Som Law College

B.A.LL.B (Hons.) Semester IV

PAPER I
(International Politics : Theory and Practice)
 Indian Foreign Policy
DETERMINANTS OF INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY
1. Geography – south Asia region – neighborhood and connectivity
2. History and Tradition - tolerance, non-vio1ence and universal brotherhood
3. Economic Conditions - possession of raw materials and natural resources
4. Nature of Leadership – Idealism or realism
5. Domestic Milieu - policies of political parties, public opinion, etc. tradition, structure of
government and enlightened leadership
6. International Trends - The fear of nuclearised United States brought the countries of Eastern
Europe under the control of the Soviet Union, with the result that all those countries adopted
socialism and came under the Russian wings.
After the sudden end of the Cold War followed by the disintegration of the Soviet Union, India’s
foreign policy underwent appreciable shifts on numerous counts—lack of enthusiasm
towards the non-aligned movement, eagerness to accommodate the American concerns,
resumption of full diplomatic ties with Israel, emphasis on economic aspects of relations with
Europe, Southeast Asia and even South Asia.

India after Independence

India’s foreign policy aims to safeguard and further national interest in terms of protecting the
country’s political independence and promoting its external security.
India’s foreign policy seeks to promote world peace, work for avoidance of dangerous wars
like the two World Wars during the first half of the 20th Century.
India wants to promote harmony and cooperation between the countries that have
ideological, political and other differences.
India’s foreign policy - to promote the economic development of underprivileged nations and
their peoples. For this purpose, its foreign policy seeks to develop beneficial relationship with
the industrially advanced countries with a view to securing necessary assistance.
⚫ India had occasion to revamp its foreign policy in a span of over seventy years following end of
alien administration.
1. Post Independence : Guided by anti colonial perspective it supported decolonization
movements in Asia and outside.
⚫ India’s foreign policy makers designed it to be independent of cold war alignments.
⚫ The options for India were limited because of its demography, weak economy and multiple
 socio economic problems coupled with tensions arising from the geographical division of the
country. (SAARC – Identity Crisis)
2. The end of cold war thawed a new world order – US Dominance (Unipolar)
⚫ India had no choice but to change its priorities and firm up relationship with the US.
⚫ In fact, these changes were in process much before but were given a final shape after collapse
of USSR to expedite economic reforms.
⚫ Even with limited options during the transitional period India benefitted from engagements in a
globalised economy. (Globalisation)

Panchsheel - 1954
⚫ The guiding principles of India’s Foreign Policy have been founded on Panchsheel,
pragmatism and pursuit of national interest.
⚫ The five principles of peaceful coexistence or Panchsheel was evolved during talks between
India and the People’s Republic of China in 1954. The five principles which formed the basis of
the nonaligned movement were laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru.
⚫ The Five Principles are:
1. Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression against anyone
3. Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affair
4. Equality and mutual benefit
5. Peaceful co-existence
⚫ The 29 April 1954 agreement was set to last for eight years. When it lapsed the relations were
already soaring, the provision for renewal of the agreement was not taken up and the Sino-
Indian war broke out between the two sides.

Significance of Panchsheel
⚫ After 60 years of its origin and working Panchsheel still remains a mere paperwork for China
which was a major party to the agreement and more than anxious to sign it.
⚫ Another misfortune is that the idealistic five principles were never been followed either in letter
or in spirit by China, particularly, “non-interference in other’s affairs” and “respect for the
neighbour’s territorial integrity”.
⚫ In a way, the agreement opened the door to the China’s military control of the roof of the world
by the People’s Liberation Army. This further translated into building a network of roads and
airstrips heading towards the Indian frontiers in NEFA (North East Frontier Agency) and
Ladakh.
⚫ On a more positive note, it can be concluded that the agreement proved to be of lasting
significance as it was the first of its kind where India and China agreed for mutual tolerance and
 peaceful co-existence so much so that the five principles today form the centre-piece of their
current CSBMs (Confidence and Security Building Measures).

NAM (Non-Aligned Movement)

⚫ On 1 Sep 1961 the heads of 28 nations gathered in Belgrade to launch the Non-Alignment
Movement.
⚫ 67 years on, NAM has grown to more than 120 nations and represents a majority voice in the
United Nations.
⚫ Issues : Members of NAM initially had disputes on some issues due to gap in the level of
technological and economical development.
⚫ The major difference was between Asian and African countries as the Asian countries rose and
African countries went down.
⚫ Also, the disputes between India and Pakistan questioned the very basic principle of NAM—
peaceful coexistence.
⚫ In the post cold war period NAM was considered as sleeping beauty.

Achievement of NAM:
⚫ postponing of wars, reducing their intensity and in some cases disputes were completely
solved.
⚫ played a vital role in maintaining world peace in this nuclear age.
⚫ brought cold war to ceasefire. Neutral observer in cold war era
⚫ It beefed up the role of UNO in which all countries have equal representation.
⚫ Non aligned countries have been successful in establishing a foundation of economic
cooperation amongst underdeveloped countries.
⚫ South—South dialogue has been summoned from the non aligned countries’ front.
⚫ transformed from a political movement to an economical movement whereby the developing
and underdeveloped nations are demanding a New International Economic Order.

The Gujral Doctrine

⚫ This doctrine was an expression of the foreign policy initiated by Inder Kumar Gujral, the
Foreign Minister in Deve Gowda Government which assumed office in June 1996.
⚫ The Gujral Doctrine is a set of five principles to guide the conduct of foreign relations with
India’s immediate neighbours as spelt out by I.K.
⚫ Gujral, first as India’s External Affairs Minister and later as the Prime Minister.
⚫ These Principles are:
1. With neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka, India does not ask
for reciprocity, but gives and accommodates what it can in good faith and trust.
2. No South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the interest of another
country of the region. (Second Principle of Panchsheel- Mutual non- aggression)
3. No country should interfere in the internal affairs of another. (Third Principle of Panchsheel-
Mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs)
4. All South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. (First
Principle of Panchsheel- Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty)
5. They should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral negotiations. (Fourth and Fifth
Principles of Panchsheel- Equality and mutual benefit & Peaceful co-existence)

Positive Application
1. Sharing of Ganga Water with Bangladesh: It is in pursuance of this policy that late in 1996 India
concluded an agreement with Bangladesh on sharing of Ganga Waters. This agreement
enabled Bangladesh to draw in lean season slightly more water than even the 1977 Agreement
had provided.
2. Freezing of Border Dispute with PRC: agreed upon by India and China in November 1996 were
also a part of efforts made by the two countries to improve bilateral relations, and freeze, for the
time being, the border dispute.
3. Increasing People to People Contact with Pakistan: India unilaterally announced in 1997
several concessions to Pakistan tourists, particularly the elder citizens and cultural groups, in
regard to visa fees and police reporting.
4. “Confidence Building Measures” Talks with Pakistan: The Gujral Doctrine assumed
significance when at Foreign Secretary level talks between India and Pakistan in June 1997,
the two countries identified eight areas for negotiation so as to build confidence and seek
friendly resolution of all disputes.

Significance of the Doctrine

1. It, thus, recognises the supreme importance of friendly, cordial relations with neighbours.
2. According to Gujral, these five principles, scrupulously adhered to, would achieve a
fundamental recasting of South Asia’s regional relationships, including the difficult relationship
between India and Pakistan.
3. Further, the implementation of these principles would generate a climate of close and mutually
benign cooperation in the region, where the weight and size of India is regarded positively and
as an asset by these countries.
4. The Gujral Doctrine was generally welcomed and appreciated not only within the country, but
also by most of the neighbours and major powers.
5. In the context of changed international environment in post-cold war world Gujral Doctrine
become a new and important principle of India’s foreign policy.
6. It can be implemented by different regional powers like USA, Russia, People Republic of
China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Germany, etc.
⚫ Nuclear Doctrine
⚫ Energy Diplomacy
⚫ Global Issues : Disarmament
⚫ Climate Change
⚫ Terrorism
⚫ Global Governance
⚫ Diaspora

Modi Doctrine :
⚫ The foreign policy of the Modi government (also referred to as the Modi Doctrine) concerns the
policy initiatives made towards other states by the current Modi government after he assumed
office as Prime Minister of India on 26 May 2014.
⚫ Modi's foreign policy is currently focused on improving relations with neighbouring countries in
South Asia, engaging the extended neighbourhood in Southeast Asia and the major global
powers.

Timeline :
⚫ General Election : Candidature
⚫ Improving relations with immediate neighbours would be his priority as peace and tranquillity in
South Asia is essential for realizing his development agenda.
⚫ Significantly he pledged to introduce the concept of para diplomacy in India where each states
and cities would have liberty to forge special relation with countries or federal states or even
cities of their interest.
⚫ Bilateral trade going to dominate the relations with most countries except few important global
powers with which India shares a strategic partnership.
 National Security Council (NSC) of India
⚫ The National Security Council (NSC) of India is the apex agency looking into the country’s
political, economic, energy and strategic security concerns.
⚫ NSC has roles beyond nuclear deterrance.
⚫ The chief executive is the National Security Adviser.
⚫ Prior to the formation of the NSC, these activities were
overseen by the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister.
⚫ The three-tiered structure of the NSC comprises
1. the Strategic Policy Group
2. the National Security Advisory Board
3. a Secretariat represented by the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC).
Ajit Doval: NSA

How does Nuclear Deterrence Work in India?

⚫ The executive council of NSA advise the political council
of NSA in case of any security treat or nuclear action
needed.
⚫ The political council give orders to Strategic Nuclear
Command.
⚫ Strategic Nuclear Command posses all major nuclear
arsenals, and it is the agency responsible for executing a
nuclear retaliation.
⚫ SNC requires approval from NCA for any nuclear action.
⚫ Recent estimates suggest that India has between 90 and
110 nuclear weapons.
 Nuclear Triad
⚫ Nuclear Triad is a term used to denote a nation which
has capabilities of nuclear strike from land, air and
water.
⚫ India has tested its abilities in land, air and sea.
⚫ From Land : Ballistic missiles with nuclear war-head in
the Prithvi and Agni Series.
⚫ From Air : Nuclear bombs from Dassault Mirage 2000s
and SEPECAT Jaguars. (Free- falling and un-guided
method).
⚫ From Sea : Submarines : Sagarika K- 15 missile in
Arihant Submarine
⚫ Ship : Dhanush missile from ships like INS Subhadra or
INS Rajput.
 Issue over no First Use policy
Arguments against No First Use
⚫ Several think tanks have been critical of the no-first-use (NFU) posture, calling it a liability in
serious war planning.
⚫ NFU may result in unacceptably high initial casualties and damage to Indian population, cities,
and infrastructure.
⚫ "Massive" retaliation is not credible, especially against a tactical nuclear strike on Indian forces
on the adversary's own territory.
⚫ Lt. Gen. B.S. Nagal (Ret.), former commander in chief highlighted that it would be morally
wrong for the leadership to place the population "in peril".
⚫ An elaborate and costly ballistic missile defense (BMD) system would be required to defend
against a first strike.
Arguments supporting No First Use
⚫ India's strategic restraint posture has provided major gains internationally, including the lifting
of economic sanctions and the removal of technology denial regimes, civil nuclear cooperation
agreements, and accommodation in multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Most of these
will be frittered away if India opts for first use.
⚫ Complex command and control and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance systems are necessary for a first-use posture.
⚫ A first-use posture will deny India the opportunity to engage in conventional warfare below the
nuclear threshold.
⚫ It may lead to arms race and destabilization of the entire south Asia and meddling of outside
powers.

Debate : Reassessing India's Nuclear Doctrine

⚫ Former National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon’s take on India’s No First Use (NFU)
pledge in his recent book has led some nuclear thinkers to offer an exciting interpretation of
India’s changing nuclear doctrine.
⚫ As Vipin Narang of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology recently suggested, India may
conduct a pre-emptive first strike if the use of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal appears imminent.
This first strike would decapitate Pakistani arsenal to the effect that its ability to retaliate further
is taken out of the equation. In short, India’s NFU policy is up for major revisions.
⚫ That has not been the official story, however. Critics are right in pointing out that since 2003,
India has conditioned its NFU, its former strategic forces commanders have openly questioned
NFU and Manohar Parrikar as Defence Minister had recently raised doubts on the desirability of
NFU (in his personal capacity).
⚫ In April 2013, in what was widely taken to be a semi-official statement, Ambassador Shyam
Saran too had ruled out any move towards a first use option.
 How Did The NFU Sustain for So Long?- Harsh V Pant
When the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) was debating the draft nuclear doctrine in 1998,
some members had openly argued against NFU. Yet, the debate was settled in favour of NFU mainly
because of four reasons.

⚫ K Subrahmanyam and JN Dixit

– were strong votaries of NFU.
1. Individual convictions notwithstanding,
India’s nuclear capability was also at an
elementary stage.
2. A first use doctrine demanded nuclear
wherewithal unaffordable at that stage.
3. The objective of India’s nuclear weapons
was primarily political: To avoid nuclear
blackmail.
4. NFU posture made India appear to be a
responsible nuclear power.

This was necessary to cajole the Americans who

had imposed economic sanctions after the
1998 nuclear tests. As Strobe Talbott argues in
his memoirs, the US considered India’s nuclear
doctrine as proof of its responsible nuclear
behaviour.
 1. Countering the Pakistani Threat :
⚫ It is, therefore, worth asking what explains the recent shift in India’s nuclear thinking. Menon’s
book, ‘Choices’, provides some answers in this regard. Central to Menon’s arguments is the
2008 Mumbai attacks.
⚫ Pakistan’s nuclear shield permits Pakistan to undertake terrorist attacks on India without fear
of retaliation. This may well have figured in the Pakistan Army’s calculations behind the
Mumbai attack of 26 November 2008.
⚫ To further reinforce this perception, Pakistan also introduced tactical nuclear weapons around
the same time. Pakistani calculations indicated a propensity for nuclear use at the lowest level
of conventional conflict.
⚫ On the other hand, India’s posture of “retaliating massively” to any use of battle-field nuclear
weapons was considered incredulous. India would not risk a nuclear exchange for a tactical
nuclear use by Pakistan, so went the argument in Islamabad. If deterrence is a largely a game
of perceptions, India appeared to be on the losing side. Perceptions around the credibility of
India’s nuclear deterrent therefore required a balancing act. Reinforcing the threat of India’s
nuclear retaliation to Pakistan’s use, or threat of use, of tactical nukes appears to be the logical
response.
⚫ Menon is right in claiming that retaliation should not be restricted to civilian targets; it must take
out Pakistan’s ability to endanger any Indian cities after Pakistan’s initial salvo.

⚫ Even in the official nuclear doctrine of 2003,

there has been no distinction made
between civilian and military-nuclear
targets.
⚫ Menon’s use of the phrase “comprehensive
first strike against Pakistan” in a scenario
where tactical nukes are used by Islamabad
is not out of context; it is rather one possible
alternative to reinforce India’s retaliatory
nuclear posture. A counterforce strike refers
to an attack on a country’s nuclear assets.
⚫ The logic behind the rhetoric of pre- emption
of an imminent Pakistani nuclear strike also serves the same purpose.
 2. Rising India
⚫ India’s draft nuclear doctrine in 1999 was not just a statement of India’s nuclear strategy; it was
also a pitch for its foreign policy.
⚫ The restrained nature of India’s nuclear behaviour paid many dividends including the Indo-US
nuclear deal.
⚫ In fact, the responsible nature of India’s nuclear behaviour was one of the major arguments in
favour of the deal.
⚫ That functional requirement is not so pressing in the present context, however. Post-2008
trajectory of India’s nuclear arsenal has been rather expansive without the threat of adverse
reactions primarily from the US.
⚫ India’s sea-based nuclear deterrent, or its ICBM capabilities, have been accepted as a natural
corollary of India’s nuclear weapons programme.
⚫ India’s emergence as a major power in global politics coupled with the changing geo-political
balance of power has helped India’s cause.

⚫ As India rises on the international ladder, one cannot expect it

to be bound by considerations which made sense a decade
earlier – especially when it faces trigger-happy nuclear
neighbours.
⚫ It may disappoint a few nuclear analysts – who consider
India’s changing nuclear behaviour as a threat to strategic
stability and an ominous precursor to an arms race in the
region.
⚫ These sermons, as Menon argues, “sound to emerging
powers like an attempt to continue an untenable status quo
by those who designed and manage the present security
order in Asia.” In short, India would not always act as a “status
quoist power.”
⚫ The most important take-away from the current debate is that
such rethinking on India’s nuclear behaviour cannot be
restricted to ideological leanings of any particular
government in power.
⚫ The current doctrinal shift appears to have been in place since 2008 when the UPA
government was in power.
⚫ Menon’s writings suggest that India’s national security considerations are not defined either by
Hindu or by secular nationalism.
⚫ They are merely a response to its changing security requirements. However, it also
necessitates that the Indian government should officially review its nuclear doctrine in order to
convey deterrence more effectively.
⚫ It cannot let those sitting in Washington and London be the interpreters of Indian nuclear
strategy for the world at large.
⚫ That responsibility lies with the government in New Delhi and it should be discharge it
responsibly.

Conclusion
⚫ Given the difficult neighbourhood and increasing threat of nuclear warfare, India's Nuclear
doctrine acts as a deterrent, and plays a de-escalating role, creating space for diplomatic
solution to critical issues.
⚫ While adhering to its "No first use" policy India must be prepared with a full proof ballistic
missile defence system and efficient intelligence gathering network.
⚫ India's principled nuclear doctrine, it's time tested credibility in peaceful nuclear use and its
commitment to non discriminatory global disarmament must be leveraged to acquire
membership in Global Nuclear Regime.
⚫ These platforms must be used to strengthen the global nuclear architecture disincentivising
nuclear states to either use or transfer nuclear know how to non state actors.