Cambridge University Press

The Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824
Author(s): John R. Fisher

Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1, Andean Issue (Feb., 2000), pp. 55-84
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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J. Lat. Amer. Stud. 32, 55-84 Printed in the United Kingdom 2000zoo
Cambridge University Press 55
The Royalist Regime in the

Viceroyalty of Peru, I820-I824*
JOHN R. FISHER
Abstract. This article provides an analysis of royalist strategy in the viceroyalty

of Peru during the four years between the arrival of Josd de San Martin's invasion
force in September I820 and the battle of Ayacucho of December 824. It pays
particular attention to royalist policy from July 1821, when viceroy Josd de la
Serna evacuated Lima, the viceregal capital, leaving the city open to San Martin,
who declared independence there on 28 July. Its focus differs, therefore, from
that of most previous commentators on Peru's transition to independence, who
have tended to neglect royalist policy and activity during these crucial final years
in favour of a concentration upon the activities of San Martin, Antonio Josd de
Sucre, Sim6n Bolivar and their Peruvian allies. The article begins with a brief
contextual discussion of the historiography of Peruvian independence and
subsequently analyses the main features of historical developments in the
viceroyalty in the period 1810-20. Following substantive discussion of the period
1820-4, it concludes with observations on the historical legacy in Peru of the
royalists' elevation of the city of Cusco to the status of viceregal capital in I 822-4.
I. The historiographicalcontext
If fortune favours the brave, as Terence had Pliny the Elder suggest in
Phormio, historiography tends to concentrate upon the achievements of
the victorious. This tendency is particularly marked when the outcome of
a civil war, such as the conflict fought in Peru between patriots and
royalists in 1820-4, becomes inextricably associated in establishment
ideology - and gradually in popular consciousness too - with the ar-
ticulation of national identity. In late colonial Peru, the related phenomena
of insurgency and proto-nationalism, such as they were prior to the arrival
of San Martin in 1820, manifested themselves primarily in the 'Indian'
highlands - symbolically represented by the city of Cusco - rather than in
aristocratic, creole Lima and its hinterland. Notwithstanding a certain
tendency to exalt Peru's Inca past, the leaders of the coastal elite (and, in
large measure, the creoles of the interior, too) had looked askance at the
rebellion of Tupac Amaru of 1780-3, and three decades later they actively
supported the suppression of the Cusco rebellion of I814-15. This was
more for what they seemed to symbolise, feebly in the first case but very
John Fisher is Professor of Latin American History and Director of the Institute of
Latin American Studies at the University of Liverpool.
* Research for this article in
Spain (I995) and Peru (I998) was made possible by grants
from the British Academy.

56 John R. Fisher
clearly in the second - the possibility of an independent Peru controlled

from the Indian interior - rather than for what they actually threatened to
creole hegemony, for both movements were conservative in terms of their
social and economic goals. Similarly, as Cecilia Mendez has recently
demonstrated, the limenoaristocracy would fight, with pen and sword, in
i836-9 against the Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, using blatantly
racist rhetoric to undermine the legitimacy of its president, Andres de
Santa Cruz, who was condemned as not only an invader from Bolivia but
also as an upstart Indian.1
Ever since 821, the identity of republican Peru has been associated in
formal manifestations of nationalist ideology - what Mendez describes as
'officialist historiography' - with San Martin's declaration of indepen-
dence in Lima on 28 July I821, and the perceived need to celebrate that
event as the crucial moment in Peru's fiestas patrias.2 By contrast, the
anniversary of the battle of Ayacucho of 9 December I824, following
which the numerically superior royalist army surrendered to Sucre, is
regarded more as a tidying-up operation than as the decisive moment in
the establishment of Peruvian independence from Spain. This tendency to
see Peru's identity through the myopic eyes of the metropolitan elite,
looking outwards to Europe and the United States rather than towards
the country's interior, intensified, of course, rather than diminished from
the mid-nineteenth century, as export-led economic growth provided the
material legitimisation for a deep-rooted cultural antipathy towards the
increasingly marginalised southern highlands and their inhabitants, the
vast majority of whom were excluded by their illiteracy from formal
participation in political life.3
In the Hispanic world the celebration of significant historical
anniversaries occasionally brings in its train a degree of historical
revisionism. In Peru, the urge to mark the onset of the first centenary of
independence from Spain made a small contribution to this process, with
the publication of several studies of pre-revolutionary activity beyond
In fact, Santa Cruz was of mixed descent, the La Paz-born son of a minor colonial
official and a wealthy cacica. Although he served briefly as president of Peru in 1827,
following distinguished military service for the patriot cause under Sucre from 1820,
like Juan Velasco Alvarado 140 years later, he was never able to shake off the disdain
displayed by the Lima elite for a provincial officer whose racial origins were perceived
to be dubious. See Cecilia Mendez G., 'Incas Sf, Indios No: Notes on Peruvian Creole
Nationalism and its Contemporary Crisis', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 28
(I996), pp. 197-225. Conversely, some scholars have sought to exalt his Indian
identity; see, for example, Alfredo Crespo, Santa Cru.: el condorindio (Mexico, 1944).
2 Mendez, 'Incas Sf, Indios No', p. 202.
3 The background to the marginalisation of the sierra from national life in the Igth
century is discussed in Maria Isabel Remy, 'La sociedad local al inicio de la republica.
Cusco, I824-1850', Revista Andina, vol. 6 (I988), pp. 45 1-84.

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyaltyof Peru 57
Lima itself, mainly in Huanuco, Huamanga and Cusco.4 This process
complemented the early twentieth-century attempts of several prominent
writers of the Cusco school to revive the indigenismopromoted in the
immediate post-independence period by cusquenowriters such as Narciso
Arestegui, Pio Benigno Mesa and Clorinda Matto de Turner, and later at
the national level by Manuel Gonzalez Prada.5 Despite their activities and
the parallel efforts in the 1920S of Jose Carlos Mariategui to promote the
discussion of national as opposed to purely metropolitan reality, the
oligarchic control of political life - and, hence, an oligarchic view of
Peru's historical development - remained largely intact throughout the
second quarter of the twentieth century, even if occasional compromises
had to be made by co-opting potential dissidents into establishment
structures.
The collapse of oligarchic politics in Peru in the third quarter of the
twentieth century brought with it a consequential shift in historiographical
focus away from the traditional preoccupation with the metropolis and its
elite groups towards a much clearer awareness of the need to examine the
history of the country's interior in general and that of the Indian and the
rural population in particular. To some extent this trend was imposed
from above during the most radical period (1968-75) of the Revolutionary
Government of the Armed Forces, when the Comision Nacional del
Sesquicentenario de la Independencia sought to promote a reinterpretation
of the late colonial history of Peru that harmonised with the military's new
insistence upon social justice, racial harmony and nationalism in
reconstructing Peru in the wake of the October I968 revolution.6 The
scholarly shift also reflected the emergence of a new generation of
Peruvian historians, many of whom had undertaken their doctoral
research outside Peru before returning to publish penetrating analyses of
Peru's past that were often thinly-disguised critiques of the country's old
historical and political establishments.7 To a small extent this process
involved, perhaps almost unconsciously, a reconsideration of the
preeminence or otherwise of i82I in securing national independence: for
example, one volume of the vast Colecciondocumentalpublished by the
Comision Nacional del Sesquicentenario reproduced documents relating
to the functioning of viceregal government in Cusco during the I822-4
4 See, for example, Luis A. Eguiguren, Guerra separatista del Perti. La rebelidnde Leon de
Huanuco(Lima, 1912) and La revolucidnde 1814 (Lima, 1914).
5 This theme is discussed in Jose Tamayo Herrera, Historia del
indigenismocugqueno,siglos
XVI-XX (Lima, 980).
6 John R. Fisher, 'Royalism, Regionalism and Rebellion in Colonial Peru, I808-I815',
Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 59 (I979), pp. 232-7.

7 A classic
example is provided by the iconoclastic work of Heraclio Bonilla et al., La
independenciaen el Perti (Lima, 1972).

58 John R. Fisher
period.8 However, chronologically the commission's principal thrust was

in the opposite direction, with the exaltation of Tupac Amaru as both
the first of South America's precursors of independence - thereby enabling
Peru to trump the reputations of Bolivar and San Martin- and as a
prophet of the agrarian reform and nationalisation programmes of
Velasco.9 Curiously, this trend (which revealed little about the historical
reality of the late colonial period but much about the superficiality of
pseudo-historical scholarship in Peru in the 1970s) survived the I975
shift to the right in military politics, partly because of the vigour with
which a further official body, the Comisi6n Nacional del Bicentenario de
la Rebeli6n Emancipadora de Tdpac Amaru, organised the bicentennial
celebrations of the 1780 uprising.10 During the I980s, the return to the
presidency of Fernando Belaunde Terry and, subsequently, the election
of Peru's first Aprista president, Alan Garcia, brought in their train,
at least at the rhetorical level, renewed interest in the need to devolve
political power from Lima towards the highlands, and specifically in the
possibility of creating a federal republic with Cusco as its capital.11
The more sober political environment created in Peru in the I990S by
Alberto Fujimori has restored a degree of reality to debates about the
potential for the restructuring of the country's political organisation.
Visitors to Peru now encounter apparently contradictory symbols. Real
power is entrenched ever more firmly in Lima, but the (imagined) flag of
Tawantisuyu flies freely in Cusco.l2 Popular participation at least at the
superficial levels of political activity, is here to stay. In this context, the
modern media (notably television) are capable of projecting a distorted
image of Peru's present and past, and, in the annual build-up to the
celebration of thefiestaspatrias, specifically of how (and when) the country
secured independence from Spain.13With these observations in mind, the
following section will discuss political and military events in Peru during
the decade prior to the disembarkation of San Martin's army in 1820,
before moving to a more detailed analysis of royalist strategy in the
subsequent four years.
8
Coleccidndocumentalde la independenciadel Perui, 87 vols. in 30 tomos (Lima, 1971-74);
tomo 22, vol. 3, 'Gobierno virreynal del Cuzco' Horacio Villanueva Urteaga (ed.).
9 This theme is developed in John Fisher, 'Imperialism, Centralism and Regionalism in
Peru, I776-I845', in Region and Class in Modern Peruvian History, Rory Miller (ed.)
(Liverpool, i987), pp. 21-34.
10 An example of its work is Actas del ColoquioInternacional'Tupac Amaruj su tiempo'
(Lima, I982). 1 Fisher, 'Imperialism', p. 23.
12 The traditional (Spanish) name of the city - Cuzco - is now rarely seen; in some circles
the new-style Cusco has already given way to Qosqo.

13
Visiting Ayacucho on 31 July I998 I heard a speech in the main square, nominally
about events in 82 , from the city's military commander which elevated obvious pride
in Peru's national identity into a threat of war against Ecuador.

2. The historicalcontext: Peru 181o-2o

The viceroyalty of Peru was, of course, the only major administrative unit
in Spanish America that did not experience a sustained attempt by
disaffected creoles in I8Io-II to seize political power, following the
French takeover of peninsular Spain in I8o8-io.14 One of the fruits of
revisionism since the I970s, however, is that it is also now widely
acknowledged that behind the facade of Peruvian royalism in the post-
1808 period-when viceroy Jose Fernandez de Abascal (I8o6-I6) was
able to despatch royalist armies, led by creole officers, to repress
insurrections in Upper Peru, Chile and Ecuador - there was considerable
local unrest, merging into attempted armed rebellion in the south of the
viceroyalty (Tacna in 1811 and 1813; Arequipa in 1813) and the centre
(Huamanga and Huanuco in 1812). Crucially, however, proto-nationalist
activity in Lima never got beyond the stage of half-hearted conspiracies
primarily because the conservative elite was intensely afraid of upsetting
social and racial stability. As future president Jose de la Riva Agiiero
observed in 1821: 'Es sabido que los que van a ganar en toda revolucion
son las gentes perdidas, y no las acomodadas'.15
In Cusco, the viceroyalty's second city, and the seat (since 1788) of its
second audiencia,a much more uneasy peace prevailed until August 1814,
when a major insurrection was provoked by the failure of the viceregal
authorities to implement fully the provisions of the Constitution of Cadiz
of 1812 (ironically, the restored Ferdinand VII had decreed its abolition
in May, but news did not reach Peru until September).16 The movement's
creole leaders - small landowners, lawyers, clergy and municipal officials
- immediately made clear their demand for Peruvian independence, as
they despatched hastily-recruited expeditions, manned largely by in-
digenous recruits, throughout southern Peru. By the end of 1814 they
controlled the cities of Puno, La Paz, Huamanga (modern Ayacucho) and
Arequipa, before falling back to Cusco, following the arrival of a royalist
force of I,200 cusquenoofficers and men hitherto fighting insurgency in
Upper Peru. By March I815 this force, led by General Juan Ramirez,
deputy-commander of the army in Upper Peru, had retaken Cusco, where
the leaders of the rebellion were promptly executed. They included the
cacique of Chincheros, Mateo Garcia Pumacahua, whose participation
14 A restatementof the reasons for the political conservatism of Peruvian creoles is
embraced in Brian R. Hamnett, 'Process and Pattern: a Re-examination of the
Ibero-American Independence Movements, I8o8-i826', Journalof Latin American
Studies, vol. 29 (I997), pp. 279-328.
15
Quoted in Fisher, 'Royalism', p. 244.
16
J. R. Fisher, Governmentand Societyin ColonialPeru: the IntendantSystemI784-1814
(London, 1970), p. 233.

6o John R. Fisher
legitimised the interpretation of the movement as a racial uprising of

Indians against whites, as well as a bid to make Cusco the capital of an
independent Peru.
Similarities between the Tiipac Amaru rising (initially an attempt at a
broad-based revolution, drawing some support from poor creoles and
mestizos in southern Peru) and the I814-I5 rebellion (started by non-
Indians but rapidly taking on the character of a caste war against all
whites) are obvious. The connecting thread, revealed most recently by
David Cahill, is that the three decades separating the two movements had
seen a sustained assault on traditional indigenous rights in the region, the
most common features of which were the entry of creoles and mestizos
into the cacicazgos,and the usurpation of community lands and other
resources.17
The audiencia of Cusco grappled with these issues throughout the
i790S, but, in the face of political opposition (locally and in Lima)
reconciled itself gradually to the inevitable abuses inherent in allowing
outsiders access to community resources. In the event the tribunal
capitulated to the subdelegates, the local political authorities who replaced
the corregidoresin 1784, under whose aegis entry of the 'new' caciques had
been permitted. The audiencia's failure to control the exploitation of
communities stemmed largely from its awareness that the new community
officials were more efficient than their indigenous predecessors in
collecting tribute revenues. It also helps explain why the weakening of
crown authority in southern Peru in 1814 provided an opportunity for not
only the expression of creole political protest but also for the revival of
widespread indigenous insurgency.18 The suppression of the rising by
Ramirez in 8 5 meant that the process of inserting outsiders as caciques
continued unabated throughout - and beyond - the final transition to
independence, with communities that resisted running the risk of being
accused of sedition by the subdelegates.19
Although experience of the unpredictability of socio-racial alliances
made the creoles of Cusco wary of the region's indigenous population,
elements of both the white middle class and the elite were attracted from
17 David P. Cahill, 'Repartos ilicitos y familias principales en el sur andino, 1780-1824',
Revista de Indias, vol. 48 (1988), pp. 449-73.
18
David P. Cahill and Scarlett O'Phelan Godoy, 'Forging their own History: Indian
Insurgency in the southern Peruvian Sierra, 1814-I817', Bulletin of Latin American
Research, vol. ii (1992), pp. 125-67.
19 In I822, for example, the subdelegate of Abancay accused the alcalde of the pueblo of
Huanipa (Francisco Xavier Negr6n) of insurrection because of his resistance to the
appointment as cacique of the subdelegate's nominee (Mariano Alzamorra); Negr6n
attributed the appointment to the payment of a bribe whereas the subdelegate accused
Negr6n of having encouraged the inhabitants not to pay their contribucidn:Archivo
Departamental del Cusco (hereafter cited as ADC), Intendencia, Gobierno, leg. I57.

time to time to the idea of identifying an Inca to lead a separatist

movement. This sentiment surfaced not only in 1780 and 1814 but also in
the I8o5 Aguilar-Ubalde conspiracy, when creole plotters tried to
persuade the Cusco regidor Manuel Valverde Ampuero, who claimed
descent from Huayna Capac, to recruit support from the noble Indian
electors of the alferago real - they represented the pre-Conquest panacas,
or lineage groups into which the nobility of Inca Cusco had been
organised - for the proclamation of Gabriel Aguilar, a miner from
Huanuco, as Inca.20At first sight it is difficult to reconcile such sentiments
with the increasing tendency of local landowners, merchants, and officials
to exploit community resources, but it is worth remembering that some
prominent creole families could claim kinship links with the indigenous
nobility. Moreover, indigenista- or incanista- rhetoric would continue
into the republican period, its principal exponent being Cusco's first
prefect after independence, Agustin Gamarra, at least until he realised in
the I83os that he had more to gain by identifying with metropolitan
interests rather than with the regionally-based Peruvian-Bolivian Con-
federation.21
The savage reprisals undertaken in the aftermath of the 1814 rebellion
in and around Cusco by the royalist forces - many of them local creoles
who saw an enhanced opportunity to seize Indian community lands -
ensured relative political tranquillity in southern Peru for the remainder
of the second decade of the nineteenth century. Within the old viceroyalty
as a whole (i.e. excluding Upper Peru), what insurrectionary activity there
was from mid- 8 5 until the end of 1819 manifested itself primarily in
guerrilla activity in the Mantaro Valley; it remains to be determined
definitively whether this represented banditry, social protest, patriotism,
or a combination of all three.22 However, recent scholarship suggests that
support for the montonerascame mainly from rootless groups particularly
susceptible to economic fluctuations- 'arrieros, vagabundos y jornaleros
de las minas', to quote one source - rather than community Indians with
greater resources upon which to fall back in times of recession.23 In Lima
20
J R Fisher, 'Regionalism and Rebellion in Late Colonial Peru: The Aguilar-Ubalde
Conspiracy of I805', BibliotechaAmericana, vol. I (1982), pp. 44-59.
21 Recent treatments of incanismoinclude Manuel Burga, Nacimiento de una utopia: muerte
y resurreccidnde los Incas (Lima, i988) and Alberto Flores Galindo, Buscandoun Inca:
identidady utopia en los Andes (Lima, I987).
22 Peter Guardino, 'Las guerrillas y la independencia peruana: un ensayo de
interpretaci6n', Pasadoy Presente,vol. 2 (I989), pp. 10I-I7. See, too, Rail Rivera Serna,
Los guerrillerosdel centroen la emancipacidn
peruana (Lima, 95 8), Gustavo Vergara Arias,
Montonerasyguerrillas en la etapa de la emancipacidndel Perui(I82o-182) (Lima, 1974), and
Ezequiel Beltran Gallardo, Las guerrillas de Yauyosen la emancipaciondel Peru, 1820-1824
(Lima, 1977).
23 Alberto Flores
Galindo, quoted in Remy, 'La sociedad', p. 482.

62 John R. Fisher
itself economic and fiscal difficulties rather than overt revolutionary
activity were the principal concerns, at least until i820, of the new
viceroy, Joaquin de La Pezuela who succeeded Abascal in mid-i8i6,
following service from I 813 as commander-in-chief of the royalist army in
Upper Peru. Pezuela's crowning moment in this role had occurred in
November I815, with his decisive victory at Viluma over Jose Rondeau,
following earlier successes at Vilcapugio and Ayohuma against the
expeditionary force brought from Buenos Aires by Manuel Belgrano.24
Thereafter, the new viceroy's preoccupation with maintaining a strong
military presence in Upper Peru - where overall command of the royalist
army was transferred in i 86 to the newly-arrived La Serna, a veteran of
the peninsular war - is usually cited as a decisive factor in his failure to
commit adequate forces to the defence of Chile against San Martin's 1817
trans-Andean expedition.25 A point of relative detail, which would
become a major bone of contention in due course between the respective
apologists of Pezuela and La Serna, was that, following his landing at
Arica in September 8 6, the latter travelled directly to Upper Peru, rather
than going first to Lima to confer with the viceroy, thereby allegedly
undermining the authority of his superior.26
In the event, Upper Peru remained relatively secure in royalist hands
until well after San Martin's landing. Similarly, the kingdom of Quito was
mostly tranquil, following the eventual Peruvian repression by i 812 of its
early efforts to reject Spanish rule, and would remain so until invaded by
Colombian forces in I822.27 As Field Marshal Jer6nimo Vald6s wrote in
1827, following his return to Spain after Ayacucho, when Pezuela became
viceroy in 1816 'la situaci6n de aquel Reino era la mas lisonjera... el nuevo
mundo era todo espafiol, a excepci6n de parte del Virreinato de Buenos
Aires '.28
Although continuous warfare in Upper Peru from 1809 had imposed a
heavy drain on the human and material resources of the southern Peruvian
provinces of Arequipa, Cusco and Puno - from which the aptly-named
royalist 'army of Peru' was largely recruited - the full costs of the
determination of most Peruvians to fight for the royalist cause did not
24
A detailedaccountof the viceroy's militarycareeris provided by Joaquinde la Pezuela,
MemoriamilitardelgeneralPeZuela(181}-181y)(Lima, 955) Felix Denegri Luna (ed.).
See, too, Joaquin de la Pezuela, Memoriadegobierno(Sevilla, 1947) Vicente Rodriguez
Casadoand Guillermo Lohmann Villena (eds.).
25 John Lynch, The Spanish American RevolutionsI808-1826 (London, I973), pp. 125-6.
26 Jer6nimo Valdes, Documentos la historiade la guerra
para separatistadel Peru, 4 vols.,
(Madrid, i894-98) Fernando Valdes y Hector [Conde de Torata] (ed.), vol. I, p. 21.
27
Guayaquil- officially part of Peru since 1803 --revolted in October I820, however,
providing Bolivar with an early opportunity to despatch Colombian troops (under
Sucre) to help its defence against royalist counter-attack.
28 Valdes, Documentos,vol. I, p. 20.

become evident to lime,os until 18 8, with the loss of Chile. The patriot
victory at Maipu in April over the royalist army commanded by Mariano
Osorio - Pezuela's son-in-law - caused heavy casualties among the 3,000-
strong expeditionary force - half of them Peruvians, and the remainder
peninsularesrecently-arrived from Panamai- despatched to Chile from Peru
at the end of i8I7.29 The southern port of Valdivia would remain in
royalist hands until its capture by Thomas Cochrane in January 1820 (and
the island of Chiloe until January I 826), but Peruvian dreams of mounting
yet another reconquest of Chile were rapidly dissipated after Maipu. A
decisive blow was the capture in October 1818 in Talcahuano - the naval
base near Concepci6n abandoned by Osorio - by the fledgling Chilean
navy of the Callao-bound naval frigate Maria Isabeland several transports
carrying troops and arms from Cadiz.30 This single incident not only
deprived Peru of 2,000 reinforcements but also provided the Chileans
with the flagship (renamed the O'Higgins) of the seven warships that
escorted the 4,500 troops of the liberating expedition from Valparaiso to
Peru in August I820.31 The following section of the article begins with a
consideration of the royalist reaction to the landing of this force south of
Lima on 8-o0 September 1820.
3. Royalist reactions: Peru 1820-4
Despite the fact that official statistics of troop strengths in late-colonial

Peru, as elsewhere in Spanish America in this period, are notoriously
unreliable, particularly with respect to the real numbers of men in militia
regiments able and willing to go on active service, on the face of it Pezuela
had substantial forces at his disposal in 1820 for the defence of the
viceroyalty against both internal insurgency and external attack.32 The
largest elements in his total forces of 23,000 were the 'army of Upper
Peru' (io,ooo), commanded by Ramirez - who had returned to Upper
29
Exhaustive coverage of Peruvian participation in military activity throughout the
viceroyalty and in Chile, Quito and Upper Peru during the independence period as a
whole is provided by El ejercitoen la independenciadel Peru, tomo 4, 3 vols. (Lima, I984).
For a more succinct coverage, see Julio Albi, Banderasolvidadas: el ejercito realista en
America (Madrid, I 990). A solid account of the period is Ruben Vargas Ugarte, Historia
del Peru: emancipacion(I809-I821) (Buenos Aires, 95 8).
30 The failure to maintain a military presence at Talcahuano after Maipu became another
of the major complaints against Pezuela: Valdes, Documentos,vol. 2, p. 43.
31 For details of the ships in the Chilean squadron, see Vargas Ugarte, Historia, pp. 1 56-7.
32 An overview of the roles of regular and militia troops in the royalist armies is provided
by Juan Marchena Fernandez, Ejercitoy milicias en el mundocolonialamericano(Madrid,
1992). See, too, Juan Marchena Fernindez, 'The Social World of the Military in Peru
and New Granada: the Colonial Oligarchies in Conflict, I750-I8I0', in Reform and
Insurrectionin BourbonNew Granadaand Peru (Baton Rouge, i990), eds. John R. Fisher,
Allan J. Kuethe, and Anthony McFarlane, pp. 60-6i, 69.

64 John R. Fisher
Peru in succession to La Serna, following an interim period as president
of Quito - and the 6,ooo-strong 'army of Lima', under the direct
command of the viceroy.33 The garrison of Callao (i,ooo) and other
detachments north and south of Lima increased immediately-available
royalist strength to almost 9,ooo.34 Within hours of receiving confirmation
that San Martin had begun to disembark his troops at Paracas, Pezuela
withdrew the small force he had posted at Pisco, ordered Ramfrez to move
his headquarters from Tupiza to La Paz (i.e. nearer to Lower Peru), and
repeated his instructions to hacendadossouth of Lima to move slaves, cattle
and horses to the interior.35
The viceroy's general strategy of concentrating his forces in and around
Lima reflected his apprehension about the vulnerability of Callao to attack
by the superior naval squadron of the Chileans, whose control of the sea
grew even more marked with the capture of the royalist flagship, the
Esmeralda, by Cochrane on 5 November.36 The following month the
semi-phoney war was further punctuated by the occupation of Peru's
principal mining town, Cerro de Pasco, by a column despatched by San
Martin to the interior of central Peru under the command of the Spanish-
born Juan Antonio Alvarez de Arenales. Although Arenales (as he is
commonly called) soon returned to the coast - leaving the montoneras and
the citizens of Tarma and Huanuco who had declared for independence at
the mercy of the royalist reinforcements under Valdes and Brigadier
Mariano Ricafort - he did lasting damage to the viceregal economy by
seizing large stocks of silver and sabotaging recently-installed steam
engines that had brought production at Cerro de Pasco to a record level
in I82o.37 He also took with him future president Santa Cruz, commander
33 ' Estado general de la tropa de artilleria, infanteria y caballeria que existe en los ejercitos
de Lima y Alto Peru, asi como en las provincias dependientes de ambos virreynatos...',
Biblioteca de Men6ndez Pelayo, Santander, Papeles de Pezuela (ilereafter cited as BMP,
Pezuela), ms. 5, cuad. io.
34 In February 821, following desertions to San Martin (the most conspicuous of which
was that of the 6so-strong Numancia battalion), a British naval officer put royalist
strength at 7,000, including 2,500 Europeans: Margaret L. Woodward, 'The Spanish
Army and the Loss of America,' Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 48 (I968), p.
592. Of the 33,000 troops despatched from Spain to America in 1810-18, 6,ooo had
reached Peru, the majority in I8I 5-i8: Edmundo A. Heredia, Planes espanolespara
reconquistarHispanoamerica(I81o-18I8) (Buenos Aires, i974), pp. 382-7.
35 Pezuela to minister of war, Ii
Sept. 820z, BMP, Pezuela, ms. io, cuad. 5.
36 On the same date,
coincidentally, plans - in the event fruitless - were discussed in
Madrid to send additional warships to Callao and Cartagena, 'amenazados de nueva
invasi6n por las fuerzas rebeldes auxiliadas por los extranjeros...': Jose Canga Arguelles
to overseas minister, 5 Nov. 1820, Archivo General de Indias, Seville (cited hereafter
as AGI), Indif. Gen., leg. i568.
37 J. R.
Fisher, Silver Mines and Silver Miners in Colonial Peru, i776-r824 (Liverpool, 1977),
p. III. San Martin protested to Pezuela on 6 January 1821 that, on entering Tarma,
Ricafort had executed the wounded left there by Arenales; in his response - of i

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru 65
of the royalist cavalry at Cerro de Pasco, who had defected to the

insurgents after being taken prisoner on 6 December.
While San Martin's strategy of waiting for the royalist r6gime to
disintegrate rather than risking his troops in open battle seemed to be
further vindicated in December i820 by the declaration of independence
in the northern city of Trujillo by its intendant, the Marques de Torre
Tagle, Pezuela's political and military indecisiveness provided the
backdrop to the famous military coup against him of 29 January i82i.38
Essentially, the nineteen principal officers in the royalist army camped at
Aznapuquio accused Pezuela of a variety of defects (primarily an
unwillingness to attack San Martin, accentuated by specific military
errors, fraud, contraband, nepotism, and a tolerance of suspicious
behaviour among his close advisors).39 Faced with an ultimatum that the
army would march on Lima unless he transferred power to La Serna
within four hours, Pezuela informed a hastily-convenedjznta deguerralater
that day of his compliance, and left Lima for his country house at La
Magdalena.40 La Serna, for his part, promptly appointed Vald6s as his
chief-of-staff, promoted Jose Canterac to overall command of the army,
and set about the strategic review that would lead five months later to the
royalist evacuation of Lima and San Martin's unopposed entry on 12
July.41
The deposition of Pezuela, although subsequently condoned in Madrid
(and indirectly sanctioned in advance by a royal order of 1820, authorising
La Serna to take over as viceroy 'en caso de muerte, ausencia, o
enfermedad' of Pezuela) undermined the legitimacy of royalist authority
in the eyes of many conservative Peruvians, who now felt able to support
January 1821 - Pezuela denied this but made the counter-accusation that the insurgents
had committed atrocities in Ica, Huamanga and Huancavelica, of which one of the most
serious had been to allow black soldiers to rape Spanish women: 'Conferencias en
Miraflores y correspondencia con el general enemigo', BMP, Pezuela, ms. 6.
38 Neighbouring towns, including Piura, rapidly followed the example set by Trujillo,
and by May I821 much of northern Peru had declared for San Martin.
39 For the names of the principal signatories, see Vargas Ugarte, Historia, p. 221. They
were also listed in an anonymous pamphlet (in reality written by Pezuela's nephew
'Fernandito') - Ingenuo, Rebelidnde Agnapuquio por variosjefes del exercito espanolpara
deponerdel mandoal dignisimoVirrey... (Rio de Janeiro, 1821; Lima, 822) - which made
unflattering remarks about many of them: Garcia Camba, for example, was described
as 'vano, orgulloso... bien ingrato', La Serna as 'de conocimientos escasos, f(.cil de ser
engafiado', and Valdes as possessing a 'trato grosero e insolente'.
40 The
building now houses Peru's Museo Nacional de la Historia in Pueblo Libre.
Initially, Pezuela was ordered to leave Peru within 24 hours, but La Serna relaxed this
condition and he remained until June 1821.
41 For an account of the background to this decision see Timothy E. Anna, The Fall of
the Royal Governmentin Peru (Lincoln NE and London, I979), pp. 170-80.

66 John R. Fisher
San Martin in good conscience.42 More seriously, it also became a matter

of public debate in Madrid, with the publication there before the end of
the year of not only the accusations against Pezuela but also his detailed
refutation of them written at La Magdalena before his departure for
Spain.43 The war of words would continue long after the independence of
Peru had been secured, with Valdes' response to Pezuela, written in 1827
but not published until 1894, and the publication in 1846 of a further pro-
La Serna account by another signatory of the Aznapuquio proclamation,
Andres Garcia Camba.44
The principal thrust of Pezuela's manifesto was that he had been the
innocent victim of 'una insurreccion puramente militar' - organised by a
tightly-knit group of peninsular officers who, ever since their arrival from
Spain in 18 6 (Canterac, in fact, came in 1818) had sought to 'formar un
partido' - to which he had given way only to avoid 'una guerra civil'.45
La Serna, he declared, had opposed him with 'una taciturnidad invencible'
and an 'arrogancia petulante', Garcia Camba was 'uno de mis mas
acerrisimos enemigos', and Canterac had dedicated himself to his
'degradacion'; similar charges were made against other leading members
of'el partido de oficiales europeos', notably Colonel Juan Loriga and
Lieutenant-Colonel Antonio Seoane.46 These charges, coupled with
evidence of the subsequent rift between La Serna and the then commander
of the army of Upper Peru, Pedro Antonio Olafieta, following the I823
abolition of the constitution, have led some commentators to explain the
42 Printed
royal order, 30 Sept. 1820, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro I, fol. 81.
43 Manifiestoen el que el virreydel Peru Don Joaquinde la PeZuelarefiereel hechoy circunstancias
de su separacidndel mando:demuestralafalsedad, malicia, e imposturade las atrocesimputaciones
contenidasen el oficiode intimaciondel 29 de Enero de losjefes del ejercitode Lima, autores de
la conspiracion;y anuncialas causas de este acontecimiento(Madrid, 1821).
44 Andres Garcia Camba, Memoriaspara la historia de las armas reales en el Peru (Madrid,
1846). The I827 response of Valdes dealt with not only Pezuela's 1821 accusations but
also the post-I 824 charges that La Serna and his officers - 'los mal mirados' - should
not have surrendered at Ayacucho: 'Exposici6n que dirige al rey don Fernando VII el
mariscal de campo don Jer6nimo Valdes sobre las causas que motivaron la perdida del
Peru, desde Vitoria, a 12 de Julio de I827', in Valdes, Documentos,vol. 2, pp. 17-137;
it is preceded by his grandson's introduction [pp. i-i 5; see p. 8 for the 'mal mirados'
reference], and is followed by a large number of 'documentos justificativos' (pp.
141-497). Another less direct but influential authority, Mariano Torrente, sometimes
described as hostile to La Serna - Torata claimed (Documentos,vol. 3, p. 8) that his work
was influenced by 'los Pezuelistas y Olafietistas'- eulogised him as the only viceroy
'que haya sellado con su sangre su fidelidad en el campo de batalla', a reference to the
wounds he received at Ayacucho: Mariano Torrente, Historia de la revolucionhispano-
americana,3 vols. (Madrid, 1829-30), vol. 3, P. 508. Analyses of Spanish public opinion
towards American independence include Melchor Fernindez Almagro, La emancipacidn
de Americay su reflejoen la concienciaespanola (Madrid, 1957) and Luis Miguel Enciso
Recio, La opinidnpiblica espanolay la independencia hispanoamericana1819-1820 (Valladolid,
1967). 45 Pezuela, Manifiesto, pp. 10, 13, I44.
46
Ibid, pp. IIo, I25-6.

I82I crisis in terms of a political conflict between liberal officers around

La Serna, who believed that only the I8I2 constitution could reconcile
Americans to the maintenance of Spanish rule, and absolutists - creole
and peninsular - deeply suspicious of constitutionalism.47 Pezuela himself
went some way towards fostering this interpretation, suggesting,
somewhat obliquely, that 'la grande revolucion ocurrida en la peninsula'
had provided an opportunity for 'los menos apreciables ciudadanos' to
'trastornar impunamente la autoridad'.48 He was more direct in his
private correspondence, accusing La Serna of 'hipocresia, arteria,
malignidad, ingratitud y cautela', and describing him and his principal
officers as 'una rama mas6nica del Arbol que esti en las Cortes, y
ministros del dia (y del t'po siguiente, si sigue el actual desgobierno de
Espafia)....49
La Serna, for his part, pointed out to the crown in March 1824,
following the restoration of absolutism, that, although he had been
required to pay lip service to the constitution during the previous three
years, he had actually decreed in April 1822 that orders received from the
liberal government in Spain should not be implemented without his
specific authority.50 Any individual disobeying this order, he had declared,
would be treated 'como sedicioso y perturbador del orden puiblico'.51
Referring directly to Olafieta's refusal to obey him because of his initial
reluctance to abolish the constitution without receiving explicit
instructions from Spain, La Serna asked rhetorically if any of those trying
to project themselves as 'mas anti-constitucionales' than himself 'se
hubieran atrevido en mi lugar a tan clasicas violaciones y modificaciones
cuando la Constituci6n se ostentaba protegida y recomendada por el
mismo Monarca?'.52 In the light of Olaneta's abolition of the constitution
in the provinces of Potosi and Charcas, and the subsequent decision of
Valdes - whom La Serna had despatched to repress his insurrection - to
take similar action in the rest of Upper Peru, the viceroy finally decreed
the restoration of absolutism in Lower Peru on i March 1824, despite
still not having received specific authorisation from Spain for this
measure.53
The evidence available about relations between Pezuela and La Serna
47 See, for example, Woodward, 'The Spanish Army', pp. 602-604, and Lynch, The
Spanish American Revolutions,pp. I71-2. 48 Pezuela, Manifiesto, p. 26.
49 Pezuela to La Serna, La Magdalena, 22 Feb. I821, BMP, Pezuela, ms. i.
50 La Serna to minister of
grace and justice, Cusco, 15 March 824, AGI, Lima, leg. 762.
51 Decree of La Serna, Cusco, i April 822, ADC, Intendencia, Gobierno Virreinal, leg.
52 See note
I59. 5o.
53 Decree of La Serna, ii March 1824, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro i, if.
377-8. The royal
decree of 25 Dec. I823, ordering this step, was published in Cusco on 3I July 1824:
Ibid, fol. 401-402.

68 John R. Fisher
and their respective circles prior to January I821 also tends to suggest
that, although factions certainly existed within the military, they did not
necessarily reflect deep-seated ideological disagreements. Rather more
important were the broader cultural differences and arguments about
tactics between long-serving officers in America like Pezuela (whose
service there went back to 80o5)and Ramirez, who felt that only they
understood the creoles, and the arrogant, self-confident peninsular
veterans who arrived in Peru in I8I6 determined to repress dissidence
with their vigorous professionalism. One of the standard accusations
against La Serna, for example, was that as soon as he reached Upper Peru
he disbanded two militia regiments from Cusco, including that which had
defeated the Pumacahua rebellion, dispersing their men and officers to
other units, in order to facilitate the promotion of his peninsular
subordinates.54 On the other side, there is clear evidence that La Serna
disagreed fundamentally with Pezuela's military tactics - notably in Chile
in 1817 - to such an extent that he sought permission to resign his
command and return to Spain.55 Approval in Madrid for his retirement
- ostensibly on grounds of ill-health - was confirmed in 18I 8, and, having
travelled to Lima, La Serna was actually within two days of leaving for
Panama when, somewhat surprisingly in view of subsequent events,
Pezuela promoted him to the rank of lieutenant-general and persuaded
him to remain in the capital, ready to step in as interim viceroy should the
need arise.56 Pezuela's original intention, it seems, had been to restore La
Serna to his command in Upper Peru - from where he would receive
testimony in July 820 of deep hostility between Ramirez and the 'partido
escandaloso' of peninsularesled by Canterac - but this plan was overtaken
by the arrival of San Martin and the consequential need to keep La Serna
in Lima.57
Despite reservations about attributing the divisions among the royalists
in 1820-I to ideological differences, it has to be recognised that the
restoration of liberalism in Spain in 1820 profoundly affected develop-
54 Pezuela, Manifiesto,p. I 13. See, too, Garcia Camba, Memorias,pp. 223-4, who observes
that the unwillingness of creoles to serve under peninsularesprovoked many desertions
of hitherto enthusiastic supporters of the royalist cause.
55 Vargas Ugarte, Historia, pp. I52-3.
56 Pezuela to minister of war, no. 803, Lima, 14 Feb. 1820, BMP, Pezuela, ms. 5, cuad.
8.
57 Mariano de la Torre
y Vera to Pezuela, Tupiza, 7 July 1820, BMP, Pezuela, ms. 5, cuad.
9; La Serna to Pezuela, Lima, 30 Sept. I820, BMP, Pezuela, ms. 5, cuad. Io. Despite
more pressing matters, a lot of paper and time was wasted in deciding the actual date
up to which he should be paid as commander of the army of Upper Peru (eventually
determined as 5 December I8 9), a matter of some concern to Lima treasury officials
because of salary differentials: Pezuela to secretary of state, Lima, no. 489, 5 June I 820,
AGI, Lima, leg. 762.

ments in Peru, to the disadvantage of first Pezuela and subsequently that
of San Martin.58 The precise chronology is of some significance for,
although Pezuela was aware by mid-July of the 1820 revolution, thanks
to private correspondence with the Spanish ambassador in Rio de Janeiro,
it was only on 4 September, four days before San Martin began his
disembarkation, that he received a formal instruction to restore the 81 2
constitution.59 The ceremony itself, held on I5 September, was preceded
by an offer to San Martin four days earlier to arrange a cease-fire,
following the receipt of complementary orders to take this step pending
the arrival from Spain of peace commissioners entrusted with the task of
persuading the insurgents that the restoration of the constitution would
enable them to secure all their objectives within the Spanish fold.60
Although the viceroy's initial letter was worded rather abruptly - he
stated that the orders from Madrid had interrupted his plans to repel San
Martin from Peruvian soil - his offer of talks was accepted, and they got
under way outside Lima between respective pairs of delegates on 25
September.6' It was clear within a week that the gulf between the two
sides was unbridgeable, not least because of San Martin's insistence on the
surrender of Upper Peru to his forces, and formal hostilities were renewed
on 7 October, despite a last-ditch plea from San Martin to keep them
going on the grounds that 'una mala paz es mejor que la guerra mis
feroz', a reference perhaps to Pezuela's earlier observation that the long
war in Upper Peru had caused only 'muertos, miseria y ruina'.62 By the
beginning of November, San Martin's army, which had taken advantage
58 Standardsourceson Spanishpolitics in 1820-3 includeJose Luis Comellas,Los realistas
en el trienioconstitucional(i 82 0-I 823) (Pamplona, 1958) and Los primerospronunciamientos
en Espana 814-I-820 (Madrid, I958). Broader analyses of Spanish imperial policy are
provided by Timothy E. Anna, Spain and the loss of America (Lincoln NE and London,
1983) and Michael P. Costeloe, Response to Revolution: Imperial Spain and the Spanish
American Revolutions,i8ro-I84o (Cambridge, 1986).
59 Pezuela to ambassador Casaflores, Lima, 14
July 1820, acknowledging receipt of his
letter of II May I820: BMP, Pezuela, ms. 5, cuad. 6. See, too, Anna, Spain, pp. 234-9,
and Anna, Fall of the Royal Government,pp. 159-6 I.
60 Full details of Pezuela's correspondence with government officials in Spain and with
San Martin himself in the period 4 April 1820 - 20 January 182 , are in 'Conferencias
en Miraflores y correspondencia con el general enemigo', BMP, Pezuela, ms. 6. The
swearing of the constitution in the rest of the viceroyalty was arranged at a rather
leisurely pace, occurring in Cusco, for example, on I5 October: decree of president,
Cusco, 2 Oct. 1820, ADC, Intendencia, Gobierno, leg. 157.
61 Details of Pezuela's military tactics were discussed at meetings of his junta deguerraheld
on 13 and 22 September: BMP, Pezuela, ms. 5, cuad. o1, fol. 88-91, pp. 101-104.
During the Miraflores discussions Pezuela met personally with San Martin's delegates,
and the latter with Pezuela's, but there was no direct meeting between the two leaders.
62 San Martin to Pezuela, i Oct. 1820; Pezuela to San Martin, i I Sept. 1820, ibid. La Serna
supported the view that the transfer of Upper Peru to San Martin was out of the
question, but, with remarkable prescience, he suggested that the Chileans might be
satisfied if offered Tacna and Arica: La Serna to Pezuela, Lima, 30 Sept. I820, ibid.

70 John R. Fisher
of the cease-fire to secure food, horses and recruits from coastal estates,
had advanced to the outskirts of Lima, setting in train the events that
would lead to Pezuela's deposition in January.63
Against this background, ponderous steps were being taken in Spain to
appoint, instruct, and despatch to various American destinations the peace
commissioners promised in April i 820, a process that led eventually to the
departure from Cidiz for Peru via Panama of naval Captain Manuel de
Abreu and Brigadier Jose Rodriguez de Arias.64 Arias got no further than
Cartagena de Indias, where he resigned his commission on grounds of ill-
health, citing rheumatoid arthritis.65 Abreu, however, stuck to his task,
sailing to northern Peru and travelling overland to the insurgent
headquarters at Huaura, where he made direct contact with San Martin on
27 March I821.66 By the time he presented himself to La Serna in Lima
on 30 March, following a preliminary meeting with Canterac at
Aznapuquio, Abreu had begun to create the conditions that would lead to
an armistice between the two sides, under cover of which the viceroy was
able to plan his evacuation of Lima without fear of military action, thereby
reversing the situation in which Pezuela had found himself in September
I820.67
63 The offer of emancipation to slaves who left haciendas to join San Martin attracted
sufficientrecruitsto make good the losses causedby diseasein the forces brought from
Chile: GarciaCamba,Memorias,p. 336. A parallelappealto Peru's Indian inhabitants,
printed in both Spanishand Quechua, for their support in returnfor the abolition of
tributewas less successful,at least in the short term: Jose de San Martin... a los Indios
Naturales del Peri, Pisco, 7 Sept. 1820, BMP, Pezuela, ms. 5, cuad. Io.
64 Full details are in AGI, Indif. Gen., leg. 568. Those originally chosen for Peru, Captain
Joaquin Gofii and CaptainFrancisco Xavier Ulloa, managed to wriggle out of the
commission, the first because of a dispute about his salary, and the second on the
grounds that he had 'tios carnalesen aquellos paises y Gobiernos disidentes...': Juan
Tabot to overseas minister, 2 July 820o,ibid.
65 Arias to Abreu, Cartagena, ii Jan. i8z2, AGI, Indif. Gen., leg. 1569.
66 The fullest account of Abreu's the from his
activities, covering period departurefrom
Portobelo on 2z January 1821 until his arrival in Tarifa on I6 June i822, is his detailed
(55 pp.) 'Diario Politico...', i8 June i822, AGI, Lima, leg. 800. This report was
misfiled until 1971 in the Audiencia of Mexico (leg. 233o) section of the AGI.
Consequently,many earlierinvestigators,although awareof Abreu'sactivities,did not
see his report, which contains much fascinating detail of his discussions with San
Martin,La Serna,and other leading figures. Much of his correspondenceis duplicated
in AGI, Lima, leg. 800, copies having been brought back by a second commissioner,
Pedro Fernandezde Tavira(appointedin Limaas a substitutefor Arias),who left Peru
in November for the peninsula via Panama, reaching Lisbon in March: Tavira to
overseas minister, Lisbon, I5 March 1822, enclosing 'exposici6n breve y sencilla', ibid.
67 Abreu noted in his 'Diario' that at his first full meeting with La Serna,on I April 'el
virrey me habl6 con la frialdadpropia de su caracter';GarciaCamba(Memoria,p. 388)
commentedthat even at this earlystage it was evident to the royaliststhat he had come
as 'un ciego apologista de los independientes'. Garcia Camba(ibid.,p. 393) thought
that the discussionswere 'inutiles y ain perjudiciales',but Valdes (Documentos,vol. 2,
p. 57) conceded that 'una suspensi6n de hostilidades... nos interesaba'.

Preliminary discussions between respective sets of commissioners led to

a formal armistice on 23 May 1821, initially of twenty days but
subsequently extended until late June; on 2 June, at the hacienda of
Punchauca, La Serna and San Martin met face-to-face and the latter
proposed the creation of a regency with La Serna as president, offering to
travel in person to Spain as part of a commission to arrange the
independence of Peru under a Spanish prince. According to Abreu, La
Serna, although diffident about accepting the presidency, was tempted by
this offer, but, following discussions with Valdes and Garcia Camba,
rejected it because 'los jefes del ejercito se habian opuesto por no
anteceder la aprobaci6n de las Cortes'. By early July, despite Abreu's
continuing optimism, it was clear that the gulf between the two sides was
unbridgeable, and La Serna and his army voted with their feet by
marching out of Lima, ignoring a protest from the audienciathat the city
was being cut off from 'la integridad nacional'.68 The tribunal's misgivings
about the fate awaiting the city's peninsulareswere borne out before the end
of the year by their persecution at the hands of San Martin's minister of
war, Bernardo de Monteagudo, who boasted that he used 'todos los
medios que estaban a mi alcance para inflamar el odio contra los
espafioles: sugeri medidas de severidad, y siempre estuve pronto a apoyar
los que tenian por objeto disminuir su numero y debilitar su influjo
publico o privado'.69 Those expelled unceremoniously, following
confiscation of the bulk of their property, included the archbishop of
Lima, the bishop of Huamanga, five audienciaministers, and prominent
members of the consulado.70By contrast, Abreu, who remained in Lima
when La Serna left, deprived of his salary (35 pesos a month), was given
I,ooo pesos by Hipolito Unanue in August, and was showered with
presents and compliments by San Martin when he sailed for Spain, via
Chile and Brazil, in December i82 .71 Not surprisingly, relations between
68 Audiencia to La Serna, Lima, 5

July 1821, AGI, Lima, leg. 800.
69 Bernardo de Monteagudo, Memoriasobrelosprincipiospoliticosqueseguien la administracion
del Peruy acontecimientosposterioresa mi separacion(Santiago de Chile, 823), p. o0. Garcia
Camba (Memorias, p. 436) described him as belonging to 'la clase mas infima de la
sociedad como de origen africano... tenia todo el caracter perfido y cruel de un zambo,
con la imaginaci6n ardiente y ambiciosa de la mayor parte de los mulatos'.
70 Pedro Gutierrez Cos, bishop of Huamanga, to minister of grace and justice, Mexico,
8 March I822; 'Relaci6n de los sujetos que han salido de la ciudad de Lima para la
peninsula', Cadiz, I5 March 1822, AGI, Indif. Gen. leg. I571.
71 Hip6lito Unanue to Abreu, Lima, 17 Aug. I821, AGI, Lima, leg. 800. The presents
included 2 large gold medals, and 25 large and 50 small silver medals struck to
commemorate Peru's independence; San Martin's covering letter stated 'para algin
espafiol servil seria un insulto la remesa de las medallas de la Independ'a... pero para
un liberal no creo sera un insulto, sino q'e las recibira como una prueba de mi afecto,
para q'e V. las reparta entre sus amigos': San Martin to Abreu, La Magdalena, I Dec.
i82i, ibid.

72 John R. Fisher
Abreu and La Serna, who had maintained correspondence, had grown
extremely frigid in the intervening five months: in November, for
example, in response to a letter from Abreu which he dismissed as 'un
aglomeramiento de frases, disgresiones, reflexiones y consejos
insignificantes', the viceroy suggested that his language 'parece mas bien
el de un Agente de los disidentes que el de un comisionado por S.M.C'.72
In his reply, Abreu accused La Serna of having sabotaged any possibility
of a reconciliation with the 'disidentes' because of his insistence on
treating them as 'traidores, alevosos y rateros', thereby causing 'el
rompimiento escandaloso a que V. E. nos provoc6...'.73 Monteagudo
noted that Abreu's efforts to reconcile the two sides had been 'initiles',
but expressed the hope that, despite the obstruction displayed by the
royalist commanders of the 'ultimos restos de Ejercito que mantienen en
este territorio', it was still possible 'que una amigable transaci6n sea el
termino de la actual contienda...'.74
Abreu left Lima still hoping that San Martin would send commissioners
to Spain to negotiate the establishment of an independent monarchy in
Peru.75 Despite a reluctance in Madrid to engage directly with Abreu
following his return to Spain - he waited for four months in Tarifa before
receiving permission to come to court - several new peace commissioners
were appointed to go to parts of America other than Peru in 1822, an
indication that the constitutional government had not rejected the idea of
a negotiated settlement.76 There is some evidence that San Martin, too,
entertained similar optimism, at least until the end of 1821, a factor which
possibly explains his unwillingness to engage Canterac's force of 3,300
men in September when it evacuated the bulk of the royalist garrison left
behind at Callao in July.77 La Serna, however, had clearly decided before
Abreu left that a negotiated settlement was unattainable, and that the
sierra was the best place from which to organise the armed defence of the
viceroyalty against insurgency.
In fact, the limenos had by no means seen the back of the royalists, for,
in addition to Canterac's return to Callao in September and his brief re-
72 La Serna to Abreu, Huancayo, 2 Nov. 1821, ibid.
73 Abreu to La Serna, Lima, 12 Nov. 1821, ibid.
74
Monteagudo to overseas minister, Lima, 22 Nov. i821, ibid.
75 Abreu to San Martin, Callao, 2 Dec. I821, ibid.
76 Overseas minister to Abreu, Madrid, 13 Oct. 1822, ibid. Full details of their instructions
are in AGI, Indif. Gen., leg. 1570. Those despatched to Buenos Aires, Antonio Luis
Pereyra and Luis de la Robla, signed an armistice in July 1824 and tried in vain to
secure permission for an emissary to go to Cusco to persuade La Serna to observe it:
Torrente, vol. 3, pp. 408-9. By then, in fact, the initiative had been abandoned in
Madrid: decree of Ferdinand VII, 26 Jan. 1824, AGI, Indif. Gen., leg. I571.
77 Almost the reverse
happened in June 1823, when Sucre withdrew to Callao, allowing
Canterac to reoccupy Lima for a month: Anna, Fall of the Royal Government,pp. 2 17-I 8.

occupation of the city in June 1823, a mutiny in February I824 of the

patriot garrison of Callao led to the royalists retaking both the defenceless
capital - which they surrended only after the battle of Ayacucho - and
Callao itself, which Jose Ram6n Rodil refused to give up until January
I826.78 Among the several thousand civilian victims of the bitter siege of
its fortresses imposed from December I824 was the flamboyant publicist
Gaspar Rico y Angulo, whose varied career in Peru had included work as
an administrator of the Cinco Gremios Mayores and, from 1818, the
management of the recently-established lottery of South America.79
However, Rico's main claim to fame, and his value to the historian, was
that he had accompanied La Serna to the highlands in July 1821, and for
the next three years published, using a portable press, first in Huancayo
and subsequently in Cusco, a series of periodicals and pamphlets that
constitute one of the key sources for understanding royalist strategy
during this period.80
Rico already enjoyed considerable notoriety prior to the evacuation.
Abascal had expelled him from Lima in 1812, allegedly for abusing the
freedom of the press to publish libellous material in El Peruano;Pezuela
complained in April I821 of his 'ponzofiosas erupciones' (including
describing the constitution as 'un aborto de la ignorancia'); and Abreu
attributed the intransigence of La Serna in the negotiations with San
Martin to the fact that he was 'gobernado por Valdes y el periodista
Rico'.81 Their low opinion of Rico was accepted by post-independence
commentators, including the editor of El Sol (Cusco), which described
him in 825 as 'este loco' and 'el periodista mis estrafalario que ha tenido
el gobierno espafol'.82 La Serna, however, praised him as the only civil
employee who had left Lima with him, and Rodil allowed him in I825 to
continue publishing El Depositarioin Callao, regularly sending copies to
Manuel Blanco Encalada (Chilean commander of the naval blockade of the
fortresses), and praising the editor's 'buen humor'.83
78
Jose Ram6n Rodil, Memoria del sitio del Callao, eds. Vicente Rodriguez Casado and
Guillermo Lohmann Villena (Sevilla, 1955).
79 Rico died in
February 1826, several days after Rodil's capitulation, as a result of the
privations suffered during the siege.
80 Their value is accentuated by the paucity of official documentation for the La Serna
viceregency, a result in part of the loss of many of the papers of the viceregal
secretariat, left in Callao in July 1821, and the ditching in 1822 off the coast of Brazil
of official reports en route to Spain when the ship carrying them was attacked by
Buenos Aires corsairs: Anna, Fall of the Royal Government,p. 269.
81 Ibid, pp. 67-9; Pezuela, Manifiesto, p. 128; Abreu, 'Diario politico'.
82 El
Sol, no. I0, 5 March i825, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro 2A, fol. 3Iv.
83 Rodil, Memoria,
p. 26 i. Mendiburu later dismissed this organ as 'en verdad un dep6sito
de insulsas producciones de desvergiienzas y aun obscenidades', containing
'observaciones vulgares mezcladas con cuentos ridiculos y sucios': Manuel de
Mendiburu, Diccionariohistdrico-biogrdfico del Peru, 8 vols. (Lima, 1874-90), vol. 7, pp.

74 John R. Fisher
Following the evacuation of Lima, La Serna established himself initially

in Huancayo, which served as an excellent base for securing supplies from
the fertile Mantaro Valley as well as attacking the montoneras for which the
region had become notorious. Canterac's army continued to use Huancayo
as its principal base until I824.84 However, within a very short period La
Serna himself was persuaded to reside in Cusco, which he described in
September 1821 as the 'antigua capital del Perui, y centro de que podia dar
impulso mas facilmente en todas direcciones a las operaciones militares, y
a las Providencias del Gobierno y Estado que convienen en tan
extraordinarias circunstancias'.85 The idea of elevating Cusco's status to
that of viceregal capital was taken up with enthusiasm by its audiencia,
which in November urged the viceroy to abandon 'el obscuro pueblo de
Huancayo', lacking in 'ciudadanos de rango, e ilustracin ', in favour of' la
Corte de los Yncas'.86 This invocation of the city's indigenous tradition
was particularly striking, given that three of the four ministers who signed
the confidential letter were not only peninsular Spaniards but also hitherto
long-standing advocates of the need to transfer the tribunal from Cusco,
where, they believed, 'los magnates' had a long tradition of supporting
revolutionary projects, to the more secure base of Arequipa.87 La Serna
himself tended to play down the symbolic significance of his move to
Cusco, concentrating instead on its practical benefits; he also attempted to
minimise the pageantry associated with his formal reception in the city on
3o December I82I.88 The city council, for its part, wrote to the crown in
75-6. A flavour of what upset Mendiburu is provided by El Depositario, no. i oo, 9 Nov.
i823 (reproduced in Valdds, Documentos, vol. 4, pp. 503-4) which insulted both
Bolivar and Sucreby suggesting that the former, 'el virote', 'sera enterradoen mierda
hasta el cogote/y el duelo de su entierro, bajo y sucio/s6lo lo podra hacer
Sucreprepucio'.
84 A valuable source for the army's activities is the Boletindel EjercitoNacionalde Lima
(Huancayo and Jauja), 19 issues of which for the period 20 April - 28 October 1822 are
in ADC, Peri6dicos, libro i.
85 La Serna to secretary of grace and justice, no. 9, 1i Sept. 1822, AGI, Aud. de Lima,
leg. 762.
86 Audiencia to La
Serna, reservada, iI Nov. 1821, ADC, Real Audiencia, libro 3.
87
'Expediente sobre traslaci6n de la Audiencia del Cuzco a Arequipa', 27 Oct. i819,
AGI, Aud. de Cuzco, leg. io. The audiencia's campaignin favour of the transferbegan
in I8 5, a mere two days afterits re-installationin Cusco following the suppressionof
the Pumacahuarebellion: audienciato Pezuela, reservada,I5 April i8 5, ADC, Real
Audiencia, libro 3. The ministers in office in 1821 were Jose Darcourt, Bartolome
Mosquera de Puga, Martin Jose de Mujica (all peninsulares) and the creole Santiago
Corbalan: details of their careers are in Mark A. Burkholder and D. S. Chandler,
Biographical of AudienciaMinistersin theAmericas(Westport, I982), pp. 92, 98,
Dictionary
226-7, 23 .
88 Audiencia to viceroy, 29 Dec. I8z2, ADC, Real Audiencia, libro 3. In this letter the
tribunalobjected to his plan to hold certainceremoniesin his house ratherthan in the

April 1824, requesting the formal confirmation of Cusco's status as

viceregal capital, a move which, although made redundant in December
by the battle of Ayacucho, suggested that by the very end of the colonial
period the civic leaders had identified royalism as a better guarantor than
insurgency of their attempts to assert regional identity.89
The self-confidence of the municipal establishment was undoubtedly
bolstered by La Serna's success in establishing a complex administrative
structure in Cusco in I822-4. Although he drew back from formally
transferring the functions of the audienciaof Charcas to that of Cusco -
fearing 'una guerra de papeles tan perjudicial y de funestas consecuencias
como la de las Armas' -large areas of central and southern Peru
(including the intendencies of Arequipa, Huamanga, Huancavelica and
Tarma) formerly dependent upon Lima for judicial administration were
brought under the jurisdiction of the Cusco tribunal.90 In the wider
political sphere, the difficulty of communication with the metropolitan
authorities, depicted by some commentators as a weakness suffered by La
Serna, in the opinion of the audienciagave his 'sublime personage' an
enhanced authority in the eyes of royalist sympathisers in Peru.91 It
certainly allowed him to be selective in deciding how far to go in
implementing the provisions of the restored constitution, and to exert
considerable control over, for example, local elections without the fear of
reprimand.92
The viceroy followed the example set by the president of Cusco, Juan
Pio Tristan, in 1820-I of dealing harshly with deserters from the army,
decreeing in May i822 that, along with conspirators and those resisting
audiencia'spremises. Details of the substantial costs of the public ceremony are in

'Cuadernos de los gastos imprendidos en la recepci6n del Ex'mo Sr. Virey', ADC,
Intendencia, Real Hacienda, leg. 225.
89 The
original document has not been located, but a summary in AGI, Lima, leg. 1024
states: 'Cuzco 8 de Abril de 1824. El Cavildo Real de la Ciudad Expone: Que para la
seguridad de aquellos dominios y conservaci6n de orden en ellos se hace indispensable
el que para el futuro se establezca en ella la Capital de aquel Virreynato que se ha
llamado de Lima, pues concurren en el Cuzco las circunstancias singulares de su
seguridad local, de su abundancia, su sanidad, y establecida opini6n; cuyo conjunto de
ventajas tan especiales al intento, no reune otra alguna de las de aquel Territorio'. A
note inside the summary records that the proposal was sent to the president of the
Consejo de Indias on 12 Jan. 82z5,'para q'e el Consejo consulte su parecer...'
90 See note 85.
91 See note 86; the negative features of isolation are stressed in Anna, Fall of the Royal
Government,pp. I92-3, and Albi, Banderasolvidadas,p. 337.
92
The subdelegate of Abancay referred in December 1822 to an order from the viceroy
to ensure that any person elected to the post of alcaldeshould be 'adicto a la justa causa,
timorato...': Josef M'a Bargas to diputaci6n provincial, Abancay, 26 Dec. 1822, ADC,
Gobierno Virreinal, leg. 59.

76 John R. Fisher
arrest, they would be subject to summary jurisdiction before military
courts.93 Similarly, considerable publicity was given in Cusco to the
reprisals taken against insurgents. These included the burning of the town
of Cangallo, described as 'criminalisimo' and 'un asilo de asesinos y
guarida de ladrones', the exemplary display of the heads of prisoners
captured during an unsuccessful guerrilla attack on the town of Chongos,
and a series of executions and beatings of Indian alcaldesin the intendancy
of Huamanga for either armed insurrection or passing information to the
enemy.94 Similarly, a series of morale-boosting reports from Colonel Jos6
Carratala, describing his hounding of guerrillas in the province of
Huamanga was published in May I822.95 Some attempt was also made to
retain the moral high ground by publicising alleged atrocities committed
against royalist prisoners by guerrillas professing allegiance to San
Martin, albeit in the context of a threat from Canterac that he would
respond to their atrocities by burning their towns and villages 'como me
ha visto en la precisi6n de hacerlo en Chacapalca, Huayhuay, y otros'.96 On
the other hand, considerable care seems to have been taken to ensure that
the rural communities ordered to supply the royalist army with horses,
fodder, food and billets for troops received proper payment.97 There are
occasional hints of local resistance to the troops' increasingly heavy
demands-in February I823 the viceroy reminded the subdelegate of
Andahuaylas that 'no es justo q'e estas valientes tropas carescan de quanto
necesitan'- coupled, however, with a determination to ensure that firm
measures should be taken against abusive soldiers ('delincuentes') who
seized animals from communities without making proper payment.98
93 Decree of La Serna, 17 May 1822, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro I, fol. 121. Two months
earlier he offered substantial rewards - eight pesos per man-for the capture of
deserters from the Burgos regiment: La Serna to subdelegate of Andahuaylas, 15
March 1822, ADC, Comunicaciones de La Serna, leg. i. Details of Tristan's measures
are in ADC, Intendencia, Gobierno, leg. I57; Garcia Camba, Memorias, pp. 386-7
details Tristan's vigorous action against an 1821 barracks conspiracy.
94 Gacetadelgobiernegio
egimodel Perti, no. 6, 22 Jan. 1822; no. 8I, 8 June I822; unnumbered
issue, 19 May 1822, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro i, fol. 87, 124, 131.
95 Ibid., un-numbered, 19 May 1822; Gaceta Extraordinaria, no. i5, 5 May 1822, and
unnumbered issue, 22 May 1822, ibid., fol. I19, 123, 129.
96 Canterac to San Martin, Huancayo, 8 Feb. 1822, Gaceta, no. II, 25 March 1822, ibid.,
fol. 107. Occasionally one finds examples of humane treatment: for example, the release
in 1824, in response to an appeal from his uncle, of a 14-year old boy, Jose Castro,
brought to Cusco with other insurgent prisoners: Antonio Maria Alvarez, president of
Cusco, to La Serna, 29 July I824, ADC, Intendencia, Gobierno, leg. 58.
97 ADC, Comunicaciones de La Serna, leg. I, contains a considerable number of orders
from the viceroy to the subdelegate of Andahuaylas in 1822-3 concerning the supply
of animals, grain, potatoes and other foodstuffs, a common theme of which was the
need to ensure that 'arreglados y equitativos' prices were paid.
98 La Serna to subdelegate of Andahuaylas, 17 February I823, and 30 March 1822, ADC,
Comunicaciones de La Serna, leg. i.

Even the collection in 1822 from private citizens of firearms and sabres
was accompanied by the issuing of receipts, as well as the threat of
conscription into the army as private soldiers and heavy fines for those
who disobeyed.99
The broader issue of creating a financial machinery capable of
generating sufficient income to meet military expenses and those of
general administration (including the salaries of public functionaries who
had fled to Cusco from enemy-held territory) was tackled with a similar
combination of improvisation, persuasion and respect for established
procedures.100 At the coercive end of the spectrum, in February i822 La
Serna authorised the seizure of all property of individuals, lay and
ecclesiastical, who had remained in Lima or other places that had declared
for San Martin, with a rather vague promise that they might be
reimbursed once order had been restored, subject to them not having
engaged in the meantime in what he called criminal activity.101 To some
extent this measure regularised a policy already in force, and of which one
prominent victim was the leading Lima merchant, Pedro Abadia, from
whose house in Cerro de Pasco unminted silver worth some 20,000 pesos
was seized in late-I82I.102 There is also evidence of the confiscation of
unminted silver suspected of being used in contraband trade in the
province of Arequipa.103 Other expedients included the raising of
voluntary and forced loans, a moratorium on the repayment of existing
loans, the confiscation of silverware from convents and churches, and the
maintenance of the Indian tribute in the guise of the 'unica contribuci6n
de Naturales', notwithstanding its abolition by the constitutional
regime.104Intendants and subdelegates were put under particular pressure
to mantain the twice-yearly flow of funds to the treasury from this source,
99 Decree of La Serna, Cusco, 28 Oct. i822, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro i, fol. 173.
100
Such refugees were entitled initially to receive two-thirds of their salaries, subject to
a further 'descuento general' ordered by La Serna in 1823 of 12 maravedis per peso
for civilians and 8 maravedis for the military: treasury minister to intendant, Cusco,
io Sept. 1823 and 25 Oct. I823, ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Libros Varios, libro I6.
101 Oficio of La Serna, 6 February 1822, transcribed by Canterac to Gabriel Herboso,
intendant of Huamanga, Huancayo, 22 March 1822, ADC, Comunicaciones de La
Serna, leg. i.
102 Dionisio Marcilla to La Serna, Huancayo, 2 Nov. I821, ADC, Tesorerfa Fiscal,
Ejercito Realista, leg. 3I2.
103 Treasury minister to La Serna, Cusco, 7 Apr. I824, (referring to confiscation of plata
pina which a German, Daniel Selnutt, was about to 'embarcar clandestinamente'),

ADC, Tesorerfa Fiscal, Libros Varios, libro I5.
104 Details of these (and
other) measures are in ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Libros Varios,
libros 5-16; ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Ej6rcito Realista, leg. 313 contains details of a
substantial loan by the cura of Acobamba, Tadeo Valverde, to assist with meeting the
'urgentes necesidades de la Naci6n': Domingo Xim6nez to Canterac, Jauja, 30 Aug.
1822.

78 John R. Fisher
as well as to oversee the collection of church silver and the distribution
of forced loans within their territorial jurisdictions.105 The crucial
importance of the head tax as a source of income for the royalists is starkly
demonstrated by the accounts of the Cusco treasury for 1821, when it
provided no less than 60 per cent (273,000 pesos) of total income of
454,000 pesos for the ramos de real hacienda. This was more than four times
the sum provided by the second largest item, namely the income from the
alcabalaand monopolies.106
The arrival of the army in Huancayo brought with it a substantial
increase in military expenditure, with pay alone consuming some 40,000
pesos a month by mid-i822.107 To some extent it also brought benefits to
the regional economy, particularly the textile sector, which experienced a
surge in demand for the supply of uniforms.108 Moreover, despite the
inevitable unpopularity of many of the measures taken to increase the
income of the Cusco treasury - which grew by 43 per cent in I823 - the
city's elite was conscious of certain symbolic benefits.'09 One was the
establishment of a mint, made necessary by the increasing difficulty in
sending church silver and plata pina from the mines to Potosi for
coining.10 More important still was the fact that Cusco had assumed not
only the responsibility for fiscal oversight of the treasuries of La Paz,
Potosi, and Oruro, but also, by virtue of the presence of the viceroy in the
city, control of ecclesiastical administration in Upper Peru.1l
105
ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Ejercito Realista, leg. 3 I 5, contains details of the collection of
church silver in I823: Juan Antonio Rodriguez, 'Relaci6n que manifiesta la Plata
labrada sacada de varias Iglesias...', 21 Dec. 1823; leg. 314 has correspondence
between the intendants of Tarma, Huamanga, and Huancavelica and Canterac about
the collection of forced loans. Gabriel Perez to Canterac, Huancavelica, 8 Apr. I823,
refers to the difficulty of actually raising the cash from 'este pobre vecindario'.
106 'Estado de las entradas de caudales de la Hacienda Nacional...', Cusco, 3 Sept. I822,
ADC, Intendencia, Real Hacienda, leg. 225.
107 Monthly accounts for 1822 in 'Relaci6n del importe de los Presupuestos de los
Cuerpos en el mes de la fecha...' are in ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Ejercito Realista, leg.
3 3. Other expenses detailed in this legajo include payments to spies, and those of
establishing a military hospital in Jauja.
108 Treasury minister to La Serna, Cusco, 12 March I823, ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Libros
Varios, libro 5, reported that he had provided 49,000 pesos in 1822 for 'la
construcci6n de vestuarios del Ex'to'. Details of the shipment of 42,500 varas of cloth
for the royalist forces in Potosi in 1823 from the 'fabrica de D'n Andres Suarez de
Villamil' are in ADC, Intendencia, Gobierno Virreinal, leg. i6o.
109
Treasury minister to La Serna, Cusco, 21 Feb. 1824, ADC, Tesorerfa Fiscal, Libros
Varios, libro 15, reported total income in 1822 (including the ramospropios,particulares
y ajenos) as 936,000 pesos and in I823 as 1,335,555 pesos.
110 Treasury minister to La Serna, Cusco, 19 Aug. 1824, ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Libros
Varios, libro I6.
111 La Serna to minister of grace and justice, Cusco, 10 March I824, AGI, Aud. of Lima,
leg. 762, reported on measures taken in collaboration with the bishops of Charcas, La
Paz, and Santa Cruz (as well as those of Arequipa and Cusco) to arrange concursosfor

There is some evidence that by the end of I823 this gradual process of
consolidation of authority in Cusco was provoking a belief that an
independent Peruvian entity, including Upper Peru, could turn its back
on Lima and the coast on a more permanent basis. The best-known and
most overt articulation of this possibility appeared in verse-form in Rico's
El Depositarioon 9 November i 82 3 under the title 'Sueio anacre6ntico',
which seemed to conjure up the vision of an independent empire, ruled
over by La Serna, stretching from Tupiza (in the south of Upper Peru) to
Tumbes in the north.1l2 Particular attention was focused upon the
declaration that 'O La Serna establece/el imperio peruano/o nadie lo
preserva/de infinitos estragos', and to a statement in a later issue (26
November) that 'los dias se acercan, y acaso en el Cuzco se dataran unos
actos que recuerden con gratitud las futuras generaciones'.113 Moreover,
an intermediate issue (19 November) carried a reassuring message from La
Serna about his military successes in Upper Peru during the previous three
months, and a promise that the war would soon end 'por medio de
tratados o de operaciones militares'.114 La Serna himself, stung by
requests from surrounding provinces to explain these remarks, as well as
by Olafieta's direct denunciation of his apparent intentions, informed the
crown in March 824 that the 26 November comment had been referring
to nothing more than the impending opening of the mint, and that the
invocation of the 'Peruvian empire' a fortnight earlier had been based on
the assumption that it would continue to be ruled by Ferdinand VII.115He
conceded that he had been shown the offending text by Rico the day
before its publication, but claimed to have paid little attention to it
'porque no soy de los que se saborean 6 reclamen con sus propias
alabanzas'. A few days before sending this explanation, La Serna had
written a separate despatch denouncing Olafieta's insubordination and,
perhaps more significantly, offering to resign his command to Canterac if
he were required to come to Madrid to justify his actions during the
the filling of vacant benefices. He reported that all had gone smoothly except in
Charcas, where 'el criminal Olaieta' had suspended the process on the grounds that
it infringed ecclesiastical immunity. Further details are in 'Relaci6n de los eclesiasticos
elegidos y mandados presentar para los curatos de la Paz', 1824, ADC, Intendencia,
Gobierno Virreinal, leg. i60.
112 El Depositario, no. ioo, 9 Nov. 1823, in Valdes, Documentos,vol. 4, pp. 500-504. The
article embraced disparaging remarks about 'la republica de los limenos', and its
'director politico' (Bolivar).
103, 26 Nov. I823, quoted in Valdes, Documentos,vol. 4, p. II5.
113 Ibid., no.
114 'El
Virrey a los Peruanos', Cusco, 12 Nov. I823, El Depositario, no. Ioi, 19 Nov.
1823, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro I, fol. 336.
115 La Serna to minister of war, no. 127, Cusco, 20 March 1824, in Valdes, Documentos,vol.
4, pp. II15-22.

80 John R. Fisher
previous three years.116 During the period between the publication of

these articles in November 1823 and the viceroy's attempts to play them
down in March 1824, the principal treasury minister in Cusco
corresponded with him in January about 'el Prestamo de dos millones de
pesos q'e V. Ex'a se propone solicitar de las Naciones extrangeras'.1l7 A
passing reference was made to the unfortunate 'guerra civil' that had
paralysed some traditional sources of income, but it was predicted that,
even allowing for this circumstance, the treasury would be capable of
raising an annual income of nearly three million pesos, to guarantee the
principal and interest on the projected loan.118
The editor of El Depositario,Rico, received a glowing testimonial from
La Serna in April 1824 when he applied successfully for a licence to return
to Spain: the viceroy described him as an 'hombre de honor', whose
'impresos...han producido el descredito de los rebeldes', adding that
'nadie sino Rico h'a impugnado con mas tez6n y decisi6n el sistema
revolucionario'.119 These comments suggest that the viceroy bore him no
ill will, and help substantiate the suspicion that La Serna had, indeed, been
party to the floating of the idea of an autonomous entity governed from
Cusco. Moreover, there is no doubt that Rico had been a very effective
propagandist for the royalist cause, providing a platform for nearly three
years for the publication of both news of military successes and often quite
subtle political comments: in January-February 1823, for example,
several issues of the Gaceta Extraordinaria carried detailed reports of the
successes of Valdes and Canterac at and around Torata, while, on the
political front, Jose de la Riva Agiiero, was effectively denounced in May
I823 as 'un criminal', and president 'de una repdblica imaginaria'.120
By the middle of I824, with Rico gone, the management of news in
Cusco became less surefooted. On 15 May, for example, the Gacetacarried
news of La Serna's wish to resign as viceroy, and three months later
publicity was given to Bolivar's proclamation of 15 August, announcing
the patriot victory at Junin, and praising the 'bravo Olafieta', operating
116
La Sernato minister of grace and justice, no. 5 , Cusco, 5 March I824, AGI, Aud.
de Lima, leg. 762. The viceroy warnedon 20 Marchthat unless Olafietacame to heel,
his former triumphs would be buried in the 'hedionda tumba de los Pizarros,
Almagros, Girones, Tupacamaros,Angulos...': Valdes, Documentos, vol. 4, p. 122.
117
Treasuryminister to La Serna, Cusco, 3 Jan. 1824, ADC, Tesoreria Fiscal, Libros
Varios, libro I5.
118 The principal item of projected income - the 'unica contribuci6n de Naturales 6
Tributos'- was shown as providing I,250,ooo of a total 2,870,000 pesos.
119 La Sernato ministerof state, no. 24, Cusco, 2 Apr. 824, AGI, Aud. de Lima,
leg. 762.
As noted, Rico got no furtherthan Callao.
120 Gaceta Extraordinaria, no. 3, 26 Jan. 1823; no. 31, 28 Jan. 1823; no. 32, 31 Jan. 1823;
no. 33, 23 Feb. 1823 ; El Depositario, no. 82, 6 May 1823, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro i, fol.
209-11, 235, 250-1.

Royalist Regime in the Viceroyaltyof Peru 8i
in Upper Peru 'con un ejercito verdaderamente patriota y protector de la

libertad'.121 By September, with the viceroy having left the city to take
personal command of the royalist army, the mood of senior administrators
was becoming more pessimistic, and at a secret meeting the audiencia
ministers, including three of the four who had urged La Serna to make
Cusco his base three years earlier, decided to seek from president Alvarez
guarantees of their own safety should rumours of an impending evacuation
of the city turn out to be accurate.122
4. Ayacuchoand its aftermath

In the event the city of Cusco, like Lima and Arequipa, was still in royalist
hands when Canterac surrendered to Sucre following the capture of the
wounded La Serna at the 'sangrienta y desgraciada batalla' fought at
Ayacucho on 9 December 1824, prompting Sucre's observation two days
later that following the signing of the detailed capitulation, 'la campaia
del Peru esta terminada; su independencia y la paz de America se han
firmado en este campo de batalla'.123The royalist prisoners, including 60
senior officers, 500 junior officers and over I,ooo troops, were treated with
some chivalry, a key feature of which was the choice of remaining in Peru
or being repatriated to Spain. La Serna and other senior officers promptly
made for the port of Quilca, from where they departed on 3 January 1825
on a long voyage, via Rio de Janeiro and Bordeaux, back to a bitter
polemic in Spain about the reasons for the loss of Peru.124 Of greater
121 Gaceta, no. 49, I5 May 1824, and proclamation of Bolivar, Huancayo, Aug. 15, 1824,
ADC, Peri6dicos, libro I, fol. 388, 404.
122
Acuerdo of audiencia,14 Sept. 1824, ADC, Real Audiencia, Asuntos Administrativos,
leg. i8o. The three were Corbalan, Darcourt and Mtjica, the fourth (Mosquera)
having died in 1822; the other signatories on this latter occasion were Juan
Nepomuceno Mdioz, Juan Antonio de Zavala, and Mateo Ximeno.
123 Canterac to president of Cusco, I Dec. I 824, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro 2A, fol. I; Sucre
to minister of war, Ayacucho, I Dec. 1824, ibid., libro i I. A succinct account of the
battle is provided by Armando Nieto Velez, S. J., Jun/n and Ayacucho (Lima, I974).
124 Details of the actual voyage, particularly illuminating on the ill-feeling between
liberals and absolutists, are provided by Alberto Wagner de la Reyna, 'Ocho afnos de
La Serna en el Peru (De la "Venganza" a la "Ernestine")', Quinto Centenario,vol. 8
(1985), pp. 37-59. When they reached Spain, Pezuela and his sympathisers led the
attack against La Serna and Canterac, accusing them of cowardice and incompetence:
'Diario de operaciones de la iltima campana del Peru', BMP, Pezuela, ms. 13. Valdes,
who had commanded the vanguard division, emerged as the principal apologist for
both himself his fellow-officers, blaming the defeat upon the perfidy of the common
soldiers, whose front rank 'volvi6 la espalda' as soon as the fighting began, 'llegando
los mas al extremo de arrojar las armas y algunos de hacer el fuego a los Jefes y
Oficiales...': Valdes, Documentos, vol. i, p. 98. [In 1820, Tristan had noted that
reinforcements for the ist Cusco regiment were secured by rounding-up 'desertores,
vagos y mal entendidos de robustez y aptitudes para el servicio de las Armas': Tristan

8z John R. Fisher
relevance for Peruvianists is the fact that, although nearly 400 officers (and
a similar number of ordinary soldiers) who surrendered at or immediately
after the battle of Ayacucho exercised the right to be repatriated, a
considerably larger number- 526 officers and nearly I,ooo soldiers-
chose to return to 'sus casas en el pafs'.125
Olafieta, whose failure to support La Serna was regarded by Vald6s as
the other major reason for the defeat at Ayacucho, resisted the patriots in
Upper Peru until his death at Tumusla in April 1825, two months before
the peninsular government took the bizarre decision to name him viceroy
of the Rio de la Plata.126In Cusco the initial response to the capitulation
was a half-hearted show of defiance with the audiencianaming as new
viceroy the city's former president, Field Marshal Tristan, whose absence
from Ayacucho made him the most senior royalist officer not in patriot
custody.127 Tristan, it seems, was tempted to rally the royalist forces in
Arequipa and Cusco, but having received assurances from Sucre that the
safety of those who had capitulated would be guaranteed, coupled with
threats that those continuing to resist would be subjected to summary
justice -'castigados hasta con la capital' - he stood aside to allow
Gamarra to be sworn in as prefect and military commander of Cusco at
the end of December.128
The dominant feature of the transfer of authority in Cusco to the
republican regime was continuity. The University of San Antonio Abad,
closed in I816 in reprisal for the Pumacahua rebellion, reopened in July
i825.129 The audiencia was replaced in February by the Corte Superior de
to subdelegate of Abancay, Cusco, i 5 March 1820, ADC, Intendencia, Gobierno, leg.

I57.]
125
Their names, ranks and destinations are published in Coleccidndocumental,tomo 22, vol.
3, pp. 402-32. Those who remained in Peru included 4 generals, 29 colonels, 93
lieutenant-colonels, I5o captains, 147 lieutenants, and 212 sub-lieutenants and
chaplains. Valdes suggested, somewhat unconvincingly, that they might be of use -
'una semilla...que podria dar algun dia frutos abundantes' -in the event of an
attempted Spanish reconquest; he also expressed some relief that the majority 'de
Oficiales del pais de distintos colores' had not exercised the option of going to Spain,
because they would have been 'initiles en la Europa, aunque muy benemeritos alli por
su fidelidad': Valdes, Documentos,vol. i, p. ioI.
126 Garcia Camba, Memoria, p. 326. El Sol, a new Cusco periodical inaugurated on i
January I825, printed an account of the battle on i6 April i825, and on 23 April a
somewhat tardy report of the mutiny of the Cochabamba garrison against Olafieta on
I3 January: ADC, Peri6dicos, libro 2A, fol. 43-6.
127
Garcia-Camba, Memoria, p. 285; Torrente, Historia, vol. 3, p. 507.
128
Decree of Gamarra, Cusco, 30 Dec. I824, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro 2A, fol. 9. The
details of the swearing of allegiance by the city council and other corporations are in
Gamarra to Jose de Caceres, 3o Dec. 1824, ibid., fol. II.
129 Decree of Bolivar, Urubamba, I8 July I825, in El Sol, no. 30, 23 July I825, ADC,
Peri6dicos, libro 2A.

Justicia, exercising virtually identical powers and even with some

continuity of personnel.130 Rhetorical flourishes from Bolivar assured the
'Pueblo querido de los Incas ... los remotos descendientes del Sol' of their
glorious future, prompting the editor of El Sol to publish an imagined
reply from Manco Capac to the 'ilustre rejenerador de mi patria, vengador
de la sangre de mis hijos', stating that he could now rest in peace 'dejando
a mi Peru descansando, Libertador, a la sombra de tus laureles'.131 The
reality, of course, for the indigenous inhabitants was that many of the
measures taken by Bolivar to give them nominal equality - including the
division of community lands and the abolition of cacica.gos- accelerated
the late-colonial process of usurpation of community resources by non-
Indians.132 A classic beneficiary was Pablo de Mar y Tapia, a former
functionary of the audienciaas well as cacique of Puroy, who rapidly
became one of the region's largest landowners, and representative of
Paruro in the national congress, before securing appointment as treasurer
of Cusco's caja nacional in 8 34.133
The principal dilemma faced by individuals such as Mar y Tapia was
whether they should make do with socio-economic gains or seek political
power too. The related question was whether they should identify with
the metropolitan elite, striving somewhat unsuccessfully until the I 84os to
centralise power in Lima, or with the regional forces that looked back to
Cusco's primacy in Peru in I820-4 and saw that as a basis for reuniting
Peru and Bolivia. The crunch came in I836-9 with the creation of the
Peruvian-Bolivian Confederation, and the establishment of Cusco as the
capital of the southern Peruvian state.134Gamarra, by then identified with
Lima and its elite, preferred to side with Chile in destroying the
confederation in I839, only to lose his life two years later in his punitive
130 Details of its membership are in El Sol, 19 Feb. 1825, ibid., fol. 26-7. The continuity
was personified by Santiago Corbalan, oidor since 817, who became one of the three
ministers of the new court. El Sol reported that although he and its president, Vicente
Le6n, had been employed by the former regime, 'no se familiarisaron con el
despotismo'. A subsequent issue of El Sol (no. 46, I Nov. 825, ibid., fol. o04)noted
that Corbalan had been elected to represent Cusco in the national senate.
131 'El Jeneral en Jefe del Ejercito Unido Libertador del Peru a los habitantes del Cuzco',
29 Dec. I824, ADC, Peri6dicos, libro i ; El Sol, no. 29, i6 July I825, ibid., libro 2A,
fol. 70-71.
132 Decrees of Bolivar of July I825 abolishing personal service, the mita, cacicavgosand
communal ownership of land are in ADC, Peri6dicos, libro 2, fol. 67, 127.
133 Jorge A. Guevara Gil, Propiedadagrariay derechocolonial: los documentosde la hacienda
Santosis Cutco (Iy43-1822) (Lima, 1993), pp. 285-8, David P. Cahill, 'Independencia,
sociedad y fiscalidad: el Sur Andino (I780-I880)', Revista Complutensede Historia de
America, vol. 19 (I993), pp. 262-3.
134 General coverage of this process is provided by P. T. Parkerson, 'Sub-Regional
Integration in Nineteenth-Century South America: Andres Santa Cruz and the
Peru-Bolivia Confederation, I835-1839' (Ph.D. diss., University of Florida, 1978).

84 John R. Fisher
attempt to incorporate Bolivia into a Peru ruled from Lima. The more
astute Tristan, who had remained in his native Arequipa after 1824,
graduated from the office of prefect there in i832-3 to become the
confederation's minister of foreign affairs in I836-7 and provisional
president of the southern Peruvian state in 1838-9. Like many arequipenos,
he decided soon after the battle of Yungay that southern Peruvian
regionalism was a spent force, and that the future lay in retiring from
politics and concentrating upon business in guano-rich Lima.135 If, I6o
years later, genuine decentralisation becomes a reality in the Peru of the
third millenium, perhaps La Serna, like Manco Capac in i825, will feel
compelled to write from beyond the grave to the editor of El Sol.
135
As early as I808, when he was alcalde of Arequipa, Tristan formed a company to
purchase the ship BuenAyre and the cargo of guano it was carrying from Copiap6 to
Callao: Archivo Departamentalde Arequipa,Protocolos, Rafael de Hurtado (i808),
fol. 55-9.


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The Royalist Regime in the Viceroyalty of Peru, 1820-1824

Author(s): John R. Fisher

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The Royalist Regime in the

Abstract. This article provides an analysis of royalist strategy in the viceroyalty

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clearly in the second - the possibility of an independent Peru controlled

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Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 59 (I979), pp. 232-7.

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period.8 However, chronologically the commission's principal thrust was

the new-style Cusco has already given way to Qosqo.

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2. The historicalcontext: Peru 181o-2o

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legitimised the interpretation of the movement as a racial uprising of

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time to time to the idea of identifying an Inca to lead a separatist

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3. Royalist reactions: Peru 1820-4

Despite the fact that official statistics of troop strengths in late-colonial

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of the royalist cavalry at Cerro de Pasco, who had defected to the

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San Martin in good conscience.42 More seriously, it also became a matter

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I82I crisis in terms of a political conflict between liberal officers around

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Preliminary discussions between respective sets of commissioners led to

68 Audiencia to La Serna, Lima, 5

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occupation of the city in June 1823, a mutiny in February I824 of the

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Following the evacuation of Lima, La Serna established himself initially

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April 1824, requesting the formal confirmation of Cusco's status as

audiencia'spremises. Details of the substantial costs of the public ceremony are in

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pina which a German, Daniel Selnutt, was about to 'embarcar clandestinamente'),

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previous three years.116 During the period between the publication of

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in Upper Peru 'con un ejercito verdaderamente patriota y protector de la

4. Ayacuchoand its aftermath

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to subdelegate of Abancay, Cusco, i 5 March 1820, ADC, Intendencia, Gobierno, leg.

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Justicia, exercising virtually identical powers and even with some

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Sun, 21 Dec 2014 11:52:02 AM

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Sun, 21 Dec 2014 11:52:02 AM

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