ISSUES:
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA
446 (December 29, 1986)
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette,
petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent
public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations
and administrative orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no
legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required
before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is
to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws
which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which
he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall
be published in the Official Gazette…. The word “shall” therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That
duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first
be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
“otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval.
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of
general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of
general circulation.
HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date
of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general
application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only,
and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its
purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not
called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun
instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive
law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut
unless the naked blade is drawn.
Kasilag v. Rodriguez, 69 PHIL 217
FACTS: Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a contract of
mortgage of improvements of land acquired as homestead to secure
the payment of the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest. The parties
stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was to pay the debt with interest
within 4 ½ years., and in such case, mortgage would not have any
effect. They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would execute a
deed of sale if it would not be paid within 4 ½ years and that she
would pay the tax on the land. After a year, it turned out that she
was not able to pay the tax. Hence, they entered a verbal agreement
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
the condition that they would not collect the interest of the loan,
would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by the
fruits of the land, & would introduce improvement thereof.
These pacts made by the parties independently were calculated to
alter the mortgage a contract clearly entered into, converting the
latter into a contract of antichresis. The contract of antichresis,
being a real encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and void
because it is legal and valid.
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the
land in good faith because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or
in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of law may not be the basis of good
faith, but possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant with the laws because he is not
a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. In taking possession
thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know, as
clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the
fruits are attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter,
as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These considerations again
bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of
the provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the
basis of his good faith.

RULING: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of

Appeals we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was
aware of a flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition, aside
from the prohibition contained in section 116. This being the case,
the question is whether good faith may be premised upon ignorance
of the laws.