Art 2. Laws shall take effect after 15 days following the and administrative orders.
ders. Respondents, on the other Ruling: NO. Philsa is not liable for illegal exaction. In
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
1 year after such publication.
Ordinary Law – is made & enforce by the competent
authorities of the state and it determines the relation of
the citizens to the state and to one another.
SCOPE:
1. Ordinary Law
2. The Civil Code
a. General Orders
b. Presidential Decrees or Executive Orders
c. Letters of Instruction or Letters of
Implementation
d. Proclamations
NOTE: When a country is placed under martial law, the
law-making authority is ordinarily vested in the Chief
Executive or President or Commander-in-Chief.
Publication:
1. On the date it is expressly provided to take
effect; or
2. If no such date is made, then after 15 days
following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation.
When no publication is needed:
- Where a law provides for its own effectivity,
publication in the Official Gazette is not
necessary so long as it is not punitive in
character.
When publication is needed:
- laws shall take effect after 15 days following the
completion of the publication in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation.
CASES:
TANADA v. TUVERA, G.R. L-63915, Dec. 29, 1988
Facts: Petitioners herein are seeking a writ of mandamus
to compel public officials to publish and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation
hand, claimed that this case has no legal personality or
standing. Further, they argued that the publication in the
Official Gazette in necessary for the effectivity of the law
where the law themselves provides for their own
effectivity dates.
Issue: Whether the Presidential Decrees in question which
contain special provisions as to the date they are to take
effect still need to be published in the Official Gazette.
Ruling: YES. Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary
in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide
for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is
material for determining the date of the effectivity which
must be 15 days following the completion of its
publication, but not when the law itself provides for the
date when it goes to effect.
Article 2 does not prevent the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of
all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people,
such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category.
Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and
executive orders need not be published on the assumption
that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court
therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no
force and effect.
PHILSA v. CA, 356 SCRA 174
Facts: The Philsa recruited the private respondents for
employment in Saudi Arabia and were required to pay the
corresponding placement fees. While in Saudi Arabia, the
private respondents were alleged to sign a second contract
that reduced their benefits and privileges and then a third
contract that increases their working hours in which they
refused so the private respondents were repatriated to
the Philippines. The respondents demanded from Philsa to
return their placement fees and return their salaries of the
unexpired portion of their contract.
Issue: Whether Philsa may be held liable for illegal
exaction
Tañada v. Tuvera, which stated that administrative rules
and regulations must be published if their purpose is to
enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. Therefore, the Philsa is not liable for illegal
exaction.
DE ROY v. CA, G.R. 80718, Jan. 29, 1988
Facts: The firewall of burned out building of the
petitioners struck down a privately owned business
establishment of the respondents resulting in the death of
a family member of the respondents as a result the RTC
awarded damages to the respondents. Not long after, the
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration to the court
of appeals on the last day of the 15 day deadline of the
COA to file for a motion for reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the COA will grant the Motion for
reconsideration
Ruling: NO, after the promulgation of this Resolution,
pursuant to Section 1 rule 52 of the Rules of Court: the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court.
PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY, 94 Phil 640
Facts: Po Lay was accused of violating Circular No. 20 of
the Central Bank compelling those who had foreign
currency to sell the same to the Centra Ban. Po Lay alleged
that as the circular had not yet been published in the
Official Gazette before he committed the act, the circular
should have no effect on his act and that, therefore, he
should be acquitted.
Issue: Whether Po Lay can pe accused for violating Circular
No. 20 of the Central Bank without the law being public in
the Official Gazette.
Ruling: No. Po Lay is correct for the circular has the force
of law, and should have been publish. Moreover, as a rule,
circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation
should be published before becoming effective. This is
based on the general principle and theory that before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, regulation, or circular must first be
published, and the people officially and specifically
informed of said contents and the penalties for violation
thereof.
NPC v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL, G.R. 176006, Mar. 26,
2010
Facts: The National Power Corporation (NPC) had
published a public bidding for its scrap ASCR cables, of
which one of the aspiring bidders was Pinatubo
Commercial whose application for the pre-qualification
was denied on the basis of following Circular No.99-75, the
respondent, petitioned for the reconsideration but was
denied. The issue was brought before the RTC who ruled in
favor of the respondent and declared that the Circular, in
particular items 3 and 3.1 as unconstitutional for being
unpublished and violating the equal protection clause, due
process, and restraining competitive free trade and
commerce. The NPC then brought the case before the SC
questioning the RTC’s decision.
Issue: Whether the RTC erred in its decision that the
circular was unconstitutional for not following the
publication requirements.
Ruling: No. Because the Circular in question was of general
application that was an internal regulation/rule within the
staff of the NPC, thus it need not be published. The
government also reserves the right to intervene in the
market whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare and curtail the practice of trafficking stolen
government property.
NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEEE IN ACCOUNTABILITY OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS, G.R. 180643, Mar. 25, 2008
Facts: Petitioner was invited many times for investigation
but avoided and held executive privilege of the President.
Petitioner alleged that the senate is not a continuing body,
thus the failure of the present senate to publish its Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
(Rules) has a vitiating effect on them.
Issue: Did the Senate violate Section 21 of Article VI
Ruling: YES. Court ruled that Senate violated Section 21 of
Article 6 of the constitution because their inquiry was not
in accordance with the “duly published rules of procedure”
and they issued contempt order arbitrarily and
precipitately.
PIMINTEL v. SENATE COMMITTEE, G.R. 187714, Mar. 8,
2011
Facts: Petitioner alleged the Senate Committee of the
Whole violated the due process clause of the Constitution
when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the whole in spite of its own provision which
requires its effectivity upon publication. Respondents
argued that the Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have
been duly published and adopted, allow the adoption of
supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.
Issue: Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.
Ruling: Yes. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules
must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus,
even if publication is not required under the Constitution,
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate
their publication.
Art. 3 Ignorance of the Law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
“Ignorantia Legis non Excusat”
Ignorance of the Law/Mistake of Law:
- we refer not only to the literal words of the law
itself, but also to the meaning or interpretation
given to said law by our courts of justice.
Ignorance of Fact/Mistake of Fact:
- ignorance of fact eliminates criminal intent as
long as there is no negligence.
Art. 526 – mistake on doubtful or difficult provision of law
is basis for good faith – mitigates but does not extinguish
liability.
NOTE: a mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law
may be the basis of good faith. However, that one is
excused because of such ignorance. He is still liable, but
his liability shall be mitigated, i.e., while he will still be
considered as a debtor, he will be a debtor in good faith.
Art. 1334 – mutual error on legal effect of agreement may
vitiate consent;
Art. 2155 – mistake in payment gives rise to right to return
of erroneous payment.
Processual Presumption - The foreign law, whenever
applicable, should be proved by the proponent thereof,
otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the
same as the law of the forum.
CASES:
YOA KEE v. SY-GONZALES, G.R. L-55960, 167 SCRA 786
(1988)
FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17,
1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing, leaving
behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines
worth P300,000.00 more or less. Yao Kee testified that she
was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien,
China; that she does not have a marriage certificate
because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children. In addition to
Yao Kee’s statement is the testimony of Gan Ching, a
younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among
the many people who attended the wedding of his sister
with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by
the Chinese government
ISSUE: W/ON the Philippine Constitution considers the
marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat valid.
RULING: NO. Under Article 71 of the Civil Code states that:
“All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country. For failure to prove the foreign law
or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage
in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage
between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this
jurisdiction.
OCAMPO v. JUDGE ARCAYA-CHUA, 619 SCRA 59 (2010)
Facts: Judge Aracaya-Chua issued a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO) in favor of petitioner Albert Chang Tan. Since
a TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife,
the Judge was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
Issue: is the respondent Judge guilty as charge

Ruling: YES. Judge Arcaya-Chua is guilty of gross ignorance
of the law. Under R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-
Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a
TPO cannot be issued in favor of a man against his wife.
Art. 4 Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided.
General Rule: laws are prospective, not retroactive.
Exceptions:
1. Tax statutes
2. if the laws are remedial in nature. (remedies
only)
3. penal law if favorable to the accused
4. if the law is curative, meaning its purpose is to
cure errors or irregularities
5. if the laws are of an emergency nature and are
authorized by the police power of the
government.
6. Creating new rights
7. Interpretative statues
Exception to the Exception:
1. Ex post facto laws
2. Penal laws not favorable to the accused
3. Substantive laws impairing vested rights.
CASES:
LAGARDO v. MASAGANDA, G.R. L-17624, June 1962
Facts: Petitioner, Aquilina Largado, filed a motion to
review the decision of the justice of peace court in
appointing guardianship on the ground that the
aforementioned court has no such jurisdiction and is in
violation of R.A. No. 2613. This occurred after guardianship
to minors was appointed to Reyes by default.
Issue: WON the justice of the peace court has jurisdiction
in appointing a guardian in the case at bar
Ruling: No, the aforementioned court has no jurisdiction
to appoint guardianship. R.A. No. 2613, which amended
R.A. No. 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948)), states that the
jurisdiction of the peace of courts shall not extend, among
others, to the appointment of guardians even if the Sec. of
Justice has ruled otherwise in an opinion rendered in 1959.
Thus, the peace court is prohibited by the mentioned Act.
BUYCO v. PNB, G.R. L-14406, June 1961
Facts: This is a mandamus case filed by the petitioner,
Buyco, praying that the respondent, PNB, be compelled to
accept his back pay acknowledgment as payment of his
obligation. Petitioner Buyco was indebted to respondent
bank in the amount of P5,102.90 plus interest thereon,
which represented petitioner’s deficit on his 1952-53 crop
loan with PNB. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay
Acknowledgment Certificate No. 4801, dated July 9, 1955,
under Rep. Act No. 897 in the amount of P22,227.69
payable in thirty (30) years. He offered to pay PNB the
deficit of his crop loan for the above-mentioned crop year
1952-53 with his said backpay acknowledgment.
Respondent answered petitioner that in view of the
amendment of its charter on June 16, 1956 by R.A. No.
1576, it could not accept petitioners’ certificate.
Issue: Does the amendment in R.A. 1576 have a
retroactive effect
Ruling: NO. Article 4 of the Civil Code applies to
amendment of statues. After an Act is amended, the
original act continues to be in force with regard to all
rights that had accrued prior to such amendment.
Applying this rule, it has been held that R.A. 1576 divesting
the Philippine National Bank of the authority to accept
backpay certificates in payment of loans, does not apply
where the offer of payment was made before the
effectivity of said Act.
ABS-CBN v. CTA, 1981
Facts: Petitioner corporation was engaged in the business
of telecasting local as well as foreign films acquired from
foreign corporations not engaged in trade or business
within the Philippines. for which petitioner paid rentals
after withholding income tax of 30% of one-half of the film
rentals. In implementing Section 4(b) of the Tax Code, the
Commissioner issued General Circular V-334. Pursuant
thereto, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. dutifully withheld
and turned over to the BIR 30% of ½ of the film rentals
paid by it to foreign corporations not engaged in trade or
business in the Philippines. The last year that the company
withheld taxes pursuant to the Circular was in 1968. On 27
June 1908, RA 5431 amended Section 24 (b) of the Tax
Code increasing the tax rate from 30% to 35% and revising
the tax basis from “such amount” referring to rents, etc. to
“gross income.” In 1971, the Commissioner issued a letter
of assessment and demand for deficiency withholding
income tax for years 1965 to 1968. The company
requested for reconsideration, where the Commissioner
did not act upon.
Issue: Whether Revenue Memorandum Circular 4-71,
revoking General Circular V-334, may be retroactively
applied.
Ruling: NO. Rulings or circulars promulgated by the
Commissioner have no retroactive application where to so
apply them would be prejudicial to taxpayers. Herein, the
prejudice the company of the retroactive application of
Memorandum Circular 4-71 is beyond question. It was
issued only in 1971, or three years after 1968, the last year
that petitioner had withheld taxes under General Circular
No. V-334. The assessment and demand on petitioner to
pay deficiency withholding income tax was also made
three years after 1968 for a period commencing in 1965.
UNICIANO PARAMEDICAL v. CA, 221 SCRA 285
FACTS: In July 1989, Villegas and Magallanes proposed to
the school authorities the organization of a student
council. Villegas and a certain Barroa were summoned to
the office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to
proceed with the proposal as the school does not allow
such organization. Villegas and Barroa were then barred
from enrollment for violating the school’s rules and
regulations. Subsequently, they were informed of
different reasons for their non-admission. The students,
through their counsel and their mothers, filed a petition
for injunction with prayer for writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction against the school. The RTC then
granted the petition, ordering the school to allow the
petitioners to enroll for the first semester the following
school year.
ISSUE: Whether or not the non doctrine should be applied
retroactively
RULING: NO. it should not be given a retroactive. If it
were otherwise, it would result in oppression to
petitioners and other schools similarly situated who
relied on the ruling in the Alcuaz case recognized the
termination of contract theory

VALEROSO v. PEOPLE, G.R. 164815, Feb. 22, 2008
Facts: SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal
Investigation Division, Central Police District Command,
received a dispatch order from the desk officer, against
petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for
kidnapping with ransom. The team conducted the
necessary surveillance on petitioner and checking his
hideouts. Eventually, they proceeded to the Integrated
National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City,
did then and there. When they saw the petitioner boarded
a tricycle, they immediately arrest him and found tucked in
his waist was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number
52315 with five (5) live ammunition. The Petitioner was
then charged with illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866.
Issue: Whether penal laws may have a retroactive
application?
Ruling: YES. As a general rule, penal laws should not have
retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of
an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however,
is when the law is advantageous to the accused.
According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is “not as a
right” of the offender, “but founded on the very principles
on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not
as an exception based on political considerations, but as a
rule founded on principles of strict justice.” Although an
additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294,
the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering
that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in
its maximum period from reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No.
1866.
PNB v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. 104528, Jan 18,
1996
Facts: Private respondent were the buyers on installation
of subdivision lots from the subdivision developer,
Marikina Village Inc. Notwithstanding the land purchase
agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision
developer mortgaged the lots in question. The office of the
President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise concurred with the
HLURB. Petitioner argued that P.D. 957 cannot be applied
as the said law was enacted only on July 12, 1976, while
the subject mortgaged was executed on Dec. 18, 1975.
Issue: Whether or not P.D. 957 may be applied to the
mortgaged contract which was executed prior to its
enactment.
Ruling: YES. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for
retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to
protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision
developer.
COMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE
HEALT CARE PROVIDERS, G.R. 168129, APR. 24, 2007
Facts: Respondent Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is
a prepaid group health care delivery system or a health
maintenance organization. On July 25, 1987, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273
imposing Value-Added Tax (VAT). Then on January 1, 1998,
R.A. No. 8424 (National Internal Revenue Code of 1997)
became effective. This new Tax Code substantially adopted
and reproduced the provisions of E.O. No. 273 on VAT and
R.A. No. 7716 on E-VAT. Petitioner BIR sent respondent a
Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in its
payment of the VAT. Respondent filed a petition
questioning petitioner’s assessment of its VAT liabilities.
Issue: Whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting
respondent from payment of VAT has retroactive
application
Ruling: No, VAT Ruling No. 231-88 does not have a
retroactive application. Any revocation, modification, or
reversal of any of the rules and regulations promulgated in
accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the
rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall
not be given retroactive application if the revocation,
modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the
taxpayers.
PEOPLE v. JABINAL, 55 SCRA 607
FACTS: Jose Jabinal, the accused, kept in his possession,
custody and direct control a revolver with ammunition
without first securing the necessary permit or license to
possess the same. The accused admitted that he was in
possession of such weapon however, he claimed to be
entitled to exoneration because he had an appointment as
Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and
an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC
Provincial Commander. The said appointments expressly
carried with them to be authorized to possess and carry
the firearm in question.
ISSUE: Whether the Macarandang and Lucero doctrines
are applicable in the present case.
HELD: Yes, the Macarandang and Lucero doctrines are
applicable in the present case. The interpretation upon a
law by this Court constitutes a part of the law as of the
date that law originally passed, since the Court’s
construction merely establishes the contemporaneous
legislative intent thus intended to effectuate. At the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in
question and when he was arraigned by the trial court.,
the doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero,
under which no criminal liability is attached to the
accused, prevailed.
Art. 5 Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory
or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity.
Exceptions:
1. The law makes the act valid, but punishes the
violator
2. The law itself authorizes its validity
3. The law declares the nullity of an act but
recognizes its effects as legally existing,
CASES:
PAFLU v. SECRETARY OF LABOR, 1969
Fact : The petitioner is requesting for a specific judgment
to hold back in cancellation of the registration certificate
of the Social Security System Employee Association
(SSSEA) which is affiliated to Philippine Association of Free
Labor Union (PAFLU) from Security of labor. The company
fail to provide the report to Bureau of Labor Relations with
the copies of the reports on the finances of that union duly
verified by affidavits of its treasurers that covers the
period of September 24, 1960 to September 23, 1961 and
September 24, 1961 to September 23, 1962 within sixty
days of 2 later date that which are end of its fiscal year.
Republic Act No. 875
They also failed to submit this office names, postal
addresses and non – subversive affidavit of the officers of
the union with in 60 days of their election in October 1,
1961 and 1963.
Issue : Whether or not PAFLU will be granted on not to
cancel the registration certificate in the effect of Section
23 of Republic Act No. 875.
Ruling : NO, there is no incompatibility between and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The cancellation of
the SSSEA’s registration certificate would not entail a
dissolution of said association or its suspension. The
existence of SSSEA would not be affected by the
cancellation and its juridical personality and its statutory
rights and privileges – as distinguished from those
conferred by the Constitution- would be suspended.
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
Right – the power or privilege given to one person and as a
rule demandable of another.
Real Right distinguished from Personal Right:
1. Real Right (Jus in re) is enforceable against the
whole world (absolute right)
2. Personal Right (Jus in personam) is enforceable
against a particular individual (Relative right)
Waiver – the intentional or voluntary relinquish of a
known right or such conduct as warrants an inference of
the relinquishment of such rights.
Requisites:
1. the person waiving must be capacitated to make
the waiver.
2. The waiver must be made clear, but not
necessarily express.
3. The person waiving must actually have the right,
which he is renouncing
4. The waiver must not be contrary to law, morals,
public policy, public order, or good customs
5. The waiver must not prejudice others with a
right recognized by law.
Exceptions:
1. Waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs
2. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party with a
right recognized by law.
3. Alleged rights which really do not yet exist, as in
the case of future inheritance.
4. If the right is a natural right, such as right to be
supported.
CASES:
D.M. CONSUNJI v. CA, G.R. 137873, Apr. 20, 2001
Facts: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego,
a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors
from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. The
victim was rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro
Manila where investigation disclosed that Jose A. Juego
was crushed to death when the platform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the
platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the
pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of
the chain block and platform but without a safety lock. On
May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji,
Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the
widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund. The petitioner argues that private
respondent had previously availed of the death benefits
provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore,
precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer
damages under the Civil Code, the election being
equivalent to a waiver.
Issue: Whether there was a valid waiver made by private
respondent.
Ruling: NO. There is no valid waiver made by the private
respondent in the case at bar because there was a mistake
of fact. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes
that a party has knowledge of its rights but chooses not to
assert them. It must be generally shown by the party
claiming a waiver that the person against whom the
waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or
constructive, of the existence of the party’s rights or of all
material facts upon which they depended. Where one
lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which
waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates
waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent
given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. It bears
stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or
a mistake of fact.
CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, 2 SCRA 205
FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at
Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law
from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th
year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship
grants of the said university amounting to a total of
P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester
as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure
permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of
records from Arellano University. The defendant refused
to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87
scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not
take the bar without Arellano’s issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued
Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private
schools, colleges and universities. Part of the
memorandum states that “the amount in tuition and other
fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be
subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution.
Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and
keep students in a school”.
ISSUE: Whether Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97
payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano
University.
HELD: NO. The memorandum of the Director of Private
Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was
advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the
stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay
back the scholarship grant if they transfer before
graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and
good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights and hence, null and void.

Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.
Kinds of Repeal:
1. Express repeal
2. Implied repeal
Effects:
1. When a law which expressly repeals a prior law
is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not
be thereby revived, unless expressly so provided.
2. When a law which repeals a prior law, not
expressly but by implication, is itself repealed,
the repeal of the repealing law revives the prior
law, unless the language of the repealing statute
provides otherwise.
General Law distinguished form Special Law
- General law was enacted prior to the special law,
the latter is considered the exception to the
general law.
- Special laws was enacted first, before the
general law, the special law remains unless:
a. There is an express declaration to the
contrary; or
b. There is a clear, necessary and
unreconcilable conflict; or
c. Unless the subsequent general law covers
the while subject and is clearly intended to
replace the special law on the matter.
Grounds for declaring a law unconstitutional
1. The enactment of the law may not be within the
legislative powers of the lawmaking body.
2. Arbitrary methods may have been established.
3. The purpose or effect violates the Constitution
or its basic principles.
Effect of a law being declared unconstitutional
- Generally, an unconstitutional law confers no
right, creates no office, affords no protection and
justifies no acts performed under it.
Operative Fact Doctrine: is when a legislative or executive
act, prior to its being declared as unconstitutional by the
courts, is valid and must be complied with.
CASES:
MECANO v. COA, G.R. 103982, Dec. 11, 1992
Facts: Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation,
Antonio Mecano, filed a petition for certiorari to review
the decision of the Commission on Audit when the latter
denied his claim for reimbursement. The petitioner was
hospitalized for cholecystitis and filed a reimbursement
request following the Revised Administrative Code Section
669 to COA. COA denied his request claiming that the said
RAC Section 669 has been repealed by the new
Administrative Code of 1987. The reimbursement request
was denied about 7 times stating that because the new
Administrative Code of 1987 never mentioned about the
specific Section 669 in questioned, COA will stay firm on
their decision that the RAC was repealed.
Issue: W/N the RAC 1917 Section 669 was repealed when
it was amended of the new Administrative Code 1987?
Ruling: No, the new Administrative Code of 1987 did not
entirely repeal the RAC of 1917 when it was amended. The
court said that there should be a substantial conflict from
the previous or existing act. Failure to add a repealing
clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal the
existing law. Therefore, the Court granted the petition and
ordered COA to give due course to the petitioner's claim
for benefits.
BACOBO v. ESTANISLAO, G.R. L-30458, Aug. 31, 1976
Facts: A radio broadcaster was accused of libel before the
municipal court of Balanga, Bataan, the municipality being
one of the places where the broadcast was heard. It was
contended that while R.A. 1289 vested exclusive
jurisdiction over libel cases in courts of first instance, still
under a later law, R.A. 3828, municipal courts in provincial
capitals were given concurrent jurisdiction over certain
crimes.
Issue: Does the Court of First Instance (now the Regional
Trial Court) in Bataan has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: Yes. Repeal of the special enactment (R.A. 1289) by
a general but later enactment (R.A. 3828) is not favored,
unless the legislative purpose to do so is manifest. This is
so, even if the provisions of the general but later law are
sufficiently comprehensive to include matters apparently
set forth in the special law.
BORLOUGH v. FORTUNE ENTERPRISES, G.R. L-9451, Mar.
29, 1957
Facts: Under the Chattel Mortgage Law, a chattel
mortgage must be registered in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry. Under the Motor Vehicles Law, a chattel
mortgage on an automobile must be registered in the
Motor Vehicles Office (now LTO).
Issue: Does the latter law repealed the former
Ruling: NO, because the requirement of registration in the
Motor Vehicle Office is merely additional to the
requirement of registration in the Chattel Mortgage
Registry if the subject matter is a vehicle. The 2 laws are
complementary, not inconsistent.
PEOPLE v. TAMAYO, 61 Phil 225
Facts: Appellant moved for dismissal of action against him
on account of the repeal of the section of the municipal
ordinance under which he had been convicted. Appellant
was convicted in Justice of Peace Court Magsingal, Ilocos
Sur for violation of Section 2 Municipal Ordinance No. 5
Series of 1932. Upon appeal to Court of First Instance of
Ilocos Sur, conviction resulted and a fine was imposed.
While appeal was pending, Municipal Council repealed
Section 2 in question. Repeal was approved by Provincial
Board, and the act complained of has now become legal in
that municipality.
ISSUE: Whether the appellant, Mr. Tamayo is still liable for
violation of that ordinance which has been repealed and is
now legal.
RULING: No, doctrine was established in the Philippines
repeal of a criminal act by its reenactment, even without a
saving clause, that it would not destroy criminal liability.
However, not a single sentence in either decision indicates
there was any desire to hold a person convicted,
prosecuted and punished for acts no longer criminal.
Furthermore, the repeal was absolute and not a
reenactment, repeal by implication, nor was there a
saving clause.
ANG BENG v. COMMISSION OF IMMIGRATION, G.R> L-
9621, (1957)
Facts: The petitioners, both Chinese nationals, were
prosecuted in and convicted by the Court of First Instance
of Manila for violation of the Import Control Law (Republic
Act No. 650) in Criminal Case No. 21317. They were also
charged before the Deportation Board. Pending appeal of
the criminal case in the Court of Appeals, the Import
Control Law expired, in view of which and with the
conformity of the Solicitor General, petitioners' motion for
dismissal was granted and they were ordered discharged.
The Deportation Board, however, submitted to the
President of the Philippines its findings Jn the Deportation
Case and recommended petitioners' deportation. On
January 18, 1954, the President issued the corresponding
order of deportation.' On March 1, 1955, the petitioners
filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for prohibition and certiorari, praying that the President's
order of deportation be declared illegal and that they be
released. From the dismissal of the petition the petitioners
have appealed before us.
Issue: Whether the deportation of the petitioners should
be set aside. Being that the law defining the crime to
which they were convicted of had already expired.
Ruling: YES. We cannot subscribed to petitioners'
contention that the expiration of the Import Control Law
should be considered favorable to them in the sense that
it erases the stigma of their conviction. There is no law
upholding such proposition. The benefit of retroactivity
and liberal construction accrues when penal laws are
repealed. There is no subsequent repealing law that
petitioners could mention. The law violated by them
expired in virtue of its own force. The case of Tamayo, 6
Phil., 225, invoked by petitioners is irrelevant, as it
involved absolute repeal.
LIANGA BAY v. HON. ENAGE, ET. AL, G.R. L-30637, Jul. 16,
1987
Facts: The parties herein are both forest concessionaires
whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other, they
have a common boundary In an appeal interposed by
respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as DANR Case No. 2268,
should be that indicated by the green line on the same
sketch which had been made an integral part of the
appealed decision Respondent Judge erred in taking
cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago,
asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary
line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had
already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Office of the President. The Court grants the petition for
certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge,
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no
competence nor authority to review anew the decision in
administrative proceedings of respondents’ public officials
Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari and
prohibition to review the order of the Court of First
Instance is valid?
Ruling: Yes, But the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the
decision of when advisable in the public interests, whose
decision is in turn appealable to the Office of the
President, Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative
Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and
authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all
public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of
licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest
products.
ALCUAZ v. PSBA, May 2, 1988
FACTS: The Petitioner, students of PSBA and the
Respondent school have agreed on certain matters which
would govern their activities within the school. In spite of
the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to
hold dialogues. Among others they demanded the
negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was
turned down by the school, resulting in mass assemblies
and barricades of school entrances. During the regular
enrolment period, petitioners and other students similarly
situated were allegedly blacklisted and denied re-
enrollment for the second semester of school.
ISSUE: Whether there has been deprivation of
constitutional rights of the students who have been denied
the re-enrollment for the school?
RULING: NO. The Court has already recognized the right of
the school to refuse re-enrollment of students for
academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary
regulations. The Court then upheld that there is no denial
of due process where all requirements of administrative
due process were met by the school and the students
were given the opportunity to be heard and that the right
of expression and assembly are not absolute especially
when parties are bound to certain rules under a contract.
ABRA VALLEY COLEGE v. HON. AQUINO, Jun. 15, 1988
Fact: Petitioner, filed a complaint in the court a quo to
annul and declare void the “Notice of Seizure’ and the
“Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued,
Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties.
The “Notice of Sale” was caused to be served upon the
petitioner by the respondent treasurers for the sale at
public auction of said college lot and building, which sale
was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then
Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid
which was duly accepted. the respondent filed through
counstel a motion to dismiss the complaint. Nonetheless,
the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second
floor by the Director of petitioner school for residential
purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered
the assailed decision. Hence petitioner instead availed of
the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for
preliminary injunction before the Supreme Court. Adrian
Avilado Antazo
Issue: Whether the Educational Institution Properties
which is not exclusively used for educational purposes is
not eligible for tax exemption.
Held: Yes, Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court
correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building
as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not
because the second floor of the same is being used by the
Director and his family for residential purposes, but
because the first floor thereof is being used for
commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is
used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair that half of
the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used
exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is ‘not
limited to property actually indispensable’ therefor but
extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes.
NAWASA v. REYES, Feb. 29, 1968
FACTS: NAWASA published an advertisement calling for
bids for the supply of steel pipes, intended for the Interim
Program of Development of the Distribution System of the
Manila and Suburbs Waterworks. The said call for bids was
prejudicial to its interest, NAWASA had specifically and
exclusively called for the supply of steel pipes only
excluding therefrom the asbestos cement pressure pipes it
manufactures. The C & C Commercial Corporation filed a
complaint against the NAWASA, alleging that it is a
qualified bidder in any bidding of the Government; that its
locally manufactured asbestos cement pipes are far less
expensive and cheaper than any other type. Asbestos
cement pressure pipes had been excluded in violation of
Republic Act 912.
ISSUE: May a court of first instance issue a writ of
preliminary injunction which will be enforced outside the
territorial boundaries of said court?
RULING: No, The power of a court to issue an injunction,
which is a matter of jurisdiction, and the manner of its
exercise is prescribed by the Rules of Court. Thus, the
Judiciary Act, as amended, provides: SEC. 44. Original
Jurisdiction.—Courts of First Instance shall have original
jurisdiction; '(n) Said courts and their judges, or any of
them, shall have power to issue writs of injunction,
mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and
habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts, in
the manner provided in the Rules of Court.
GENUINE v. COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, Feb. 26,
1968
FACTS: Petitioner, Eduarda Genuino is the judicial
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Jacinto
Genuino, Jr., part of which were lands Pampanga, all
devoted to rice production. The share tenants of said lands
filed the following complaints against Eduarda Genuino
before the Court of Agrarian Relations of Angeles City,
Pampanga to compel her to convert their agricultural
share tenancy to leasehold tenancy pursuant to the
Republic Act 3844. However, The petitioner alleged the
unconstitutionality of the said Land Reform Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Agricultural Land Reform
Code is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes The Court of Agrarian Relations correctly held
then that even if the challenged provisions of the
Agricultural Land Reform Code be declared
unconstitutional, the effect would be the same for the
Code provides. Section 14 of Republic Act 1199, which
grants this option to choose the leasehold relationship to
the tenant and binding to the landowner, is as earlier
pointed out, constitutional Consequently, regardless of the
Land Reform Code, petitioner Eduarda Genuino must give
in to the desired change of system.
TOLENTINO v. SECRETARY OF FINANCE & CIR, 65 SCRA
352, Oct. 30, 1995
FACTS: These are motions seeking reconsideration of our
decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
Now it is contended by the Philippine Press Institute (PPI)
that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT
while maintaining those granted to others, the law
discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred,
“even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally
guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional.”
ISSUE: Does sales tax on bible sales violative of religious
and press freedom?
RULING: No. The Court was speaking in that case of a
license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional
because it lays a prior restraint on the exercise of its right.
Hence, although its application to others, such those
selling goods, is valid, its application to the press or to
religious groups, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses, in
connection with the latter’s sale of religious books and
pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court
put it, “it is one thing to impose a tax on income or
property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact a
tax on him for delivering a sermon.”
IN RE: CUNANAN, 94 Phil 534
Facts: Congress through R.A. 972 (Bar Flunkers’ Act of
1953) decreed among other things, that bar candidates
who obtained in the bar exams of 1946 to 1952 a general
average of 70% without failing below 50% in any subject
should be admitted en masse to the practice of law
despite their having been raised admission by the
Supreme Court.
Issue: Does the congress have the right to admit these bar
flunkers do so.
Ruling: NO. Congress has no right to admit these flunkers
because this disputed law is not even legislation; it is a
judgement – one revoking those promulgated by the
Supreme Court during the forecited years affecting the bar
candidates concerned. A good bar is essential for the
proper administration of justice. For Congress to oblige the
Tribunal to admit flunkers is contrary to reason. Surely,
this law is a manifest encroachment on the Constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court.
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws
or the constitution shall form a part of the legal system of
the Philippines.
Judicial Decisions – decisions which apply or interpret the
Constitution or the laws are part of the legal system of the
Philippines. thought not laws, are evidence, however, of
what the law mean, and this is why they are part of the
legal system of the Philippines
Judicial Legislation - laws held to be created by the
pronouncements of a judge who departs from a strict
interpretation of a law according to the manifest intention
of the legislature.
Doctrine of Stare Decisis – adherence to precedents,
states that once a case has been decided one way, then
another case, involving exactly the same point at issue,
should be decided in the same manner.
Obiter Dicta - are opinions not necessary to the
determination of a case. They are not binding and cannot
have the force of judicial precedents.
Common Law - is a body of unwritten laws based on legal
precedents established by the courts. Common law
influences the decision-making process in unusual cases
where the outcome cannot be determined based on
existing statutes or written rules of law.
CASES:
PEOPLE v. LICERA, G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975
Facts: The Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental
Mindoro, filed a complaint, charging Rafael Licera with
illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .
30. the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera
guilty of the crime charged. The court a quo rendered
judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault upon
an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of
illegal possession of firearm, Licera invoked as his legal
justification for his possession of the Winchester rifle his
appointment as secret agent by Governor Feliciano Leviste
of Batangas. He claims that as secret agent, he was a
“peace officer” and, thus, pursuant was exempt from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess
firearms.
Issue: Whether the appointment given to Licera as a secret
agent of Batangas exempts him from acquiring a firearm
license.
Ruling: YES. The appointment given to Licera by Governor
Leviste which includes a grant of authority to Licera to
possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: Under the rule
then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang, 3the
appointment of a civilian as a “secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection
of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a
“peace officer” equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police” whom section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code exempts from the requirements
relating to firearm licenses.
TAN CHONG v. SEC. OF LABOR, 79 SCRA 249
Facts: Petitioner was born in San Pablo, Laguna, in the
month of July, 1915, of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother; that his parents were legally married; that
sometime in 1925 when the petitioner was about ten
years old he was taken by his parents to China; that on
January 25, 1940, he arrived at the port of Manila and
sought entry as a native born citizen. He was denied
admission on the alleged ground that he is a Chinese
citizen, and on appeal, the Secretary of Labor affirmed the
decision of the Board and ordered the deportation of the
petitioner to the port from whence he came.
Issue: Is the petitioner a Filipino citizen?
Ruling: Yes, the petitioner, having been born in the
Philippines before the approval of our Constitution, of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother, is a Filipino citizen.
Precedent for Nationality in court decisions
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render
judgement by reason of the silence, obscurity, or
insufficiency of the laws.
Duty of a Judge:
- A judge must give a decision, whether he knows
what law to apply or not.
CASES:
CHU JAN v. BERNAS, 34 Phil 631 (1916)
Facts: There is cockfight between two cocks belonging to
the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively.
Defendant's cock has been declared as the winner but the
plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in the justice of
the peace court of the pueblo, asking that his own rooster
be declared the winner. Justice decided that it was a draw,
due to this, the defendant appealed to the court of the
province. Plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed that this
court render judgement ordering the defendant to abide
and comply with the rules and regulations governing
cockfights. The defendant denied all of the allegations and
moved to dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff. Court
of First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal
without special finding as to costs. Defendant excepted to
this judgment and to an order dictated by the same court.
Issues: Can the Judge dismiss a case if there is no law
governing it?
Ruling: No. The ignorance of the court or his lack of
knowledge regarding the law applicable to case submitted
to him, or the court does not know the rules applicable to
a certain matter are not reasons that can serve to excuse
the court for terminating and dismissing the proceedings
without deciding the issues. A judge must give a decision,
whether he knows what law to apply or not. Thus, even if
a judge does not know the rules of cockfighting, he must
still decide the case.
PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE v. DE VERA, G.R. L-
18816, Dec. 29, 1962
Facts: The respondent was the owner of the two parcels of
land mortgaged to the Philippine Bank of Commerce to
secure his debt. Failing to pay, the respondent’s property
was auctioned but the total amount of the property was
not sufficient to cover the debt. PBC now seeks to recover
the remaining amount from the respondent and the Court
ordered the defendant to pay PBC. The respondent
appealed stating that Act No. 3135 is silent as to the
mortgagee’s right to recover deficiency arising after an
extrajudicial foreclosure sale of mortgage.
Issue: May said deficiency be recovered
Ruling: Yes, Under the Mortgage Law, the mortgagee has
the right to claim for the deficiency resulting from the
price obtained in the sale of the real property at public
auction. Thus, finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from the court a quo, the same is hereby
affirmed with costs against the defendant appellant. for
in the absence of a pertinent provision in Act 3135, we
may make use of the rule under the Rules of Court that the
deficiency may be recovered in JUDICIAL foreclosures.
After all, the principle involved is the same, namely, that a
mortgage is mere security, and does not, even if
foreclosed whether judicially or not, effect a satisfaction of
the debt.

Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking
body intended right and justice to prevail.
DURA LEX SED LEX – the law may be harsh, but it is still
the law.
CASES:
PEOPLE v. PURISIMA, G.R. L-42050-66, L-46229-32, L-
46313-16, L-46997, Nov. 20, 1978
FACTS: These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review were
filed by the People of the Philippines charging the
respective accused with “illegal possession of deadly
weapon” in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a
motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges
issued an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations,
on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not
allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by
Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Informations filed by the
petitioners are sufficient in form and substance to
constitute the offense of “illegal possession of deadly
weapon” penalized under PD No. 9.
RULING: No. The Information filed by petitioner are fatally
defective. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D.
9(3) must be alleged in the Information in order that the
latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charge. The
sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the
facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and
do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of
the accusation is in order.
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order
or public policy shall not be countered.
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to
the rules of evidence.
Custom – is a rule of human action established by
repeated acts, and uniformly observed or practiced as a
rule of society, though the implicit approval of lawmakers,
generally obligatory and legally binding.
Requisites to make a custom an obligatory rule:
1. Plurality or repetition of acts
2. Practiced by the great mass of the social group
3. Continued practice for a long period of time
4. The community accepts it as a proper way of
acting, such that it is considered as obligatory
upon all.
CASES:
MARTINEZ v. VAN BUSKIRK, 18 Phil 79, (1910)
FACTS:
Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in a carromata on
Calle Real, Ermita, Manila, Philippines, when a delivery
wagon belonging to William Van Buskirk, came along the
street in the opposite direction at a great speed, and run
over to carromata severely wounding Carmen Ong with a
serious cut upon her head. The defendant claimed was a
good servant and was considered a safe and reliable
cochero and that upon the delivery of some forage, the
defendant's cochero tied the driving lines of the horses to
the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back
inside the wagon to unload the forage. While unloading
the forage, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which
cracked a whip and made some other noise, which
frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and
they ran away. The driver was thrown out from the wagon
and was unable to stop the horses resulting to a collision
with the carromata.
ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is liable for
negligence of his cochero.
RULING: NO. The act of defendant’s driver in leaving the
horses in the manner provided was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts that the performance of which has not
proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore,
been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they
have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be of
themselves unreasonable or imprudent. In fact, the very
reason why they have been permitted by society is that
they are beneficial rather than prejudicial.
YAO KEE v. SY_GONZALES, G.R. 55960, Nov. 24, 1988
Facts: Sy kiat, a Chinese national died on January, 1997 in
Caloocan city. He left behind real and personal properties
worth P300,000. Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, et al, filed a
petition for the grant of a letter of administration. They
claim that Aida Sy-Gonzales was the appointed
administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased. The
petition was opposed by Yao Kee, et. Al, and they claim
that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of the deceased. Yao Kee
and the deceased were married without a marriage
certificate because it was a custom marriage that
happened in China.
Issue: Whether the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China
is valid and accepted
Ruling: No, the law requires that a custom must be proved
as a fact according to the rules of evidence. A local custom
as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. Therefore, the
marriage of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized by
Philippine jurisdiction.
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months days or
nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days
each; months, of 30 days; days of 24 hours; and nights
from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they
shall be computed by their name, they shall be computed
by the number of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded, and the last day included.
Rule on Computation of Period: First day excluded, last
day included:
 a. Years- 365 days, unless year identified
b. Months-30 days, unless month identified
c. Days – 24 hours
d. Nights - sunset to sundown
Exception: Computation of age - each year based on birth
anniversary
Rule if the last day is a Sunday or a Legal Holiday:
a. In ordinary contract, general rule is that an act is
due even if the first day be a Sunday or a Legal
Holiday.
b. When the time refer to a period prescribed or
allowed by the Rules of Court, by an order of the
court, or by any other applicable statue, it is
understood that the last day should really be the
next day, provided said day is neither a Sunday
nor a Legal Holiday.
CASES:
PEOPLE v. RAMOS, May 9, 1987
FACTS: Alleged offense was made as early as July 17, 1963
and all subsequent knowledge or discoveries of posterior
sales and possession of said books by the respondents,
including that involved in the police search of September
4, 1963 were only confirmatory of the first last act was
allegedly committed on September 3, 1963. Therefore,
when the information was filed on September 3, 1965, it
was filed within the two-year period, albeit the last day of
the prescriptive period. The case was filed on September
3, 1965 - one day late.
ISSUE/S: whether the extra day in the leap year, 1964
should be taken into consideration in the computation of
the two-year period of prescription provided in Section 24
of the copyright law.
RULING/HELD: YES It was held in 1969 in Namarco vs.
Tuazon[27] that February 28 and 29 of a leap year should
be counted as separate days in computing periods of
prescription. Since this case was filed on September 3,
1965, it was filed one day too late; considering that the
730th day fell on September 2, 1965 - the year 1964 being
a leap year. There is no merit in the allegation that the
reckoning of the prescriptive period should start from
September 4, 1963.
AMIGOS v. CA
No case
NAMARCO v TECSON, G.R. L-29131, Aug. 27, 1969
Facts: Defendant Miguel Tecson seeks the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
prescription against NAMARCO’s prayer of revival of the
judgment rendered in said Case No. 20520 on December
21, 1965. As for lack of jurisdiction, as the amount involved
is less than P10,000 as actually these proceedings are a
revival of a decision issued by this same court, the matter
of jurisdiction must be admitted. But as for prescription,
plaintiffs admit the decision of this Court became final on
December 21, 1955. This case was filed exactly on
December 21, 1965 — but more than ten years have
passed a year is a period of 365 days
Issue: W/N the plaintiff’s case is valid in terms of date
validity
Ruling: YES. Pursuant to Art. 1144 of our Civil Code, an
action upon a judgment "must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the
language of Art. 1152 of the same Code, "commences
from the time the judgment sought to be revived has
become final." In this case, this took place on December
21, 1955, or thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
— which was received by the defendants herein on
November 21, 1955 — no appeal having been taken
therefrom. The issue is thus confined to the date on which
ten (10) years from December 21, 1955 expired. Hence,
the same Supreme Court declared that, pursuant to Art. 7
of said Code, "whenever months ... are referred to in the
law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30
days," not the "natural," or "solar" or "calendar" months,
unless they are "designated by name," in which case "they
shall be computed by the actual number of days they
have.