques who settled Taichira8 nurtured a
surprisingly egalitariansociety. Landholdings remained relatively small,
even after generations. Moreover, the absence of an over-burdening
officialdom encouraged an independent, self-reliant strain which became
a distinguishing mark of the Tachirense.
The racial make-up of the Tachirense also remained distinct. As
there was little economic incentive to bring Negro slaves up to the
Andes, the lighter skinned andino was easily set apart from the darker
complexioned Venezuelan of the coast. Although no political signifi-
cance should be attached to their racial self-image, the people of the
Andes felt themselves superior to their duskier compatriots.9
Taichira passed the centuries of Spanish rule in relative tranquillity,
practically unnoticed by the viceregal authorities. It was best known
as a way station for the soldiers, bureaucrats, and merchant caravans
traveling between the administrative centers of Merida and Pamplona.
Aside from a handful of royal officials and a few modest religious
establishments, the town of San Crist6bal was free of a bureaucratic
elite, enabling its inhabitantsto pursue a relatively independent existence
throughout the colonial era."'
The coming of Independence heralded for Taichira an age of eco-
nomic growth unparalleled in Venezuelan history up to that time. Of
the factors contributing to regional economic prosperity, the most
important by far was the introduction of coffee in the 1790's." Coffee
cultivation thrived in Taichira'stemperate climate, rich soil, and abundant
land. By the late nineteenth century Tachiran coffee had become
Venezuela's leading export.
8 Guerrero,
p. 69.
SSiso, I, 511-514, 519-521. See also Ram6n Diaz S&nchez, "Evoluci6n social de
Venezuela (hasta 1960)," in Mariano Pic6n-Salas, et al., Venezuela independiente:
1810-1960 (Caracas, 1962), p. 281. The historical significance of the absence of the
Negro slave element in the Andes was also stressed in interviews with prominent
Tachirans.
The term "andino" when used by Venezuelans can signify anyone from the three
Andean states, but more often than not, it is used to identify the tachirense. The latter
is considered the "true" Andean, and the meridei~os and trujillanos are sometimes
referred to as "andinos asimilados."
toRangel, pp. 9-10.
"1Guerrero, p. 60.
Aside from land and climate, another advantage that favored Taichira
coffee production was easy access to the sea. The crop could be shipped
from nearby Lake Maracaibo to the burgeoning Caribbean port of
Maracaibo. The coffee trade resulted in extensive commercial ties
between the Maracaiberos and the Tachirenses. Maracaibo merchants
and bankers (mostly Germans) extended credits to the producers and
acted as middlemen in the exporting of coffee and the importing of
merchandise.12
Obviously, the basic flaw in the regional economy was the utter
dependence of local producers on overseas markets. Venezuelans them-
selves consumed only a minimal percentage of the total yield. As a
result prices and profits fluctuated according to European demand.
Greater and greater production each year necessitated a corresponding
rise in demand to maintain a stable price level. When this failed to
occur, an adverse effect was immediately felt in the merchant houses
of Maracaibo and in the coffee fields of Thchira.'3 Fortunately for
Taichira'ssingle export economy, conditions favored the producer for
most of the century.
The coffee industry required considerable manpower. However, to
the end of the colonial era the population of Taichira had remained
sparse. Therefore, when coffee production increased, producers were
forced to import workers from outside the region. These came from
the llanos, particularly from the neighboring state of Barinas, and from
eastern Colombia. The llaneros, plagued with malariaand other tropical
diseases, welcomed the opportunity to migrate to the more healthful
Andes. And especially at the time of the devastating Federal War,
other Venezuelans sought in Taichira shelter from civil conflict and
new economic opportunities.14
As migratory workers invested their savings in land, Tichira became
the locale of numerous small, independent farms. In addition to coffee
a variety of other crops-sugar cane, wheat, cacao, tobacco, bananas,
cotton, rice, and potatoes-were grown.'5 Livestock raising also had
some importance, although Taichira was better known as a central
market for the sale and transshipment of Ilanos cattle to Colombia.
Thchira's population kept pace with economic growth. Only 27,000
12 Rangel, pp.17-18. See also Diaz Sanchez, pp. 281-282,and Jose Gregorio Villafafie,
Apuntes estadisticos del Tdchira (Caracas, 1960), p. 51.
18 Rangel, p. 20.
141Ibid., pp. 14-15. See also Charles C. Griffin, "Regionalism's Role in Venezuelan
Politics," Inter-American Quarterly, III (October, 1941), 30.
15Guerrero, pp. 61-66, and Villafafie, pp. 43, 46-48.
WINFIELD
J. BURGGRAAFF 165
in 1839,it roseto 42,000in 1846,to 68,000in 1874,to over 100,000
in 1891.* By the end of the century,Thchirawas one of Venezuela's
mostdenselypopulatedstates.
Sociallyand culturallythe nativesof Tichira formeda raceapart.
Nowhereelse in Venezueladid sucha bourgeois,capitalistic breedof
menemerge.Eventheimmigrants coming into the area tended to adopt
indigenous Taichiran Fromthetimeof theFederalWar,
characteristics.
Venezuelans fromotherregionsfloodedTichiraandengagednot only
in agrarianpursuits,but in business,commerce,and the professions."
Manyof themwerewell-educated andhadsubstantial resources.The
shrewdestbusinessmen, however, were not Venezuelans, but Colom-
bians,who left the hot plainsof Norte de Santander to maketheir
livingin the coolerclimate of the Andean valleys. Althoughfarming
wastheirinitialoccupation,manyeventually settledin theurbancenters
to engagein businessandcommerce.'
The landholdingsystemwas, of course,an integralpart of the
prevailingsocio-economic structure.Operating a relativelysmallcoffee
was a
plantation generally familyaffair, made easierby the Taichiran
tendency toward raisinglarge broods. Earningswent into a common
familystrongbox, andlandholdings couldbe extendedasprofitsaccrued.
Relianceon the laborof thosewho hada stakein the profits,andon
workerswho weremotivated to savein orderto securelandthemselves,
led to a stable social and economic development.19
Within the large Tichiran families, the father of the clan was a
formidable figure indeed. According to Domingo Alberto Rangel, the
senior male member of the oldest family in the community was respon-
sible for dispensationof local justice, except in the case of major crimes.
This practice contrasts sharply with that of other Venezuelan regions,
where justice was dispensed by the wealthiest hacendado in the district.20
Close adherence to patriarchal authority became an entrenched char-
acteristic of the Tachirense, contributing in some measure to the
development of a strong military tradition.
Paradoxically, although tradition and order were paramount virtues
in the Taichiran scale of values, social mobility was greater there than
anywhere else in Venezuela. Immigrants were readily accepted and
16 Guerrero,p. 68.
17 Griffin, p. 30.
1s Rangel., pp. 15-16.
19Ibid., pp. 24-27.
20
Ibid.,pp. 27-29.
absorbed into the existing fabric of society. Since they found plentiful
and rich soil, and a climate conducive to an array of agricultural activi-
ties, opportunities abounded for the newcomers. No one, however,
could become inordinately wealthy, given the structure of the regional
economy. In effect, Tichira was an example of that rare phenomenon
in nineteenth-century Spanish America-an agrarian-basedmiddle-class
society. It had neither a landed elite at the top, nor extensive rural and
urban proletariats at the bottom. The immigrant laborer had every
opportunity to rise in society and take his place alongside his former
employer as a fellow entrepreneur.2'
The great stress Taichira placed on education also contributed in-
directly to the rise of the region. Local standardswere far higher than
those of non-Andean Venezuela. An influential Tichiran intellectual,
Jos6 Gregorio Villafafie, writing in the 1870's, remarked upon the
extensive scope of public instruction in Tichira and the existence of
private secondary schools of high caliber.22 The literacy rate, at least
in urban centers, was high.23
Other characteristics of this land and its people were frontier-style
individualism, frugality, and drive. Rangel likens the individualism of
the Tachirense not to the Spanish variety, but rather to the frontier
economic
spirit of the American pioneer.24 The accelerated rate of
rise to an expansive, exuberant, aggressive frame of mind.
growth gave
That self-confidence, combined with adverse conditions at the end of
the century, created the revolutionary atmosphere that culminated in
Cipriano Castro's Liberal Restoration movement.
T~chira 25 generally remained aloof from the caudillo uprisings that
plagued most of the country in the decades after Independence. In fact,
and
although Tachirenses were active in the Independence movement
served in the army of the Liberator,26 the region was not gripped by the
21 Villafafie, p. 18.
22
Ibid., pp. 73-76.
23 Guerrero, pp. 69-70. For a brief account of regional intellectual history, see Rafael
Maria Rosales, Bajo el alegre cielo (Caracas, 1961), pp. 51-61.
24Rangel, pp. 31-32.
25 For convenience, Tichira is generally referred to as a state in this paper. Actually
it retained its colonial jurisdictional attachment to the Province of M'rida until 1856,
in which year it was made an independent province. It became a state seven years
later. In 1867 it was annexed to Zulia, but regained its autonomous status the next
Taichira
year. In 1881, as part of President Guzmin Blanco's centralization policy,
became Secci6n Taichira in the Gran Estado Los Andes, which included, along with
Tachira, Merida and Trujillo. In 1899 it once again became an autonomous state.
26
Ample evidence of Taichiranparticipationin the Independence struggle is provided
by Rafael Maria Rosales in El Tdchira en la emancipacidn (Caracas, 1964).
revolutionary fervor of the capital, nor was its military contribution

comparable, for example, to that of the llaneros. On the contrary, much
loyalist sentiment persisted in the Andes during the prolonged struggle.
Decades later, when the Federal War brought devastation and social
disorganization to the greater part of the republic, the Andean states
missed its worst effects. This escape from war's destruction, along with
brighter economic prospects in the Andes, persuaded non-andinos to
resettle there, with Tachira receiving the greatest percentage.
T~ichira'sremoteness served the area both well and ill. On the one
hand, political insulation allowed the state's economy to advance without
the incessant interruptions of caudillo feuds, civil wars, enforced recruit-
ments, and property confiscations. On the other hand, Taichiraremained
culturally isolated from the rest of the country. Its people were viewed
with suspicion by Venezuelans from the Center. The andino spoke more
slowly and distinctly and he dressed more simply than the sophisticated
caraquefio. The latter felt no affinity toward the men of the mountains
who, in turn, felt awkward and self-conscious in the cosmopolitan
atmosphere of the capital.27
Physical barriers were also effective in keeping regional antagonisms
alive. Major problems of communication and transportation remained
unattended and unsolved until well into the twentieth century. For
example, it took almost a month for the Tachirense to traverse the
overland route to Caracas. The alternate sea route, though speedier, was
far more difficult and hazardous."8 Nineteenth-century writers com-
plained bitterly about neglect of the Andes by the federal government.
Villafafie, writing at the time of the Guzmin Blanco dictatorship,
deplored the lamentable condition of Andean " highways," and attacked
the sublime indifference of the government authorities toward his native
region. He added: "If it [Taichira] has at one time or another been
remembered, it has been with no other object than that of imposing a
new tax, a war contribution, or another contingent for the army.
Nothing more! "29 The abuses committed by agents of the national
government, especially under Guzmin Blanco's centralization program,
also aroused the ire of the local populace.3-
Aside from isolation and neglect, another circumstance set Taichira
27
Rangel, p. 36, and interview with Ram6n J. Velisquez, Caracas, March 23, 1965.
Velisquez, as was his father, is a noted Tichiran intellectual and regional historian.
28Interview with Ram6n J. Velaisquez,March 23, 1965. See also Griffin, p. 31.
29Villafafie, p. 31.
30Robert L. Gilmore, Caudillism and Militarism in Venezuela: 1810-1910 (Athens,
Ohio, 1964), p. 119.
apart from the rest of Venezuela and contributed to mutual resentment

and suspicions. This was its time-honored link with the neighboring
republic of Colombia. As mentioned, the Indians inhabiting the Tichira
area at the time of the conquest were affiliatedwith the Chibchas, who
predominated in highland New Granada. Those tribes bore little
resemblance to the fierce, low-culture Caribs of the Venezuelan coast.
After the Andean area had been subjugated, it was placed under the
jurisdiction of the Audiencia of Bogota, while the coastal region was
governed (except for a few years) from Santo Domingo. Long after
the Andean province was annexed to the Captaincy General of Vene-
zuela in 1777, its spiritual link remained with New Granada. Close
commercial ties supported that bond. Cficuta became an important
international marketplace and a heavy volume of trade was carried on
across the border. A common valley between Tichira and the neigh-
boring Colombian department aided communications. In contrast,
Tachirenses encountered a massive mountain barrier on the route to
Caracas.
Familial and political solidarity also tended to unite andinos on both
sides of the border. Close kinships existed across the boundary as a
result of long interminging. In the late nineteenth century, for example,
many Tachirenses could claim a Colombian parent or grandparent.
Moreover, most politically conscious Tachirenses were Liberals, and
they felt a certain rapport with the Liberal Party of Colombia. In
periods when Colombian Liberals were in rebellion against a Conserva-
tive government, they would be harbored safely by sympathetic
Tachirenses. Likewise, Tichiran Liberals, including Cipriano Castro,
when under fire by an opposition government in Caracas,sought shelter
across the border in Norte de Santander. In many ways, Colombian
and T~chiran Liberals felt that they had as much in common with each
other as with their Conservative countrymen."
By the decade of the 1890's, Thchira was restless and politically
frustrated. The vigorous Tachirenses found little virgin land left for
development in the state, and total inattention to their broader problems
in the capital. The added insult of political abuse and discrimination
at all levels of government produced an unarticulated, but growing,
desire for change.
Young Tachirenses were alarmed by the anarchy that substituted
for law and authority in the country at large. Despite Liberal promises,
exaggerated personalism remained a blight on the nation, lands were
a1 See Rangel, pp. 43-44.
confiscated,and illegallyconscriptedtroopsmarauded at will. Graft

wascommonto everygovernment officefromthe localjuzgadoto the
presidentialpalace. Disease and malnutritioncontinuedrampantafter
four decadesof Liberalrule. Rangelsumsup existingconditionsin
contemptuousterms:
It is the legacy of forty yearsof caudillisticcivil wars in which the
most valiantmen die withoutknowingwhy, andin which the conu-
quero is recruited so that he can die under the hooves of a horse, on
which jauntily rides General Perez or Colonel Martinez;forty years
in which the LiberalParty was robbing pigs and confiscatingchickens;
forty years of a miserablefarce, with its traitorouscaudillos and semi-
literate doctors, who rob and impoverishthe Republic in the name
of the Liberalprogramwhich they are the first to disavow.32
The more widely traveled Tachirenses made revealing comparisons
between their own state and the rest of the country. At home their
people were energetic, healthy, and relatively well-educated. Having
built a prosperous economy and stable social order the Tachirenses,
unlike non-andinos, were filled with provincial pride and an unlimited
measure of confidence. The questions they asked now had a revolu-
tionary tinge: how could they capitalize on their century of progress
and avoid relying exclusively on foreign markets? How could vitally
needed improvements in communications and public services be pro-
vided? Where would a government responsive to their wishes arise?
In the last years of the century, these dissatisfactions coalesced into a
cause: the Liberal Restoration. Its leader was Cipriano Castro.
Cipriano Castro was born October 12, 1858,-8in the town of Capacho,
a short distance northwest of San Crist6bal. His parents were middle-
class Tachirenses who aspired to give their son the best education they
could afford. Since secondary schools were scarce in Venezuela, many
young andinos went to eastern Colombia for their bachelor's degree.34
Castro was sent to the seminary in Pamplona.
Rangel persuasively argues that the years in Pamplona were crucial
to Castro'sideological formation."*For there he came into contact with
leaders of the Colombian Liberal Party; a party which, in contrast to
its Venezuelan counterpart, remained committed to its ideals whether
32
Ibid., p. 34.
38Although accounts differ as to Castro'sdate of birth, this is most likely the correct
one; Jose Valeri, "Rasgos biogrnficos del General Cipriano Castro,"Boletin del Archivo
Histdrico de Miraflores, I (July-August, 1959), 73.
341.e., a secondary school degree, in Spanish-Americanusage.
35Rangel, pp. 62-63.
in or out of power. Its leaders were distinguished more for their

intellectual astuteness than for martial prowess. They debated genuine
issues both in Congress and on the streetcorners,and they propagandized
via newspapers and pamphlets.
Inspired by Colombian Liberalism, Castro returned home after com-

pleting his preparatory education to write newspaper essays devoted
to issues of the day.36 The coherent Liberal program that he proclaimed
found a ready audience among young Tachirenses chafing under their
condemnation to provincial stagnation, and eager for radical changes in
the traditional political system.
Rangel links Castro's popularity to the dilemma that faced the urban
middle-class Taichiranyouth in the last years of the century.3' Owing
to the state's relative prosperity, most middle-class men succeeded in
getting a secondary education, even if thy had to go to Ciicuta, Pam-
plona, or another Colombian city. For most, however, the university
was out of the question. The expenses of five or more years of study
in M6rida, Caracas, or Bogoti were prohibitive. Armed only with a
bachillerato, prospects for these young men were decidedly limited.
They could not practice law or medicine without a professional degree.
Openings in industry were non-existent since Thchira had not even
been touched by industrialization. Moreover, in the cities and towns
of the region the level of business activity was not high enough to
completely absorb the youthful work force. In the official bureaucracy,
jobs for andinos were scarce; positions were limited in the area, and
those in the rest of the country went to non-andinos. Forced to become
schoolteachers, bookkeepers, or salesclerks, these frustrated young
Tachirenses made perfect targets for Castro'srevolutionary propaganda.
During the 1890's Cipriano Castro took an active part in national and
local politics. For some years he served as a Liberal deputy in the
National Congress, where he gained something of a reputation for his
rhetorical eloquence in proclaiming a revived Liberalism." Castro also
played a role in some of the chaotic politico-military skirmishing of
the 1890's, his personal fortunes fluctuating as the caudillo struggles
ebbed and flowed. Biding his time, he spent the months preceding the
opening of his campaign as a political exile in Colombia. There he
learned of the death of General Joaquin Crespo in the Battle of Car-
36 In this he was following the example of another noted tachirense of the late
nineteenth century, Dr. Santiago Bricefio, who also used the local newspapers as vehicles
for propagating his reformist ideas; see Rangel, p. 48.
37Rangel, p. 67.
38 Jose Maria Siso Martinez, Historia de Venezuela (6th ed.; Caracas, 1962), p. 629.
melera (April, 1898). Castro knew then that the last stumbling block
to power had been removed. The remaining caudillos were lesser men;
they proved this in the months and years ahead."39
By early 1899 conditions were unusually propitious for an assault
on national power. In Caracas the political situation was in hopeless
chaos. In the countryside civil war sputtered intermittently. In Taichira
expansiveness and parochial pride were juxtaposed with the ambitions
and frustrations of the youth fed by Castro's provocative propaganda.
The military advantage was Taichira'salso. The mountainous terrain,
the frequent border skirmishes, the traditions of work, physical tough-
ness, rigid discipline, and hierarchy had produced a corps of ideal
infantrymen.
Inasmuch as Castro's successful revolution was destined to change
the course of Venezuelan history, several aspects of the 1899 military
campaign are worth mentioning. First, in CiprianoCastro the movement
had one of the foremost instinctive military commanders in Venezuelan
history. He was the prototype of the old-style caudillo-courageous,
flamboyant, restless; what Venezuelans call " un valiente."
The army under General Castro's command was young, semi-edu-
cated, and largely urban-based. Aside from Castro and his chief lieuten-
ant and financial backer, Juan Vicente G6mez, the officers and troops
ranged in age from fifteen to about thirty. For the first time in national
history an army was composed of troops from the cities and villages,
not from the countryside.40 The level of education was several notches
above that of the earlier campesino armies. Some men had just com-
pleted their secondary education; " others were young teachers, artisans,
tradesmen, and employees of shops and merchant houses. The usual
complement of unemployed and adventurers rounded out the revolu-
tionary army. In the future the national army would continue to main-
39Between 1894 and 1898 Ilanero President Crespo had managed to impose some
degree of order on Venezuela's restless caudillos. He brought on his own downfall,
however, when he followed the time-honored Venezuelan custom of rigging elections
(in this case, the national election of 1897) to assure victory for the official candidate.
Just as routinely, his chief opponent, General Jose Maria Hernandez, declared himself
in rebellion. The latter's forces defeated and killed General Crespo, but Hernindez
himself was subdued by Crespo's military successor. From that point the situation
deteriorated into the anarchic confusion that gave Cipriano Castro the opportunity to
strike.
40 Rangel, p. 67.
41 For
example, future General in Chief and President of the Republic Eleazar L6pez
Contreras, who joined the revolutionary army at the age of seventeen, months after
receiving his secondary school diploma from the Colegio del Sagrado Coraz6n de
Jesuisin La Grita.
tain its urban roots, and the superior educational level of Castro's forces
would be perpetuated through the academic training of officers initiated
by Castro and G6mez when in power.
To the cry of "New Men, New Ideals, New Methods," Castro's
army brought the government to its knees in five months.42 The cam-
paign opened on May 23 when Castro and his band of sixty men
crossed into Tichira from Colombia. He first captured his home district
of Capacho, built up sizeable support in the area, and then assaulted
the regional capital of San Crist6bal. His siege of the city made little
headway, and he was on the verge of losing revolutionary momentum
when he decided to strike instead at the heart of the country.43 Thus
began the celebrated march on Caracas, a campaign which culminated
in the capture of the government bastion of Valencia and, consequently,
in the fall of the government itself. President Ignacio Andrade, a
merideiio, fled the capital before the soldiers of the Liberal Restoration
entered the city.
In essence what were the aims and impulses of the Revoluci6n Liberal
Restauradora and what was its impact on the political evolution of
Venezuela? First, the 1899 Revolution began as a movement for the
restoration of genuine Liberal ideals, long betrayed by generations of
unprincipled pseudo-Liberals. Concepts such as constitutionalism, civil
supremacy and political liberty were invoked by Castro and the revo-
lutionaries. Second, it was a provincial movement seeking the political
integration of the Andes into national affairs. In harsher terms, it could
be conceived as andino revenge against the long dominant oligarchy
of the Center. Third, the Restoration movement involved a lust for
power, a shortcut to wealth, and a means to take control of the resources
of the national government. It was to be the tragedy of the Castroite
Revolution-a Revolution that held great promise for the nation-that
these selfish motives almost immediately gained precedence over the
others and betrayed the Revolution while still in its early stages.
After 1899, Tichira and the Andes became intimately involved in
national affairs,and the traditionalColombian influence weakened corre-
spondingly.4 In fact, the andinos came to dominate both the civil
42 For a participant's account, see Eleazar L6pez Contreras, Pdginas para la historia
militar de Venezuela (Caracas, 1944), pp. 3-34. For a contemporary account by a foe
of Castro, see Antonio Paredes, Cdmo llegd Cipriano Castro al poder (2d ed.; Caracas,
1954).
48 L6pez Contreras, pp. 13, 15, and Rangel, pp. 76-77.
44 Jos'
A. Giacopini Zairraga,"Los hombres del 23 de mayo," El Nacional (Caracas),
los
May 23, 1964. See also Pinz6n, p. 215, and Enrique Castellanos, "Los andinos en
Andes," El Nacional, March 31, 1965.
bureaucracy and the national armed forces so thoroughly that they were
virtually impossible to dislodge.45
A second innovation stemming from the Revolution was the enforced
establishmentof a long era of peace and order. Regional caudillos were
crushed, and central authority was implanted to a degree never before
attempted. What started out as a regionalist movement ended up
enforcing rigid centralization of power. That the new Andean autoc-
racy had its repressive and reactionary aspects is undeniable, but at
the same time it provided the political climate requisite for the material
development of Venezuela.
Finally, Cipriano Castro delivered the coup de grace to civilian politics
as it had functioned in the nineteenth century. The year 1899 marked
the end of the Conservative-Liberal struggles and the demise of the
traditional parties, owing to systematic repression under the first two
andino rulers. The curtailment of political activity in the next decades
was to create a vacuum that was not to be filled for many years. The
military regimes of Generals Castro and G6mez were largely sustained
by the new national army and not by civilian political forces. While
the military retained its tight control, the older generation of politicians
gradually died off. The vacuum was to be filled by a younger generation
of leaders who represented new ideological systems and who created
parties fashioned along more modern lines.46 Eventually these groups
were to challenge the military for political supremacy.
Ironically, the andino seizure of national power failed to satisfy the
economic needs and frustrations of the region. Castro did next to
nothing to aid the Andean economy, which continued to be over-
dependent on the world coffee market. General G6mez did little more,
even after the Great Depression sent coffee prices plummeting. Vene-
zuelans of this century, who have seen one Andean general after another
move from the barracks to the presidential palace, have at the same
time witnessed the dramatic economic decline of the Andes. The
deterioration of the Tichiran economy during the years that the state's
own sons were in power could very well provide the central theme for
a study of twentieth-century Venezuelan regionalism.
WINFIELD J. BURGGRAAFF
Universityof Missouri,
Columbia, Missouri
4 For forty-six years Venezuela was ruled by successive andino generals: Cipriano
Castro (1899-1908); Juan Vicente G6mez (1908-1935); Eleazar L6pez Contreras (1935-
1941); and Isaias Medina Angarita (1941-1945).
46 Giacopini Zairraga,"Los hombres del 23 de
mayo," El Nacional, May 23, 1964.

Burggraaff, Winfield J. - Regionalism and The Rise of Táchira

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Venezuelan Regionalism and the Rise of Táchira

Author(s): Winfield J. Burggraaff

underwentthree great nineteenth-centuryrevo-

stratified, its rugged topography prevented an hacienda-debt peonage

They were a different breed entirely. They devoted themselves to a

revolutionary fervor of the capital, nor was its military contribution

apart from the rest of Venezuela and contributed to mutual resentment

a1 See Rangel, pp. 43-44.

confiscated,and illegallyconscriptedtroopsmarauded at will. Graft

in or out of power. Its leaders were distinguished more for their

Inspired by Colombian Liberalism, Castro returned home after com-

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