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95J, TPP09J

Real World Ethics1

Instructor: Caroline Whitbeck, whitbeck@mit.edu
Office Hours: 3-137C, M & W 11 (after class) - 11:30; Tu, W, Th 3-3:30

1. Values Distinguished from Preferences

The question of what is good or bad, better or worse, and more or less desirable is a question of something's merit. It is a
question of values and it calls for a value judgment. A value judgment is any judgment that can be expressed in the form
"X is good, meritorious, worthy, desirable" or "X is bad, without merit, worthless, undesirable."

The first point to consider is the difference between being desirable or worthy in some respect, and simply being desired,
liked or preferred by some person or group. This distinction is crucial to my later discussion of ethical judgments and
standards for engineering practice. Consider the sentences below:

"I like fried peppers."

"I am unalterably opposed to having cats in the neighborhood."

These are statements of preference, that is of liking and disliking, rather than judgments about whether something is good
or bad in some respect.

Unlike a value judgment, the statement of a preference, such as "I like fried peppers," is a statement about the speaker.
More specifically, it is a statement about the speaker's feelings, views or attitudes toward the thing in question. Statements
of preference are false only if they are not true of the speaker.

It is normal to feel some repugnance at wrongdoing, but the strength of one's feelings are not a reliable guide to the
gravity of an offense. As people mature they learn to distinguish between their feelings on a subject and their moral
judgments. For example, someone believe that, ethically speaking, shooting a person is much worse than shooting a dog.
However, if someone recently shot and killed his dog, and he had never been personally acquainted with any person who
was shot to death, that person might have a much stronger emotional reaction when hearing about the shooting of a pet
than when hear about the murder of a person.

Like this speaker, a person may know the origins of her preferences and attitudes and may give causal explanations in
terms of psychological factors that have contributed to their development. For example:

"We always served fried peppers at celebrations when I was growing up."

"When I was a young child, my closest friend was attacked by a cat.

Alternatively she may analyze her preferences to identify more precisely what it is she likes or dislikes:

"I can't stand the sound of cats fighting."

Such a person may even give you reasons for thinking that what she prefers is desirable or at least desirable for her, such
as:

"Cats carry disease."

"I am extremely allergic to cats."

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http://web.mit.edu/course/2/2.95j/index.html accessed date October 10, 2021
However, the speaker need not give any reasons for a preference. For some matters, such as preferring one flavor of ice
cream to another, people usually do not have reasons for their preference. When you state your preference, you are stating
your own attitudes or feelings, not giving a reasoned judgment. A person may have a strong preference for something
without believing it fulfills some high standards or brings about some good. He may not even know how he came to prefer
what he does.

If something is claimed to be good or desirable, one makes a statement about the thing that is claimed to be good, rather
than about the person who likes it. As Aristotle argued, and many subsequent philosophers have agreed, to say that
something is good or desirable is to say that it has qualities it is rational to want (in a thing of that sort). For example, a
good knife is one with the properties it is rational to want in a tool with one blade used for cutting, such as being sharp,
well-balanced and comfortable to grip. To claim that something has the qualities that it is rational to want in a thing of that
sort is to claim that there are good reasons for wanting it.

Given the differences between value judgments and statements of preferences, you may expect that others expect you to
back up your judgments and preferences in different ways. If you make a value judgment, others are likely to ask you for
the reasons you judge it rational to want (or not to want) whatever is the object of your judgment. If, on the other hand,
you merely state your preference, you need give no further reasons for your liking or disliking. You may or may
not have reasons underlying your preference.

2. Types of Value and Value Judgments

There are different types of value and value judgments. Both works of art and naturally occurring objects and events may
be judged in terms of aesthetic value. Words like "beautiful," "harmonious," "elegant" and "engaging" are terms of
aesthetic praise. Words like "ugly," "banal," "dull," "lopsided" are terms of aesthetic scorn.

Statements--both ordinary statements and statements in specialized areas of study--along with hypotheses, research
studies, theories and designs for experiments are also judged to be good or bad (or something in between) in terms of what
are sometimes called knowledge values or epistemic values. These include truth, informativeness, precision, accuracy
and significance. For example, research is regularly judged not only by whether it reveals a relationship that is unlikely to
have occurred by chance--that is, it reaches "statistical significance"--but also by its larger implications, assuming its
findings to be true. Research is also judged in terms of its fruitfulness, that is, of the further lines of inquiry the research
questions or results suggest. Hypotheses are judged in terms of plausibility, the scope of the phenomena explained, and
testability.

Plans and strategies are common objects of prudential judgment. When someone speaks of a good (prudent or effective)
strategy or a bad (stupid, short-sighted) plan, they are making a prudential judgment about the efficacy of the plan or
strategy in question, that is, whether it will achieve certain ends. Behind most prudential judgments are other value
judgments that certain ends are worth achieving. A special case of an end that is generally assumed to be valuable and,
therefore, something that should not be casually jeopardized, is survival, either biological survival or survival as a
member of some group. A plan or idea is generally judged imprudent or stupid to the extent that it neglects matters crucial
to the biological survival of those involved (or, by extension, to their continued membership in some cultural or
organizational group, to their career or economic well-being). People do speak colloquially of "survival value." When two
people disagree in their prudential judgments, they may be disagreeing about what is risked in some course of action or
whether that thing should be put at risk. For example, in response to the warning "If you want to survive in this
organization, you will not report corruption, so it would be stupid to stick your neck out," one might reason that one does
not want to risk one's integrity by being part of a corrupt organization. If corruption does permeate the organization so that
reporting wrongdoing will be punished, there might be more survival value in leaving than in staying. In this case, one
puts the maintenance of one's integrity ahead of continuance with the organization.

The final type of value other than ethical value I will discuss is religious value. The terms of evaluation include "sacred"
and "holy" as contrasted with "profane" and "mundane." Purely religious standards are often applied to people, writings,
objects, times, places, liturgies, rituals, stories, doctrines, and practices. Religions that emphasize the importance of
doctrine are called "doctrinal;" others emphasize liturgy, the order of worship. Some religions understand life in terms of
sacred stories. Other religions emphasize non-liturgical practices, such as forms of yoga or meditation, either for spiritual
training or for their own sake. Some emphasize care of less fortunate members. One emphasis may co-exist with others.
(These differences are noted because a surprising number of philosophers write as though doctrine were the central
element in religion. In fact, doctrinal issues are not the central concern of many religions.) Some emphases change over
time. For example, in Judaism before the exile, a place--the Temple at Jerusalem--had central importance. After the exile,
when people could no longer go to the Temple, scripture--the Torah--became central.

Most existing religions, and all major world religions, have moral, or ethical, standards which they apply to moral agents--
to their character traits, motives or actions. Religions vary in their relative emphasis on the development of spiritual and
moral virtues of individuals, on the realization of a particular kind of family or community, and on the faith of people as a
whole and its practice in community. Confucianism puts great emphasis on the family, for example. Buddhism in contrast
emphasizes enlightenment of the individual. Judaism emphasizes the relation of the whole people of Israel to God, and
praiseworthy individuals are those who make the relation between God and community flourish. Because Christianity
emphasizes individual salvation, it is generally regarded as more individualistic than Judaism, notwithstanding a
continuing emphasis on the community of the faithful or "the Church." Islam emphasizes the duty to form an equitable
society where the poor and vulnerable are treated decently. (These are rough generalizations about each of these major
religions and does not take account of differences among branches of them.) Although major religions do have ethical
components, a religion need not have a morality associated with it other than enjoining piety toward divine beings or
forces, especially if, according to that religion, divine beings or forces are amoral and unconcerned with the behavior of
humans toward one another.

There is not space here to examine all the many views about how the different types of value relate to one another, but
here are two examples: aesthetic criteria, such as beauty and symmetry, are commonly held to enter the assessment of
scientific theories. Conversely, many argue that great art gives a profound insight into reality, which brings aesthetic value
close to religious, or perhaps scientific, value. So, although I have distinguished various types of value here, it is an open
question whether there are fundamental connections among them.

Notice that all of the types of value discussed differ from market value. When one assesses market value, one
is not making a value judgment of what is good or bad in some respect. Rather, one is simply determining the price at
which the supply of an item equals demand for it. For example, we all need breathable air for health and survival--health
is commonly regarded as a fundamental good. Since there is no scarcity of air of breathable quality in most areas, no one
needs to buy it. Therefore, breathable air has no market value.

Just as valuable items, like clean air, may have no market value, so high "market value" may attach to items that are not
good by any reasonable standards. Market value depends on the relation of supply and demand. So it may depend on the
strength of preference of those who have the means to pay for an item and the willingness of those who have it or can
make it, to sell it. An addictive and physiologically destructive drug with analgesic or euphoric properties might have high
market value. Such a drug would not be "good" even in the sense of having properties it would be rational to want in an
analgesic or euphoric drug.

4. Good-Bad, Right-Wrong, and What One Ought To Do

Ethical judgment of an act or a course of action can take the form of a judgment about whether (or the extent to which) the
action was a good or a bad thing to do. For example, "signing the peace accord was a good (compassionate, responsible,
beneficial) thing to do." But ethical evaluation of an act can also be in terms of the rightness (or wrongness) of the act,
that is, whether (or the extent to which) it was "the right thing to do." The two types of ethical judgment, good/bad and
right/wrong, are similar in some respects. The presence of "the" in the "the right thing to do" rather than "a" in "a good
thing to do" suggests that the "the right thing to do" was the only morally acceptable response. However, speakers do not
always mean that it was the only acceptable response. Often a speaker uses the language of right and wrong if her
justification for the ethical judgment rests on an appeal to moral rules, rights or obligations, often to the exclusion of any
mention of the consequences of the act. Speaking of good and bad things to do usually signals a consideration of the total
configuration of consequences, and perhaps of other moral constraints, such as demonstration of virtues such as kindness
or wisdom as well.

The term "ought" is sometimes used to mean what is desirable or advisable, other things being equal. For example, "You
ought to avoid bad company" means that other things being equal, you should avoid bad company, rather than that there
are no circumstances in which you ought, ethically speaking, to be in the company of morally corrupt people. Sometimes
it means what is advisable, all things considered--as in "in these circumstances what you ought to do is start over." Often,
as in the above examples, when the general case is being discussed, "ought" without further specification is understood as
"necessary, other things being equal." When a specific instance is being discussed, "ought" is understood as "ought, all
things considered."

In this book, the term "ought" without further qualification should be understood as according to a given case's generality
or specificity. Therefore, if I am discussing a specific case, "ought" without further qualification means "ought, all things
considered." If I am discussing a general type of situation "ought" without further qualification means "ought, other things
equal." The qualifiers "all things considered" and "other things being equal" may be added in some contexts for clarity.

Moral and Amoral Agents

Acts, agents and the character or motives of agents are the objects of moral evaluation. However, only certain agents have
their acts, character or motives morally evaluated. For example, the statement "the storm was responsible for three deaths
and heavy property damage" means that the storm caused these outcomes. Although the storm was the agent of
destruction, the actions of the storm are not subject to moral evaluation. The storm is not guilty of murder or even
manslaughter. Those whose actions, character and motives can be morally evaluated are called moral agents. A
competent and reasonably mature human being is the most familiar example of a moral agent. In contrast, most "lower"
(that is, non-human) animals are generally understood to be amoral. Saying they are amoral is to say that morality is not a
factor in their own behavior, and, therefore, questions of morality are not appropriate in evaluating them and their acts.

To say that lower animals are not capable of acting morally or immorally is not to deny that there are moral constraints on
the way moral agents should treat them. Moral constraints on the way lower animals are treated is a matter of the
animals' moral standing, not their moral agency. I discuss moral standing in Part 2, in the section Moral Obligations,
Moral Rules and Moral Standing. Any moral agent has moral standing, but the prevalent view is that some beings are not
moral agents yet have moral standing. For example, it is generally held that it is wrong to be cruel to animals--even
though they are incapable of moral action.

Although one can evaluate the behavior of amoral beings in other ways (as being stupid or clever, instinctual or learned,
adaptive or maladaptive), their behavior is neither moral nor immoral, because those beings are incapable of considering
moral questions. Some animals, like pet dogs, do sometimes sacrifice themselves for humans, but this behavior is (perhaps
mistakenly) taken to be motivated by their attachment to their owners rather than by moral considerations. Recall the
earlier discussion of the difference between emotions and ethical evaluation.

Human beings and human groups such as nations are the most familiar moral agents. However, some other species, like
porpoises, are often alleged to qualify as moral agents, even though they are not human. The Planet of the Apes portrays
apes as moral agents. Science fiction often describes non-human extra-terrestrials as persons and moral agents. Various
religious traditions speak of beings, such as angels or dakinis, who seem very much like people and count as moral agents.
Humans may be the most common example of moral agents, but they are not the only example.

Moral agents are not necessarily morally good individuals. They are those who can and should take account of ethical
considerations. Moral agents are those of whom one may sensibly say that they are either moral or immoral, ethical or
unethical in contrast to the amorality of most other beings.

Common terms of moral praise for agents include "good," "a person of high moral character," "virtuous." Particular
character traits that are praised as moral virtues are "kindness," "honesty," "courage," "bravery." Acts are judged as right
and wrong according to three criteria: the nature of the acts--e.g., "Murder is wrong;" the specific circumstances of a
particular act--e.g., "Arthur's unprovoked assault on Cecil was wrong;" and the motives with which the agent committed
the act--e.g., "Cedilla's criticism was destructive and motivated by hostility rather than a sincere attempt to improve
performance."