Philosophy of Science Association

Dispositional Explanation and the Covering-Law Model: Response to Laird Addis

Author(s): Carl G. Hempel
Source: PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association,
Vol. 1974 (1974), pp. 369-376
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/495813
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 CARL G. HEMPEL

DISPOSITIONAL EXPLANATION
AND THE COVERING-LAW MODEL:
RESPONSE TO LAIRD ADDIS

The following considerations are offered in response to the critical ob-

servations and constructive proposals set forth by Laird Addis, in his
paper 'On Defending the Covering-Law "Model"', concerning my ex-
plications of "rational" and dispositional explanation and concerning
the claims associated with the covering-law model of
explanation.

1. My main objection to Dray's construal of rational

explanation, as
characterized by the first schema in Addis's paper, was not that it is at
odds with the covering-law model, but that the second
explanans sen-
tence, 'In a situation of type C, the appropriate thing to do is x', ex-
presses a norm and therefore cannot possibly explain why A did in fact
do x: to do that, we need, not a normative sentence, but a
descriptive
one, roughly to the effect that A was disposed to act in accordance with
the normative principle. Accordingly, I proposed this modified construal
for rational explanations of the kind considered
by Dray:

(P,) A was in a situation of type C

(Schema R) (P2) A was a rational agent
(P3) In a situation of type C, any rational agent will do x
(E) (Therefore,) A did x.

Here, the explanans sentences P2 and P3jointly imply the required de-
scriptive sentence just mentioned'.

2. Addis argues that, thus construed, a rational

explanation is not a
covering-law explanation, on the ground that the only sentence of gen-
eral form occurring in the explanans, namely P3, is not an
empirical law,
but a definitional truth. For reasons to be suggested in Section I do
3,
not think that a clear and defensible construal can be
given to this claim.
But suppose, for the sake of the argument, that the term 'rational
agent'
has been introduced explicitly as an abbreviation of
'agent who does x

R. S. Cohen et al. (eds.), PSA 1974, 369-376. All Rights Reserved.

Copyright ? 1976 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland.
370 CARL G. HEMPEL

whenever he is in a situation of kind C'. Then, in virtue of this conven-

tion, the sentence P2 attributes to A a general behavioral disposition,
namely, to do x whenever faced with a situation of kind C; and the ex-
planation represented by schema R accounts for A's action by showing
that it was but a particular manifestation of A's general disposition to
do x when in C. In this "dispositional explanation", the role of the cov-
ering law is played by the sentence P2. This sentence has nomic force;
it is what Ryle calls a law-like sentence, ascribing a nomic behavior
pattern to a particular individual2.

3. But, as mentioned before, I must take exception to Addis's view that

the sentence P3, and analogous sentences in other dispositional expla-
nations, are definitional truths and therefore not empirical.
Suppose that the term 'temperature' is originally introduced by the
convention to add to the set of accepted physical sentences a new one
saying that a physical body has a temperature of r degrees centigrade
just in case a regular mercury thermometer that is in contact with the
body will show a reading of r on its scale. Though adopted by conven-
tion, this dispositional "criterion sentence" for the term 'temperature in
centigrades' is not treated in physics as devoid of empirical content and
immune from challenge by empirical findings. For suppose that physical
research, making use, among other things, of the thermometer criterion,
leads to the establishment of the laws of heat exchange. These laws imply
that when a mercury thermometer is inserted into a body of water, then
- unless thermometer and water happen to have the same temperature
before insertion - heat will flow from the warmer to the colder of the
two bodies, and the resulting reading of the thermometer will not show
the temperature that was to be measured. Thus, if those laws are ac-
cepted as (presumably) true, the criterion sentence for temperature must
be rejected as (presumably) false. In fact, considerations of just this kind
have led to modifications of the criterion sentence which provide for
specific ways of compensating for the disturbing effect. Thus, the original
criterion sentence, though introduced by terminological convention, has
been abandoned in response to empirical findings, namely, those that
led to the acceptance of the laws of heat exchange.
In similar fashion, dispositional or operational criterion sentences for
many other scientific terms have come to be abolished or revised even
 RESPONSE TO LAIRD ADDIS 371

though they were originally accepted by linguistic convention. The pre-

ceding considerations apply equally, of course, to any dispositional cri-
terion sentence, such as P3 above, that might be used to characterize an
agent as rational.
The reply might suggest itself that the abolition of the criterion sen-
tence for temperature does not amount to the retraction, as presumably
false, of an empirical belief or assertion which has come into conflict
with empirical evidence: that it is rather a matter of abandoning, as in-
expedient, a terminological convention which could have been retained,
but at the price of making it practically impossible to establish general
and simple laws of heat exchange and of other thermodynamic processes.
But there is no fundamental difference between the two kinds of theo-
retical change thus distinguished. For, as has been pointed out by Duhem,
and repeatedly emphasized by Quine, a scientific hypothesis will nor-
mally conflict with empirical findings, not when taken in isolation, but
only when combined with a more or less extensive body of further hy-
potheses; and in this case, the conflict does not unambiguously establish
the falsehood of the given hypothesis and can be resolved not only by
abandoning the latter, but alternatively by a variety of other changes
within the theoretical system. And which of the possible adjustments is
chosen will depend not just on the conflicting evidence, but also on the
effect the contemplated modification would have upon such general fea-
tures of the theory as scope, simplicity, and closeness of empirical fit.
In sum, both the so-called retraction of an empirical hypothesis as pre-
sumably false and what is described as the withdrawal, as inexpedient,
of a "truth-by-linguistic-convention" are based on considerations of em-
pirical evidence and of certain overall features of the theoretical system
within which the given hypothesis functions. Consequently, criterion
sentences such as P3 above cannot properly be qualified as non-empirical,
purely definitional, truths.3

4. For brevity of exposition, the preceding argument treats dispositional

terms as standing for specific, "single-track"4, dispositions. But this is
a considerable oversimplification: such expressions as 'has a temperature
of 7 degrees centigrade', 'electrically charged', 'greedy', 'rational agent',
must be regarded as dispositional in a broad sense, i.e., as each standing
for a large bundle of dispositions, corresponding to the diverse ways in
372 CARL G. HEMPEL

which electric charge, greed, a temperature of 7 degrees centigrade, etc.,

can manifest themselves under different conditions. In particular, any of
the various "operational" criteria of application for a term may-be re-
garded as specifying one of the dispositions the term stands for.
But this conception requires further refinement. What determines the
set of dispositions that a given term stands for ? Surely, it is not specified
by some sort of explicit enumeration; rather, it is determined by a system
of hypotheses or a theory in the context of which the term is used. To
put the point schematically: a theory T in which a term, say 'D', occurs
may imply sentences of the following kind:
(H) (x) [Dx (t) (Sxt v Rxt) ].
This is then one of the dispositional criteria provided by T for the pres-
ence of D; it states that if an object has the property D, then it will
respond in manner R whenever it is in a stimulus-, or test-, situation S.
In many cases, especially when D is a quantitative feature, T will imply
infinitely many such such dispositional criteria for D. And when the the-
ory changes - e.g., by the addition of new laws linking the temperature of
a body to other quantitative characteristics of the body or its environ-
ment - then the set of dispositions that T links to D changes accordingly.
But the term 'D' cannot be said to stand just for the conjunction, as
it were, of the various dispositions the theory associates with it; for T
will normally include further, nondispositional, hypotheses about D. For
example, T will typically contain theoretical principles that link D to
other attributes each of which has a set of dispositional aspects: thus,
thermodynamic theory links the temperature of a gas to its pressure and
volume; and a theory of rational action may link an agent's decisions to
his objectives, values, and beliefs, all of which have dispositional as-
pects.5 In short, what I called a broadly dispositional term is more ade-
quately conceived in analogy to the "theoretical terms" of physics, as
standing for a theoretically characterized property, which is linked to
other such properties by the basic principles of a theory T, and which
can manifest itself in a vast variety of ways, as indicated by the corre-
sponding dispositional criteria that T implies for it. And if such a prop-
erty, say D, is invoked for explanatory purposes, it is the theoretical
principles concerning D that do the explaining. Dispositional explana-
tion is basically of a kind with theoretical explanation.
 RESPONSE TO LAIRD ADDIS 373

There is a certain affinity, I think, between this conception and Addis's

claim that every dispositional explanation is uniquely related to a po-
tential covering-law explanation. The law in question is made evident,
according to Addis, if the dispositional property, say D, of reacting in
manner R under circumstances of kind S is analyzed as follows:
(Schema A) 'x has the property D' is tantamount to 'there is a non-
dispositional property f such that x has f and anything that has f reacts
in manner R when in situation S'.
Proposals to analyse or define dispositional properties by expressions
of just this form have, in fact, been made by some earlier writers, es-
pecially Eino Kaila and Arthur Pap.6 They were prompted by Carnap's
observation7 that the apparently obvious definition of 'Dx' by 'when-
ever Sx then Rx' would attribute the disposition D to, among other
things, all those objects which are never exposed to situation S: for them
the antecedent of the defining conditional is false, and the conditional
thus trivially true. Thus, any rock that is never immersed in water would
trivially satisfy the definiens for 'x is soluble'.
Now, definitions conforming to schema A yield the same consequence
unless the range of the permissible properties f is suitably restricted: a
rock never placed in water would still qualify as soluble because it has
the property of dissolving-whenever-placed-in-water; and, as required in
schema A, anything that has this property does dissolve when placed in
water.
Addis's restriction off to non-dispositional properties is intended to
rule out such undesired consequences. In the case of dispositions like
solubility, elasticity, or electric conductivity, the relevant non-disposi-
tional properties might be identified with certain microstructuralcharac-
teristics which account for a substance having the dispositions in ques-
tion. But the general requirement that f be "non-dispositional" might
be questioned on the ground that any property may be amenable to dis-
positional characterization.8
Pap, in his definition, requiresf to be a "kind-property", i.e., a prop-
erty "with respect to [the possession of] which a thing cannot mean-
ingfully be said to change"9; but the notion of meaningful assertability
faces obvious difficulties of its own.
However, as I have tried to show, an analysis of rational and other
dispositional explanations need presuppose no "definitions" of disposi-
374 CARL G. HEMPEL

tional terms. Theoretical principles of the character of H above are suf-

ficient for the purpose. D is a property dealt with by a theory, and the
explanatory principle H is part of what the theory asserts about D; and,
as a general theoretical principle, it expresses a nomic claim.10

5. In sum, then, I think that rational and dispositional explanations do

conform to the covering-law conception of explanation. As for the gen-
eral claim to be made for that conception, I would persist in limiting it
to the thesis that any adequate scientific explanation accounts for its
explanandum phenomenon by subsuming it under general laws or theo-
retical principles. I do not wish to assert that all empirical phenomena
admit of scientific explanation; for what empirical phenomena are ex-
plainable depends upon the nomic structure of our world: and the tight-
ness and reach of the nomic net cannot be determined by philosophical
analysis. Another reason for my position will be indicated in Section 6.
Addis suggests another claim, stronger than the one I have put for-
ward, but weaker than the one just spurned; it asserts: "There is no good
reason to believe that any event occurs which cannot be given an expla-
nation of the covering-law type". I certainly agree with Addis in the view,
suggested at the end of his paper, that arguments that have been offered
to prove the absolute unexplainability of certain aspects of the world are
flawed; indeed, I think that no conclusive proof of this kind is possible.
But Addis's thesis seems to me open to question. Consider the prob-
abilistic laws that specify the half-lives of radioactive elements. They
may be said, in the sense of the inductive-statistical form of the covering-
law model, to explain such facts as that, of a certain initial amount of
the element Ra223, only very close to half is left after a period of 11.2
days - its half-life; that close to one-quarter remains after 22.4 days, etc.
But, one may argue, these laws cannot account for certain other kinds
of event: they cannot explain, for example, why atom a, decayed exactly
two hours after the start of the test, or why atom a2 survived for exactly
200 hours and 41 minutes; for to events thus characterized, the decay
law ascribes zero probability. 11 An explanation of individual events of
this kind would presumably require laws of strictly universal form. But
suppose there are grounds for doubt that there are universal laws gov-
erning such events: would this not constitute a good reason to believe
that there are events which cannot be explained ? Now, just such grounds
 RESPONSE TO LAIRD ADDIS 375

for doubting the explainability of the individual decay events, and of

various other kinds of elementary event, would seem to be provided by
the probabilistic aspects of quantum theory and by the various consider-
ations that throw into question the possibility of supplementing the the-
oretical system by a hidden-variable theory which would restore a form
of determinism to the level of elementary events.

6. On closer examination, the idea of the explainability of an event

proves to be frustratingly obscure. Events which form the subject of any
explanation are always events-under-a-sentential-description; the expla-
nandum of an explanatory account is a sentence describing the occur-
rence to be explained, not an expression naming it. Perhaps, then, the
thesis that every event can be explained should be construed as claiming
that for every true sentence E describing an event in some language L,
there exists a set of true sentences expressible in L which jointly explain
the event described by E. But thus construed, the thesis is surely false:
the expressive means of L may be too limited for the formulation of
suitable explanatory laws or theories. So one would have to claim, per-
haps, that L can always be extended or modified in ways that permit an
explanation of the given event, or that there is some other language in
which the event can be described and explained. But this proposal needs
supplementation by an account of the conditions under which a sentence
E' in a new language L' can be said to describe the same event as E in
L: and this project faces familiar difficulties.
Analogous problems stand in the way of a sharp formulation of the
principle of causality and of the idea of universal determinism. The thesis
that all events are explainable is very closely related to these two ideas;
and like them, it had perhaps best be viewed, not as an elusively com-
prehensive claim about the world, but as a heuristic maxim for scientific
inquiry, calling for unflagging efforts to find explanatory principles where
none are known so far.

Princeton University

NOTES
1 For fuller
details, see C. G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays
in the Philosophy of Science (Free Press, New York, 1965), pp. 469-472.
376 CARL G. HEMPEL

2
See G G. Ry
Ryle, Concept oof M
e The Concep Mind
nd (Hutchinson's
Hu ch nson s Un vers y L
University brary London
Library, London, 1949 1949),
pp 88
pp. 90 no
88-90; notee Ry mpu a on oof a mo
e s remark "The imputation
Ryle's motiveve for
or a par cu ar ac
particular on iss ... the
action he
subsumption
subsump on oof an ep episode
sode propos
proposition on under a law-like
aw ke proposproposition."
on " (p. p 9090) The
character
charac er oof d spos ona exp
dispositional ana ons and oof law-like
explanations aw ke sen ences iss d
sentences scussed in
discussed n some
detail
de a in n Hempe
Hempel, op pp. 457
op. ccit., pp 457-463.
463
3 These cons dera ons are cclosely
considerations ose y ak
akin n too ideas
deas deve
developed
oped by Qu ne - for
Quine or examp
example, e in n
"Carnap and Log Logicalca Tru
Truth",h" in nP P. A
A. Sch
Schilpp ed The Ph
pp (ed.), Philosophy Rudolf Carnap
osophy oof Rudo
Court, La Sa
Open Cour
(Open e IIllinois,
Salle, no s 1963
1963), pppp. 385
385-406.
406
4 ThThiss charac er za on iss used by Ry
characterization Ryle,e who thenhen goes on too sstress ha there
ress that here are "many
spos ons the
dispositions
d he ac ua sa ons oof wh
actualisations ch can take
which ake a w de and perhaps un
wide unlimited
m ed var
varietye y oof
shapes" (op. op ccit., pp pp. 43
43-44).
44
5 The issuessue iss exam
examined ned more fullyu y inn Hempe
Hempel, op pp. 472
op. ccit., pp 472-477.
477
6 See A A. Pap
Pap, Ana y sche Erkenn
Analytische Erkenntnistheorie
n s heor e(Wien,
W en SprSpringer, pp. 140
1955), pp
nger 1955 140-142142 (reference
re erence
Kailaa on p
too Ka 141), and the
p. 141 he amp
amplifieded d scuss on in
discussion nA Pap, An In
A. Pap roduc ontoo the
Introduction he Ph
Philosophy
osophy
oof Sc
Science
ence (Free Press, New York
Free Press York, 1962 pp. 278
1962), pp 278-284.
284
7 R R. Carnap
Carnap, "Tes ab y and Mean
"Testability Meaning",
ng" Ph osophyoof Sc
Philosophy ence 3 (1936),
Science 1936 pp pp. 419
419-471
471 and
4 (1937),
1937 pp pp. 11-40;40 see pp pp. 439
439-441.
441
8 C Cf. NN. Goodman
Goodman, Fac Fact, F c on and Forecas
Fiction, Forecast (2nd2nd ed on The Bobbs
edition, Bobbs-Merrill
Merr Company
Company,
Indianapolis,
Ind anapo s 1965 1965), p p. 41
41.
Pap, An In
9 Pap roduc on too the
Introduction he Ph osophy oof Sc
Philosophy Science,
ence pp pp. 281
281-282.
282 Pap
Pap'ss ana ys s aalso
analysis so
ers from
differs
d rom Ka Kaila'sa s and Add Addis's nvok ng causa
s s by invoking mp ca on where the
causal implication her two
he oother wo
authors
au hors rerelyy on the he ma er a cond
material conditional.
ona
10 A ser series
es oof illuminating
um na ng and sugges suggestiveve observa ons on the
observations he issues ouched upon in
ssues touched n this
hs
section
sec on wwill be foundound on pp 15 oof W
pp. 44-15 W. V V. Qu ne The Roo
Quine, Rootss oof ReReference Open Cour
erence (Open Court,
La SaSalle,e IIllinois,
no s 19741974).
" The po pointn iss no
not aaffected
ec ed by the he fact
ac that m a ons oof measuremen
ha limitations measurement do no not perm
permit the he
gnmen oof an even
assignment
ass event too an instant,
ns an bu but on n e time
onlyy too a finite me interval,
n erva and that ha thehe decay
law e ds some finite
aw yyields probabilityy for
n e probab or the
he latter
a er case
case. The po n aat issue
point ssue h nges on the
hinges he logical
og ca
form
orm oof the he exp ana ory laws:
explanatory aws limitations
m a ons oof measuremen
measurement no notwithstanding,
w hs and ng sstrictly rc y
universal
un versa lawsaws do permpermit the he deduc
deductionon oof consequences concern
concerning ng wha
what happens aat some
cu ar instant.
particular
par ns an
Moreover, even the
Moreover he d s n egra on oof a ggiven
disintegration ven aatom
om dur
duringng a spec ed time
specified me interval
n erva may
have an ex reme y sma
extremely small probab
probabilityy accord
according ng too the
he decay law aw - depend
depending ng on the
he length
eng h
oca on oof the
and location he interval;
n erva accord ng y the
accordingly, he law
aw tells
e s us that
ha the he decay was aalmostmos cer
certain
an
not too occur dur
no duringng that
ha interval:
n erva and this h s hard
hardlyy qua
qualifieses as an exp ana on oof why it d
explanation didd
occur aall the he same
same. My ear earlierer ana yses oof sstatistical
analyses a s ca exp ana on do no
explanation not qua
qualifyy the
he sstatis-
a s
tical
ca argumen
argumentss assoc a ed w
associated withh such cases as exp ana ory bu
explanatory; but important
mpor an aalternatives
erna ves too
my way oof vviewing ew ng this h s issue
ssue have ssince
nce been proposed by R R. C C. Je rey in
Jeffrey n 'Statistical
S a s ca
ana on vs
Explanation
Exp vs. S Statistical
a s ca In Inference'
erence and by W W. C C. Sa mon in
Salmon n 'Statistical
S a s ca Exp Explanation';
ana on
both
bo h oof these
hese sstudies
ud es are included
nc uded in nWW. C C. Sa
Salmon
mon (ed.)
ed S Statistical
a s ca Exp ana on and S
Explanation Statis-
a s
tical
ca ReRelevance
evance (University
Un vers y oof P sburgh Press
Pittsburgh Press, PPittsburgh,
sburgh 19711971). I doub however, that
doubt, however ha
Addiss wou
Add would d take
ake comcomfort
or fromrom these
hese vviews
ews inn regard too h hiss thesis
hes s abou
about expexplainability.
a nab y