Persons and Family Relations Reviewer
subscription list of paying subscribers, and that it is
ARTICLE 1. This Act shall be known as the “Civil
Code of the Philippines.” (n)
ARTICLE 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.
General Rule:
▪ Laws shall take effect after 15 days following its
complete publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation.
Exception:
▪ Unless it is otherwise provided, such that the
law itself states the date of its effectivity.
Note:
▪ The clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot
in any event be omitted. (Tañada vs. Tuvera)
▪ Supreme Court decisions need not to be
published in the Official Gazette or a newspaper
of general circulation since there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can
be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. (De Roy vs. Court of Appeals)
What laws need to be published?
▪ All laws, even those which do not have general
application.
▪ Statutes
▪ Presidential Decrees and Executive Orders
▪ Administrative Rules and Regulations if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing
laws.
▪ Circulars if punitive in nature.
What do we mean by a newspaper of general
circulation?
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough
that it is published for the dissemination of local news
and general information, that it has a bona fide
published at regular intervals.
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Facts:
Various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders were not
published in the Official Gazette during the Marcos
Administration. Petitioners argue that such publishing of
laws concern a public right and its object is to compel
the performance of a public duty. Respondents contend
that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates.
It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances
in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is
not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed
is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code which states
that “Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided”
Issue:
1. Whether or not a law takes effect even such law
was not published.
2. What does “Unless Otherwise Provided” mean?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that publishing laws is an
indispensable requirement for its effectivity. The clear
object of the above-quoted provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which
are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia legis
non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect conferring no
rights and imposing no duties and so
Page | 1
hold, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided"
refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
Felisa De Roy and Virgilio Ramos are found guilty of
gross negligence for allowing the firewall of a burnt-out
building they own to accidentally destroy the tailoring
shop occupied by the Bernal family which resulted to
injuries and the death of Marissa Bernal
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated
on August 17, 1987, copy of which was received by De
Roy and Ramos on August 25, 1987. On September 9,
1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an
appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually
denied by the appellate court. Applying the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon that the
fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for
reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roy and Ramos contend that the rule enunciated in
the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to the
case at bar owing to the non-publication of the
Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time
the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated.
Issue:
Whether or not Supreme Court Decisions are required to
be published in the Official Gazette.
Ruling:
No. Supreme Court Decisions are not required to
published in the Official Gazette. Contrary to
petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to
their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where
issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court
decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as the
Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
ARTICLE 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. (2)
Note:
▪ Everyone is conclusively presumed to know the
law. Furthermore, actual notice is not required
since constructive notice is sufficient.
▪ Article 3 presupposes complete publication
under Article 2 since ” It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen
for the transgression of a law of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
▪ Article 3 is not applicable to Foreign Laws since
there is no conclusive presumption of
knowledge of foreign laws. Even our courts
cannot take judicial notice of them. They must
be specially alleged and proved. Thus, ignorance
of a foreign law will not be a mistake of law but
a mistake of fact.
How may Foreign Laws be admitted as evidence in
Philippine Courts?
▪ Rule 132 section 24 and 25 of the Rules of Court
states that there must be a official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer
having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not
kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in
which the record is kept is in foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
▪ Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy
is a correct copy of the original, or a specific
part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting
officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court
Rodolfo Caranto vs. Anita Caranto
Facts:
Page | 2
Rodolfo Caranto filed a Complaint for cancellation of
title and reconveyance against Anita seeking to: (a)
cancel the title of the subject land; (b) reconvey one-half
of the same to him; and (c) pay the sum equal to 25% of
the value of the recoverable property as attorney's fees as
well as costs of suit. Rodolfo alleged that he is the son of
Juan C. Caranto Sr. and brother to Juan Caranto (Juan)
who was Anita's husband.
The subject property was supposed to be adjudicated to
Juan Caranto, Rodolfo Caranto and Rizalina Caranto.
Juan died intestate then Anita executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication adjudicating upon herself the subject
property. Rodolfo alleged that the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication was a total falsity because at the time of his
demise, Juan was survived not only by his wife Anita,
but also by him and their sister Rizalina, as collateral
relatives. Considering that Rizalina executed a Deed of
Waiver of Rights whereby she relinquished all her rights
and participation over the subject property in his favor,
Rodolfo alleged that he is now entitled to one half
thereof.
The RTC and the CA ruled that Rodolfo failed to prove
that he is the brother of Anita's husband, Juan, so as to
have the right to inherit a portion of the subject property.
Likewise, there was insufficient evidence to prove his
title over the same to warrant an action for reconveyance
as well as the cancellation of the title of the subject
property.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of Rodolfo raise a
question of law or a question of fact
Ruling:
The allegations are a question of fact. Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court lays down the rule that only questions of
law should be raised in petitions filed under the said rule
since factual questions are not the proper subject of an
appeal. The Court will thus not entertain questions of
fact as the factual findings of the appellate court are
considered final, binding, or conclusive on the parties
and upon this Court especially when supported by
substantial evidence.
Doctrine:
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what
the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a
question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or
falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of
law, the question must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants
or any of them.
The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the
law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact. Thus, the
test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not
the appellation given to such question by the party
raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court
can determine the issue raised without reviewing or
evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of
law; otherwise it is a question of fact. (Century Iron
Works, Inc. v. Banas)
However, there are 10 recognized exceptional
circumstances wherein the Court admits and reviews
questions of fact. These are enumerated in Medina v.
Mayor Asistio, Jr. as follows:
1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
2. When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
4. When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
5. When the findings of fact are conflicting;
6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
7. The findings of the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court;
8. When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based;
9. When the facts set forth in the petition as well as
in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondents; and
10. The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is
premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and is contradicted by the evidence on record.
The allegations asseverated by Rodolfo such as: (a) that
Anita is estopped from impugning that he and Juan are
siblings; and (b) he is entitled to one half or the whole of
the subject property, hinge on his claim that he has
sufficiently proven by preponderance of evidence his
cause of action in the complaint for annulment of title
and reconveyance of the subject property that he filed
against Anita.
Page | 3
In his vain attempt to prove that his petition should be
given due course despite raising factual issues, Rodolfo
interposes that the following six exceptions wherein the
Court may review factual issues exist:
● the findings of the appellate court are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises and
conjectures;
● its inference from the findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken/absurd;
● it went beyond the issues of the case and the
same are contrary to the admissions of both
parties; its judgment is premised on
misapprehension of facts;
● it failed to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; and
● its findings of fact are based on the absence of
evidence but contradicted by the evidence on
record.
None of these exceptions is present in the case.
A close perusal of Rodolfo's arguments in the petition
shows that these are simply a mere rehash of his claims
in his appeal before the appellate court which it already
thoroughly passed upon. He failed to demonstrate any
compelling reason that would warrant the reversal of the
findings and conclusions of the appellate court that
Rodolfo failed to sufficiently prove that he is the brother
of Juan and therefore he had no share in the latter's
estate.
Indubitably, the Court will not review the factual
findings of the appellate court as there is not even a
scintilla of evidence that the instant petition falls under
any of the exceptions laid down in Medina.
ARTICLE 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. (3)
General Rule:
▪ Laws are applied prospectively and shall have
no retroactive effect.
Exception:
▪ If the Law itself expressly provides for
retroactivity.
What are laws that have retroactive effect?
▪ Penal Laws that are favorable to the accused
▪ Procedural Laws
▪ Curative Laws
▪ Tax Laws
▪ Emergency Laws
▪ Laws creating new substantive rights.
Note:
▪ If the procedural law provides for its prospective
application, then it shall have no retroactive
effect.
▪ A right is vested when the right to enjoyment
has become the property of some particular
person or persons as a present interest". It is "the
privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to
enforce contracts, and enjoy the rights of
property conferred by the existing law" or "some
right or interest in property which has become
fixed and established and is no longer open to
doubt or controversy. (Ayog vs. Cusi)
Juan De Dios Carlos vs. Felicidad Sandoval
Facts:
Felix B. Carlos and Felipa Elemia (parents of Juan and
Teofilo I) died intestate. They left six (6) parcels of land
to their compulsory heirs, Teofilo Carlos and petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos. The first three (3) parcels of land
were transferred and registered in the name of Teofilo.
Parcel No. 4 was registered in the name of petitioner
Juan De Dios Carlos. Teofilo died intestate. He was
survived by respondents Felicidad and their son, Teofilo
Carlos II (Teofilo II). Upon Teofilo's death, Parcel Nos.
5 & 6 were registered in the name of respondent
Felicidad and co-respondent, Teofilo II.
In 1994, Juan Carlos and Felicidad initiated a
compromise agreement. Under the compromise, the
parties acknowledged their respective shares in the
proceeds from the sale of a portion of the first parcel of
land. Afterwards, the parties executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition, dividing the remaining land of the
first parcel between them. Petitioner and respondents
entered into two more contracts. Under the contracts, the
parties equally divided between them the third and
fourth parcels of land. In a separate case the second
parcel of land were adjudicated in favor of plaintiffs
Rillo. The remaining 10,000-square meter portion was
later divided between Juan and Felicidad.
In August 1995, petitioner commenced an action for:
1. declaration of nullity of marriage;
2. status of a child;
3. recovery of property;
4. reconveyance; and
5. sum of money and damages.
Page | 4
Juan asserted that the marriage between his late brother
Teofilo and respondent Felicidad was a nullity in view
of the absence of the required marriage license. He
likewise maintained that his deceased brother was
neither the natural nor the adoptive father of respondent
Teofilo Carlos II. The RTC ruled in favor of Juan Carlos
while the CA remanded the case hence this petition for
the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan Carlos is the proper party to
commence an action for the declaration of nullity of
marriage.
Ruling:
No. Juan Carlos is not the proper party to commence
an action for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Under the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the
marriage. Only an aggrieved or injured spouse may file
a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. Such
petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs
of the spouses or by the State. Compulsory or intestate
heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their
predecessor, and, hence, can only question the validity
of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a
spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
The exceptions to this rule is if:
1. Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the
effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10 -SC; and
2. Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of
the Civil Code.
However, that the Rule does not apply to cases already
commenced before March 15, 2003. This is so, as the
new Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is
prospective in its application. The marriage in
controversy was celebrated on May 14, 1962. The
marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code, the applicable law is the Civil Code
which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration.
But the Civil Code is silent as to who may bring an
action to declare the marriage void.
However, this silence cannot be construed as a license
for any person to institute a nullity of marriage case.
Such person must appear to be the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of
the suit. Elsewise stated, plaintiff must be the real party-
in-interest. For it is basic in procedural law that every
action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of
the real party-in-interest.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that
the compulsory or intestate heirs are without any
recourse under the law. They can still protect their
successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the
Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages,
compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the
validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a
proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death
of a spouse in a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
Anita Cheng vs. Spouses Sy
Facts:
On January 20, 1999, Anita Cheng filed against the
spouses Sy two (2) cases for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22 for issuing to her
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC) Check Nos.
171762 and 71860 for P300,000.00 each, in payment of
their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed
account.
On February 27, 2005, the MeTC dismissed the B.P.
Blg. 22 cases on account of the failure of petitioner to
identify the accused respondents in open court. The
Order also did not make any pronouncement as to the
civil liability of accused respondents. On April 26, 2005,
petitioner lodged against respondents before the RTC,
Branch 18, Manila, a complaint for collection of a sum
of money with damages based on the same loaned
amount of P600,000.00 covered by the two PBC checks
previously subject of the estafa and BP Blg. 22 cases
The RTC, Branch 18, Manila, dismissed the complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, ratiocinating that the civil action
to collect the amount of P600,000.00 with damages was
already impliedly instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in
light of Section 1, paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Cheng argues that since the BP
Blg. 22 cases were filed on January 20, 1999, the 2000
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure promulgated on
Page | 5
December 1, 2000 should not apply, as it must be given
only prospective application.
Issue:
Whether or not the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
promulgated on December 2000, should not be given
retroactive application.
Ruling
It is given retroactive application. Petitioner is in error
when she insists that the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure should not apply because she filed her BP
Blg. 22 complaints in 1999. It is now settled that rules of
procedure apply even to cases already pending at the
time of their promulgation. The fact that procedural
statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights does not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions.
It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person
who may feel that he is adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is
that, as a general rule, no vested right may attach to,
nor arise from, procedural laws. Faced with the
dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases, petitioner's recourse
pursuant to the prevailing rules of procedure would have
been to appeal the civil action to recover the amount
loaned to respondents corresponding to the bounced
checks. Hence, the said civil action may proceed
requiring only a preponderance of evidence on the part
of petitioner.
Carolino vs. Senga
Facts:
On December 1, 1976, Jeremias A. Carolino, Adoracion
Carolino’s husband, retired from the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) pursuant to the provisions of
Sections 1(A) and 10 of Republic Act (RA) No. 340, as
amended. He started receiving his monthly retirement
pay in the amount of P18,315.00 in December 1976 until
the same was withheld by respondents in March 2005.
Upon inquiring upon the reasons why his retirement pay
is being withheld, Myrna F. Villaruz, LTC (FS) PA,
Pension and Gratuity Officer of the AFP Finance Center,
informed Jeremias that his loss of Filipino citizenship
caused the deletion of his name in the alpha list of the
AFP Pensioners' Payroll effective March 5, 2005; and
that he could avail of re-entitlement to his retirement
benefits and the restoration of his name in the AFP
Pensioners' Masterlist Payroll by complying with the
requirements prescribed under RA No. 9225, or the Dual
Citizenship Act.
That under the provisions of Sections 4, 5, and 6 of RA
No. 340, retired military personnel are disqualified from
receiving pension benefits once incapable to render
military service as a result of his having sworn
allegiance to a foreign country. It was also mentioned
that termination of retirement benefits of pensioner of
the AFP
could be done pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1638 which provides that the name of a
retiree who loses his Filipino citizenship shall be
removed from the retired list and his retirement benefits
terminated upon such loss. It being in consonance with
the policy consideration that all retirement laws
inconsistent with the provisions of PD No. 1638 are
repealed and modified accordingly. Jeremias died and
was substituted by his wife Adoracion.
Upon appeal, Adoracion contends that her husband's
retirement from the active service in 1976 was pursuant
to the provisions of RA No. No. 340 as PD No. 1638
was not yet in existence then, and there was nothing in
RA No. 340 that disqualifies a retired military personnel
from receiving retirement benefits after acquiring
foreign citizenship. The concept of retirement benefits is
such that one is entitled to them for services already
rendered and not for those to be made at a future time.
Retirement benefits due petitioner's husband under RA
No. 340, is an acquired right which cannot be taken
away by a subsequent law. PD No. 1638 does not
expressly provide for its retroactive application.
Issue:
Whether or not PD No. 1638 should be given retroactive
effect.
Ruling:
PD No. 1638 should not be given retroactive effect.
Section 5 of R.A. 340 clearly shows how a retiree's
retirement benefits may be terminated. There is no other
requirement found in the law which would be the reason
for the termination of a retiree's retirement benefits.
Petitioner's husband was never called to perform active
service and refused to do so, however, his retirement
benefit was terminated. The reason for such termination
was his loss of Filipino citizenship based on PD No.
1638.
PD No. 1638 was signed by then President Ferdinand
Marcos on September 10, 1979. Under Article 4 of
the Civil Code, it is provided that
Page | 6
laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. It is said that the law looks to the
future only and has no retroactive effect unless the
legislator may have formally given that effect to some
legal provisions. PD No. 1638 does not contain any
provision regarding its retroactive application, nor
the same may be implied from its language. In fact,
Section 36 of PD No. 1638 clearly provides that the
decree shall take effect upon its approval
Jeremias Carolino had already acquired vested right
to the payment of his retirement benefits which must
be respected and cannot be affected by the
subsequent enactment of PD No. 1638 which provides
that loss of Filipino citizenship terminates retirement
benefits. Vested rights include not only legal or
equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also
an exemption from new obligations after the right has
vested.
In fact, Sections 33 and 35 of PD No. 1638 recognize
such vested right. Section 33 of PD No. 1638 is clear
that the law has no intention to reduce or to revoke
whatever retirement benefits being enjoyed by a retiree
at the time of its passage. Hence, Section 35 provides for
an exception to what the decree repealed or modified,
i.e., except those necessary to preserve the rights granted
to retired or separated military personnel.
Doctrine:
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has
become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest". It is "the privilege to enjoy
property legally vested, to enforce contracts, and enjoy
the rights of property conferred by the existing law" or
"some right or interest in property which has become
fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy" (Ayog vs. Cusi)
Atienza vs. Brilliantes
Facts:
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his
bedroom, petitioner Lupo Atienza saw respondent judge
Brillantes sleeping on his bed. Upon inquiry, he was told
by the houseboy that Brillantes had been cohabiting with
Yolanda De Castro, the mother of his two children.
Atienza did not bother to wake up Brillantes and instead
left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to
take care of his children.
Thereafter, Brillantes prevented him from visiting his
children and even alienated the affection of his children
for him. This led Atienza to file a complaint for Gross
Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes. Atienza claims that
Brillantes is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom
he has five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991
sworn statements of assets and liabilities
Brillantes denies having been married to Ongkiko,
although he admits having five children with her. He
alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on
April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for
lack of a marriage license. They went through another
marriage ceremony in Manila on June 5, 1965. Again,
neither party applied for a marriage license.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage
before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage.
Brillantes argues that his marriage with Yolanda De
Castro was made in good faith. He believed, in all good
faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without
a license. He argues that the provision of Article 40 of
the Family Code does not apply to him considering that
his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed
by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family
Code.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 40 of the Family Code can be
given retroactive effect.
Ruling:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code can be given
retroactive effect. Article 40 is applicable to
remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of
the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the
Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40,
which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of
Article 40 to his case.
Page | 7
Doctrine:
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not
violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is
adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural
laws
Esther Abalos vs. People
Facts:
In April 2011, Esther Abalos introducing herself as
"Vicenta Abalos," accompanied by Christine Molina
(Molina), went to the office of private complainant
Elaine D. Sembrano (Sembrano) at Manulife, Baguio
City and offered to her two East West Bank checks for
rediscounting both amounting to 267,500.00. Sembrano
agreed to rediscount the checks upon assurance of
petitioner and her companion, Molina, that they were
good checks.
Sometime later, she learned from friends that petitioner's
name was Esther and not "Vicenta." When Sembrano
presented the checks for payment on due dates, the
checks were dishonored. Sembrano then engaged the
services of Benguet Credit Collectors to collect. For
failure to pay her loans, a complaint for estafa under
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was filed
against petitioner.
Esther claimed that the checks were issued only as a
collateral for a loan together with the title to a property
in the name of "Vicenta Abalos." She stated that she did
not personally transact with Sembrano and that it was
Molina who transacted with her and she merely
accompanied Molina to Sembrano's office in April 2011.
The RTC and the CA found Esther guilty and sentenced
her to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prison correctional as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The Supreme Court in its decision took into
consideration the amendment embodied in R.A. No.
10951 which modifies the penalty in swindling and
estafa cases. Section 100 of the said law, however,
provides that it shall have retroactive effect only insofar
as it is favorable to the accused.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 10951 is beneficial to Esther and is
given retroactive effect.
Ruling
No. The provisions of the RPC on the penalty for the
crime of Estafa are more beneficial to Esther hence
R.A. 10951 is not given retroactive effect. R.A. 10951
provides that the penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos
(P40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred
thousand pesos (P1,200,000).
Under R.A. No. 10951, therefore, the petitioner is liable
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six years and one day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to eight years, eight months and one day of
prision mayor, as maximum.
However the Court used the case of Hisoler vs. People
which stated that at any rate, even if the maximum
period imposable upon the petitioner under the RPC in
this case is higher than that under R.A. No. 10951, the
Court finds that the benefits that would accrue to the
petitioner with the imposition of a lower minimum
sentence outweighs
the longer prison sentence and is more in keeping with
the spirit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
Doctrine: (More Fitting for Criminal Law)
In fixing the indeterminate penalty imposable upon the
accused, the Court should be mindful that the basic
purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to "uplift
and redeem valuable human material, and prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness." Simply, an
indeterminate sentence is imposed to give the accused
the opportunity to shorten the term of imprisonment
depending upon his or her demeanor, and physical,
mental, and moral record as a prisoner. The goal of the
law is to encourage reformation and good behavior and
reduce the incidence of recidivism. While the grant of
parole after service of the minimum sentence is still
conditional, the flexibility granted upon the petitioner to
immediately avail of the benefits of parole considering
the much shorter minimum sentence under the RPC
should inspire the petitioner into
achieving the underlying purpose behind the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.
It is clear, therefore, that if R.A. No. 10951 would be
given retroactive effect, the same will prejudice
Esther. The penalty under the RPC, insofar as it
benefits the her must prevail. Hence, the penalty
imposed by the RTC and the CA, which is four years
and two months of prison
Page | 8
correccional as minimum to 20 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, is correct as it is within the
proper penalty imposed by law
ARTICLE 5. Acts executed against the provisions of
mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void, except
when the law itself authorizes their validity. (4a)
General Rule:
Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws are void.
Exceptions:
▪ When the law itself authorizes its validity
although generally they would have been void.
▪ When the law makes the act valid, but punishes
the violator.
▪ Where the law merely makes the act voidable,
that is, valid unless annulled.
▪ Where the law declares the act void, but
recognizes legal effects as arising from it.
Note:
▪ If the law commands that something be done, it
is mandatory. If the law commands that
something should not be done, it is prohibitory.
If the law commands that what it permits to be
done should be tolerated or respected, in which
case, it is permissive or directory.
ARTICLE 6. Rights may be waived, unless the
waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third
person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
What is a waiver?
▪ A waiver is the intentional or voluntary
relinquishment of a known right, or such
conduct as warrants an influence of
relinquishment of such right
What is a right?
▪ A right is a legally enforceable claim of one
person against another, that the other shall do a
given act, or shall not do a given act. It is the
power or privilege given to one person and as a
rule demandable of another.
What are [un]waivable rights?
▪ Natural rights such as the right to life;
▪ Right to future support;
▪ Personality and family rights.
▪ Rights which if renounced would infringe public
policy;
▪ If the waiver is prejudicial to a third person.
Requisites for a valid waiver of rights:
▪ He must have the full capacity to make the
waiver;
▪ The waiving party must actually have the right
he is renouncing;
▪ The waiver must be clear and unequivocal;
▪ The waiver must not be contrary to law, public
order, public policy, morals or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law; and
Note:
▪ Waivers may be expressly or impliedly given.
▪ Waivers are not presumed but need to be clearly
and convincingly shown.
Every right has three elements:
1. The subject,
2. The object, and
3. The efficient cause.
There are two kinds of subject: (1) active subject, one
who is entitled to demand the enforcement of the right,
and (2) passive subject, one who is duty-bound to suffer
its enforcement.
Things and services constitute the object of rights. The
efficient cause is the fact that gives rise to the legal
relation.
Roberto Famanila vs. Court of
Appeals
Page | 9
Facts:
Roberto G. Famanila is a Messman for the Hansa Riga, a
vessel registered and owned by its principal and co
respondent, Barbership Management Limited. While the
Hansa Riga was docked at the port of Eureka, California,
U.S.A. Roberto complained of headaches and
experienced dizziness until he subsequently collapsed.
Upon examination, it was determined that he had a
sudden attack of left cerebral hemorrhage from a
ruptured cerebral aneurysm. Owing to his physical and
mental condition, he was repatriated to the Philippines.
On August 21, 1990, he was examined at the American
Hospital in Intramuros, Manila where the examining
physician, Dr. Patricia Abesamis declared that he
"cannot go back to sea duty and has been observed for
120 days, he is being declared permanently, totally
disabled." Thereafter, authorized representatives of the
respondents convinced him to settle his claim amicably
by accepting the amount of US$13,200, which Roberto
accepted as evidenced by his signature in the Receipt
and Release dated February 28, 1991. His wife, Gloria
Famanila and one Richard Famanila, acted as witnesses
in the signing of the release.
On June 11, 1997, Roberto filed a complaint with the
NLRC praying for an award of disability benefits, share
in the insurance proceeds, moral damages and attorney's
fees. He claims that he did not sign the Receipt and
Release voluntarily or freely because he was
permanently disabled and in financial constraints. These
factors allegedly vitiated his consent which makes the
Receipt and Release void and unenforceable.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid waiver.
Ruling:
Yes. There is a valid waiver. The Supreme Court said
that It is true that quitclaims and waivers are oftentimes
frowned upon and are considered as ineffective in
barring recovery for the full measure of the worker's
right and that acceptance of the benefits therefrom does
not amount to estoppel. The reason is plain. Employer
and employee, obviously do not stand on the same
footing.
However, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as
against public policy. If the agreement was voluntarily
entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned
simply because of change of mind. It is only where there
is clear proof that the waiver was
wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the
terms of the settlement are unconscionable on its face,
that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person
making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the
consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid
and binding undertaking, as in this case.
To be valid and effective, waivers must be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms, leaving no doubt as to the
intention of those giving up a right or a benefit that
legally pertains to them. We have reviewed the terms
and conditions contained in the Receipt and Release and
we find the same to be clear and unambiguous. The
signing was even witnessed by petitioner's wife, Gloria
T. Famanila and one Richard T. Famanila.
Roberto contends that his permanent and total disability
vitiated his consent to the Receipt and Release thereby
rendering it void and unenforceable. However, disability
is not among the factors that may vitiate consent.
Besides, save for petitioner's self-serving allegations,
there is no proof on record that his consent was vitiated
on account of his disability. In the absence of such proof
of vitiated consent, the validity of the Receipt and
Release must be upheld.
Michael Guy vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen
Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their
mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for
letters of administration alleging that they are the duly
acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei, who
died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992,
leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of
real and personal properties.
Michael Guy prayed for the dismissal of the petition and
argued that private respondents should have established
their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of
Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
Michael along with his co-heirs also allege that
Remedios’ claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7,
1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in
exchange for the financial and
Page | 10
educational assistance received from Michael Guy,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of
Sima Wei from any and all liabilities.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid waiver of rights on the
part of Remedios.
Ruling:
No. There is no valid waiver. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and
unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed
to a person when its terms do not explicitly and
clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.
The Supreme Court Ruled that there was no waiver of
hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver of Claim
does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received
P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor
daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full
settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature
and kind against the estate of the late Rufino Guy
Susim." Considering that the document did not
specifically mention private respondents' hereditary
share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as
a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even if Remedios truly waived the hereditary
rights of her daughters, such waiver will not bar the
latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code states that
any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons
may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Parents or
guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization. Parents and
guardians may not therefore repudiate the
inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.
This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of
property which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to
protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim
in the instant case is void and will not bar private
respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the
deceased.
Otamias vs. Republic
Facts:
On September 2000, Edna and Colonel Fransisco
Otamias separated due to his alleged infidelity. Their
five children remained with Edna. On
August 2002, Edna filed a
Complaint-Affidavit against Colonel Otamias. Edna
demanded monthly support equivalent to 75% of
Colonel Otamias' retirement benefits. However, Colonel
Otamias executed an Affidavit, stating that can only
commit 50% of his retirement benefits to be pro-rated
among my wife and five (5) children. On February 26,
2003, Colonel Otamias executed a Deed of Assignment
where he waived 50% of his salary and pension benefits
in favor of Edna and their children.
The agreement was honored until January 6, 2006 until
the Armed Forces of the Philippines suddenly decided
not to honor the agreement. The RTC decided in favor of
Edna ordering the AFP to pay her the amount indicated
in the deed of assignment signed by both parties. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the AFP,
stating that under Section 31 of Presidential Decree No.
1638, otherwise known as the AFP Military Personnel
Retirement and Separation Decree of 1979, "provides for
the exemption of the monthly pension of retired military
personnel from execution and attachment.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a valid waiver on Fransisco
Otamias’ salary and pension benefits.
Ruling:
Yes. There is a valid waiver. The Supreme Court ruled
that when Colonel Otamias executed the Deed of
Assignment, he effectively waived his right to claim that
his retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
right to receive retirement benefits belongs to Colonel
Otamias. His decision to waive a portion of his
retirement benefits does not infringe on the right of third
persons, but even protects the right of his family to
receive support.
In addition, the Deed of Assignment should be
considered as the law between the parties, and its
provisions should be respected in the absence of
allegations that Colonel Otamias was coerced or
defrauded in executing it. The general rule is that a
contract is the law between parties and parties are free to
stipulate terms and conditions that are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.
The Deed of Assignment executed by Colonel
Otamias was not contrary to law; it was in
accordance with the provisions on
Page | 11
support in the Family Code. Hence, there was no
reason for the AFP PGMC not to recognize its validity.
ARTICLE 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent
ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the
contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with
the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
Laws are repealed in two ways:
1. Express and
2. Implied
Note:
▪ An express repeal is that contained in a special
provision of a subsequent law.
▪ An Implied repeal, on the other hand, takes
place when the provisions of the subsequent law
are incompatible with those of an earlier law
▪ Implied repeals are not to be favored because
they rest only on the presumption that because
the old and the new laws are incompatible with
each other, there is an intention to repeal the old.
What are the requisites for implied repeal?
1. The laws cover the same subject matter and
2. The latter law is repugnant to the earlier.
Effect if Repealing Law is Repealed:
▪ If the first law is repealed by IMPLICATION by
the second law, and the second law is itself
repealed by a third law, the first law is revived
unless otherwise provided in the third law.
▪ If the first law is repealed EXPRESSLY by the
second law, and the second law is repealed by a
third law, the first law is not revived, unless
expressly so provided.
What if there is conflict between the Special Law and
General Law?
▪ When there is a conflict between a general law
and a special statute, the special statute should
prevail since it evinces the legislative intent
more clearly than the general statute.
ARTICLE 8. Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. (n)
Note:
▪ While judicial decisions form part of the legal
system, judicial decisions are not laws. They are,
however, evidence of what the law means, and
this is why they are part of the legal system of
the Philippines. The interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.
▪ This Article only refers to Supreme Court
Decisions since the decisions of subordinate
courts are only persuasive in nature, and can
have no mandatory effect.
ARTICLE 9. No judge or court shall decline to
render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the laws. (6)
Note:
▪ If the law be silent, obscure or insufficient with
respect to a particular controversy, the custom of
the place shall be applied, and, in default
thereof, the general principles of law and justice.
▪ In Criminal Prosecutions, when the law is silent,
the judge may not decline to render a judgment.
Instead, the judge must dismiss the criminal
action. Applying the rule “nullum crimen, nulla
poena sine lege” (there is no crime when there is
no law punishing it)
Rommel Silverio vs. Republic
Facts:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a
petition for the change of his first name and sex in his
birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
He is a male transsexual, that is,
“anatomically male but feels, thinks
Page | 12
and acts as a female” and that he had always identified
himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a
man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United
States. He underwent psychological examination,
hormone treatment and breast augmentation.
On January 27, 2001 he underwent sex reassignment
surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter
examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic
and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure. From then on,
petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to
be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth
certificate changed from “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely,”
and his sex from “male” to “female.”
The RTC ruled in favor of Rommel stating that that no
harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or
the community in granting the petition. However the
OSG filed a petition to the Court of Appeals arguing
that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the
birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in its decision to grant
Rommel’s petition.
Ruling:
Yes. The RTC is in error. The State has an interest in the
names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of
identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a
right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by
statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
which was amended by RA 9048 the (Clerical Error
Law).
The law provides that no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for
Clerical or typographical errors. RA 9048 likewise
provides the grounds for which change of first name
may be allowed
1. The petitioner finds the first name or nickname
to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been
habitually and continuously used by the
petitioner and he has been publicly known by
that first name or nickname in the community;
or
3. The change will avoid confusion.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding
confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his
declared purpose may only create grave complications in
the civil registry and the public interest. Under the Civil
Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of
the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the
sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his
or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and
wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences.
First, even the trial court itself found that the petition
was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual
marriage to his male fiancé. However, marriage, one of
the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract
of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of
its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the
contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To
grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially
reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and
family relations. It will allow the union of a man with
another man who has undergone sex reassignment.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that
“no judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the
law.” However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or
interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
ARTICLE 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
(n)
Note:
▪ The first duty of the judge is to apply the law
whether it be wise or not, whether unjust
provided that the law is clear, and there is no
doubt.
▪ It is the sworn duty of the judge to apply the law
without fear or favor, to follow its mandate, not
to temper with it. What the law grants, the court
cannot deny.
Page | 13
ARTICLE 11. Customs which are contrary to law,
public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. (n)
ARTICLE 12. A custom must be proved as a fact,
according to the rules of evidence. (n)
What is a Custom?
▪ Custom is a “rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed as a social
rule, legally binding and obligatory.
Kinds of Customs:
1. General – prevailing throughout the country
2. Local – prevailing in some cities or towns
3. Particular – prevailing only in a district
Requisites before the Court can consider customs:
▪ Plurality of acts, or various resolutions of a
juridical question raised repeatedly in life;
▪ Uniformity, or identity of acts or various
solutions to the juridical question;
▪ General practice by the great mass of the social
group;
▪ Continued performance of these acts for a long
period of time;
▪ General conviction that the practice corresponds
to a juridical necessity or that it is obligatory;
and
▪ The practice must not be contrary to law, morals
or public order.
ARTICLE 13. When the laws speak of years, months,
days or nights, it shall be understood that years are
of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of
thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours; and nights
from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be
computed by the number of days which they
respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded, and the last day included. (7a)
Rules in computing periods:
▪ In computing a period, the first day is excluded
while the last day is included.
▪ If the last day is a Saturday, Sunday or a Legal
Holiday, whether the act is due that day or the
following day will depend
whether it is under an Ordinary Contract or
whether The Rules of Court decides it.
▪ In an ordinary contract, the agreement of the
parties prevails. This is because obligations
arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties.
▪ When the time refers to a period prescribed or
allowed by the Rules of Court, or by order of the
court, or by any applicable statute, if the last day
of the period falls on a Saturday, a Sunday or a
legal holiday in the place where the court sits,
the time shall not run until the next working day
Amendment to the calculation of a year:
▪ Under the Administrative Code of 1987, Section
31. A year shall be understood to be twelve
calendar months, rather than 365 days.
ARTICLE 14. Penal laws and those of public security
and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principles of public international law and to treaty
stipulations. (8a)
Note:
▪ Also known as the Generality Principle.
▪ Article 14 of the Civil Code embodies one of the
three main characteristics of our Criminal Law
which is GENERALITY.
▪ As a rule, our criminal law is binding on all
persons who live or sojourn in Philippine
territory.
Exceptions to this Article:
1. Treaty Stipulations
2. Laws of Preferential Application
3. Principles of Public International Law
Del Socorro vs. Wilsem
Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990. They were blessed with
a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Their
marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the
Page | 14
appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was
only eighteen (18) months old.
Norma alleges that Van Wilsem made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene which is equivalent
to Php17,500.00 more or less. However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. On
August 28, 2009, Norma, through her counsel, sent a
letter demanding for support from Wilsem. However,
Wilsem refused to receive the letter. Because of the
foregoing circumstances, Norma filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against Wilsem for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not Van Wilsem has an obligation to support
his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not
he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.
Ruling:
Yes. Van Wilsem has an obligation to support his
minor child and he may be held liable under R.A.
9262. In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden of
proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that
the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree). Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved. The doctrine of processual
presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved,
our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same
as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to
support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents
to support their children and penalizing the non-
compliance therewith.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the non-compliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto. Under the aforesaid special law, the
deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and
children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently
living in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s
claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in
relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to
the instant case, which provides that:“penal laws and
those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations.” On this score, it is indisputable that
the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction
over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
ARTICLE 15. Laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. (9a)
General Rule:
▪ The Philippines follows the Nationality or
Citizenship Theory such that the national law of
the person is applied in matters involving
personal relations.
Article 15 refers to:
1. Family Rights and Duties – refers to the rights
and duties provided in the Family Code and
other special laws such as matters relating to
marriage, legal separation, property relations,
support, adoption, filiation, etc.
2. Status – A term used to
designate the circumstances
Page | 15
 affecting the legal situation of a person in view
of his age, nation and his family membership.
3. Condition – a mode or state of being, state or
situation, status or rank.
4. Legal Capacity – the legal power to enter into
binding obligations or to enjoy the privileges of
a legal status.
Note:
▪ Also known as the Nationality Principle.
▪ The capacity to enter into an ordinary contract is
governed by the national law of the person, and
not by the law of the place where the contract
was entered into.
Alice Van Dorn vs. Manuel Romillo
Facts:
Petitioner Alice Vann Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines
while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of
the United States, both were married in Hongkong in
1972. After the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children. The parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that Alice has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On June 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against
Alice Van Dorn stating that Alice’s business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered
to render an accounting of that business, and that he be
declared with the right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the
cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein
Richard had acknowledged that both of them had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982.
Upton argues that the Divorce Decree issued by the
Nevada Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of
the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially
if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree is ineffective in the
Philippines due to it being contrary to our laws, morals,
and public policy.
Ruling:
The Divorce Decree is recognized in the Philippines.
There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on Richard Upton as an American
citizen. For instance, Richard cannot sue petitioner, as
her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code , only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he
is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
Imelda Pilapil vs. Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
Facts: #2
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,
and private respondent Erich Ekkchard Geiling, a
German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedcnsweilcr in the
Federal Republic of Germany. The couple lived together
for some time in Malate, Manila where their only child,
Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born. After about three and
a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony
eventuated in Erich initiating a divorce proceeding
against Imelda in Germany before the Schoneberg Local
Court
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg
Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage
of the spouses. On June 27, 1986, or more than five
months after the issuance of the
Page | 16
divorce decree, Erich filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still
married to said him, Imelda "had an affair with two other
men.
Issue:
Whether or not the adultery charge shall prosper despite
the divorce between Erich and Imelda.
Ruling:
No. The adultery charge will not prosper. Under
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
adultery, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse and
nobody else. It necessarily follows that such initiator
must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since
the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the
spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of
the criminal case.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as Erich is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of
persons. Being no longer the husband of Imelda, Erich
had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
Grace Recio vs. Rederick Recio
Facts: #3
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, married Editha Samson,
an Australian citizen in Malabon, Rizal, on March 1,
1987. Unfortunately, on May 18, 1989, the Australian
Family Court issued a decree of divorce, purportedly
dissolving the marriage between the two. On June 26,
1992, respondent became an Australian citizen
Grace and Rederick were married on January 12, 1994.
In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was
declared as "single" and "Filipino. On March 3, 1998,
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage in the court, on the ground
of bigamy Grace found out that
Redederick still had a prior subsisting marriage at the
time he married her on January 12, 1994.
Rederick argues that the marriage was validly dissolved
by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree capacitated Rederick
to remarry.
Ruling:
No. The presentation of the divorce decree alone does
not capacitate Rederick to remarry. Philippine law does
not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot
be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because
of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented
and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other
hand, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either
1. an official publication or
2. a copy thereof attested by the officer having
legal custody of the document.
If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be:
1. accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept and
2. authenticated by the seal of his office.
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha
Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by an
Australian family court. However, appearance is not
sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned rules on
evidence must be demonstrated.
Fe Quita vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: #4
Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos, were
married in the Philippines on 18 May
Page | 17
1941. Somewhere along the way their relationship
soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A. On 23 July 1954 she
obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks
thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality, but their relationship also ended in a divorce.
Still in the U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a
certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 7
October 1987 Quita moved for the immediate
declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution
of his estate. The trial court invoking Tenchavez v.
Escaño which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity
of the present Civil Code was not entitled to recognition
as valid in this jurisdiction," and disregarded the divorce
between Quita and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed
the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of
Arturo in 1972.
Issue:
Whether or not Fe is still entitled to inherit from the
decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in
the U.S.A.
Ruling:
It is still unclear. The doubt persisted as to whether she
was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the
materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce,
Van Dorn would become applicable and Fe Quita
could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Hence, The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings is AFFIRMED.
Elmar Perez vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: #5
Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily
Gomez Catindig. Several years later, the couple
encountered marital problems that they decided to
separate from each other. Upon advice of a mutual
friend, they decided to obtain a divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O.
Perez in the State of Virginia in the
United States and both lived as
husband and wife until October 2001. Elmar learned that
the divorce decree issued by the court in the Dominican
Republic which "dissolved" the marriage between
Tristan and Lily was not recognized in the Philippines
and that her marriage to Tristan was deemed void under
Philippine law. When she confronted Tristan about this,
the latter assured her that he would legalize their union
after he obtains an annulment of his marriage with Lily.
As Tristan was filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to Lily with the Regional Trial
Court. Elmar filed a Motion for Leave to File
Intervention claiming that she has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation because she knows certain
information which might aid the trial court at a truthful,
fair and just adjudication of the annulment case, The
RTC granted her petition but was overturned when
Tristan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
the Court of Appeals seeking to annul the order
Elmar claims that her status as the wife and companion
of Tristan for 17 years vests her with the requisite legal
interest required of a would-be intervenor under the
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Elmar has the capacity to intervene the
declaration of nullity proceedings between Tristan and
Lily.
Ruling:
No. Elmar has no legal interest that capacitates her to
intervene. Under the law, Elmar was never the legal
wife of Tristan, hence her claim of legal interest has no
basis. When Elmar and Tristan married on July 14, 1984,
Tristan was still lawfully married to Lily. The divorce
decree that Tristan and Lily obtained from the
Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage bond
between them. It is basic that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of
where a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she
will be governed by Philippine laws with respect to his
or her family rights and duties, or to his or her status,
condition and legal capacity.
Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she was
married here or abroad, initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually
becomes successful in getting an
Page | 18
absolute divorce decree, the Philippines will not
recognize such absolute divorce.
Rodolfo San Luis vs Felicidad San Luis
Facts:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages.
1. Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942
2. Merry Lee Corwin on May 1,1968
3. Felicidad San Luis (respondent) on June 20,
1974
On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
On October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen,
filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of
America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce
Felicisimo had no children with Felicidad but lived with
her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his
death on December 18, 1992. Thereafter, Felicidad
sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. Petitioner
Rodolfo San Luis one of the children of Felicisimo and
Virginia claims that claimed that Felicidad has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Felicidad then presented the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry
Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue
of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Issue:
Whether or not Felicisimo was still married to Merry
Lee despite the divorce decree.
Ruling:
No. The divorce decree freed Felicisimo from his
marriage bonds with Merry Lee. Court stated the
previous cases of Van Dorn, Ibay-
Somera, and Quita which resulted to the conclusion that
that where a Filipino is divorced by his foreign spouse,
it capacitates the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse.
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties
and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable. Marriage, being
a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society
where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce
abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Rodolfo cites Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law
insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of
this Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in
his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. In
the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's
surviving spouse.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to
marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the
latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition
for letters of administration, as she may be considered
the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that
were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
On the divorce decree as evidence
However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by
Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio
Felicidad merely submitted photocopies of the Marriage
Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act
of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in
Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
Page | 19
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. Hence
the court remanded the case.
Soledad Lavadia vs. Heirs of Luna
Facts: #7
Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name
partner in the prestigious law firm at that time when he
was living with his first wife Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
which gave way to the birth of seven (7) children. After
almost two (2) decades of marriage Luna and Eugenia
agreed to live apart from each other in February 1966
and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement for separation and
settlement of properties dated November 12, 1975,
whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, Luna obtained a divorce decree of
his marriage with Eugenia from Court of First Instance
of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also, in Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic, on the same date, Luna
contracted another marriage, this time with Soledad.
Thereafter, Luna and Soledad returned to the Philippines
and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON (a new law firm
organized by Luna) through Atty. Luna purchased from
Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of
Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium Project (condominium
unit). After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over
the condominium unit was executed on July 15, 1983,
and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983,
which was registered bearing the following names:
“JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna.
Additional Facts for Family Code Discussions:
Luna thereafter established and headed another law firm
with Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz and used a portion of
the office condominium unit as their office. The said law
firm lasted until the death of Luna on July 12, 1997.
After the death of Atty. Luna, his share in the
condominium unit including the lawbooks, office
furniture and equipment found therein were taken over
by Gregorio Z. Luna, Juan Luna’s son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna then leased out the 25/100
portion of the condominium unit belonging to his father
to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who established his own
law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the
condominium unit as well as the law books, office
furniture and equipment became the subject of the
complaint filed by Soledad. She alleged that the subject
properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between Atty. Luna and her through their joint
efforts that since they had no children, she would
become co-owner of the said properties upon the death
of Atty. Luna.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree dissolved the
marriage bond between Atty Juan Luna and Eugenia.
Ruling:
No. It did not dissolve the marriage. The first marriage
between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was
solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947.
The law in force at the time of the solemnization was
the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the
nationality rule. The Civil Code continued to follow
the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons were binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed this case by virtue of both Atty. Luna and
Eugenio having remained Filipinos until the death of
Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce
between Filipinos has remained even under the Family
Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital
unions under our laws have been the void and the
voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such
defective marriages have been limited to the declaration
of nullity of the marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
As to the ownership of property: (More Fitting on
Family Code Discussions)
SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual
contribution to purchase the said property. She failed to
establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were
indeed used for the acquisition of the share of ATTY.
LUNA in the condominium unit.
Page | 20
Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding
shares were prima facie presumed to be equal. However,
for this presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution
was required.
The title showing the names of “JUAN LUCES LUNA,
married to Soledad L. Luna” was no proof that
SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not
confer title but merely confirms one already existing.
The phrase “married to” preceding “Soledad L. Luna” is
merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
David Noveras vs. Leticia Noveras
Facts: #8
David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras
(Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in Quezon
City, Philippines. They resided in California, United
States of America (USA) where they eventually acquired
American citizenship. During the marriage, they
acquired the properties in the Philippines and in the
USA. The subject property in this case is the House and
Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085 Norma
Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property).
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and
returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December 2002,
Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc property for P2.2
Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September
2003, David abandoned his family and lived with
Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Upon learning
that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a
petition for divorce with the Superior Court of
California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California
court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment
was duly entered on 29 June 2005. The California court
granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as
well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.
Additional Facts for Family Code Discussions:
On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial
Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She prayed for:
1. the power to administer all conjugal properties
in the Philippines;
2. David and his partner to cease and desist from
selling the subject conjugal properties;
3. the declaration that all conjugal properties be
forfeited in favor of her children;
4. David to remit half of the purchase price as
share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc
property; and
5. the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00
litigation expenses.
In his answer, David demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA
properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be
charged against the conjugal partnership. David argues
that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties
is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia
considering that the latter was already granted all US
properties by the California court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Divorce between David and Leticia is
recognized in the Philippines.
Ruling
No. It is not recognized. As a rule, “no sovereign is
bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment
rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This means
that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together
with the alien’s applicable national law to show the
effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a
party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of
his claim or defense.
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce
decree and the national law of the foreigner must comply
with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine
courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may
be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule
132, Sections 24 and 25. Based on the records, only the
divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the
pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it
follows that the parties are still legally married in the
Philippines.
Page | 21
 Orion Savings Bank vs. Suzuki
Facts: #9
On August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki),
a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja)
to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot
at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned
by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national.
On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 83349 for One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) as reservation
fee. On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another
check, BPI Check No. 83350, this time for
P2,700,000.00 representing the remaining balance of the
purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003 covering Unit
No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki
took possession of the condominium unit and parking
lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.
Kang thereafter made several representations with
Suzuki to deliver the titles to the properties. Despite
several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the
documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left
the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the status of the
properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of
Deeds.
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from
Orion’s counsel dated October 9, 2003, stating that Kang
obtained a loan in the amount of P1,800,000.00. When
Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated
February 2, 2003, in favor of Orion covering Unit No.
536.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the deed of sale was void.
2. What law shall govern the immovable property.
Ruling:
No. The deed of sale was valid. Property relations
between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking
the application of a foreign law has the burden of
proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of
fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the judge
cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. In this case
Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean
law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely
attached a “Certification from the
Embassy of the Republic of Korea”
to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification,
does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal
nature of the property for there is no showing that it was
properly authenticated by the seal of his office, as
required under Section 24 of Rule 132.
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of
presumed-identity approach or processual presumption
comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded
or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang
‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung” is merely descriptive of
the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from
the certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the
properties as they are registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
On Article 16 of the Civil Code:
It is a universal principle that real or immovable
property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country
or state where it is located. The reason is found in the
very nature of immovable property; its immobility.
Immovables are part of the country and so closely
connected to it that all rights over them have their
natural center of gravity there.
Thus, all matters concerning the title and disposition of
real property are determined by what is known as the lex
loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by
which a title can pass from one person to another, or by
which an interest therein can be gained or lost. This
general principle includes all rules governing the
descent, alienation and transfer of immovable property
and the validity, effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances.
This principle even governs the capacity of the person
making a deed relating to immovable property, no matter
what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be
ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it
is incapacitated by the lex loci rei sitae, even though
under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place
where the instrument is actually made, his capacity is
undoubted.
Del Socorro vs. Wilsem
Facts: #10
Page | 22
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990. They were blessed with
a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Their
marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a
Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of
Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.
Norma alleges that Van Wilsem made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene which is equivalent
to Php17,500.00 more or less. However, since the
arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines,
respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo. On
August 28, 2009, Norma, through her counsel, sent a
letter demanding for support from Wilsem. However,
Wilsem refused to receive the letter. Because of the
foregoing circumstances, Norma filed a complaint-
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
against Wilsem for violation of Section 5, paragraph
E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to
support his minor child with petitioner.
The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien.
Upon Appeal Norma reiterated Wilsem’s obligation to
support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code,
thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No.
9262 which “equally applies to all persons in the
Philippines who are obliged to support their minor
children regardless of the obligor’s nationality.”
Issue:
Whether or not Article 195 of the Family Code Applies
to Van Wilsem.
Ruling:
No it is not applicable. The Supreme Court ruled that
Norma cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code
in demanding support from Wilsem, who is a foreign
citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses
the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the
provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same
principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family
rights and duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that
falls under family rights and duties.
Since the Wilsem is a citizen of Holland or the
Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law,
as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child,
as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.
This does not, however, mean that Wilsem is not obliged
to support petitioner’s son altogether. (Refer to the
Discusion on proving foreign law)
ARTICLE 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country where it
is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions,
both with respect to the order of succession and to
the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic
validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated
by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found. (10a)
General Rule:
▪ Under the first paragraph of Article 16 of the
Civil Code, real and personal properties are
subject to the law of the country in which they
are situated. (Lex Rei Sitae)
Exception:
▪ The second paragraph of Article 16 of the Civil
Code renders inapplicable the principle of lex rei
sitae, even if real and personal properties are
involved, in the matter of the intestate and
testate succession of a decedent.
▪ Instead, what is applicable is the national law of
the decedent, with respect to the following
aspects of intestate or testamentary succession:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of
successional rights; and (c) the intrinsic validity
of the provisions of the will.
▪ In addition, the national law of the decedent
likewise governs the capacity of the heir to
succeed.
Illustrative Problem:
Page | 23
A an American citizen, executed a will in Canada
leaving his property located in the Philippines to B his
friend.
Question:
What law shall govern A’s
1. Capacity to execute the will
2. The formality of execution
3. The capacity of B to inherit from A
4. The intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provision
Answer:
1. A’s capacity to execute the will is governed by
his national law.
2. The laws of Canada shall govern the formalities
of the execution of the will.
3. The national law of A shall govern B’s capacity
to succeed.
4. The national law of A shall govern the intrinsic
validity of the testamentary provisions.
What is the Renvoi, Remission, Transmission?
▪ Renvoi literally means referring back which
arises where our law refers a case to another
country for solution, but for that country refers it
back to our country for determination.
▪ When the reference is made back to the law of
the forum that is known as Remission.
▪ Whole the reference is made to a third state is
known as Transmission.
What is the doctrine of presumed identity approach?
▪ It is also known as the doctrine of processual
presumption. Under this doctrine, if foreign law
is not specifically alleged, or even if alleged it
has not been proven, our courts will presume
that the foreign law is the same as our internal or
domestic law.
ARTICLE 17. The forms and solemnities of
contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be
governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the
diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in
their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall
not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. (11a)
Note:
▪ Under the first paragraph of Article 17, the
forms and solemnities of contracts, wills and
other public instruments are governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed
under the principle of “lex loci celebrationis.”
▪ The intrinsic validity of a contract is governed
by the proper law of the contract which may
either be the law of the place voluntarily agreed
upon by the contracting parties (“lex loci
voluntatis”) or the law of the place intended by
them expressly or impliedly (“lex loci
intentionis”).
▪ The intrinsic validity of the provisions of a will,
however, shall be governed by the national law
of the decedent.
Illustrative Problem:
Juan, a Filipino citizen, enters into an ordinary contract
with Joe, an American citizen. The contract was
executed in Canada. What law shall govern:
1. The formal validity of the contract.
2. The legal capacities of the parties to enter into
such contract.
3. The intrinsic validity of the contract.
Answer:
1. Canadian law, under the principle of lex loci
celebrationis.
2. Their respective national laws.
3. The proper law of the contract (lex contractus),
which may either be the law of the place
voluntarily agreed upon by the contracting
parties (lex loci voluntatis) or the law of the
place intended by them expressly or impliedly
(lex loci intentionis)
ARTICLE 18. In matters which are governed by the
Code of Commerce and special
Page | 24
laws, their deficiency shall be supplied by the
provisions of this Code. (16a)
Note:
▪ Where there is no deficiency in the special law
or Code of Commerce, the provisions of the
Civil Code cannot be applied.
ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
ARTICLE 20. Every person who, contrary to law,
wilfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
ARTICLE 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
What is the principle of Damnum Absque Injuria?
▪ One who merely exercises one’s rights does no
actionable injury and cannot be held liable for
damages.
▪ Under this principle, the legitimate exercise of a
person’s rights, even if it causes loss to another,
does not automatically result in an actionable
injury. The law does not prescribe a remedy for
the loss.
Exception to the principle:
▪ This principle does not, however, apply when
there is an abuse of a person’s rights, or when
the exercise of this right is suspended or
extinguished pursuant to a court order.
Golden Rule under Article 19:
1. To act with justice
2. Give everyone his due
3. Observe honestly and good faith.
Counter to that is the principle of abuse of rights.
The elements of an abuse of right under Article 19
are the following:
1. There is a legal right or duty;
2. which is exercised in bad
faith;
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Note:
▪ Article 19 lays down the rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide
a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21
would be proper
▪ Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all
other provisions of law which do not especially
provide for their own sanction. Thus, anyone
who, whether willfully or negligently, in the
exercise of his legal right or duty, causes
damage to another, shall indemnify his victim
for injuries suffered thereby.
▪ Article 21 deals with acts contra bonus mores,
and has the following elements: (1) There is an
act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to
morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy; and (3) and it is done with intent to
injure.
Is a breach of promise to marry actionable for
damages?
▪ No. It is generally not actionable.
▪ Unless if there is Fraud or Deceit
▪ Unless if expenses are actually incurred
▪ When the Woman was forcibly abducted and
raped
What are the elements of Malicious Prosecution?
1. The fact of the prosecution and the further fact
that the defendant himself was the prosecutor,
and that the action was finally terminated with
an acquittal;
2. That in bringing the action the prosecutor acted
without probable cause; and
3. That the prosecutor was actuated or impelled by
legal malice that is improper or sinister motive.
Far East Bank vs. Pacilan Jr.
Facts:
On March 1988, Pacilan Jr. issued a check in the amount
of ₱680.00 and the same was presented for payment to
Far East Bank on April 4, 1988. Upon its presentment
the check was dishonored. When Pacilan verified with
Far East Bank about the dishonor, he
Page | 25
discovered that his current account was closed on the
ground that it was improperly handled. That from the
period of March 30 up to April 5 1988, Pacilan issued 4
checks with a total amount of 7,410php but his account
only reflected a deposit of 6,981.43php.
On April 18, 1988, Pacilan Jr. wrote to Far East Bank
complaining that the closure of his account was
unjustified. When he did not receive a reply, Pacilan
filed a complaint for damages against the said bank. He
alleged that the closure of his current account by the
bank was unjustified because on the first banking hour
of April 5, 1988, he already deposited an amount
sufficient to fund his checks. He also pointed out that the
check he issued on April 4, was delivered to the bank at
the close of banking hours on April 4, 1988 and,
following normal banking procedure, he had until the
last clearing hour of the following day, or on April 5,
1988, to honor the check or return it, if not funded. In
disregard of this banking procedure and practice,
however, Far East Bank hastily closed the respondent’s
current account and dishonored his Check.
Pacilan alleged he indecent haste that attended the
closure of his account was patently malicious and
intended to embarrass him. That the alleged malicious
acts of petitioner bank besmirched the his reputation and
caused him "social humiliation, wounded feelings,
insurmountable worries and sleepless nights" entitling
him to an award of damages.
In their reply Far East Bank showed that Pacilan had
improperly and irregularly handled his current account.
For example, in 1986, his account was overdrawn 156
times, in 1987, 117 times and in 1988, 26 times. In all
these instances, the account was overdrawn due to the
issuance of checks against insufficient funds. The bank
also argued that Pacilan had also signed several checks
with a different signature from the specimen on file for
dubious reasons. They further argue that it acted in good
faith and in accordance with the rules and regulations
governing the operation of a regular demand deposit
which reserves to the bank "the right to close an account
if the depositor frequently draws checks against
insufficient funds and/or uncollected deposits."
Issue:
Whether or not Far East Bank is Liable for Damages.
Ruling:
No. Far East Bank is not liable for damages. The
elements of abuse of rights are the following:
1. the existence of a legal right or duty;
2. which is exercised in bad faith; and
3. for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision.
The law always presumes good faith and any person
who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of
another has the burden of proving that the latter
acted in bad faith or with ill-motive.
The facts, as found by the court a quo and the appellate
court, do not establish that, in the exercise of this right,
petitioner bank committed an abuse thereof.
Specifically, the second and third elements for abuse
of rights are not attendant in the present case. The
evidence presented by petitioner bank negates the
existence of bad faith or malice on its part in closing the
respondent’s account on April 4, 1988 because on the
said date the same was already overdrawn.
Further, Far East Bank showed that in 1986, the current
account of the respondent was overdrawn 156 times due
to his issuance of checks against insufficient funds. In
1987, the said account was overdrawn 117 times for the
same reason. Again, in 1988, 26 times. There were also
several instances when the respondent issued checks
deliberately using a signature different from his
specimen signature on file with petitioner bank. All
these circumstances taken together justified the
petitioner bank’s closure of the respondent’s account on
April 4, 1988 for "improper handling."
It is observed that nowhere under its rules and
regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the
respondent, or any depositor for that matter, of the
closure of the account for frequently drawing checks
against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could
be imputed on far east bank for so acting since the
records bear out that the Pacilan Jr. had indeed been
improperly and irregularly handling his account not just
a few times but hundreds of times. Under the
circumstances, Far East Bank could not be faulted for
exercising its right in accordance with the express rules
and regulations governing the current accounts of its
depositors. Upon the opening of his account, Pacilan had
agreed to be bound by these terms and conditions.
Definition of Terms by SC on this case:
Page | 26
 ● Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
● Damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results
from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered.
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of
a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone,
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
● Good faith refers to the state of the mind which
is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain
from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another.
● Bad faith does not simply connote bad
judgment or simple negligence, dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to
some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes
of the nature of fraud.
● Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty. It implies an intention to do
ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad
faith or bad motive.
Atty. Ernesto Uypitching vs Ernesto Quiamco
Facts:
In 1982 Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by 3
individuals.
1. Juan Davalan
2. Josefino Gabutero; and
3. Raul Generoso
To amicably settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for
robbery filed by Quiamco against them. They
surrendered to him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and
a photocopy of its certificate of registration. Quiamco
asked for the original certificate of registration but the
three accused never came to see him again.
It turned out that, in October 1981, the motorcycle had
been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by Atty.
Ernesto Uypitching of Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments,
Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the
payments. In September 1982, however, Davalan
stopped paying the remaining installments and told the
corporation’s collector, that the
motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by Quiamco’s
men.
Nine years later, on January 26, 1991, Atty. Uypitching,
accompanied by policemen, went to Quiamco’s
workplace to recover the motorcycle. While the
policemen and the clerk were talking, Atty. Uypitching
paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle." Unable to find
Quaiamco, the policemen went back to Avesco-AVNE
Enterprises and, on Atty. Uypitching’s instruction and
over the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.
Afterwards, Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law
against Quiamco in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Dumaguete City. Quiamco moved for dismissal because
the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither
stolen nor bought the motorcycle.
Quiamco filed an action for damages against petitioners
in the RTC of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, Branch
37.9 He sought to hold the petitioners liable for the
following: (1) unlawful taking of the motorcycle; (2)
utterance of a defamatory remark (that respondent was a
thief) and (3) precipitate filing of a baseless and
malicious complaint. These acts humiliated and
embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation
and integrity.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ernesto Uypitching is liable for
damages.
Ruling:
Yes. He is liable for damages. Uypitching claim that
they should not be held liable for his corporation’s
exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover the
mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its
right to foreclose on the mortgage in case of default.
They are clearly mistaken.
True, a mortgagee may take steps to recover the
mortgaged property to enable it to enforce or protect its
foreclosure right thereon. There is, however, a well-
defined procedure for the recovery of possession of
mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain
possession of a mortgaged property for its sale on
foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to recover
Page | 27
such possession as a preliminary step to the sale, or to
obtain judicial foreclosure.
Uypitching’s corporation failed to bring the proper civil
action necessary to acquire legal possession of the
motorcycle. Instead, Uypitching descended on
Quiamco’s establishment with his policemen and
ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a
search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of
the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, Uypitching even
mouthed a slanderous statement.
No doubt, Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the lawful
procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the
prejudice of respondent. Uypitching’s acts violated the
law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper
norms of human relations.
The Supreme Court even quotes the ruling of the
RTC and The CA on the existence of malice:
There was malice or ill-will in filing the complaint
before the City Prosecutor’s Office because Atty.
Ernesto Ramas Uypitching knew or ought to have
known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable
cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and fencing activity against Quiamco. Atty.
Uypitching had no personal knowledge that Quiamco
stole the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by
his bill collector Wilfredo Veraño, that Juan Dabalan
will no longer pay the remaining installments for the
motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the
men of Quiamco.
Cebu Country Club vs. Ricardo Elizagaque
Facts:
Cebu Country Club, Inc. (CCCI), is a domestic
corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock
private membership club. Sometime in 1987, San
Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary
member of CCCI, designated respondent Ricardo F.
Elizagaque, its Senior Vice President and Operations
Manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special
non-proprietary member. The designation was thereafter
approved by the CCCI’s Board of Directors.
In 1996, Ricardo filed with CCCI an application for
proprietary membership. During the meetings dated
April 4, 1997 and May 30, 1997 of the CCCI Board of
Directors, action on Ricardo’s application for proprietary
membership was deferred. In another
Board meeting held on July 30, 1997,
Ricardo’s application was voted upon. Subsequently, or
on August 1, 1997, Ricardo received a letter from Julius
Z. Neri, CCCI’s corporate secretary, informing him that
the Board disapproved his application for proprietary
membership.
On the months of August, October, and November,
Ricardo sent letters of reconsideration, all of which were
not replied. On November Ricardo again sent CCCI a
letter inquiring whether any member of the Board
objected to his application. Again, CCCI did not reply.
This led him to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
a complaint for damages against Cebu Country Club and
its board of directors.
Issue:
Whether or not Cebu Country Club is liable for
damages.
Ruling:
Yes. They are liable for damages. As shown by the
records, the Board adopted a secret balloting known as
the "black ball system" of voting wherein each member
will drop a ball in the ballot box. A white ball represents
conformity to the admission of an applicant, while a
black ball means disapproval. Pursuant to Section 3(c),
as amended which provides that a unanimous vote of the
directors is required. Ricardo’s application for
proprietary membership was voted upon during the
Board meeting on July 30, 1997, the ballot box
contained one (1) black ball. Thus, for lack of unanimity,
his application was disapproved.
Obviously, the CCCI Board of Directors, under its
Articles of Incorporation, has the right to approve or
disapprove an application for proprietary
membership. But such right should not be exercised
arbitrarily. In rejecting Ricardo’s application for
proprietary membership, we find that CCCI violated the
rules governing human relations, the basic principles to
be observed for the rightful relationship between human
beings and for the stability of social order.
It is thus clear that Ricardo was left groping in the dark
wondering why his application was disapproved. He was
not even informed that a unanimous vote of the Board
members was required. When he sent a letter for
reconsideration and an inquiry whether there was an
objection to his application, The Board of Directors
apparently ignored him. Certainly, he
Page | 28
did not deserve this kind of treatment. Having been
designated by San Miguel Corporation as a special non-
proprietary member of CCCI, he should have been
treated by CCCI with courtesy and civility. At the very
least, they should have informed him why his
application was disapproved.
Calatagan Golf Club vs. Clemente Jr.
Facts:
Clemente applied to purchase one share of stock of
Calatagan, indicating in his application for membership
his mailing address, complete residential address, office
and residence telephone numbers, as well as the
company (Phimco) with which he was connected.
Calatagan charges monthly dues on its members to meet
expenses for general operations, as well as costs for
upkeep and improvement of the grounds and facilities.
The provision on monthly dues is incorporated in
Calatagan’s Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws.
When Clemente became a member the monthly charge
stood at ₱400.00. He paid ₱3,000.00 for his monthly
dues on 21 March 1991 and another ₱5,400.00 on 9
December 1991. Then he ceased paying the dues. At that
point, his balance amounted to ₱400.00.
Ten (10) months later, Calatagan made the initial step to
collect Clemente’s back accounts by sending a demand
letter dated 21 September 1992. It was followed by a
second letter dated 22 October 1992. Both letters were
sent to Clemente’s mailing address as indicated in his
membership application but were sent back to sender
with the postal note that the address had been closed. On
7 December 1992, Calatagan sent a third and final letter
to Clemente, this time signed by its Corporate Secretary,
Atty. Benjamin Tanedo, Jr. The letter contains a warning
that unless Clemente settles his outstanding dues, his
share would be included among the delinquent shares to
be sold at public auction on 15 January 1993. Again, this
letter was sent to Clemente’s mailing address that had
already been closed.
On 5 January 1993, a notice of auction sale was posted
on the Club’s bulletin board, as well as on the club’s
premises. The auction sale took place as scheduled on 15
January 1993, and Clemente’s share sold for ₱64,000.
Clemente learned of the sale of his share only in
November of 1997.11 He filed a claim with the
Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) seeking the restoration of his
shareholding in Calatagan with damages.
The SEC concluded that Clemente’s claim, filed four (4)
years after the sale, had already prescribed. The SEC
further held that Calatagan had complied with all the
requirements for a valid sale of the subject share,
Clemente having failed to inform Calatagan that the
address he had earlier supplied was no longer his
address.
Issue:
Whether or not Calatan Golf Club is liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. They are liable for damages. Under the By-Laws,
the Corporate Secretary is tasked to "give or cause to be
given, all notices required by law or by these By-Laws
and keep a record of the addresses of all stockholders.
We presume that the Corporate Secretary, as a lawyer is
knowledgeable on the law and on the standards of good
faith and fairness that the law requires. As custodian of
corporate records, he should also have known that
the first two letters sent to Clemente were returned
because the P.O. Box had been closed. Thus, we are
surprised – given his knowledge of the law and of
corporate records – that he would send the third and final
letter – Clemente’s last chance before his share is sold
and his membership lost – to the same P.O. Box that had
been closed.
We cannot label as due diligence Calatagan’s act of
sending the December 7, 1992 letter to Clemente’s
mailing address knowing fully well that the P.O. Box
had been closed. Due diligence or good faith imposes
upon the Corporate Secretary – the chief repository of all
corporate records – the obligation to check Clemente’s
other address which, under the By-Laws, have to be kept
on file and are in fact on file. One obvious purpose of
giving the Corporate Secretary the duty to keep the
addresses of members on file is specifically for matters
of this kind, when the member cannot be reached
through his or her mailing address. In fact, one telephone
call to Clemente’s phone numbers on file would have
alerted him of his impending loss.
It is noteworthy that Clemente in his membership
application had provided his residential address along
with his residence and office telephone numbers.
Nothing in Section 32 of Calatagan’s By-Laws requires
that the final notice prior to the sale
Page | 29
be made solely through the member’s mailing address.
The utter bad faith exhibited by Calatagan brings into
operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code,16
under the Chapter on Human Relations. These
provisions, which the Court of Appeals did apply,
enunciate a general obligation under law for every
person to act fairly and in good faith towards one
another. A non-stock corporation like Calatagan is not
exempt from that obligation in its treatment of its
members. The obligation of a corporation to treat every
person honestly and in good faith extends even to its
shareholders or members, even if the latter find
themselves contractually bound to perform certain
obligations to the corporation. A certificate of stock
cannot be a charter of dehumanization.
Joyce Ardiente vs. Spouses Javier
Facts:
On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement selling, transferring and
conveying in favor of co-respondent Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing
unit at Emily Homes in consideration of ₱70,000.00.
The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation
that the water and power bill of the subject property shall
be for the account of Pastorfide effective June 1, 1994.
On March 12, 1999, without notice, the water
connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding to
the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District
(COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma.
Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3) months
corresponding to the months of December 1998, January
1999, and February 1999. Mrs. Madjos later told her that
it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water
line was cut off.
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide
and her husband filed a complaint for damages against
Joyce Ardiente, Cagayan de Oro Water District and its
manager Gaspar Gonzalez.
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was
only restored and reconnected on December 14, 1999
Issue:
Whether or not Joyce Ardiente along with COWD is
liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. They are liable for damages. It is true that it is
within Ardiente’s right to ask and even require the
Spouses Pastorfide to cause the transfer of the former's
account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to
their Memorandum of Agreement. However, the
remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the Spouses Javier’s water supply.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the
purpose for which it was established and must not be
excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to
harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach.
In the present case, intention to harm was evident on
the part of Ardiente when she requested for the
disconnection of the Spouses Javier’s water supply
without warning or informing the latter of such
request. Ardiente claims that her request for
disconnection was based on the advise of COWD
personnel and that her intention was just to compel the
Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that
Ardiente's account with COWD be transferred in
Spouses Javier’s name. If such was Ardiente’s only
intention, then she should have advised the spouses
before or immediately after submitting her request for
disconnection, telling them that her request was simply
to force them to comply with their obligation under their
Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What
made matters worse is the fact that COWD undertook
the disconnection also without prior notice and even
failed to reconnect the Spouses Pastorfide’s water supply
despite payment of their arrears. There was clearly an
abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and
Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad faith.
Raul Sesbreño vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
VECO engaged in the sale and distribution of electricity
within Metropolitan Cebu. Sesbreño was one of VECO’s
customers under the metered service contract they had
entered into on March 2, 1982. On the afternoon of May
11, 1989 the Violation of Contracts (VOC) Team
composed of Engr. Felipe Constantino and Ronald
Arcilla accompanied by Sgt. Demetrio Balicha
conducted a routine inspection of the houses at La
Paloma Village, Labangon, Cebu City.
After Sesbreño’s maid, unlocked the gate, they inspected
the electric meter and found that it had been turned
upside down. Defendant-appellant
Page | 30
Arcilla took photographs of the upturned electric meter.
With Chuchie Garcia, Peter Sesbreño and one of the
maids present, they removed said meter and replaced it
with a new one.
At that time Sesbreño was in his office and no one called
to inform him of the inspection. The VOC Team then
asked for and received Chuchie Garcia’s permission to
enter the house itself to examine the kind and number of
appliances and light fixtures in the household and
determine its electrical load.
Sesbreño argued that the entry to his house and the
surrounding premises was effected without his
permission and over the objections of his maids. They
threatened, forced or coerced their way into his house.
They unscrewed the electric meter, turned it upside
down and took photographs thereof. They then replaced
it with a new electric meter. They searched the house
and its rooms without his permission or a search warrant.
They forced a visitor to sign two documents, making her
appear to be his representative or agent. Afterwards, he
found that some of his personal effects were missing,
apparently stolen by the VOC Team when they searched
the house.
Sesbreño insists so, citing Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the clause guaranteeing the right of
every individual against unreasonable searches and
seizures and further states that a violation of this
constitutional guaranty rendered VECO and its VOS
team liable to him for damages by virtue of Article 32
(9) of the Civil Code,
Issue:
Whether or not VECO is liable for damages.
Ruling:
No. It is not liable for damages. Under paragraph 9 of
the metered service contract entered into between VECO
and its consumers it is stated that :
“The CONSUMER agrees to allow properly authorized
employees or representatives of the COMPANY to enter
his premises at all reasonable hours without being liable
to trespass to dwelling for the purpose of inspecting,
installing, reading, removing, testing, replacing or
otherwise disposing of its property, and/or removing the
COMPANY’S property in the event of the termination
of the contract for any cause.”
Paragraph 9 clothed the entire VOC team with
unquestioned authority to enter the
garage to inspect the meter. The
members of the team obviously met the conditions
imposed by paragraph 9 for an authorized entry. Firstly,
their entry had the objective of conducting the routine
inspection of the meter. Secondly, the entry and
inspection were confined to the garage where the meter
was installed.14 Thirdly, the entry was effected at
around 4 o’clock p.m., a reasonable hour. And, fourthly,
the persons who inspected the meter were duly
authorized for the purpose by VECO.
Although Balicha was not himself an employee of
VECO, his participation was to render police assistance
to ensure the personal security of Constantino and
Arcilla during the inspection, rendering him a necessary
part of the team as an authorized representative. Under
the circumstances, he was authorized to enter
considering that paragraph 9 expressly extended such
authority to "properly authorized employees or
representatives" of VECO.
The constitutional guaranty against unlawful searches
and seizures is intended as a restraint against the
Government and its agents tasked with law enforcement.
It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom from arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of State power.
Not being agents of the State, the VOC team did not
have to first obtain a search warrant to do so.
Balicha’s presence participation in the entry did not
make the inspection a search by an agent of the State
within the ambit of the guaranty. As already mentioned,
Balicha was part of the team by virtue of his mission
order authorizing him to assist and escort the team
during its routine inspection. Consequently, the entry
into the main premises of the house by the VOC team
did not constitute a violation of the guaranty. Clearly,
Sesbreño did not establish his claim for damages.
Florencio Saladaga vs. Atty. Arturo Astorga
Facts:
Florencio A. Saladaga and Atty. Arturo B. Astorga
entered into a "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
on December 2, 1981 where Arturo sold with right of
repurchase to Florencio a parcel of coconut land. Under
the said deed, Arturo represented that he has "the perfect
right to dispose as owner of the subject property and that
the said property is "free from all liens and
encumbrances." The deed also provided that Arturo, as
vendor a retro, had two years within
Page | 31
which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased
within the said period, "the parties shall renew the
instrument/agreement.
Arturo failed to exercise his right of repurchase within
the period provided in the deed, and no renewal of the
contract was made even after Florencio sent him a final
demand to repurchase the property.
Florencio then received letters from the Rural Bank of
Albuera (Leyte), Inc. (RBAI) informing him that the
property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI. Arturo
argues that the deed is not one of sale with pacto de
retro, but one of equitable mortgage
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Arturo was liable for damages.
Ruling:
Yes. He is liable for damages. Respondent, as owner of
the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant
but, as a lawyer, he should have seen to it that his
agreement with complainant is embodied in an
instrument that clearly expresses the intent of the
contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract
must see to it that the agreement faithfully and clearly
reflects the intention of the contracting parties.
Otherwise, the respective rights and obligations of the
contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the
door to legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed,
the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor formulation
of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a
significant factor in the legal controversy between
respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation
reflects at the very least negatively on the legal
competence of respondent.
Arturo was in bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he
entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase"
dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it
appear that the property was covered by TCT No. T-662
under his name, even giving complainant the owner’s
copy of the said certificate oftitle, when the truth is that
the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine
years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB.
He did not evencare to correct the wrong statement in
the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of
TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982,21 or barely a
month after the execution of the said deed. All told
Arturo clearly committed an act of gross dishonesty and
deceit against complainant.
Coca Cola Bottlers vs. Spouses Bernardo
Facts:
The Spouses Bernardo doing business under the name
"Jolly Beverage Enterprises," are wholesalers of
softdrinks in Quezon City commenced their business
relationship with Coca Col Bottlers when the parties
formally entered into an exclusive dealership contract for
three years. Under the Agreement, CCB would extend
developmental assistance to the Spouses Bernardo in the
form of cash assistance and trade discount incentives.
For their part, the Spouses Bernardo undertook to sell
CCB’s products exclusively, meet the sales quota of
7,000 cases per month, and assist petitioner in its
marketing efforts.
For 13 years, the parties enjoyed a good and harmonious
business partnership. While the contracts contained a
clause for breach, it was never enforced. Sometime in
late 1998 or early 1999, before the contract expired,
CCB required respondents to submit a list of their
customers on the pretext that it would formulate a policy
defining its territorial dealership in Quezon City. It
assured the Spouses Bernardo that their contract would
be renewed for a longer period, provided that they would
submit the list. However, despite their compliance, the
promise did not materialize.
It was then discovered that in February 1999, CCB
started to reach out to the persons whose names were on
the list employing employed a different pricing scheme,
such that the price given to distributors was significantly
higher than that given to supermarkets. It also enticed
direct buyers and sari-sari store owners in the area with
its promos.
The Spouses Bernardo claimed that because of these
schemes, they lost not only their major customers - such
as Peach Blossoms, May Flower Restaurant, Saisaki
Restaurant, and Kim Hong Restaurant but also small
stores, such as the canteen in the hospital where
respondent Jose Bernardo worked.
Issue:
Whether or not CCB is liable for Damages.
Ruling:
Yes. CCB is liable for damages. Articles 19, 20, and 21
of the Civil Code provide the legal bedrock for the
award of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever another person commits an
Page | 32
act in violation of some legal provision; or an act which,
though not constituting a transgression of positive law,
nevertheless violates certain rudimentary rights of the
party aggrieved.
The Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that the
cut-throat competition is precisely what CCB did in
order to take over the market by directly selling its
products or deal them off to competing stores at a price
substantially lower than those imposed on its
wholesalers. As a result, the wholesalers suffered losses,
and in the Spouses Bernardo’s case, laid of a number of
employees and alienated the patronage of its major
customers including small-scale stores.
In addition, it took advantage of the information
provided by the Spouses Bernardo to facilitate its
takeover of the latter's usual business area. Distributors
who had assisted CCB in its marketing efforts, suddenly
found themselves with fewer customers.
Meanwhile, the use of unjust, oppressive, or high-
handed business methods resulting in unfair competition
also gives a right of action to the injured party under
Article 28 of the Civil Code
Jurisprudence holds that when a person starts an
opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit, but
regardless of Joss and for the sole purpose of driving a
competitor out of business, in order to take advantage of
the effects of a malevolent purpose, that person is guilty
of a wanton wrong.
St. Martin Polyclinic vs. LWV Construction
Facts:
LWV Construction is engaged in the business of
recruiting Filipino workers for deployment to Saudi
Arabia. St. Martin Polyclinic on the other hand is an
accredited member of the Gulf Cooperative Council
Approved Medical Centers Association (GAMCA) and
as such, authorized to conduct medical examinations of
prospective applicants for overseas employment.
On January 10, 2008, LWV referred prospective
applicant Jonathan V. Raguindin (Raguindin) to the
clinic for a pre-deployment medical examination in
accordance with the instructions from GAMCA and later
on found him fit for employment. Unfortunately, when
Raguindin underwent another
medical examination with the
General Care Dispensary of Saudi Arabia he purportedly
tested positive for HCV or the hepatitis C virus.
Claiming that the clinic was reckless in issuing its
Medical Report stating that Raguindin is "fit for
employment" when a subsequent finding in Saudi Arabia
revealed that he was positive for HCV, LWV filed a
Complaint for sum of money and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not St. Martin Polyclinic was liable for
damages.
What law shall be the basis for the reward for damages.
Ruling:
No. It is not liable for damages. even assuming that
Raguindin's diagnosis for HCV was correct, the fact that
he later tested positive for the same does not
convincingly prove that he was already under the same
medical state at the time the clinic issued the Medical
Report on January 11, 2008.
In this regard, it was therefore incumbent upon LWV to
show that there was already negligence at the time the
Medical Report was issued, may it be through evidence
that show that standard medical procedures were not
carefully observed or that there were already palpable
signs that exhibited Raguindin's unfitness for
deployment at that time.
This is hardly the case when LWV only proffered
evidence which demonstrate that months after St. Martin
Polyclinic’s Medical Report was issued, Raguindin, who
had already been deployed to Saudi Arabia, tested
positive for HCV and as such, was no longer "fit for
employment".
In fact, there is a reasonable possibility that Raguindin
became exposed to the HCV only after his medical
examination with the clinic on January 11, 2008. The
intervening period could very well account for a number
of variables that could have led to a change in
Raguindin's condition, such as his deployment to a
different environment in Saudi Arabia.
Indisputably, Raguindin was not deployed to Saudi
Arabia immediately after petitioner's medical
examination and hence, could have possibly contracted
the same only when he arrived
thereat.
Page | 33
As to what law shall be applied:
The Supreme Court ruled that Article 2176 and not
Articles 19-21 should be applied in this case.
As a general rule, any act or omission coming under the
purview of Article 2176 gives rise to a cause of action
under quasi-delict. This, in turn, gives the basis for a
claim of damages.
Article 2176 covers situations where an injury happens
through an act or omission of the defendant. When it
involves a positive act, the intention to commit the
outcome is irrelevant. The act itself must not be a breach
of an existing law or a pre-existing contractual
obligation.
The elements of a quasi-delict are:
1. An act or omission;
2. The presence of fault or negligence in the
performance or non-performance of the act;
3. Injury;
4. A causal connection between the negligent act
and the injury; and
5. No pre-existing contractual relation.
While Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance
of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 would then be proper." Between
these two provisions as worded, it is Article 20 which
applies to both willful and negligent acts that are done
contrary to law. On the other hand, Article 21 applies
only to willful acts done contra bonos mores
Article 19 is the general rule which governs the conduct
of human relations. By itself, it is not the basis of an
actionable tort. Article 19 describes the degree of care
required so that an actionable tort may arise when it is
alleged together with Article 20 or Article 21.
In this case, the courts a quo erroneously anchored their
respective rulings on the provisions of Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code. This is because LWV did not
proffer (nor have these courts mentioned) any law as
basis for which damages may be recovered due to the
clinic’s alleged negligent act.
In its amended complaint, LWV mainly avers that had
the clinic not issue a "fit for employment" Medical
Report to Raguindin, LWV would
not have processed his documents,
deployed him to Saudi Arabia, and later on - in view of
the subsequent findings that Raguindin was positive for
HCV and hence, unfit to work - suffered actual damages
in the amount of P84,373.41.52 Thus, as the claimed
negligent act of St. Martin’s Polyclinic was not
premised on the breach of any law, and not to
mention the incontestable fact that no pre-existing
contractual relation was averred to exist between the
parties, Article 2176 - instead of Articles 19, 20 and
21 - of the Civil Code should govern.
Noel Buenaventura vs. Court of Appeals
Facts:
This case involves a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage by Noel on the ground of the alleged
psychological incapacity of his wife Isabel. Later on,
Noel amended his petition claiming that he and Isabel
are psychologically incapacitated. Upon decision of the
RTC, the marriage was declared null and void, awarding
Isabel moral damages in the amount of 2.5 million pesos
and 1 million pesos as exemplary damages and
Attorney’s fees.
The basis of damages was based on the RTC’s finding
and Isabel’s arguments that Noel deceived her into
marrying him, that instead of professing his love, Noel
was instead heavily pressured by his parents to marry
her, that he was not ready to enter into marriage. Isabel
argues that, Noel not only became indifferent to her but
also to their son. This along with the refusal of Noel to
reconcile after their separation allegedly caused Isabel to
suffer mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
and sleepless nights.
Issue:
Whether or not the basis for the award for damages to
Isabel was valid.
Ruling:
No. The award for damages is without basis. The
supreme court ruled that it is contradictory to
characterize acts as a product of psychological
incapacity which is beyond the control of the parties
because of an innate inability at same consider them as
acts that are willful.
The award for damages should be predicated no on
the mere act of entering into the marriage but on
specific evidence that it was done deliberately and
with malice by a party who had knowledge of his
disability and yet concealed the
Page | 34
same. No such evidence was adduced in the present
case. If Isabel was deceived, it was not a willful act of
Noel.
ARTICLE 22. Every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground,
shall return the same to him.
In order that an action under Article 22 of the Civil
Code, on unjust enrichment, may prosper, the
following conditions must concur:
1. That the defendant has been enriched
2. That the plaintiff has suffered a loss
3. That the enrichment of the defendant is without
just or legal ground
4. That the plaintiff has no other action based on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, or quasi-delict.
Note:
▪ Under Article 22 of the Civil Code, if a person
acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of another without just or legal
ground through an act or of performance by
another or any other means has the obligation to
return the same.
▪ An action for recovery of what has been paid or
delivered without just cause or legal ground is
called an accion in rem verso.
▪ Article 22 is a last resort. If the plaintiff can file
an action based on a contract, quasi-contract,
crime, or quasi-delict, then the principle of
accion in rem verso will not apply.
▪ An accion in rem verso is considered merely an
auxiliary action, available only when there is no
other remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime,
or quasi-delict
Filinvest vs. Ngilay
Facts:
The Ngilay’s were grantees of agricultural public lands
located in General Santos City through homestead and
fee patents. Sometime in 1995, negotiations were made
by Filinvest with the patriarch of the Ngilay’s which
resulted to a Deed of Conditional Sale in favor of
Filinvest.
To accommodate the Ngilay’s with the belief that they
could demand it anytime should the Ngilay’s fail to
comply with the conditions of sale, Filinvest made an
advance payment of 14 million.
It was later found out that the deed of conditional sale
was null and void due to the sale being done in the
period they were not allowed to do so.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ngilay’s are compelled to return the
advance payment under the principle of unjust
enrichment.
Ruling:
Yes. The Ngilay’s must return the advance payment. The
Supreme Court ruled that Filinvest did not err in seeking
the return of the down payment as a consequence of the
sale having been declared void. To allow the Ngilay’s to
keep the amount received from Filinvest is tantamount to
unjust enrichment. Hence, The Ngilay’s have the duty to
return the downp ayment as they no longer have the right
to keep it.
Domingo Gonzalo vs. John Tarnate
Facts:
After the DPWH awarded the contract of improvement
of a section in the Benguet road to Gonzalo
Construction, Domingo Gonzalo subcontracted to John
Tarnate, the supply for materials and labor for the
project. Their agreement was stipulated that Tarnate
would be given an amount to 10% of the total collection
from DPWH for the project.
This 10% retention fee was for the rent for Tarnate’s
equipment that had been utilized in the project.
However, during the processing of the documents for the
retention fee, Tarnate learned that Gonzalo had
unilaterally rescinded the deed of assignment by means
of an affidavit of cancellation of deed.
Gonzalo argues that such assignment could not stand
independently due to it being a mere product of the
subcontract that had been based on his contract with
DPWH. Gonzalo who was the sole contractor of the
project subcontracted the implementation of the project
without the approval of the DPWH Secretary which is a
violation. In deciding the case, both the RTC and the CA
found the parties guilty of In Pari
Delicto.
Page | 35
Issue:
Whether or not Tarnate should be granted the 10%
retention fee despite being In Pari Delicto with Gonzalo.
Ruling:
Yes. Tarnate should be granted the 10% retention fee.
The Supreme Court ruled in this case that the doctrine of
In Pari Delicto is not always rigid. An accepted
exception arises when its application contravenes well
established public policy.
In this case, there is no question that Tarnate provided
the equipment, labor, and materials for the project in
compliance with his obligations under the subcontract.
Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands to
deliver to Tarnate the stipulated 10% that would have
compensated the latter for the use of his equipment,
Gonzalo would have been unjustly enriched at the
expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be barred from
recovering because of the rigid application of In Pari
Delicto.
Bliss Development vs. Diaz
Facts:
Petitioner Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) is the
registered owner of a lot located in Brgy. Matandang
Balara, Diliman, Quezon City. On October 19, 1984, it
entered into and executed a Deed of Sale over the said
property in favor of Spouses Emiliano and Leonila
Melgazo (Sps. Melgazo), both of whom are now
deceased.
On May 7, 1991, a certain Rodolfo Nacua (Nacua) sent a
letter to BDC, saying that Sps. Melgazo transferred to
him their rights over the property. He further expressed
willingness to pay the outstanding obligations of Sps.
Melgazo to BDC. Before the property was fully paid,
however, Nacua sold his rights to Olivia Garcia through
a Deed of Transfer of Rights, then from Garcia to
Elizabeth Reyes, and from Reyes to Domingo Tapay
who later on sold his rights to herein respondent
Montano Diaz.
After paying the amortizations due on the property BDC
issued a permit to occupy the property in favor of Diaz.
Diaz then introduced improvements on the property,
amounting to P700,000.00. On April 15, 1994, however,
BDC informed Diaz that respondent Edgar Arreza
(Arreza) was claiming that the heirs of Sps. Melgazo
sold to him the rights over the property. To resolve the
conflicting claims of Arreza and
Diaz, BDC filed a complaint for
Interpleader against them. The RTC ruled that the
signatures of Sps. Melgazo transferring their rights to
Nacua were mere forgeries. Thus, it ruled that Arreza
had a better right over the property. This decision
became final and executory.
Issue:
Whether or not BDC is liable to return the amortizations
Diaz paid.
Ruling:
Yes. BDC is liable. The Supreme Court ruled that BDC
is nevertheless liable to return to him the amortizations
which he already paid on the property, applying the rule
on unjust enrichment. Allowing BDC to keep the
amortizations paid by Diaz is tantamount to unjust
enrichment. It would result in BDC receiving
amortizations twice the amount it should have received,
that is, the amortizations paid by Diaz and Arreza. While
BDC claims that it did not receive amortizations from
both Diaz and Arreza covering the same period, such a
claim is self-serving, and is not amply supported by any
documentary evidence.
Even if BDC can prove that there was no overlap
between the payments made by Diaz and those made by
Arreza, allowing it to keep the amortizations paid by
Diaz still amounts to unjust enrichment. As a direct
result of the final and executory ruling that Arreza is the
rightful buyer of the subject property, the buyer-seller
relationship between Diaz and BDC is rendered null and
void. Consequently, there remains no valid consideration
whatsoever for the payments made by Diaz to BDC.
There being no indication of intent to donate, because
such payments were made under the impression that
Diaz is the rightful buyer of the property, it is only but
just that Diaz be allowed to claim back what he has paid.
This is only a natural consequence of the final and
executory ruling that Diaz is not the rightful buyer of the
subject property. Allowing BDC to keep such payments,
at the expense of and to the damage of Diaz, still
amounts to unjust enrichment.
On the improvements:
Article 453 is applied. It states that If there was bad
faith, not only on the part of the person who built,
planted or sowed on the land of another, but also on the
part of the owner of such land, the rights of one and the
other shall be the same as though both had acted in good
faith.
Page | 36
The Supreme Court ruled that the CA was correct in
stating that under Article 448, the landowner is given the
option, either to appropriate the improvement as his own
upon payment of the proper amount of indemnity or to
sell the land to the possessor in good faith. Relatedly
Article 546 provides that a builder in good faith is
entitled to full reimbursement for all the necessary and
useful expenses incurred. In this case, however, the
option of selling the land to the builder in good faith is
no longer viable in light of the ruling in the interpleader
case. Hence, there is only one thing left for BDC to do:
indemnify Diaz for the improvements introduced on the
property.
On Bad Faith:
BDC acted in bad faith. It is undisputed that Bliss
knew about Arreza’s claim in 1991. It even received
amortization payments from Arreza. Yet, Bliss
acknowledged the transfer to Diaz and received the
monthly amortizations paid by Diaz. Also, Bliss is aware
that should Arreza pursue his claim in court, Diaz may
be evicted from the property.”
Diaz is also in bad faith. the several transfers that
occurred did not purport to be Deeds of Absolute Sale,
but merely deeds of assignment of rights. The subject of
those deeds of assignment was never the real right over
the subject property, but merely the personal right to
purchase it. A careful review of the records of this case
reveals that Diaz, in fact, failed to diligently inquire into
the title of his predecessor before entering into the
contract of sale. As such, he cannot be considered a
buyer in good faith. There is no issue that despite the
several transfers of rights from Nacua to Garcia to Reyes
to Tapay to Diaz, title over the property remained in
BDC’s name.When Diaz transacted with Tapay, it was
also clear that what was being transferred was merely
rights to purchase the property, and not title over the lot
itself As the buyer in such a transaction, it was
incumbent upon Diaz not only to inquire as to the right
of Tapay to transfer his rights, but also to trace the
source of that right to purchase the property. Had he
discharged this duty diligently, he would have found out
that Nacua’s right was without basis, because it was
founded on a forged deed. For his failure to inquire
diligently and trace the source of the right to purchase
the property, Diaz cannot claim to be a purchaser in
good faith and for value.
ARTICLE 23. Even when an act or event causing
damage to another’s property was not due to the
fault or negligence of the
defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if
through the act or event he was benefited.
Note:
▪ What is contemplated by Article 23 is an
involuntary act or an act which though foreseen
could not have been avoided. An involuntary
act, because of its character cannot generally
create an obligation; but when by such act its
author has been enriched, it is only just that he
should indemnify for the damages caused, to the
extent of his enrichment.
ARTICLE 24. In all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage
on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other
handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his
protection.
Note:
▪ Anchored on the Doctrine of Parens Patriae.
Under this doctrine the state has the sovereign
power of guardianship over persons under
disability.
ARTICLE 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses
for pleasure or display during a period of acute
public want or emergency may be stopped by order
of the courts at the instance of any government or
private charitable institution.
Before thoughtless extravagance may be prevented,
the following requisites must be present:
1. There must be an acute public want or
emergency; and
2. The person seeking to stop it must be a
government or private charitable institutions.
Example of Application:
▪ E.O. 25 of Davao City “An Order to Declare a
Period of Mourning and Vigilance in Davao
City.
Page | 37

ARTICLE 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another’s residence;
(2)Meddling with or disturbing the private life or
family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from
his friends;
(4)Vexing or humiliating another on account of his
religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth,
physical defect, or other personal condition.
Note:
▪ Remember that Article 26 does not constitute a
criminal offense, but shall produce a cause of
action for damages.
▪ Under this article, the rights of persons are
amply protected, and damages are provided for
violations of a person’s dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind.
▪ The violations mentioned in Article 26 are not
exclusive but are merely examples and do not
preclude other similar or analogous acts that
does not constitute a criminal offense.
Jerome Castro vs. People
Facts:
Albert Tan after attending his son’s (Justin Albert)
graduation, met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent at
RIS. In the course of their conversation, Tan intimated
that he was contemplating a suit against the officers of
RIS in their personal capacities,
including Jerome Castro who was the
assistant headmaster for nearly excluding Justin Albert
from participating in the graduation ceremonies.
Ching telephoned Jerome and told him that Tan was
planning to sue the officers of RIS in their personal
capacities. Before they hung up, Jerome told Ching:
“Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking to [Tan],
that's dangerous.”
Ching then called Tan and informed him that petitioner
said "talking to him was dangerous." Insulted, Tan filed
a complaint for grave oral defamation
Issue:
Whether or not Jerome Castro is liable under Article 26.
Ruling:
Yes. He may be held liable. The Supreme Court ruled
that Jerome Castro could have been liable for damages
under Article 26 of the Civil Code which states that
every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief.
More specifically paragraph 3 of said article which is
intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends. Castro is reminded that, as an educator, he is
supposed to be a role model for the youth. As such, he
should always act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith.
ARTICLE 27. Any person suffering material or
moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other
relief against the latter, without prejudice to any
disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Note:
▪ Article 27 does not cover all cases of official
wrongs. It is limited to refusal or neglect to
perform official duties. This article does not
cover malfeasance and misfeasance, but only
nonfeasance
Page | 38
 ▪ Article 27 presupposes that the refusal or
omission of a public official is attributable to
malice or inexcusable negligence.
▪ For a public servant to be held liable under this
article, the duty which he refused or failed to
perform must be MINISTERIAL in character. If
the duty is DISCRETIONARY, he is not liable,
unless he acted in a notoriously arbitrary manner
or he acted willfully, maliciously or with gross
neglect.
Requisites of Action under Article 27:
1. That the defendant be a public official charged
with the performance of official duties;
2. That there be a violation of an official duty in
favor of an individual;
3. That there be willfulness or negligence in the
violation of such official duty; and
4. That there be an injury to the individual.
Nonfeasance, Misfeasance, Malfeasance distinguished
▪ Nonfeasance – is the omission of an act which a
person ought to do.
▪ Misfeasance – is the improper doing of an act
which a person might lawfully do.
▪ Malfeasance – is the doing of an act which a
person ought not to do at all.
Jose Ledesma vs. CA and Spouses Delmo
Facts:
Violeta Delmo was elected as the treasurer of an
organization called Student Leadership Club in West
Visayas College. In that capacity, Delmo extended loans
from the funds of the club to some of the students of the
school. Jose Ledesma claims that the said act of
extending loans was against school rules and regulations.
Thus, as President of the School, Ledesma sent a letter to
Delmo informing her that she was being dropped from
the membership of the club and that she would not be a
candidate for any award or citation from the school.
Upon appeal to the Office of the Director of the Bureau
of Public Schools, The Director, after due investigation,
rendered a decision on April 13, 1966 that Violeta M.
Delmo had acted in good faith, in her capacity as Club
Treasurer, in extending loans to the officers and
members of the Student Leadership Club. Resolution
No. 2 authorizing the Club treasurer
to discharge funds to students in need of financial
assistance and other humanitarian purposes as approved
by the Club adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon. Hence,
On April 27, 1966, Ledesma received by mail the
decision of the Director and all the records of the case.
On the same day, he received a telegram asking for the
return only of the records but allegedly mistook the
telegram as ordering him to also send the decision back.
On the same day, he returned by mail all the records plus
the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public
Schools.
The next day, Ledesma received another telegram from
the Director ordering him to furnish Delmo with a copy
of the decision. Ledesma, in turn, sent a night letter to
the Director informing the latter that he had sent the
decision back and that he had not retained a copy
thereof. On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation,
Ledesma received another telegram from the Director
ordering him not to deprive Delmo of any honors due
her. As it was impossible by this time to include Delmo's
name in the program as one of the honor students,
Ledesma let her graduate as a plain student instead of
being awarded the Latin honor of Magna Cum Laude.
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by
her parents in filing an action for damages against
Ledesma. During the pendency of the action, however,
Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and
Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her
sole and only heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not Jose Ledesma was liable for damages
under Article 27 of the New Civil Code.
Ruling:
Yes. He is liable for damages. It cannot be disputed that
Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was
brought about by Ledesma’s neglect of duty and
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper. The
Solicitor-General tries to cover-up Ledesma’s deliberate
omission to inform Miss Delmo by stating that it was not
his duty to furnish her a Copy of the Director's decision.
Granting this to be true, it was nevertheless the
Ledesma’s duty to enforce the said decision. He could
have done so considering that he received the decision
on April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back with
the records of the case, he
Page | 39
undoubtedly read the whole of it which consisted of only
three pages. Moreover, Ledesma should have had the
decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, the girl's father, and
inform the latter, at the very least of the decision. This,
the petitioner likewise failed to do
"Defendant, being a public officer should have acted
with circumspection and due regard to the rights of Miss
Delmo. Inasmuch as he exceeded the scope of his
authority by defiantly disobeying the lawful directive of
his superior, Director Bernardino, defendant is liable for
damages in his personal capacity.”
Campugan vs. Atty. Tolentino
Facts:
This is a disbarment case against:
● Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.
● Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr.,
● Atty. Renato G. Cunanan
● Atty. Elbert T. Quilala; and
● Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr.
For allegedly falsifying a court order that became the
basis for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice
of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the
Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.
Campugan and Torres (complainants) argue that after
their amicable settlement with Ramon and Josefina
Ricafort represented by Atty. Tolentino, they could no
longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite
making several phone calls and visits to his office. It was
later found out upon verification at the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City that new annotations were made to the
property subject to the amicable settlement specifically
that the annotation of the letter-request seeks the
cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim and the
notice of lis pendens.
They claim that allowing such cancellation resulted from
the connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Victorio,
Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking
advantage of their positions as officials in the Registry
of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief
Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and
signatory of the new annotations. Thus, they claimed to
be thereby prejudiced.
Atty. Victorio argued that he should not be held
responsible for their representation in other proceedings,
such as that before the LRA, which required a separate
engagement; and that the only
payment he had received from the
complainants were those for his appearance fees of
P1,000.00 for every hearing in the RTC.
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of conspiracy,
stressing that he was not acquainted with the other
respondents, except Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met
during the hearings in Civil Case
Atty. Quilala replied stating that the cancellation of the
annotations was undertaken in the regular course of
official duty and in the exercise of the ministerial duty of
the Register of Deeds.
Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of Campugan and Torres
have merit that would warrant an award for damages
under Article 27.
Ruling:
No. their arguments has no merit.
As to Atty. Quilala, Cunanan and Caluya:
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to
immediately register an instrument presented for
registration dealing with real or personal property which
complies with all the requisites for registration.
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is
ministerial in nature. It was not for them to determine
whether the document or decision of the RTC was
falsified, fraudulent or invalid inasmuch as their duty
to examine documents presented for registration was
limited only to what appears on the face of the
documents. If, upon their evaluation of the letter-request
and the RTC order, they found the same to be sufficient
in law and t]o be in conformity with existing
requirements, it became obligatory for them to perform
their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.
Doctrine:
A purely ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the
law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him
the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is
Page | 40
discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when its discharge requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.
As to Atty. Victorio and Tolentino:
Consipracy is established by clear and convincing
evidence. The complainants failed in this regard. Outside
of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty.
Tolentino, Jr. had conspired with each other in order to
cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge
of the annotations, they presented no evidence to
support their allegation of conspiracy. On the
contrary, the records indicated their own active
participation in arriving at the amicable settlement with
the defendants in the Civil Case Hence, they could not
now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that they
had themselves entered into.
ARTICLE 28. Unfair competition in agricultural,
commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor
through the use of force, intimidation, deceit,
machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action
by the person who thereby suffers damage.
Note:
▪ Unfair competition is the employment of
deception or any other means contrary to good
faith by which he shall pass off the goods
manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his
business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who shall commit
any acts calculated to produce said result.
▪ Unfair competition could be committed through
the use of either force, intimidation, deceit,
unfair machination or other unjust, oppressive or
high-handed method.
Test of Unfair Competition
▪ The true test of unfair competition is whether
certain goods have been intentionally clothed
with an appearance which is likely to deceive
the ordinary purchaser exercising ordinary care,
and whether a certain limited class of purchasers
with special knowledge not possessed by the
ordinary purchaser could avoid mistake by the
exercise of this special knowledge.
ARTICLE 29. When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the
plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case
the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Note:
▪ Under Article 100 or the RPC, a person
criminally liable is civilly liable.
▪ Underlying this legal principle is the traditional
theory that when a person commits a crime he
offends two entities namely (1) the society in
which he lives in or the political entity called the
State whose law he had violated; and (2) the
individual member of that society whose person,
right, honor, chastity or property was actually or
directly injured or damaged by the same
punishable act or omission.
▪ What is contemplated in Article 29 is an
acquittal where the guilt of the accused is based
on reasonable doubt.
▪ The civil action which should be filed under
Article 29 following the acquittal of the accused
should only refer to dependent civil actions only.
Degree of proof needed:
▪ In Criminal Actions – The degree of proof
required is guilt beyond reasonable doubt such
that there is moral certainty on the part of the
judge that the accused is indeed the author of the
crime.
▪ In Civil Cases – The degree of proof required is
only preponderance of evidence. That the
evidence as a whole, adduced by one side is
superior over the other.
Acquittals should be based on:
Page | 41
 ▪ The guilt of the accused has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt.
▪ The accused is not the author of the crime.
▪ The crime complained of does not exist.
Civil liability shall not arise if the acquittal is based on
the instance that the accused is not the author of the
crime or if the crime complained of does not exist
What shall be the basis for the civil liability?
The basis shall be under Article 1157 of the Civil Code
which states the other sources of obligation. These are:
▪ Laws
▪ Contracts
▪ Quasi-Contracts
▪ Quasi-Delicts
Rule:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case. The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where:
1. The acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;
2. The court declares that the liability of the
accused is only civil; and
3. The civil liability of the accused does not arise
from or is based upon the crime of which the
accused is acquitted.
Must the recovery of the civil liability based on
Article 29 be made on a separate civil action?
▪ The Supreme Court in the case of Padilla, et.al
vs. Court of Appeals ruled that There appear to
be no sound reasons to require a separate civil
action to still be filed considering that the facts
to be proved in the civil case have already been
established in the criminal proceedings where
the accused is acquitted. To require a separate
civil action simply because the accused was
acquitted would mean needless clogging of
courts dockets and unnecessary duplication of
litigation with all its attendant loss of time,
effort and money on the part of all concerned.
ARTICLE 30. When a separate civil action is
brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient
to prove the act complained of.
General Rule:
▪ When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action.
Exceptions:
▪ Unless the offended party reserves the right to
institute a separate civil action.
▪ Unless the offended party waives the civil
action.
▪ Unless the offended party institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
When should reservation to the civil action be made?
▪ The reservation of the right to institute
separately the civil action shall be made before
the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
What is the effect of the reservation?
▪ If the criminal action is instituted after the said
civil action has already been instituted, the latter
shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be
found before judgment on the merits. The
suspension shall last until final judgment is
rendered in the criminal action.
▪ Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon
motion of the offended party, be consolidated
with the criminal action.
ARTICLE 31. When the civil action is based on an
obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter.
Independent Civil Action
▪ An independent civil action is one that is
brought distinctly and separately from a criminal
case allowed for considerations of public policy
▪ In independent civil actions, the civil action is
no longer deemed impliedly
instituted with the criminal
Page | 42
 action. Here, the civil action proceeds
simultaneously and separately from the criminal
action, provided that the offended party may not
recover twice for the same act or omission.
▪ It may be instituted before or after the institution
of the criminal action.
What is the scope of Independent Civil Actions?
▪ Article 31 – Where the civil action is based on
an obligation not arising rom the act or omission
complained of as a felony
▪ Article 32 – Where there is breach of
Constitutional or other rights.
▪ Article 33 – Where there is defamation, fraud,
and physical injuries.
▪ Article 34 – Where there is refusal or failure on
part of the city or municipal police to give
protection.
▪ Article 2176 – Where there is quasi-delict or
culpa aquilana.
Note:
▪ Cases arising from Article 31, although not
referred to as independent civil actions are
prosecuted independently of the criminal action
for being based on culpa contractual.
▪ In accordance with Article 31, the civil action
for damages based upon quasi-delict may
proceed independently of the criminal
proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, even
if the defendant is acquitted in the criminal
action of the charge of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, the civil action for
damages for the death of the deceased based
upon quasi-delict may proceed to judgment.
▪ The same negligent act causing damages may
produce a civil liability arising from a crime
under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual
under Articles 2176 to 2194 of the New Civil
Code. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent
negligence, having always had its own
foundation and individuality.
ARTICLE 32. Any public officer or employee, or any
private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes
or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of
another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages: (refer to the codal for the full list of rights)
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether
or not the defendant’s act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to
commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil
action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages.
Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable
from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Note:
▪ Article 32 provides for the imposition of
damages upon any public officer or public
employee or any private person who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates, or in any
manner impairs the rights and liberties listed in
this Article.
▪ Good Faith is not a defense for the impairment
or violation of the fundamental rights listed in
this Article.
▪ Judges are expressly exempted from damages, if
by performing their duties in good faith, they
happen to violate or impair the rights or liberties
under the Article. The exception is that if the
Judge’s acts are classified as punishable under
Article 204 – 207 of the RPC.
ARTICLE 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance
of evidence.
Page | 43
Note:
▪ Defamation – Libel, Slander, or Intrigue against
honor.
▪ Fraud – Fraud itself, Estafa, or Swindling.
▪ Physical Injuries – Not Physical Injuries under
RPC, but all kinds of physical injuries. It
includes attempted, frustrated, and consummated
homicide.
ARTICLE 34. When a member of a city or municipal
police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable
for damages, and the city or municipality shall be
subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action
herein recognized shall be independent of any
criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of
evidence shall suffice to support such action.
▪ Self-Explanatory
People vs. Rogelio Bayotas
Facts:
Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and
eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 Pending
appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4,
1992 at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio
respiratory arrest.
The Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it
required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his
commission of the offense charged.
Issue:
Whether or not death extinguishes civil liability.
Ruling:
Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and
only the civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed.
The claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on
a source of obligation other than
delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these
other sources of obligation from which the civil liability
may arise as a result of the same act or omission, these
are:
1. Laws
2. Contracts
3. Quasi-Contracts; and
4. Quasi-Delicts
Where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1,
Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of
the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon
which the same is based as explained above.
Finally, the private offended party need not fear a
forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the
private-offended party instituted together therewith the
civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the
civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency
of the criminal case.
Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold
that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his
criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on
the act complained of, i.e., rape.
Antonio Daluraya vs. Marla Oliva
Facts:
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an
Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide for the death of Marina Oliva. Records reveal
that sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006,
Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan
Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing
EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City,
ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the
hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually
died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla
Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the
purported driver of the vehicle.
Page | 44
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an
Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) asserting that he
was not positively identified by any of the prosecution
witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim,
and that there was no clear and competent evidence of
how the incident transpired.
Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses individually, the MeTC found that: (a) Marla
merely testified on the damages sustained by her family
but she failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of the
vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did not
identify Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c)
Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d)
PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident,
likewise declared that he did not witness the same.
The MeTC granted the demurrer which had the effect of
an acquittal and reconsideration of its order would
violate Daluraya’s right against double jeopardy.
With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC
likewise denied the same, holding that no civil liability
can be awarded absent any evidence proving that
Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva’s
demise.
Issue:
Whether or not Daluraya is liable for damages despite
the demurrer which is tantamount to acquittal.
Ruling:
No. Daluraya cannot held liable for damages. The
Supreme Court ruled that Every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an
accused of the crime charged, however, does not
necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In other cases,
the Supreme Court ruled on the distinctions between
acquittals and their effect on civil liabilities.
In Manantan v. CA the court ruled:
There are two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on
the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of the
act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to
be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and
can never be held liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be
instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is
an acquittal based on reasonable
doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if
the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily
established, he is not exempt from civil liability which
may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
In Dayap v. Sendiong:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically
preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of
the case. The extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a)
the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court
declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and
(c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from
or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is
acquitted. However, the civil action based on delict may
be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission
from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or
where the accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that
the judgment state “whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.”
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion
that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution
was not able to establish that he was the author of the
crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear
and categorical when the MeTC declared that “the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish
that the accused precisely committed the crime charged
against him. The prosecution was not able to establish
that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette
which bumped Marina Oliva” and that “there is no
competent evidence on hand which proves that the
accused was the person responsible for the death of
Marina Oliva.”
People vs. Armando Dionaldo
Facts:
Page | 45
On July 23, 2014, the Court accused-appellants Renato
Dionaldo (Renato), Mariano Gariguez, Jr., and Rodolfo
Larido (accused-appellants) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide
On even date, the Court received a letter from the
Bureau of Corrections dated September 16, 2014
informing them of the death of Renato, on June 10,
2014, as evidenced by the Certificate of Death.
Issue:
Whether or not Dionaldo’s Civil liability is extinguished.
Ruling:
In this case, the Supreme Court ruled yes. As Renato's
death transpired before the promulgation of the Court's
July 23, 2014 Resolution in this case, i.e., when his
appeal before the Court was still pending resolution, his
criminal liability is totally extinguished in view of the
provisions of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
which states that Criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment
In People v. Amistoso,the Court explained that the death
of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto.
Gloria Dy vs. People
Facts:
Dy was the former General Manager of Mandy
Commodities Company, Inc. (MCCI.) In the course of
her employment, Dy assisted MCCI in its business
involving several properties Sometime in May 1996, in
pursuit of MCCI's business, Dy proposed to William
Mandy (Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a
property owned by Pantranco. As the transaction
involved a large amount of money, Mandy agreed to
obtain a loan from the International China Bank of
Commerce (ICBC). ICBC granted a loan to MCCI in the
amount of P20,000,000.00, As security, MCCI also
executed a chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the
Numancia Property.
In order to prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed Dy
to facilitate the payment of the loan. ICBC eventually
foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued
to default in its obligation to pay.
Mandy claims that it was only at this
point in time that he discovered that not a check was
paid to ICBC
Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa against
Dy. Which, after a full-blown trial, the RTC Manila
rendered a decision acquitting her.
Issue:
Whether or not Dy is liable for damages despite the
acquittal.
Ruling:
No. Dy is not liable for damages. The Supreme Court
ruled that the lower courts erred when they ordered Dy
to pay her civil obligation arising from a contract of loan
in the same criminal case where she was acquitted on the
ground that there was no crime. Any contractual
obligation she may have must be litigated in a separate
civil action involving the contract of loan. We clarify
that in cases where the accused is acquitted on the
ground that there is no crime, the civil action deemed
instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely
because there is no delict from which any civil
obligation may be sourced.
People vs. Ruben Calomia
Facts:
Ruben Calomia was charged before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) with two counts of qualified rape of his
minor daughter, AAA, which he allegedly committed
sometime in August 2007 and April 2008. the RTC
promulgated its decision finding accused-appellant
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of both counts of
qualified rape. On September 9, 2015 Calomia died
pending appeal of "Asphyxia due to Strangulation, Self
Inflicted, Hanging."
Issue:
Whether or not Calomia’s civil liabilities are
extinguished due to his death.
Ruling:
No. It is not extinguished. In People v. Bayotas, the
Court pronounced these guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused
prior to final judgment
Page | 46
 terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based
solely on the offense committed
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Whether it be from
Law, Contracts, Quasi-Contracts and Quasi-
Delicts.
3. Where the civil liability survives, an action for
recovery therefor may be pursued but only by
way of filing a separate civil action and subject
to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation
upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear
a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted
together therewith the civil action. In such case,
the statute of limitations on the civil liability is
deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case
In the instant case, Calomia’s death occurred prior to the
finality of the judgment of conviction rendered against
him. In fact, he died way back on September 29, 2015,
during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of
Appeals. Unfortunately, the appellate court was not
timely informed of his death prior to the promulgation of
its Decision in on August 26, 2016. Irrefragably,
accused-appellant's death extinguished his criminal
liability and his civil liabilities directly arising from and
based solely on the crime/s he committed.
ARTICLE 35. When a person, claiming to be injured
by a criminal offense, charges another with the same,
for which no independent civil action is granted in
this Code or any special law, but the justice of the
peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a
crime has been committed, or the prosecuting
attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal
proceedings, the complainant may bring a civil action
for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil
action may be supported by a preponderance of
evidence. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify
the defendant in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the prosecuting
attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the
termination of the criminal proceedings.
Situation under Article 35:
▪ A person claims to be injured by a criminal
offense (act or omission punished by law as a
felony or crime) and charges another with the
same based on civil liability.
▪ But the Judge finds no reasonable grounds to
believe that the crime has been committed, or
the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to
institute criminal proceedings
▪ The Civil liability has no independent action is
granted in the Civil Code or any Special law.
Rule:
1. The complainant may bring a civil action for
damages against the alleged offender.
2. Such civil action may be supported by a
preponderance of evidence.
3. Upon the defendant’s motion, the court may
require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify
the defendant in case the complaint should be
found malicious.
Application:
▪ Civil Action has been filed
▪ During its pendency, a criminal information
should/was presented by the prosecuting
attorney charging the defendant in the civil case
with a crime.
▪ The rule is that the civil action should be
suspended until the termination of the criminal
proceedings.
Difference between Article 29 and 35
Article 29 Article 35
1. Here there is no civil 1. Here, the civil case
case, only the criminal was instituted prior to the
case was instituted and institution of the criminal
there was an acquittal. case.
2. Effect on the civil 2. Effect on the civil
liability ex delicto = liability ex delicto = Not
deemed instituted.
Page | 47
 Deemed instituted
3. If subsequently, the
3.How to claim for civil criminal case was filed.
liability ex delicto (if = the civil case will be
acquittal was based on suspended to await the
reasonable doubt) outcome of the criminal
= filing a separate action case.
after acquittal or if an
acquittal carries a
pronouncement of civil
liability only.
ARTICLE 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be
decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules
of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate
and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions
of this Code.
Prejudicial Question defined:
▪ A prejudicial question has been defined to be
one which arises in a case, the resolution of
which question is logical antecedent of the issue
involved in said case. It is one based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines
the guilt or innocence of the accused
Elements of Prejudicial Question:
1. The previously instituted civil action involves an
issue similarly or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Procedure:
▪ A petition for suspension of the criminal action
based upon the pendency of a prejudicial
question in a civil action may be filed in the
office of the prosecutor or the court conducting
the preliminary investigation. When the criminal
action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same
criminal action at any time before the
prosecution rests. (Sec. 6, Rule 111 Rules of
Court)
When can you invoke a prejudicial question?
▪ A prejudicial question can be invoked either
during the preliminary investigation or at any
time before the prosecution has rested its case.
▪ It is the defendant who can invoke or seek the
suspension of the criminal case due to the
existence of a prejudicial question and not the
prosecutor, especially after he had presented
evidence for the prosecution.
Instances where prejudicial question is not
considered:
▪ When one case is Administrative while the other
is Civil.
▪ When the civil action is an independent civil
action.
▪ When the question could be used as a defense in
the criminal case.
Tuanda vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:
On 9 February 1989, private respondents Delia
Estrellanes and Bartolome Binaohan were designated as
industrial labor sectoral representative and agricultural
labor sectoral representative respectively, for the
Sangguniang Bayan of Jimalalud, Province of Negros
Oriental. On 20 June 1991, Tuanda along with other
petitioners filed an action with the Regional Trial Court
of Dumaguete City to declare null and void the
designations of private respondents as sectoral
representatives.
On 21 July 1991, an information was filed before the
Sandiganbayan, charging Tuanda et.al for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act) for refusing to pay Delia’s and
Bartolome’s per diems, salaries and other privileges and
benefits.
On 9 September 1991, Tuanda et. al filed a motion with
the Sandiganbayan for suspension of the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 16936 on the ground that a
prejudicial question exists.
Issue:
Whether or not the legality or validity of Delia and
Bartolome’s designation as sectoral representatives
which is pending is a prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case.
Ruling:
Yes. It is a prejudicial question.
A prejudicial question has two
elements:
Page | 48
 1. The civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the
criminal action; and
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bench,
we find that the issue in the civil case constitutes a valid
prejudicial question to warrant suspension of the
arraignment and further proceedings in the criminal case
against Tuanda et.al.
There is no doubt that the facts and issues involved in
the civil action and the criminal case are closely related.
The filing of the criminal case was premised on Tuanda
et.al alleged partiality and evident bad faith in not paying
Delia and Bartolome’s salaries and per diems as sectoral
representatives, while the civil action was instituted
precisely to resolve whether or not their designations as
sectoral representatives were made in accordance with
law. More importantly, the resolution of the civil case
will certainly determine if there will still be any reason
to proceed with the criminal action.
The Court of Appeals uphold the trial court's decision
declaring null and void Delia and Bartlome’s
designations as sectoral representatives for failure to
comply with the provisions of the Local Government
Code. Their charges in the criminal case would no
longer, so to speak, have a leg to stand on. Tuanda et.al
cannot be accused of bad faith and partiality there being
in the first place no obligation on their part to pay Delia
and Bartolome as they do not have any legal right to
demand salaries, per diems and other benefits.
Meynardo Beltran vs. People
Facts:
Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine E. Felix were married
on June 16, 1973. On February 7, 1997, after twenty-
four years of marriage and four children Meynardo filed
a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code. In her answer, Charmaine alleged that it was
Maynardo who abandoned the conjugal home and lived
with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.
Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for
concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
Code against Meynardo and his paramour.
In order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest, Meynardo argued that the pendency of the civil
case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal
case.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage by Meynardo is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
No. It is not. The pendency of the case for declaration of
nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the
suspension of the latter pending the final determination
of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said
civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on
the ground alleged by Meynardo, that fact would not be
material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he
who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for concubinage.
Philippine Aguilla Satellite Inc. vs. Lichauco
Facts:
Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI) is a duly organized
corporation, whose President and Chief Executive
Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI
was established by a consortium of private
telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered
into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the
DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia,
concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-owned
satellite into outer space.
The government, together with PASI, coordinated
through the International Telecommunication Union two
(2) orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and
153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites. PASI
avers that after having secured the confirmation from the
Philippine government, it proceeded with preparations
for the launching, operation and
Page | 49
management of its satellites, including the availment of
loans, the increase in its capital, negotiation with
business partners, and an initial payment of US$3.5
Million to the French satellite manufacturer. However,
respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for
Communications, allegedly "embarked on a crusade to
malign the name of Michael de Guzman and sabotage
the business of PASI." Lichauco's purported efforts
against PASI culminated allegedly in her offering orbital
slot 153º East Longitude for bidding to other parties
sometime in December 1997, despite the prior
assignment to PASI of the said slot. It was later claimed
by PASI that Lichauco subsequently awarded the orbital
slot to an entity whose indentity was unknown.
Aggrieved by Lichauco's actions, PASI and De Guzman
instituted on 23 January 1998 a civil complaint against
Lichauco and the "Unknown Awardee" who was to be
the recipient of orbital slot 153º East Longitude. The
complaint, alleged three (3) causes of action, which are
injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.
PASI also filed on February 23, 1998 a complaint before
the Office of the Ombudsman against Secretary Josefina
Trinidad Lichauco. In his affidavit-complaint, de
Guzman charged Lichauco with gross violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Office of the Ombudsman correctly found that there
is a prejudicial question however, it made a ruling to
dismiss it and left the case for the RTC to decide.
Issue:
Whether or not there exists a prejudicial question and
did the office of the ombudsman err in dismissing the
criminal case.
Ruling:
Yes. There is a prejudicial question. The elements of a
prejudicial question are: (a) the previously instituted
civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. To
determine the existence of a prejudicial question in the
case before the Ombudsman, it is necessary to examine
the elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 for which
Lichauco was charged and the causes of action in the
civil case.
The elements of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 are:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited act
during the performance of his official duty or in
relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross, inexcusable
negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the
Government or any private party, or gave
any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference to such parties.
If the award to the undisclosed bidder of orbital slot
153ºE is, in the civil case, declared valid for being
within Lichauco's scope of authority to thus free her
from liability for damages, there would be no prohibited
act to speak of nor would there be basis for undue injury
claimed to have been suffered by petitioner. The finding
by the Ombudsman of the existence of a prejudicial
question is thus well-taken.
On the dismissal of the office of the ombudsman:
When, in the course of the actions taken by those to
whom the complaint is endorsed or forwarded, a
prejudicial question is found to be pending, Section 6,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court should be applied in a
suppletory character. Section 6, Rule 111 provides that a
petition for suspension of the criminal action based upon
the pendency of a prejudicial question in a civil action
may be filed in the office of the prosecutor or the court
conducting the preliminary investigation. When the
criminal action has been filed in court for trial, the
petition to suspend shall be filed in the same criminal
action at any time before the prosecution rests.
The said rule directs that the proceedings may only be
suspended, not dismissed, and that it may be made only
upon petition and not at the instance of the judge alone
or as in this case, the investigating officer. To give
imprimatur to the Ombudsman’s dismissal of
petitioner’s criminal complaint due to prejudicial
question would not only run counter to the provision of
Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. It would
sanction the extinguishment of criminal liability
Jesse Yap vs. Hon. Monico Cabales
Facts:
Page | 50
Petitioner Jesse Y. Yap and his spouse Bessie Yap are
engaged in the real estate business through their
company Primetown Property Group. Sometime in 1996,
they purchased several real properties from a certain
Evelyn Te (Evelyn). In consideration of said purchases,
Jesse issued several Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI)
postdated checks to Evelyn. Thereafter, spouses
Orlando and Mergyl Mirabueno and spouses Charlie and
Jovita Dimalanta, rediscounted the checks from Evelyn.
The first few checks were honored by the bank, but in
the early part of 1997, when the remaining checks were
deposited with the drawee bank, they were dishonored
for the reason that the "Account is Closed." Demands
were made by Spouses Mirabueno and Spouses
Dimalanta to the Jesse to make good the checks. Despite
this, however, the latter failed to pay the amounts
represented by the said checks.
On December 8, 1997, Spouses Mirabueno filed a civil
action for collection of sum of money, damages and
attorney's fees against Jesse. On December 15, 1997,
Spouses Dimalanta followed suit and instituted a similar
action. Subsequently, on various dates, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of General Santos City filed several
informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang
(B.P. Blg.) 22.
In the criminal cases, Jesse filed separate motions to
suspend proceedings on account of the existence of a
prejudicial question.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
No. There is no prejudicial question. A prejudicial
question generally exists in a situation where a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively
resolved before the latter may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is
to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or
the issue in one is intimately related to the issues raised
in the other, then a prejudicial
question would likely exist, provided the other element
or characteristic is satisfied. It must appear not only that
the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would
be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil
action will not determine the criminal responsibility of
the accused in the criminal action based on the same
facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the
civil case does not involve a prejudicial question.
Neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the
criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
In the aforementioned civil actions, even if Jesse is
declared not liable for the payment of the value of the
checks and damages, he cannot be adjudged free from
criminal liability for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The mere
issuance of worthless checks with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to support the checks is in itself an
offense. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P.
Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless
check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and
circulation of worthless checks. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public
order.
Dreamwork vs. Janiola
Facts:
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President,
Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance
and Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint
Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent
Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Las Piñas City.
On September 20, 2006, Cleofe, joined by her husband
instituted a civil complaint against Dreamwork by filing
a Complaint for the rescission of an alleged construction
agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, Cleofe filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings of the criminal
Page | 51
case alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved
facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in
the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. In other words, Cleofe claimed that the civil
case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal
cases.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
No. There is no prejudicial question. The 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure now provides that The elements of a
prejudicial question are:
1. The previously instituted civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action, and
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether
or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is
understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a
final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action
with which said question is closely connected. The civil
action must be instituted prior to the institution of the
criminal action. In this case, the Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil
Case. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
In any event, even if the civil case here was instituted
prior to the criminal action, there is, still, no prejudicial
question to speak of that would justify the suspension of
the proceedings in the criminal case.
Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or
agreement to support the issuance of the check/s or that
the checks were issued for valuable consideration does
not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court
has held in a long line of cases that the agreement
surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is
irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of BP 22. At
any rate, we have held that what the law punishes is the
mere act of issuing a bouncing check, not the purpose
for which it was issued nor the terms and conditions
relating to its issuance. This is because the thrust of the
law is to prohibit the making of worthless checks and
putting them into circulation.
Joselito Pimentel vs. Maria Pimentel
Facts:
On 25 October 2004, Maria
Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap filed
an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel. On 7 February 2005, petitioner received
summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo City, for the pre-trial and trial of the Civil Case
concerning the declaration of nullity of marriage under
Section 36 of the Family Code.
On 11 February 2005, Joselito filed an urgent motion to
suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.
Joselito asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the
outcome of the Civil Case would have a bearing in the
criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon
City.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
No. There is no prejudicial question. The Civil Case
Must be Instituted Before the Criminal Case. The rule is
clear that the civil action must be instituted first before
the filing of the criminal action.
In this case, the Information for Frustrated Parricide was
dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon
City on 25 October 2004. The RTC Quezon City set the
Criminal Case for pre-trial and trial on 14 February
2005. Joselito was served summons in the Civil Case on
7 February 2005. Clearly, the civil case for annulment
was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section
7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure
was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent
to the filing of the criminal action.
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a
prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension
of the criminal action. The issue in the civil case for
annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether Joselito is psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since Joselito was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have
killed Maria as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
petitioner's will. At the time of the
Page | 52
commission of the alleged crime, Joselito and Maria
were married. The subsequent dissolution of their
marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392
is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the
marriage. In short, even if the marriage between Joselito
and Maria is annulled, Joselito could still be held
criminally liable since at the time of the commission of
the alleged crime, he was still married to Maria.
Rafael Consing vs. People
Facts:
Rafael Consing negotiated with and obtained for himself
and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la Cruz) various
loans totaling P18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc.
(Unicapital). The loans were secured by a real estate
mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property)
located on the Province of Cavite registered under the
name of de la Cruz.
Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property
for a total consideration of P21,221,500.00. Payment
was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and
Consing in the amount of P18,000,000.00 and paying an
additional amount of P3,145,946.50. The other half of
the property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus
Builders), a joint venture partner of Unicapital.
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the
property, they learned that the title to the property was
really in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan
Teng, the parties from whom the property had been
allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. On its part, Unicapital
demanded the return of the total amount of
P41,377,851.48 as of April 19, 1999 that had been paid
to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter
ignored the demands.
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in
the Pasig City Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Pasig civil
case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin
Unicapital from proceeding against him for the
collection of the P41,377,851.48 on the ground that he
had acted as a mere agent of his mother. On the same
date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa
through falsification of public document against Consing
and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office.
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC
in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-1418) for the recovery
of a sum of money and damages, with an application for
a writ of preliminary attachment (Makati civil case). On
January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati City filed against Consing
and De la Cruz an information for estafa through
falsification of public document in the RTC in Makati
City (Criminal Case)
Issue:
Whether or not there was a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
No. There is no prejudicial question. A perusal of
Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals
that the action was predicated on fraud. This was
apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its
complaint to the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had
acted in a “wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or malevolent
manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a
property which they do not own, and foisting to the
public a spurious title.” As such, the action was one that
could proceed independently of the Criminal Case
pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code which states that
In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a
civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation,
fraud and physical injuries may be independently
instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and
does not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify
the suspension of a criminal case.
Even if Rafael is declared merely an agent of his mother
in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned
lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability.
An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring
to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of
the issue involved in the Civil Case for Injunctive Relief
is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent
in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of
public document.
Caterpillar Inc. vs. Samson
Facts:
Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal
complaints for unfair competition in the Department of
Justice (DOJ). On July 26, 2000, upon application of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, in Makati City issued
Search Warrants Nos. 00-022 to 00-
Page | 53
032, inclusive, all for unfair competition, to search the
establishments owned, controlled and operated by
Samson.
Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a
civil action against Samson and his business entities,
with the IPO as a nominal party for Unfair Competition,
Damages and Cancellation of Trademark with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
On May 30, 2002, Samson filed a Motion to Suspend
Arraignment in Criminal Cases on the grounds that there
exists a prejudicial question pending litigation before the
RTC of Quezon City.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a prejudicial question.
Ruling:
No. There is no Prejudicial Question. We note, to
begin with, that the Civil Case, the civil case filed by
Caterpillar in the RTC in Quezon City, was for unfair
competition, damages and cancellation of trademark,
while the Criminal Cases were the criminal prosecution
of Samson for unfair competition. A common element of
all such cases for unfair competition – civil and criminal
– was fraud. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code, a civil
action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action may be brought by the injured party in cases of
fraud, and such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution. In view of its being an
independent civil action, the Civil Case did not operate
as a prejudicial question that justified the suspension of
the proceedings in the Criminal Cases.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil
and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.
Secondly, a civil action for damages and cancellation of
trademark cannot be considered a prejudicial question by
which to suspend the proceedings in the criminal cases
for unfair competition. A prejudicial question is that
which arises in a civil case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issues to be
determined in the criminal case. It
must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the
resolution of the issues raised in the civil action will
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.
An action for the cancellation of trademark like Civil
Case No. Q-00-41446 is a remedy available to a person
who believes that he is or will be damaged by the
registration of a mark. On the other hand, the criminal
actions for unfair competition (Criminal Cases Nos. Q-
02-108043-44) involved the determination of whether or
not Samson had given his goods the general appearance
of the goods of Caterpillar, with the intent to deceive the
public or defraud Caterpillar as his competitor. In the
suit for the cancellation of trademark, the issue of lawful
registration should necessarily be determined, but
registration was not a consideration necessary in unfair
competition. Indeed, unfair competition is committed if
the effect of the act is "to pass off to the public the goods
of one man as the goods of another;" it is independent of
registration.
Clearly, the determination of the lawful ownership of the
trademark in the civil action was not determinative of
whether or not the criminal actions for unfair
competition shall proceed against Samson.
ARTICLE 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness
to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in
every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Distinction between Juridical Capacity and Capacity
to Act:
Juridical Capacity Capacity to act
Passive Active
the aptitude to be the the power to give life to
subject of rights and juridical acts, to execute
obligations acts with legal effect
indivisible, irreducible, does not exist in all men
and essentially the same nor does it exist to the
always and for all men same extent
it is enough that the intelligence and volition
person exists is required
lost only through death lost through other means
or circumstances
cannot be limited or can be limited or
restricted restricted by certain
circumstances
Page | 54
2 kinds of persons:
▪ Natural – Human Beings
▪ Juridical – Artificial Persons
ARTICLE 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the
state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act,
and do not exempt the incapacitated person from
certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his
acts or from property relations, such as easements.
(32a)
Note:
▪ Article 38 enumerates some of the restrictions
on one’s capacity to act. Since these are mere
restrictions, it does not mean that the person
suffering therefrom is not possessed of capacity
to act. A minor, for example, possesses capacity
to act, although his capacity to act is restricted.
ARTICLE 39. The following circumstances, among
others, modify or limit capacity to act: age, insanity,
imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty,
prodigality, family relations, alienage, absence,
insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of
these circumstances are governed in this Code, other
codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws.
Capacity to act is not limited on account of religious
belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is
qualified for all acts of civil life, except in cases
specified by law. (n)
Note:
▪ Article 39 enumerates circumstances which
modify one’s capacity to act. Although the
above articles enumerate some of the causes of
incapacity or limitations on capacity to act, said
enumeration is not exclusive as the Rules of
Court provide for other limitations.
ARTICLE 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born
later with the conditions specified in the following
article. (29a)
ARTICLE 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is
considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother’s womb.
However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less
than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
from the maternal womb. (30a)
Note:
▪ Article 40, 41, and 42 should be read together
with Article 37.
▪ For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born
if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother’s womb. Complete delivery
means the cutting of the umbilical cord so that if
after the cutting of the umbilical cord the child is
alive, even only for a few hours, it is considered
a person. (This rule applies only if the foetus had
an intrauterine life of at least seven months.)
▪ If the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than
seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within twenty-four hours after its complete
delivery from the maternal womb.
▪ Exceptionally, however, a conceived child
which is still inside the mother’s womb is
deemed “born,” hence, considered a person, but
subject to the following conditions: (1) it is
deemed born only for purposes that are
favorable to it; and (2) it must be born later
under the conditions specified in Article 41 of
the Civil Code.
▪ A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own
for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly
provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines.
Rights of the Unborn Child:
▪ Right to support from its progenitors.
▪ It may receive donations as prescribed by Article
742 of the Civil Code.
▪ It may not be ignored by the parent in his
testament; otherwise, it may result in preterition
of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the
testamentary heir.
ARTICLE 42. Civil personality is extinguished by
death. The effect of death upon the
Page | 55
rights and obligations of the deceased is determined
by law, by contract and by will. (32a)
Note:
▪ Refer to Continental Steel vs. Montaño
Quimiguing vs. Felix Icao
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing and Felix Icao were neigbors in
Dapitan City. Both had close and confidential relations
such that Felix was a married man. In several instances
Felix succeeded in having carnal intercourse with
Carmen without her consent through the use of force and
intimidation.
As a result, Carmen became pregnant, hence she filed
before the courts a complaint for support amounting to
120php per month plus damages and attorney’s fees.
Icao moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action since it did not allege that the child had been born.
Issue:
Whether or not an unborn child is entitled to support.
Ruling:
Yes. The unborn child is entitled to support. A
conceived child, although unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes
favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child,
therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the Felix whose paternity is deemed
admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss.
Even if the said child is still in the womb of its mother, a
conceived child, unborn, it may still receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the Civil Code, and its
being ignored by the parent in his testament may result
in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution
of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be
born after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil
Code).
Other translation of 854:
The omission by a testator of some one of his heirs who
is entitled to a legitime.
The lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil
Code declaring that support is an obligation of parents
and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support
to children as yet unborn", violates Article 40
On Damages:
To allow a married man to force a woman not his wife
to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the
rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused which is based on
Article 21 of the Civil Code which states that any person
who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code
which states that Moral damages may be recovered in
the following and analogous cases:
● Seduction,
● abduction,
● rape or other lascivious act.
Continental Steel vs. Alan Montaño
Facts:
Rolando P. Hortillano is an employee of Continental
Steel and a member of NMCSC-SUPER. On 9 January
2006, Rolando filed claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance
for a dependent pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement concluded between continental and NMCSC-
SUPER.
Under said agreement, the Company shall grant
bereavement leave of 7 days (if within Metro Manila) or
11 days (if provincial) and pay an amount of
Php11,550.00 to an employee in case of the death of his
legitimate dependents which are
● parents
● spouse
● children
● brothers and sisters
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn
child. Rolando’s wife, Marife, had a premature delivery
on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy. The death certificate states that the female
fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim
for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death
and accident insurance.
The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to
bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to
the CBA. They argue that the CBA
Page | 56
did not specifically state that the dependent should have
first been born alive or must have acquired juridical
personality so that his/her subsequent death could be
covered by the CBA death benefits.
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the
express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the
death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal
personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the
entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2)
status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in
Hortillano's case. Continental Steel, relying on Articles
40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code, contended that only one
with civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child
never died because it never acquired juridical
personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought,
Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead
from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a
fetus that never acquired juridical personality. A fetus
that was delivered dead could not be considered a
dependent, since it never needed any support, nor did it
ever acquire the right to be supported.
Issue:
Whether or not Rolando should be granted the death
insurance.
Ruling:
Yes. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death
is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42
plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by
death.
Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the
same Code which states that Juridical capacity, which is
the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent
in every natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal
effect, is acquired and may be lost.
While the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not
explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die. Death has been defined
as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first
before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb
already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from
conception, that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the
cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered,
qualifies as death.
The unborn child can be considered a dependent under
the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one
not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or
aid of someone else." Under said general definition, even
an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano's
child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano's wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is
explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the
dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a
married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a
single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child
must have been born or must have acquired civil
personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such
qualification, then child shall be understood in its more
general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mother's womb.
Continental Steel cannot argue that the provisions of the
CBA are clear and unambiguous. If the provisions of the
CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no
need to resort to the interpretation or construction of the
same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that
neither management nor the Union sought to define the
pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death
benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
ARTICLE 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or
more persons who are called to succeed each other, as
to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death
of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the
same time and there shall be no transmission of
rights from one to the other. (33)
Note:
▪ Article 43 applies only when the question of
survivorship involves persons “who are called
upon to succeed each other” and is not
applicable where there is no question of
succession. For example, father and son died on
the same day but the exact
Page | 57
 hours of their death cannot be determined, it is
presumed that they died at the same time and
there shall be no transmission of rights from one
to the other.
ARTICLE 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for
public interest or purpose, created by law; their
personality begins as soon as they have been
constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for
private interest or purpose to which the law grants a
juridical personality, separate and distinct from that
of each shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
ARTICLE 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1
and 2 of the preceding article are governed by the
laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general
application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or
purpose are governed by the provisions of this Code
concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)
ARTICLE 46. Juridical persons may acquire and
possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in
conformity with the laws and regulations of their
organization. (38a)
ARTICLE 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations,
institutions and other entities for public interest or
purpose mentioned in No. 2 of article 44, their
property and other assets shall be disposed of in
pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If
nothing has been specified on this point, the property
and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes
for the benefit of the region, province, city or
municipality which during the existence of the
institution derived the principal benefits from the
same. (39a)
Note:
▪ Take note that the list in Article 45 is not an
exclusive list. In Corporation law there are other
entities that are considered to be Juridical
Persons, an example would be estates and
cooperations.
▪ Juridical persons are artificial beings to which
the law grants a personality distinct and separate
from each individual member composing it and
susceptible of rights and obligations, or of being
the subject of legal relations.
▪ Their personality begins from the moment the
law recognizes them or creates them unless the
law provides otherwise and such personality is
extinguished only in accordance with law.
▪ A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical
personality separate and distinct from the
personality of the owner of the enterprise. The
law merely recognizes the existence of a sole
proprietorship as a form of business organization
conducted for profit by a single individual and
requires its proprietor or owner to secure
licenses and permits, register its business name,
and pay taxes to the national government. The
law does not vest a separate legal personality on
the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or
defend an action in court.
Manuela Mayor vs. Edwin Tiu and Damiana Marty
Facts:
On May 25, 2008, Rosario Guy-Juco Villasin Casilan
(Rosario), the widow of the late Primo Villasin (Primo),
passed away and left a holographic Last Will and
Testament, wherein she named her sister, Remedios Tiu
(Remedios), and her niece, Manuela Azucena Mayor
(Manuela), as executors. Immediately thereafter,
Remedios and Manuela filed a petition for the probate of
Rosario's holographic will.
Note:
In a probate proceeding, the court oversees the process
of identifying the deceased person's property, paying
any debts, identifying the proper heirs, and distributing
the property to them.
On May 29, 2008, respondent Damiana Charito Marty
(Marty) claiming to be the adopted daughter of Rosario,
filed a petition for letters of
Page | 58
administration before the RTC but it was not given due
course due to the probate proceedings.
After alleging that Remedios held Rosario a virtual
hostage. Marty prayed for the probate court to: (1) order
an immediate inventory of all the properties subject of
the proceedings; (2) direct the tenants of the estate,
namely, Mercury Drug and Chowking, located at
Primrose Hotel, to deposit their rentals with the court;
(3) direct Metrobank, P. Burgos Branch, to freeze the
accounts in the name of Rosario, Primrose Development
Corporation (Primrose) or Remedios; and (4) lock up the
Primrose Hotel in order to preserve the property until
final disposition by the court.
On July 8, 2008, Remedios and Manuela filed their
Comment/Opposition to the urgent manifestation
averring that Marty was not an adopted child of the
Villasins based on a certification issued by the Office of
the Clerk of Court of Tacloban City, attesting that no
record of any adoption proceedings involving Marty
existed in their records. Remedios and Manuela argued
that the probate court had no jurisdiction over the
properties mistakenly claimed by Marty as part of
Rosario's estate because these properties were actually
owned by, and titled in the name of, Primrose who has a
separate and distinct personality from the decedent's
estate.
Marty cited an order of the Court of First Instance of
Leyte claiming that as early as March 3, 1981, the veil of
corporate entity of Primrose was pierced on the ground
that it was a closed family corporation controlled by
Rosario after Primo's death. Thus, Marty alleged that
"piercing" was proper in the case of Rosario's estate
because the incorporation of Primrose was founded on a
fraudulent consideration, having been done in
contemplation of Primo's death.
Issue:
Whether or not Primrose is a distinct personality from
the Estate of Rosario.
Ruling:
Yes. It has a separate and distinct personality.
Artificial persons include
1. A collection or succession of natural persons
forming a corporation; and
2. A collection of property to which the law
attributes the capacity of having rights and
duties.
This class of artificial persons is recognized only to a
limited extent in our law. Example is the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person. From this pronouncement,
it can be gleaned that the estate of the deceased person is
a juridical person separate and distinct from the person
of the decedent and any other corporation. This status of
an estate comes about by operation of law. This is in
consonance with the basic tenet under corporation law
that a corporation has a separate personality distinct
from its stockholders and from other corporations to
which it may be connected.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil has no
relevant application in this case. Under this doctrine, the
court looks at the corporation as a mere collection of
individuals or an aggregation of persons undertaking
business as a group, disregarding the separate juridical
personality of the corporation unifying the group.
Another formulation of this doctrine is that when two
business enterprises are owned, conducted and
controlled by the same parties, both law and equity will,
when necessary to protect the rights of third parties,
disregard the legal fiction that two corporations are
distinct entities and treat them as identical or as one and
the same. The purpose behind piercing a corporation's
identity is to remove the barrier between the corporation
and the persons comprising it to thwart the fraudulent
and illegal schemes of those who use the corporate
personality as a shield for undertaking certain proscribed
activities.
Here, instead of holding the decedent's interest in the
corporation separately as a stockholder, the situation was
reversed. Instead, the probate court ordered the lessees
of the corporation to remit rentals to the estate's
administrator without taking note of the fact that the
decedent was not the absolute owner of Primrose but
only an owner of shares thereof. Mere ownership by a
single stockholder or by another corporation of all or
nearly all of the capital stocks of a corporation is not of
itself a sufficient reason for disregarding the fiction of
separate corporate personalities. Moreover, to disregard
the separate juridical personality of a corporation, the
wrongdoing cannot be presumed, but must be clearly
and convincingly established.
ARTICLE 48. The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
Page | 59
(1) Those who were citizens of the Philippines at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution of the
Philippines;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents

who, before the adoption of said Constitution, had
been elected to public office in the Philippines;

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the

Philippines;

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the

Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority,
elect Philippine citizenship;

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with

law. (n)

ARTICLE 49. Naturalization and the loss and

reacquisition of citizenship of the Philippines are
governed by special laws. (n)

ARTICLE 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the

fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)

ARTICLE 51. When the law creating or recognizing

them, or any other provision does not fix the domicile
of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to
be the place where their legal representation is
established or where they exercise their principal
functions. (41a)

Page | 60