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LEO BERANEK
Prelude to ARPANET
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Roots of the Internet: A Personal History
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/. C. R. Licklider, psycho-physicist,
often called the promoter of the
Internet, who advocated through
published papers the need for time
shared computers and transmission
lines.
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Roots of the Internet: A Personal History
Men will set the goals, formulate the hypotheses, determine the criteria,
and perform the evaluations. Computing machines will do the routiniz
able work that must be done to prepare the way for insights and deci
sions in technical and scientific thinking.
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Of course, Lick alone did not develop the means for making
work. At BBN, he tackled the problem with John McCarthy, M
and Ed Fredkin. Lick brought McCarthy and Minsky, both ar
gence experts at MIT, to BBN to work as consultants in the sum
I had met neither of them before they started. Consequently, w
strange men sitting at a table in the guest conference roo
approached them and asked, "Who are you?" McCarthy, n
answered, "Who are you?" The two worked well with Fre
McCarthy credited with insisting that "time sharing could be d
computer, namely a PDP-i." McCarthy also admired his indom
do attitude. "I kept arguing with him," McCarthy recalled in
that an interrupt system was needed. And he said, 'We can do
needed was some kind of swapper. 'We can do that.'"8 (An "inte
a message into packets; a "swapper" interleaves message pa
transmission and reassembles them separately on arrival.)
The team quickly produced results, creating a modified PDP
screen divided into four parts, each assigned to a separate user
1962, BBN conducted the first public demonstration of time-
one operator in Washington, D.C., and two in Cambridge. Con
tions followed soon after. That winter, for example, BBN ins
shared information system in the Massachusetts General
allowed nurses and doctors to create and access patient records
tions, all connected to a central computer. BBN also formed a s
pany, TELCOMP, that allowed subscribers in Boston and New
our time-shared digital computers by using teletypewriters con
machines via dial-up telephone lines.
The time-sharing breakthrough also spurred BBN's internal
purchased ever-more advanced computers from Digital, IBM,
we invested in separate large-disk memories so specialized we
them in a spacious, raised-floor, air-conditioned room. The f
more prime contracts from federal agencies than any other co
England. By 1968, BBN had hired over 600 employees, more th
computer division. Those included many names now famous i
Jerome Elkind, David Green, Tom Marill, John Swets, Frank
Crowther, Warren Teitelman, Ross Quinlan, Fisher Black, D
Bernie Cosell, Hawley Rising, Severo Ornstein, John H
Feurzeig, Paul Castleman, Seymour Papert, Robert Kahn, D
Fredkin, Sheldon Boilen, and Alex McKenzie. BBN soon bec
Cambridge's "Third University"?and to some academics th
60
teaching and committee assignments made BBN more appealing than the
other two.
This infusion of eager and brilliant computer nicks?1960s lingo for
geeks?changed the social character of BBN, adding to the spirit of freedom
and experimentation the firm encouraged. BBN's original acousticians ex
uded traditionalism, always wearing jackets and ties. Programmers, as re
mains the case today, came to work in chinos, T-shirts, and sandals. Dogs
roamed the offices, work went on around the clock, and coke, pizza, and
potato chips constituted dietary staples. The women, hired only as technical
assistants and secretaries in those antediluvian days, wore slacks and often
went without shoes. Blazing a trail still underpopulated today, BBN set up a
day nursery to accommodate the staff's needs. Our bankers?upon whom we
depended for capital?unfortunately remained inflexible and conservative, so
we had to keep them from seeing this strange (to them) menagerie.
Creating ARPANET
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covered every conceivable aspect of the system, beginning with the computer
that would serve as the IMP at each host location. Heart had influenced this
choice with his adamance that the machine must be reliable above all else. He
favored Honeywell's new DDP-516?it had the correct digital capacity and
could handle input and output signals with speed and efficiency. (Honeywell's
manufacturing plant only stood a short drive from BBN's offices.) The pro
posal also spelled out how the network would address and queue the packets;
determine the best available transmission routes to avoid congestion; recover
from line, power, and IMP failures; and monitor and debug the machines from
a remote-control center. During the research BBN also determined that the
network could process the packets much more quickly than ARPA had ex
pected?in only about one-tenth the time originally specified. Even so, the doc
ument cautioned ARPA that "it will be difficult to make the system work."20
Although 140 companies received Roberts's request and 13 submitted pro
posals, BBN was one of only two that made the government's final list. All the
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THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL REVIEW
66
:?ii^%
m i
m
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THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL REVIEW
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During the months that this work took, BBN meticulously tracked all the
changes and passed the information on to the Honeywell engineers, who
could then ensure that the next machine they sent would function properly.
We hoped to check it over quickly?our Labor Day deadline was looming
large?before shipping it to UCLA, the first host in line for IMP installation.
But we were not so lucky: the machine arrived with many of the same prob
lems, and again Barker had to go in with his wire-wrap gun.
Finally, with wires all properly wrapped and only a week or so to go before
we had to ship our official IMP No. i to California, we ran into one last prob
lem. The machine now worked correctly, but it still crashed, sometimes as
often as once a day. Barker suspected a "timing" problem. A computer's
timer, an internal clock of sorts, synchronizes all its operations; the Honey
well's timer "ticked" one million times per second. Barker, figuring that the
IMP crashed whenever a packet arrived between two of these ticks, worked
with Ornstein to correct the problem. At last, we test drove the machine with
no accidents for one full day?the last day we had before we had to ship it to
UCLA. Ornstein, for one, felt confident that it had passed the real test: "We
The creators of the IMP were (crouching, left to right) James Geisman,
David Waiden, Will Crowther; (next row) Truet Thach, William Bertell,
Frank Heart, Marty Thorpe, Severo Ornstein, Robert Kahn;
(rear) Ben Barker; (not pictured) Bernie Cosell. (1969)
Courtesy of Frank Heart.
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THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL REVIEW
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Notes
i. Katie Hafner and Matthew Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late (New York
153.
2. The standard histories of the Internet are Funding a Revolution: Government Support
for Computing Research (Washington, D. C, 1999); Hafner and Lyon, Where Wiz
ards Stay Up Late; Stephen Segaller, Nerds 2.0.1: A Brief History of the Internet (New
York, 1998); Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet (Cambridge, Mass., 1999); and
David Hudson and Bruce Rinehart, Rewired (Indianapolis, 1997).
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3. J. C. R. Licklider, interview by William Aspray and Arthur Nor berg, Oct. 28,1988,
transcript, pp. 4-11, Charles Babbage Institute, University of Minnesota (cited
hereafter as CBI).
4. My papers, including the apppointment book referred to, are housed in the Leo
Beranek Papers, Institute Archives, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cam
bridge, Mass. BBN's personnel records also shored up my memory here. Much of
what follows, however, unless otherwise cited, comes from my own recollections.
5. My recollections here were augmented by a personal discussion with Licklider.
6. Licklider, interview, pp. 12-17, CBI.
7. J. C. R. Licklider, "Man-Machine Symbosis," IRE Transactions on Human Factors in
Electronics i(i96o):4-n.
8. John McCarthy, interview by William Aspray, Mar. 2, 1989, transcript, pp. 3,4,
CBI.
9. Licklider, interview, p. 19, CBI.
10. One of the primary motivations behind the ARPANET initiative was, according to
Taylor, "sociological" rather than "technical." He saw the opportunity to create a
countrywide discussion, as he explained later: "The events that got me interested in
networking had little to do with technical issues but rather with sociological issues.
I had witnessed [at those laboratories] that bright, creative people, by virtue of the
fact that they were beginning to use [time-shared systems] together, were forced to
talk to one another about, 'What's wrong with this? How do I do that? Do you
know anyone who has some data about this? ... I thought, 'Why couldn't we do
this across the country?' . . . This motivation . . . came to be known as the
ARPANET. [To succeed] I had to ... (1) convince ARPA, (2) convince IPTO con
tractors that they really wanted to be nodes on this network, (3) find a program
manager to run it, and (4) select the right group for the implementation of it all... .
A number of people [that I talked with] thought that. . . the idea of an interactive,
nation-wide network was not very interesting. Wes Clark and J. C. R. Licklider
were two who encouraged me." From remarks at The Path to Today, the University
of California?Los Angeles, Aug. 17, 1989, transcript, pp. 9-11, CBI.
11. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 71, 72.
12. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 73, 74, 75.
13. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 54, 61; Paul Baran, "On Distributed
Communications Networks," IEEE Transactions on Communications (1964)11-9,
12; Path to Today, pp. 17-21, CBI.
14. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 64-66; Segaller, Nerds, 62, 67, 82;
Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 26-41.
15. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 69, 70. Leonard Kleinrock stated in
1990 that "The mathematical tool that had been developed in queuing theory,
namely queuing networks, matched [when adjusted] the model of [later] computer
networks. . . . Then I developed some design procedures as well for optimal capac
ity assignment, routing procedures and topology design." Leonard Kleinrock, in
terview by Judy O'Neill, Apr. 3,1990, transcript, p. 8, CBI.
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30. Abbate, Inventing the Internet, 78-80; Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up
Late, 176-186; Segaller, Nerds, 106-109.
31. Hafner and Lyon, Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 187-205. After what was really a
"hack" between two computers, Ray Tomlinson at BBN wrote a mail program that
had two parts: one to send, called SNDMSG, and the other to receive, called
READMAIL. Larry Roberts further streamlined e-mail by writing a program for
listing the messages and a simple means for accessing and deleting them. Another
valuable contribution was "Reply," added by John Vittal, which allowed recipients
to answer a message without retyping the whole address.
32. Vinton G. Cerf and Robert E. Kahn, "A Protocol for Packet Network Intercom
munication," IEEE Transactions on Communications COM-22 (May I974):637
648; Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving the Web (New York, 1999); Hafner and Lyon,
Where Wizards Stay Up Late, 253-256.
33. Janet Abbate wrote that "The ARPANET ... developed a vision of what a network
should be and worked out the techniques that would make this vision a reality. Cre
ating the ARPANET was a formidable task that presented a wide range of techni
cal obstacles. . . . ARPA did not invent the idea of layering [layers of addresses on
each packet]; however, the ARPANET'S success popularized layering as a network
ing technique and made it a model for builders of other networks. . . . The
ARPANET also influenced the design of computers . . . [and of] terminals that
could be used with a variety of systems rather than just a single local computer.
Detailed accounts of the ARPANET in the professional computer journals dissem
inated its techniques and legitimized packet switching as a reliable and economic
alternative for data communication. . . . The ARPANET would train a whole gen
eration of American computer scientists to understand, use, and advocate its new
networking techniques." Inventing the Internet, 80, 81.
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