Althea Eunice R.

Bermudez 4 April 2023

3ALM

1. TANADA v. TUVERA

FACTS:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners as they argued that there be a disclosure of
the presidential decrees which, according to them, had not been published, which is
contrary to law. Additionally, laws of general applicability and those that are not shall not
be distinguished and they must be published in their complete form. However, the
government countered such contention and stated that even if publication is
indispensable, the terms “otherwise provided,” mean that the law may take effect
immediately upon approval. The publication need not be in the Official Gazette if such
law falls under the aforementioned clause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidential decrees are covered by the provisions of Article
2 of the New Civil Code, which requires publication to be effective

RULING:
Yes. The clause “unless otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself. According to the Supreme Court, the publication is
indispensable in every case. However, the legislature may at its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. Contrary to the
respondent’s argument, the term “laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws related to the people in general albeit
there are some that do not apply to them directly. All laws, including those of local
application, be published in full in the Official Gazette to become effective only after
fifteen days from their publication or on another date specified by the legislature. The
publication must be full or there is no publication at all because Article 2 of the Civil
Code’s purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.

2. DE ROY v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
The petitioners owned a building. The firewall of such was burned, which caused the
building to collapse. It led to the destruction of the tailoring shop occupied by the private
respondents. They sustained injuries and the family’s daughter died due to the incident.
The private respondents were advised to leave the shop, but they did not comply. With
this, the petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. It was followed by a denial of
their motion for reconsideration. The petitioners argued that the rule in the Habaluyas
case shall not be applied in this case. The respondent, however, contended that there is
no law that requires the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
for them to be binding.

ISSUE: Whether or not judicial decisions shall be published as a prerogative to being in

force and effective

RULING:
No. Supreme Court decisions need not be published in the Official Gazette since there
is no law that requires the same. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or
the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Therefore, the
Court applied the rule prescribed in the Habaluyas case.

3. PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY

FACTS:

The respondent possessed a foreign exchange which consists of US Dollars, checks,

and money orders amounting to almost $7,000. The respondent failed to sell them to the
Central Bank. According to the Central Bank Circular No. 20, the foreign exchange
needs to be sold within one day following the receipt. The respondent was found guilty
of violating said Circular. He was also sentenced to 6 months of imprisonment with a
fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as per Section 34 of
R.A. No. 265. The respondent argued that Circular No. 20 had no force and effect
because it was not published in the Official Gazette when he committed the alleged
defense. Moreover, Commonwealth Acts No. 638 and 2930 require the Circular to be
published in the Official Gazette since it is a notice of general applicability. The Solicitor
General dissented from such argument and stated that the Circular is in force and
effective.

ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank Circular No. 20 requires publication to have force
and effect

RULING:
Yes. Circulars and regulations especially the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, which
prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. The
general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its
penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties must be applied.
Although Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, which is about 3 months after the appellant's
conviction. It is clear that said Circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any
legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazette or after
November 1951. Therefore, the appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it
was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in
his possession within one day following his taking possession thereof.

4. NPC v. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL

FACTS:
National Power Corporation set NPC Circular No. 99-75 as the guidelines in the
disposal of scrap aluminum conductors stell-reinforced to decongest and maintain good
housekeeping in NPC installations as well as to generate additional income for the NPC.
NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its
scrap ASCR cables. However, respondent Pinatubo Commercial submitted a
pre-qualification form to the petitioner, which the latter denied. Respondent sought
reconsideration but the petitioner once again denied it.

The respondent now argues that the annulment of the Circular was unconstitutional
because it violated due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, and
ran counter to the government policy of public bidding. The petitioner countered it by
stating there was no need to publish the circular since it is not of general application.
Furthermore, it was addressed only to particular persons or classes of persons, namely
the disposal committees, head offices, regional, and all other officials involved in the
disposition of ACSRs.

ISSUE: Whether or not NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published

RULING:

No, NPC Circular No. 99-75 need not be published to be binding and as a condition for
its effectivity. In the case of Tañada vs. Tuvera, interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature – that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is the publication required of
the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule
or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a
directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and
efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined
the responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification,
bidding, and award of scrap ACSRS.

All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and
award of scrap ACSRSs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general
or of any other person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected
individual rights, it did so only remotely, indirectly, and incidentally.

5. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

FACTS:
DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE)
for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN)
Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00, and the People’s Republic of China is to
finance the Project. The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On
the other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project
by the NEDA.
Romulo Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during
which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange
for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he informed President
Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when the probe further went on what they discussed about the NBN Project,
Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer
the questions on (a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up on the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and (c) whether or not she directed
him to approve. He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to
the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA and Neri is privileged and
that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri
for contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Committees violated the requirement of publication
of their Rules under Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution
RULING:
Yes. The SC recognized the executive privilege which is the Presidential
communications privilege. It pertains to “communications, documents or other materials
that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President
believes should remain confidential.” Presidential communications privilege applies to
decision-making of the President. It is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation
of power and the President’s unique constitutional role.
The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such
as the area of military and foreign relations. The information relating to these powers
may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Elements of presidential communications privilege:

1) The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.” - i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement with
other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements
without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence.
2) The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an
advisor must be in “operational proximity” to the President.
3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that
may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information
sought “likely contains important evidence” and by the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. - there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate
investigating authority.

6. GARCILLANO v. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FACTS:

A number of versions of the wiretapped communications appeared, which includes one

in which Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Garcillano discussed their intention
to manipulate the 2004 presidential elections in Arroyo's favor. Sen. Ping Lacson
requested a Senate investigation, which was then referred to Sen. Rodolfo Biazon's
Committee on National Defense and Security. Garcillano, the tapes' Commissioner, filed
a petition for prohibition and injunction with this Court, seeking a temporary restraining
order (TRO) to prevent the illegally obtained recordings from being used by the
respondent, the House of Representatives. On the other hand, the petitioners in the
consolidated case seek to prevent the Senate from proceeding with its scheduled
legislative inquiry into the problem of the "Hello Garci" tapes without first publishing rules
of procedure, in clear violation of Article III of the Constitution and R.A. NO. 4200.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a proper publication of the rules to proceed with the
investigation

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court mentioned the following:

The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "the Senate or the
House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure." The requisite
of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
The publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth
in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that "laws shall take effect after 15 days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines."

The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the
clear and unambiguous language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The
organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure,
and does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules prevails
over any custom, practice, or tradition followed by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known
as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication
through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data
message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a written document
only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules,
and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of
these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate
has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules because it can
do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Indeed the inquiry to be conducted by the Senate in aid of legislation cannot proceed for
the reason that the rules that they will observe were not properly published as provided
by the Fundamental Law of the land. Such inquiry if allowed without observance of the
required publication will put a person’s life, liberty, and property at stake without due
process of law. Also, the further assertion of the senate that they already published
such rules through their web page, in observance of the RA 8792 or the Electronic
Commerce Act was only viewed by the court as a matter of evidence and still does not
conform with what the constitution propounded.

7. PIMENTEL, JR. v. SENATE COMMITTEE

FACTS:
Senator Madrigal introduced Senate Resolution 706, claiming that Senate President,
then-Senator Villar, had overwhelming evidence that he used his influence on the
executive to cause the realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his
properties in Barangay San Dionisio, Paranaque City, and Barangays Pulang Lupa and
Mayuno Uno, Las Pinas would be financially benefited. On 17 November 2008, Senator
Enrile was elected Senate President. The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the
election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, but there was no declaration of the minority
members. Villar then announced that he will respond to the allegations against him on
the floor, rather than before the Ethics Committee, due to the accusation that the Ethics
Committee could not act with fairness.

Senator Lacson proposed that the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole, take up
the duties of the Ethics Committee. The motion passed with 10 votes in favor, zero votes
against, and five abstentions.  During the proceedings, petitioners objected to the Ethics
Committee's Rules being applied to the Senate Committee as a Whole. They contended
that the transfer of Senator Villar's complaint from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole violates Senator Villar's constitutional right to equal protection
and due process and that the Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due
process clause of the Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole in spite of its own provision that requires its effectivity upon
publication.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of the Rules of Senate Committee is required
before effectivity 

Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that the Constitution does not require publication of the internal
rules of the House or Senate since rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their
members are internal to the House or Senate unless such rules expressly provide for
their publication before the rules can take effect. Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole provides: “These Rules shall be effective after
publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.” The Rules of
the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that the Rules must be published
before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not required under the
Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required
because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. To comply with due process
requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own
members are affected. 

The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the
observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. —The Constitutional right
of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been recognized and
affirmed by this Court. The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its
own rules is the observance of quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long
as these requirements are complied with, the Court will not interfere with the right of
Congress to amend its own rules.

8. VALEROSO v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation Division, in a case involving
kidnapping for ransom, got a dispatch order directing him and 3 other officers to serve a
warrant of arrest against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso. SPO2 Disuanco and his
crew approached the petitioner, arrested him, informed him, and searched him. A
Charter Arms was discovered tucked away in his waistband, along with 5 live
ammunition. The firearm was not issued to the petitioner, but to Raul Palencia
Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila, according to the Firearms and Explosives Division of
Camp Crame. Under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended, petitioner was
charged with illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. The petitioner pleaded not
guilty, claiming that he was sleeping in his children's boarding house when four heavily
armed men in civilian clothes entered the room, pointed their guns at him, and invaded
the place, stating that he was under a shoot-to-kill order. The search was illegal, and the
pistol seized was properly licensed, but he was unable to provide the documentation
because they were taken away by the cops.

ISSUE: Whether or not R.A NO. 8294, amended during the pendency of this case, shall
apply

RULING:
Yes. P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time the petitioner
committed the offense on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No.
1866 on July 6, 1997, during the pendency of the case. Penal laws should not have
retroactive applications, as per the general rule. However, when the law is in favor of the
accused, it becomes an exemption. Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is
imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous to the accused, considering
that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period from
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua. Therefore, R.A No.
8294 shall be applied.

9. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

FACTS:
Subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc were bought by the private respondents were
buyers on its installment. In the land purchase agreements executed over said lots, the
subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of the Philippine National Bank.
Private respondents fulfilled their commitments as lot buyers and built their homes on
the lots in question unaware of the indebtedness. The petitioner foreclosed on the
mortgage after the subdivision developer declared them as the highest bidder. The
Office of the President, citing P.D. 957, agreed with the HLURB Office of Appeals' ruling
that PNB may only collect "remaining amortizations, in accordance with the land
purchase agreements they had previously entered into with Marikina Village, Inc., and
cannot compel private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had previously
purchased from said subdivision developer." The petitioner argued that P.D 957 was
only enacted on July 12, 1976, whereas the underlying mortgage was issued on
December 18, 1975, and because the contracts between private respondents and the
mortgagor-subdivision developer are not known to the petitioner bank, the remaining
amortizations cannot be accepted.

ISSUE: Whether or not P.D 957 shall apply

RULING:
Yes. P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at
issue here, executed prior to its enactment, and such intent must be given effect if the
laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved. While P.D. 957
did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet can be plainly inferred that
the intent of the law is to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision
developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial institutions
which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law—as an instrument of social
justice—must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast
resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is
presumed to have conducted the usual “due diligence” checking and ascertained the
actual status, condition, utilization, and occupancy of the property offered as collateral. It
could not have been unaware that the property had been built by small lot buyers. It
would be illogical in the extreme if P.D. 957 is to be given full force and effect and yet,
the fraudulent practices and manipulations it seeks to curb in the first instance can
nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because P.D. 957 cannot be applied to
existing antecedent mortgage contracts. P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said
law obliges the petitioner Bank to accept the payment of the remaining unpaid
amortizations tendered by private respondents.

10. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE

PROVIDERS, INC.

FACTS:
Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. is a corporation incorporated and existing under
the laws of the Philippines. President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No.
273, revising the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (Presidential Decree No.
1158) by imposing Value-Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of goods and services, on July
25, 1987. Respondent wrote to the petitioner, asking if the services it provides to
participants in its healthcare program are VAT-exempt. The VAT Review Committee of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88, indicating that the
respondent is exempt from VAT coverage as a provider of medical services. After the
E-VAT took effect, BIR gave the respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for
insufficiency in its payment of the VAT for the taxable years 1996 and 1997 after the
E-VAT Law became effective (January 1, 1996). Respondent also received a letter from
petitioner CIR seeking their insufficiency.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent’s services are subject to VAT

RULING:
Yes. Respondent does not actually provide medical and/or hospital services, as
provided under Section 103 on exempt transactions, but merely arranges for the same,
its services are not VAT-exempt. However, undue prejudice will be caused to the
respondent if the revocation of VAT Ruling No. 231-88 will be retroactively applied to its
case. VAT Ruling No. 231-88 issued by no less than the petitioner itself has confirmed
the respondent’s entitlement to VAT exemption under Section 103 of the Tax Code. In
saying so, the petitioner has actually broadened the scope of “medical services” to
include the case of the respondent. Thus, the court is convinced that the petitioner’s
reliance on the said ruling is premised on good faith. 

Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides that rulings, circulars, rules
and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue have no
retroactive application if applying them would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to
this rule are: (1) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from
his return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2)
where the facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially
different from the facts on which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in
bad faith.

11. D.M. CONSUNJI v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Jose Juego is a construction worker of CM Consunji, Inc. who fell 14 floors from the
Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. Investigation disclosed that while the victim
Jose Juego together with two other construction workers, were performing their work as
carpenters at the elevator core of the 14th floor of Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building,
on board a platform made of steel, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely
inserted to connect the chain block with the platform got loose causing the whole
platform to fall with the victim Jose Juego.
Jose Juego’s widow, Maria filed in RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the
deceased’s employer. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior
availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The Regional Trial Court
rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Maria can claim damages from DM Consunji apart from the
death benefits she claimed in the State Insurance Fund
RULING:
Yes. The Court, in previous cases ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to
recover from the employer the fixed amounts by the Workmen’s Compensation Act
(WCA) or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages
but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. However, the Court allowed
some of the petitioners to proceed with their suit under the Civil Code despite having
availed of the benefit under the WCA.
The Court agreed when the CA held that the private respondent’s case came under the
exception because the private respondent was unaware of the petitioner's negligence
when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Maria filed
the civil complaint for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation
report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing the complaint against the
petitioner’s personnel. CA further held that not only was the private respondent ignorant
of the facts, but of her rights as well as Maria testified that she has reached only
elementary school for her educational attainment; that she didn't know that damages
could be recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she
may also recover more from the Civil Code.
Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of
a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact
negates waiver, and waiver cannot, be established by consent given under a mistake or
misapprehension of fact. Waiver requires the knowledge of the facts basic to the
exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That lack of
knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception
in Floresca. It bears stressing that what negates waiver is a lack of knowledge or a
mistake of fact. In this case, the ‘fact’ that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is
the negligence of the petitioner’s employees, which the private respondent learned only
after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be a civil liability.

12. EMETERIO CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY

FACTS:
Emeterio Cui was an academic scholar at Arellano University where he finished the first
three years of his law degree. His tuition was refunded at the end of every semester.
The Director of Private Schools issued a Memorandum in 1949 instructing schools not
to withhold the credentials of former student scholars who choose to transfer to other
schools if they fail to pay their fees. As per the Memorandum, the amount of tuition and
other fees associated with these grants should not be charged when the students
decide to quit school or transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be
granted to attract and retain students in a particular institution. The petitioner and
Arellano University signed an agreement in 1951 in which Cui committed to waiving his
right to transfer to another school unless he returned the scholarship he had received.
The petitioner opted to move to Abad Santos Law School in his last year, where he
completed his legal degree. Cui needed his transcripts from Arellano University to
enable him to take the 1953 bar exams, but the university refused to give them to him
until he paid back the scholarship money.
ISSUE: Whether or not the waiver made by Emeterio Cui is valid
RULING:
No, because the waiver is contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court contended that
the stipulation is contrary to public policy, hence, null and void. Scholarships, according
to Arellano University, are a business program aimed to boost an educational
institution's business potential. Such an approach contradicts not only public policy but
also good customs. Therefore, Arellano University has been ordered to reimburse Cui's
money, plus interest. Scholarships to recruit students and retain them in school are not
good customs, and they have gained no social or practical validation except in a few
private institutions, such as Arellano University.

13. ANTONIO MECANO v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:
Antonio A. Mecano is the Director II of the NBI, who was hospitalized for cholecystitis on
account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses. He now claims the
fees from the COA.

On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director Alfredo S. Lim, he requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under
Section 699 of the RAC. Director Lim then forwarded the petitioner’s claim to the
Secretary of Justice, along with the comment, “recommending favorable action thereof.”
Finding the petitioner’s illness to be service connected, the Committee on Physical
Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of the
petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III returned the petitioner's
claim to Director Lim, considering the statements of the Chairman of the COA that the
RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Mecano then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S.
1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon stating that “the issuance of the
Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.”
Director Lim transmitted Mecano's claim to Undersecretary Bello for favorable
consideration. Secretary Drilon also forwarded the petitioner's claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. The COA Chairman however, denied
the petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC has been repealed by
the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not
restarted or re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however,
that the claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering
that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectiveness of the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Eventually, the petitioner’s claim was returned by the Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo
Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that the petitioner “elevate the matter to the
Supreme Court if he so desires.”


ISSUE: Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section
699 of the Revised Administrative Code

RULING:
No. The legislature did not intend to repeal Sec. 699 of the old Code. The new Code did
not expressly repeal the old as the new Code fails to identify or designate the act to be
repealed.
 
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject,
that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a
clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to
abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; otherwise, at
least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a
substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the
time of the first enactment. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and
not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. The two Codes should be read
in pari materia.

14. PEOPLE v. LICERA

FACTS:

The Chief of Police in Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint, with the Municipal Court of
said municipality, charging Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle. On
August 1996, Licera was found guilty of the crime charged, sentencing him to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from five years and one day to six years and eight months
of imprisonment. Licera contends that he possessed the firearms because of his
appointment as a secret agent by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims
that he was a ‘peace officer,’ and thus pursuant to People v. Macarandang, was exempt
from the requirements relating to the issuance of a license to possess firearms. He
alleges that the court erred in relying on the latter case of People v. Mapa, which held
that the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as
secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
The appointment to Licera includes the grant of authority to possess the Winchester
rifle.

ISSUE: Whether or not the rule enunciated in Macarandang should be applied in the
determination of the case

RULING:

Yes. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system.
These decisions, although in themselves are not laws, constitute evidence of what the
laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is a part of
law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or
interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the
construed law purports to carry. At the time of Licera’s designation as a secret agent in
1961 and at the time of his apprehension for the possession of the rifles without the
required license, the Macarandang rule formed part of our jurisprudence, and hence of
this jurisdiction’s legal system.

Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and
should not adversely affect those favored by the old rules especially those who relied
thereon and acted on good faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the
application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal laws, for, in this area, more
than in any other, it is imperative that the punishment of an act be reasonably foreseen
for the guidance of society.

15. CHU JAN v. BERNAS

FACTS:
A match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks
belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively on the afternoon of June 26,
1913. A wager of P160 was put up by each person. As the referee of the cockpit had
declared the defendant’s cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against
the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own
rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was
a draw. The defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. For the
appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering
the defendant to abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing
cockfights — to pay the stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both
sums of the wager being held for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte)
and to assess the costs of both instances against the defendant.
The defendant denied the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss with the
costs against the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court or judge can dismiss a case if there is no law that
governs it
RULING:
No. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to
a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules
applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by
him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that
can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them
without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is less acceptable because, foreseeing that
a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the
second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be observed,
and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.

16. PEOPLE v. PURISIMA

FACTS:

The accused was charged with "illegal possession of a deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9 or the unlawful carrying outside of residence any bladed
pointed or blunt weapon. Respondent Judges argue that (1) the said decree is used in
extortion by the police (Purisima); the desired result of the decree is to prevent
subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public
disorder. But the mere carrying of deadly weapons it's not unlawful (Maceren). It is
common to carry weapons in rural areas and not necessarily for committing a crime but
is used for self-defense and going to and from their farms. The petitioners however
claimed that previous ordinances, Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended
by Ordinance No. 3928 , were impliedly repealed by said Presidential Decree No. 9.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No.9 impliedly repeals Act No. 1780 and
City Ordinance. 3820, as amended by City Ordinance No. 3820

RULING:

No. The Court does not agree with the petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and
the city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). P.D. 9 (3) does not contain any
repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not favored. This principle
holds true with greater force with regard to penal statutes, which as a rule, are to be
construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. In fact, Article 7
of the New Civil Code provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice
to the contrary. Hence, it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a
motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation
1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.

17. S. D. MARTINEZ v. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK

FACTS:
Carmen Ong de Martinez rode a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of
Manila. As he was going, the defendant’s delivery wagon to which was attached a pair
of horses, came along the street in the opposite direction to where Carmina was
headed. The driver of Carmina’s carromata noticed that the delivery wagon was
approaching at great speed, hence, the driver crowded close to the sidewalk on the
left-hand side of the street and stopped to give way to the delivery wagon, but the
defendant’s wagon and horses ran into Carmina’s carromata and overturned it. Both the
carromata and Carmina were injured with the latter having a serious cut on her head.
The defendant presented evidence that the cochero, who was driving the delivery
wagon at the time such an accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a
safe and reliable cochero. Upon these facts, the court found the defendant guilty of
negligence and gave judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and
a trusty and capable driver is equally liable for the negligence of the latter.

RULING:

No. The Supreme Court reversed the decision on the ground that the evidence does not
disclose that the cochero was negligent. The act of the defendant's driver in leaving the
horses in the manner executed was neither unreasonable nor imprudent. The fact that
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does
not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only
creates a prima facie case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances
under which the act complained of was performed. With the presentation of the
defendant's case showing the conditions and circumstances under which the injury
occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur disappears.

18. YAO KEE v. SY-GONZALES

FACTS:

On January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City, Sy Kiat, who was a Chinese national died. He
left behind real and personal properties worth P300,000.00 in the Philippines. Aida
Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for the
grant of letters of administration alleging that: a) they are the children of the deceased
with Asuncion Gillego; b) that Sy Kiat died intestate; c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's
marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children to him, and d) they nominate Aida
Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Yun Chen,
who appeared as Sy Kiat’s other family. The Probate Court held in favor of the
petitioners (Yao Kee et al.) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the administratrix. The
Court of Appeals, however, modified the PC’s decision by declaring that: a)
Respondents as acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego b) the
Legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to
be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee was conclusively proven
valid in accordance with the laws of the People’s Republic of China

RULING:

No. The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code. According
to the said law, two things must be proven to establish a valid foreign marriage, namely:
(1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners failed to present any
competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage which was
contended. Hence, it was stated that though the statements presented may very well
prove the fact of the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat, the same does not suffice
to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom. As
our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws and in the absence of competent
facts, the doctrine of processual presumption was deemed applicable. Ergo, the
decision of the CA was affirmed.

19. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY

GROUP, INC.

FACTS:

Gilbert Yap applied for the refund of income tax which respondent paid in 1997. Yap
explained in his letter that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and difficulty in
obtaining financing for projects have caused the real estate business to go down. In
return, the company suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228. Because of the
aforementioned losses which they have suffered, he claimed that they were not liable for
income taxes. The respondent filed a petition for review but it was not acted upon. The
CTA dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for a tax refund. It was found that the
respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998, ergo, its right to claim
commenced on the said date. The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code. In this
light, the CTA emphasized that the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of
the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days and since 2000 was
a leap year, they concluded that the respondent’s petition was filed beyond the
reglementary period. The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the
CTA. It stated that Article 13 of the Civil Code does not distinguish between a regular
year and a leap year.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 13 of the New Civil Code shall be used as the basis in the
correct computation of time

RULING:
No. Article 13 of the New Civil Code shall not be used as the basis for the correct
computation of time. Both Article 13 of the New Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter which
covers the computation of legal periods. As the two laws covered the same subject and
there exists a manifest incompatibility between them, the Court declared that the
provisions of Art 13 were already impliedly repealed by Section 31, Chapter 18, Book I
of the 1987 Administrative Code.

20. ALICE REYES VAN DORN v.. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR.
FACTS:
The petitioner is a Filipino citizen, and the private respondent is a citizen of the United
States of America, were married in Hongkong in 1972 and decided to settle in the
Philippines. Both parties had two children. The parties obtained a divorce in Nevada,
United States. In 1982, the petitioner remarried Theodore Van Dorn. On June 8, 1983,
the private respondent brought a civil action against the petitioner in the RTC
emphasizing that the latter’s Galleon Shop forms part of the partners' conjugal property.
The private respondent must be granted a right to manage such a conjugal property.
The Petitioner contends that the motion must be dismissed given that it is barred by
previous judgment in the divorce proceedings which acknowledged that the respondent
and petitioner had "no community property".

ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the parties has a binding effect on
the conjugal property located in the Philippines?
RULING:
Yes. As provided by our law, aliens may acquire divorces in other countries, which may
be recognized in the Philippines if they are legitimate under that country's laws. In the
case at bar, the Supreme Court emphasized that the divorce obtained by the parties in
Nevada, which was proven to be valid and competent, dissolved their previous
marriage. Ergo, the private respondent possessed no legal standing in filing the suit as
he is estopped by his own representation before the Nevada District Court.
21. PILAPIL, petitioner, v. IBAY-SOMERA

FACTS:

Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, the petitioner, is a Filipino citizen who is married to Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national. They were married on Sept. 7,1979 in the Federal
Republic of Germany and lived together in Malate, Manila, and both had one child. After
only about 3 and a half years of marriage, the couple initiated a divorce proceeding
against the petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983.
In January 1986, the divorce decree was promulgated on the ground of failure of
marriage between the spouses and the custody of the child was given to the petitioner.
Five months following the issuance of the divorce decree, two complaints were filed by
Geiling for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while the marriage
between him and Pilapil was in existence, the latter had an affair with two separate
individuals. Petitioner filed a petition asking for the cases filed against her to be set
aside and dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the private respondent may still file an action for adultery against
the petitioner even after a valid divorce decree

RULING:

No. Article 344 of the RPC presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the case at bar, the fact
that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as the private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law
on the matter of the status of persons. Thus, under the same consideration and
rationale, the private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner and has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

22. EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS

FACTS:
Felicisimo T. San Luis was the former governor of the Province of Laguna, who
contracted three marriages in his lifetime. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit, out
of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita, and
Manuel. When Virginia died, he married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. The third marriage was with Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos,
with whom he had no children, but both lived together for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death.
Felicidad San Luis sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the
settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. She filed a petition for letters of administration before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 146. Thereafter, the heirs of Virginia Sulit
filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause
of action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to dismiss. On
September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It
held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, and not in Makati City. It also ruled that the respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage with
Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. The Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the orders of the trial court, and, hence, the case before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidad my file for letters of administration over Felicisimo’s
state

RULING:
Yes. The espondent would qualify as an interested person who had a direct interest in
the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation. Hence, the SC also made
emphasis on the fact that if the respondent can prove the validity of Felicisimo’s capacity
to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the
laws of the U.S.A. She may still be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the
Civil Code. Applying the doctrine of the Van Dorn v. Ronillo, it was found out that
Felicisimo’s previous divorce was indeed valid, hence, the court upheld the latter’s
capacity to remarry. Respondent, however, failed to present substantial proof that could
verify the validity of their marriage in California hence, the court ruled the case to be
further remanded to the trial court for further reception.

23. ERNESTO RAMAS UYPITCHING vs. ERNESTO QUIAMCO

FACTS:
Juan Davalan, Josefino Gabutero, and Raul Generoso approached Ernesto Quiamco to
settle the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quamco against them. They
gave him a red Honda XL-100 motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate of
registration. The respondent asked for the original certificate of registration but they
never appeared. The motorcycle was parked in an open space inside Quamco’s
business establishment, Avesco-AVNE Enterprises, where it was visible and accessible
to the public. The motorcycle has been sold on an installment basis to Gabutero by
petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation. To secure its
payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to the petitioner corporation. When Gabutero
could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the
payments. Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told the petitioner
corporation’s collector (Wilfredo Verano) that the motorcycle had allegedly been “taken”
by Quiamco’s men. Uypitching, accompanied by policemen, went to Quiamco’s
workplace to recover the motorcycle. While the leader of the police team talked to the
clerk in charge and asked for Quiamco, Uypitching paced back and forth inside the
establishment uttering “Quamco is a thief of a motorcycle.” Policemen found out
Quiamco wasn’t in the establishment and tried to look for him but were unable to find
him. They went back to the establishment and under Uypitching’s instruction and over
the clerk’s objection, took the motorcycle.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is liable under Article 19 of the New Civil Code

RULING:
Yes. The Petitioners are clearly mistaken when they claim that they should not be held
liable for the petitioner corporation’s exercise of its right as seller-mortgagee to recover
the mortgaged vehicle preliminary to the enforcement of its right to foreclose on the
mortgage in case of default. There is a well-defined procedure for the recovery of
possession of mortgaged property: if a mortgagee is unable to obtain possession of a
mortgaged property for its sale on foreclosure, he must bring a civil action either to
recover such possession as a preliminary step to the sale or to obtain judicial
foreclosure.

No doubt, the petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly
disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of
respondent. The petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals and
transgressed the proper norms of human relations.

Article 19, also known as the “principle of abuse of right,” prescribes that a person
should not use his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he
opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal
right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends There is an abuse of a right when it is
exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or
unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for
damages to the injured party will attach.

Hence , Thus, the totality of the petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to
embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an
excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of the espondent. Contrary to law, petitioners
willfully caused damage to the respondent. Hence, they should indemnify him.

24. BEATRIZ WASSMER v. FRANCISCO VELEZ

FACTS:
Wassmer and Velez promised to marry each other on September 4, 1954. 2 days before
the marriage Mr. Velez left a note for Ms. Wassmer that he wants to postpone the
wedding and assured that he will return. The petitioner filed for damages, but the
respondent didn’t answer. The judgment was in favor of Ms. Wassmer ordering the
defendant to pay P29,500 as the total for all the damages including the actual, moral,
exemplary, and attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mr. Velez contends that he should not be
liable for any damages because no law requires him to pay damages for breach of
promise to marry.

ISSUE: Whether or not the breach of promise to marry is an actionable wrong

RULING:
No. There is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to
marry. Applying the case of Hermosisima v. CA the breach of a promise to marry is not
an actionable wrong. However, it is already different when they officially set up a
wedding, go through all the planning and announce that marriage will happen. Pursuant
to Article 21, NCC, Mr. Velez causes loss or injury to Ms. Wassmer and in such a case,
he should compensate him for the damages. Thus, this is not a case of mere breach of
promise to marry. As stated, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above to be solemnized is
far different. It is contrary to good customs that Mr. Velez will be held liable for the
damages in accordance with the provision of Article 21, NCC.

25. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN v. ROBERTO REYES

FACTS:
According to the respondent, more commonly known as “Amay Bisaya,” alleged that
Mrs. Filart, his friend of several years, approached him and invited him to join her in a
party at the hotel’s penthouse for the birthday of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Tsuruoka
while he was having coffee at the lobby of Hotel Nikko. He asked if she could vouch and
the latter affirmed. They went to the penthouse and Reyes was carrying the basket of
fruits to serve as a gift to the celebrant. He waited for the buffet table to be ready but he
was stopped by petitioner Ruby Lim, Executive Secretary of Hotel Nikko. The petitioner
humiliated the respondent by saying, in a loud voice, that he had to go home because
he was not invited and the guests heard it. Reyes argued that he was invited by Filart,
but the latter denied it. Hence, a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step
out of the hotel.

Reyes is now claiming P1,000,000 actual damages, P1,000,000 moral and/or exemplary
damages and P200,000 attorney’s fees. Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked
Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not denied the claims of the latter. She then narrated
that she generated an exclusive guest list limited to Mr. Tsuruoka’s closest friends and
some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited. On the other
hand, Dr. Filart argued that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party. According to her, it
was Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he
was likewise going to take the elevator.

Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit
injuria, they cannot be made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk
of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he
was a “gate-crasher.”

ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not the Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria is applicable in this case
2.) Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes a.k.a “Amay
Bisaya”, to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby
becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code
3.) Whether or not Hotel Nikko, as Ruby Lim’s employer, is solidarily liable with her

RULING:
1.) No. The petitioners are under obligation to treat Mr. Reyes fairly in order not to
expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame even if he did not assume the risk
of being asked to leave the party. The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes
to leave was likewise acceptable and humane. Hence, Art. 19 of the Civil Code,
set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
 rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. Ms. Lim complied with the
standards such as acting with justice, giving everyone his due, and observing
honesty and good faith.

2.) No. Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which
he was not invited, and cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Pursuant to Art. 21 of the Civil Code, it refers to acts
contra bonos mores and has the following elements: 1.) There is an act which is
legal; 2.) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public
policy; and 3.) it is done with intent to injure. Hence, there was no proof of any ill
motive on the part of Ms. Lim for acting within her duty to secure the intimacy of
the birthday party.

3.) Under Art. 20 of the Civil Code, Ruby Lim not being liable for both actual and
moral damages, nor can petitioner Hotel Nikko be made answerable for
exemplary damages.

26. GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v. CA

FACTS:
Private respondent Gonzales is a 22-year-old Filipina citizen in Dagupan City, who filed
a complaint for damages against petitioner Gashem Shookat Baksh, an Iranian medical
exchange student at Lyceum Northwester Colleges in Dagupan City for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. Baksh allegedly courted and proposed to
marry her, and they lived together. She allegedly was a virgin before such arrangement.
A week before filing the complaint, the petitioner’s attitude towards the respondent
changed. When the former maltreated and caused injuries to the respondent, the
petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked not to live with her anymore.

Private Respondent, therefore, sought after the Court for payment of damages in the
amount of not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual expenses, attorney’s fees
and. However, the petitioner denied the claims of private respondent. Accordingly, he
denied the marriage proposal with the respondent.

The lower court ruled in favor of the respondent applying Article 21 of the New Civil
Code in this case. The court argued that the petitioner employed machinations, deceit,
and false pretenses to marry the respondent and accordingly, the respondent was
drawn to its spell by allowing herself to be deflowered by him as well as to live with him.
Not only to the respondent but to the parents of the respondent who trusted him and
even started preparing for the wedding. Hence, such acts of the petitioner, who is a
foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of
morality, good customs, culture, and traditions. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the
trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on
the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines

RULING:
Yes. Although a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong, damages
may be recovered in such a case where the woman is a victim of moral seduction
pursuant to Article 21 of the Civil Code. It cannot be said that pari delicto rule shall apply
in this case because his promise to marry, which was employed with fraud or deceit,
was the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress.
Petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil
Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
obligations. Hence, the injury which was committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy justified the award of damages.

27. CECILIO PE v. ALFONSO PE

FACTS:
Alfonso Pe, the defendant, is a married man who works as an agent of the La Perla
Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Marinduque. He was an adopted son of a Chinaman
named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. He became close to the plaintiffs
who considered him as a member of their family and was given access to visit their
house. He fell in love with Lolita and conducted clandestine trysts. Lolita’s parents heard
about the rumor in 1955. The plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against
defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from their residence, and it was
reported to the police authorities and the NBI where the family of Lolita then filed
charges against Alfredo based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not the defendant is liable to pay damages to Lolita’s family due to
their illicit affair

RULING:
YES. There is no other conclusion that can be drawn from this chain of events than that
the defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning
the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong
defendant has caused Lolita and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact
that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita's family in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article
21 of the New Civil Code. Hence, the defendant is sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the
sum of P5,000.00 as damages.

28. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP v. CA

FACTS:
Globe Mackay, the petitioner, hired Tobias, the private respondent, as a purchasing
agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. The
petitioner discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it
lost several thousands of pesos. After private respondent made the report, petitioner
Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the number one suspect and ordered him
to take a forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers
open, and to leave the office keys. When private respondent Tobias returned to work
after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a “crook” and a
“swindler.” Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to
submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies. Police investigators however
cleared private respondent from the said anomalies. Notwithstanding the result,
petitioners filed six criminal complaints for estafa, in which all of the six criminal
complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Private respondent was also terminated by
petitioners from his employment. Tobias then sought employment with RETELCO.
However, petitioner Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Private respondent Tobias filed a civil
case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive
acts of petitioners.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondents.

RULING:
Yes, Article 19 of the Civil Code sets certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. Notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias
who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry
“showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the
number one suspect and to take a one-week vacation leave, not to communicate with
the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant and
upon reporting to work he was confronted by Hendry who said. “Tobby, you are the
crook and swindler in this company.” The imputation of guilt without basis and the
pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgressed the standards of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were not content with
just dismissing Tobias; they even wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias had
been dismissed by Globe Mckay due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed
to be employed with RETELCO.

29. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. ROMEO A. JADER

FACTS:
The respondent took up his law degree at the University of the East from 1984 up to
1988. He failed his final examination in Practice Court I, where he was given an
incomplete grade. He took a removals exam for the subject but the professor gave him a
grade of 5. During the deliberation among the Dean and the Faculty Members of the
College of Law on who among the 4th year students should be allowed to graduate,
Jader’s name appeared in the tentative list of candidates for graduation for the Degree
of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B). Respondent attended the graduation ceremony together
with his mother and his elder brother and was given a symbolical Law Diploma, took
pictures and even tendered a blow out celebration together with his friends and
relatives. Jader took a leave of absence without pay from work and enrolled at a pre-bar
review class in preparation for the bar examination. However, respondent learned of the
deficiency causing him to drop his review class and was not able to take the bar
examination. Jader sued petitioner UE for damages for the moral shock, mental
anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights
he suffered when he was not able to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the
latter's negligence. On the other hand, petitioner UE denied liability claiming that it never
led the respondent to believe that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws
degree when his name was included in the tentative list of graduating students.

ISSUE: Whether or not an educational institution can be held liable for damages for
misleading a student into believing that the latter had satisfied all the requirements for
graduation when such is not the case

RULING:
Yes, the university may be held liable for damages. Pursuant to Article 19 and 20 of the
Civil Code, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith and
that every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. Petitioner UE cannot be said to have
acted in good faith since it belatedly informed respondent Jader of the removal
examination results, particularly at a time when he had already started preparing for the
bar examination.

Pursuant to Article 19 of the Civil Code, absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of
right. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue advantage
of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts, would render the transaction
unconscientious. It is the contractual obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish
sufficient notice and information to each and every student as to whether he or she had
already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether
they would be included among those who will graduate. Furthermore, it is the
educational institution who has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any
problem involving the latter’s grade and performance and also most importantly, of the
procedures for remedying the same.

Therefore, petitioner UE is liable for failing to immediately inform the respondent of the
removal examination results and in misleading the respondent into believing that he had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation.

30. PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ v. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO

FACTS:
Petitioner is an engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, married Vicenta
Escaño, 27 years of age, a second year student of commerce. The latter’s parents were
unaware of such circumstance. Their plan to elope did not happen because Vicenta's
mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already waiting for her at the college
when Vicenta went back to her classes after the marriage. When she admitted that she
already married Pastor, her parents Mamerto and Mena Escanno were surprised,
because Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta, and were disgusted because of the
great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke. They insisted a church
wedding be held because what they believed was an invalid marriage, however, Escano
withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an
affair with another woman. Vicenta was not prevented from communicating with Pastor
but her letters to the latter became less frequent.

Eventually, she applied for a passport, claiming to be single and left for the US. She filed
in Nevada a complaint for divorce against Pastor, which became final and absolute.
Mamerto and Mena Escanno filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter's marriage to Pastor. Vicenta also sought papal dispensation of her marriage.
Further, she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and subsequently became an
american citizen, following her marriage to an american named Russel Leo Moran, and
begot children with him.

In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a complaint for damages against Vicenta and her parents,
whom he charged with alienating Vicenta’s affections, causing her to to be estranged
from him; hence, he is asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. He prayed
that legal separation be granted. Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff, while
Vicenta's parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce decree acquired by Vicenta Escano in the State of
Nevada recognizable by the Philippine laws
2. Whether or not Vicenta's parents alienated the affections of their daughter
towards the petitioner thus entitling the latter for damages

RULING:
1. No. Escano’s marriage with Tenchavez is still valid.Notwithstanding the decree
made by the courts of Nevada, the Philippine court rendered that Vicenta Escaño
was still a Filipino citizen at the time she filed for a divorce and that she is still
subject to the provision under the Civil Code of the Philippines, Article 15. The
current civil code only provides for the rules of the Legal Separation and not for
absolute divorce because for the Philippine courts to take recognition of the
foreign decrees such as the issue of this case, it would be against the patent
violation of the provisions of the code under Article 17. Moreover, in the eyes of
the Philippine Laws, the marriage of Escano with Russel Morano entails under
the criminal act of Adultery.

2. No. Vicenta's parents are not liable for damages. The allegations of alienation of
the affection of their daughter and influencing her conduct toward her husband
are not supported by credible evidence. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escaño
house to visit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to prove that he
 would not have been accepted to marry Vicenta had he openly asked for her
hand, as good manners and breeding demanded. Even after learning of the
marriage, and despite their shock at such an unexpected event, the parents of
Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage be recelebrated. The reason
why celebration did not take place was not due to defendants, but due to
Vicenta's refusal to proceed with it. There is also no evidence that, out of
improper motives, they aided Vicenta in filing the annulment case.

Therefore, they cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice
or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed
until the contrary is proved. Moreover, the petitioner, in falsely charging Vicenta’s
parents, entitles them to recover damages.

31. ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
An advertisement in the Sunday Times was published, which contains a heading of
“Where the Heart Is.” The private respondent’s residence was shown as the residence
of Arcadio S. Arcadio’s family, who recently moved into the Brookside Hills Community.
The same advertisement appeared again. Respondent called the attention of the
advertiser whose officer subsequently apologized but without however deleting the
published item. When private respondent's counsel then demanded from petitioner
actual, moral and exemplary damages of P110,000, the latter published in the issue of
the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a new advertisement with the Arcadio family and
their real house but it did not publish any apology to the private respondent and an
explanation of the error. The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages,
P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to
the Court of Appeals. The Appellate Court affirmed that judgment.

ISSUE: Whether private respondent is entitled to damages for violation of Article 26 of

the Civil Code

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court declared that the damages fixed by the judge are sanctioned
by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages
for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained in the lower court's
decision, the acts and omissions of the firm fall under Article 26.
St. Louis realty’s employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the residences in a
widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times and it never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up; it just contented itself with a cavalier
“rectification”. As a result, the private life of the complainant was mistakenly and
unnecessarily exposed causing him to suffer diminution of income and mental anguish.

32. ZENAIDA R. GREGORIO v. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
The petitioner is a proprietor of Alvi Marketing. She was charged with three counts of
violating B.P. Blg. 22 for allegedly providing insufficiently funded bank checks as
payment for a number of appliances purchased from Sansio. She failed to controvert the
claims against her since the address in the complaint was incorrect. The petitioner
contended that she couldn't have issued the bounced checks because she didn't even
have a checking account with the bank. According to Datuin's Affidavit of Desistance,
the petitioner was not one of the signatories of the bounced checks that were the focus
of the reinvestigation. Gregorio argued that the defendants' blatant disrespect of the
fundamental legal principle that every person shall respect the dignity, personality,
privacy, and peace of mind of their neighbors and other people has caused him
incalculable harm.

ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint for damages filed by Gregorio is based on
quasi-­delict or malicious prosecution

RULING:
Yes. The complaint was based on quasi-­delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article
26 of the Civil Code, rather than on malicious prosecution.In line with the provisions of
Article 2176, Quasi-delict exists when the plaintiff suffers damage due to the fault or
negligence of the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond
provided that there must be no pre-­existing contractual relation between the parties.

Article 26 of the Civil Code grants a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other
relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily constituting a criminal offense, of the
following rights: right to personal dignity, right to personal security, right to family
relations, right to social intercourse, right to privacy, and right to peace of mind.
Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identity of the person they should be rightfully accused of tendering
insufficiently funded checks. This fault was compounded when they failed to ascertain
the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the opportunity to contest the
charges, because she was not given proper notice.

33. JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Capili was charged with the crime of bigamy for having previously marrying Karla
Medina-Capili and subsequently marrying Shirley Tismo without the first being formally
annulled. The petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings, contending that there is
a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of
Antipolo City, filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; if the marriage is declared null and void, it
will exonerate him of the charge of bigamy; and the pendency of the civil case for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage serves as a prejudicial question. The
second marriage was declared void.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a
ground for dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy

RULING:
No. Criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense,
and from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. In
this case, it is undisputed that the second marriage was contracted on December 8,
1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage contracted on September 3, 1999,
hence, the crime had already been consummated and the subsequent declaration of the
nullity of the second marriage becomes immaterial. Therefore, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner’s second marriage does not impede the filing of a
criminal charge for bigamy against him.

34. VERONICO TENEBRO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
The petitioner married Leticia Ancajas. Their marriage was solemnized by Judge Alfredo
B. Perez, Jr. In 1991, Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to
Hilda Villareyes. Petitioner left the conjugal dwelling with Ancajas, and decided to
cohabit with Villareyes. However, petitioner contracted another marriage with Nilda
Villegas. When Ancajas learned of Tenebro’s third marriage, she verified from Villareyes
about its validity. Villareyes confirmed in a handwritten letter that petitioner, Veronico
Tenebro, was her husband.
Tenebro argued that his marriage with Villareyes was not legal as a fact there being no
record of such, alleging that no marriage ceremony was held to formalize their
partnership. He said that he just entered into a marriage contract to enable her to obtain
an allocation from his office in conjunction with his profession as a seaman. He further
argued that his second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to
psychological incapacity. Hence he cannot be charged for bigamy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contract serves as a positive evidence of existence
of marriage

RULING:
Yes. The Court ruled that the marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as
positive evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
This evidence should be given greater credence than the self-serving testimony of the
accused himself. The mere fact that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate
the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

35. MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO

FACTS:
The respondent married Socrates, however, during the existence of their marriage,
respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano. The respondent filed Petition for the Annulment
of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The
marriage was then declared null and void, which was final and executory.

Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, filed for Bigamy
against respondent. Respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information
alleging that her marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in
2003. RTC denied the motion. Respondent filed a Motion for reconsideration. The RTC
found that both marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family
Code, thus, it declared that the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not
prejudice the accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid with
the annulment of her first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of the respondent's first marriage
justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her

RULING:
No. At the time the respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was
still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the fact that she contracted
the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was
properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense
charged were sufficiently alleged. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

36. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES, INC. v. SEC. HERNANDO B. PEREZ

FACTS:
San Miguel Properties Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate
business that purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc. (BF Homes) 130 residential lots situated
in its subdivision BF Homes Parañaque in 1992, 1993 and April 1993. There were three
separate deeds of sale signifying the transactions. The TCTs under the first and second
deeds were delivered to San Miguel Properties. However, 20 TCTs covering 20 of the 41
parcels of land for which San Miguel Properties paid the full price of, were not delivered
to the petitioner. BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of the 20 TCTs for
parcels of land purchased under the third deed of sale because Atty. Orendain had
ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being
meanwhile replaced as receiver by FBO Network Management, Inc. BF Homes then
refused to deliver the 20 TCTs despite demands.

San Miguel Properties filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas City... charging respondent directors and officers of BF Homes with
non-delivery of... titles in violation of Section 25, in relation to Section 39, both of
Presidential Decree No. 957.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is granted and is there a prejudicial question

RULING:
No, the petition is not granted, but there is a prejudicial question. According to Article 36
of the Civil Code:

“Prejudicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court
shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.”
Even if it was pending in an administrative agency on pointing to a specific
performance, it raises a prejudicial question because it is in violation of Section 25 of
PD957 to whom the dispute be resolved even if it is a criminal case since it was
delegated to such agency. A prejudicial question is clear to be a case arising from a
resolution case that a criminal case is involved. The petitioner then assumed that any
criminal prosecution must automatically be not raised in such tribunal. The Supreme
Court frowned on petitioners that missed the provision that is governed by the Rules of
Court and the reason why the petition was denied.

37. CARMEN QUIMIGUING v. ANTONIO QUIMIGUING

FACTS:
Carmen Quimiquing, the petitioner, filed an action for support and damages against the
defendant, Felix Icao along with her parents. The parties mentioned were neighbors and
that the defendant forced the petitioner to have sexual relations with him even though he
is married. It resulted in the pregnancy of Quimiguing and that despite efforts and drugs
supplied by the defendant, the plaintiff had to stop studying. She claimed for support
amounting to P120.00 per month, damages and attorney’s fees. The defendant sought
to dismiss the said complaint for lack of cause of action for the sole reason that the child
was unborn.

ISSUE: Whether or not an action for support and damages for an unborn child may
prosper

RULING:
Yes. As stated in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines “Birth determines
personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article.” The conceived child is therefore entitled to support from its progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee.

The court held that the specific parts of the provision do not constitute the condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child given that it would make Article 40 be
entirely insignificant. It was also stated that the force and intimidation performed by the
defendant in order to have sexual relations with a woman not his wife, violates the rights
of the other hence the petitioner will be entitled to claim compensation for the said act as
provided in Art 21 of the Civil Code. In the manner now being indicated, the argument
against the plaintiff’s failure to provide a cause of action was deemed to be in error, and
the child she was carrying is entitled to support.
38. ANTONIO GELUZ v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS:
Nita Villanueva knew the petitioner for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula
Yambot. Two years after, she became pregnant by her present husband before they
were legally married. She had herself aborted by Geluz to hide her pregnancy to her
parents. After her marriage, she again became pregnant for the second time but since
she believed that her pregnancy would be inconvenient to her and her job, she had
herself aborted again by the petitioner. However, she became pregnant for the third
time, which then again led her to Geluz for another abortion. Villanueva’s husband,
Oscar Lazo was at the province of Cagayan having no idea nor have given his consent
to the said abortions. The last abortion was Lazo’s basis in filing a case and for an
award for damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband of a woman could recover damages from a
physician who caused the abortion

RULING:
No. The SC ruled that an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such
damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was
extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from
one that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity
to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the
child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition
specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child
was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

39. ANGEL T. LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE

FACTS:
Pedro Fragante was a Filipino citizen at the time of his death. He filed and applied for a
certificate of public convenience for the installation, maintenance, and operation of his
ice plant in San Juan Rizal, which was approved by the Commission because there was
evidence that public interest and convenience will be promoted properly and suitably by
the ice plant. Additionally, the estate of the deceased who is a Filipino citizen until his
demise is financially capable of maintaining the service. The Commission also
authorized an Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by
the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant. Herein
petitioner contends that the Commission erred when it allowed for the substitution of
legal representative of the estate of the deceased for the latter as party applicant, and
also thereafter granted to the said estate the application it applied for which is said to be
in contravention of the law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragante falls under the definition of a
"person" under our laws

RULING:
Yes. The estate of a decedent is a person in legal contemplation. The word "person", is
a generic term, and includes artificial as well as natural persons,' says Mr. Abbot, 'in its
legal signification. In this jurisdiction and our present laws, there is ample evidence to
manifest that the estate of a deceased person is considered as having a legal
personality independent of the heirs. In this case, there would also be a failure of justice
if the estate of Pedro O. Fragante would not be considered a "person", because the
quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death would entail prejudicial
results to his investment. Under the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of
Civil Procedure, the heirs of a deceased person were considered in contemplation of
law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the provision of article 661 of the
first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent by the
mere fact of his death. The court holds that within the framework of the constitution, the
estate of the deceased should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the
purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, includes the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death.

40. MO YA LIM YAO v. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

FACTS:
Petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa so she could enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. She mentioned that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her
great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month, to which she was granted
permission in the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor’s visa to enter the Philippines. Upon her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in
the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period
of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated
extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to
February 13, 1962. However, on January 25, 1962, Lau Yuen Yeung married Moy Ya
Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the
contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and
a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not
write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either
English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name
except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-­in-­law, or sisters-in-­law.

ISSUE: Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso facto a Filipino citizen upon her
marriage to a Filipino citizen

RULING:
Yes. The Court held that in the best interest of all concerned with Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an “alien” who marries a Filipino citizen, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a Filipino
citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. An alien woman married to an
alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath Filipino citizenship provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under Section 4. After thorough interpretation and
application of the Naturalization Law, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing the
appellants’ petition for injunction is reversed by the SC, and the Commissioner of
Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing
the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen
Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of
her marriage to her co-­appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen.

41. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS

FACTS:
A Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur was filed by the
respondent who was born in Matangas, Zamboanga del Sur, to Chinese Parents and
she has never departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena married Santuigas
Batuigas and begot five children at the age of 26. She alleged in her Petition that she
believes that she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during
the period of her stay in the Philippines, as well as in her relations with the constituted
Government and with the community in which she is living. After all the jurisdictional
requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that petitioner failed to allege that she is engaged in a
lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by
the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied Motion.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has validly complied with the citizenship
requirement as required by law to become a naturalized citizen of the Philippines

RULING:
Yes. Under our existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either
judicial naturalization under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act
No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option,
called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines”. Under the said
provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they possess
other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to
submit themselves to judicial naturalization. With this, the SC ruled that Azucena has
clearly proven, under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that
privilege, and this Court will not stand in the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino
family.

42. JUAN G. FRIVALDO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
Petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon.
Private respondent Raul R. Lee, another candidate, filed a petition with the COMELEC
praying that Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or position
by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines", and that his Certificate of
Candidacy be canceled. The Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution granting the petition declaring that respondent is disqualified to run for the
Office of Governor of Sorsogon on the ground that he is NOT a citizen of the
Philippines. As the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the petitioner remained unacted
upon, the latter’s candidacy continued where he was voted for during the elections. Lee
then filed a supplemental petition praying for his proclamation as the duly elected
Governor of Sorsogon. The COMELEC banc directed the Provincial Board of
Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul
Lee as the winning gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon; a day after, Lee
was proclaimed governor of Sorsogon. Hence, Frivaldo filed with the COMELEC a new
petition praying for the annulment of the proclamation of the respondent where the
COMELEC First Division promulgated the herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee,
not having garnered the highest number of votes, was not legally entitled to be
proclaimed as duly-elected governor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the repatriation of the petitioner valid and legal and reasonably
cure his lack of citizenship as to qualify him to be proclaimed and to hold the Office

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court emphasized that citizenship may be reacquired by 1) a direct
act of Congress, 2) by naturalization, or 3) by repatriation under P.D 725. Further, the
law does not specifically state a particular date or time when the candidate must
possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (at least 1-year residency immediately
preceding the day of the election) and age (at least 35 years old on election day).

The prime issue of citizenship should be reckoned from the date of proclamation, not
necessarily the date of election or the date of filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
repatriation of the petitioner then retracted upon the date of filing of his application.
Since Frivaldo re-assumed his citizenship on the very day the term of his office began,
he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold office, and to discharge the
functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.

43. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS:
A petition for cancellation and disqualification was filed with the COMELEC alleging that
Imelda-Romualdez Marcos did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency
when she filed her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte, stating that she is a 7-month resident in the said district.
Petitioner then filed a corrected certificate of candidacy changing the entry “seven”
months to “since childhood”. The COMELEC denied petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration declaring her not qualified to run for the position of the member of the
House of Representatives for the First District of Leyte. In a supplemental petition,
Marcos averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Imelda is a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that Imelda was a resident of the First District of Leyte for
election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to
run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. Residence is
synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept of domicile
for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required
by the 1987 Constitution. The SC ruled that It cannot be correctly argued that the
petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. A wife does not automatically gain the
husband’s domicile. What the petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence;
she did not lose her domicile of origin.