ETHICS: FOUNDATIONS OF MORAL VALUATION

CHAPTER IV: THE PRINCIPLE OF UTILITY

Chapter Objectives

After reading the lesson, students must apply the following;

1. Discuss the basic principles of utilitarian ethics;

2. Distinguish between two utilitarian models; the quantitative model of Jeremy Bentham
and the qualitative model of John Stuart Mill, and

3. Apply utilitarianism in understanding and evaluating local and international scenarios.

INTRODUCTION

In the book An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789),

Jeremy Bentham begins by arguing that our actions are governed by two "sovereign
masters" - which he calls pleasure and pain. These "masters" are given to us by nature
to help us determine what is good or bad and what ought to be done and not; they
fasten our choices to their throne.

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters,
pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine what we shall do. On the one hand, the standard of right and wrong, on the
other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all
we do, in all we say, in all we think every effort we can make to throw off our subjection,
will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to abjure their
empire: but in reality he will remain subject to it all the while. The principle of utility
recognizes this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object
of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.

The principle of utility is about our subjection to these sovereign masters:

pleasure and pain. On one hand, the principle refers to the motivation of our actions as
guided by our avoidance of pain and our desire for pleasure. It is like saying that in our
everyday actions, we do what is pleasurable and we do not do what is painful. On the
other hand, the principle also refers to pleasure as good if, and only if they produce
more happiness than unhappiness. This means that it is not enough to experience
pleasure, but to also inquire whether the things we do make us happier. Having
identified the tendency for pleasure and the avoidance of pain as the principle of utility,
Bentham equates happiness with pleasure.

Mill supports Bentham's principle of utility. He reiterates moral good as

happiness and, consequently, happiness as pleasure." Mill clarifies that what makes
people happy is intended pleasure and what makes us unhappy is the privation of
pleasure. The things that produce happiness and pleasure are good; whereas, those
that produce unhappiness and pain are bad. Mill explains:

The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility or the greatest
happiness principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote
happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is
intended pleasure and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of
pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral Standard set up by the theory, much more
requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and
pleasure, and to what extent, this is left an open question. But these supplementary
explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded-
namely, that pleasure and freedom from pain are the only things desirable as ends; and
that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other
scheme) are desirable either for pleasure inherent in themselves or as a means to the
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.

Clearly, Mill argues that we act and do things because we find them pleasurable
and we avoid doing things because they are painful. If we find our actions pleasurable,
Mill explains, it is because they are inherently pleasurable in themselves or they
eventually lead to the promotion of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Bentham and
Mill characterized moral value as utility and understood it as whatever produced
happiness or pleasure and the avoidance of pain. The next step is to understand the
nature of pleasure and pain to identify a criterion for distinguishing pleasures and to
calculate the resultant pleasure or pain; it is in relation to these aforementioned themes
that a distinction occurs between Bentham and Mill.

What Bentham identified as the natural moral preferability of pleasure, Mill refers
to as a theory of life. If we consider, for example, what moral agents do and how they
assess their actions, then it is hard to deny the pursuit for happiness and the avoidance
of pain. For Bentham and Mill, the pursuit for pleasure and the avoidance of pain are not
only important principles- they are in fact the only principle in assessing an action's
morality. Why is it justifiable to wiretap private conversations in instances of treason,
rebellion, espionage, and sedition? Why is it preferable to alleviate poverty or. eliminate
criminality? Why is it noble to build schools and hospitals? Why is it good to improve the
quality of life and the like? There is no other answer than the principle of utility, that is,
to increase happiness and decrease pain.

What kind of pleasure is morally preferable and valuable? Are all pleasures
necessarily and ethically good? Does this mean that because eating or exercising is
good, it is morally acceptable to eat and exercise excessively? While utilitarian
supporters do not condone excessive pleasures while others are suffering, it cannot be
justified on utilitarian grounds why some persons indulge in extravagant pleasures at
the expense of others. Suppose nobody is suffering, is it morally permissible utilitarian
principles to maximize pleasure by wanton intemperance? While Bentham and mill
agree on the moral value of pleasure, they do not have the same view on these
question.

John Stuart Mill (1806-1873)

John Stuart Mill was born on May 20, 1806 in Pentonville, London, United
Kingdom. He was the son of James Mill, a friend and disciple of Jeremy Bentham. John
Stuart Mill was home-schooled. He studied Greek at the age of three and Latin at the
age of eight. He wrote a history of Roman Law at age
eleven, and suffered a nervous breakdown at the age of
twenty. He was married to Harriet Taylor after twenty-
one years of friendship. His ethical theory and his
defense of utilitarian views are found in his long essay
entitled Utilitarianism (1861). Mill died on May 8, 1873 in
Avignon, France from erysipelas.

In determining the moral preferability of actions,

Bentham provides a framework for evaluating pleasure
and pain commonly called felicific calculus. Felicific
calculus is a common currency framework that
calculates the pleasure that some actions can produce.
In this framework, an action can be evaluated on the
basis of intensity or strength of pleasure: duration or length of the experience of
pleasure, certainty, uncertainty, or the likelihood that pleasure will occur; and
propinquity, remoteness, or how soon there will be pleasure. These indicators allow us
to measure pleasure and pain in an action. However, when we are to evaluate our
tendency to choose these actions, we need to consider two more dimensions: fecundity
or the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same kind, and purity or the
chance it has of not being followed by sensations of the opposite kind. Lastly, when
considering the number of persons who are affected by pleasure or pain, another
dimension is to be considered-extent.' Felicific calculus allows the evaluation of all
actions and their resultant pleasure. This means that actions are evaluated on this
single scale regardless of preferences and values. In this sense, pleasure and pain can
only quantitatively differ but not qualitatively differ from other experiences of pleasure
and pain accordingly.

Mill dissents from Bentham's single scale of pleasure. He thinks that the
principle of utility must distinguish pleasures qualitatively and not merely quantitatively.
For Mill, utilitarianism cannot promote the kind of pleasures appropriate to pigs or to any
other animals. He thinks that there are higher intellectual and lower base pleasures.
We, as moral agents, are capable of searching and desiring higher intellectual
pleasures more than pigs are capable of. We undermine ourselves if we only and
primarily desire sensuality; this is because we are capable of higher intellectual
pleasurable goods. For Mill, crude bestial pleasures, which are appropriate for animals,
are degrading to us because we are by nature not easily satisfied by pleasures only for
pigs. Human pleasures are qualitatively different from animal pleasures. It is unfair to
assume that we merely pursue pleasures appropriate for beasts even if there are
instances when we choose to pursue such base pleasures. To explain this, Mill
recognizes the empirical fact that there are different kinds of pleasures: It is quite
compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact that some kinds of pleasure
are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in
estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of
pleasure should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.?

Contrary to Bentham, Mill argues that quality is more preferable than quantity. An
excessive quantity of what is otherwise pleasurable might result in pain. We can
consider. for example, our experience of excessive eating or exercising. Whereas
eating the right amount of food can be pleasurable, excessive eating may not be. The
same is true when exercising. If the quality of pleasure is sometimes more important
than quantity, then it is important to consider the standards whereby differences of
pleasures can be judged. The test that Mill suggests is simple. In deciding over two
comparable pleasures, it is important to experience both and to discover which one is
actually more preferred than the other. There is no other way of determining which of
the two pleasures is preferable except by appealing to the actual preferences and
experiences. What Mill discovers anthropologically is that actual choices of
knowledgeable persons point that higher intellectual pleasures are preferable than
purely sensual appetites.

In defending further the comparative choice between intellectual and bestial

pleasures, Mill offers an imaginative thought experiment. He asks whether a human
person would prefer to accept the highly pleasurable life of an animal while at the same
time being denied of everything that makes him a person. He thinks that few, if any,
would give up human qualities of higher reason for the pleasures of a pig. In the most
famous quote in Mill's Utilitarianism, we read It is better to be a human being dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the
fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of
the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides,

While it is difficult to understand how Mill was able to compare swinish pleasures
with human ones, we can presume that it would be better to be Socrates dissatisfied
than a pig satisfied. Simply put, as human beings, we prefer the pleasures that are
actually within our grasp. It is easy to compare extreme types of pleasures as in the
case of pigs and humans, but it is difficult to compare pleasures deeply integrated in our
way of life. The pleasures of an Ilonggo eating chicken inasal and an Igorot eating
pinikpikan is an example. This cannot be done by simply tasting inasal or pinikpikan. In
the same way, some people prefer puto to bibingka or liking for the music of
Eraserheads than that of the APO Hiking Society.

PRINCIPLE OF THE GREATEST NUMBER

Equating happiness with pleasure does not aim to describe the utilitarian moral
agent alone and independently from others. This is not only about our individual
pleasures, regardless of how high, intellectual, or in other ways noble it is, but it is also
about the pleasure of the greatest number affected by the consequences of our actions.

Mill explains: I have dwelt on this point, as being part of a perfectly just conception of
utility or happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no
means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that
standard is not the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of
happiness altogether, and if it may possibly be doubted whether a noble character is
always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people
happier, and that the world in general is immediately a gainer by it.

Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness
of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from
the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders
refutations superfluous.

Utilitarianism cannot lead to selfish acts. It is neither about our pleasure nor
happiness alone; it cannot be all about us. If we are the only ones satisfied by our
actions, it does not constitute a moral good. If we are the only ones who are made
happy by our actions, then we cannot be morally
good. In this sense, utilitarianism is not dismissive
of sacrifices that procure more happiness for
others.

Therefore, it is necessary for us to consider

everyone's happiness, including our own, as the
standard by which to evaluate what is moral. Also,
it implies that utilitarianism is not at all separate
from liberal social practices that aim to improve the
quality of life for all persons. Utilitarianism is
interested with everyone's happiness, in fact, the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. Mill
identifies the eradication of disease, using
technology, and other practical ways as examples
of utilitarianism. Consequently, utilitarianism maximizes the total amount of pleasure
over displeasure for the greatest number. Because of the premium given to the
consequences of actions, Mill pushes for the moral irrelevance of motive in evaluating
actions:

He who saves a fellow creature from drowning does what is morally right,
whether his motive be duty or the hope of being paid for his trouble; he who betrays the
friend that trusts him, is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to serve another friend to
whom he is under greater obligations. But to speak only of actions done from the motive
of duty, and in direct obedience to principle: it is a misapprehension of the 0utilitarian
mode of thought, to conceive it as implying that people should fix their minds upon so
wide a generality as the world, or society at large. The great majority of good actions
are intended, not for the benefit of the world, but for that of individuals, of which the
good of the world is made up; and the thoughts of the most virtuous man need not on
these occasions travel beyond the particular persons concerned, except so far as is
necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them he is not violating the rights-that is,
the legitimate and authorized expectations-of anyone else.

Utilitarianism is interested with the best consequence for the highest number of
people. It is not interested with the intention of the agent. Moral value cannot be
discernible in the intention or motivation of the person doing the act; it is based solely
and exclusively on the difference it makes on the world's total amount of pleasure and
pain. This leads us to question utilitarianism's take of moral rights. If actions are based
only on the greatest happiness of the greatest number, is it justifiable to let go of some
rights for the sake of the benefit of the majority?
JUSTICE AND MORAL RIGHTS

What is a right? Mill understands justice as a respect for rights directed toward
society's pursuit for the greatest happiness of the greatest number. For him, rights are a
valid claim on society and are justified by utility.

He explains: I have throughout, treated the idea

of a right residing in the injured person, and
violated by the injury, not as a separate element
in the composition of the idea and sentiment, but
as one of the forms in which the other two
elements clothe themselves. These elements are, a hurt to some assignable person or
persons on the one hand, and a demand for punishment, on the other. An examination
of our minds, I think, will show that these two things include all that we mean when we
speak of violation of a right. When we call anything a person's right, we mean that he
has a valid claim on society to protect him in the possession of it, either by the force of
law, or by that of education and opinion. if he has what we consider a sufficient claim,
on whatever account, to have something guaranteed to him by society, we say that he
has a right to it.

Mill expounds that the abovementioned rights referred are related to the interests
that serve general happiness. The right to due process, the right to free speech or
religion, and others are justified because they contribute to the general good. This
means that society is made happier if its citizens are able to live their lives knowing that
their interests are protected and that society (as a whole) defends it. Extending this
concept to animals, they have rights because of the effect of such principles on the sum
total of happiness that follows as a consequence of instituting and protecting their
interests. It is not accidental, therefore, that utilitarians are also the staunchest
defenders of animal rights. A right is justifiable on utilitarian principles inasmuch as they
produce an overall happiness that is greater than the unhappiness resulting from their
implementation.

Utilitarians argue that issues of justice carry a very strong emotional import
because the category of rights is directly associated with the individual's most vital
interests. All of these rights are predicated on the person's right to life. Mill describes:

To have a right, then is, I conceive,

to have something which society ought to
defend me in the possession of. If the
objector goes on to ask why it ought, I can
give him no other reason than general
utility. If that expression does not seem to
convey a sufficient feeling of the strength
of the obligation, nor to account for the
peculiar energy of the feeling, it is because
there goes to the composition of the sentiment, not a rational only but also an animal
element, the thirst for retaliation; and this thirst derives its intensity as well as its moral
justification, from the extraordinarily important and impressive kind of utility which is
concerned. The interest involved is that of security, to everyone's feelings the most vital
of all interests.

In this context, our participation in government and social interactions can be

explained by the principle of utility and be clarified by Mill's consequentialism. Mill
further associates utilitarianism with the possession of legal and moral rights.

We are treated justly when our legal and moral rights are respected. Mill
enumerates different kinds of goods that he characterized as rights and are protected
by law. Mill understands that legal rights are neither inviolable nor natural, but rights are
subject to some exceptions: ... It is mostly considered unjust to deprive any one of his
personal liberty, his property, or any other thing which belongs to him by law. Here,
therefore, is one instance of the application of the terms just and unjust in a perfectly
definite sense, namely, that it is just to respect, unjust to violate, the legal rights of
anyone. But this judgment admits of several exceptions, arising from the other forms in
which the notions of justice and injustice present themselves. For example, the person
who suffers the deprivation may (as the phrase is) have forfeited the rights which he is
so deprived of: a case to which we shall return presently,

Mill creates a distinction between legal rights and their justification. He points out
that when legal rights are not morally justified in accordance to the greatest happiness
principle, then these rights need neither be observed, nor be respected. This is like
saying that there are instances when the law is not morally justified and, in this case,
even objectionable.

The legal rights of which he is deprived

may be rights which ought not to have belonged to
him; in other words, the law which confers on him
these rights may be a bad law. When it is so, or
when (which is the same thing for our purpose) it
is supposed to be so, opinions will differ as to the
justice or injustice of infringing it. Some maintain
that no law, however bad, ought to be disobeyed
by an individual citizen; that his opposition to it, if shown at all, should only be shown in
endeavoring to get it altered by competent authority. This opinion (which condemns
many of the most illustrious benefactors of mankind, and would often protect pernicious
institutions against the only weapons which, in the state of things existing at the time,
have any chance of succeeding against them) is defended, by those who hold it, on
grounds of expediency: principally on that of the importance, to the common interest of
mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment of submission to law... When, however,
a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always to be regarded as being so in the same
ways in which a breach of law is unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's right; which,
as it cannot in this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is called a
moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case on injustice consists in taking or
withholding from any person that to which he has a moral right.

Mill seems to be suggesting that it is morally permissible to not follow, even

violate, an unjust law. The implication is that those who protest over political policies of
a morally objectionable government act in a morally obligatory way. While this is not
always preferred,

Mill thinks that it is commendable to endure legal punishments for acts of civil
disobedience for the sake of promoting a higher moral good. At an instance of conflict
between moral and legal rights, Mill points out that moral rights take precedence over
legal rights.

While it can be justified why others violate legal rights, it is an act of injustice to
violate an individual's moral rights. However, Mill seems to provide some extenuating
circumstances in which some moral rights can be overridden for the sake of the greater
general happiness. Going back to the case of wiretapping, it seems that one's right to
privacy can be sacrificed for the sake of the common good. This means that moral
rights are only justifiable by considerations of greater overall happiness. He qualifies
moral rights in this way: All persons are deemed to have a right to equality of treatment,
except when some recognized social expediency requires the reverse. And hence all
social inequalities which have ceased to be considered expedient, assume the
character not of simple inexpediency, but of injustice, and appear so tyrannical, that
people are apt to wonder how they ever could have been tolerated; forgetful that they
themselves perhaps tolerate other inequalities under an equally mistaken notion of
expediency, the reaction of which would make that which they approve seem quite as
monstrous as what they have at least learnt to condemn.

In this sense, the principle of utility can theoretically obligate us to steal, kill, and
the like. We say "theoretically because this merely constitutes a thought experiment and
need not be actualized. Since what matters in the assessment of what we do is the
resultant happiness, then anything may be justified for the sake of producing the
greatest happiness of the greatest number of people.

Thus, to save a life, it may not only be allowable, but a duty to steal or take by
force, the necessary food or medicine, or to kidnap, and compel to officiate, the only
qualified medical practitioner. In such cases, as we do not call justice which is not a
virtue, we usually say, not that justice must give way to some other moral principle, but
that what is just in ordinary cases is, by reason of that other principle, not just in the
particular case. By this useful accommodation of language, the character of
indefeasibility attributed to justice is kept up, and we are saved from the necessity of
maintaining that there can be laudable injustice."

While there is no such thing as a laudable and praiseworthy injustice, Mill

appeals to the utilitarian understanding of justice as an act justified by the greatest
happiness principle. There is no right to violate where utility is not served by the social
protection of individual interests. While he recognizes how utilitarian principles can
sometimes obligate us to perform acts that would regularly be understood as
disregarding individual rights, he argues that this is only possible if it is judged to
produce more happiness than unhappiness.

In short, Mills moral rights and considerations of justice are not absolute, but are
only justified by their consequences to promote the greatest good of the greatest
number, with these understanding of nights in place, Mill explains his understanding of
justice and it is with this that we end this section. For Mill justice can be interpreted in
terms of moral rights because justice promotes the greater social good. He explains:.the
idea of justice supposes two things, a rule of conduct and a sentiment which sanctions
the rule. The first must be supposed common to all mankind, and intended for their
good. The other sentiment) is a desire that punishment may be suffered by those who
infringe the rule. There is involved, in addition, the conception of some definite person
who suffers by the infringement; whose rights (to use the expression appropriated to the
case) are violated by it. And the sentiment of justice appears to me to be, the animal
desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself, or to those with whom one
sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged
sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter
elements, the feeling derives its morality, from the former, its peculiar impressiveness,
and energy of self-assertion."

SUMMARY
Bentham and Mill see moral good as pleasure, not merely self-gratification, but
also the greatest happiness principle or the greatest happiness for the greatest number
of people. We are compelled to do whatever increases pleasure and decreases pain to
the most number of persons, counting each as one and none as more than one. In
determining the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people, there is no
distinction between Bentham and Mill. Bentham suggests his felicific calculus, a
framework for quantifying moral valuation. Mill provides a criterion for comparative
pleasures. He thinks that persons who experience two different types of pleasures
generally prefer higher intellectual pleasures to base sensual ones.

Mill provides an adequate discourse on rights despite it being mistakenly argued

to be the weakness of utilitarianism. He argues that rights are socially protected
interests that are justified by their contribution to the greatest happiness principle.
However, he also claims that in extreme circumstances, respect for individual rights can
be overridden to promote the better welfare especially in circumstances of conflict
valuation.
SUGGESTED READINGS

Albee, Ernest. A History of English Utilitarianism. New York: Macmillan, 1902.

Alican, Necip Fikri. Mill's Principle of Utility: A Defense of John Stuart Mill's Notorious
Proof. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1994.

Berger, Fred R. Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy
of John Stuart Mill. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Crisp, Roger. Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Mill on Utilitarianism. London:

Routledge, 2009.

Lyons, David. Rights, Welfare, and Mill's Moral Theory. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1994.

Mill, John Stuart. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. 33 Volumes. London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1963.

Ryan, Alan. The Philosophy of John Stuart Mill. London: Macmillan, 1987.

Semmel, Bernard. John Stuart Mill and the Pursuit of Virtue. New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1984. Skorupski, John, editor. The Cambridge Companion to Mill.
Cambridge: Cambridge Universit Press, 2001.

NOTES
1. Christina Mendez. "Senators Clash Over Playing of Mamasapano Tapes."
Philstar.com, http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/01/27/1546749/ senators-clash-
over-playing-mamasapano-tapes, accessed 27 February 2017.

2. Jeremy Bentham. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. Edited

By J. H. Burns and H. L. A. Hart, Oxford: The Athlone Press, 1970, pp. 11.

3. John Stuart Mill. Utilitarianism. London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907, pp. 8-9.

4. ibid., 9-10.

5. Bentham, pp. 38-39.

6. Mill, 10-11.

7. Ibid., 11-12.

8. Ibid., 12.
9. Ibid., 12-13

10. Ibid., 14.

11. ibid., 16.

12. Ibid., 26-28

13. Ibid., 79-80.

14. Ibid., 80-81.

15. ibid., 64-65

16. ibid., 65-66

17. ibid 94

18. ibid.,95

19. ibid.,79