Epilepsy & Behavior 21 (2011) 36–41

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Epilepsy & Behavior

j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s ev i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / ye b e h

Autobiographical memory and the self in a case of transient epileptic amnesia

Nathan A. Illman a,⁎, Clare J. Rathbone b, Steven Kemp c, Chris J.A. Moulin a
a
Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK
b
Department of Psychology, School of Psychology and Clinical Language Sciences, University of Reading, Reading, UK
c
Department of Clinical and Health Psychology, St James’ Teaching Hospital, Leeds, UK

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Transient epileptic amnesia (TEA) is characterized by deficits in autobiographical memory (AM). One of the
Received 29 November 2010 functions of AM is to maintain the self, suggesting that the self may undergo changes as a result of memory
Revised 31 January 2011 loss in temporal lobe epilepsy. To examine this, we used a modification of a task used to assess the relationship
Accepted 15 February 2011
between self and memory (the IAM task) in a single case, E.B. Despite complaints of AM loss, E.B. had no
Available online 8 April 2011
difficulty in producing a range of self-images (e.g., I am a husband) and collections of self-defining AMs in
Keywords:
support of these statements. E.B. produced fewer episodic memories at times of self-formation, but this did
Transient epileptic amnesia not seem to impact on the maintenance of self. The results support recent work suggesting the self may be
Recollection maintained in the absence of episodic memory. The application of tasks such as that used here will further
Episodic memory elucidate AM impairment in temporal lobe epilepsy.
Autobiographical memory © 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Self
Identity

1. Introduction
Subjective memory complaint in temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE) is
related to a significantly reduced quality of life (e.g., questionnaire
studies) [1,2]. Such studies overlook contemporary developments
in memory theory that pertain to the self. For instance, a recent
development is that as well as deficits in anterograde learning, TLE
is associated with varying degrees of remote or autobiographical
memory (AM) impairment [3–5]. Because an intact AM system allows
one to reflect on one's personal past and project oneself into the future,
it is essential for psychological well-being [6]. As such, researchers
have tended to agree that one of the fundamental functions of AM is to
maintain a coherent and stable sense of self over time [7,8]. To date,
there has been no explicit examination of the self and memory in
TLE. The focus of the current article is measurement of the complex
relationship between self and memory in a case of TLE.
Any assessment of AM and the self needs to take into account what
is known about its underlying processes and the phenomenology
associated with them. Neurocognitive theories make a critical distinc-
tion between episodic and semantic memory [9,10]. Episodic memories
are accessed through ”mental time travel,” allowing us to reexperience
sensory–perceptual affective details of an event [11]. This autonoetic
state of awareness gives rise to a personal sense of reliving the past.
In contrast, semantic memory is experienced as knowledge, without
details concerning acquisition of that information. Intuitively, then, one
⁎ Corresponding author at: Institute of Psychological Sciences, University of Leeds,
Leeds, UK, LS2 9JT. Fax: + 44 113 343 5749.
E-mail address: n.a.illman05@leeds.ac.uk (N.A. Illman).
may predict that without the ability to experience ”me” in time, selfhood
would be diminished. Addis and Tippett [12] displayed evidence of
this in Alzheimer's disease, where episodic memory impairment was
related to a loss in the strength of identity, with patients producing
more abstract representations of the self than controls. However, other
studies in traumatic brain injury have revealed that in the absence of
intact episodic memory, the individual is still able to draw on semantic
knowledge to maintain a ”conceptual self ” [13]. This suggests that
although the nature of self may be significantly altered, identity is not
necessarily lost in memory impairment.
It is not yet known what the impact more subtle forms of AM
impairment may have on identity in TLE. In the present study, we
drew on recent cognitive experimental approaches to assessing the
self, and focused on a case of transient epileptic amnesia (TEA). TEA is
characterized by subjective complaints of AM loss, in the absence of
any objectively measured anterograde deficit [4,14]. Episodic memory
impairment has been found to cover the entire life span in these
patients [15]. It is important to note that these deficits may be
somewhat more nebulous and subtle than the amnesia seen in head
injury or Alzheimer's disease as discussed above.
It is subjective report that we focus on here. Episodic and semantic
memories give rise to different states of conscious awareness during
retrieval. We were interested to see how the subjective experience
associated with self-defining memories of one's past would relate
to aspects of identity. As such, we employed the remember/know
procedure, which asks participants to classify a retrieved memory
as remembered, corresponding to a subjective quality of pastness
and context, or known, corresponding to conceptual knowledge. We
reasoned that this first-person approach would allow a direct measure

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 N.A. Illman et al. / Epilepsy & Behavior 21 (2011) 36–41 37

of ”phenomenological continuity.” which has been suggested to be and estimated premorbid IQ scores were also above average, as were
critical for maintenance of the self [16]. In brief, we present a detailed his scores on tests of executive function. This profile matches other
investigation of a typical case of TEA using a modification of the IAM documented cases of TEA, where standardized measures do not
memory task [8,13] that considers subjective states at retrieval and validate subjective memory complaints of patients.
the self in autobiographical memory. E.B.'s predominant complaint was that he had a loss of salient
autobiographical information from his retired life. Strikingly, he was
2. Case report: Patient E.B. unable to provide details of what his wife described as highly
memorable holidays to places such as New Zealand and Fiji. Moreover,
In February 2009, patient E.B., a right-handed 73-year-old man, he explained how his memories for remote events in general lacked
had a generalized tonic–clonic seizure lasting a couple of minutes, the vividness they once had.
arising from sleep. His right arm was possibly more rigid than his left.
He was taken to a hospital, and an ECG and blood tests were normal. 3. Method
The next day he had a brief vacant attack with gulping. After that he
could remember nothing of the events of the day. 3.1. Participants
E.B. and his caring wife described two other types of attacks going
back 20 years. They referred to “memory attacks” with sudden The comparison group consisted of 10 neurologically intact older
repetitive questioning. These lasted about 1–2 hours and, for a time, adults (4 male) matched with E.B. for age (M=71.9, SD=2.81). They
were thought to be transient global amnesia (TGA). More recently these were recruited from the older adult participant panel of Leeds Memory
attacks of amnesia lasted less than 1 hour and were associated with Group. The study was approved by the Institute of Psychological Sciences,
retrograde amnesia. Second, he experienced attacks of sudden nausea University of Leeds ethics committee, and adhered to the British
associated with a ”woozy feeling.“ Further, his wife reported involuntary Psychological Society's ethical principles.
gulping, chewing, and pallor, with these attacks lasting 5–10 minutes
and followed by fatigue. 3.2. Materials and procedure
Regarding past medical history, his birth was normal; he did not
have febrile convulsions and was never knocked out. He has been The IAM task is based on Kuhn and McPartland's [21] Twenty
treated for hypertension for many years and recently had treatment Statements Test (TST) and has shown that AMs cluster around the age
for benign prostatic hypertrophy. Neurological examination was at which various self-images emerge, demonstrating a quantifiable
normal, as were three EEGs, an MRI scan (head), and a PET scan. organizational role of the self in memory [8,13]. In the present study,
Levetiracetam (750 mg twice daily) was commenced and his seizures participants were sent two booklets to complete by post. In part 1,
went into remission. The neurological opinion was that E.B. presented the first page asked participants to generate 10 ”I am” statements,
with different manifestations of TLE, closely resembling Butler and which reflected stable and enduring self-images. Next, participants
colleagues’ [17] diagnostic criteria for TEA. selected the three self-images that were most important to them and
were asked to recall and write down 10 specific AMs to support
2.1. Subjective memory complaints and neuropsychological profile each self, giving each a brief title. For example, a supporting AM for the
self-image ”I am a father” might be ”taking my son to his first golf
E.B.'s neuropsychological investigation is summarized in Table 1. tournament.” The age at which the event occurred was then noted, and
E.B.'s standardized scores on the Wechsler Memory Scale, Third finally, participants gave an age of emergence for the three original ”I
Edition (WMS-III) [18], for immediate and delayed visual and verbal am's” (i.e., the age at which being a father was considered a stable
anterograde memory ranged from average to superior. His Full Scale aspect of identity). Self-images were dated after retrieval of supporting
memories so as not to influence which specific AMs were selected.
After this first booklet was returned, part 2 was compiled
Table 1
separately for each participant. Memories were transcribed and
Neuropsychological test results for E.B.
participants were instructed to reread their responses and carefully
Function Test E.B.'s score follow the instructions provided for the remember/know (R/K)
Premorbid intellectual WTAR 121 procedure [9,22], the Point of View paradigm [23], and rate rehearsal.
functioning For the R/K procedure, participants were asked to classify their
Intellectual ability WASI subjective state of awareness during retrieval: Participants were
Full Scale IQ 141
Learning and memory WMS-III
instructed to make a remember response for memories that conjured
Logical Memory I 15 internal thoughts, feelings, and sensory information from a specific
Faces I 12 event that lasted less than 1 day and was essentially ”relived” during
Verbal Paired Associates I 15 retrieval. They were asked to assign a know response to memories that
Letter Number Sequencing 13
lacked some of these contextual details, that may have been repeated
Spatial Span 16
Logical Memory II 16 events, and that did not conjure the same sensation of reliving the
Faces II 11 episode as a remember response. Finally, participants had the option
Verbal Paired Associates II 15 of choosing a guess response for memories that contained fragments
Rey Complex Figure of information they were not certain were true and more likely
Immediate 25.5
derived from other people's retelling of stories. The Point of View
Delayed 24
Executive function Categories completed paradigm focuses on the perspective experienced during retrieval.
Letter fluency (words/3 min) 66 Field (F) responses are assigned to memories in which recall was
Category fluency (words/3 ming) 49 experienced through the participant's own eyes, in a first-person
Trail Making
perspective; observer (O) responses are assigned to memories
Number sequencing 11
Letter sequencing 9 experienced in a third-person perspective. F and O perspectives
Number–letter switching 14 correspond to episodic and semantic memories similarly to R/K
Note. Age-scaled scores are in italics. WTAR, Wechsler Test of Adult Reading [19]; WASI,
judgments [24]. Rehearsal was reported on a scale of 1–7 for the level
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence [20]; WMS-III, Wechsler Memory Scale of rehearsal for that particular memory, with 1 indicating ”never think
Third Edition [18]. about it” and 7 indicating ”think about it all the time.”
38 N.A. Illman et al. / Epilepsy & Behavior 21 (2011) 36–41
4. Results
Our aim was to compare E.B. with the controls on their ability
to produce specific AMs cued by a range of self-images. We were
interested in the temporal distribution of these self-supporting
memories and identity statements and the phenomenology associated
with them.
E.B. produced 10 self-images, along with 30 memories to support
the 3 self-images he judged to be most significant: ”I am a granddad
and family man”; ”I am a Black Country man”; ”I am very happily
married.” The supporting memories were later verified by E.B.'s wife.
For controls, an average of 24.33 (SD = 7.78) memories were
produced. In some circumstances, despite the instruction to provide
specific memories, participants noted an age period spanning a
number of years, denoting a repeated event. In these cases, the
midpoint of the age range was taken as the age of the memory for
further analysis. For example, E.B. reported an “annual visit to the zoo”
during the age range 10–16. In this case, the age used in further
analyses was13 years.
4.1. Distribution of memories
First, we were interested to see if our older adult sample would
display the typical reminiscence bump, whereby the largest propor-
tion of memories recalled are those between the ages of 10 and 30
[25]. As Fig. 1 displays, the mean proportion of memories for controls
peaks in the period 11–20 years, with subsequent proportions
gradually decreasing throughout middle adulthood. This is followed
by a very clear recency effect for the period 61–70, which is consistent
with other studies sampling AMs from older adults [26]. Whereas the
control distribution is defined by two peaks, E.B.'s distribution is much
less consistent. Sixty percent of his memories come from between the
ages of 11 and 30, which is a much more prominent reminiscence
bump compared with controls. Following this, he is comparable to
controls in the proportion of memories coming from middle-aged
periods, but he draws on far fewer memories from late-middle and
older age (51–70) to support his self-images. Therefore, on initial
observation, it would seem that this early period of life is particularly
self-defining for E.B.
4.2. Age of emergence
Having established the relative distribution of E.B.'s and the
controls’ self-supporting memories, we examined whether E.B. used
AMs to support different selves in the same way as controls. Following
Rathbone et al. [8,13], each participant's memory was recoded based
Fig. 1. Proportion of self-supporting memories recalled across the life span for E.B.
versus mean proportion for controls (N = 10).
on the associated age of self-emergence for that ”I am” statement.
Thus, each supporting memory was coded as number of years before
(negative) or after (positive) age of emergence. These data are
summarized in Fig. 2, and illustrate the formation of different self-
images based on a distribution of AMs. For example, E.B.'s self image
”I am very happily married“ was given an age of emergence of 23. One
of his supporting memories for this was titled ”our first date,” which
occurred when he was 18. Therefore, the recoded score would be –5,
as this memory occurred 5 years before that self emerged.
The two experiments reported by Rathbone et al. [8] found that
the majority of all participants’ supporting memories clustered in the
–4 to 5 epoch period, with more memories after the self emerged,
than before it, recalled. As Fig. 2 displays, we have replicated this
finding in our comparison group. More than one-third of participants’
supporting memories emerged within the –4 to 5 epoch, approxi-
mately one-quarter of memories in the 6 to 15 epoch, and a decreasing
but relatively even distribution of memories for up to 30 years after
that. Our sample was, on average, about 20 years older than the mean
age of Rathbone and colleagues’ [8] subjects, and the average age of
emergence of self-images was considerably older here (22.9 vs 33.15).
Therefore, our results suggest that as one ages, self-images continue to
emerge (such as being a grandparent), and people use AMs from later
life to support these images.
E.B.'s distribution of memories follows a similar pattern, although he
produced more supporting AMs from before the age of self-emergence.
This result is skewed, however, by the supporting memories for his self-
image, “I am a Black Country man,” relating to his strong sense of
belonging and identifying with his geographical upbringing in England.
His age of emergence for this was 26, but the majority of memories were
generic repeated events that were given age ranges considerably before
the age of emergence. His inability to produce a number of specific
episodic memories from this period is interesting, given that this
identity seems particularly salient for E.B.
4.3. Subjective experience: Remember/Know and Point of View
Thus far, the results indicate that E.B. is able to generate a number
of AMs to support the formation of a range of self-images. Next, we
aimed to assess if there was a qualitative difference in the nature
of those memories, measured by asking participants to report their
subjective state of consciousness during retrieval.
Table 2 lists the overall proportions of responses E.B. and controls
gave for R/K judgments and F/O judgments. When taking into account
the large variation in the controls’ responses, E.B. reported a level of R
Fig. 2. Proportion of memories recalled from epochs around age of self-emergence in
IAM task.
 N.A. Illman et al. / Epilepsy & Behavior 21 (2011) 36–41
Table 2
Proportion of responses associated with IAMs of E.B. and controls.
Remember/Know judgment
Remember Know
E.B. 0.70 0.30
Control mean (SD) 0.78 (0.21) 0.20 (0.19)
and K responses for all memories comparable to that of the controls.
This initially suggests there is no difference in the number of memories
E.B. vividly recollects to support his self-images. For the Point of
View perspectives, however, he reported an equal amount of F and O
responses, whereas controls reported a large proportion of F
responses. Moreover, E.B., to a greater extent than controls, reported
O perspective for a number of memories he assigned an R response. In
controls, we see the expected pattern whereby R and K responses are
generally assigned to field and observer perspectives, respectively
[24].1 This, in itself, may be an indication that the subjective experience
associated with E.B.'s retrieval may lack some of the phenomenological
detail encountered by adults similar in age to him.
E.B. produced the majority of his supporting memories from the
period 11–20 years, suggesting this epoch is particularly self-defining
for him. Although previous research has also suggested this period
represents the most personally significant time of self-formation in
healthy adults [27], there have been few attempts to characterize
the subjective experience of associated memories. We therefore
chose to compare E.B. and the controls with respect to the mean
proportions for the subjective experience measures in this epoch. For
controls, R, K, and G proportions were 0.74, 0.22, and 0.04,
respectively. E.B.'s respective proportions for R, K, and G judgments
were 0.42 (z = –0.89), 0.58 (z = 1.44), and 0.00 (z = –1.00). In the
same period, controls’ F, O, and both F and O judgments were 0.81,
0.08, and 0.11, and E.B.'s were 0.33 (z = –1.30), 0.67 (z = 2.68), and
0.00 (z = –0.33), respectively. Given that the task instructions asked
for specific events that participants consider self-defining, one would
anticipate that these would be associated with a strong recollective
component. The above data show that although E.B. generates most
of his memories from this time period, they are associated with
subjective states of awareness characteristic of semantic content. In
contrast, controls retrieve specific AMs, literally reliving the original
context of the event.
4.4. Rehearsal
Because evidence suggests that repeated rehearsal of remote
memories may increase richness of their recollection [28], we assessed
differences between E.B.'s and the controls’ subjectively rated
rehearsal for each memory. A modified t test [29] revealed no
significant difference between E.B. (2.20) and controls (M = 3.74,
SD = 1.52) in overall average rehearsal scores (P N 0.05). In terms of age
of memory and level of rehearsal, small to moderate positive
correlations were significant for both E.B. (r = 0.40, P = 0.03) and the
mean of the controls’ individual correlations (r = 0.29, P = 0.0001),
suggesting that the more recent the memory, the more it was
rehearsed. Finally, because we found E.B. to have particular difficulty
recollecting the most remote experiences, we compared his mean
rehearsal for memories up to 30 years old (2.05) with that of controls
(mean = 3.20, SD = 1.53) and again found no significant difference
1
A nonparametric correlation was used to examine the association between R and K
and Point of View perspective in controls, G = 0.86, showing a robust relationship
between these two variables. For E.B., however, 19% of his memories given an R
response were with an observer perspective, whereas only 8% of responses were
assigned in this manner by controls.
39
Point of View
Guess Field (F) Observer (O) F/O
0.00 0.57 0.43 0.00
0.02 (0.04) 0.80 (0.26) 0.16 (0.22) 0.04 (0.08)
(P N 0.05). Hence, a simple explanation involving individual differences
in rehearsal cannot explain our above findings.
5. Discussion
In the present study, we aimed to assess how subjective impair-
ments in AM would affect the self in the context of TEA. We used the
IAM memory task, which explores the use of self-images to cue salient
AMs. Our novel contribution to this literature was not only the first
empirical assessment of the self in a syndrome of TLE, but also a
specific focus on the phenomenology associated with autobiographical
retrieval, reflecting the ”mental time travel” that is the hallmark of
episodic memory [9].
In general, our results did not suggest that E.B. had a loss of self—he
was able to produce 10 self-images and retrieved AMs that clustered
around the age of emergence of the three most personally significant of
these. Moreover, the subjective experience ratings revealed that,
overall, E.B. appeared unimpaired in his ability to recollect specific
episodes in support of his identity statements. On closer inspection,
however, E.B. displayed a tendency to subjectively report two
opposing states of consciousness during retrieval; he often reported
recollecting an event despite retrieving the memory from a third-
person perspective. Additionally, he almost solely relied on the use of
semantic knowledge from his childhood and adolescence to support a
key identity, whereas controls were able to recollect detailed, episodic
information. Below we discuss some of the theoretical implications of
these findings with respect to theories of the self and AM consolidation
and suggest some potential clinical applications of the IAM task in TLE.
Our findings largely mirror those reported for P.J.M., a woman who
had a traumatic brain injury resulting in dense retrograde amnesia
[13]. The authors found that despite severe episodic memory deficits
and a resulting inability to produce specific supporting memories, P.J.
M. drew on conceptual knowledge about her life to support the self.
Although our patient presented with comparatively milder AM
deficits when formally tested, we have shown a similar pattern of
results, suggesting that when episodic memories are unavailable, the
self is maintained through a reliance on semantic memory. This
provides further evidence for the robustness of personal semantic
memory in light of episodic impairments [30–33]. It also suggests that
even when there are deficits in the reexperiencing of the self at
discrete moments in the past, or ”phenomenological continuity,” one
is still able to draw on an integrated and extended set of events to
support a ”narrative continuity.” As Addis and Tippett describe, the
relative importance of these processes is not yet well understood [12].
What is particularly interesting is the fact that E.B. showed a
preferential impairment in remembering memories from the remi-
niscence bump, which is considered to reflect a period of salient self-
defining experiences [27]. Our evidence suggests that the retrieval of
individual episodes that are experienced as vivid recollections from
this time is not required for an intact self-representation, and that
collections of experiences may instead be used to the same end. In
support, in a study of 2341 healthy people aged 16–75, Janssen et al.
[34] showed that AMs were drawn predominantly from the ages of
6–20, but that memories from this period did not differ from those
outside of this epoch in terms of self-rated vividness, or ”reliving”
(the author's rating of recollection).
40 N.A. Illman et al. / Epilepsy & Behavior 21 (2011) 36–41
One cognitive theory of how the self is functionally supported
comes from Klein et al. [35], who suggest that the transformation of a
memory trace into an autobiographical experience is reliant on self-
reflection, self-agency, self-ownership, and personal temporality.
The modified IAM task seems a particularly useful tool for assessing
these dimensions: mentally reexperiencing or remembering past
events in their temporal order is dependent on self-reflection and
temporality; and the ability to produce meaningful, idiosyncratic
self-images and conjure personal experiences as examples of those
requires agency and ownership. E.B.'s pattern of impairment then
can be incorporated into Klein and colleagues’ suggested approach of
identifying the resulting ”species” of amnesia as a function of the
relative breakdown of one or all of these processes. His impaired
recollective experience suggests it is likely that he has combined
damage to both his capacity to self-reflect (required for autonoetic
awareness) and his ability to combine this with personal temporal-
ity. Despite this, like P.J.M., he is able to chronologically order
semantic personal knowledge to form a coherent narrative of his past
and present. What we have shown in the present study is that even
in the context of damage to one or more of these proposed processes,
the self may remain intact. What is not known is whether people
with damage like E.B.'s are able to form new selves; this should be a
priority for future research. In other memory impairments a
”petrified” self is often observed [36], whereby memory deficits do
not permit the construction of new self-images.
We propose that E.B. has a form of ”recollective retrograde amnesia,”
in which chronic subclinical epileptiform activity has selectively
damaged hippocampus-based recollective processes. This would be
consistent with evidence that TEA is associated with subtle hippocampal
volume loss [37] and fits with current theories of the underlying
neuropathological mechanism underlying this syndrome [e.g., 38]. The
use of the IAM task in TLE and other neuropsychological populations
is likely to inform this neurobiological debate further. For example,
personal significance has been shown to modulate hippocampal activity
[39], yet most typical AM tasks only ask for post hoc ratings of this
measure. The IAM task explicitly requires generation of self-defining
and personally significant experiences and, as shown in the present
study, can record the subjective experience (and, hence, type of
memory) associated with these. It therefore not only allows an
exploration of the role of AM involvement in the self, but adds to the
vastly expanding empirical literature on AM in general. Although we
postulate that E.B. has a ”healthy” self, it would be interesting to see if
current perceptions of identity are different when specific episodic
memories are available, before the onset of his TEA. Such questions
require longitudinal designs.
The critical clinical issue here is that whereas E.B. spontaneously
complained of memory loss, his standardized assessment did not
identify any memory impairment. We propose that clinicians consider
tests of AM and, at that, ones that examine subjective experience to
better validate and explore memory impairment in the community of
persons with epilepsy. To date, the neuropsychological application of
the IAM task has been used in only single case work [13]. As a clinical
tool, it quickly enables the clinician to focus on memories of some
value to the patient, and there is an expected level of remembering for
such memories. We would predict that other cases like E.B. would
show intact clustering but impaired remembering on personally
significant memories. Currently, patients’ perceptions of their illness
are typically derived from questionnaires; the IAM task may be a
useful adjunct to these by providing a rich source of information about
how patients perceive the self and how impairments in AM may relate
to this. Because of the high comorbidity of depression and anxiety in
TLE [40,41], it would also be useful to assess differences in negative
and positive self-images, particularly abstract trait-like identities
pertaining to the self (e.g., “I am a worrier”) and associated memories,
to better understand how depressed patients, for example, perceive
their identity.
Finally, as well as providing a novel way of assessing differences
in memory pre- and postsurgery, the IAM task could also be used
to see how people's perceptions of themselves change throughout
the course of treatment, or any other chronic disease. This may be
particularly instructive in cases where successful resective surgery
leads to a paradoxical difficulty in adjusting to ”normal” life, termed
the burden of normality [42,43].
6. Conclusions
In summary, we found further support for the contribution of
autobiographical memory to the self. In the absence of the subjective
experience of remembering past, self-defining experiences, the
self can remain stable and coherent through the use of conceptual
autobiographical knowledge. Our results provide further support for
retrograde impairments in autobiographical memory observed
elsewhere in transient epileptic amnesia, and it is suggested that
the clinical application of this measure to the general temporal lobe
epilepsy population will be highly instructive, allowing a better
understanding of memory impairment and its impact on the self.
Acknowledgments
We are very grateful for the support of E.B. and his wife and for their
comments on this article. This work was presented at the International
Congress on Epilepsy: Brain and Mind, Prague, March 2010.
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