308. People v. Bernal, G.R. No.

44988, [October 31, 1936], 63 PHIL 750-760

X. Circumstances that affect liability; Art 62

FACTS: Accused Canuto Bernal took without consent three game-cocks belonging to Elias Piamonte. It was
established that aside from the presence of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the accused is an
habitual delinquent because he had been convicted, prior to the commission of the offense at bar, thrice of the
same crime of theft. The trial court found accused guilty as charged and sentenced to 4 months and 1 day of
arresto mayor, with an additional penalty of 7 years for being a habitual delinquent.

Defense alleged that the applicable provision is that found in subsection (a) Sec 62 of the aforesaid codal
paragraph and article, because in truth and according to the decisions, the accused has no more than two
prior convictions, the third being the one at bar. Elaborating on this contention, the defense alleges that the
conviction on October 19, 1935, for the crime of theft should not be counted against the accused because it
took place after the commission of the offense at bar on the 11th of the said month and year. The Solicitor-
General in his brief agrees with the defense, and recommends that the penalty fixed in subsection ( a) of
paragraph 5 of article 62 of the Revised Penal Code be imposed upon the accused. We hold that the third
conviction, having taken place after the commission of the last offense with which the accused is now
charged, should not be reckoned with in determining habitual delinquency and the additional penalty to be
imposed.

The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in the commission of the crime of
theft in view of the established fact that the accused was thrice convicted of the said crime prior to the trial of
this case on November 4, 1935. For this reason, the penalty imposable should be six (6) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional. As an habitual delinquent, because he was twice convicted of the crime of theft
prior to the commission of the offense at bar (art. 62, last paragraph of the Revised Penal Code), he should be
sentenced to the additional penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional pursuant to subsection ( a) of
paragraph 5 of the said article.

ISSUE: WN in instances where the accused turns out to be an habitual delinquent the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism, when alleged and proved, should be taken into account in fixing the penalty
applicable for the commission of the principal offense, independently of the additional penalty provided by
law for habitual delinquency.

RULING: YES. Recidivism is committed by a person who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgement of another crime embraced in the same title of the code. The SC holds
that it is wrong to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when the accused is declared a habitual
delinquent. Recidivism as an aggravating circumstance modifying the criminal liability is not an inherent or
integral element of habitual delinquency, which the RPC considers as extraordinary and special aggravating
circumstance. Recidivism as viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which is
necessarily forms an integral part of habitual delinquency. Therefore, recidivism may exist independently
from habitual delinquency in case a person is a habitual delinquent. In the case at bar, the penalty of
recidivism should also be taken into account independently from the fact that the accused is also penalized
for being a habitual delinquent.

Penalty: Guilty of Theft and sentenced to 6 months and 1 day of prision correcional, and to an additional
penalty of 3 years.

Dissenting opinion (Judge Abad Santos): Concurs that the accused is guilty of theft. Dissents that the penalty
for recidivism should be considered independently from the penalty of habitual delinquency. The aggravating
circumstance of recidivism should not be taken into consideration in the imposition of penalty prescribed by
law for the crime of which the appellant has been found guilty.
 309 – Tan
People vs. Tolentino
G.R. No. L-48740, August 5, 1942

FACTS: Defendants, Tolentino and Quintong, pleaded guilty to the charge of theft of 7 shirts valued at P14.
Both being, recidivists, were sentenced in the CFI to suffer 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor. Tolentino
was further sentenced to suffer an additional penalty of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor for habitual
delinquency. The only question raised by the Tolentino is the correctness of the additional penalty. He was
convicted by final judgments as follows (different dates): qualified theft, theft, qualified theft, estafa.

CFI convicted him as if this was his 4th offense on the theory that appellant's 4 th previous conviction should be
disregarded because the date of his release in connection therewith was not shown. On the other hand,
appellant contends that he should be sentenced under par. 5 (a) of Art. 62, as if the present were only his 3 rd
conviction, on the ground that the 1 st conviction should be taken circumstance and should be disregarded as
an element of habitual, delinquency.

ISSUE: What additional penalty should be applied?

RULING: Par. 5 (c) of Art. 62. Additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period. This penalty must be imposed in its minimum degree because of the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilty. A habitual delinquent is necessarily a recidivist, and in imposing the
principal penalty upon him the aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be taken into account. In fixing
the penalty provided by law for the last crime " as required in pars. 5 (a) (b), and (c) of Art. 62 of the RPC, the
court cannot disregard Arts. 14 (9) and Revised Penal Code, which respectively define recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance and lay down the rule for the application of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. However, for the purpose of fixing the additional penalty, recidivism cannot be taken as an
aggravating circumstance for the reason it is inherent in habitual delinquency.

Neither can we accept the recommendation for affirmance made by the SolGen on the theory that the present
is appellant's 4th conviction. We cannot disregard his previous 4th conviction alleged in the information solely
because the date of his release in connection therewith has not been shown. It appearing that he was
sentenced for the 4th time on September 30, 1935, to suffer 2 months and 1 day of arresto mayor plus an
additional penalty of 2 years, 4 months, and 21 days of prision correctional, we can readily see that he must
have been released in connection therewith less than 10 years previous to August 13, 1941, the date of the
commission of the offense complained of in the present case. The stand taken by the trial court and the
SolGen is untenable because if appellant's 4 th previous conviction be disregarded, he could not be sentenced
to any additional penalty as a habitual delinquent, his previous 3 rd conviction and release having taken place
more than 10 years prior to August 13, 1941.

320 TORIBIO
People vs Pajenado
G.R. No. L-26458
Mitigating Circumstance: Incomplete Justifying/Exempting

FACTS: At about 12NN on Dec. 31, 1965, while prosecution witness Epifanio Cabe was walking alone in a
street and arrived in front of the house of one Pablo Jazmines, he saw Openiano holding the now deceased
Carlos Tapong by the neck.

As the two were wrestling each other, Carlito Pajenado (Openiano’s cousin) intervened and they were able to
throw Tapong to the ground. Carlito held Tapong by the shoulder and pinned him down while Openiano held
him by one leg. Openiano then drew his gun and fired at Tapong. Carlito ran away while Openiano remained
at the crime scene with his drawn gun until a policeman arrived and took the firearm from him.
Another prosecution witness, Pelagia Tapong, testified on the incident. She said she saw Openiano standing
on the street. When Tapong appeared, Openiano immediately met him and held him by the neck and then
Carlito arrived who helped his cousin. Because of the gunshot wound, Tapong died. CFI of Samar convicted
Openiano of murder and illegal possession of firearm.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant should be convicted only of homicide instead of murder?

RULING: NO. The Court held that the testimony of prosecution witness Pelagia Tapong clearly shows that, for
sometime before the incident, appellant had been waiting for Tapong to appear, and that as soon as the latter
showed up and arrived in front of the house of Pablo Jazmines, appellant met him and held him by the neck;
that thereafter his cousin Carlito helped him throw their victim to the ground. According to the Court, this is
sufficient evidence of premeditation.

The Court agreed that treachery was not proved. On the other hand, the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, admitted by appellant's counsel must be considered in the imposition of the corresponding
penalty.
321
6.4. Obedience to a lawful order
Ambil, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, 653 SCRA 576, G.R. No. 175457 July 6, 2011

FACTS: The present controversy arose from a letter of Atty. David B. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar
Chapter of the IBP, to the Office of the Ombudsman, praying for an investigation into the alleged transfer of
then Mayor Francisco Adalim, an accused in Criminal Case for murder, from the provincial jail of Eastern
Samar to the residence of petitioner, then Governor Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. NBI recommended the filing of
criminal charges against petitioner Ambil, Jr. for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. At the pre-trial, petitioners admitted the allegations in the Information. They reason, however,
that Adalim’s transfer was justified considering the imminent threats upon his person and the dangers posed
by his detention at the provincial jail. According to petitioners, Adalim’s sister, Atty. Juliana A. Adalim-White,
had sent numerous prisoners to the same jail where Mayor Adalim was to be held.

Petitioner Ambil, Jr. testified that he was the Governor of Eastern Samar from 1998 to 2001. According to him,
it was upon the advice of Adalim’s lawyers that he directed the transfer of Adalim’s detention to his
home. Francisco Adalim introduced himself as the Mayor of Taft, Eastern Samar. He confirmed his arrest in
connection with a murder case. Adalim confirmed Atty. White’s account that he spotted inmates who served
as bodyguards for, or who are associated with, his political rivals at the provincial jail. Petitioner Apelado, Sr.
testified that he was the Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar. At the provincial jail, petitioner was
confronted by Atty. White who informed him that he was under the governor, in the latter’s capacity as a
provincial jailer. Petitioner claims that it is for this reason that he submitted to the governor’s order to
relinquish custody of Adalim. Sandiganbayan, found the petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019. The court ruled that in moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him
unwarranted benefits. It stressed that under the Rules, no person under detention by legal process shall be
released or transferred except upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.

Fundamentally, petitioner Ambil, Jr. argues that Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 does not apply to his case because
the provision contemplates only transactions of a pecuniary nature. Further, he claims good faith in taking
custody of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a "Provincial Jailer" under the Administrative Code of 1917.
Considering this, petitioner believes himself entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of duty.
Petitioner Apelado, Sr., on the other hand, denies allegations of conspiracy between him and petitioner Ambil,
Jr. Petitioner Apelado, Sr. defends that he was merely following the orders of a superior when he transferred
the detention of Adalim

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Ambil, is entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under Article
11(5) of the RPC.

RULING: No. In this case, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s house. Significantly, it is the provincial
government and not the governor alone which has authority to exercise control and supervision over
provincial jails. In any case, neither of said powers authorizes the doing of acts beyond the parameters set by
law. 

(2) Whether Petitioner Apelado, Sr. is entitled to the justifying circumstance of obedience to an order issued
by a superior for some lawful purpose under Article 11(6) of the RPC.

No. Under paragraph 6, Article 11 of the RPC, any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose does not incur any criminal liability. For this justifying circumstance to
apply, the following requisites must be present: (1) an order has been issued by a superior; (2) such order
must be for some lawful purpose; and (3) the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful.
Only the first requisite is present in this case.

While the order for Adalim’s transfer emanated from petitioner Ambil, Jr., who was then Governor, neither
said order nor the means employed by petitioner Apelado, Sr. to carry it out was lawful. In his capacity as the
Provincial Jail Warden of Eastern Samar, petitioner Apelado, Sr. fetched Mayor Adalim at the provincial jail
and, unarmed with a court order, transported him to the house of petitioner Ambil, Jr. This makes him liable
as a principal by direct participation under Article 17(1) of the RPC. Conspiracy was sufficiently
demonstrated by petitioner Apelado, Sr.’s willful cooperation in executing petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s order to
move Adalim from jail, despite the absence of a court order. Petitioner Apelado, Sr., a law graduate, cannot
hide behind the cloak of ignorance of the law. The Rule requiring a court order to transfer a person under
detention by legal process is elementary.

In order for this justifying circumstance to apply, two requisites must be satisfied: (1) the accused acted in the
performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and (2) the injury caused or the offense
committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right
or office. Both requisites are lacking in petitioner Ambil, Jr.’s case.

Thus, the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan upon petitioner Ambil, Jr. of imprisonment for nine (9)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and four (4) months is in accord with law. As a
co-principal without the benefit of an incomplete justifying circumstance to his credit, petitioner Apelado, Sr.
shall suffer the same penalty.

322. Chua
Incomplete justifying circumstance a.69
People vs. Villanueva, 534 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 172697 September 25, 2007
FACTS: appellant, then 31 years old, killed his niece, aged 8, by boxing her on the head and kicking her
several times on the different parts of her body. Appellant also mauled his nephews and aged 5 and 2.
Consequently, appellant was charged with murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder. Appellant
pleaded insanity.
ISSUE: Whether the defense of insanity be appreciated
RULING: Yes, as a mitigating circumstance. We agree with the Court of Appeals in appreciating appellant’s
mental disorder as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code. There is no
dispute that appellant has a history of mental illness. He was diagnosed to be suffering from "Schizophrenia,
Paranoid, Episodic with Interepisode Residual Symptoms" which began in 1985 and was characterized by
intermittent episodes of psychotic signs and symptoms since then until appellant’s examination on 21 June
2000. We find that such illness diminished the exercise of appellant’s will power without however depriving
him of the consciousness of his acts. In fact, appellant was aware that he hurt his niece "for he perceived her
as a big man with a horrifying appearance."
Appellant’s recollection of the events prior to the crimes and his emotions afterwards indicate that he was
sane before, during, and after the commission of the crimes. Dr. Dy’s psychiatric report states that appellant
felt guilty about Angelica’s death and apprehensive for being in jail for a longer time. A feeling of remorse is
inconsistent with insanity, as it is a clear indication that he was conscious of his acts. He acknowledged his
guilt and was sorry for his acts.

323
People vs. Oandasan
Art. 69

FACTS: The criminal complaint was for homicide. T The case was thereafter elevated to the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan for trial on the merits. There, a formal indictment for homicide was filed by the
prosecuting attorney. Upon arraignment, the accused — this time — pleaded guilty. Before sentence, he
presented evidence to prove the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary
surrender, aside from the plea of guilty.

The accused saw the deceased Quirino Duldulao chasing the former's son. When the accused approached
Duldulao and asked him why he (Duldulao) was doing so, Duldulao hit the accused with a wooden club on the
left shoulder. The accused drew a sharp-pointed knife he had with him. Then, the deceased clubbed the
accused on the head, which prompted the latter to stab Duldulao on the front.

ISSUE: Whether privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense is present.

RULING: YES. As we see it, the only element absent to exempt the accused totally from criminal liability under
Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code, is "[r]easonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel" the
unlawful aggression.

By the facts, the accused deserves the benefit of Article 69 of the Revised Penal Code. It provides: "A penalty
lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable
by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal
liability in the several cases mentioned in articles 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be
present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the
number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking."
 324. HALID
PEOPLE V. NARVAEZ, 121 SCRA 389
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

FACTS: At about 2:30 in the afternoon of August 22, 1968, Graciano Juan, Jesus Verano and Cesar Ibanez
together with the two deceased Davis Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia, were fencing the land of George Fleischer,
father of deceased Davis Fleischer. The place was in the boundary of the highway and the hacienda owned by
George Fleischer. This is located in the municipality of Maitum, South Cotabato. At the place of the fencing is
the house and rice drier of appellant Mamerto Narvaez. At that time, appellant was taking his rest, but when
he heard that the walls of his house were being chiselled, he arose and there he saw the fencing going on. If
the fencing would go on, appellant would be prevented from getting into his house and the bodega of his
ricemill. So he addressed the group, saying 'Pare, if possible you stop destroying my house and if possible we
will talk it over what is good,' addressing the deceased Rubia, who is appellant's compadre. The deceased
Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit, proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparently lost his equilibrium and
he got his gun and shot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer fell down, Rubia ran towards the jeep, and knowing
there is a gun on the jeep, appellant fired at Rubia, likewise hitting him. Both Fleischer and Rubia died as a
result of the shotting'

ISSUE: WN THERE IS A MITIGATING CIRCUMTANCE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.

RULING: YES. the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it appearing that appellant
surrendered to the authorities soon after the shooting. Likewise, We find that passion and obfuscation
attended the commission of the crime. The appellant awoke to find his house being damaged and its
accessibility to the highway as well as of his rice mill bodega being closed. Not only was his house being
unlawfully violated; his business was also in danger of closing down for lack of access to the highway. These
circumstances, coming so near to the time when his first house was dismantled, thus forcing him to transfer
to his only remaining house, must have so aggravated his obfuscation that he lost momentarily all reason
causing him to reach for his shotgun and fire at the victims in defense of his rights. Considering the
antecedent facts of this case, where appellant had thirty years earlier migrated to this so-called "land of
promise" with dreams and hopes of relative prosperity and tranquility, only to find his castle crumbling at the
hands of the deceased, his dispassionate plea going unheeded-all these could be too much for any man-he
should be credited with this mitigating circumstance. Consequently, appellant is guilty of two crimes of
homicide only, the killing not being attended by any qualifying nor aggravating circumstance, but extenuated
by the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense-in view of the presence of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victims and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the appellant-and by two
generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and passion and obfuscation. Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty for homicide as reclusion temporal. Pursuant to Article
69, supra, the penalty lower by one or two degrees shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly
excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same. Considering that
the majority of the requirements for defense of property are present, the penalty may be lowered by two
degrees, i.e., to prision correccional And under paragraph 5 of Article 64, the same may further be reduced by
one degree, i.e., arresto mayor, because of the presence of two mitigating circumstances and no aggravating
circumstance.

328. Estioca vs. Peple, 556 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 173876 June 27, 2008
10.2.2. Minors

FACTS: petitioner Bacus, Boniao, and Handoc are charged with robbery. The trial court imposed on
petitioner, Bacus and Handoc an indeterminate penalty ranging from 6 years and 1 day of  prision mayor as
minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Since Boniao was a minor (14
years old) when he participated in the heist, he was sentenced to a lower prison term of 6 months of  arresto
mayor as minimum to 4 years and 2 months of  prision correccional as maximum. Nonetheless, the sentence
meted out to Boniao was suspended, he is therefore committed to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) for reformation, otherwise if he is incorrigible, then the sentence shall be imposed
upon him by the court.

 When MR was filed, upon applying Indeterminate Sentence Law with paragraph 1 of Art. 64, Revised
Penal Code, ranges from (4) years, (2) months and (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to (8)
years and (1) day of prision mayor as maximum with accessory penalty provided for by law; and for
minor accused Kevin Boniao, the penalty of four (4) months of  arresto mayor upon applying the
privileged mitigating circumstance in Art. 68, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code with Art. 64,
paragraph 1 of the same Code.  It also ordered the DSWD to release and turn over Boniao to his
parents.

ISSUE: is the penalty imposed by the court proper? -- YES

RULING: Article 68, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code instructs that the penalty imposable on him,
which is prision mayor, shall be lowered by 2 degrees. The RTC, therefore, acted accordingly in sentencing
him to 4 months of arresto mayor. Nonetheless, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Boniao, who was
barely 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be exempt from criminal liability and
should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of The Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act of 2006.

 15 years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from
criminal liability.
 Although the crime was committed on 28 July 2001 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20
May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Boniao who was not shown to be
a habitual criminal.

330. People vs. Wile, 789 SCRA 228, G.R. No. 208066 April 12, 2016
Minors

Facts: Wile and two others and BBB were members of a fraternity called SWAK. A person who wished to join
SWAK had to undergo an initiation, choosing between "hirap" or "sarap." In "hirap" the applicant was hit with
a paddle and/or punched on the shoulders, abdomen, and thighs; and in "sarap" the applicant would pick a
SWAK member to have sexual intercourse with. Appellants were charged with the crime of rape. In
conspiracy, raped AAA, a fifteen-year old minor in the presence of her friend, BBB, while being blindfolded.
Thereafter, they also raped BBB in the presence of AAA. The minors exhibited a change in behavior and was
brought to their school’s guidance counselor but manifested that they only missed their parents. In the
second week of August 2005, AAA attempted suicide. AAA was again raped by accused-appellants John and
Mark on September 12, 2005. Accused-appellants John, Mark, and Jaypee, being minors at the time of
commission of the purported crimes, eventually filed on February 13, 2007 a motion for probation under
Section 42 of Republic Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. The
RTC denied on the ground that juveniles who have been convicted of a crime the imposable penalty for which
is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua to death or death, are disqualified from having
their sentences suspended

Issue: W/N the appellants may invoke RA 9344.

Ruling: Although suspension of sentence still applies even when the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, such suspension is
only until the minor reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21). By now, accused-appellants John and Mark
are twenty-seven (27) years old, while accused-appellant Jaypee is twenty-six (26) years old. Since accused-
appellants John, Mark, and Jaypee are found to have acted with discernment and are convicted as charged, we
shall render the appropriate sentences against them, keeping in mind the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Accused-appellants John, Mark, and Jaypee may no longer have their
sentences suspended under Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344.

Nevertheless, accused-appellants John, Mark, and Jaypee are still entitled to the benefit of Section 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344 even when they are already beyond twenty-one (21) years of age. Upon order of the
court, accused-appellants may serve their sentences at an agricultural camp or any other training facility,
controlled by the Bureau of Correction, in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, in lieu of a regular penal institution.
331
People vs. Ancajas
773 SCRA 518, 2015
Minors

FACTS: AAA, 19 years old, is a household help of the spouses Constantino and Elvira Cueva. At around 8
o'clock in the evening of July 16, 1998, she asked permission from her employers to go to her parents’ house.
AAA's house is located in Barangay Taytayan, Bogo, Cebu, the same barangay where her employers' house is
situated. On her way to her parents' house, she met appellants Vergel and Allain who wanted to go with her
but she refused. They suddenly held her hands but she was able to get free from their hold. She then decided
to return to her employers' house but when she thought about her parents' need for the money, she just
stayed and waited at the side of the road hoping that the appellants would go away.

Thinking that appellants had already left, she continued walking to her parents’ house but appellants
reappeared and held her hands again. She shouted for help and struggled to be freed from their hold but
appellant Allain covered her mouth with a handkerchief and appellant Vergel punched her in the stomach
which caused her to lose consciousness.
At about 1 o’clock in the morning of July 17, 1998, AAA regained her consciousness and she noticed that she
was only wearing her t-shirt as her bra, panty and maong pants were on her side. She went back to her
employers' house and told them that she was raped by appellants.19
At around 9 o’clock in the morning of the same day, AAA was accompanied by the Spouses Cuevas to the
police station in Bogo, Cebu to report the rape incident. On the other hand, appellants strongly denied the
accusation and interposed the defense of alibi. They both claimed that they were not at the crime scene where
AAA's alleged rape happened as they were somewhere else. Appellant Allain's birth certificate was presented
to show that he was still 17 years old at the time the alleged rape of AAA was committed.

The RTC ruled on the issue of appellant Allain's minority by saying that the penalty imposed upon the two
accused is reclusion perpetua which is a single indivisible penalty; and pursuant to Article 63 of the RPC, the
said penalty should be applied and imposed regardless of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of
minority. The RTC further said that the benefits of a suspended sentence shall not apply to appellant Allain
because he is convicted of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, citing Section 32, A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC,
the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. CA affirmed.

ISSUE: W/N Appellant is entitled to mitigating circumstance of minority

RULING: YES. As the crime of rape was committed by two persons, the penalty imposable under Article
266(B) of the RPC is reclusion perpetua to death. Pursuant to Article 63 of the RPC, if the penalty prescribed
by law is composed of two indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed if neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Since no aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Appellant Allain
was only 17 years old when he committed the crime; he is, therefore, entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority under Article 68(2) of the RPC which provides that the penalty to be imposed upon
a person under 18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in the
proper period.
Section 38 of RA No. 9344 provides that when the child below 18 years of age who committed a crime and
was found guilty, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence even if
such child has reached 18 years or more at the time of judgment.

Although suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with the law is already 18 years of
age or more at the time the judgment of conviction was rendered, however, such suspension is only until the
minor reaches the maximum age of 21 as provided under Section 40 of RA No. 9344, to wit: SEC. 40. Return of
the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court.— If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures
imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law
has willfully failed to comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in
conflict with the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict with
the law has reached 18 years of age while under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to
discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21 years.

332 REYES
People vs. Monticalvo
Minors

MAIN POINT: The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the judgment of
conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still of
tender age.

FACTS: Monticalvo, 17 years old at the time, was charged for raping his neighbor, AAA, a mental retardate
who was 12 years and 11 months old at the time of the rape incident. The RTC convicted Monticalvo and
sentenced him to an imprisonment term of reclusion perpetua. Upon appeal, Monticalvo claimed that the RTC
failed to appreciate his age since he was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, and that
the RTC should have considered the same as a privileged mitigating circumstance in imposing the penalty
against him.

ISSUE: W/N the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated.

RULING: YES. Under Article 266-B, in relation to Article 266-A of the RPC, provides that simple rape is
punishable by reclusion perpetua. However, when rape is committed by an assailant who has knowledge of
the victim’s mental retardation, the penalty is increased to death. This circumstance must be alleged in the
information being a qualifying circumstance which increases the penalty to death and changes the nature of
the offense from simple to qualified rape. In the case at bench, while Monticalvo categorically admitted that
he knew AAA to be suffering from mental abnormalities, the prosecution failed to allege this fact in the
information. As such, even if it was proved, it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. Thus,
Monticalvo’s conviction is only for simple rape for which he should be meted the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

Nonetheless, a reasonable ground exists in the case that calls for the modification of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua imposed by both lower courts upon Monticalvo. This Court finds merit in the assertion that he was a
minor during the commission of the crime charged. During trial, upon order of the trial court, the Local Civil
Registrar of Bobon, Northern Samar, brought before it their office records, particularly Monticalvo’s
Certificate of Live Birth containing the fact of birth of the latter. His Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was
born on 23 February 1985. Indeed, at the time of the commission of the crime charged on 9 December 2002,
he was only 17 years old, a minor. Thus, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which specifically states that:

ART. 68. – Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. – When the offender is a
minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to
the last of article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed:
 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that
prescribed by the law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period.

Applying the privileged mitigating circumstance, the proper imposable penalty upon Monticalvo is reclusion
temporal, being the penalty next lower to reclusion perpetua - the penalty prescribed by law for simple rape.
Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within the range of
prision mayor (the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal), that is 6 years and 1 day to 12 years,
and maximum of which shall be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period (there being no
other modifying circumstances attendant to the crime), that is 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4
months. With that, the indeterminate penalty of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and 4
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, should be imposed upon Monticalvo.

HOWEVER, the case does not, as it normally should, end at this point. On 20 May 2006, Republic Act No.
9344, otherwise known as the “Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006,” took effect. Section 68 thereof
specifically provides for its retroactive application. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9344 is applicable in this case
even though the crime was committed four (4) years prior to its enactment and effectivity. Parenthetically,
with more reason should Republic Act No. 9344 apply to this case as the 2005 conviction by the lower courts
was still under review when the law took effect in 2006. However, while Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344
provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same
law limits the said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21.

At present (January 30, 2013), Monticalvo is already 27 years of age, and the judgment of the trial court
was promulgated prior to the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9344. Therefore, the application of Sections 38
and 40 of the said law is already moot and academic.

Be that as it may, to give meaning to the legislative intent of Republic Act No. 9344, the promotion of the
welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit of
21 years, so long as he/she committed the crime when he/she was still a child . The offender shall be
entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration in accordance with Republic Act No. 9344
in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and become a productive member of the
community. The age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of the
judgment of conviction is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when
he/she was still of tender age.

Thus, Monticalvo shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, which provides for the
confinement of convicted children:

SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A
child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other
training facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in
coordination with the DSWD.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
00457 dated 3 December 2009 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: (I) appellant is found guilty of rape under
subparagraph (b) of Article 266-A(I) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and not under subparagraph (d)
thereof; (2) in view of the privileged mitigating circumstance appreciated in favor of appellant the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is reduced to reclusion temporal and being a divisible penalty, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies and the indeterminate penalty of I0 years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is imposed upon the
appellant; and (3) the amount of exemplary damages awarded by the lower courts is increased from
P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. The award of civil indemnity and moral damages both in the amount of P50,000.00
are maintained. This case, however, shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for appropriate disposition in
accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344.

335 - Sabtaluh
People v. Bahuyan (G.R. No. 105842, 24 November 1994, 238 SCRA 330),
10.2.2. Minors

FACTS: Accused was charged with Rape. According to complainant the accused-appellant went to their house
and told her "lolo", that he was giving them some "pandesal" which complainant should get from his house.
She went there as instructed and returned home with bread in a tin container. At about ten o'clock of the
same day, accused-appellant returned and asked complainant to return the bread container, a biscuit can
with a soda cracker label. As soon as she entered the door, accused-appellant immediately pulled her hand
and poked a knife at her neck. He directed her to go upstairs, after which he closed the door, followed her and
forced her to remove her clothes. His first attempt at having sexual intercourse with her was not successful.
Later, he succeeded with "the help of his hand." Scared and in pain, she was not able to resist his moves.
Before allowing her to go home, she was warned, on pain of death, not to tell her mother about the incident.
Under accused-appellant's version, he alleged that the sexual liaison happened under circumstances not
constituting rape for it was complainant herself who initiated everything while he submissively followed her.
(Ang kapal). He maintained that the sexual act was never consummated as it was no longer possible at his
age. He was 80 years old and the victim was 12.

ISSUE: WON appellant is guilty of rape and not statutory rape

RULING: Rape committed with the use of force or intimidation. Accused-appellant having found to have
likewise committed the same with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be  reclusion perpetua to
death. Considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, Republic Act No. 7659 was not yet
effective, the maximum penalty of death cannot be imposed. While the age of an offender over seventy years
is a generic mitigating circumstance, the same will not affect the sentence imposed on accused-appellant, not
only because his actual age was not proved, but also, even if the same is true, when the law prescribes a
penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied.  However, the
phrase "after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended" in the dispositive portion is
unnecessary, the same not being applicable to persons convicted of offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua which is an indivisible penalty.

Note: Considering the facts of the case, the prosecution should have filed an information for statutory rape
because of the materiality of complainant's age. When it failed to do so and instead filed an information for
rape with the use of force or intimidation, complainant's age became inconsequential

336. People vs. Yu, 80 SCRA 382, No. L-29667 November 29, 1977
10.2. Mitigating Circumstances; 10.2.2. Minors
(Case not found)

337 – Tan
People vs. Vera
G.R. No. L-45685, November 16, 1937

FACTS: Mario Cu-Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case. He applied for probation under the Act No. 4221. He
challenged the constitutionality of Act No. 4221, saying that the said Act is unconstitutional as it is an invalid
delegation of legislative powers to provincial boards. The challenged provision thereof reads, “This act shall
apply ONLY in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals.”

ISSUE: W/N Congress may enact probation laws.

RULING: YES. However, Act 4221 is unconstitutional because it constitutes undue delegation of legislative
power to provincial boards to determine when the Act should take effect in their respective provinces

We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of the United States, may legally
enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This
conclusion is supported by other authorities. It is clearly within the province of the Legislature to denominate
and define all classes of crime, and to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment. The
legislative power to set punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the general
assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to
the beginning and end of the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or conditional.
Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their violation. Invariably,
the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the courts, particularly the trial courts, large discretion
in imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that justice can best be
served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an
individual convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not allowed to refrain from
imposing a sentence merely because, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by
the offense, the penalty provided by law is clearly excessive, the courts being allowed in such case to submit
to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as it may deem, in cases where both
mitigating and aggravating circumstances are attendant in the commission of a crime and the law provides
for a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the courts may allow such circumstances to offset one
another in consideration of their number and importance, and to apply the penalty according to the result of
such compensation. Again, Article 64, paragraph 7, of the Revised Penal Code empowers the courts to
determine, within the limits of each periods, in case the penalty prescribed by law contains three periods, the
extent of the evil produced by the crime. In the imposition of fines, the courts are allowed to fix any amount
within the limits established by law, considering not only the mitigating and aggravating circumstances, but
more particularly the wealth or means of the culprit. Article 68, paragraph 1, of the same Code provides that
"a discretionary penalty shall be imposed" upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who has
not acted without discernment, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the
crime which he has committed. Article 69 of the same Code provides that in case of "incomplete self-defense",
i.e., when the crime committed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions
required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in article 11
and 12 of the Code, "the courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view
of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking." And, in case the commission of
what are known as "impossible" crimes, "the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of
criminality shown by the offender," shall impose upon him either arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to
500 pesos. (Art. 59, Revised Penal Code.)

Under our Revised Penal Code, also, one-half of the period of preventive imprisonment is deducted from the
entire term of imprisonment, except in certain cases expressly mentioned (art. 29); the death penalty is not
imposed when the guilty person is more than seventy years of age, or where upon appeal or revision of the
case by the Supreme Court, all the members thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of
the imposition of the death penalty; the death sentence is not to be inflicted upon a woman within the three
years next following the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years
of age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after final sentence has been
pronounced, or while he is serving his sentenced, the execution of said sentence shall be suspended with
regard to the personal penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility.

339 TORIBIO
Frontreras vs People
G.R. No. 190583
Mitigating Circumstance: No intention to commit so grave a wrong
FACTS: On October 27, 1998, a surprise audit was conducted by Cebuana Lhuillier Pawnshop’s (Cebuana)
internal auditors where it revealed that 156 pieces of jewelry, with an aggregate value of ₱1,250,800.00 were
missing. A cash shortage of ₱848.60 was likewise discovered. When the petitioner, Maria Paz Frontreras Y
Ilagan (Frontreras), the vault custodian was asked to explain the discrepancy, she told Mila Escartin
(Escartin)(one of the internal auditors) that she would reduce her explanation into writing. The next day, an
audit report was sent to Marcelino Finolan (Finolan), Area Manager of Cebuana. Upon receipt of the audit
report on October 28, 1998, Finolan immediately proceeded to the Old Balara branch to conduct an
investigation. He called Escartin and the petitioner for a meeting during which the petitioner handed over
several pawn tickets while Escartin gave him a handwritten letter made by the petitioner.

On May 10, 1999, an Information for Qualified Theft was filed before the RTC against the petitioner,
Salazar, and Carpon. Trial thereafter ensued. According to prosecution witness Finolan, aside from receiving
the petitioner’s handwritten letter on October 28, 1998, the petitioner also gave him original pawn tickets,
the back portion of which showed the signatures of their respective pledgors. These signatures mean that the
pledgors have already redeemed the jewelry covered by each ticket by paying the amount for which they
stand as a security. No payments were, however, recorded nor turned over to the pawnshop. The petitioner
also intimated to him that Carpon took some of such cash payments but failed to return the same.

The RTC found sufficient circumstantial evidence establishing that the petitioner perpetrated the
offense but the petitioner’s co-accused Salazar and Carpon were acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The petitioner moved for reconsideration but her petition was denied and appealed to the CA which upheld
the lower court's conclusion. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner's extrajudicial confession through the handwritten letter coupled with
her act of surrendering the redeemed pawn tickets and thereafter going to the police station can be taken as
an analogous circumstance of voluntary surrender?

RULING: YES. Based on the same extrajudicial confession, the petitioner is also entitled to the mitigating
circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong under paragraph 3 in relation to paragraph 10 both
of Article 13. Based on her letter, the petitioner misappropriated the redemption payments under her custody
and control because she was constrained by extreme necessity for money.

This is not to promote monetary crisis as an excuse to commit a crime or to embolden a person entrusted
with funds or properties to feloniously access the same, but rather to underscore the utmost consideration in
the Court's exercise of its discretional power to impose penalties, that is - a guilty person deserves the penalty
given the attendant circumstances and commensurate with the gravity of the offense committed. From such
standpoint, the Court finds it prudent that unless the foregoing analogous mitigating circumstances are
appreciated in her favor, the petitioner will be penalized excessively.
340
No intent to commit so grave a wrong
People Vs Maglian

FACTS: The accused is Jay Mandy Maglian and Atty. Mary Jay Rios (Victim) were married on January 29,
1999. The accused did not want Mary Jay to attend a party, causing them to fight. Incensed, the accused
collected the clothes that Mary Joy had given him for Christmas Mary Jay tried to wrestle the can of kerosene
from him and, at the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife’s plea, the accused still
poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire. Before she died, she told her mother
what had happened to her, declaring, "Si Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. The accused, in his defense, said
the burning incident was completely accidental. He said it was Mary Jay who was being difficult while they
were arguing.

Accused-appellant contends that (1) he never or did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
or so grave an offense as the felony charged against him; If not acquitted, accused-appellant argues that, in
the alternative, his sentence must be reduced due to mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so
grave a wrong and voluntary surrender. 

ISSUE: Whether the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.

RULING: No. The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the mitigating circumstance that the
offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. This mitigating circumstance is
obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong
and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is
manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim.

The court is convinced that the deceased did not take possession of the gallon container with kerosene. The
accused had full control and possession of the same. To be able to wet 90 percent of the body surface the
kerosene content of the gallon container must have been poured over the head of the deceased. This explains
why when she got ignited, the flames rose up to the ceiling and burned her from head to toe.

We, thus, agree with the trial court’s finding that accused-appellant knew the fatal injuries that he could cause
when he poured kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to ignite a fire. There was no disparity between the
means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled
to the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.

341. Chua
No intention to commit so grave a wrong
Dungo vs. People, 761 SCRA 375, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015 copy
FACTS: during an initiation rite, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his admission to the fraternity,
thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death.
Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon Villanueva y Mejilla."
Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049 because they "[i]nduced the victim
to be present" during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing by inducement does not necessarily include the
criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus, they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or
necessarily included in the information. By reason of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them has been violated.
ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong shall be appreciated
RULING: No, Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of hazing, the law provides that any person
charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to
commit so grave a wrong.

342
Seguritan vs. People
No intention to commit so grave a wrong

FACTS:. Version of the Prosecution: Seguritan was in a drinking session with his uncles Lucrecio Seguritan
(deceased), Melchor Panis, Baltazar Panis in the house of Manuel Dela Cruz in Bgy Paradise, Gonzaga,
Cagayan. Rono claimed that Lucrecio’s carabao entered his farm and destroyed his crops, and this was
followed by a heated discussion and then Rono punched Lucrecio twice (right and left temple) which caused
Lucrecio to fall as he was standing up, and his head hit a hollow block which was an improvised stove.
Lucrecio lost consciousness but later revived, and he was able to go home, at bgy Calayan, Cagayan. His wife
noticed blood on his forehead but he said he was stoned and then went to sleep. At about 9pm, his wife and
daughter noticed that his complexion darkened and foam coming out of his mouth. He was not revived and he
died the same night. After his burial on December 4, his wife learned of Rono’s involvement and sought the
help of NBI. NBI Medico-Legal officer Dr. Antonio Vertido exhumed the body and performed an autopsy which
found hematomas in the right parietal and left occipital areas, a linear fracture in the right middle fossa, and
subdural hemorrhage. The conclusion was that the cause of death was traumatic head injury

ISSUES: Whether accused should be convicted, and whether it should be homicide or reckless imprudence
resulting to homicide.

RULING: Accused is guilty of homicide. Rono contends that the fracture could have been caused by falling
from a height. He also said that the punches that he threw had nothing to do with Lucrecio’s death, and that
the injuries were caused by the latter hitting the hollow block. SC: Disagrees. It is on record that Lucrecio
suffered 2 external injuries and 1 internal injury in his head. The autopsy report shows that he died of
internal hemorrhage caused by injuries (see facts for location of injuries). Also, Melchor categorically testified
that Rono punched Lucrecio twice, who fell to the ground and hit his head on the hollow block. He even
hesitated to testify, as shown by the fact that he executed the sworn statement only after the autopsy report.
Melchor’s testimony was consistent with the autopsy findings. The court also declared that the punches could
really cause the fracture on deceased’s head. The testimony of Dr Vertido also says that the cause of death is
not heart attack but internal hemorrhage. His testimony said that the gross examination of the heart showed
no signs of heart attack which caused him not to further examine. The notation in the Death Cert has no
weight since Dr. Flor said she did not examine the cadaver of Lucrecio since Renato Sidantes, brother-in-law
of the deceased had no knowledge of the real cause of death. Rono contends that the delay in autopsy of
Lucrecio’s body and its embalming compromised the results thereof.

Rono cannot be held liable for reckless imprudence only since even when there is no intent to kill, death
resulted, hence the crime is homicide, since with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks at
the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for consequences thereof
(cited art 4, RPC).

344.HALID
GOTIS V PEOPLE, GR NO. GR NO. 157201
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION

FACTS: petitioner, Nemrod Gotis, and his brother, Nahom, arrived at Eddie Bautista's coconut plantation in
Bulan, Sorsogon looking for Serafin Gotis. Serafin's wife, Carmen, and daughter, Nilda, were then at the
plantation. Petitioner and Nahom, who were both armed with bolos, angrily approached Carmen and Nilda
and asked them where Serafin was. Not being able to find Serafin, Nahom pointed his bolo at Nilda and said,
"We will kill your father!" After petitioner and Nahom had left, Carmen and Nilda went to the house of Adolfo
Malinao to wait for Serafin. When Serafin arrived, Carmen told him what had happened at the plantation and
prevented him from going home. Serafin, however, disregarded Carmen's warning and insisted on going
home. On their way home, Serafin and his family had to pass by Nahom's house. Serafin attempted to hack
petitioner and tried to enter the gate of Nahom's house. Thereafter, Nahom struck Serafin on the head with a
bolo. Meanwhile, petitioner entered his brother's house to look for a bolo. After being hit, Serafin ran away.
Petitioner, however, pursued him, and hit him several times on the back and arm. 11 Carmen, who was then
following Serafin, saw the incident and cried for help. Serafin's brother, Jose, responded, but before he could
extend any help, petitioner poked a Batangas knife on his neck. Jose, however, was able to parry the blow
with his arm. Thereafter, petitioner ran away.Serafin was brought to a hospital in Irosin, Sorsogon, but he
eventually died during treatment. Petitioner admitted having killed Serafin. He, however, interposed the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. He claimed that he hit Serafin merely to defend himself against the
latter's attack.

ISSUE: WN Petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation because this
circumstance is anchored on [petitioner's] plea for self-defense.

RULING:YES. Sufficient Provocation as a Mitigating Circumstance. As an element of self-defense, unlawful

aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger of the attack, from the
victim. On the other hand, as a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper
conduct or act of the victim adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly
proportionate in gravity. Notably, while an act cannot be considered an unlawful aggression for the purpose
of self-defense, the same act can be considered as sufficient provocation for the purpose of mitigating the
crime.the retaliation of the accused in Romero v. People, although not considered an unlawful aggression, was
nevertheless deemed as sufficient provocation. The Court explained, "Thrusting his bolo at petitioner,
threatening to kill him, and hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to
enrage any man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children
are in danger." In the present case, petitioner was merely pacifying Serafin when the latter suddenly
attempted to hack the former. Although petitioner evaded the attack, Serafin's act was enough provocation to
anger petitioner and cause him to strike back.Thus, sufficient provocation attended the crime. ±rοblεŠ¡
νιrâ € Ï…αl  lαω 

347. People v. Benito y Restubog, G.R. No. L-32042, [February 13, 1975], 159 PHIL 408-417
10.2.5. immediate vindication
FACTS: Alberto Benito was sentenced to death by the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila after he pleaded guilty
to the charge of murder for having shot with a .22 caliber revolver Pedro Moncayo, Jr. on December 12, 1969.
The killing was qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation and disregard of rank. It was
mitigated by plea of guilty. After a mandatory review of the death sentence, this Court affirmed the judgment
of conviction. It appreciated in Benito's favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender after he shot
the victim. The penalty was reduced to reclusion perpetua

 assassination shed light on the remark which the victim, Moncayo, (at 11am) allegedly made upon
seeing Benito in the compound of the Civil Service Commission: "Nagiistambay pala dito and
magnanakaw." or, as Benito testified, Moncayo said: "Hindi ko alam na itong Civil Service pala ay
istambayan ng magnanakaw." (He shot the victim at 5:25pm)
 Benito argues that that remark "was tantamount to kicking a man already down and to rubbing salt
into a raw wound" and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, he was exposed to ridicule in
the presence of his officemates.
 Thus, Benito filed a MR. He contends that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of immediate
vindication of a grave offense and that the aggravating circumstances of disregard of rank should not
be appreciated against him.
ISSUE: is Benito entitled to mitigating circumstance of immediate vindication --NO

RULING: The facts of the case strongly suggest that what really impelled Benito to assassinate Moncayo was
not the latter's alleged defamatory remark that the Civil Service Commission compound was a hangout for a
thief or for thieves but the refusal of Moncayo to change his report so as to favor Benito. Benito did not act
primarily to vindicate an alleged grave offense to himself but mainly to chastise Moncayo for having exposed
the alleged anomalies or defraudation committed by Benito and for obstinately refusing to change his report.
 The 6-hour interval between the alleged grave offense committed by Moncayo against Benito and the
assassination was more than sufficient to enable Benito to recover his serenity. But instead of using
that time to regain his composure, he evolved the plan of liquidating Moncayo after office hours.
Benito literally ambushed Moncayo just a few minutes after the victim had left the office. He acted
with treachery and evident premeditation in perpetrating the cold-blooded murder.
 Benito "had more than sufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark if he ever did resent
it."

Aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank.— Benito contends that disregard of rank should not be
considered against him because there was no evidence that he "deliberately intended to offend or insult the
rank" of Moncayo. That contention has no merit.

 It should be borne in mind that the victim was a ranking official of the Civil Service Commission
( Assistant Chief of the Personnel Transactions Division and Acting Chief) and that the killer was a
clerk in the same office who resented the victim's condemnatory report against him.

349.
David v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 111168-69, [June 17, 1998]
Immediate vindication

Facts: Petitioner Joaquin E. David was charged, in two separate informations, with homicide and frustrated
homicide for the fatal shooting of Noel Nora and the serious wounding of the latters brother, Narciso Nora, Jr.,
on March 28, 1981, in Malabon, Metro Manila. while the Nora brothers Arturo, Arnel, Noel and Narciso were
walking along Flerida Street in Malabon, Metro Manila on their way home to Capitan Tiago Street, they saw
petitioner near the compound of his house. Noel Nora, the deceased, confronted him about derogatory
remarks allegedly made by the latter. Petitioner ran to his house to get a gun. When the Nora brothers
reached the intersection of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets, he shouted at them Putang ina ninyo (You sons
of a bitch) and other epithets, and then fired four times at them. One shot hit Noel, killing him. Another shot
hit Narciso Nora on the ankle. Another nearly hit the zipper of Arturo Nora. Petitioner claimed self-defense.
He alleged that on the night in question, he went to the corner of Flerida and Capitan Tiago Streets because
Noel Nora had earlier challenged him to a fight. However, upon reaching the place, he found that Noel had
brought along his three (3) brothers and other companions who ganged up on him. Petitioner further
contends that certain mitigating circumstances, besides voluntary surrender, should have been considered in
his favor, to wit: (a) that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately
preceded the act; (b) that he acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense committed against him; (c)
that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion or obfuscation.

Issue: W/N the mitigating circumstances should be considered.

Ruling: Yes. The mitigating circumstance of having acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense may
be appreciated. As the trial court and the Court of Appeals found, the petitioner had been beaten up by the
Noras and their companions. Although the unlawful aggression had ceased when petitioner shot the Nora
brothers, it was nonetheless a grave offense for the vindication of which petitioner may be given the benefit
of a mitigating circumstance. . As petitioners mother testified:
ATTY. RODRIGUEZ: [Private Prosecutor]
Q: Did you ask your son who fired the shots?
A: I told him, Ikaw ba, Jake? And answered: Pinagtulung-tulungan nila po ako kasi.

But the mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and sufficient provocation cannot be considered
apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These circumstances all arose from one and the
same incident, i.e., the attack on the petitioner by the victims and their companions, so that they should be
considered as one mitigating circumstance. Nor is the fact that petitioner has not shown himself to be
incorrigible a ground for reducing the penalty on him. This is a ground for suspension of judgment of youthful
offenders, i.e., those over 9 but under 18 years of age, which of course could no longer be ordered since at the
time the trial court rendered its decision petitioner was already over 18 years of age. Clearly, this is not a
mitigating circumstance and should not be used as basis for reducing the penalty. One circumstance not
raised by the defense but evident from the record of this case is minority.

351
People v. Cauyan
GR. L-33697, [April 2, 1984], 213 PHIL 456-460
Passion or obfuscation

FACTS: Constancio Cauyan was convicted by the CFI of Quezon of the crime of murder in Criminal Case 14735
and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case 14737. In the murder case, said accused was sentenced "to suffer
20 years of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Claudia Amat in the sum of P6,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay the costs." In the frustrated murder case, he was sentenced "to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 12 years of prision mayor, with the accessory
penalties prescribed by law; and to pay the costs.” Upon appeal, the CA certified to us Criminal Case 14735 for
final determination because "eliminating passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the proper
penalty should be reclusion perpetua."

Prosecution evidence shows that about 9:30 in the evening of April 7, 1961, Claudia Amat, then 58 years old,
was heard by her husband, Maximo Patron, and her son, Andres Patron, shouting "Huag, pare! tama na,
pare!." Andres Patron, 21 years old, rushed to the stairs of their house where he saw appellant Cauyan
stabbing his mother. When appellant saw him he stabbed Andres on the armpit and other parts of his body.
Whereupon, Andres went to their yard and took a piece of wood with which to defend himself and his mother.
Appellant still holding the knife ran after Andres who fell to the ground. The neighbors shouted at him to rise
up immediately as Cauyan might catch up with him and kill him. Rising up, he continued to run and shouted
for help. Roman Natividad responded by firing his gun in the air to scare appellant and to alarm the police. As
this juncture, Cauyan stopped chasing Andres.

In his defense, appellant testified that it was Andres who first hit him on the head and it was only then that he
drew his knife and stabbed Andres. During their struggle, Andres jumped back and his mother, Claudia, who
was holding him (Andres) was exposed and she was hit instead by the stab blows. Thus, appellant contends
that the knife thrusts at Claudia were accidental; and, with respect to Andres, he inflicted the wounds in
legitimate self-defense.

ISSUE: W/N there is passion or obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance

RULING: NO. In sentencing appellant to the minimum penalty of 20 years of reclusion temporal, the trial
court considered in his favor this mitigating circumstance for the reason, according to the court, that Maximo
Patron, husband of the deceased, had bailed out Rev. Fr. Palilio against whom appellant had filed a criminal
case. We do not agree that the act of Maximo Patron of having bailed out Rev. Fr. Palilio could have by its very
nature effectively caused passion and obfuscation upon appellant. An offended party who feels sore and is
enraged at the bondsman of one he charges with a crime is a rare specimen of mankind. That behavior is not
in line with the natural tendencies and experience of an ordinary human being. One who so reacts must have
been harboring in his heart something sinister against the bondsman which drove him to wreak vengeance
on the latter’s wife. This is not the kind of passion and obfuscation contemplated by law as an extenuating
circumstance in favor of the accused."

We fully agree with the appellate court in its rejection of passion and obfuscation as a mitigating
circumstance in favor of appellant Cauyan. In order that the circumstance of passion and obfuscation can be
considered, it is necessary to establish the existence of an unlawful act sufficient to produce such a condition
of mind, and it must be shown that the act which produced the passion and obfuscation is not far removed
from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might
recover his normal equanimity. In the case at bar, it was not unlawful on the part of Maximo Patron, husband
of the deceased Claudia, when he acted as bondsman for Rev. Father Palilio whom appellant had criminally
charged in court. And, it has not been shown that the act of having bailed Fr. Palilio was so proximate in point
of time to the commission of the crime as to preclude a sober realization of the wrongfulness of the course of
action taken by Appellant.

352 REYES
People vs. Cruz
Passion and obfuscation

MAIN POINT: The act of the deceased in favoring a rival of the accused in his courtship of a young woman
does not constitute a legitimate and sufficient cause of that passion and obfuscation which mitigates the guilt.

FACTS: Cruz was courting a woman named Hernandez. However, another guy, Enriquez, was also courting
her. Perea, the victim in this case, was a friend of Enriquez. Naturally, he favored Enriquez in his courtship of
Hernandez. For some reason, Cruz became angry and stabbed the victim in the abdomen. Perea died a few
hours later.

Cruz was charged and convicted of homicide. According to the trial court, Cruz, in inflicting the wounds that
caused the death of Perea, acted from an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation, because
of how Perea favored his friend Enriquez’s courting of Hernandez. Thus, by the trial court’s appreciation of
the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation, Cruz was sentenced to 6 years and 1 day of prision
mayor.

Upon appeal, the Attorney-General claimed that the trial court erred in appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

ISSUE: W/N the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can be appreciated.

RULING: NO. The fact that Perea favored a rival of Cruz in his courtship of the young woman, Hernandez, does
not constitute a legitimate and sufficient cause of that passion and obfuscation which mitigates the guilt. As
was held in the case of United States vs. Herrera (13 Phil., 583), and United States vs, Fitzgerald (2 Phil., 419),
the accused must have been actuated by such causes, both strong and powerful, as naturally produced
passion and obfuscation, and those causes which merely give rise to the excitement inherent in
combatants are not sufficient. Furthermore, the obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings (U. S.
vs. Flores, 28 Phil., 29).

In this case, the act of Perea was not enough to obfuscate Cruz, nor did the latter have any right to prevent
others from courting the Hernandez girl, or the deceased from favoring said courtship.

N.B. As to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so great a wrong as that committed, it cannot
be deemed present, considering the weapon employed by Cruz and the part of Perea’s body upon which it had
been used. There is no great or obvious disproportion between the means and circumstances of the attack and
the consequences thereof.
DISPOSITION: Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified, and the defendant is held guilty of the
crime of homicide penalized in Article 404 of the Penal Code, without any modifying circumstance, and he
is hereby sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the amount 1,000, to suffer the accessory penalties provided in Article 59 of the
Penal Code, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

355 – Sabtaluh
People v. Real y Bartolay, G.R. No. 93436, [March 24, 1995],
Passion and Obfuscation

Facts: Appellant and Edgardo, both vendors in the public market, engaged in a heated argument over the
right to use the market table to display their fish. The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but
after a while Corpus raised his voice again and said something to appellant. When Corpus kept on walking to
and from near the disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself. Once
Corpus turned around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape. The blow caused
Corpus to collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic. Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he
did so out of humiliation and anger when the victim threw his fish in the presence of so many
people. Appellant claims that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation

ISSUE: WON Appellant is entitled to the two mitigating circumstances: namely, vindication of a grave offense
and passion and obfuscation. 
 
RULING: Only Passion and obfuscation. The peculiarity of these two mitigating circumstances is that they
cannot be applied at the same time if they arise from the same facts or motive. If appellant attacked his victim
in the proximate vindication of a grave offense, he cannot successfully claim in the same breath that he was
also blinded by passion and obfuscation. At most, only one of two circumstances could be considered in favor
of appellant. The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce
passion and obfuscation, considering that the incident happened in a market place within full view
and within hearing distance of many people.

356. Quial v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-63564 (Resolution), [November 28, 1983], 211 PHIL 220-222
10.2. Mitigating Circumstances; 10.2.7. Voluntary surrender

FACTS: Job Quial, while intoxicated, hit a certain Edmundo Sebido with a single fist blow on the face, causing
the latter to fall with his head hitting the asphalted road, resulting in head injuries which eventually cause his
death. Indicted, Quial was Convicted of homicide by the Court of First Instance of Palawan, from which an
appeal was taken to the Intermediate Appellate Court. The latter court affirmed the appealed decision with
modifications, prompting the appellant to file the instant petition for review praying for a reduced penalty in
view of the alleged presence of two additional mitigating circumstances: lack of intention to commit so grave
a wrong and voluntary surrender.

ISSUE: WN the court a quo was correct in appreciating both the mitigating circumstances.

RULING: As to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong - YES, it
should be appreciated; Barring exceptional circumstances indicating otherwise, such as clear physical
capability to inflict a fatal blow, an intention to kill cannot be deduced from a single fist blow, especially when
the assailant, as in the case at bar, was intoxicated when the attack took place.
As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender - NO; While he did not hide from the authorities
after the boxing incident, he did not voluntarily surrender either. It was only when he was served the warrant
for his arrest on July 17, 1975 that he gave himself up to the police. Voluntary surrender does not simply
mean non-flight. As a matter of law, it does not matter if the accused never avoided arrest and never hid or
fled. What the law considers as mitigating is the voluntary surrender of an accused before his arrest, showing
either acknowledgment of his guilt or an intention to save the authorities from the trouble and expense that
his search and capture would require.

357 – Tan
De Vera vs. De Vera
G.R. No. 172832, April 7, 2009

FACTS: Petitioner accused her spouse and Josephine of Bigamy. Upon arraignment, Geren pleaded "Guilty."
However, in a Motion, he prayed that he be allowed to withdraw his plea in the meantime in order to prove
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The motion was opposed by petitioner on the ground
that not all the elements of the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender" were present. She added
that "voluntary surrender" was raised only as an afterthought, as Geren had earlier invoked a "voluntary plea
of guilty" without raising the former. Finally, she posited that since the case was ready for promulgation,
Geren’s motion should no longer be entertained. The RTC granted Geren’s motion and appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in the determination of the penalty to be imposed.

ISSUE: W/N all the requisites of voluntary surrender are present.

RULING: YES. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: 1) the
offender has not been actually arrested; 2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the
latter’s agent; and 3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the
intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges
his guilt or he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture. Without these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability
of arrest and the need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be
characterized as "voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance.

Petitioner is correct in saying that in People v. Cagas and in People v. Taraya, the Court added a 4 th requisite
before "voluntary surrender" may be appreciated in favor of the accused – that there is no pending warrant of
arrest or information filed. Since the warrant of arrest had been issued, petitioner insists that arrest was
imminent and the "surrender" could not be considered "voluntary."

In this case, it appears that the Information was filed with the RTC on February 24, 2005. On March 1, 2005,
the court issued an Order finding probable cause for the accused to stand trial for the crime of bigamy and for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, Geren surrendered to the court and filed
a motion for reduction of bail. After the accused posted bail, there was no more need for the court to issue the
warrant of arrest.

The foregoing circumstances clearly show the voluntariness of the surrender. As distinguished from the
earlier cases, upon learning that the court had finally determined the presence of probable cause and even
before the issuance and implementation of the warrant of arrest, Geren already gave himself up,
acknowledging his culpability. This was bolstered by his eventual plea of guilt during the arraignment. Thus,
the trial court was correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of "voluntary surrender.”

359 TORIBIO
People vs Nunez y Dubduban
G.R. No. 128875
Mitigating Circumstance: Plea of Guilt
FACTS: Complainant Janeth Nuñ ez was born on August 30, 1981 to Demetrio Nuñ ez and Nelia Ebay. When
her mother took on a job as domestic helper in Guam, Janeth stayed on with her father and younger brother
in Lower Cabantian, Buhangin, Davao City.

On January 17, 1996, at around 10:00 p.m., complainant was roused from her sleep and discovered that her
shorts and panties had been taken off. Her father, whom she found beside her, touched her nipple and
inserted his finger into her vagina. He also sucked her nipple. Complainant pushed her father away,
whereupon he returned to bed and complainant put on her shorts and panties and went back to sleep. She
woke up again later and saw her father on top of her. He inserted his penis into her vagina. She pushed him
aside and felt sticky fluid spill on her thigh and vagina. When her father left, complainant just sat down and
could no longer sleep.

The following day, complainant confided the incident to her classmate and her teacher, Mrs. Meliana
Geradona, who reported the matter to the police. Complainant thereafter submitted herself to an examination
by the Medico-Legal Officer of the Davao City Health Office, Dr. Danilo Ledesma, who found a superficial
laceration on her hymen at 6:00 o'clock position.

The incident made complainant very angry at her father, so she voluntarily instituted a case which led to the
filing of the following Information with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner's Plea of Guilt may be appreciated as mitigating circumstance?

RULING: NO. This was clearly misleading because (1) a plea of guilty may only be considered as mitigating
when seasonably interjected, that is, before the prosecution presents its evidence; and (2) the penalty of
death is indivisible and is not affected by either aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Clearly, too, the
accused was not categorically advised that his plea of guilt would not under any circumstance affect or reduce
his sentence, making his re-arraignment flawed.

360 BAIRD
People Vs. Gravino
FACTS: defendant-appellant Nonceto Gravino, had been courting Zosima Diagbel, a 20 year old student, for
about a year. In fact the two had been sweethearts until Zosima told the accused-appellant that she did not
wish to marry him because her parents did not want him to be Zosima's husband. accused-appellant went to
the house of the Diagbels. He entered the house surreptitiously, but he was discovered or in his own words "I
was noticed by the parents" whereupon he committed the crimes that led to the deaths of two persons and
almost led to the death of the third victim. Accused-appellant then surrendered to Sergeant Almazan of the
Philippine Constabulary in Kinoskosan, Lanao del Sur. On October 2, 1969, accused-appellant, in the presence
of counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty to each of the informations, but claimed the mitigating circumstances of
voluntary surrender, no intention to commit so grave a wrong, and the plea of guilt. Because these
circumstances were not in the record, the accused testified to prove the same.

On the basis of the plea of guilt, the trial court in its decision of October 24, 1969, convicted the accused-
appellant in the three criminal cases.  

The accused-appellant argues that the information simply alleged "treachery and evident premeditation" but
that there are no allegations of facts that could or would constitute these circumstances. The plea of not guilty
therefore according to the accused-appellant should be interpreted as a plea only to the conclusion of evident
premeditation and treachery but not to any actual facts or fact.

ISSUE: Whether the plea of guilt should be appreciated

RULING: Yes. Both the counsel de officio and the Solicitor General did not discuss as to whether or not the
accused-appellant made an improvident plea of guilty.

In capital offenses where the accused-appellant enters a plea of guilty, we have adhered to the rule that the
trial court should still take testimony and receive evidence not only to satisfy the trial judge but to aid this
Court in determining whether the accused truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance,
and consequences of his pleas

First, where in the arraignment, the accused is represented by counsel de oficio (as in this case), it is
incumbent upon the trial judge to accord such counsel the fullest opportunity not only to examine the records
but also to acquire every relevant information on the matter. Second, in the event of a plea of guilty, trial
courts are enjoined from accepting with alacrity such plea. Third, in capital offenses despite the entry of a plea
of guilty, the trial court in exercising its discretion should take or require the presentation of
evidence. ... Finally, Court again emphasized the necessity for trial courts to ascertain 'beyond the pale of
doubt whether the accused fully realized the consequence of their plea and imminence of a death sentence
arising therefrom before accepting their plea and imposing upon them the supreme penalty of death.

In the instant case, there is no doubt as to the guilt of the accused and to the absence of an improvident plea
because the trial court received evidence on the crimes while trying to ascertain the presence of the alleged
mitigating circumstances. It was the prosecution which decided to rely mainly on the pleas of guilt to all three
crimes and to forego presentation of evidence on the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and
treachery. As a matter of fact, the extrajudicial statements which are not refuted were never offered as
evidence during the trial.

We, therefore, agree with the accused-appellant that the crimes in two of the cases are not murder but only
homicide and that the third offense is only frustrated homicide.

362 Chua
Physical defect
People v. Deopante y Carillo, G.R. No. 102772, [October 30, 1996], 331 PHIL 998-1018
FACTS: Accused stab the victim and was charge with the crime of murder. He raised the defense of self-
defense, voluntary surrender and physical defect.
ISSUE: Whether physical defect shall be appreciated
RULING: The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a severed left hand, does not mean that he
should automatically be credited with the mitigating circumstance contained in paragraph 8, Article 13 of the
Revised Penal Code. In order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such physical defect
limited his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings to such an extent that he did
not have complete freedom of action, consequently resulting in diminution of the element of voluntariness.
Such cannot be appreciated in the case at bar where the appellant's physical condition clearly did not limit his
means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his free will. In fact, despite his handicap, appellant
nevertheless managed to attack, overcome and fatally stab his victim.

364
People vs. Javier
Illness
FACTS: Accused-appellant Eduardo Javier and the deceased Florentina Lacaste Javier had been married for
41 years at the time of her death. They had 3 children: Alma, who lived with them; Consolacion, who lived 15
meters away; and Manuel, who lived about 70-80 meters away. 2. Jun. 15, 1996, 2-3am: While at home,
Consolacion heard Florentina screaming, “Arayaten dac ta papatayen nac ni Tatangyo” (Your father is going to
kill me). Consolacion rushed out of her house and saw Alma in front of their parents’ house, who told her that
their parents were fighting. The two sisters rushed to Manuel’s house to fetch him.  The siblings then went
back to their parents’ house. Manuel entered first and found Florentina’s lifeless body and Eduardo wounded
in the abdomen. Eduardo had confessed to him that he killed Florentina and stabbed himself. 3. Eduardo
raised the defense of insanity. He told the court that he killed his wife because he had not slept for more than
a month, and that at the time the killing took place, his mind went totally blank and he did not know what he
was doing.  The RTC rejected this contention, because the defense failed to present any medical records nor
the testimony of a psychiatrist to prove 4. RTC Agoo convicted Eduardo of parricide and sentenced him to
death, to pay Florentina’s heirs P50,000 in moral damages and P21,730 as actual expenses, and costs. 5.
Eduardo appeals, averring that the lower court should have considered the mitigating circumstances of
passion and obfuscation, and illness (loss of sleep for a prolonged period of time). (These circumstances were
not alleged by the defense before the lower court).  He also contends that he suspected that Florentina was
having an affair, which was aggravated by his illness.  OSG argues that Eduardo cannot claim the mitigating
circumstance of illness absent a medical finding to support such claim, and the circumstance of passion and
obfuscation absent sufficient evidence.

ISSUE: Whether accused-appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of illness.

RULING: NO. For the mitigating circumstance of illness to be appreciated, the following must be present: The
illness must diminish the exercise of the willpower of the offender; and o Such illness should not deprive the
offender of consciousness of his acts. However, aside from Eduardo’s own testimony that his mind went blank
due to insomnia, no medical finding was presented regarding his mental condition at the time of the killing. o
No clear and convincing evidence was shown that he was suffering an illness which diminished the exercise of
his willpower at the time. On the other hand, it is apparent that Eduardo was aware of the acts he committed.
He remembered that he killed Florentina using a bolo, that he tried to kill himself thereafter, and that he was
brought to the hospital by his children. o This shows he was in full control of his mental faculties, negating his
claim that his insomnia diminished the exercise if his willpower.

365. HALID
PEOPLE V. BANEZ Y CABAEL, GR NO. 125849
ILLNESS

FACTS: Accused-appellant Wilfredo Bañ ez was living in his parents' house. his sisters, Elvira Bañ ez-
Bustamante and Emelinda Bañ ez-Antiado, came to the house because their father, Bernardo P. Bañ ez,
complained that accused-appellant made trouble whenever he was drunk. when her father went to his room,
accused-appellant, who looked drunk because he was red in the face, ran to the kitchen and got two (2)
knives and then went inside their father's room. Emelinda followed accused-appellant inside the room. Elvira
then heard Emelinda scream. When Elvira went inside the room, she saw accused-appellant stabbing her
father saying, "Pinalalayas mo ako!".. Emelinda tried to stop accused-appellant by throwing a piece of wood at
him, but accused-appellant turned to Emelinda and said to her: "You are also one." Emelinda was so
frightened she ran to Elvira's house, about 25 meters away from their father's house. As accused-appellant
chased Emelinda, Elvira locked herself inside her father's house and stayed there until three (3) helpers from
their poultry farm and their maid arrived. she was finally able to get help to take her father to the Sacred
Heart. By then, however, her father was already dead. Elvira herself was treated for her injuries.  twenty (20)
days after the commission of the crime, the accused-appellant was suffering from schizophrenia, Dr. Gerona
III testified that accused-appellant admitted the killing and said this was because his father wanted to throw
him out of their house to make room for a new helper. He said that accused-appellant was remorseful and
hoped that he would be forgiven. 9

ISSUE: wn schizophrenia may be considered as mitigating circumstance.

RULING:yes but the defense failed to prove that the accused was suffering from mental illness. the
evidence shows that accused-appellant had a motive for killing his father. The latter wanted to put him up in
another house because accused-appellant made trouble whenever he was drunk. His sister Elvira testified
that accused-appellant created trouble whenever he was drunk and that was the reason she (Elvira) and
Emelinda were in their father's house because their father did not want accused-appellant to stay there
anymore. It was entirely possible that he killed his father out of resentment and that he only suffered a
mental breakdown because of emotional stress arising from the incident. That was the reason he was found
suffering from schizophrenia when taken to the National Center for Mental Health.Although schizophrenia
is not exempting if it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, it may
nevertheless be considered mitigating under Art. 13(9) if it diminishes the exercise of his will power.
In this case, however, the defense failed to prove that accused-appellant was suffering from schizophrenia or
any mental illness at the time immediately preceding or at the very moment of the commission of the crime
that could diminish his will-power.

368. People v. Macbul, G.R. No. 48976, [October 11, 1943], 74 PHIL 436-445
10.2.11. Analogous Circumstances
Facts: Appellant pleaded guilty to an information for theft of 2 sacks of papers valued at P10; it being also
alleged that he was a habitual delinquent, having been twice convicted of the same crime. The trial court
sentenced him to suffer one month and 1 day of arresto mayor as principal penalty and 2 years, 4 months, and
1 day of prision correccional as additional penalty for habitual delinquency. The trial court found 2 mitigating
circumstances: plea of guilty under paragraph 7, and extreme poverty and necessity under paragraph 10, of
article 13 of the Revised Penal Code; but it took into account the aggravating circumstance of recidivism in
imposing the principal as well as the additional penalty.
Issue: whether the mitigating circumstance is proper -- YES

Ruling: The trial court considered extreme poverty and necessity as a mitigating circumstance falling within
No. 10 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, which authorizes the court to consider in favor of an accused
"any other circumstance of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned." The trial court
predicates such consideration upon its finding that the accused, on account of extreme poverty and of the
economic difficulties brought about by the present cataclysm, was forced to pilfer the two sacks of papers
mentioned in the information from the Customhouse Building, which he sold for P2.50, in order to be able to
buy something to eat for various minor children of his. (The stolen goods were subsequently recovered.) The
Solicitor General interposes no objection to the consideration of such circumstance as mitigating under No. 10
of article 13. We give it our stamp of approval, recognizing the immanent principle that the right to life is
more sacred than a mere property right. That is not to encourage or even countenance theft but merely to
dull somewhat the keen and pain-producing edges of the stark realities of life.

BOCOBO, J., concurring: extreme poverty and necessity is a mitigating circumstance, not only because it is
analogous mitigating circumstance under No. 10 of art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code, but also for the reason
that it is an incomplete exempting circumstance contemplated in No. 1 of said article 13, in relation to Nos. 5
(irresistable force) and 6 (uncontrollable fear) of art. 12. The trial court found that the accused committed the
crime of theft "por extrema pobreza y necesidad," and considered this as an analogous mitigating
circumstance within the meaning of No. 10, art. 13 of the Revised Penal Code. Such a finding is based on the
fact that on March 9, 1943, the accused took the two sacks of papers and sold the same for P2.50 because he is
the father of several minor children and they and he had nothing to eat on that day. The extreme poverty and
need is a mitigating circumstance analogous to 2 of the circumstances enumerated in art. 13. These two are:
1. "That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation."
(No. 6) 2. "Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of will-power without however
depriving him of consciousness of his acts." (no. 9) It will be noted that there is a common idea underlying
these 2 mitigating circumstances, namely, that the offender either by a powerful impulse or through illness
had no effective control over himself at the time he committed the crime. Was this the state of mind of the
defendant herein when he took the papers? I believe so because the thought that his little children would
starve on that day must have temporarily dulled his conscience and driven him to steal. The spectre of hunger
of his loved ones terrified him into stealing. The reason for Nos. 6 and 9 of art. 13, above quoted, being the
same as in the instant case, the rule of analogy authorized in No. 10 of that article should be applied. 

 NOTE: The lawmaker, fully aware of the impossibility of laying down an exhaustive enumeration of
circumstances that would extenuate crime, has formulated a general statement in No. 10 of art. 13. It
is thus that each case must be judged by the courts on its own merits, the only condition being that
there must be similarity or analogy to one or more of the nine circumstances specifically mentioned
in said art. 13.
Taking irresistible force and uncontrollable fear together, I believe that the force and the fear which coerced
the accused herein to steal are of the same nature contemplated in Nos. 5 and 6 of art. 12, but they are of less
degree than that required for complete exemption from criminal responsibility. Therefore, I am of the opinion
that according to No. 1 of art. 13, there is a mitigating circumstance of incomplete exemption from criminal
liability under Nos. 5 and 6 of art. 12 of the Revised Penal Code.

 This being so, why should the offense of the accused herein be mitigated by extreme poverty and
need? Because misery and hunger impelled him to steal, although such force was not absolutely
irresistible, under No. 5 of art. 12. His condition was sufficiently grave to drive him to take the
papers, but it was not utterly inevitable that he should do so. The same considerations apply in
regard to uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury (No. 6, art. 12). The accused, desperate
because of fear that his little children would starve, stole the papers, but his fear was not absolutely
uncontrollable.

370
Palaganas vs. People, 501 SCRA 533, G.R. No. 165483, September 12, 2006
Aggravating Circumstance

Facts: Brothers Servillano, Melton and Michael Ferrer were having their drinking spree at their house but
later decided to proceed to Tidbits Videoke Bar to continue their drinking spree and to sing. Thereafter, Jaime
Palaganas arrived together with Ferdinand Palaganas and Virgilio Bautista. When Jaime Palaganas was
singing, Melton Ferrer sang with him. Jaime got irritated and insulted. He felt that he was being mocked by
Melton that caused him to go to the latter’s table and uttered statements which began the fight. Ferdinand
sought help from Rujjeric Palaganas. They went to the bar and upon seeing the Ferrers instructed Rujjeric to
shoot them. Rujjeric Palaganas shot Servillano, Melton and Michael with the use of unlicensed firearm. As a
result, Melton was killed, Servillano was fatally wounded and Michael was shot in his right shoulder.

Issues:
(1) W/N Palaganas was guilty of the crime of homicide and 2 counts of frustrated murder.
(2) W/N of the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance which should be appreciated by the
court at the case at bar.
Ruling: On the first issue, Rujjeric Palaganas is guilty of homicide for the death of Melton Ferrer, frustrated
homicide for fatally wounding Servillano Ferrer and attempted homicide for shooting Michael at his right
shoulder.

On the second issue, yes, the unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance. An aggravating
circumstance was provided for under Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act 8294 which
is a special law that was passed stating that: if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed
firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. Voluntary surrender of the petitioner in this case is merely an
ordinary mitigating circumstance.

371
People v. Solar y Dumbrique
GR. 225595, [August 6, 2019]
Aggravating Circumstances

FACTS: Ma. Theresa, the wife of the victim, Joseph Capinig testified that on March 9, 2008, at around 2AM, she
decided to follow her husband who left the house to get his Cell phone from Rolando Solar. Along the way, she
saw Rolando and Mark Kenneth Solar hit Joseph with a baseball bat on his nape. When Joseph fell down, the
two simultaneously ganged up on him. She then shouted for help and the assailants ran away. Immediately,
Joseph was rushed to the hospital but was pronounced "dead on arrival." Rolando denied the accusation and
claimed that he was attending a wake on the night of March 8, 2008, from 11PM to 2AM the following day.
Joseph was also there drinking and playing cara with his group. After a while, Joseph approached him and
offered to pawn a cellphone in exchange of cash. However, he refused because he also needed money. On his
way home, he met Joseph who, upon seeing him, drew out a kitchen knife and tried to stab him thrice.
Fortunately, he was not hit and he immediately ran away. The RTC found the testimony of Ma. Theresa, the
sole eyewitness of the prosecution, to be clear, positive, categorical, and credible to establish Rolando's guilt
for the crime charged. The RTC also held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was present in the
killing of Joseph, and hence, the crime committed by Rolando was Murder. Nevertheless, the CA downgraded
the offense from Murder to Homicide, holding that the Information did not sufficiently set forth the facts and
circumstances describing how treachery attended the killing.

ISSUE: W/N the CA is correct in convicting Solar of Homicide on the ground that the Information did not
sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing the attendance of treachery in the killing.

RULING: NO. The CA erred in modifying Rolando's conviction in the way that it did when he had effectively
waived the right to question his conviction on that ground. The Court notes that the right to question the
defects in an Information is not absolute. In fact, defects in an Information with regard to its form may be
waived by the accused. In this case, Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the Information
filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He voluntarily entered his
plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the trial. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the
waivable defects in the Information, including the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the
attendant circumstances. In other words, Rolando is deemed to have understood the acts imputed against
him by the Information. It is for this reason that the Court modifies Rolando's conviction from Homicide to
Murder — he failed to question the sufficiency of the Information by availing any of the remedies provided
under the procedural rules, namely: either by filing a motion to quash for failure of the Information to
conform substantially to the prescribed form or by filing a motion for bill of particulars. Again, he is deemed
to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information filed against him. In view of the foregoing, the
Court thus reversed the assailed Decision of the CA. It finds the accused-appellant Rolando Solar y Dumbrique
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code.

373 REYES
People vs. Reyes
 Public position

FACTS: Reyes and his companion approached Garcia and Flores and inquired about a certain Oscar Solomon,
who lives near their residence. Flores approached Reyes and asked for a cigarette light but Reyes suddenly
struck him with a karate chop to the stomach using the side of his open palm, at the same time poking a gun
on them saying, “Ang sama ng porma niyo.” Reyes and his companion appeared to have taken liquor as they
had alcoholic breath.

Immediately after they left, Garica and Flores went to the police station and reported about the “gun-poking”
incident. When Reyes was investigated, he made known that he was a policeman from a different precinct, but
that he was in civilian clothes because he was on emergency leave that day. They tried to settle the matter.
Meanwhile, the mother of Flores refused to settle the case and shouted at each other. Reyes suddenly
approached Flores, sat at the edge of the investigator’s table in front of Flores who was seated on the chair,
uttered bad words and said “I will shoot you now,” and immediately, pulled his gun and shot Flores, hitting
him in the abdomen which gunshot wound caused his death a few hours thereafter.

Reyes was charged and convicted of murder qualified by treachery and, there being proved the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of public position without any mitigating circumstance to offset the same,
sentenced to death.

ISSUE: W/N the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position can be appreciated.

RULING: YES. The crime was committed with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of public position. Reyes
was in civilian clothes at the time he was apprehended. He identified himself as a policeman of the Manila
Police Department belonging to another precinct. Because of his position, he was not relieved of his service
firearm which he had on his person in spite of the fact that the charge against him was grave threats. At the
investigation room, Reyes had the run of the place, in a manner of speaking, again because of his position. In
the course of the investigation being conducted, Reyes had the effrontery and arrogance to sit on top of the
table of the investigator, at the edge thereof, in utter disregard of the respect due the investigator, let alone
the elementary rules of courtesy.

From this position, Reyes, with his service firearm, shot Flores who was then seated on a chair in front of the
investigator's table, stooping and smoking. Instead of upholding the law, Reyes broke it; instead of using his
service firearm for good, he used it for evil. Clearly, his crime is graver and his responsibility greater.

DISPOSITION: WHEREFORE, finding the appealed judgment in accordance with the law and the evidence, the
same is hereby affirmed in toto.

N.B. As to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the deceased was unarmed at the time he was shot, seated of
a chair at the investigator's table, stooping and smoking, completely unaware of the impending attack. Reyes
was seated on the edge of the table two feet away from the deceased when the former pulled out his gun from his
waistline and shot him, immediately after the accused had uttered the words, "I will shoot you now". It is evident
that Reyes employed a method of attack which tended directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk
to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery therefore, qualified the
killing to murder.

As to the mitigating circumstance of (a) sufficient provocation; (b) passion and obfuscation; (c) drunkenness; (d)
voluntary surrender; and (e) lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, which Reyes claims to have attended the
commission of the crime, we find the contention to be without merit. Since the alleged provocation which caused
the obfuscation of Reyes did not come from the deceased but from the latter's mother, the same may not, be
appreciated in favor of Reyes. Besides, it may be pointed out that in the present case, provocation and
obfuscation cannot be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances but should treated as one, having
arisen from the same incident. Voluntary surrender may not also be credited to Reyes because the fact that he
did not try to escape or did not resist arrest after he was taken into custody by the authorities does not amount
to voluntary surrender. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to
submit himself unconditionally to the authorities. Here, the accused after shooting the deceased was
immediately disarmed and placed under arrest. There is, therefore, no voluntary surrender to speak of because
Reyes was in point of fact arrested. As to the alleged lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed the same cannot likewise be considered in favor of Reyes. His clear intention to kill the deceased may
be inferred from the fact that he used a deadly weapon and fired at the deceased almost point blank, thereby
hitting him in the abdomen and causing death. And as to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it suffices
to state that the medical certification shows that Reyes was not intoxicated.

375. - Sabtaluh
People v. Herrera, G.R. Nos. 140557-58, [December 5, 2001]
Public position

FACTS: Accused was charged with murder. Enrique the victim was sitting on a steel chair at his home eating
fishballs while cuddling his youngest child. He was engaged in a conversation with Ma. Rizza Aguilar and his
brother Edwin. The calm evening air was shattered when Egardo Herrera armed with a .38 caliber revolver
suddenly approached Enrique from behind and fired at close range. Although wounded, Enrique managed to
pass his child to his brother in the ensuing uproar and attempted to crawl to safety. His attacker, however,
followed and pumped more bullets into him. After firing the sixth shot, the assailant casually walked away.
When the smoke cleared, Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo, who caught a slug in her temple, lay bloodied
and fatally wounded. Accused was charged with murder aggravated by taking advantage of his public
position as he was a policeman.

ISSUE: WON the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position should be appreciated in
this case.

RULING: NO. To appreciate this aggravating circumstance, the public officer must use the influence, prestige
or ascendancy which his office gives him as a means by which he realizes his purpose.  The essence of the
matter is presented in the inquiry Did the accused abuse his office to commit the crime? In the case at bar,
there was no showing that accused-appellant took advantage of his being a policeman to shoot Ganan or that
he used his influence, prestige or ascendancy in killing the victim. Accused-appellant could have shot Ganan
even without being a policeman. In other words, if the accused could have perpetrated the crime even
without occupying his position, there is no abuse of public position.  The mere fact that accused-appellant is a
policeman and used his government issued .38 caliber revolver to kill Ganan is not sufficient to establish that
he misused his public position in the commission of the crime. 

376. People v. Gutierrez, Jr., G.R. No. 116281, [February 8, 1999], 362 PHIL 259-285
10.3. Aggravating Circumstances; 10.3.1. public position

FACTS: This is an appeal from the RTC's decision wherein the Court Court finds accused SPO1 Gutierrez, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER with aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength, that advantage was taken by the accused of his public position, and that the crime was committed in
contempt of or without insult to public authority, one of which is offset by the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.

He allegedly killed ANTONIO MERCENE JR. a duly elected municipal councilor, inflicting upon the latter a
gunshot wound and multiple abrasions and laceration indifferent parts of the body which caused his untimely
and instantaneous death. The information alleged two qualifying circumstances (evident premeditation and
treachery) and three aggravating circumstances (abuse of superior strength, that advantage was taken by the
accused of his public position, and that the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to public
authority).

ISSUE: WN the aggravating circumstance of public position should be taken into account.

RULING: YES. The trial court found that there was evident premeditation based one fact that, before the
shooting, there was an incident between the parties the Casiligan river, for which several-complaints were
filed by the deceased against accused-appellant. Assuming that these caused ill-feeling the part of the latter,
accused-appellant did not know that he would see the deceased on October 17, 1992 and, therefore, could not
have planned to kill him then. Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength
so the same need not be appreciated separately. The aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of one's
public position is present since the gun used by accused-appellant was the service revolver issued to him.

The crime, therefore, is murder with the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of accused-appellant's
office. At the time when the crime was committed in 1992, the penalty for murder was reclusion temporal
maximum to death. The presence of an aggravating circumstance would call for the imposition of the
maximum penalty, i.e., death. However, in view of Art. III, Sec. 19(1) of the Constitution, the imposition of the
death penalty then was prohibited. It was only on December 31, 1993 when, by virtue of R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty of death was imposed for certain heinous offense; in view of the compelling necessity for imposing
the supreme penalty. Accordingly, the penalty next lower to death, i.e., reclusion perpetua, should be imposed
in this case.

378 – Tan
People vs. Magdueño
G.R. No. L-68699, September 22, 1986

FACTS: As the late Fiscal Dilig had placed himself at the driver's seat inside his jeep parked near his house, all
of a sudden, 2 successive gunshots burst into the air, as the gunman coming from his left side aimed and
poured said shots into his body, inflicting two fatal wounds. 3 witnesses positively identified the assailant as
accused Magdueñ o: Magdueñ o also executed an extra-judicial confession wherein he admitted that he killed
Fiscal Dilig for a price or reward and implicated Senas and de Leon to the commission of the crime. However,
both Senas and de Leon were later dropped from the amended information for lack of a prima facie case
against them. He was convicted by the RTC with the crime of murder qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation and aggravated by price or reward and that the crime was committed in contempt of/or with
insult of public authority.

ISSUE: W/N the aggravating circumstance of contempt to public authority is applicable.

RULING: NO. The aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime with insult to public authority does not
seem to be borne by the records. For this aggravating circumstance to be considered it must not only be
shown that the crime was not committed in the presence of the public authority but also that the crime was
not committed against the public authority himself. In the instant case Fiscal Dilig, the public authority
involved in the crime, was the victim. Hence, the lower court, erred in including commission of the crime with
insult to public authority as an aggravating circumstance.

379 TORIBIO
People vs Rodil
G.R. No. L-35156
Aggravating Circumstance: Contempt to Public Authorities

FACTS: Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine
Constabulary. The accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and treachery,
and with intent to kill, did, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of
his official duties, which directly caused his death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of murder can be complexed with assault upon agent of authority.
RULING: YES. The Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because "it was established by
the prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance
to defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting. The suddenness of the attack does
not by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery, the record failed to show that the accused made any
preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly, therefore, the impelling
motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former
resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of treachery in the commission of the
crime.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim.
Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and
therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were charged with the
complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then
the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be
appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is inherent in the charge of assault against a person
in authority or an agent of a person in authority.

380 BAIRD
Contempt to Public Authorities
People Vs. Guitierrez

FACTS: SPO1 Romulo Gutierrez, Jr.,was found guilty of MURDER for the death of ANTONIO MERCENE JR. a
duly elected municipal councilor, inflicting upon the latter a gunshot wound and multiple abrasions and
laceration indifferent parts of the body which caused his untimely and instantaneous death.defined and
punished under Article 248 paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code as charged with aggravating
circumstances of abuse of superior strength, that advantage was taken by the accused of his public position,
and that the crime was committed in contempt of or without insult to public authority, one of which is offset
by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

Witness Jose Advincula was first to testify. He told the court that he went with Dante Pajaron to deliver gravel
and sand to a certain Evelyn in Barangay Batuhan, Pola, Oriental Mindoro. While their truck was parked and
he was on top of the sand loaded on it, he heard a commotion. Looking to his right, he saw two persons, one
had a gun (whom he identified as accused-appellant), while the other (whom he identified as Mercene, Jr.)
had none. Advincula said that while Mercene, Jr. was lighting a cigarette, accused-appellant kicked him,
causing him to fall to the ground with both hands touching the ground. As Mercene, Jr. tried to stand up,
accused-appellant boxed him, causing him to fall again to the ground. Again Mercene, Jr. tried to get up, but
accused-appellant hit him on the shoulder, causing Mercene, Jr. to fall with his hands and knees to the ground.
Accused-appellant then aimed his gun (about two inches away) towards the back of Mercene, Jr.'s left ear and
fired. The prosecution's next witness was Arnel Marasigan Aranas, a fellow member of the deceased Antonio
Mercene, Jr. in the Sangguniang Bayan of Pola. Aranas knew both Mercene, Jr. and accused-appellant. He
testified 7 that Mercene, Jr. was a member of the Task Force Dagat of the Sangguniang Bayan. According to
him, Mercene; Jr. wrote to SP04 Romeo V. Delmo, accused-appellant's superior, charging accused-appellant
with grave misconduct (Exh. C). 8 Mercene, Jr.'s complaint was based on an incident which happened on
August 25, 1992. Aranas said that he and Rosie Rivas accompanied the deceased on an inspection trip along
the Casiligan river in Pola because of Rivas' complaint that accused-appellant had been poaching in the area
in which she had been granted the exclusive right to catch lapu-lapu. Rivas had asked Mercene, Jr. for
assistance. 

ISSUE: Whether the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to
public authority should be appreciated
RULING: No. Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength so the same need
not be appreciated separately.  Neither can the aggravating circumstance that the crime was committed with
insult to public authority be appreciated as the crime was committed against the public authority himself.  The
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of one's public position, however, is present since the gun used
by accused-appellant was the service revolver issued to him.(eto lang nakalagay)

381 Chua
contempt to public authorities
U.S. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 6344, [March 21, 1911], 19 PHIL 150-158
FACTS: appellants, with nine other, being members of the second company of the Constabulary stationed at
Davao, mutinied on the 6th day of June, 1909, attempting, during the course of such mutiny, to kill one of their
superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria
ISSUE: Whether the crime is committed in contempt with insult to the public authorities.
RULING: No, The supreme court of Spain has held "that the circumstance of contempt of or insult to public
authority, provided for in paragraph 16 of the Penal Code, can exist only when such authority is engaged in
the exercise of its functions and he who is thus engaged in the exercise of said functions is not the person
against whom the crime is committed in which that circumstance appears;" the court further saying that such
aggravating circumstance was not present in the case before it "because D. Jose Torres, although he was
municipal judge, was the object of the murder involved in that case."

In the case at bar, if the crime was committed with contempt of and insult to the public authorities, those
authorities must have been the public authorities of Davao. But the persons exercising that authority were the
very persons against whom, among others, the crime charged in this action was being committed.

383
People vs. Torellos
Rank, age, sex

FACTS: 16 year-old Erriza Antiquera, left her house to visit her friend who lives on Paghanapin Street, Tondo,
Manila. However, her friend was not home. Thereafter, she took a pedicab and proceeded to her house. Along
the way, the pedicab she was riding in was blocked by another pedicab with five men on board. One of them,
appellant Jose Torellos, whom complainant had previously met, boarded her pedicab and pointed a knife at
her. He ordered the driver to bring them to KP Tower in Tondo, Manila. His companions followed them in the
other pedicab. When they reached the place, they entered a small shanty. Inside, appellant lit a candle and
they inhaled shabu. They told complainant to join them but she refused, prompting appellant to hit her on the
stomach. Thus, she was forced to inhale the substance, which made her weak that she had to sit down in a
corner of the shanty. Appellant then asked his companions to leave, then locked the door and forcibly
undressed complainant and kissed her on the neck, breast and private parts. Then, he lay on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She protested and struggled against the advances but her efforts were in
vain. In the afternoon, appellant returned to the shanty and raped complainant again. After he left, she peeked
through the door to make sure that no one was guarding her, then she forced open the door and boarded a
pedicab and proceeded to her brother’s house. However, she lost consciousness along the way before she
could reach her brother’s house. When she regained consciousness, she found herself at the Philippine
General Hospital with her mother. Accused is convicted of the crime of rape under Article 266-A of the RPC,
attended by the aggravating circumstance of minority of the victim, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua will all the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether the court erred in appreciating the circumstance of minority.

RULING: YES. The trial court found that the commission of the rape in this case was attended by the
aggravating circumstance of minority of the victim, which was duly proved at the trial.15 However, under
Article 266-B of the RPC, the fact that the rape victim was under eighteen (18) years of age may be
appreciated as a qualifying aggravating circumstance only when the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse
of the parent of the victim. In the case at bar, none of these relationships obtains between appellant and the
victim. Neither can the minority of the victim be considered a generic aggravating circumstance under Article
14 (3) of the RPC. In order that this circumstance shall aggravate the offense, there must be a showing that
the appellant deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim.18 There was no such showing in
this case. Hence, the trial court erred in applying the aggravating circumstance of minority. Accordingly, there
being no aggravating circumstance, appellant can only be convicted of simple rape defined under Article 266-
A of the RPC, which is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Article 63 of the RPC
provides that in "all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of
the deed." Therefore, the trial court correctly imposed on appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

384. HALID
PEOPLE V. CORTES Y ORTEGA, GR NO. 137050
RANK, AGE, OR SEX

FACTS: at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside her house Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuñ a.
Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs
of the house. When Edlyn complied, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla
tried to help Edlyn, but accused overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away despite being
wounded; however, she collapsed five (5) meters away from where she was stabbed. Junilla shouted for help.
At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn was able to stand up but again collapsed after walking about
five (5) steps. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired. Accused admitted that he
stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against whom he had an altercation earlier. He
committed the mistake because at the time of the incident, accused was very drunk and the place was very
dark. He only learned that he had stabbed the wrong person the following morning through the radio
vigilantes program. The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the
commission of the crime. The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating
circumstance of intoxication.

ISSUE: WN there is an aggravating circumstance of sex 

RULING:NO. The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this aggravating circumstance: (a)
the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act."As to the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to
offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood. 11 In fact, the accused
mistook the victim for a man.

384. HALID
PEOPLE V. CORTES Y ORTEGA, GR NO. 137050
RANK, AGE, OR SEX

FACTS: at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside her house Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuñ a.
Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs
of the house. When Edlyn complied, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla
tried to help Edlyn, but accused overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away despite being
wounded; however, she collapsed five (5) meters away from where she was stabbed. Junilla shouted for help.
At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn was able to stand up but again collapsed after walking about
five (5) steps. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired. Accused admitted that he
stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against whom he had an altercation earlier. He
committed the mistake because at the time of the incident, accused was very drunk and the place was very
dark. He only learned that he had stabbed the wrong person the following morning through the radio
vigilantes program. The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the
commission of the crime. The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating
circumstance of intoxication.

ISSUE: WN there is an aggravating circumstance of sex 

RULING:NO. The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this aggravating circumstance: (a)
the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act."As to the aggravating circumstance of
disregard of sex, the same could not be considered as it was not shown that accused deliberately intended to
offend or insult the sex of the victim, or showed manifest disrespect for her womanhood. 11 In fact, the accused
mistook the victim for a man.

387. People v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, [March 29, 2017], 808 PHIL 276-296
10.3.4. dwelling

FACTS: the accused were charged of different offenses attempted murder and murder. Crime was committed
[in] the dwelling x x x of the victim at nighttime and disguise was employed, with accused Sibbu wearing a
bonnet on his face. When they were convicted by the court, they argued that the aggravating circumstances
of treachery, dwelling, and use of disguise were not sufficiently established.

 Trial court held: In the instant cases, the victims were at their azotea in their house when accused
Tirso Sibbu fired shots at them. Tirso Sibbu was outside the house of the victims. Under these
circumstances, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated against Tirso Sibbu.

ISSUE: aggravating circumstance of dwelling is proper -- YES

RULING: The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman
fired the shot from outside the house, his victim was inside. For this circumstance to be considered it is not
necessary that the accused should have actually entered the dwelling of the victim to commit the offense; it is
enough that the victim was attacked inside his own house, although the assailant may have devised means to
perpetrate the assault from without xx.

Issue: aggravating circumstance of treachery is proper – YES

RULING: Treachery is present "when the offender commits any of the crimes against person, employing
means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make

 The case of Catbagan has an entirely different factual context with the case at bar. In Catbagan, the
accused was a police officer who investigated reported gunshots during an election gun ban in the
residence of one of the victims. Prior to the shooting, Catbagan had no intention of killing anyone. It
just so happened that during a heated exchange, Catbagan drew his firearm and shot the victims. In
this case however, before the shooting incident, appellant was seen with a gun slung over his neck
and a bonnet covered his face to conceal his identity. It is clear that appellant's purpose is to harm
and kill his victims.
In this case, the evidence on record reveals that at the time of the shooting incident, Warlito, Ofelia, Trisha,
and Bryan were at the porch of their house totally unaware of the impending attack. In addition, they were all
unarmed thus unable to mount a defense in the event of an attack. On the other hand, appellant and his
cohorts were armed. They also surreptitiously approached the residence of the victims. Appellant, in
particular, wore camouflage uniform to avoid detection. Although Bryan was able to warn his family about
the impending attack, it was too late for the victims to scamper for safety or to defend themselves. At the time
Bryan became aware of appellant's presence, the latter was already in the vicinity of about five meters. In
fine, appellant employed deliberate means to ensure the accomplishment of his purpose of killing his victims
with minimal risk to his safety. There can be no other conclusion than th at the appellant's attack was
treacherous.

Issue: aggravating circumstance of use of disguise is proper – YES

RULING: There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal
his identity, especially since Bryan and appellant live in the same barangay and are familiar with each other.

Penalty: Since 2 aggravating circumstances of dwelling and use of disguise attended the commission of the
crime of murder, appellant should be sentenced to death in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Thus
under Article 63, the higher penalty should be imposed. However, because of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346, or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines, the imposition of death penalty
is now prohibited. The law provides that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed with no eligibility for parole. Accordingly, appellant should suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole 

389
People v. Kalipayan y Aniano, G.R. No. 229829, [January 22, 2018]
Aggravating Circumstance: Dwelling

Facts: On or about the 25th day of June 2008 in the City of Tacloban, Arnel stabbed several times Glaiza
Molina, his former live-in partner inside her house while she was cooking with her mother with the use of
bladed knife hitting different parts of the latter’s body causing her some injuries thereon resulting to her
instantaneous death. Said act is attended with the aggravating circumstance of “dwelling” as charged in the
information. Accused-appellant presented a different account of the incident. He claimed that he confronted
Glaiza because he believes that the latter was having an affair with another man and the situation hurt him.
He claims that they argued and he lost control and started stabbing Glaiza, and he could not remember the
number of times he stabbed her. He could also not recall what happened until he surrendered. On the subject
of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance, the RTC stated that there is no evidence showing that the crime
was deliberately and purposely intended to be inside Glaiza's house and to cause disrespect to the sanctity of
the dwelling.
Issues: W/N the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated.

Ruling: Yes. Notably, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling need not be "deliberately and purposely
intended" by an accused for it to be appreciated. Rather, it aggravates the felony when the crime was
committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter did not give any provocation. It is considered
an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy accorded to the human abode.
Repeated across many cases are these lines: "[o]ne's dwelling is a sanctuary worthy of respect thus one who
slanders another in the latter's house is more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere.
According to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in another's dwelling shows worse perversity and
produces graver harm." He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he
who offends him elsewhere.

As pointed out earlier, Glaiza was only preparing dinner in the sanctity of her home when the attack
happened. There was no prior incident that would give rise to accused-appellant's sudden actions. Clearly,
there was no provocation that would exempt this case from being aggravated by the circumstance of
dwelling. There is also no question that Glaiza was living in the same house where the crime was committed.
Therefore, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant should be that for an aggravated crime, the higher of
the two (2) indivisible penalties, which is death in this case. However, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346 , the
penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed, with no eligibility for parole.

390
People v. Jugueta
GR 202124, [April 5, 2016]
Dwelling

FACTS: Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina were all lying down side by side about to
sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when suddenly their wall made of sack was
stripped off by appellant and his companions. They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused
despite his plea for mercy, they fired at them successively and indiscriminately, having hit and killed his two
daughters, Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were 13 years old and 3 ½ years old respectively.

In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with
Multiple Attempted Murder. However, based on the sworn statement of one Danilo Fajarillo, the Provincial
Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

Appellant was then convicted by the trial court of Double Murder and Multiple Attempted Murder.
CA affirmed.
 
ISSUE: W/N dwelling, as an ordinary aggravating circumstance is present
 
RULING: YES. Murder is defined under Article 248 of the RPC as the unlawful killing of a person, which is not
parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such as treachery or evident premeditation. The trial
court correctly ruled that appellant is liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s
two children. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.
When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists. As to the charge of multiple attempted
murder, the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code states that a felony is attempted when the
offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of
appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the manner of, the commission
of the crime. The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s finding that appellant is liable for attempted
murder.
Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Information in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect.

It has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the
law accords to human abode. He who goes to another’s house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than
he who offends him elsewhere.” Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the dwelling of
the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation therefor. In view of the attendant
ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant.

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. However,
pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be
imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without
eligibility for parole. With regard to the four (4) counts of attempted murder, the penalty prescribed for each
count is prision mayor. With one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its
maximum period.

397. People v. Abrazaldo, G.R. No. 124392, [February 7, 2003], 445 PHIL 109-127
10.3. Aggravating Circumstances; 10.3.7. place where official function

FACTS: Information was filed against Abrazaldo for the crime of murder; wherein accused armed with a bolo
stabbed DELFIN GUBAN which caused his death. However, Abrazaldo invoked self-defense saying that it was
the deceased who went to his house and shouted at him, saying, "Get out Feding I will kill you!" and hit him
with a pipe.

The Solicitor General, in the Appellee's Brief, asserts that in pleading self-defense, accused-appellant admitted
he killed the victim and, therefore, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness
of that of the prosecution. Moreover, accused-appellant's version of the incident is completely contradicted by
the testimony of his sister. Also, the aggravating circumstance, under par. (5) of Article 14, Revised Penal
Code, was clearly established because during the incident, Guban, as the Assistant Chief Tanod, was on duty
and engaged in the maintenance of peace and order.

ISSUE: WN the aggravating circumstance of "place where official function" could be appreciated.

RULING: NO. The Court held that it must be pointed out that this aggravating circumstance is based on the
greater perversity of the offender, as shown by the place of the commission of the crime, which must be
respected. In this case, the crime was committed at the compound of the accused-appellant where no public
function was being held. The arrival of the barangay authorities was precisely due to the trouble that had
commenced prior to the stabbing incident. Clearly, the said aggravating circumstance cannot be considered.
Moreover, under the present Rules, aggravating circumstances must be alleged, otherwise, they cannot be
appreciated. Being favorable to the accused, this new procedure may be given retroactive effect. Except
treachery, the other aggravating circumstances mentioned have not been alleged in the Information.

398 – Tan
Navarro vs. CA
G.R. No. 121087, August 26, 1999

FACTS: Reporters went to an entertainment club and took a picture of the dancers. The floor manager took
out his gun. The reporters went to the police station to report the matter. 3 of the policeman on duty,
including Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station. They got into an argument thereafter. As
Lingan, one of the reporters, was about turn away, Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left
eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave
him a fist blow on the forehead which floored him. Lingan was rushed to the hospital but he died from his
injuries. He was held beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of homicide

ISSUE: W/N Art. 14 (5) of the RPC is applicable.

RULING: YES. The aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities
are engaged in the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against Navarro. The offense in this case
was committed right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions.

400 TORIBIO
People vs Dela Cruz y Venancio
G.R. No. 75267
Aggravating Circumstance: Place of Religious Worship

FACTS: At about 8:00 o'clock p.m. on 6 September 1980, Brigida Venancio—then barely seven (7) years
old — was walking through a heavy rain, alone and without an umbrella, bound for her grandparents' house.
While Brigida was passing by the Chapel in Sta. Cruz, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, the accused Carlos dela Cruz y
Venancio, a blood relative of Brigida (the record does not disclose in what civil degree), suddenly reached out
from the doorway and grabbed Brigida's arm and pulled her inside the Chapel.

In the Chapel, where it was dark the lights being off, the accused led her to the last pew, pinned her down on
the pew and removed her panty. Accused also removed his pants and immediately introjected or sought to
introject his penis into little Brigida's private organ. While so engaged, the accused covered Brigida's mouth
with his one hand twisted her arm with his other arm. Accused succeeded in placing his organ on top and at
least partially into Brigida's private part. Shortly, thereafter, while the two (2) lay down on the pew, head to
head, with panty and pants on, respectively, two (2) young parishioners Luzviminda Mendoza and Marilou
Carpio, entered the Chapel for a scheduled prayer rally and switched on the lights. Luzviminda Mendoza saw
Brigida, who immediately stood up almost simultaneously with the accused, dazed and soaking wet. Another
parishioner Mrs. Francisca Mendoza, Brigida's teacher in Grade I primary school, arrived in the Chapel a little
later. She too saw Brigida and the accused and wondered why she was still abroad rather than at home at
such a late hour. Mrs. Mendoza advised Brigida to go home immediately which Brigida did. On her way back
to her parents' house, Brigida met Luzviminda Mendoza's father, Mang Domeng, who on noticing her dazed
condition accompanied her home to her doorstep.

After the rally, Luzviminda who was an aunt of Brigida, did not go home directly but went to the house of
Brigida's parents and asked the mother why Brigida was soaking wet and still not at home at that late hour.
After Luzviminda had left, the mother asked Brigida what had happened. Brigida then told her mother she
had been violated by Carlos "Bosyo" dela Cruz. 

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of committed in the place of religious worship is an aggravating
circumstance

RULING: YES. the trial court could have and should have found the presence of the generic aggravating
circumstance of commission of the offense in a place dedicated to religious worship. The trial court made no
mention of such aggravating circumstance in its decision. Because the appropriately imposable penalty
of reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty, and was in fact imposed by the trial court, the finding that we
here make of the presence of this generic aggravating circumstance, does not impact upon the imposable
penalty.

401 BAIRD
 Place for Religious Worship
People Vs. Jaurigue

FACTS: Nicolas Jaurigue and Avelina Jaurigue were prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas, for
the crime of murder, of which Nicolas Jaurigue was acquitted, but defendant Avelina Jaurigue was found
guilty of homicide.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, September 20, 1942, Nicolas Jaurigue went to the chapel of
the Seventh Day Adventists Defendant and appellant Avelina Jaurigue entered the chapel shortly after the
arrival of her father, also for the purpose of attending religious services, and sat on the bench next to the last
one nearest the door. Amado Capina was seated on the other side of the chapel. Upon observing the presence
of Avelina Jaurigue, Amado Capina went to the bench on which Avelina was sitting and sat by her right side,
and, without saying a word, Amado, with the greatest of impudence, placed his hand on the upper part of her
right thigh. On observing this highly improper and offensive conduct of Amado Capina, Avelina Jaurigue,
conscious of her personal dignity and honor, pulled out with her right hand the fan knife which she had in a
pocket of her dress, with the intention of punishing Amado's offending hand. Amado seized Avelina's right
hand, but she quickly grabbed the knife with her left hand and stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side
of the neck, inflicting upon him a wound about 4 1/2 inches deep, which was necessarily mortal causing his
death.

From said judgment of conviction, defendant Avelina Jaurigue appealed to the Court of Appeals for Southern
Luzon, and in her brief filed therein on June 10, 1944, claimed —(3) That the trial court erred in holding that
the commission of the alleged offense was attended by the aggravating circumstance of having been
committed in a sacred place.

ISSUE: Whether the aggravating circumstance of having been commited in a place of worship should be
appreciated

RULING: No. The claim of the prosecution, sustained by the learned trial court, that the offense was
committed by the defendant and appellant, with the aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a
place dedicated to religious worship, cannot be legally sustained; as there is no evidence to show that the
defendant and appellant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel that fatal night. Avelina is not a
criminal by nature. She happened to kill under the greatest provocation. She is a God-fearing young woman,
typical of our country girls, who still possess the consolation of religious hope in a world where so many
others have hopelessly lost the faith of their elders and now drifting away they know not where.

403 Chua
nighttime
People v. Sabas, G.R. No. L-29776, [August 27, 1975], 160 PHIL 911-915
FACTS: Bonificia echaluce with other co-accused killed one Severiano Echaluce with treachery and evident
premeditation. In the commission of the offense the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling
were present.
ISSUE: Whether nighttime shall be appreciated
RULING: No, As regards nighttime, the Solicitor General agrees with the appellant that said aggravating
circumstance, the presence of which was admitted when the plea of guilty was entered, is nevertheless
absorbed by the qualifying circumstance of treachery and therefore should have not been considered by the
trial court in imposing the penalty. We find their position on the point to be correct and justified by decisions
of this Court.

404
People vs. Matbagon
Nighttime

FACTS: Between eleven and twelve o'clock on the night of May 13, 1934, Marciano Retubado, the deceased,
and Vicente Matbagon, the defendant, had a fight at the cockpit in Ilihan, in the municipality of Tobogon, Cebu
Province. The fight resulted from a remark made by the defendant respecting the tuba sold by the niece of
Marciano Retubado. Magno Surigao separated the defendant and the deceased, but they had already bitten
each other. Shortly afterwards Marciano Retubado called his son and they started home. He carried a torch
struck in a bottle, and was followed by his son, Emiliano Retubado, a schoolboy, fifteen years old. When they
came opposite a colo tree, about fifty meters from the cockpit, the defendant with a knife in his hand
approached the deceased and stabbed him in the breast. The deceased struck the defendant on the head with
the bottle that he was carrying. The bottle was broken and the light went out. A struggle between the accused
and the deceased followed. The deceased received in all four wounds; one on the chin, and another on the
right side of the face; one, two inches deep, on the left side of the chest, and another, one and one-half inches
deep, on the breast. The injured man died in a few minutes from the wounds that he had received on the
breast and on the left side of the chest. The accused then ran away.When the accused first stabbed the
deceased, Emiliano Retubado cried for help. Rufino Surigao was the first to arrive. The distance between the
place where the defendant was standing near the colo tree and the place where he stabbed the deceased was
about a braza.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty of murder because the crime was committed with treachery; that
the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity was offset by the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, since the defendant committed the crime because he had been bitten a few minutes before by the
deceased.

ISSUE: Whether the court erred in appreciating the nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance.

RULING: YES. In construing the provision of the Penal Code relating to nocturnity, it was repeatedly held by
this court that nocturnity would be considered as an aggravating circumstance only when it appeared that it
was especially sought by the offender or that he had taken advantage thereof in order to facilitate the
commission of the crime or for the purpose of impunity. It was said in the case of People vs. Trumata and
Baligasa (49 Phil., 192), that nocturnity should not be estimated as an aggravating circumstance, since the
time for the commission of the crime was not deliberately chosen by the accused; that if it appears from the
record that the accused took advantage of the darkness for the more successful consummation of his plans, to
prevent his being recognized, and that the crime might be perpetrated unmolested, the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity should be applied. In the present case none of the foregoing reasons exists for
appreciating nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. The attack made by the defendant upon the deceased
was but a sequel to the fight at the cockpit, which had taken place half an hour before. If the defendant had
killed the deceased in the fight at the cockpit, probably no one would contend that nocturnity should be
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in that case. It would be purely accidental, and so it was in the
present case.

In the case at bar the accused neither sought the nighttime nor took advantage of it to commit the crime with
greater facility or to escape. If he had hidden behind the tree and attacked the deceased without warning or
availed himself f the darkness t prevent his being recognized or to escape, then nocturnity would have been
an aggravating circumstance. If the accused in this case did not take advantage of the nighttime to commit the
crime or to escape, then the darkness did not facilitate the commission of the offense. To take advantage of a
fact or circumstance in committing a crime clearly implies an intention to do so, and one does not avail
oneself of the darkness unless one intended to do so.

405. HALID
PEOPLE V. CORTES Y ORTEGA, GR NO. 137050
NIGHTTIME

FACTS: at about eleven o'clock in the evening, Junilla Macaldo was sitting on a bench outside her house Bislig,
Surigao del Sur. While thus seated, Edlyn Gamboa came to her asking for the whereabouts of Yen-yen Ibuñ a.
Junilla noticed that Edlyn was followed by accused George Cortes. Junilla then instructed Edlyn to go upstairs
of the house. When Edlyn complied, accused followed her and successively stabbed her several times. Junilla
tried to help Edlyn, but accused overpowered her. In a moment, Edlyn was able to run away despite being
wounded; however, she collapsed five (5) meters away from where she was stabbed. Junilla shouted for help.
At this juncture, accused scampered away. Edlyn was able to stand up but again collapsed after walking about
five (5) steps. She was brought to the Babano Medical Clinic, where she expired. Accused admitted that he
stabbed Edlyn. He mistook Edlyn for her male companion against whom he had an altercation earlier. He
committed the mistake because at the time of the incident, accused was very drunk and the place was very
dark. He only learned that he had stabbed the wrong person the following morning through the radio
vigilantes program. The prosecution alleged that the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation,
cruelty, nighttime, abuse of superior strength, disrespect to sex, and intoxication were present in the
commission of the crime. The accused, on the other hand, raised the attendance of the mitigating
circumstances of voluntary surrender, plea of guilty, mistaken identity and the alternative mitigating
circumstance of intoxication.

ISSUE: WN there is an aggravating circumstance of nigthtime 

RULING:NO. The prosecution failed to establish the following elements of this aggravating circumstance: (a)
the time when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused
clung to that determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and the execution sufficient to
allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of the act."

As to the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, the same could not be considered for the simple reason that
it was not specifically sought in the commission of the crime. "Night-time becomes an aggravating
circumstance only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes advantage of it; or (3)
it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offender's immunity from identification or
capture."9 In the case at bar, no evidence suggests that accused purposely sought the cover of darkness to
perpetrate the crime, or to conceal his identity.

408. THE UNITED STATES, vs. RAFAEL ARCIGA, ET AL

10.3.10. uninhabited place
FACTS: The judge has imposed upon the defendants the penalty of death, considering the concurrence, in the
commission of the crime of the aggravating circumstances of alevosia, premeditation, and the perpetration of
the offense in an uninhabited place (robbery with homicide)
ISSUE: whether the aggravating circumstance of perpetration of the offense in an uninhabited place is
proper? -- NO
RULING: With respect to the circumstance of the commission of the crime in an uninhabited place, we do not
find this circumstance sufficiently proven in the case, in consideration of the fact that a short distance from
the place where the crime was committed there was a station, the precise purpose of which was to serve as a
shelter for the peace officers of the town. On the other hand, it does not appear that when the offense in the
case at bar was committed there were no watchmen at the station; therefore it cannot be said, strictly
speaking, that the place in question was an uninhabited, solitary place, and that its isolation made it easy to
commit the crime with impunity. This is the very element upon which rests the increased responsibility for
crimes committed in uninhabited places.

With respect to premeditation: there are no data whatever to show when the idea of killing and robbing the
deceased first arose in the minds of the accused. This idea might well have occurred to them at the very
moment they met him in the place where the crime was committed. This meeting, in accordance with all
conjectures possible upon the record of the case, was casual, and therefore it cannot be affirmed, because of
the lack of any evidence, that the commission of the crime was preceded by a reflexive and premeditated
purpose or intent, this being precisely what constitutes premeditation. In consequence, we hold that this
circumstance did not exist in this case.
With respect to alevosia:  No witness was present at the commission of the crime, and therefore no one can
testify from his own knowledge as to the manner and form in which the crime was committed. These data
being absent, there is no foundation upon which to rest the circumstance of alevosia, which is, in its essential
characteristics, a modifying condition in the commission of the crime. It can not even be presumed that the
defendants tied the hands of the deceased - and this is apparently the fact upon which the judge relied for the
purpose of considering that this circumstance was present - because the vague indications which appear in
the record to have been made upon this point as a mere matter of hearsay are overcome by the certain and
unquestionable fact that the deceased crawled on his hands and knees some 300 meters from the place where
the crime was committed to the police station, where he was found wounded by the people of the barrio in
which the crime occurred. This proves positively that his hands were free and not tied. This conclusion is
corroborated by the circumstance that none of the various witnesses who saw him in the station could testify
to the contrary at the trial.

410.
People v. Antonio y Rivera, G.R. No. 208623 (Resolution), [July 23, 2014]
Uninhabited place

Facts: AAA, minor, was raped by her godfather. In April of 2001, while in the farm up in the mountain, the
accused-appellant threatened AAA with death. Against her will, he succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her. In her statements regarding the second rape incident on August 26, 2003, AAA did not mention that the
accused-appellant threatened to kill her. Nonetheless the Court recognized the accused-appellant’s moral
ascendancy over AAA takes the place of the force and intimidation that is required in rape cases.

Issue: W/N the aggravating of uninhabited place can be appreciated.

Ruling: Yes. Court sustains the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the RTC and CA on the accused-
appellant for each of the two counts of rape which he committed. The aggravating circumstances of minority
and commission of the crime in an uninhabited place were present as regards the first rape incident. The
second rape was,on the other hand, aggravated by minority alone since legal guardianship was not proven.
The aggravating circumstances attendant in the instant case are all merely generic and not qualifying. Generic
aggravating circumstances increase the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase
the same o the next higher degree.32 In the accused-appellant's case, the two counts of rape were committed
through the use of force and intimidation. The crime falls under Article 266-A(l)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
Article 266-B of the same code provides that the said crime is punishable by reclusion perpetua, which is an
indivisible penalty. Therefore, despite the attendance of generic aggravating circumstances, the penalty
imposable upon the accused-appellant for each count of rape remains the same.
411
People v. Cabiles
GR. 113785, [September 14, 1995], 318 PHIL 250-267
Uninhabited place

FACTS: "That on or about July 27, 1991, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Sowa, Municipality of San
Fernando, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
confederating together and mutually helping one another with intent of gain, violence and intimidation upon
person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously demand money from one Violeta Angustia,
box and then hogtied her, with intent to kill, hack with a bolo hitting her neck, thereby inflicting wound which
directly caused her instantaneous death, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and rob away cash in
the amount of 1,000, belonging to Violeta Angustia, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount
aforementioned.” "That apart from the aforementioned aggravating circumstances, the following also
concurrently attended in the commission of the crime; that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place;
that it was committed with insult or in disregard on account of her sex.”

Only accused Rudy and Rogelio Esparraguerra were arrested. Ely Cabiles, on the other hand, remains at large.

ISSUE: W/N the aggravating circumstances of disregard of sex and uninhabited place attended the
commission of the crime

RULING: NO. Well settled is the rule that the aggravating circumstances that the crime was committed with
insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, age or sex, may be taken
into account only in crimes against persons or honor, when in the commission of the crime, there is some
insult or disrespect shown to rank, age or sex. It is not proper to consider this aggravating circumstance in
crime against property. Robbery with homicide is primarily a crime against property and not against persons.
Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the criminal. It is
thus erroneous to take this aggravating circumstance into account in robbery with homicide.

As regards the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place (despoblado), we have ruled that the term
uninhabited place refers not to the distance of the nearest house to the locus criminis. The more important
consideration is whether the place of commission affords a reasonable possibility for the victim to receive
some help. Further, before it could be appreciated against the accused, it must be established that solitude
was purposely sought or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime. We find that this
circumstance was not satisfactorily proven in this case. Robbery with homicide is punishable by two (2)
indivisible penalties, reclusion perpetua to death. Since the alleged aggravating circumstances were not duly
established, we agree with the court a quo that the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed
against Accused-Appellants.

416. U.S. v. Santiago, G.R. No. 1000, [March 6, 1903], 2 PHIL 6-9
10.3. Aggravating Circumstances; 10.3.11. by a band
(case not found)

418 – Tan
People vs. Arpa
G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969

FACTS: An Information was filed against Dicto Arpa and Maalum Arpa, charging them with robbery with
triple homicide. It stated that having boarded a motor banca, owned by Mola together with other passengers
bound for Talicud Island, Davao, and once the motor banca was in the middle of the sea and when it
developed engine trouble, the accused, conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to steal the
motor banca and by means of intimidation, the Dicto firing his .22 cal. revolver to scare the passengers of the
banca, and fired at one of the passengers, hitting the said passenger at the right shoulder, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously took and carried away the said motor banca valued at P2,100, to the damage and prejudice of
the above-named owner in the aforementioned amount, and as a result of the jumping into the sea of all the
passengers of the motor banca, 3 passengers of the motor banca drowned and died. The RTC appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt and appreciated 2 aggravating circumstances: (1) the crime was
committed in an uninhabited place; (2) the crime is committed on the occasion of conflagration, shipwreck,
earthquake, epidemic or other calamity or misfortune.

ISSUE: W/N the crime was committed "on the occasion of a conflagration, shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic,
or other calamity or misfortune”.

RULING: NO. The development of engine trouble at sea is a misfortune, but it does not come within the
context of the phrase "other calamity or misfortune" as used in Article 14, par. 7 of the RPC, which refer to
other conditions of distress similar to those precedingly enumerated therein, namely, "configuration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic", such as the chaotic conditions resulting from war or the liberation of the
Philippines during the last World War. The reason for the provision of this aggravating circumstance "is
found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending
aid to the afflicted adds to their suffering by taking advantage of their misfortune to despoil them." Clearly, no
such condition of great calamity or misfortune existed when the motor banca developed engine trouble.

There is nothing in the record whatever to indicate that the engine trouble developed was a serious one such
as to create confusion and apprehension on the part of the passengers as perceived by the trial court, and that
the same was not easily repaired; if at all, the indications are to the contrary, for as alleged in the information,
the accused succeeded in stealing the motor banca at sea.

420 TORIBIO
People vs Enojas
G.R. No. 204894
Aggravating Circumstance: Calamity

FACTS: PO2 Gregorio and PO2 Pangilinan were patrolling the vicinity of Toyota Alabang and SM Southmall
when they spotted a suspiciously parked taxi. They approached the taxi driver Enojas and asked for his
documents. Having entertained doubts regarding the veracity of documents shown them, they invited him in
their mobile car to the police station for further questioning. Enojas complied leaving his taxi behind. Upon
reaching 7-11 on Zapote-Alabang Road, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down to relieve himself there.
As he approached the store’s door, however, he came upon two suspected robbers and a shootout ensued.
PO2 Pangilinan shot one suspect dead and hit the other who still managed to escape. But someone fired at
PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2 Gregorio was also engaged in a shootout with two more armed
robbers who managed to escape. He then went back to the patrol car and noticed that Enojas fled. Suspecting
that Enojas was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched his abandoned taxi and found a mobile
phone apparently left behind by Enojas. The police officers monitored the incoming messages and posed as
Enojas. The accused appellants were later on arrested in an entrapment operation and were convicted of
murder by RTC Las Pinas.

ISSUE: Whether or not in aid of armed men and use of unlicensed firearm are aggravating circumstances

RULING: NO. The Court must, however, disagree with the CA’s ruling that the aggravating circumstances of a)
aid of armed men and b) use of unlicensed firearms qualified the killing of PO2 Pangilinan to murder. In "aid
of armed men," the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in the commission of the crime
under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise they are to be regarded as co-principals or co-
conspirators. The use of unlicensed firearm, on the other hand, is a special aggravating circumstance that is
not among the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as qualifying a homicide to
murder. Consequently, the accused in this case may be held liable only for homicide, aggravated by the use of
unlicensed firearms, a circumstance alleged in the information.

422
Recidivist
US vs. Torrida

FACTS: appellant Florencio Torrida, shortly after entering upon his duties as councilman of the town of
Aparri, Province of Cagayan, gave  directions to his subordinates that the death of all large animals must be
reported by the owners to him as councilman. amaso Rabilas lost one carabao, Bonifacio Rante one, Santiago
Rante two, and Felipe Rante one. he respective owners of these animals reported their death to the appellant.
Upon the receipt of this information the appellant informed these owners that they must pay a fine of P5 for
each animal, these fees to be turned into the municipality by him. The owners, believing that the municipality
had provided for the payment of such fines, turned over to the appellant five pesos for each animal that died.
There was no provision whatever made by the municipality or any other entity for the imposition of such
fines. These facts clearly constitute the crime of estafa. Appellant was charged with three separates crimes
of estafa in three separate actions, tried and found guilty in each case Appellant insists that the trial court
erred (1) finding that there were present in the commission of these crimes the aggravating circumstance of
being a recidivist

ISSUE: Whether he is a recidivist

RULING: No. These three cases were tried together in the court below. The judgments in all three of these
cases were rendered at the same time; in fact, the three judgments are contained in the same paragraph and
were pronounced at the same time. A recidivist is one who at the time of his trial for one crime shall have
been convicted by the final judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Penal Code. At the
time the trial court held that the accused was twice a recidivist there was no final judgment against him. In
fact, the judgments imposed could not have become final until after the expiration of fifteen days and this only
in the event that an appeal was not taken. So it is clear that the aggravating circumstance mentioned in
number 18 was not present.

423 Chua
recidivist
U.S. v. Ramos, G.R. No. 539, [April 1, 1902], 1 PHIL 192-194
FACTS: accused inflicted several wounds upon Ambrosio Macaraeg, who died shortly after in consequence
thereof, and that the accused perpetrated the crime treacherously (alevosamente)
ISSUE: Whether accused are recidivist
RULING: No, The bad antecedents of the accused do not constitute in themselves an aggravating
circumstance, it not having been made to appear that they have been formerly punished for some crime or
crimes, or could be regarded as recidivists under paragraphs 17 and 18 of article 10 of the Penal Code.
Furthermore, the report of the municipality in which the Ramos brothers lived as to their manner of life and
conduct solely states that it was middling — a vague expression which conveys no concrete idea and can not,
therefore, be considered for the purpose of aggravating the penalty which the law requires should be inflicted
upon these defendants.

425
People vs. Real y Bartolay
Reiteracion

FACTS: In the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant and Edgardo Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a
heated argument over the right to use the market table to display their fish. Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal
Mayor, who happened to be at the public market, tried to pacify them, saying that they were arguing over
trivial matters.The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpus raised his voice
again and said something to appellant. The latter, in a soft voice, uttered "SOBRA NA INA NA
IMOPAGDAOGDAOG" (You are being too oppressive). When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the
disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his bolo while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned
around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked him on the nape. The blow caused Corpus to
collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic. When asked by his wife as to who hacked him, he answered
"Melchor Real." A police investigator went to the clinic to take the dying declaration of Corpus, who said that
it was appellant who stabbed him. Corpus died two days later. Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but
claimed that he did so out of humiliation and anger when the victim threw his fish in the presence of so many
people. Information provided that accused is a recidivist having been convicted by the Municipal Court of
Aroroy. The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that the attendant aggravating circumstance
was reiteracion and not reincidencia as alleged in the information.

ISSUE: Whether the aggravating circumstance is reiteracion.

RULING: NO. According to the information charging appellant of murder and the evidence, the accused was
previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed on July 6, 1965 and grave threats on November 25, 1968. In
recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion,
the offender shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]).
Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in kind from that for which he
was previously tried and convicted.Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised
Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was
convicted of homicide in the instant criminal case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as
homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated
against him is recidivism under Article 14[g] rather than reiteracion under Article 14(10) of the Revised
Penal Code.

There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be embraced
in the same title of the Code. While grave threats fall in title (Title Nine) different from homicide (Title Eight),
still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating circumstance requires that if there is only
one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the one for which the
accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the offender has been punished for
the previous offense. There is no evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect. Appellant is convicted
of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, which is offset
by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
 426. HALID
PEOPLE V. LAYSON, GR NO. L-25177
REITERACION

FACTS: The four accused, armed with bladed weapons, entered the cell where the unsuspecting victim,
prisoner Regino Gasang, was. Layson locked the door of the room. they then swiftly took turns in stabbing
Gasang. They thereafter barricaded themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the
scene of the crime, agreeing to surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising prison guard. Afurong
arrived, identified himself, and assured them of their safety, whereupon they handed their weapons through
the hole of the barricaded door and surrendered themselves.Gasang died shortly after being brought to the
prison hospital. Death was caused by severe internal and external hemorrhage and shock, all secondary to
multiple stab wounds. Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that they killed Gasang because the latter urinated
on their coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a
week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying. while then being convicts
serving in the said Davao Penal Colony their corresponding sentences of conviction by reason of final
judgment imposed upon them, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with
sharp-pointed instruments, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, and with
intent to kill, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with said
weapons Regino Gasang, their co-inmate in the said Colony, thereby inflicting upon him serious injuries
which caused his death; with the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused
Nicolas Layson and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them with two or more prior convictions.

ISSUE:WN the aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom it is
considered shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses.

RULING: It was error for the trial judge to consider against the accused the aggravating circumstance of
having been previously punished for two or more crimes to which the law attaches lighter penalties because
the said aggravating circumstance of "reiteracion" requires that the offender against whom it is considered
shall have served out his sentences for the prior offenses. Here all the accused were yet serving their
respective sentences at the time of the commission of the murder. It is indeed a lethal hand that pens
affirmance of a death sentence, but ours is the inescapable duty to enforce the inexorable mandate of the law.

428. People v. Bernal, G.R. No. 44988, [October 31, 1936], 63 PHIL 750-760
10.3.15. habitual delinquency
FACTS: The accused was charged with the crime of theft, the information alleging that, aside from the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of nocturnity, the accused is an habitual delinquent because he had
been convicted, prior to the commission of the offense at bar, thrice of the same crime of theft. As an habitual
delinquent, because previously convicted three times of the same crime of theft, he was sentenced to an
additional penalty of seven (7) years of prision mayor.

 Defense argued that third conviction, having taken place after the commission of the last offense with
which the accused is now charged, should not be reckoned with in determining habitual delinquency
and the additional penalty to be imposed.
 The aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into account in the commission of the
crime of theft in view of the established fact that the accused was thrice convicted of the said crime
prior to the trial of this case on November 4, 1935 (art. 14, par. 9, Revised Penal Code). For this
reason, the penalty imposable should be six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional.
 As an habitual delinquent, because he was twice convicted of the crime of theft prior to the
commission of the offense at bar (art. 62, last paragraph of the Revised Penal Code), he should be
 sentenced to the additional penalty of three (3) years of prision correccional pursuant to subsection
(a) of paragraph 5 of the said article.
ISSUE: Whether in instances where the accused turns out to be an habitual delinquent the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism, when alleged and proved, should be taken into account in fixing the penalty
applicable for the commission of the principal offense, independently of the additional penalty provided by
law for habitual delinquency –No.

RULING: such should not be considered, otherwise it would be twice held against the accused inasmuch as it
is necessarily taken into account in ascertaining whether he is a habitual delinquent or not. The majority of
the court hold to the contrary view, namely, that recidivism should be reckoned with; hence, the accused is
sentenced to the minimum of the maximum penalty fixed by law.

 aggravating circumstance of recidivism should be taken into consideration, notwithstanding the

allegation and proof that the accused were habitual delinquents and should accordingly be sentenced
to the additional penalty provided by law
  It is not correct to assume that recidivism is twice taken into account when the accused is declared
an habitual delinquent and when it is deemed to aggravate the crime in fixing the principal penalty to
be imposed, because recidivism as an aggravating circumstance modifying criminal liability is not an
inherent or integral element of habitual delinquency which the Revised Penal Code considers as an
extraordinary and special aggravating circumstance.

habitually delinquent Recidivism reiteration or habituality

- paragraph 5 of article 62
of Revised Penal Cod
if within a period of ten years
from the date of his release or last
conviction of the crime of
robbery, theft, estafa, or
falsification, he is found guilty of
any of said crimes a third time or
oftener.
- Paragraph 9 of article 14
It is committed by a person who,
at the time of his trial for one
crime, shall have been previously
convicted by final judgment of
another crime embraced in the
same title of the Code.
- paragraph 10
t is committed when the offender
has been previously punished for
an offense to which the law
attaches at an equal or greater
penalty or for two or more crimes
to which it attaches a lighter
penalty.

recidivism, viewed as an aggravating circumstance, is not a factor or element which necessarily forms an
integral part of habitual delinquency. It will be noted that the elements as well as the basis of each of these
circumstances are different

recidivism habitual delinquency

it is sufficient that the accused, on the date of his it is not enough that the accused shall have been
trial, shall have been previously convicted by final convicted of any of the crimes specified, and that
judgment of another crime embraced in the same the last conviction shall have taken place ten (10)
title years before the commission of the last offense.
- It is necessary that the crimes previously
committed be prior to the commission of
the offense with which the accused is
charged a third time or oftener.
Accused-appellant is found guilty of the crime of theft charged in the complaint and sentenced to six (6)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional

Dissent:  the aggravating circumstance of recidivism should not be taken into consideration in the imposition
of the penalty prescribed by law for the crime of which the appellant has been found guilty.lâwphi1.nêt
  if, within a period of ten years from the date of his release, or last conviction of the crime
of robo, hurto, estafa, or falsificacion, a person be found guilty of the same crime for the second time,
he would be deemed a recidivist; and if he be found guilty for the third time or oftener, he would be
deemed a habitual delinquent
The law determines the effect to be given to one previous conviction, and it also determines the effect of two
or more previous convictions. One previous conviction merely constitutes the generic aggravating
circumstance prescribed by article 14, paragraph 9, while two or more previous convictions qualify the crime.
The previous convictions enter into the third or subsequent offense to the extent of aggravating it, and
increasing the punishment. In other words such previous convictions constitute an essential element of the
aggravated offense. "The previous conviction enters into the second or third offense to the extent of
aggravating it, and increasing the punishment; and, where it is sought to impose the greater penalty for a
second or third offense, the previous conviction or convictions, like every other material fact, must be
distinctly alleged in the indictment. 'When the statute imposes a higher penalty upon a second and a third
conviction, respectively, it makes the prior conviction of a similar offense a part of the description and
character of the offense intended to be punished; and therefore the fact of such prior conviction must be
charged as well as proved. It is essential to an indictment that the facts constituting the offense intended to be
punished should be averred.' And in like manner, when a statute, besides imposing a higher penalty upon a
second or third conviction than upon the first, provides that any person convicted of two or more offenses
upon the same indictment shall be subject to the same punishment as if he had been successively convicted
on two indictments, still the second and third offenses must be alleged in the indictment to be second and
third offenses in order to warrant the increased punishment."

 It will be observed that the reason for not taking into consideration the second conviction as a
generic aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the penalty prescribed under article 533 of the
Penal Code of Spain, is because the third or subsequent conviction, together with the previous ones,
constitutes but a single qualifying circumstance. The same may be said in relation to article 62,
paragraph 5, of the Revised Penal Code. The third or subsequent conviction, combined with the
previous ones, constitutes but a single qualifying circumstance. In other words, the second conviction
— which generally goes to make up the generic aggravating circumstance of recidivism — is
necessarily included in the number of convictions required to establish habitual delinquency.

431.
People v. Hipolito y Clemente, G.R. No. L-31402, [August 17, 1981]
Price, Reward or Promise

Facts: The victim was shot and mortally wounded while making a telephone call outside a small "tienda"
which caused his death. Upon arrest, Accused Hipolito admitted having killed the victim while accused
Malagamba admitted participation in the commission of the crime in a custodial investigation conducted in
1968, without the assistance of counsel. Based on the said extrajudicial confession, the Court of First Instance
of Manila found both accused guilty of murder, qualified by evident premeditation, with aggravating
circumstance of price, reward or promise as to Hipolito, and without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance as to Malagamba. Feliciano Hipolito admitted having killed the said Concepcion Bustamante
Ang and implicated one Cirilo, the driver of Ang Kung alias Vicente Ang, the husband of the deceased, as the
person who hired him to kill the deceased for the amount of P5,000.00 at the instance of the said Ang Kung
alias Vicente Ang.

Issue: W/N there was a consideration of a price, reward or promise.

Ruling: No. There is no merit in the claim of the accused that the aggravating circumstance of price. reward
or promise is not present in view of the non-prosecution of Vicente Ang, the alleged giver of the price or
reward. The record shows that the accused Feliciano Hipolito made arrangements with his co-accused Cirilo
Malagamba relative to the killing of Concepcion Bustamante Ang and not with Vicente Ang, although Cirilo
Malagamba said that he was acting at the instance of the said Vicente Ang. and it was the accused Cirilo
Malagamba who paid him the amount of P2,800.00. Accordingly, whether or not Vicente Ang was prosecuted
in connection with the slaying of Concepcion Bustamante Ang is of little importance, the trial court, therefore,
did not commit an error in finding the accused Feliciano Hipolito guilty of the crime of MURDER, for the
killing of Concepcion Bustamante Ang, qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by the
circumstance that the crime was committed in consideration of a price, reward, or promise.

432
Paña v. Buyser
GR. Nos. 130144 & 130502-03, [May 24, 2001], 410 PHIL 433-450
Price reward or promise

FACTS: On December 10, 1993, Jose Juanite, Sr. and his son Jose Juanite, Jr. were in their residence in San
Pedro, Alegria, Surigao del Norte conversing with members of their family. When someone knocked on the
door, 10-year old Teotimo Questo, Jr. opened it. Upon opening the door, a man suddenly burst in and fired at
Jose Juanite, Sr. His son, Jose Juanite, Jr., rushed towards the door, close it but he was shot from the window
by another man. The gunshot wounds sustained by both father and son caused their instantaneous deaths.
This incident led to the filling of 2 criminal information for murder against appellant Tiguman, accused
Pomoy, Jr. and one John Doe. Subsequently, the informations2 were amended to include spouses Efren and
appellant Pañ a, as principals by inducement.

"In summary, insofar as the accused Melecia Paña is concerned. there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that, as
a result exists on the part of said accused to caused the killing of Jose Juanieta, Sr. and Jose Juanieta, Jr.; that, on
November 25, 1993, the accused Melecia Paña procured pictures of the said victims from prosecution witness
Elena Siaboc; that, in the evening of December 8, 1993, the accused Melecia Paña, Emmanuel (Manny) Tiguman,
Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr. a.k.a. Robert Bayan, and a certain Glen and Nonoy met in the Paña residence and there,
they planned, the killing of the Juanites, during which occasion the accused Melecia Paña instructed Manny
Tiguman and Robert Bayan, thus:'; that is all, ha? You will kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr.; that the
accused Melicia Paña handed the money to Manny Tiguman, saying: here is the money. This is one half of the
total price, 'bahala na nimo' (it is up to you); and that, on January 2, 1994, the accused Melecia Paña and her
husband, Efren Paña , invited prosecution witness Gemma Bacor to the formers residence and there, the Paña
spouses convinced the latter to execute an affidavit that would declare that the persons, whom Gemma Bacor
saw passing by her residence in the evening of December 10, 1993, after she learned gunshots, were children and
not adults, contrary to what Gemma Bacor had actually seen. "From the facts thus proven, there is no doubt that
the accused Melicia Paña induced her co-accused Emmanuel [Manny] Tiguman and Jose Bilboro Pomoy, Jr.
(Robert Bayan) to kill Jose Juanite, Sr. and Jose Juanite, Jr. in the evening of December 10, 1993, at San Pedro,
Alegria, Surigao del Norte."

The Trial court issued an order sentencing Pomoy, Jr. to suffer for each case the indeterminate penalty of 6
years and 1 day of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal medium, as maximum. After trial, judgement was rendered by the lower court convicting appellant
Tiguman, as principal by direct participation, and appellant Pañ a, as principal by inducement, for the crime of
murder and sentenced each of them to death. However, the trial court acquitted appellant Pañ a's husband
Efren Pañ a for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE: W/N price, reward or promise as an aggravating circumstance is present

RULING: YES. The trial court ruled that the crime committed was murder after finding that the killing were
attended by treachery, evident premeditation, dwelling and price or reward. Only one aggravating
circumstance is enough to qualify the killing to murder, the rest constitute generic aggravating circumstances.
We agree with the trial court that treachery was proven since the "attack was sudden, unexpected, without
warning, and without giving victims an opportunity to deafened themselves or repel the aggression, as in fact
the deceased did not sense any danger that they would be shot by the assailants as there was no grudge and
misunderstanding between them." Dwelling is also aggravating considering that the assailants were in the
sanctity of their own home – which is perhaps the last bulwark of their safety. An unsuspecting knock on the
door betrayed that trust of peace in the family who were only conversing. Dwelling, or morada, is aggravating
when crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation.
Provocation in dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the
commission of the crime. No such provocation concurs herein. With respect to evident premeditation, the
hiring of Tiguman to kill the victims for a price, providing the victims' picture and meeting to carry out the
killing provide more than sufficient evidence to appreciate the same. As to the circumstance of price or
reward, it can only be appreciated against appellant Tiguman since it was he who committed the felonious act
for money. the same evidence on price established conspiracy between the appellants. Consequently the act
of one is the act of all.

The fact that the husband of appellant Pañ a, one of the alleged conspirators or induces in the killing, was
acquitted of the charges does not put to doubt appellant's culpability. Thought conspiracy is a joint act, there
is nothing irregular if the supposed co-conspirator is acquitted and others convicted. Generally, conspiracy is
only a means by which a crime is committed as the mere act of conspiring is not by it self punishable. Hence, it
does not follow that one person alone cannot be convicted when there is conspiracy. As long as the acquittal
of a co-conspirator does not remove the basis of a charge of conspiracy, one defendant may be guilty of the
offense.

Murder committed in 1993 is penalized with reclusion temporal maximum to death. Under Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code, When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, the
maximum period shall be imposed, and whatever may be the number and nature of the aggravating
circumstances, the court may not impose a greater penalty than that prescribed by law in its maximum period
Considering however, the proscription in the 1987 Constitution on the imposition of death penalty, the trial
court erred in imposing on appellants Tiguman and Pañ a the death penalty. The crimes in this case
committed prior to the restoration of the Death Penalty law on December 31, 1993.

438. People v. Layson, G.R. No. L-25177, [October 31, 1969], 140 PHIL 491-498
10.3. Aggravating Circumstances; 10.3.19. evident premeditation

FACTS: On January 17, 1964 when these four accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death, they were inmates of
the Davao Penal Colony serving their sentences. They entered the cell where Regino Gasang was and without
warning and acting in concert they then swiftly took turns in stabbing Gasang. They thereafter barricaded
themselves, refusing to surrender to the trustees who had come to the scene of the crime, agreeing to
surrender only to Vicente Afurong, the supervising prison guard. Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that
they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times. Garces stated that he
killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a week before. The four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to
the actual slaying.

They were convicted with Murder by means of treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior
strength; with the aggravating circumstances of (1) recidivism with respect to the accused Nicolas Layson
and Cezar Ragub, and (2) all of them with two or more prior convictions.

ISSUE: WN evident premeditation is present in this case.

RULING: YES. Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-feeling against Gasang because the latter
urinated on their coffee cups several times, all these taking place at least ten days before the actual slaying.
Gasang spat on Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill Gasang a few days
before January 17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that sufficient time had elapsed
during which the accused regained their equanimity. They moved their evil scheme forward to consummation
after obtaining weapons from their fellow inmates whose aid they had solicited. The aforenarrated
circumstances prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation.
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code) was correctly
considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of the offense, were undoubtedly
serving their respective sentences for previous convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment
of the accused with the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

440 – Tan
People vs. Sibbu
G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017

FACTS: Bryan, private complainant and a common witness to all the cases, testified that between 6:30 and
7:00 p.m, he was with his 3-year old daughter, Trisha May; his mother Ofelia; and his father, Warlito, the
victim in Criminal Case No. 11724 in the azotea of his parents' house when he saw from a distance of about
5m a person in camouflage uniform with a long firearm slung across his chest and a black bonnet over his
head. When the armed man inched closer to the house, he tried to fix his bonnet thereby providing Bryan the
opportunity to see his face; Bryan had a clear look at the armed man because there were Christmas lights
hanging from the roof of their porch. Bryan recognized the armed man as the Sibbu. Brian also saw 2 men in
crouching position at a distance of 3m away from the appellant. Fearing the worst, Bryan shouted a warning
to his family. Appellant then fired upon them killing Trisha, Ofelia and Warlito.

He was held guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime attempted murder in 1 criminal case and
consummated murder in 3 criminal cases. (Attempted murder victim was Bryan’s brother)

ISSUE: W/N the aggravating circumstance of use of disguise is applicable.

RULING: YES. While the appellant was seen wearing a bonnet over his head, Bryan was able to get a glimpse
of appellant's face when the latter fixed his bonnet. In addition, Christmas lights hanging from the roof of the
porch provided illumination enabling Bryan to identify the appellant. Moreover, Bryan is familiar with the
appellant's built, height, and body movements.

The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case. Bryan
testified that the appellant covered his face with a bonnet during the shooting incident There could be no
other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet over appellant's face but to conceal his identity, especially since
Bryan and appellant live in the same barangay and are familiar with each other.

441 TORIBIO
US vs Gampona
G.R. No. L-12057
Aggravating Circumstance: Fraud, Craft and Disguise

FACTS: April 1, 1915, Leon Raneses was murdered in the municipality of Sinait, in the Province of Ilocos Sur,
under the following circumstances: Clemente Gampoñ a, being moved by the desire to possess the wife and
the property of Raneses, induced Valentin Yacas, Liberto Tumbaga, Tomas Mangrubang, and Roman
Guillermo to kill him for a reward to be paid in money. In order to accomplish the work with the least possible
danger of discovery, it was decided that the intended victim should be lured to a wild, remote, and
uninhabited place in the mountains.

To this end he was invited to go with these four men to a place called Pittao upon the pretense that they
would there find a molave tree from which flowed bulbulong, a mysterious liquid supposed to have the virtue
of making the man who possessed it irresistible to women. By prearrangement the party met late in the
evening on the date mentioned above at a hut situated in a field of Tomas Mangrubang. To this place the
deceased was brought by Liberto Tumbaga; and there these two found their three companions ready for the
journey. The party proceeded on its way, but after they had climbed some distance up Mount Camiding they
decided to stop for the night. When Raneses had fallen asleep the assassins, who had remained awake, arose
and proceeded to their work. Valentin Yacas struck the deceased in the forehead with a hatchet — a blow
which necessarily would have been fatal. Roman Guillermo then struck him in the right side and Tomas
Mangrubang struck him in the left side with the sharp edge of the same instrument, inflicting other wounds of
a serious nature.

When the victim was dead the body was buried in the bed of a dry stream nearby, and the murderers
returned to their homes. Within a short period they were paid the reward which had been promised by
Clemente Gampoñ a, being P160 on money. This money was divided among the four.

ISSUE: Whether or not Craft as aggravating circumstances is present

RULING: YES. There were present in this case the aggravating circumstances of craft,  alevosia, evident
premeditation, and that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place. The circumstance of nocturnity in
this case is sufficiently estimated in the circumstance of alevosia and need not be considered. It is also evident
that the aggravating circumstances of craft, evident premeditation, and the commission of the crime in an
uninhabited place are involved to some extent with each other; and upon close analysis it would probably be
found that the number of these aggravating circumstances could be reduced. For instance, it might be argued
that evident premeditation is sufficiently estimated in craft and the commission of the crime for a reward.

However, it is obvious that no benefit would result to these defendants as a result of such process, for the
aggravating elements are so pronounced and numerous that it would be impossible under the circumstances
of this case to reduce the penalty below the maximum prescribed for the crime of murder.

443 BAIRD
Weaken the defense
People Vs. Maron Y Emplona 2019

FACTS: Michael Clarianes and Alma Exconde were seated on a bench and engaged in a conversation, 3 male
persons on board a motorcycle arrived near the shores of Sampaloc Lake. 2 of them alighted from the
motorcycle, one went in front of Michael and Alma and urinated along the banks of the lake, while the other
went behind a coconut tree nearby. Ten minutes later, the man who urinated suddenly approached Alma and
pointed a knife to her neck. Likewise, the person who hid behind the coconut tree approached Michael and
pointed a knife at him. Thereafter, the person who stayed at the motorcycle approached Michael and Alma,
brandishing a "kawit." Michael cried for help and attempted to fight. The three men however, repeatedly
stabbed Michael until he slumped on the ground lifeless. On the other hand, accused-appellants denied the
charges against them and interposed their respective alibis.  RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder.

ISSUE: Whether the aggravating circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense is present

RULING: Yes. However contrary to the ruling of the RTC and the CA, the Court finds that the killing of Michael
was not attended by treachery. However, the Court finds that appellants are still guilty of murder since the
killing of Michael was a tended by the qualifying circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense.

abuse of superior strength and employment of means are taken as one and the same aggravating
circumstance. Further, it appears that employment of means to weaken the defense is, at the very least,
subsumed under the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Thus, in determining whether the
qualifying circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense is present in this case the Court shall be
guided by the same standard in determining the presence of abuse of superior strength, i.e., "notorious
inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the
aggressor's and purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime."48
Here, Alma's testimony is clear as to how appellants stabbed Michael successively using their respective
weapons. The fact that Michael was unarmed, that he as ganged up by appellants, and that the latter were
equipped with and took advantage of their respective knives and kawit in inflicting fatal wounds on Michael,
show a notorious inequality of forces which was obviously advantageous to the appellants.

445 Chua
Weaken the defense
People v. Fieldad, G.R. No. 196005, [October 1, 2014], 744 PHIL 790-816
FACTS: The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999, JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2
Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1 Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa hut
searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa summoned inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua).
JO2 Gamboa gave Badua the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to open all the cells for the
routine headcount.

Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding the time of his hearing scheduled for
that day. While JO2 Gamboa and Chan were conversing, the telephone in the administration building rang. JO2
Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration building to answer the phone.

After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball court. On his way there, he turned his
head towards the nipa hut and saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was seated, and
shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.

Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of an armalite. Cornista struck
JO1 Bacolor at the back of the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2 Gamboa’s
gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada.
JO2 Niturada returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
ISSUE: Whether accused are guilty of murder
RULING: Yes, The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with discernment, being able to
distinguish between right and wrong and knowing fully well the consequences of his acts." The Court of
Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly establish discernment:

His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor and hitting the latter’s head clearly
demonstrated his discernment. He took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also grappling with JO1
Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously knew would weaken the latter’s defenses.
Moreover, his act of getting the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he usedin opening the main gate clearly
demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted with
discernment may not be excused from criminal liability.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not afforded any chance of defending
themselves. Without warning, Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan held the
shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile, Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1
Bacolor of his armalite, and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and shot JO1 Bacolor.

446
People vs. Herrera
Weaken the denfense
FACTS: On May 29, 1996 at around 6:30 p.m., Enrique Ganan was sitting on a steel chair at his home eating
fishballs while cuddling his youngest child. He was engaged in a conversation with Ma. Rizza Aguilar and his
brother Edwin. His wife, Mariel was situated a few meters away. At the same time, Corazon Cajipo was
chatting with a friend about ten (10) meters away. The calm evening air was shattered when someone armed
with a .38 caliber revolver suddenly approached Enrique from behind and fired at close range. Although
wounded, Enrique managed to pass his child to his brother in the ensuing uproar and attempted to crawl to
safety. His attacker, however, followed and pumped more bullets into him. After firing the sixth shot, the
assailant casually walked away. When the smoke cleared, Enrique Ganan and Corazon Cajipo, who caught a
slug in her temple, lay bloodied and fatally wounded. For the killing of Enrique, accused Edgardo Herrera was
charged with Murder.

ISSUE: Whether treachery should be appreciated in this case.

RULING: YES. Given the prevailing facts of the case, the Court agrees with the trial court that the killing of
Enrique Ganan was attended by alevosia. "There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.69 The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing as the two conditions for the
same are present, i.e. (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and
(2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.70
The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim."

In the case at bar, Enrique Ganan was in the comforts of his home, eating fishballs while cuddling his youngest
daughter and was engaged in conversation with some visitors when he was shot in the head from behind by
the gunman. As in the recent case of People v. Padilla,72 , treachery is evident when the accused-appellant
suddenly positioned himself at the back of the unsuspecting victim, pointed his gun at him and, without any
warning, promptly delivered the fatal shots. The victim was unaware of the attempt on his life and the danger
that lurked behind him. There was no way the victim could have defended himself, taken flight or avoided the
assault. The attendance of treachery qualifies the killing to Murder.

447. HALID
PEOPLE V. ADRIANO, GR NO. 205228
WEAKEN THE DEFENSE

FACTS: Adriano was charged with two (2) counts of Murder. killing Ofelia Bulanan, hitting her on the
different parts of her body, resulting in her death to the damage of her heirs and Danilo Cabiedes, hitting him
on the different parts of his body, resulting in his death to the damage of his heirs.

Version of the Prosecution: Four (4) armed men then suddenly alighted the Corolla and started shooting at
the driver of the CRV, who was later identified as Cabiedes. During the shooting, a bystander, Bulanan, who
was standing near the road embankment, was hit by a stray bullet. The four armed men hurried back to the
Corolla and immediately left the crime scene. PO 1 Garabiles and P02 Santos followed the Corolla but lost
track of the latter. Later, both Cabiedes and Bulanan died from fatal gunshot wounds: Cabiedes was
pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) at the Good Samaritan General Hospital due to three (3) gunshot wounds
on the left side of his chest while Bulanan died on the spot after being shot in the head. Rivera admitted that
he is the owner of the Corolla but clarified that the Corolla is one of the several cars he owns in his car rental
business, which he leased to Adriano. Later that day, Adriano arrived at Rivera's shop with the Corolla, where
he was identified by P02 Santos and PO 1 Garabiles as one of the four assailants who alighted from the
passenger's seat beside the driver of the Corolla and shot Cabiedes.
Version of the Defense: Adriano testified at the time of the incident, he was at his house in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga, washing the clothes of his child. After doing the laundry, he took his motorcycle to a repair shop
and left it there. After resting, Adriano picked-up his motorcycle and proceeded to a store and stayed there. At
around 5 :00 p.m., he went back home. After a while, he received a call from a certain Boyet Garcia (Garcia),
who borrowed the Corolla from him, which he rented from Rivera. . After dropping Garcia off, Adriano went
to Rivera to return the Corolla, where he was arrested by police officers, thrown inside the Corolla's trunk,
and brought to a place where he was tortured.

ISSUE: wn the defnse of alibi can be appreciated in this case.

RULING: NO. On the alibi as defense, time and again, we have ruled alibis like denials, are inherently weak
and unreliable because they can easily be fabricated.  For alibi to prosper, the accused must convincingly
prove that he was somewhere else at the time when the crime was committed and that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the crime scene. In the case at bar, Adriano claimed he was in Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga at the time of incident. Adriano's claim failed to persuade. As admitted, Dolores, Magalang,
Pampanga was only less than an hour away from the crime scene, Barangay Malapit, San Isidro, Nueva Ecija.
Hence, it was not physically impossible for Adriano to be at the crime scene at the time of the incident. It is
likewise uniform holding that denial and alibi will not prevail when corroborated not by credible witnesses
but by the accused's relatives and friends.1âwphi1 Therefore, the defense's evidence which is composed of
Adriano's relatives and friends cannot prevail over the prosecution's positive identification of Adriano as one
of the perpetrators of the crime.

455.
People vs. Salahuddin, 781 SCRA 154, G.R. No. 206291 January 18, 2016
Aggravating; motor vehicles

Facts: Appellant Zaldy Salahuddin was charged with the crime of murder. At around 5:30 in the afternoon,
Atty. Segundo Sotto Jr., a prominent law practitioner in Zamboanga City, together with his niece, Liezel Mae
Java[,] left the former’s law office and went home driving an owner[-]type jeep. On the way towards their
house at Farmer’s Drive, Sta. Maria, Zamboanga City, they passed by Nunez Street, then turned left going to
Governor Camins Street and through Barangay Sta. Maria. When the jeep was nearing Farmer’s Drive, the jeep
slowed down, then, there were two gun shots. Liezel Mae, the one sitting at the right side of the jeep felt her
shoulder get numb. Thinking that they were the ones being fired at, she bent forward and turned left towards
her uncle. While bending downwards, she heard a sound of a motorcycle at her right side. Then, she heard
another three (3) [gunshots] from the person in the motorcycle. After that, the motorcycle left.

Issue: W/N the use of motor vehicle may be appreciated as aggravating circumstance.

Ruling: Yes. The trial court correctly appreciated the generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor
vehicle in the commission of the crime. Since the fatal shooting of the victim was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, the Court upholds the trial court in convicting appellant of the crime of murder.
The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63
of the same Code provides that, in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible
penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the commission of the deed is attended by one
aggravating circumstance. Although evident premeditation was not established, the other aggravating
circumstances of use of unlicensed firearm and use of motor vehicle in the commission thereof, were alleged
in the Information and proven during the trial. The presence of such aggravating circumstances warrants the
imposition of the death penalty. However, in view of the enactment of RA No. 9346, the death penalty should
be reduced to reclusion perpetua "without eligibility for parole" pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC.

458
People v. Orilla
GR. Nos. 148939-40, 2004
 Cruelty

FACTS: In September 12, 1996 at around 3:00 o’clock in the morning, 15-year-old Remilyn Orilla was sound
asleep inside one of the rooms of their house when she was suddenly awakened by a heavy weight pressing
on her body and found her brother, Joseph Orilla on top of her. Remilyn Orilla noticed that she was naked
from waist down. Joseph Orilla continuously pinned down Remilyn Orilla’s body with his own. She struggled
to free herself from appellant but her efforts proved futile. Appellant held both hands of Remilyn Orilla with
one hand holding a knife with his other hand. He then forced Remilyn’s legs apart and inserted his penis into
her vagina. Remilyn felt pain. She also felt some warm matter enter her vagina. Appellant remained on top of
Remilyn Orilla and, after a few minutes, she again felt the same substance enter her vagina. Joseph Orilla was
charged with two (2) counts of Rape.

The trial court found Joseph Orilla guilty of only 1 crime of QUALIFIED RAPE and imposed on him the death
penalty because while appellant ejaculated twice in Remilyn’s vagina, the first and second ejaculations
occurred during one single body connection. However, instead of dismissing the second case, the trial court
considered it as a qualifying circumstance for the purpose of imposing the death penalty.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC gravely erred when it imposed the death penalty based on the following grounds:
1) Relationship;
2) Minority;
3) Use of deadly weapon; and
4) Second ejaculation

RULING: YES.
Relationship – Article 14 does not include relationship as an aggravating circumstance. Relationship is an
alternative circumstance under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. The list of aggravating circumstances in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is thus exclusive. Based on a strict interpretation, alternative
circumstances are thus not aggravating circumstances per se. The Revised Penal Code is silent as to when
relationship is mitigating and when it is aggravating. Jurisprudence considers relationship as an aggravating
circumstance in crimes against chastity. However, rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now
classified as a crime against persons. The determination of whether an alternative circumstance is
aggravating or not to warrant the death penalty cannot be left on a case-by-case basis. The law must declare
unequivocally an attendant circumstance as qualifying to warrant the imposition of the death penalty. The
Constitution expressly provides that the death penalty may only be imposed for crimes defined as heinous by
Congress. Any attendant circumstance that qualifies a crime as heinous must be expressly so prescribed by
Congress.

Minority – Amended Information did not allege Remilyn’s minor age. The prosecution’s failure to allege
specifically Remilyn’s minor age prevents the transformation of the crime to its qualified form. Since the
Amended Information failed to inform appellant that the prosecution was accusing him of qualified rape, the
court can convict appellant only for simple rape and the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua and not death.
The information must allege every element of the offense to enable the accused to prepare properly for his
defense. The law assumes that the accused has no independent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense

Use of Deadly Weapon – When the accused commits rape with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty is not
death but the range of two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death.

Second Ejaculation – It is not the number of times that appellant ejaculated but the penetration or touching
that determines the consummation of the sexual act. Thus, appellant committed only one count of rape.
Second ejaculation is not also of one of the qualifying circumstances of Rape. Therefore, it has no basis in law.

Proper Penalty – To determine the proper penalty, we apply Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 63
states that the greater penalty, which is death, will be applied when in the commission of rape there is
present one aggravating circumstance. The Supreme Court held that the aggravating circumstance that is
sufficient to warrant the imposition of the graver penalty of death must be that specifically enumerated in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Since it is only relationship that is alleged and proven in this case, and it
is not an aggravating circumstance per se, the proper penalty is the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua.

462. People v. Olicia, G.R. No. 134775, [July 9, 2002], 433 PHIL 592-602
10.3. Aggravating Circumstances; 10.3.26. cruelty
(case not found)