PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-N.U.B.E. VS.

HONORABLE
BENJAMIN VEGA, THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE LIQUIDATOR
OF THE PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 105364*, June 28, 2001

Facts:
In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB).
Thereafter, the Philippine Veterans Bank Employees Union-N.U.B.E. (petitioner) filed claims for
accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits with said court. After lengthy proceedings,
partial payments to the employees were made. However, due to the piecemeal hearings on the
benefits, many remain unpaid. Petitioners then moved to disqualify the respondent judge from
hearing the case on grounds of bias and hostility towards petitioners.

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation
of the Philippine Veterans Bank. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the labor tribunals their residual
claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening of the bank. Central Bank also issued a
certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen.

Despite the legislative mandate for rehabilitation and reopening of PVB, respondent judge
continued with the liquidation proceedings of the bank. Moreover, petitioners learned that
respondents were set to order the payment and release of employee benefits upon motion of
another lawyer, while petitioners’ claims have been frozen to their prejudice.

Petitioners argue that with the passage of R.A. 7169, the liquidation court became functus officio,
and no longer had the authority to continue with liquidation proceedings.

Issue:
May a liquidation court continue with liquidation proceedings of the PVB when Congress had
mandated its rehabilitation and reopening?

Ruling:
No. SC ruled in favor of the Petitioner.

Republic Act No. 7169 entitled "An Act To Rehabilitate The Philippine Veterans Bank Created
Under Republic Act No. 3518, Providing The Mechanisms Therefor, And For Other Purposes"
provides in part for the reopening of the Philippine Veterans Bank together with all its branches
within the period of three (3) years from the date of the reopening of the head office. The law
likewise provides for the creation of a rehabilitation committee to facilitate the implementation of
its provisions.

Pursuant to said R.A. 7169, the Rehabilitation Committee submitted the proposed Rehabilitation
Plan of the PVB to the Monetary Board for its approval. Meanwhile, PVB filed a motion to
terminate the liquidation proceedings with the respondent judge praying that the liquidation
proceedings be immediately terminated in view of the passage of R.A. 7169. The Monetary Board
then approved the Rehabilitation Plan submitted by the Rehabilitation Committee. Thereafter, the
Monetary Board issued a Certificate of Authority allowing PVB to reopen. On June 3, 1992, the
liquidator filed a motion for the termination of the liquidation proceedings of PVB with the
respondent judge. In a Resolution dated June 8, 1992, this court (SC) issued a temporary
restraining order in the instant case restraining respondent judge from further proceeding with
the liquidation of PVB. Thus, on August 3, 1992, the PVB opened its doors to the public and
started regular banking operations.
Clearly, the enactment of R.A. 7169, as well as the subsequent developments stated above, has
rendered the liquidation court functus officio. Consequently, respondent judge has been stripped
of the authority to issue orders involving acts of liquidation.

[In relation to Corp Law… you may skip this part]

Liquidation, in corporation law, connotes a winding up or settling with creditors and debtors. It is
the winding up of a corporation so that assets are distributed to those entitled to receive them. It
is the process of reducing assets to cash, discharging liabilities and dividing surplus or loss. On
the other end of the spectrum is rehabilitation which connotes a reopening or reorganization.
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of corporate life and activities in an effort to restore
and reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful operation and solvency.

It is crystal clear that the concept of liquidation is diametrically opposed or contrary to the
concept of rehabilitation, such that both cannot be undertaken at the same time. To allow the
liquidation proceedings to continue would seriously hinder the rehabilitation of the subject bank.

[In relation to our topic in Consti…]

Anent the claim of respondents Central Bank and Liquidator of PVB that R.A. 7169 became
effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its publication in the Official Gazette, the Court
is of the view that such contention is bereft of merit.

While as a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions, as indicated in the clause "unless otherwise provided."

In the case at bar, Section 10 of R.A. 7169 provides:

Sec. 10. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its
approval. It is undisputed that R.A. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on
January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.

Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. 7169,
then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in
the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992, as erroneously claimed by respondents Central
Bank and Liquidator.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby given due course and granted. Respondent judge is
hereby permanently enjoined from further proceeding with Civil Case No. SP- 32311.
TAŇADA VS. TUVERA

G.R. No. L-63915

146 SCRA 446, April 24, 1985

Petitioner seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Petitioners invoked the
right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that in order for laws to
be valid and enforceable, it must be published in the Official Gazette. Solicitor General representing the
respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring
the instant petition. Petitioners maintained that the petition is a publicright compelling the performance of a
public duty. The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the
reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law/statute becomes valid and

Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. This is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws,
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. The clause “otherwise provided” refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of thepublication itself. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all, since its purpose is to inform The provision in the Civil Code provides that publications of laws must be
made in the Official Gazette. And not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule on the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify if it finds it impractical. The publication must be
made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances, which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;

2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. “Laws”
should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there aresome that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the
public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature.
To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall bepublished as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code
provides that publication of laws must be made inthe Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for
their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdomof a law or to repeal or modify it if
it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.
SUBJECT: TOPIC: Date Made: Digest Maker:
PERSONS When law takes effect 8 Aug 2018 Alrick and Rikki
CASE NAME: Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579
PONENTE: SERENO, J. Case Date: February 1, 2012
Case Summary:
- Petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC) issued CMO 27-2003 to impose tariffs on
wheat imports based on grade classification.
- Respondent, a wheat importer, filed for Declaratory Relief with the RTC on the ground
of failure to follow requirement of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-
2003.
- RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
- CA dismissed the appeal
- SC denied the petition
Rule of Law/Doctrine: Failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and publication
under the Revised Administrative Code invalidates an agency’s regulation.

Detailed Facts:
- On November 7, 2003, petitioner COC issued CMO 27-2003, which for tariff purposes,
classifies wheat according to the (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and
(3) port of discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat would then be classified
either as food grade or feed grade with a corresponding tariff of 3% and 7%
respectively.
- On December 19, 2003, the respondent, a wheat importer, filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Las Pinas contending that CMO 27-2003 was issued
without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
- On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for
twenty (20) days from notice.
- Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that, among others, was an
internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature.
- On 28 February 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, declaring CMO 27-2003 as
INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, citing the petitioner’s failure to follow the
basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of the CMO.
- Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-
2003.
- CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights of
petitioners and other importers and that the petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
Issue:
W/N CMO 27-2003 is valid
Holding:
Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an
importer of wheat, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent
provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of the
CMO.
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center
 three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall
not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons. Section

Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far
as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates
shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
Ruling:
SC denied the petition, affirming the previous declaration that the CMO is invalid
Relevant Provisions
Revised Administrative Code Chapter 2, Sec 3 and 9
 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. MICHEL J. LHUILLIER PAWNSHOP,
INC., respondent.

[G.R. No. 150947. July 15, 2003] 406 scra 178

FACTS:

Revenue Memorandum Orders (RMOs) were issued imposing a 5% lending investor’s tax on
pawnshop. Pursuant to this, the BIR issued an assessment against Michel J. Lhuillier Pawnshop,
Inc. (hereafter Lhuillier) demanding payment of deficiency percentage tax. Lhuillier filed an
administrative protest, contending, inter alia, that pawnshops are different from lending
investors, which are subject to the 5% percentage tax under the specific provision of the Tax
Code. Its protest having been unacted upon, Lhuillier with the CTA which declared the RMO’s in
question null and void insofar as they classify pawnshops as lending investors subject to 5%
percentage tax.

ISSUE: Are pawnshops included in the term lending investors for the purpose of imposing the
5% percentage tax under then Section 116 of the NIRC?

HELD: NO. While it is true that pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending money, they
are not considered “lending investors” for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage
taxes since: (1) prior to its amendment the NIRC, pawnshops and lending investors were
subjected to different tax treatments; (2) Congress never intended pawnshops to be treated in
the same way as lending investors, since the amendment of the NIRC treated both tax subjects
differently’ (3) Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned, Sec. 116 subjects to percentage tax
dealers in securities and lending investors only.

ISSUE: Whether or not the RMOs in question are valid

HELD: NO. There are two kinds of administrative issuances: the legislative rule and
the interpretative rule. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to
implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. An interpretative rule, on the
other hand, is designed to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency is in
charge of enforcing

When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs

nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it
behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.[15]
RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 cannot be viewed simply as implementing rules or
corrective measures revoking in the process the previous rulings of past
Commissioners. Specifically, they would have been amendatory provisions applicable to
pawnshops. Without these disputed CIR issuances, pawnshops would not be liable to pay the
5% percentage tax, considering that they were not specifically included in Section 116 of the
NIRC of 1977, as amended. In so doing, the CIR did not simply interpret the law. The due
observance of the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should not have been
ignored.
Municipality of Paranaque v. VM Realty

GR 127820 (July 20, 1998)

FACTS:

Pursuant to a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution in 1933, the Municipality of

Paranaque filed a complaint for expropriation against VM Realty over 2 parcels
of land with a combined area of 10,000 sq. m., allegedly “for the purpose of
alleviating the living conditions of the underprivileged by providing homes for
the homeless through a socialized housing project.”

RTC of Makati authorized petitioner to take possession of the subject property

upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount equivalent to 15% of its fair
market value based on its tax declaration.

VM Realty filed a counterclaim alleging that the complaint failed to state a

cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a Resolution and not to an
Ordinance as required by RA 7160 (Local Government Code). Thereafter, RTC
nullified the previous Order and dismissed the case.

The Mun. of Paranaque appealed to CA. CA affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

ISSUE: WON a Resolution duly approved by the Municipal Council has the
same force and effect of an Ordinance and thus, a substantial compliance of
the statutory requirement of the Local Government Code in the exercise of the
power of eminent domain

HELD:

No. An LGU may exercise the power of eminent domain only when authorized
by Congress and subject to the latter’s control and restraints imposed
“through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.”

In this case, Sec.19 of the Local Government Code, which delegates to LGUs
the power of eminent domain, also lays down the parameters for its exercise.
It provides, as follows, the requisites which must concur before an LGU may do
so:

1) An Ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local

chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain
over a particular private property.

2) The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose, welfare
or for the benefit of the poor and landless.

3) There is payment of just compensation, as required by Sec 9., Art 3 of the

Constitution, and other pertinent laws.

4) A valid and definite offer have been previously made to the owner of the
property sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.

In the case at bar, the first requisite that there must be an ordinance was not
complied with by the local chief executive. A municipal ordinance is different
from a resolution. An ordinance is a law; it possesses a general and permanent
character while a resolution is temporary in nature.
 Title Bagatsing vs Ramirez
GR 41631
Date December 17, 1976
KEYWORDS
DOCTRINE
The right to tax depends upon the ultimate use,
purpose and object for which the fund is raised.
The people may be taxed for a public purpose,
although it be under the direction of an
individual or private corporation.
CASE:
The Municipal Board of MNL enacted ordinance 7522 “AN
ORDINANCE REGULATING THE OPERATION OF PUBLIC MARKETS AND
PRESCRIBING FEES FOR THE RENTALS OF STALLS AND PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES”
Respondent Federation of Manila Market Vendors, Inc. commenced
a civil case seeking to nullify the ordinance for:
a. The publication requirements has not been complied with
b. The Market Committee was not given any participation in
the enactment of the ordinance, as envisioned by RA 6039
c. Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices act has
been violated
d. The ordinance would violate PD 7 prescribing the collection
of fees and charges on livestock and animal products
Respondent Judge declared the nullity of the ordinance on the
primary ground of non-compliance with the requirement of
publication under the Revised City Charter. Petitioners contend that
only a post-publication is required by the Local Tax Code and invokes
the non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Judge denied the
motion.
SC ruled in favor of petitioners.
The Revised charter requires publication BEFORE enactment and after
approval. The tax code only prescribes for publication after the
approval of ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees and other
charges.
The revised charter is a specific act since it relates only to the City of
Manila and the Local Tax Code is a general law for it applies to all local
governments. However, the subject of the Revised Charter is general
and the Local Tax Code is specific.
Section 17 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila speaks of
"ordinance" in general, i.e., irrespective of the nature and scope
thereof, whereas, Section 43 of the Local Tax Code relates to
"ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in
particular. In regard, therefore, to ordinances in general, the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila is doubtless dominant, but, that
dominant force loses its continuity when it approaches the realm of
"ordinances levying or imposing taxes, fees or other charges" in
particular. There, the Local Tax Code controls.
On exhaustion of administrative remedies:
Petitioners contend that Sec 47 provides that any question or issue
raised against the legality of any tax ordinance shall be referred for
opinion to the city fiscal in the case of tax ordinance of a city. Private
respondent claims that the ordinance is not a tax ordinance because
it is not strictly the taxing power that is used but a revenue-raising
function.
The SC notes that under Sec 5 of Art XI of the Constitution, each local
government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of
revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such provisions as may be
provided by law. The Local Tax Code also states that Local
Governments may collect fees or rentals for the occupancy or use of
public markets and premises. They can provide for and regulate
market stands, stalls and privileges, and, also, the sale, lease or
occupancy thereof. They can license, or permit the use of, lease, sell
or otherwise dispose of stands, stalls or marketing privileges.
** MAIN ISSUE RE: INHERENT LIMITATION: PUBLIC PURPOSE OF
TAXATION
Private respondent states that the market stall fees imposed by the
ordinance are diverted to the exclusive private use of the Asiatic
Integrated Corporation since the collection had been let by the City of
Manila to the said corporation in a Management and Operating
Contract. SC held that The entrusting of the collection of the fees does
not destroy the public purpose of the ordinance. So long as the
purpose is public, it does not matter whether the agency through
which the money is dispensed is public or private. The right to tax
depends upon the ultimate use, purpose and object for which the
fund is raised. It is not dependent on the nature or character of the
person or corporation whose intermediate agency is to be used in
applying it. The people may be taxed for a public purpose, although it
be under the direction of an individual or private corporation.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

MIGUEL D. TECSON, ET AL., defendants,

MIGUEL D. TECSON, defendant-appellee,

THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER, petitioner.

G.R. No. L-29131 August 27, 1969

Facts: On November 14, 1955, in the civil case entitled "Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D.
Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc.," the CFI ordered Tecson and Alto Surety to pay jointly
and severally PRATRA and for Tecson to indemnify Alto Surety.

A copy of the decision was served upon Tecson and Alto Surety on November 21, 1955. On December
21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as successor to all the properties, assets, rights, and
choses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation, filed a complaint against Tecson and Alto Surety
for the revival of the judgment. Tecson moved to dismiss upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction and
prescription of action. The CFI indeed dismissed the complaint for having prescribed.

The National Marketing Corp. appealed to the CA, which certified the case to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not the action for the revival of a judgment was barred by the statute of limitations.

Ruling: Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of the Civil Code, an action upon a judgment "must be brought within
10 years from the time the right of action accrues," which, in the language of Art. 1152 "commences
from the time the judgment sought to be revived has become final." This took place on December 21,
1955. The issue is thus confined to the date on which 10 years from December 21, 1955 expired.

Pursuant to Art. 7 of the Civil Code, whenever months are referred to in the law, it shall be understood
that the months are of 30 days, not the "natural" or "solar" or "calendar" months, unless they are
designated by name. This concept was later modified by Sec. 13 of the Revised Administrative Code,
pursuant to which, a month shall be understood to refer to a calendar month. In the language of the SC
in People vs. Del Rosario, with the approval of the Civil Code of the Philippines (RA 386), it shall be
understood that years are of 365 days.

The order appealed from was affirmed.

CIR vs. Primetown Property Group, Inc
G.R. No. 162155, August 28, 2007

Facts: Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of
income tax respondent paid in 1997.He claimed that because explained because respondent suffered losses, it was
not liable for income taxes. Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32. Therefore, respondent was
entitled to tax refund or tax credit.

Revenue officer required respondent to submit additional documents to support its claim. Respondent complied but
its claim was not acted upon. It filed a petition for review in the CTA.
However, the CTA the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax
refund or tax credit as provided in Sec. 229 of the NIRC. In addition, the tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code
which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of
three hundred sixty-five days each….

Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial
claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed
731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary period.
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA and the CA reversed the
decision of the CTA. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Art. 13 of the Civil Code should be applicable in computing the legal periods or Sec. 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987

Ruling: E.O. 292 should be applied in computing the legal period being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.

Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the
same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days
whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of
12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of the 24th calendar
month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
PNB vs CA
G.R. No. 98382
May 17, 1993
Facts:
Two parcels of land under the common names of the
respondent Epifanio dela Cruz, his brother and sister
were mortgaged to the Petitioner Philippine National
Bank. The lots were mortgaged to guarantee the by
three promissory notes. The first two were not paid by
the respondent. The third is disputed by the respondent
who claims that the correct date is June 30, 1961;
however, in the bank records, the note was really
executed on June 30, 1958.
PNB presented under Act No. 3135 a foreclosure
petition of the mortgaged lots. The lots were sold or
auctioned off with PNB as the highest bidder. A Final
Deed of Sale and a Certificate of Sale was executed in
favor of the petitioner. The final Deed of Sale was
registered in Registry of Property. Inasmuch as the
respondent did not buy back the lots from PNB, PNB
sold on the same in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". The
Notices of Sale of foreclosed properties were published
on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 in a
newspaper.
Respondent brought a complaint for the reconveyance
of the lands, which the petitioner allegedly unlawfully
foreclosed. The petitioner states on the other hand that
the extrajudicial foreclosure, consolidation of
ownership, and subsequent sale were all valid.
The CFI rendered its Decision; the complaint against the
petitioner was dismissed.
Unsatisfied with the judgment, respondent interposed
an appeal that the lower court erred in holding that
there was a valid compliance in regard to the required
publication under Sec. 3 of Act. 3135.
Respondent court reversed the judgment appealed from
by declaring void, inter alia, the auction sale of the
foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of sale, and
the consolidation of ownership. Hence, the petition with
SC for certiorari and intervention.
Issue:
WON the required publication of The Notices of Sale on
the foreclosed properties under Sec. 3 of Act 3135 was
complied.
Ruling:
No. The first date falls on a Friday while the second and
third dates are on a Friday and Saturday, respectively.
Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of
auction sale shall be "published once a week for at least
three consecutive weeks". Evidently, petitioner bank
failed to comply with this legal requirement. The
Supreme Court held that:
The rule is that statutory provisions governing
publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must
be strictly complied with, and those even slight
deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and
render the sale at least voidable.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and
intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of
the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in toto.
 RULE 22 – COMPUTATION OF TIME

G.R. No. L-28841 June 24, 1983

RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE HON. CONCEPCION B. BUENCAMINO and HON. JUSTINIANO CORTEZ, respondents-appellees.

FACTS:

On February 1, 1965, the City Fiscal of Quezon City filed before the City Court an information for slight
physical injuries allegedly committed by the petitioner-appellant on December 2, 1964 against Mr. Ang Cho
Ching. The petitioner-appellant moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground that the information
having been filed on the 61st day following the commission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptive period
had lapsed.

The City Court of Quezon City denied the motion to quash stating that the 60th day fell on a Sunday and
considering the rule that when the last day for the filing of a pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed
on the next succeeding business day, the action had not prescribed. After a motion for reconsideration was
denied by the City Court, the petitioner-appellant filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction before the CFI of Rizal. CFI of Rizal dismissed the petition. A motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied. Hence, this appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a Sunday or a legal holiday is a legal efficient cause which interrupts the prescription of an
offense

HELD:

The rules contained in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 1, Rule 28 of the Old Rules
of Court deal with the computation of time allowed to do a particular act, such as, the filing of tax returns on
or before a definite date, filing an answer to a complaint, taking an appeal, etc. They do not apply to lengthen
the period fixed by the State for it to prosecute those who committed a crime against it. The waiver or loss of
the right to prosecute such offenders is automatic and by operation of law. Where the sixtieth and last day to
file an information falls on a Sunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next
working day. Prescription has automatically set in. The remedy is for the fiscal or prosecution to file the
information on the last working day before the criminal offense prescribes.

Footnote:

Section 1 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Pretermission of holiday- where the day, or the last day, for doing any act required or permitted by law falls
on a holiday, the act may be done on the next succeeding business day.

Section 1, Rule 28 of the former Rules of Court provided:

How to compute time—In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, by order of
court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act, event, or default after which the designated period of
time begins to run is not to be included. The last day of the period so computed is to be included, unless it is a
Sunday or a legal holiday, in which event the time shall run until the end of the next day which is neither a
Sunday nor a holiday.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez Tan Keh
No. L-5, 75 SCRA 113. November 16, 1945
Topic Under: Government: De Jure and De facto Government.
Facts:
A petition for mandamus was filed by the petitioners to continue proceedings in civil case No.
3012 which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established
during the Japanese military occupation. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and
continue the proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued by General
McArthur has the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of
the courts in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation and that the lower court have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the
defunct Republic of the PH in the absence of an enabling law granting such authority. Also, the
court contends that the government established in the PH during the Japanese occupation were not
de facto government.
When the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila they proclaimed, among other
things, that “all laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial
institutions, shall continue to be effective for the time being as in the past.” Thereafter, a central
administrative organization under the name of Philippine Executive Commission was organized
and the Chairman thereof issued orders in which the SC, CA, CFI, justices of the peace and
municipal courts under the Commonwealth were to continue with the same jurisdiction. Sometime
in 1943, the Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated but no substantial change effected in the
organization and jurisdiction of the different courts of justice. When General McArthur returned
in Leyte, he proclaimed that “the laws existing in the statute books of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines are in full force and effect and legally binding” and that “all laws. Regulations and
processes of any other government on the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null
and void and without legal effect.”

Issue:
1) Is the government organized by the Japanese a de facto government?
2) Whether or not judicial rulings (resolved cases) “were good and valid and remained so
even after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and Filipino
forces.”
3) Is the McArthur Proclamation invalidating “all laws, regulations and processes” of the
Occupation government applicable also to judicial decisions?
4) Whether or not present courts have the legal jurisdiction to continue hearing cases which
were pending to them before the restoration of the Commonwealth.
Held:
1) YES. It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government
established by the military forces or occupation and therefore a de facto government of the
second kind: “that while it exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private
citizens who, by acts of obedience rendered in submission to such force, do not become
responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful
government. Actual governments of this sort are established over all districts differing
greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered by military authority, but
they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by
military.” As Halleck says, “The government established over an enemy’s territory during
the military occupation may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the
conqueror over the conquered and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It
is of little consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government.
Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it is a
government imposed of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine
the legality or illegality of its acts.” The fact that the Philippine Executive Commission was
a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and not by Japanese
nationals, is of no consequence.
2) YES. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings of
the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid. The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
PH during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments, which are not of
a political complexion, were good and valid, and, by virtue of the well known principle of
postliminy in international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or
reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces. Thus, judicial acts
done under his control, when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so
done, to the extent that they take effect during the same time by private persons under the
sanction of municipal law, remain good.
3) NO. According to the well-known principles of international law all judgements and
judicial proceedings , which are not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments
during the Japanese military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after
the occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereignty, it should
be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General McArthur,
in using the phrase, “processes of any other government” in said proclamation, to refer to
judicial process, in violation of said principles of international law.
4) YES. Enabling laws or acts providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued
by or transferred to another court, are not required by mere change of government
sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or their
jurisdiction so changed that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of the cases and
proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the courts having
jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings.
It is therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final
judgement, the proceedings in cases, not political complexion, pending therein at the time
of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.
PERALTA vs THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-49 November 12, 1945

WILLIAM F. PERALTA, petitioner,

vs.
THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.

William F. Peralta in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General Tañada for respondent.
City Fiscal Mabanag as amicus curie

FACTS

William Peralta was prosecuted for the crime of robbery and was sentenced to life imprisonment as defned and
penalized by Act No. 65 of the National Assembly of the Republic of the Philippines. The petition for habeas corpus
is based on the contention that the Court of Special and Exclusive Criminal Jurisdiction created by ordinance No. 7
was a political instrumentality of the military forces of Japan and which is repugnant to the aims of the
commonwealth of the Philippines for it does not afford fair trial and impairs the constitutional rights of the accused.

ISSUE/HELD!

Whether or Not the creation of court by Ordinance No.7 Valid?

a. Yes. there is no room for doubt to the validity of ordinance No. 7 since the criminal jurisdiction
established by the invader is drawn entirely from the law martial as defned in the usages of nations. it
is merely a governmental agency.

Whether or Not the sentence for life imprisonment valid?

a. Yes, the sentence rendered, likewise, is good and valid since it was within the power and competence
of the belligerent occupant to promulgate Act No. 65.

Whether or Not the punitive sentence ceased to be valid from the time of the restoration of commonwealth, by the
virtue of the principle of posliminium?

a. Yes, All judgements of political complexion of the courts during Japanese regime ceased to be valid
upon reoccupation of the islands, as such, the sentence which convicted the petitioner of a crime of a
political complexion must be considered as having ceased to be valid.
 G.R. No. L-409 January 30, 1947
ANASTACIO LAUREL, petitioner, vs. ERIBERTO MISA, respondent.

FACTS
The Court, acting on the petition for habeas corpus filed by Anastacio Laurel and based on a
theory that a Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy giving the latter aid and comfort during
the Japanese occupation cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized
by article 114 of the RPC, for the reason as stated in the Issue/s.
ISSUE/S
(1) that the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines and, consequently, the
correlative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was then suspended; and (2) that there was a
change of sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic:
RULING – SUPREME COURT
(1) A citizen or subject owes, not a qualified and temporary, but an absolute and permanent
allegiance, which consists in the obligation of fidelity and obedience to his government or
sovereign; and that this absolute and permanent allegiance should not be confused with the
qualified and temporary allegiance which a foreigner owes to the government or sovereign of
the territory wherein he resides, so long as he remains there, in return for the protection he
receives, and which consists in the obedience to the laws of the government or sovereign. The
absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the enemy of
their legitimate government or sovereign is not abrogated or severed by the enemy occupation,
because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred thereby to the
occupier, and if it is not transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remain vested in the
legitimate government; xxx there is no such thing as suspended allegiance, the basic theory on
which the whole fabric of the petitioner's contention rests; xxx The military occupation of an
enemy territory does not transfer the sovereignty to the occupant; that, in the first case, the word
"sovereignty" used therein should be construed to mean the exercise of the rights of
sovereignty, because as this remains vested in the legitimate government and is not transferred
to the occupier, it cannot be suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting said
government thereof; xxx Considering that adoption of the petitioner's theory of suspended
allegiance would lead to disastrous consequences for small and weak nations or states, and
would be repugnant to the laws of humanity and requirements of public conscience xxx such
theory would sanction the action of invaders in forcing the people of a free and sovereign
country to be a party in the nefarious task of depriving themselves of their own freedom and
independence and repressing the exercise by them of their own sovereignty; in other words, to
commit a political suicide; (2) Considering that the crime of treason against the government of
the Philippines defined and penalized in article 114 of the Penal Code, xxx was made, upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth Government in 1935 xxx Considering that the
Commonwealth of the Philippines was a sovereign government, xxx Upon the final and
complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States and the proclamation of Philippine
independence, the Commonwealth of the Philippines shall thenceforth be known as the
Republic of the Philippines"; This Court resolves, without prejudice to write later on a more
extended opinion, to deny the petitioner's petition, as it is hereby denied, for the reasons above
set forth and for others to be stated in the said opinion, without prejudice to concurring opinion
therein, if any. xxx
Concurring Opinion, J. Perfecto (mentioned in book)
“Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be committed in peace time.
While there is peace, there are no traitors. Treason may be incubated when peace reigns.
Treasonable acts may actually be perpetrated during peace, but there are no traitors until war
has started. As treason is basically a war crime, it is punished by the state as a measure of self-
defense and self-preservation. The law of treason is an emergency measure. It remains
dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is relentlessly put into effect.”
 CASE TITLE: G.R. NO. L-19650 (SEPTEMBER 29, 1966)
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC. VS. ENRICO PALOMAR IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
POSTMASTER GENERAL

1) FACTS

The case before us now is a petition for declaratory relief against Postmaster General Enrico Palomar, parying
that judgment be rendered declaring its ‘Caltex Hooded Pump Contest’ not to be violative of the Postal Law,
and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to bring the contest to the attention of the
public”.

In 1960, Caltex launched a promotional scheme called Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? which calls for
participants to estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense
during a specified period.? The contest is open to all motor vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers. There is
neither a fee or consideration required nor a purchase required to be made. The forms are available upon request
at each Caltex station and there is also a sealed can where accomplished entry stubs may be deposited.

Caltex wishes to use mails amongst the media for publicizing about the contest, thus, Caltex sent representatives
to the postal authorities for advance clearing for the use of mails for the contest. However, the postal authorities
denied their request in view of sections 1954 (a), 1982, and 1983 of the Revised Administrative Code (Anti-
lottery provisions of the Postal Law), which prohibits the use of mail in conveying any information concerning
non-mailable schemes, such as lottery, gift enterprise, or similar scheme.

Caltex sought for a reconsideration and stressed that there was no consideration involved in the part of the
contestant(s) but the Postmaster General maintained their view and even threatened Caltex that if the contest
was conducted, a fraud order will have to be issued against it (Caltex) and all its representatives?. This leads to
Caltex’s filing of this petition for declaratory relief.

The court ruled that the petitioner does not violate the Postal Law and the respondent has no right to bar the
public distribution or said rules by the mails?. The respondent then appealed.

2) ISSUE(S)

a) Whether or not the petition states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief?

b) Whether or not the proposed Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? violates the Postal Law?

3) RULING

Recapitulating, we hold that the petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that
the “Caltex Hooded Pump Contest” as described in the rules submitted by the appellee does not transgress the
provisions of the Postal Law.

ACCORDINGLY, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. No costs.

4) RATIO

Declaratory Relief is the interpretation of several constitutional provisions. Based on Section 1 Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court, an action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation
or an ordinance.

Requisites for Declaratory Relief:

- There is justiciable controversy
- The controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse
- The party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy
- The issue is ripe for judicial determination

* The Caltex Hooded Pump Contest? is a mere gratuitous distribution of property by chance?. It does not
qualify as a lottery due to the lack of consideration. An act to be deemed as a lottery must constitute a (1) prize,
(2) chance, and (3) consideration. The participants are not required to do anything or purchase anything from
Caltex in order to participate in the contest. The true test for having consideration is whether the participant
pays a valuable consideration for the chance, and not whether those conducting the enterprise receive something
of value in return for the distribution of the prize.?
City of Baguio, Reforestation Administration, and Francisco G. Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr.,
and Teresita J. Buchholz VS. Hon. Pio R. Marcos and Belong Lutes
G.R. No. L-26100, February 28, 1969
SANCHEZ, J.:

FACTS: On 12 April 1912, the Director of Lands in Court of First Instance of Baguio instituted to
reopen the cadastral proceedings over a parcel of land located in Baguio Townsite under RA 931. On
13 November 1922, a final decision was rendered in which the land involved was among the
declared as public lands.

On 25 July 1961, Belong Lutes petitioned to reopen the civil case on the following grounds: 1) he and
his predecessors have been in actual and continuous possession and cultivation of the land since
Spanish time and paying the taxes; and 2) his predecessors were illegitimate Igorots without
personal notice of the cadastral proceedings and were not able to claim the land in question within
the statutory period. However, on 18 December 1961, private petitioners Francisco Joaquin Sr,
Francisco Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita Buchholz opposed Lutes’ petition of reopening. They also
questioned the cadastral court’s jurisdiction over the petition to reopen.

ISSUE: Was the reopening petition filed outside the 40 year period preceding the approval of RA
931?

HELD: No. The Court ruled that the petition to reopen filed by Lutes was within the 40-year period
under the RA 931. It shall be noted that cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were
instituted on 12 April 1912 and a final decision was rendered on 13 November 1922. Lutes filed the
petition to reopen on 25 July 1961, 39 years after a judicial decision on the land in question was
rendered.

In the case at bar, the title of RA 31 authorizes the filing in proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared public by virtue of judicial decisions
rendered within 40 years preceding the approval of this Act. However, the body of RA 931 speaks of
parcels of land that have been or are about to be declared of public domain by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted within 40 years preceding the approval of this act.

As a rule in statutory construction, the true object of all interpretation is to ascertain the meaning
and will of the law-making body. In construing an obscure expression in the law or the exact or literal
rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative intent, the title of such laws may be
resorted to ascertain the congressional will. The title of the law may properly be regarded as an
index of or clue or guide to legislative intention. The title of this Act recites that it authorizes court
proceedings of claims of parcels of land declared public land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered
within the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act. This has no contradiction to the
provisions expressed in the body. The words "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered" in the title of
the law stand in equal importance to the phrase in Section 1 thereof, "by virtue of judicial
proceedings instituted." Further, there should be no quibbling as to the fact that R.A. 931 is a piece
of remedial legislation. In essence, it provides a mode of relief to landowners who, before the Act,
had no legal means of perfecting their titles.

Hence, the petition to reopen the civil case over the parcel of land located in Baguio Townsite filed
by Lutes on 25 July 1961 was within the 40-year period as prescribed under RA 931.
G.R. No. 170735 (December 17, 2007)
Immaculada L. Garcia v. Social Security Commission Legaland Collection & SSS

FACTS: Petitioner Immaculada L. Garcia, Eduardo de Leon, Ricardo de Leon, Pacita Fernandez, and Consuelo Villanueva were directors of Impact Corporation. The
corporation was engaged in the business of manufacturing aluminum tube containers and operated two factories. One was a "slug" foundry-factory located in Cuyapo,
NuevaEcija, while the other was an Extrusion Plant in Cainta, Metro Manila, which processed the "slugs" into aluminum collapsible tubes and similar containers for
toothpaste and other related products. Records show that around 1978, Impact Corporation started encountering financial problems. By 1980, arises a problem with the
employees of the corporation due unremitted SSS contributions issues.

ISSUE: Whether or not the only surviving director of the corporation is liable for all the workers whole collected and unremitted SSS contributions, with penalties.

HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The surviving director of the Impact Corporation is solely liable for the unremitted SSS
premium contributions and penalties therefor. The petitioner avers that under the social security law provision, the liability does not include
liability for the unremitted SSS premium contributions. But accordingly, the sections must be understood or interpreted as a whole and not
by parts. The liability imposed as contemplated under the provisions of the social security law does not preclude the liability for the
unremitted amount.

G.R. No. 158253 (March 2, 2007)

Republic v. Lacap

FACTS: Dist. Eng. Of Pampanga issued an invitation to bid dated Jan 27, 1992 where Lacap and two other contractors were pre-qualified.
Being the lowest bidder, Lacap won the bid for concreting of a certain barangay, and thereafter undertook the works and purchased
materials and labor. On Oct 29, 1992, Office of the Dist. Eng conducted final investigation of end product and fount it 100% completed
according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH. DPWH withheld payment on the grounds that the CoA disapproved
final release of funds due to Lacap’s license as contractor having expired. Dist. Eng sought the opinion of DPWH legal. Legal then
responded to Dist. Eng that the Contractor’s License Law (RA 4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by a contractor after
expiry of license is void and that there is no law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract. DPWH Legal Dept, through Dir
III Cesar Mejia, issued First Endorsement on July 20 1994 recommending that payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation,
no payment was issued.

ISSUE: Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects

HELD: A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from corresponding
fines thereof. Section 35 of R.A. No. 4566 explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Penalties - Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or
wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory
capacity of a construction work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in
this country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board, or any member
thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty
of misdemeanour, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five
thousand pesos.

The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are clear. It does not declare, expressly or
impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for
payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without
prejudice to the payment of the fine prescribed under the law.
227 SCRA 444 (1993)
Co v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: On December 15, 1981, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular holding that “Where the check is issued as part of an
arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for estafa
or violation of BP Blg. 22.” In the next preceding period, on September 21, 1987, in the case of Que v. People, the said circular was
overruled and held that check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by BP Blg. 22. Prior to
this date, Co issued a rubber check to guarantee a performance of an obligation.

ISSUE: Whether or not Co is criminally liable under the amended circular dated September 1987.

HELD: The amended circular could not be applied retroactively in accordance with the prospective principle and the doctrine that actual
existence of a statue prior to its nullification is an operative fact negating acceptance of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity. It
should not be given retroactive effect to the prejudice of Co who relied on the official opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated December
1981.

334 SCRA 738 (2000)

Lapid v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: A complaint was filed in the Ombudsman charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid and 5 other government officials with
alleged dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly having conspired between and
among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee
of P120 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection
thereof and without issuing receipts for its collection. The Ombudsman made the decision that the petitioner were find guilty for
misconduct for which a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay, pursuant to section 25 (2) of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), was
render.

DILG implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman. Proceeding from the premise that the decision of Ombudsman had not yet
been become final, the petitioner argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG for
prematurely implementing the assailed decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and
imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay, is immediately executory.

HELD: NO, it is not immediately executory. In the provisions of Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act states that any order, directive or
decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month’s
salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, which is
suspension without pay for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. It is clear that
those that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as
the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.
SUBJECT: TOPIC: Date Made: Digest Maker:
PERSONS When law takes effect 8 Aug 2018 Alrick and Rikki
CASE NAME: Commissioner of Customs vs Hypermix Feeds Corporation, G.R. No. 179579
PONENTE: SERENO, J. Case Date: February 1, 2012
Case Summary:
- Petitioner Commissioner of Customs (COC) issued CMO 27-2003 to impose tariffs on
wheat imports based on grade classification.
- Respondent, a wheat importer, filed for Declaratory Relief with the RTC on the ground
of failure to follow requirement of hearing and publication in the issuance of CMO 27-
2003.
- RTC ruled in favor of the respondent
- CA dismissed the appeal
- SC denied the petition
Rule of Law/Doctrine: Failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and publication
under the Revised Administrative Code invalidates an agency’s regulation.

Detailed Facts:
- On November 7, 2003, petitioner COC issued CMO 27-2003, which for tariff purposes,
classifies wheat according to the (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of origin; and
(3) port of discharge. Depending on these factors, wheat would then be classified
either as food grade or feed grade with a corresponding tariff of 3% and 7%
respectively.
- On December 19, 2003, the respondent, a wheat importer, filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Las Pinas contending that CMO 27-2003 was issued
without following the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public
participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with the University of the
Philippines Law Center.
- On 19 January 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) effective for
twenty (20) days from notice.
- Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that, among others, was an
internal administrative rule and not legislative in nature.
- On 28 February 2005, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent, declaring CMO 27-2003 as
INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT, citing the petitioner’s failure to follow the
basic requirements of hearing and publication in the issuance of the CMO.
- Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-
2003.
- CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights of
petitioners and other importers and that the petitioners should have observed the
requirements of notice, hearing and publication.
Issue:
W/N CMO 27-2003 is valid
Holding:
Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an
importer of wheat, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent
provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code in the issuance of the
CMO.
Sec 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center
 three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall
not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons. Section

Sec 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far
as practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested
parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates
shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
before the first hearing thereon. (3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases
shall be observed.
Ruling:
SC denied the petition, affirming the previous declaration that the CMO is invalid
Relevant Provisions
Revised Administrative Code Chapter 2, Sec 3 and 9
VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC.V SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION (4 SCRA 627)

September 10, 2016

by: Christelle B. Amil

G.R. No. L-16704 March 17, 1962

VICTORIAS MILLING COMPANY, INC., petitioner-appellant,

vs.

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

BARRERA, J.:

Facts

The Social Security Commission issued Circular No. 22 on October 15, 1958 requiring all employers in
computing premiums to include employee’s remuneration all bonuses and overtime time pay, as well as
the cash value of other media remuneration.

The petitioner(Victorias Milling Company, Inc.) protest against the circular as it is contrary to a
previous Circular No. 7 dated October 7, 1957.

Circular No. 7 excludes overtime pay and bonus in the computation of the employers’ and the
employees’ respective monthly premium contributions.

The counsel questioned the validity of the circular

Social Security Commission overruled the objections

Victorias Miller Company Inc. comes to court on appeal

Issue

Whether or not Circular No. 22 is a rule or regulation as contemplated in Section 4(a) of Republic Act
1161 empowering the Social Security Commission “to adopt, amend and repeal subject to the approval
of the President such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions and purposes
of this Act”

Held

Republic Act No. 1161 before its amendment defines compensation as: All remuneration for
employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other than cash. Except:

that part of the remuneration in excess of P500 received during the month;

bonuses, allowances or overtime pay; and

dismissal and all other payments which the employer may make, although not legally required to do
so.

Republic Act No. 1792 changed the definition of “compensation” to: (f) Compensation — All
remuneration for employment include the cash value of any remuneration paid in any medium other
than cash except that part of the remuneration in excess of P500.00 received during the month.

Circular No. 22 was issued to advise the employers and employees concerned with the interpretation of
the law as amended which was Social Security Commission’s duty to enforce. The Commission simply
stated their opinion as to how the law should be construed and that such circular did not require
presidential approval and publication in the Official Gazette for its effectivity. Whereas if it renders an
opinion or a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing law. Administrative interpretation of
law is at best merely advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Resolution appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. So ordered.
Topic: Propriety of Construction

Subtopic: Power to Construe as a Judicial Function

Case: Endencia v. David

GR L-6355-56, 31 August 1953 (93 Phil 696)

En Banc, Montemayor (p): 6 concur

Facts: Saturnino David, as a Collector of Internal Revenue collected income taxes from
Justices Endencia and Jugo, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals and Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court respectively. The lower court held that under the doctrine
laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from
the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation
and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the
refund of said taxes. Respondent, through the Solicitor General contended that the
collection was done pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act 590 which Congress enacted to
authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial o6icers, if not
to counteract the ruling on the Perfecto Case.

Issue: Whether the Legislature may lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the
salary of a public o6icial, specially a judicial o6icer, not a decrease of his salary, after the
Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise.

Held: The Legislature cannot lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of
a public o6icial, specially a judicial o6icer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme
Endencia v. David, 93 Phil. 696 (1953)
Court has found and decided otherwise. The interpretation and application of the
Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the judicial
department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that
it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby
tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when
the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous
interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land. In the case at bar,
Section 13 of Republic Act 590 interpreted or ascertained the meaning of the phrase
“which shall not be diminished during their continuance in o6ice,” found in section 9,
Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial o6icers. This act of
interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the
well-de<ned and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The Legislature
under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws,
but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic
law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department.
Allowing the legislature to interpret the law would bring confusion and instability in
judicial processes and court decisions.

Further, under the Philippine system of constitutional government, the Legislative

department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is
charged with the execution or carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the
interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department.
And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the
courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and
ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the
Constitution in order to decide whether there is a con>ict between the two, because if
there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. Therefore, the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer to the
e6ect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial o6icer is a diminution
thereof and so violates the Constitution, is reiterated.

The Supreme Court a6irmed the decision, a6irming the ruling in Perferto v. Meer and
holding the interpretation and application of laws belong to the Judiciary.