PFR Review Digests

1
Basa vs. Mercado
Article 2

FACTS: Hon. Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of Pampanga CFI, allowed and probated the last will and testament of
Ines Basa, decedent. The same judge also approved the account of the administrator of the estate, declared
him the only heir and closed the administration proceedings. Joaquin Basa, et al., filed a motion to reopen the
proceedings, alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction because there was failure to comply with the
requirements as to the publication of the notice of hearing. They contended that the hearing took place only
twenty-one days after the date of first publication instead of three full weeks. Moreover, they questioned
whether Ing Katipunan, the newspaper where the notice was published was a newspaper of general
circulation as contemplated by the law.

ISSUEs: 1. Whether the publication of the notice needs to be made twenty-one days before the day appointed
for the hearing.

2. Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper considered a newspaper of general circulation.

RULING: 1. NO. The language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the
notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing of the
will. In other words, the first publication of the notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for
the hearing.

2. YES The record shows that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is
published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list
of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication
to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province of
Pampanga."

2
Tañada v. Tuvera
Article 2

FACTS: The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus in order to compel respondents to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations, and administrative orders. Petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. Respondent contend Issuances intended only
for the internal administration of a government agency or of particular persons did not have to be published;
that publication, when necessary, must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision
under reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws
and not to the requirement of publication.

RULING: YES.

1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean
that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date,
without its previous publication. The prior publication of laws before they become effective cannot
be dispensed with.
 2. For purposes of the prior publication requirement for effectivity, the term "laws" refer not only to
those of general application, but also to laws of local application, private laws; administrative rules
enforcing a statute; city charters. Central Bank circulars to "fill-in the details of the Central Bank Act;
but not mere interpretative rules regulating and providing guidelines for purposes of internal
operations only.
3. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
4. Internal instructions issued by an administrative agency are not covered by the rule on prior
publication. Also not covered are municipal ordinances which are governed by the Local Government
Code
5. Publication of statutes must be in full or it is no publication at all.
6. Prior publication of statutes for purposes of effectivity must be made in full in the Official Gazette and
not elsewhere.

3
Department of Finance vs. Dela Cruz
Article 2

FACTS: Section 9 of EO 140 states that it shall "take effect immediately upon publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was published in Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17
September 2013. BOC Commissioner Biazon issued Customs Personnel Order No. B-189- 2013 detailing 27
BOC personnel holding the positions of Collector of Customs V and VI including respondents in this case, to
CPRO "effective immediately and valid until sooner revoked” which was approved by DOF Secretary Purisima.
Respondents filed an action for Declaratory Relief with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and/or
Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC of Manila. Respondents allege that EO 140 took effect only on 2
October 2013, fifteen days after its publication in two newspapers of general circulation. Hence, respondents
argue that when CPO 189-2013 was issued, EO 140 was not yet effective.

ISSUE: Whether EO 140 violated Article 2 of the Civil Code when it became effective immediately after its
publication.

RULING: NO. The proviso "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to an effectivity date other than after fifteen
days following the completion of the law's publication. Thus, it is within the discretion of the legislature, or
the Executive Department in this case, whether to shorten or extend the fifteen-day period as long as there is
compliance with the requirement of publication. Here, Section 9 of EO 140 provides that the "order shall take
effect immediately upon publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." EO 140 was published in
Manila Bulletin and Philippine Star on 17 September 2013. As such, EO 140 took effect on 17 September
2013. In addition, the Court already ruled that "[interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published."14 EO 140 is an internal regulation that affects primarily the personnel of the DOF and the BOC. It
remains valid even without publication.

4
Garcillano vs. HOR
Article 2

FACTS: Petitioners seek to disallow the Senate to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry on the issue of “Hello Garci” tapes containing the wiretapped communication of then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, without duly published rules of
procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. The respondents admit in their pleadings
and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had
been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present
Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session. Respondents
justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page, invoking R.A. No. 8792.

ISSUE: The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry
without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

RULING: NO. Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he Senate or the House
of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to
satisfy the basic requirements of due process. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic
document as the functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words,
the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data
messages and/or electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations. Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.

5
D.M. Consunji, Inc., vs. CA and Maria J. Juego
Article 3

FACTS: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower,
Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial,
the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

ISSUE: Whether respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided under the Labor Code and
is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s employer damages under the Civil Code.

RULING: NO. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws. This may be deduced
from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her
compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her. In any event, there
is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator crash when on November 15,
1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated
November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her
behalf on November 27, 1990. There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies
available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed.

6.
In re Brehm vs. Republic
Article 5

FACTS: Gilbert R. Brehm is an American citizen, serving the U.S. Navy with temporary assignment at Subic
Bay. He married Ester Mira, a Filipino citizen, who had a daughter Elizabeth. The spouses filed a Joint Petition
with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court for the adoption of the minor Elizabeth. The Juvenile &
Domestic Relations Court adjudged minor Elizabeth is freed from all obligations to her natural father and the
child of the petitioners Gilbert R. Brehm and Ester Mira Brehm, on the ground that Elizabeth has always been
under the care and support of Gilbert and his declared intention of permanently residing herein. The Solicitor
General claimed that it was error for the Court in adjudging Elizabeth. On appeal however, the court find
otherwise.
ISSUE: Whether or not Brehm is qualified to adopt Elizabeth.

RULING: NO. Brehm is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth. According to Art.335, it clearly states that non-resident
aliens cannot adopt. It is therefore, mandatory, because it contains words of positive prohibition and is
couched in the negative terms importing that the act required shall not be done otherwise than designated.
On the other hand, Art. 338 can only be given operation if the same does not conflict with the mandatory
provisions of Art. 335. In the instant case Brehm is clearly a non-resident alien by his own testimony.
Therefore, he is disqualified to adopt Elizabeth. The decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and Brehm’s
Petition to adopt the child EIizabeth Mira, denied. Without costs.

7
Gongon vs. Court of Appeals, et al
Article 6

FACTS: The Government purchased an estate from the Roman Catholic Church under the provisions of
Section 1 Commonwealth Act No. 539. Matias Gongon, sub lessee, filed an application with the defunct Rural
Progress Administration for the purchase of a lot claiming preferential right as bona fide occupant. This
application was opposed by Amanda Aquino, lessee, who also filed her own application, alleging that as bona
fide tenant or lessee she had preferential right to purchase a lot. Gongon’s motion was denied by the Land
Tenure Administration. Accordingly, the Land Tenure Administration executed a deed of sale in favor of
Aquino; as a result, she obtained Transfer Certificate of the lot in her name. Gongon filed a motion for
reconsideration having denied by the Court of Appeals for review contending that the appellate erred in
failing to recognize his right as sub lessee-tenant to the lot in question and in not cancelling the sale thereof to
Aquino as well as its registration in her name; in holding that he had waived his right to the lot in question in
favor of Aquino and ordering him to pay rentals plus attorney’s fees and costs CFI of Manila: Dismissed the
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gongon had the preferential right to purchase the lot in question and if he has,
whether or not the alleged waiver of whatever right he might have had over said lot is valid.

RULING: NO.  Section 1 of the Commonwealth Act No. 539, “ the intendment of the law is to award the lots to
those who may apply in the order mentioned” that is , “ the first choice is given to the bona fide ‘tenants’ and
the second to the ‘occupants’ and last to the private individuals. The court also considered the fact that the
sub lessees executed a document expressly agreeing to vacate the lots any time the tenant so require together
with the affidavit of one of the sub lessees acknowledging the right of the tenant to purchase the lot and
renouncing whatever rights he may have to purchase it and Gongons petition is that his preferential right
could not validly waived for it is against public policy under Article 6 of the New Civil Code. Wherefore the
decision is reversed the award of the lot in question is set aside; transfer certificate is ordered cancelled; and
Gongon declared to have preferential right to purchase the said lot.

8
Martinez vs. Van Buskirk
Article 11

FACTS: Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the street when a delivery wagon
belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came along the street in the opposite
direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and wounded Martinez severely. The defendant
presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was
delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and went
inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose
driver cracked a whip and made some noises which frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The
cochero was thrown from the inside of the wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with
the carromata.

ISSUE: Whether the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero
RULING: NO. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has been a
custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in the manner
which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.

9
CIR vs. Primetown
Article 13

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax
which Primetown paid in 1997. On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to
submit additional documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon
which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was
filed beyond the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of
NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since
Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition
was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period.
Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether petition was filed within the two-year period.

RULING: YES, year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a
month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain. Both Article 13 of the
Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject
matter the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a
regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12
calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.

10
Bellis v. Bellis
Article 15-16

FACTS: Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had 5 legitimate children
with his first wife (whom he divorced), 3 legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and,
finally, 3 illegitimate children. 6 years prior Amos Bellis’ death, he executed 2 wills, apportioning the
remainder of his estate and properties to his 7 surviving children.  The appellants filed their oppositions to
the project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled
according to the Philippine law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be
governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of 2 separate wills.

ISSUE: Whether Texas laws or national law of Amos should govern the intrinsic validity of the will.

RULING: YES. Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national
law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern. Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will
should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which
deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid. The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate
children are not entitled to the legitimes under the Texas law, which is the national law of the deceased.

11
Llorente vs. Court of Appeals
Article 15-16
FACTS: Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the Philippines. Lorenzo was
an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy. Soon after, he left for the US where through naturalization, he became
a US Citizen. Upon his visitation of his wife, he discovered that she was living with his brother and a child was
born. The child was registered as legitimate but the name of the father was left blank. Llorente filed a divorce
in California, which later on became final. He married Alicia and they lived together for 25 years bringing 3
children. He made his last will and testament stating that all his properties will be given to his second
marriage. He filed a petition of probate that made or appointed Alicia his special administrator of his estate.
Before the proceeding could be terminated, Lorenzo died. Paula filed a letter of administration over Llorente’s
estate. The trial granted the letter and denied the motion for reconsideration. An appeal was made to the
Court of Appeals, which affirmed and modified the judgment of the Trial Court that she be declared co-owner
of whatever properties, she and the deceased, may have acquired during their 25 years of cohabitation.

ISSUE: WON the divorce decree is valid.

RULING: YES. We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial
court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased. The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente
became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia;
(3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed. Thus, as a rule, issues
arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided that they are validly required in their National Law. Thus the
divorce obtained by Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his National
Law since the divorce was contracted after he became an American citizen. Furthermore, his National Law
allowed divorce. The case was remanded to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of
Lorenzo Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’ successional rights allowing proof of foreign law.

12
Fujiki vs. Marinay
Article 15-16

FACTS: Petitioner Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Marinay in the Philippines on 23
January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese,
Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married
on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly
suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
“Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).” The decision of the
lower courts (RTC): dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru
Fujiki, to file the petition.

ISSUEs:

1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

3. Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:

1. NO. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages does
not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02- 11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage
“does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy.” While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

2. YES. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.”Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 1. Who may
file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it.

3. YES. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign
judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity
of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on
how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the “family rights and duties, or on the
status, condition and legal capacity” of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus,
Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,
Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii
expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with
an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic
ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the
judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of
nations.

13
Ambrose vs. Suque-Ambrose
Article 15-16

FACTS: Petitioner Ambrose, a citizen of the United States, married respondent Suque-Ambrose in Manila
Philippines. Petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent on the ground
of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that
the petitioner lacks the legal capacity to sue. According to the RTC, under the nationality principle provided
for under Article 15 of the Civil Code, the petitioner, an American Citizen, is not covered by our laws on family
rights and duties, status and legal capacity. RTC dismissed his petition – not the husband. Paul argues that
Article 15 of the Civil Code does not apply, as "the legal capacity to get married and its consequences,
including the nullification of void marriage is governed by the law of the place where the marriage was
entered into and not by the nationality principle.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has the legal capacity to sue.

RULING: YES. Petitioner has both the legal capacity and personality to sue. His legal personality proceeds
from the fact that it is his marriage to the respondent, which, in turn, relates to his civil status, that stands to
be affected by the petition for nullity that he instituted. He has legal personality in the action as he has
personal and material interest in the result of the action.

Lack of Capacity Legal Personality

refers to the general disqualification of a plaintiff to W/N the real party in interest.
institute an action

14
Orion Savings Bank vs. Shigekane Suzuki
Article 15-16

FACTS:A Japanese national named Suzuki bought a 2.8-million-peso worth of condominium unit and a
parking lot allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang, a Korean national and a holder of Special Resident Retirees
Visa. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale. Kang failed to deliver the title of the properties
despite verbal demands. Accordingly, the documents were allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez, Orion
Bank‘s Loans Officer for safekeeping. Suzuki later on learned that Kang left the country. Suzuki filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages against Kang and Orion. RTC ruled in favor of Suzuki. CA
partially granted Orion’s appeal but denied its motion for reconsideration. Orion then filed petition for review
on certiorari at the SC.

Orion’s arguments: The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law,
any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses.
Suzuki’s answer: The issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised on appeal. Proof of acquisition during
the marital coverture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption of conjugal ownership.

ISSUE: Whether the Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under Korean law, any
conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the consent of both spouses.

RULING: NO. In the present case, the Korean law should not be applied. It is a universal principle that real or
immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws of the country or state where it is located. Thus, all
matters concerning the title and disposition of real property are determined by what is known as the lex loci
rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title can pass from one person to another, or by
which an interest therein can be gained or lost. On the other hand, property relations between spouses are
governed principally by the national law of the spouses. However, the party invoking the application of a
foreign law has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be properly
pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law. In the present case, Orion,
unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the conjugal ownership of property. It merely attached
a "Certification from the Embassy of the Republic of Korea" to prove the existence of Korean Law. This
certification, does not qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing
that it was properly authenticated.

Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes
into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proven, the presumption is that
foreign law is the same as Philippine Law. Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to'
Hyun Sook Jung" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung. There is no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s conveyance in favor of
Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.

15
Wassmer vs. Velez
 Article 21

FACTS: Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get
married and set September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-
be: Dear Bet — will have to postpone wedding — my mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why — that would only create a scandal. Paquing. Sued
by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default and judgment (April 1955) was
rendered in favor of Beatriz. Defendant contends: he has a good and valid defense against plaintiff's cause of
action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to fortuitous event and/or
circumstances beyond his control. Moreover, in support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration,"
defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. The reason given is that "there is no provision of the
Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to marry.

ISSUE: Whether Velez could be held liable for damages for his breach of promise to marry.

RULING: YES. The Court said that this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
above-described preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be
solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which
defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid. The record reveals
that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued. Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and distributed
to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel for the
important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A
matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with
but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: "Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his home city in
Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest assured
returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.

16
Baksh vs. CA and Gonzales
Article 21

FACTS: Respondent Gonzales, 20 years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and
reputation duly respected in her community; on the other hand petitioner, Gashem Shookat Baksh, is an
Iranian citizen residing at Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a
medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City, before August 20, 1987 the latter
courted and proposed to marry her, she accepted his love on the condition that they get married; they
therefore agreed to get married. The petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano apartments. She was
a virgin at that time. A week before the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude towards her started to change.
He maltreated and threatened to kill her. At the confrontation before the representative of the barangay
captain of Guilig, Petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement because he was already married to
someone living in Bacolod. Respondent thus filed a complaint for damages against petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Art. 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.

RULING: YES. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concepts of torts and quasi-delicts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. In the light of the above
laudable purpose of Article 21, the court held that where a man’s promise to marry in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and obtain her consent to sexual act could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such breach of promise of marriage but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it, and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or
public policy.

17
California Clothing vs. Quinones
Article 21

FACTS: Shirley Quiñ ones, after receiving an official receipt from the cashier as proof of payment for a pair of
jeans, went out of the Guess USA Boutique (California Clothing, Inc.) located in Robinsons Cebu. A few
moments later, Michelle Ybañ ez and another Guess employee ran after Quiñ ones. When they caught up with
her, they asked Quiñ ones if she already paid for the pair of jeans. Quiñ ones said she did as she even has the
receipt and the pair of jeans. Unconvinced, the Guess employees wrote a letter to Quiñ ones’ employer (Cebu
Pacific) and its human resources department seeking help and accusing Quiñ ones of not paying for the pair of
jeans. Due to these incidents, Quiñ ones felt humiliated and so she sued Guess and its employees for moral
damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the acts of Guess employees constitute an abuse of right in such a way that will give a
cause of action to Shirley.

RULING: YES. Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code, a person must, in the
exercise of legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent
to prejudice another. “The elements of abuse of rights are as follows : (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. The elements stated
are complete in the present case. First, petitioners continued to insist that there was no payment made when
respondent already presented the black jeans with the original receipt. Second, they accused the respondent
that not only did she fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally stole it and quickly left the shop.
Third, the letters sent to the respondent’s employer was not only intended to ask for assistance in collection
of the payment but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation. The exercise of rights is subject to limitations.
Thus, it must be in accordance with the purpose of its establishment and not abused.

18
Republic vs. Ballocanag and Reyes
Art 22

FACTS: Reyes bought the subject land with 162,500 sq.m. at Brgy Banus, Pimanalayan, Oriental Mindoro from
Regina Castillo. Right after his purchase, Reyes introduced improvements and planted Mangoes, Mandarin
citrus, and Guyabanos. Also, the title of the land transferred in his name. Unfortunately, it turned out that the
subject land is part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro and therefore, not subject to any disposition or
acquisition under any existing law and is not transferable. OSG in behalf of petitioner, filed a complaint for
Cancellation of Title and/or Revision that the issued TCT is spurious, fictitious, and irregularly issued on
account of the subject title was part of the Timberland of Oriental Mindoro per Bureau of Forest Department
(BFD) Land Classification Map; that the said land are entirely inside the 140 hectares Agro-Forestry Farm
Lease Agreement No. 175 in favor of Atty. Augusto D. Marte; that the subject land cannot be subject of any
disposition or acquisition under the law. RTC held that Reyes TCT is null and void and ordered to surrender
the owner’s duplicate copy of the said title and to vacate the premises. Reyes then appealed the RTC Decision
to the Court of Appeal, apparently, Motion for Reconsideration was DENIED.

ISSUE: Whether the motion of Reyes should be granted

RULING: Yes. In an action for reversion, the pertinent allegations in the complaint would admit State
ownership of the disputed land. But these decisions simply ordered the reversion of the property to the State,
and did not consider the improvements that Reyes had introduced on the property or provide him with any
remedy relative thereto. To order Reyes to simply surrender all of these fruit-bearing trees in favor of the
State would inequitably result in unjust enrichment of the State at the expense of Reyes, a planter in good
faith. This basic doctrine on unjust enrichment simply means that a person shall not be allowed to profit or
enrich himself inequitably at another's expense. There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a
benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental
principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Article 22 of the Civil Code states the rule in this wise: ART.
22. Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The requisites for the application of this doctrine are present in the instant case. There is enrichment on the
part of the petitioner, as the State would come into possession of -- and may technically appropriate -- the
more than one thousand fruit-bearing trees planted by the private respondent. There is impoverishment on
the part of Reyes, because he stands to lose the improvements he had painstakingly planted and invested in.
There is lack of valid cause for the State to acquire these improvements. Indubitably, to order the reversion of
the subject land without payment of just compensation, in absolute disregard of the rights of Reyes over the
improvements which he, in good faith, introduced therein, would not only be unjust and inequitable but cruel
as well.

19
De Lima v. Laguna Tayabas Co.
Article 24

FACTS: A passanger bus of Laguna Tayabas Bus Company and a delivery truck of Seven Up Bottling Co.,
Philippines collided causing the death of Petra Dela Cruz and serious physical injuries to Eladia De Lima and
Nemesio Flores. Three suits were filed against the respondents before the CDI of Laguna. Court rendered a
decision in favour of the plaintiffs specifying the indemnity afforded to them. However, the plaintiffs filed a
motion for reconsideration on the decision by the court a quo seeking award of legal interest on the adjudged
amount in their favour from the date of the said decision but their motion was not acted upon by the said
court. All of the plaintiffs desisted from appealing with the hope that the defendant will comply with the
indemnity. But instead, the defendant filed an appeal in contrary to the motion for reconsideration raised by
the petitioners to the Court of Appeals. This appeal was pending for around 30 years. On December 1971, the
petitioners filed a motion before the court of Appeals seeking the grant of legal interest from the date of the
decision of the Court a quo and increasing the civil indemnity for the death of Petra Dela Cruz. The appelatte
court denied the motion on the contention that the petitioners failed to make an appeal on the error on lower
court’s ruling for not awarding the legal interest and damages. The Supreme Court after thorough review and
analysis of the case GRANTED the petition of the petitioners with modifications on the amounts previously
specified by the court a quo.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court’s decision through its liberal stance manifested vigilance in favor of the
indigent litigants

RULING: YES. Article 24 provides that “In all contractual, property and other relations, when one of the
parties is at disadvantages on the account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.” The petitioners were litigating
as paupers. By reason of their indigence, they failed to appeal but petitioners De Lima and Requijo had filed
their manifestation making reference to the law and jurisprudence upon which they base their prayer for
relief while petitioner Flores filed his brief. In the liberal stance of the Supreme Court seeing the case pending
for 30 years, it shall an exemption to the rule that it should not be entertained because of its failure to make
an appeal on the lower court’s decision. The heirs though they failed to do such should be afforded with
equitable relief by the courts as it must be vigilant for their protection. The claim for legal interest and
increase in indemnity should be entertained in spite of the claimant’s failure to appeal the judgment.
Pleadings as well as remedial laws should be construed liberally in order that the litigants may have ample
opportunity to pursue their respective claims and that a possible denial of substantial justice due to legal
technicalities may be avoided.

20
 Spouses Hing vs. Chuachuy
Article 26

FACTS: Sometime in April 2005, Aldo Development & Resources, Inc. (owned by Choachuy’s) filed a case for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order against the
Hing’s. The latter claimed that the Hing’s constructed a fence without a valid permit and that it would destroy
the walls of their building. The court denied the application for lack of evidence. So in order to get evidences
for the case, on June 2005, Choachuy illegally set-up two video surveillance cameras facing the Hing’s
property. Their employees even took pictures of the said construction of the fence. The Hing’s then filed a
case against the Choachuy’s for violating their right to privacy. On October 2005, the RTC issued an order
granting the application of the Hing’s for TRO and directed the Choachuy’s to remove the two video
surveillance cameras they installed. The Choachuy’s appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and the RTC’s
decision was annulled and set aside. The Hing’s then raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not Choachuy violated the Hing’s right to privacy.

RULING: YES. The right to privacy is the right to be let alone. The right to privacy is enshrined in our
Constitution and in our laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person’s
ordinary sensibilities.” It is the right of an individual “to be free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in which the public is not necessarily concerned.” A
business office is entitled to the same privacy when the public is excluded therefrom and only such
individuals as are allowed to enter may come in. In the case at bar, the operation by [respondents] of a
revolving camera, even if it were mounted on their building, violated the right of privacy of [petitioners], who
are the owners... of the adjacent lot. The camera does not only focus on [respondents'] property or the roof of
the factory at the back (Aldo Development and Resources, Inc.) but it actually spans through a good portion of
[the] land of [petitioners]. Petitioners have a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in their property, whether
they use it as a business office or as a residence.
21
Willaware Products Corporation vs. Jesichris Manufacturing Corporation
Article 26

Facts: Respondent Jesichris Manufacturing Company filed this present complaint for damages for unfair
competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner Willaware Products Corporation from
manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of respondent. Respondent
alleged that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and
metal products. Respondent further alleged that in view of the physical proximity of petitioner's office to
respondent's office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondent's employees had transferred to
petitioner], petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent's products, especially its plastic-made
automotive parts. That sometime in November 2000, respondent discovered that petitioner had been
manufacturing and distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and
colors but was selling these products at a lower price as respondent's plastic-made automotive parts and to
the same customers.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition under Article 28 of the
Civil Code.

RULING: YES, In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must
involve an injury to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as
"contrary to good conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of
our law, these include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method. The public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private
wrong perpetrated by unconscionable means. Here, both characteristics are present. First, both parties are
competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made automotive parts. Second,
the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner admitted having employed
respondent's former... employees, deliberately copied respondent's products and even went to the extent of
selling these products to respondent's customers.

22
Quimiging vs. Icao
Articles 40-41

FACTS: Carmen Quimiguing (petitioner) and Felix Icao (defendant) were neighbors. They had a close and
confidential relationship. The defendant succeeded in having carnal intercourse with the petitioner several
times although he is married. Also, the carnal intercourse was executed by force and intimidation, and
without her consent. As a result, despite efforts and drugs supplied by the defendant, she became pregnant.
Likewise, the petitioner had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages,
and attorney’s fees. The defendant contended that the case be dismissed since it did not allege that the child
had been born. After hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained the defendant’s motion and dismissed the
complaint. Petitioner moved to amend the complaint that as a result of the intercourse, she gave birth to a
baby girl but the court ruled that “no amendment was allowable since the original complaint averred no
cause of action”.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to claim for support and damages.

RULING: YES. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to support of the child she was carrying and
an independent cause of action for damages. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it. It is explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Therefore, the unborn child has a right to support from its progenitors. It is true
that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article”
(i.e., that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb). Auxiliary reason: A
second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife
to yield to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines: ART. 21. Any person
who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the
same Code: ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction,
abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. Hence, the girl has a cause of action.

23
Geluz vs. Court of Appeals
Articles 40-41

FACTS: Nita Villanueva, wife of Oscar Lazo, engaged in abortion three times, all by the same physician,
Antonio Geluz. The first time was when Villanueva got pregnant before they were legally married with the
desire to conceal the pregnancy from her parents. The second was carried out after their marriage and while
she was employed in Commission on Elections, convinced that her being pregnant is inconvenient at her
work. The third abortion commenced during Lazo’s campaign in province of Cagayan for his election to the
provincial board, contending that he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion, which soon
become his basis for filling a complaint on the Court of First Instance of Manila asking for P50,000.00
damages and P3,000.00 attorney’s fees. Where the trial court rendered judgment favor of Lazo and against
Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3, 000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover
damages from physician who caused the same.

RULING: NO. The Supreme Court ruled in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person,
does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. Parents are entitled to
collect any damages but such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the
injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents
cannot expect either help, support or services from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral
damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes hominis that was the fetus, i.e., on
account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations
(Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them. In case of
Lazo, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages,
evidently because the appellee’s indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
affections.