CONSTI II REVIEWER this character when a public right is sought to be
enforced. If the petitioner/relator is not a proper party to
RULES IN PUBLICATION OF LAWS IN
THE PHILIPPINES
Tanada v. Tuvera [ GR L-63915, 24 April 1985]
En Banc, Escolin (p): 1 concur, 2 concur with reservation,
1 took no part, 1 on leave
Facts: Invoking the people’s right to be informed on
matters of public concern (Section 6, Article IV of the
1973 Philippine Constitution) as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish, and or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
The Supreme Court ordered the respondents to publish
in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and that
unless so published, they shall have no binding force and
effect.
1. People proper party in petition for mandamus if
question is of public right and object is to enforce a
public duty
While the general rule is that a writ of mandamus would
be granted to a private individual only in those cases
where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at
large (Severino v. Governor General), and it is for the
public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when
public rights are to be subserved (Mithchell vs.
Boardmen), nevertheless, when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to
procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are
regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need
not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and
as such interested in the execution of the laws.
2. Private citizen’s legal personality recognized
The petitioner/relator is a proper party to proceedings of
these proceedings no other person could be, as it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear
and represent the people in cases of this character. In
the case at bar, private citizen’s legal personality in the
Severino v. Governor General apply squarely to the
present petition. The Solicitor General, the government
officer generally empowered to represent the people,
has entered his appearance for respondents in the case.
3. Publication in the Official Gazette necessary to
give public adequate notice
Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date — for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is
the fifteenth day following its publication — but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes
into effect. This is correct insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Article 2
however, considered in the light of other statutes
applicable to the issue (see Section 1, CA 638), does not
preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its
effectivity. The clear object of the such provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim
“ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of
injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one. Further,
publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby (Pesigan v.
Angeles)
4. Publication vital as no publicity accompanies
law-making process of President
The publication of laws has taken so vital significance
when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature.
While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of
the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa
— and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records — no such publicity accompanies the
law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated,
much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees.
5. The word “shall” imposes an imperative duty
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 provides that
there shall be published in the Official Gazette… The
word “shall” used therein imposes upon an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality. The law
itself makes a list of what should be published in the
official Gazette. In the case at bar, such listing leaves the
officials with no discretion whatsoever as to what must
be included or excluded from such publication.
6. Publication of presidential issuance of public
nature or general applicability mandated; publication a
requirement of due process
The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public
nature” or “of general applicability” is mandated by law.
Presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a
burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential
issuances which apply only to particular persons or class
of persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they have
been circularized to all concerned.  The publication of
presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule
of law that before a person may be bound by law, he
must first be officially and specifically informed of its
contents (See Peralta v. Comelec).
7. Unpublished presidential issuance of general
application have no force and effect; Effect of ruling and
the concept of operative fact
Presidential issuances of general application, which have
not been published, shall have no force and effect. The
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is an
operative fact, which may have consequences which
cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.
8. Consequence of nullity cannot be ignored;
Orthodox v. Modern view on unconstitutionality
It is the theory that the Act of Congress, having been
found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties,
and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree
(Norton v. Shelby County; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett). Such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such a determination, is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects — with respect
to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature
both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the
most difficult of those which have engaged the attention
of courts and it is manifest from numerous decisions that
an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified (Chicot County
Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank).
WRIT OF PROHIBITION AS A LEGAL
REMEDY; HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Aglipay v. Ruiz [GR 45459, 13 March 1937]
First Division, Laurel (p): 5 concur.
Facts: In May 1936, the Director of Posts announced in
the dailies of Manila that he would order the issuance of
postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the
City of Manila of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The
petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the
Philippine Independent Church, in the fulfillment of what
he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto,
Esq., member of the Philippine Bar, to denounce the
matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the
protest of the petitioner’s attorney, the Director of Posts
publicly announced having sent to the United States the
designs of the postage for printing. The said stamps were
actually issued and sold though the greater part thereof
remained unsold. The further sale of the stamps was
sought to be prevented by the petitioner.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for a writ of
prohibition, without pronouncement as to costs.
1. Writ of prohibition as a legal remedy
While, generally, prohibition as an extraordinary legal
writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance
of other than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J.,
658), its issuance and enforcement are regulated by
statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to “inferior
tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons, whether
exercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are
without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tribunal,
corporation, board, or person” (Secs. 516 and 226, Code
of Civil Procedure.) The writ of prohibition is not
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them
within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to prevent
them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other
tribunals but will issue, in appropriate cases, to an officer
or person whose acts are without or in excess of his
authority. Not infrequently, the writ is granted, where it
is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or
to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in an
oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of
actions.
2. Prohibition on the use of public money or
property for benefit of a religion or its minister a direct
corollary of separation of church and state
Section 13, Article VI, of the Constitution provides that
“no public money or property shall ever be appropriated,
applied, or used, directly or indirectly, for the use,
benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution, or system of religion, or for the use,
benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when
such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to
the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage,
or leprosarium.” The prohibition is a direct corollary of
the principle of separation of church and state.
3. Historical perspective of separation of Church
and State in the Philippines
History has taught us that the union of church and state
is prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the
state will use the church, and the church the state, as a
weapon in the furtherance of their respective ends and
aims. The Malolos Constitution recognized this principle
of separation of church and state in the early stages of
our constitutional development; it was inserted in the
Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of
10 December 1898, reiterated in President McKinley’s
Instructions to the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in
the Philippine Bill of 1902 and in the Autonomy Act of 29
August 1916, and finally embodied in the Constitution of
the Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino
People.
4. Religious freedom is not inhibition of profound
reverence for religion and not a denial of its influence in
human affairs
Religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a
denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a
profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far
as it instills into the minds the purest principles of
morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble
of their Constitution, implored “the aid of Divine
Providence, in order to establish a government that shall
embody their ideals, conserve and develop the
patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare,
and secure to themselves and their posterity the
blessings of independence under a regime of justice,
liberty and democracy,” they thereby manifested their
intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations.
The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere.
5. Examples of general concessions accorded to
religious sects and denominations
Certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our
Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties
devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14,
subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines and sec.
1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment
Law, sec. 344, par [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not
prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the
armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium (sec. 13, subsec. 3 Art. VI, Constitution of
the Philippines). Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec.
5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to
sec. 928, Ad. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week,
Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays are made
legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the
secular idea that their observance is conducive to
beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes
against religious worship are considered crimes against
the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133,
Revised Penal Code).
6. Act 4052 does not contemplate any religious
purpose
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view.
What it gives the Director of Posts is the discretionary
power to determine when the issuance of special
postage stamps would be “advantageous to the
Government.” Of course, the phrase “advantageous to
the Government” does not authorize the violation of the
Constitution; i.e. to appropriate, use or apply of public
money or property for the use, benefit or support of a
particular sect or church. In the case at bar, the issuance
of the postage stamps was not inspired by any sectarian
feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denominations. The stamps were not issued and sold for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church, nor were
money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that
church. The purpose of the issuing of the stamps was to
take advantage of an event considered of international
importance to give publicity to the Philippines and its
people and attract more tourists to the country. Thus,
instead of showing a Catholic chalice, the stamp
contained a map of the Philippines, the location of the
City of Manila, and an inscription that reads “Seat XXXIII
International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7, 1937.”
7. Purpose must not be frustrated by incidental
results
While the issuance and sale of the stamps may be said to
be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of
the Government. The Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose
had in view is one which could legitimately be
undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main purpose
should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere
incidental results not contemplated.
EXEMPTION OF INCOME TAXES TO
JUDICIARY MEMBERS; EQUALITY OF
THE BRANCHES OF THE GOVERNMENT
Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-
78780, 23 July 1987];
Resolution
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave
Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive
to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue
the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the
judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en
banc on 4 December 1987.
Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges
presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of
the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations
in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually
enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the
Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any
deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.  With
the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to
settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if
it had dealt with the matter administratively.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for
prohibition.
1. Intent to delete express grant of exemption of
income taxes to members of Judiciary
The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to
the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This
intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set
forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and
ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the
intent may have been obscured by the failure to include
in the General Provisions a proscription against
exemption of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the
Court since then has authorized the continuation of the
deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the
members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the
salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court
hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the
ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David.
The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or
any form of emolument of any public officer or
employee, including constitutional officers, shall be
exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article
XV)” which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief
Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not
be decreased), negate the contention that the intent of
the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-
diminution” of salaries of judicial officers.
2. Equality of branches of government effected by
modifications in provision
The term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and
that the words “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted
so as to give substance to equality among the three
branches in the government. A period (.) after
“decreased” was made on the understanding that the
salary of justices is subject to tax. With the period, the
doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is
understood not to apply anymore. Justices and judges
are not only the citizens whose income have been
reduced in accepting service in government and yet
subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet
members and all other employees.
3. Constitutional construction adopts the intent of
the framers and people adopting the law
The ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with
the fundamental principle of constitutional construction
that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of
the people adopting it should be given effect.  The
primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain
and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of
the framers and of the people in the adoption of the
Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the
people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly
by the explanation offered by the framers. In the case at
bar, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution
authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of
compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must
be higher than that which they are receiving at the time
of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to
those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained
construction to read into the provision an exemption
from taxation in the light of the discussion in the
Constitutional Commission.
SALARIES OF JUDGES; TAXABILITY;
INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY
Perfecto v. Meer [GR L-2348, 27 February 1950]
First Division, Bengzon (p): 8 concur.
Facts: Article VIII, section 9 of the Constitution provides
that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of
inferior courts “shall receive such compensation as may
be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office”. It also provides that “until
Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of
P16,000, and each Associate Justice, P15,000″. When in
1945 Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not
“provided otherwise”, by fixing a different salary for
associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided
by the Constitution, i. e., P15,000 a year. In April 1947
the Collector of Internal Revenue required Justice
Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as
member of this Court during the year 1946.
After paying the amount (P802), Perfecto instituted the
action in the Manila CFI contending that the assessment
was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason
that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in
violation of the Constitution. The Manila judge upheld
his contention, and required the refund of the amount
collected. The defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.
1. Supreme Court cannot escape duty to resolve
case even if appellee has passed away
The death of Justice Perfecto should have freed the
Court from the embarrassment of passing upon the claim
of a colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all
the members of the Court, consideration of the matter is
not without its vexing feature. Adjudication may not be
declined, because (a) the Court is not not legally
disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, as it
is the defendant who appeals to the Court, and there is
no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred; (c) supreme courts in the United States have
decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the
question touches all the members of the judiciary from
top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves the right of
other constitutional officers whose compensation is
equally protected by the Constitution, for instance, the
President, the Auditor-General and the members of the
Commission on Elections.
2. Salaries of judicial officers cannot be diminished
The Constitution of the United States, like ours, forbids
the diminution of the compensation of Judges of the
Supreme Court and of inferior courts. Various states,
except Wisconsin and Missouri, provide the rule where
the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of
its judicial officers shall not be diminished during their
continuance in office, it has been held that the state
legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation
paid to the judges of its court.
3. Tax measures on compensations of judges in
the United States
(1st period) No attempt was made to tax the
compensation of Federal judges up to 1862.
(2nd period, 1862-1918) In July 1862, a statute was
passed subjecting the salaries of “civil officers of the
United States” to an income tax of 3%. Revenue officers,
construed it as including the compensation of all judges,
which CJ Taney , speaking for the judiciary protested to
the Secretary of the Treasury. The US SC declared the act
void, based on the lack of the legislative authority to
reduce the compensation of members of the Judiciary
and the effect of such legislation to separation of
powers. The protest was unheeded, although it
apparently bore the approval of the whole SC, that
ordered it printed among its records. But in 1869
Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of the Secretary
of the Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with the
CJ. The collection of the tax was consequently
discontinued and the amounts theretofore received
were all refunded. For half a century thereafter judges’
salaries were not taxed as income.
(3rd period, 1919-1938) The Federal Income Tax Act of
24 February 1919 expressly provided that taxable income
shall include “the compensation of the judges of the
Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United States”.
Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since
1899, paid income tax on his salary; and maintaining that
the impost reduced his compensation, he sued to
recover the money he had delivered under protest. He
was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an epoch-
making decision explaining the purpose, history and
meaning of the Constitutional provision forbidding
impairment of judicial salaries and the effect of an
income tax upon the salary of a judge. On 1 September
1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the
United States court of claims. His salary was taxed by
virtue of the same income tax of 24 February 1919. He
filed action for reimbursement, submitting the same
theory in Evans v. Gore. The US SC in 1925 reaffirmed
that decision, and declaring that the law had made no
distinction as to judges appointed before and after its
passage. (4th period, 1939) Foiled in their previous
attempts, the Revenue men persisted, and succeeded in
inserting in the United States Revenue Act of June 1932
the modified proviso that “gross income” on which taxes
were payable included the compensation “of judges of
courts of the United States taking office after 6 June
1932. Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United States
circuit judge on 1 May 1933. His salary as judge was
taxed, and before the US SC the issue of decrease of
remuneration again came up. The court, however, ruled
against him, declaring in 1939 that Congress had the
power to adopt the law; holding that to subject the 
members of the judiciary to a general tax is merely to
recognize that judges also are citizens, and that their
particular function in government does not generate an
immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the
material burden of the government whose Constitution
and laws they are charged with administering. (O’Malley
vs. Woodrough)
4. Separation of powers
The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory
that a larger measure of liberty and justice would be
assured by vesting the three powers — the legislative,
the executive, and the judicial — in separate
departments, each relatively independent of the others
and it was recognized that without this independence —
if it was not made both real and enduring — the
separation would fail of its purpose. All agreed that
restraints and checks must be imposed to secure the
requisite measure of independence; for otherwise the
legislative department, inherently the strongest, might
encroach on or even come to dominate the others, and
the judicial, naturally the weakest, might be dwarf or
swayed by the other two, especially by the legislative.
5. Independence of the judiciary; prohibition
against diminution
The courts are the balance wheel of the whole
constitutional system; which is so balanced and
controlled. Other constitutional systems lack complete
poise and certainty of operation because they lack the
support and interpretation of authoritative, undisputable
courts of law. It is clear beyond all need of exposition
that for the definite maintenance of constitutional
understandings it is indispensable, alike for the
preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the
preservation of the integrity of the powers of the
government, that there should be some nonpolitical
forum in which those understandings can be impartially
debated and determined. That forum our courts supply.
There the individual may assert his rights; there the
government must accept definition of its authority.
There the individual may challenge the legality of
governmental action and have it adjudged by the test of
fundamental principles, and that test the government
must abide; there the government can check the too
aggressive self-assertion of the individual and establish
its power upon lines which all can comprehend and
heed. The constitutional powers of the courts constitute
the ultimate safeguard alike of individual privilege and of
governmental prerogative. It is in this sense that our
judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system; it is
meant to maintain that nice adjustment between
individual rights and governmental powers which
constitutes political liberty.
The Constitution provides that judges shall hold their
offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times
receive for their services a compensation which shall not
be diminished during their continuance in office. Thus,
next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute
more to the independence of the judges than a fixed
provision for their support. In the general course of
human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence
amounts to a power over his will. The independence of
the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue
that could come from taxing their salaries.
6. The exemption of the judicial salary from
reduction by taxation not a gratuity or privilege
The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a
mere privilege of judges, personal and therefore
waivable, but a basic limitation upon legislative or
executive action imposed in the public interest (Evans vs.
Gore). The exemption is essentially and primarily
compensation based upon valuable consideration. The
covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty
whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration
agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its
own particular value to the citizens in securing the
independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the
establishment of the compensation upon a permanent
foundation whereby judicial preferment may be
prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent,
knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed
of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an
object of personal concern. Thus, the primary purpose of
the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the
judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract
good and competent men to the bench, and to promote
that independence of action and judgment which is
essential to the maintenance of the guaranties,
limitations, and pervading principles of the Constitution,
and to the administration of justice without respect to
persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the
rich.
7. Appreciation of the O’Malley case; 16th
amendment has no counterpart provision in the
Philippine Constitution; citation thus loses much of its
force
To grasp the full import of the O’Malley precedent, it
should be borne in mind that it does not entirely
overturn Miles vs. Graham (”To the extent that what the
Court now says is inconsistent with what was said in
Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not survive”) and that it
does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in
Evans vs. Gore, although it indicates that the
Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the
consequences of that case.  The shift of position from
Evans to O’Malley is predicated on the proposition that
he 16th Amendment empowered Congress “to collect
taxes on incomes from whatever source derived”
admitting of no exception; thus the disfavor of the Evans
ruling in the United States; as it virtually struck out the
words “from whatever source derived” from the
Amendment. It is claimed that the words of the
amendment are sufficiently strong to overrule pro tanto
the provisions of Article III, Section 1 which prohibits the
reduction in the salaries of a federal judge. The
undisclosed factor, the 16th Amendment, has no
counterpart in the Philippine legal system as the
Philippine Constitution does not repeat it. Wherefore, as
the underlying influence and the unuttered reason has
no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad generality loses
much of its force.
8. The administrative and judicial stand consistent
the US scenario prior to O’Malley
The administrative and judicial stands in the Philippines
is consistent with the second period of the status of
judicial taxation in the United States, the views of CJ
Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar and the constant
practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax
Law merely taxes “income” in general, it does not
include salaries of judges protected from diminution. The
prohibition of diminution was the prevailing belief in the
US when it was deemed transplanted in the country, and
which the 1935 Constitutional Convention approved.
Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then
outstanding doctrines; and the inference is not illogical
that in restraining the impairment of judicial
compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended
to preclude taxation of the same. Unless and until our
Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax
Law expressly taxing “the salaries of judges thereafter
appointed”, the O’Malley case is not relevant.
9. Taxability of judge’s salaries resolved on
question of policy but must be enunciated by
congressional enactment The O’Malley decision resolved
the issue of taxability of judges’ salaries into a question
of policy. But that policy must be enunciated by
Congressional enactment, as was done in the O’Malley
case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation. It must be
noted that the tax exemption does not proclaim a
general tax immunity for men on the bench as they pay
taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or cars or other
commodities, owning real property, and on incomes
other than their judicial salaries; they pay the
corresponding duties, taxes, or the assessment levied.
10. Presidential gesture to waive exemption not
binding for the Court to likewise follow
Without the voluntary act of the President, his salary
would not be taxable, because of constitutional
protection against diminution. To argue from this
executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act
in like manner is to assume that, in the matter of
compensation and power and need of security, the
judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption
certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION;
PRESIDENT'S POWER TO APPOINT
Sarmiento v. Mison [
GR L-79974, 17 December 1987]
En Banc, Padilla (p): 8 concur
Facts: Petitioners, who are taxpayers, lawyers,
members of the IBP and professors of Constitutional
Law, seek to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing
the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and Guillermo Carague, as
Secretary of the Department of Budget, from
effecting disbursements in payment of Mison’s
salaries and emoluments, on the ground that
Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of
its not having been confirmed by the Commission
on Appointments. The respondents, on the other
hand, maintain the constitutionality of Mison’s
appointment without the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
The Supreme Court held that the President has the
authority to appoint Mison as Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs without submitting his
nomination to the Commission on Appointments for
confirmation, and thus, the latter is entitled the full
authority and functions of the office and receive all
the salaries and emoluments pertaining thereto.
Thus, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition and
the petition in intervention, without costs.
1. Standing to file suit / Prohibition as proper
remedy: Procedural questions set aside due to
demands of public interest
Because of the demands of public interest, including
the need for stability in the public service, the Court
resolved to give due course to the petition and
decide, setting aside the finer procedural questions
of whether prohibition is the proper remedy to test
Mison’s right to the office of Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs and of whether the petitioners
have a standing to bring this suit.
2. Constitutional Construction
The fundamental principle of constitutional
construction is to give effect to the intent of the
framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in
the constitutional provisions themselves. (Gold
Creek Mining v. Rodriguez) The Court will thus
construe the applicable constitutional provisions,
not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative department may want them construed,
but in accordance with what they say and provide.
3. President’s power to appoint
Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
empowers the President to appoint 4 groups of
officers: (1) the heads of the executive departments,
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel
or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 
(2)  all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by
law;  (3)  those whom the President may be
authorized by law to appoint; and (4) officers lower
in rank  4 whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone. The first group is
clearly appointed with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments. Appointments of
such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the
nomination is confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, the President appoints. The second
and third groups of officers can be made by the
President without the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments, as can be
determined through the recorded proceedings of
Constitutional Commission.
4. Express enumeration excludes others not
enumerated
It is an accepted rule in constitutional and statutory
construction that an express enumeration of
subjects excludes others not enumerated. In the
case at bar, it would follow that only those
appointments to positions expressly stated in the
first group require the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments.
5. Constitutional provision presumed to have
been framed and adopted in light of prior laws
A constitutional provision must be presumed to
have been framed and adopted in the light and
understanding of prior and existing laws and with
reference to them. Courts are bound to presume
that the people adopting a constitution are familiar
with the previous and existing laws upon the
subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon
which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption. In the 1935 Constitution, almost all
presidential appointments required the consent
(confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.
Under the 1935 Constitution,  the commission was
frequently transformed into a venue of “horse-
trading” and similar malpractices. On the other
hand, the 1973 Constitution, consistent with the
authoritarian pattern in which it was molded and
remolded by successive amendments, placed the
absolute power of appointment in the President
with hardly any check on the part of the legislature.
Given the above two in extremes, one, in the 1935
Constitution and the other, in the 1973 Constitution,
it is not difficult for the Court to state that the
framers of the 1987 Constitution and the people
adopting it, struck a “middle ground” by requiring
the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on
Appointments for the first group of appointments
and leaving to the President, without such
confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e.,
those in the second and third groups as well as
those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank.
The proceedings in the 1986 Constitutional
Commission support this conclusion.
6. Construction of “also” in second sentence;
consideration of different language of proximate
sentences to determine meaning
The word “also” could mean “in addition; as well;
besides, too” besides “in like manner” which
meanings could stress that the word “also” in said
second sentence means that the President, in
addition to nominating and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appointing the
officers enumerated in the first sentence, can
appoint (without such consent  or confirmation) the
officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary
to the interpretation that the President shall
appoint the officers mentioned in said second
sentence in the same manner as he appoints
officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than
limit the area of consideration to the possible
meanings of the word “also” as used in the context
of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to
derive significance from the fact that the first
sentence speaks of nomination by the President and
appointment by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the
second sentence speaks only of appointment by the
President. And, this use of different language in 2
sentences proximate to each other underscores a
difference in message conveyed and perceptions
established. Thus, words are not pebbles in alien
juxtaposition.
7. Power to appoint fundamentally executive
in character; Limitations construed strictly
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or
presidential in character. Limitations on or
qualifications of such power should be strictly
construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be
clearly stated in order to be recognized. In the case
at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the
positions therein enumerated require the consent
of the Commission on Appointments.
8. The use of word “alone” after “President” in
third sentence is a lapse in draftsmanship, a literal
import deemed redundant
After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use
of the word “alone” after the word “President” in
said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more
than anything else, a slip or lapsus in draftmanship. 
In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed
intent of its framers was to exclude presidential
appointments from confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments, except appointments to offices
expressly mentioned in the first sentence.
Consequently, there was no reason to use in the
third sentence the word “alone” after the word
“President” in providing that Congress may by law
vest the appointment of lower-ranked officers in the
President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, because the power to appoint officers
whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint is already vested in him, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments,
in the second sentence. The word “alone” in the
third sentence, as a literal import from the last part
of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935
Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of
the second sentence. This redundancy cannot
prevail over the clear and positive intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential
appointments, except those mentioned in the first
sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments.
9. President authorized Commissioner of
Bureau of Customs; Commissioner not included
with the first group of appointment
The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within
the first group of appointments where the consent
of the Commission on Appointments is required.
The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the
position of “heads of bureaus” from appointments
that need the consent (confirmation) of the
Commission on Appointments. Moreover, the
President is expressly authorized by law to appoint
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA
1937, Tarifff and Customs Code of the Philippines,
Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October
1972).
10. Laws approved during the effectivity of
previous constitution must be read in harmony
with the new one
RA 1937 and PD  34 were approved during the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the
President may nominate and, with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments, appoint the
heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the
Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to
be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the
result that, while the appointment of the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that
devolves on the President, as an appointment he is
authorized by law to make, such appointment,
however, no longer needs the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments.
ARCHIPELAGIC DOCTRINE
The fact that for Archipelagic States, their archipelagic
waters are subject to both the right of innocent passage
and sea lanes passage does not place them in lesser
footing vis-a-vis continental coastal states which are
subject, in their territorial sea, to the right of innocent
passage and the right to transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage
rights through archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III
was a concession by archipelagic states, in exchange for
their right to claim all the waters landward of their
baselines, regardless of their depth, or distance from
coast, as archipelagic waters subject to national
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of
archipelagic state's archipelago and waters enclosed by
their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under
UNCLOS III. Separate islands generate their own
maritime zones, placing the waters between the islands
separated by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the
state's territorial sovereignty subjecting these waters to
the rights of other states under UNCLOS III.
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the
operation of the municipal and international law norms
subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of
maintaining unimpeded, expeditious international
navigation, consistent with the international law
principle of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically,
the political branches of the Philippine government, in
the competent discharge of their constitutional powers,
may pass legislation designating routes within the
archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes
passage (Magallona, et. al. vs. Ermita, et. al., GR No.
187167, august 16, 2011).
PUBLICATION - INDISPENSABLE IN THE
EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS
Effect and Application of Laws- Publication
Laws must be published. Otherwise they are not
effective. Laws take effect only after the mandatory
requirement of publication in a newspaper of general
circulation or the Official Gazette. According to the
Supreme Court:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. The
clause "unless otherwise provided" refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since the purpose of publication itself is to make the
public aware of the contents of the laws.1
Supreme Court decisions also form part of the law of
the land. Does this mean they must also be published?
The answer is in the negative. Supreme Court decisions
need not be published as enshrined in the following
case law:
However, there is no law requiring the Publication of
Supreme Court Decisions in the the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of the
counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast
of decisions of the Supreme Court.2
1
Tanada vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, December 29,
1986.
2
De Roy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-80718, January
29, 1988.
LEGALITY OF HOLD DEPARTURE
ORDERS AND WATCHLIST ORDERS
 Hold departure orders (HDO) are legal.
However, NOT according to DEPARTMENT
CIRCULAR NO. 41 issued JUNE 07, 2010 by the
Department of Justice. The Secretary of Justice
cannot anymore issue hold departure orders. For
a Hold Departure Order to be legal , the following
under CIRCULAR NO. 39-97 issued by
the SUPREME COURT must concur:
1. ISSUED ONLY IN CRIMINAL CASES
2. CRIMINAL CASES UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS
Circular no. 39-97 revoked Circular No. 38-94 dated 6
June 1994 and Circular No. 62-96 dated 9 September
1996.
 Watchlist Orders are Illegal
The Department of Justice's power to issue watchlist
orders (WLO) as well as hold departure orders (HDO)
were revoked by the Supreme Court. The highest law of
the land declared Department of Justice Department
(DOJ) Circular No. 41, dated May 25, 2010, as
unconstitutional for being violative of the right to travel
which is guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution. DOJ
Department Circular No. 41 was the one that gave power
to the Department of Justice through its Secretary to
issue watchlist orders (WLO) and hold departure orders
(HDO)
What will happen to the WLOs and HDOs that were
issued incongruent with CIRCULAR NO. 39-97 issued by
the SUPREME COURT?
They may be lifted via a motion filed in the proper
court or tribunal for being unconstitutional.
HECKLER’S VETO
Heckler’s veto is a form of curtailment of one's freedom
of expression. It occurs when the government restricts
the right to speak or to express ones opinion or
reaction. It is commonly resorted to to avoid expression
of negativity. Wikipedia defines heckler's veto as:
In the free speech context, a heckler's veto is either of
two situations in which a person who disagrees with a
speaker's message is able to unilaterally trigger events
that result in the speaker being silenced.
In the strict legal sense, a heckler's veto occurs when the
speaker's right is curtailed or restricted by the
government in order to prevent a reacting
party's behavior. The common example is the
termination of a speech or demonstration in the interest
of maintaining the public peace based on the anticipated
negative reaction of someone opposed to that speech or
demonstration. The term was coined by University of
Chicago professor of law Harry Kalven.
In common parlance, the term is used to describe
situations where hecklers or demonstrators silence a
speaker without intervention of the law.
 >    exercise of quasi judicial power
THE CONSTITUTIONAL >    Garces v. CA
COMMISSIONS o    retirement of Commissioner before promulgation
>    Ambil v. Comelec
>    Dumayas v. Comelec
A.  COMMON PROVISIONS
o    other functions as may be provided by law (Sec. 8)

4. General Prohibitions (Sec. 2)

1. Scope (Sec. 1) •    not hold any other office or employment during
•    Civil Service Commission tenure
•    Commission on Elections •    not engage in the practice of any profession
•    Commission on Audit  •    not engage in the active management or control of
any business which may be affected by the functions of
2. General Characteristics his office
•    Independent •    not financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
o    salary fixed by law and not decreased during tenure Government contract, franchise or privilege
(Sec. 3)
•    Fiscal autonomy
o    appropriations automatically and regularly released B. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(Sec. 5)

3.    General Powers
•    appoint officials and employees in accordance with
law (Sec. 4)
•    promulgate rules concerning pleadings and practice
(Sec. 6)
o    not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights
>    Aruelo v. CA (conflict with Rules of Court)
•    decide cases (Sec. 7)
o    by a majority vote of all its Members
>    Cua v. Comelec (2-1/3-2-1)
o    as a body and not as individuals
>    Orocio v. COA
>    Mison v. COA
o    within 60 days from date of submission (upon filing of
last pleading, brief or memorandum required by the
Rules)
o    appealable to the Supreme Court on certiorari within
30 days from receipt has been changed to appeal to
Court of Appeals within 15 days
>    RA 7902
>    Mateo v. CA
o    certiorari to the Supreme Court only after
reconsideration (i.e., decisions of Commission En Banc)
>    Reyes v. RTC
>    ABS-CBN v. Comelec
>    grave abuse of discretion
>    Reyes v. COA
1. Composition (Sec. 1)
•    Chairman and 2 Commissioners
•    natural born citizens
•    at least 35
•    proven capacity for public administration
•    not candidate in immediately preceding election
2. Appointment (Sec. 1)
•    Term of 7 years without reappointment
o    common starting point of Feb. 2, 1987
>    Galindez v. COA
•    consent of Commission on Appointments needed
•    appointment to any vacancy shall be for unexpired
term
•    no Member appointed in a temporary or acting
capacity
3. Scope
•    civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies of the Government
including government owned or controlled corporations
with original charters [Sec. 2(1)]
o    PNOC-EDC v. NLRC
o    Philippine Fisheries v. NLRC (security guards/janitors)
4. Functions of CSC (Sec. 3)
•    establish a career service
•    adopt measures to promote moral, efficiency,
integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness and courtesy
in the civil service
•    strengthen the merit and rewards system
•    integrate all human resources development programs
•    institutionalize a management climate conducive to
public accountability
•    submit an annual report on its personnel programs
5. Civil Service Appointments
•    according to merit and fitness to be determined, as
far as practicable, by competitive examination [Sec. 2(2)]
o    career/non-career/competitive/non-competitive
>    Astraquillo v. Manglapus
>    Achacoso v. Macaraig (POEA)
o    except positions which are policy determining,
primarily confidential or highly technical
>    merit and fitness requirement
>    security of tenure
>    Hernandez v. Villegas (not removal but expiration of
term)
>    Gloria v. CA (temporary transfer)
>    primary confidential means close intimacy which
insures freedom of intercourse  •    right to self organization
>    Borres vs. CA
>    Santiago v. CSC (“next in rank")
6. Prohibitions
•    engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign [Sec. 2(4)]
o    prohibition does not apply to department secretaries 
>    Santos v. Yatco
o    does not prevent expression of views or mentioning
names of candidates supported
•    no candidate who has lost in any election shall, within
one year after such election, be appointed to any office
in the Government or any GOCC or any of their
subsidiaries (Sec. 6)
•    no elective official eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office during
tenure (Sec. 7)
•    no appointive official shall hold any other office or
employment in Government
o    except if allowed by law or primary functions of
position (Sec. 7)
o    Art. VII, Sec. 13
•    no elective or appointive official shall receive
additional, double or indirect compensation unless
specifically authorized by law
o    pensions or gratuities not considered additional
compensation (Sec. 8)
o    per diem or allowance given as reimbursement for
expenses is allowed
>    Peralta v. Mathay
o    Santos v. CA (double retirement)
•    no elective or appointive official shall accept any
present, emolument, office or title of any kind from any
foreign government (Sec. 8)
7. Basic Rights of Civil Servants (Sec. 2)
•    cannot be removed or suspended except for cause
provided by law
o    substantive and procedural due process 
>    De los Santos v. Mallare
o    abolition of office including reorganization is allowed
if made (1) in good faith, (2) not for personal or political
reasons and (3) not in violation of the law
>    Roque v. Ericta
o    reprimand, unlike warning or admonition, is
administrative penalty
>    Tobias v. Veloso    
•    temporary employees to be given such protection as
provided by law
o     temporary employees may be removed without
cause
>    Mendiola v. Tancinco
C. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
1. Composition (Sec. 1)
•    Chairman and six Commissioners
•    natural born citizens
•    at least 35
•    not candidate in immediately preceding election
•    a majority of the Commission, including the Chairman
shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years
o    Cayetano v. Monsod
2. Appointment (Sec. 1)
•    7 year term without reappointment 
•    consent of Commission on Appointments needed
•    appointment to any vacancy only for unexpired term
•    no Member appointed in a temporary or acting >    People v. Basilia
capacity •    register political organizations
o    Brillantes v. Yorac o    must present platform or program of government
o    not religious denominations and sects
3. Powers (Sec. 2) o    anti-violence and pro-Constitution
•    enforce and administer all election laws o    not supported by foreign governments (including
o    includes power to annul elections because of financial contributions)
terrorism  •    file, on its own or upon complaint, petitions for
>    Biliwang v. Comelec inclusion or exclusion of voters
o    call for a special election •    investigate and prosecute cases of violations of
>    Sanchez v. Comelec election laws including election frauds
•    Decide election cases •    RTC has authority to try and decide criminal cases
o    original jurisdiction over contests relating to the involving elections
elections, returns and qualifications of regional, o    People v. Delgado
provincial and city officials •    Exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation
o    appellate jurisdiction over contests involving for purposes of a) filing information and b) help judge in
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general determining whether warrant of arrest should be issued
jurisdiction o    Kilosbayan v. Comelec
>    5 day period for taking an appeal •    Prosecution of election offenses is exclusively under
>    1993 Comelec Rules Comelec
>    concurrent certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and o    People v. Judge Inting
habeas corpus powers with the SC  •    recommend to Congress
>    Carlos v. Angeles o    measures to minimize election spending
o    appellate jurisdiction over contests involving o    measures to prevent and penalize all forms of
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited election fraud
jurisdiction •    recommend to the President
>    only questions of fact; questions of law to SC  o    removal of any deputized person
>    Flores v. Comelec o    imposition of any disciplinary action
o    appellate decisions shall be final, executory and not •    submit comprehensive report
appealable •    promulgate rules of procedure (Sec. 3)
>    pre-proclamation – administrative process •    supervise or regulate franchises or concessions
>    contest – judicial process granted by the Government (e.g., media, transportation
•    decide all questions affecting elections (but not to be and public utilities) (Sec. 4)
voted for) o    equal opportunity in time and space
o    except the right to vote o    reasonable rates
o    only popular elections o    meet CHOPFE objectives
>    Alunan v. Mirasol (SK) >    Sanidad v. Comelec
>    Taule v. Santos (Barangay federation) >    Philippine Press Institute v. Comelec (print)
o    contempt power only pursuant to quasi-judicial >    Telebap v. Comelec (broadcast)
function  •    recommend pardon for election offenses (Sec. 5)
>    Masangcay v. Comelec o    check on Presidential Power
•    deputize law enforcement agencies and Government
instrumentalities to ensure CHOPFE  4. Administrative Matters
o    covers criminal and administrative cases •    may sit en banc or in two divisions
o    merely recommends disciplinary action to the •    pre-proclamation cases shall be decided in division
President  provided that MRs shall be decided en banc
>    Tan v. Comelec
o    act of deputy is act of Comelec  5. Party Matters
•    free and open party system (Sec. 6)
•    party list registration (Sec. 7)
•    no representation in voter boards (Sec. 8)
o    may appoint poll watchers
6. Other matters
•    Election period
o    90 days before election day and 30 days thereafter
(Sec. 9)
•    Bona fide candidates free from harassment (Sec. 10)
•    Election expenses provided in regular or special
appropriations and released automatically upon
certification by the Commission Chairman (Sec. 11)
•    Second placer rule  4)
o    Loreto v. Brion
D. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
1. Composition (Sec. 1)
•    Chairman and 2 Commissioners
•    natural born citizens
•    at least 35
•    not candidates in immediately preceding election
•    CPA or lawyer with 10 year auditing or practice of law
experience
•    not all Members belong to the same profession
2. Appointment (Sec. 1)
•    7 year term without re appointment
•    consent of Commission on Appointments needed
•    appointment to any vacancy only for unexpired term
•    no member appointed in a temporary or acting
capacity
3. Powers
•    examine, audit and settle accounts pertaining to the
revenue, receipts of or uses of funds pertaining to the
Government of GOCCs with original charters (pre-audit)
o    Constitutional bodies and offices granted fiscal
autonomy
o    autonomous state colleges and universities
o    other GOCCs and their subsidiaries
o    non-Governmental entities receiving subsidies from
the Government (post-audit) (Sec. 2)
•    settle accounts means power to settle liquidated
accounts which may be adjusted simply by an
arithmetical process
o    law appropriating funds for a purpose
o    contract entered into by proper officer pursuant to
law
o    whether goods or services covered by contract have
been delivered
o    payment has been authorized by proper officials
>    Guevara v. Gimenez
•    define scope of audit and promulgate accounting and
audit rules
o    no law passed exempting any Governmental entity
from COA jurisdiction (Sec. 3)
o    submit annual report to President and Congress (Sec.
4. Cases
•    COA has authority to interpret “failure of public
bidding”
o    Danville v. COA
•    COA has authority to promulgate rules to prevent
“irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant
expenses”
o    Dingdong v. Guingona
o    Polloso v. Gangan
DOCTRINE OF OPERATIVE FACT
Doctrine of Operative Fact- Acts done pursuant to a law
which was subsequently declared unconstitutional
remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the
declaration of unconstitutionality.
As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has
not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by
Article 7 of the Civil Code.1
Exception to the general rule, the doctrine of operative
fact:
The Doctrine of Operative Fact serves as an exception to
the aforementioned general rule. In Planters Products,
Inc. vs. Fertiphil Corporation 2, the Cout held: The
doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general
rule only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a
determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact
and may have consequences that which cannot always
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a
declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue
burden on those who have relied on the invalid law.
Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a
declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused
in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done
by a municipality in reliance upon the law creating it. 3
ACADEMIC FREEDOM OF
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER
LEARNING
 Academic Freedom of Institutions of Higher
Learning
Capitol Medical Center v. CA
– closing down of a medical school; striking students and
faculty –Once a student is accepted for enrollment in a
given course, the school may not expel him or refuse re-
enroll him until he completes his course except when he
is academically deficient or has violated the rules of
discipline; There is no contract that the school shall
remain open for the entire duration of his course; The
contract between the college and a student who is
enrolled and pays the fees for a semester is for the entire
semester only and not the entire course; The law does
not require a school to see a student through the
completion of his course. If the school closes or is closed
by proper authority at the end of a semester, the student
has no cause of action for breach of contract against the
school.
Lupangco v. CA
– forbidding examinees from attending review classes;
CPA Board Exam - The assailed resolution is not only
unreasonable and arbitrary but it infringes on the
examinee’s right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for
the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained
from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the
fulfilment of their ambition; The assailed resolution also
infringes on the academic freedom of schools; PRC
cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review
schools and centers believe would be best enable their
enrollees to meet the standards required before
becoming a full-fledged public accountant. Unless the
means and methods of instruction are clearly found to
be inefficient, impractical or riddled with corruption,
review schools and centers may not be stopped from
helping out their students.
University of San Carlos v. CA
– granting of honors - Schools of learning are given
ample discretion to formulate rules and guidelines in the
granting of honors for purposes of graduation. This is
part of academic freedom. Within the parameters of
these rules, it is within the competence of universities
and colleges to determine who are entitled to the grant
of honors among the graduating students. Its discretion
on this academic matter may not be disturbed much less
controlled by the courts unless there is grave abuse of
discretion in its exercise.
Reyes v. CA
– admission to the UP College of Medicine; 70, 90 cut-
off, NMAT; UC wanted to admit them, UPCM did not
want to - Any entrance requirement that may be
imposed by the College Faculty must bear the UC’s
approval; The right and power to fix admission
requirements is clearly vested by law in the University
Council; The UC has the final say in the admission
requirements provided that it conforms with the law,
rules and regulations of the university.
Tan v. CA
o refusal of admission to Grace Christian
High School - Private schools are subject
to reasonable regulation and supervision
of the State, but they may also have the
right to establish reasonable rules
and regulations for the admission,
discipline and promotion of students.

*Dissenting opinion of Justice Cruz: the academic
 freedom of the school to choose its students
should NOT be stretched beyond its
constitutional limits.
Miriam College v. CA
– Libog article; student press freedom; school’s academic
freedom - Academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and
objectives, and how best to attain them free from
outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restrain; SC has
upheld the right of the students to free speech in school
premises; However, this right is not absolute. It must
always be applied in light of the special characteristics of
the school environment; The power of the school to
investigate, like the power to suspend or expel, is an
inherent part of academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution.
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COMMISSION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS
Commission on Human Rights
Cariño v. CHR
– striking of teachers - CHR has adjudicative power (it
may investigate i.e. receive evidence and make findings
of facts as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights; cannot be likened to a
judicial function; CHR has merely the power to
investigate; it cannot try and resolve on the merits
(adjudicate)
EPZA v. CHR
– CHR is a creation of the Constitution although it is not
on the same level as the Constitutional Commissions. In
essence, its power is only investigative.
Simon Jr. v. CHR
– human rights; civil rights; political rights – Human
rights – generic term; civil rights – those rights that
belong to every citizen or inhabitant of the state or
country [by virtue of his citizenship in the country] and
are not connected with the organization or
protection, freedom of contract etc.); Political rights –
right to participate, directly or indirectly in the
establishment or administration of government
(suffrage, run for public office); CHR – focus on SEVERE
cases of human rights violations (right of political
detainees, treatment of prisoners, fair and public trials
etc.); CHR can cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt but not order them to desist
AGRARIAN REFORM
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform
– constitutionality of some of the measures mentioned in
the CARL – Payment of just compensation is not always
required to be made fully in money; Other modes of
payment which are available to the landowner at his
option are not unreasonable because payment made in
shares of stocks, LBP bonds, other properties or assets,
tax credits and other things of value are equivalent to
the amount of just compensation.
Maddumba v. GSIS
– LBP bonds as payment – LBP bonds shall be accepted
as payment of pre-existing obligations to government
financial institutions at their face value and not at
discounted value
Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform
– Section II of the CARL which includes “private
agricultural lands, devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine raising” in the definition of
“commercial farms is invalid”; Livestock or poultry raising
is not similar to crop or tree farming; agricultural land
RIGHT TO STRIKE
SSSEA v. CA
– right to strike – At present, in the absence of any
legislation in government employees the right to strike,
recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise
of such right, they are prohibited form striking by
express prohibition of MC No. 6 and as implied in EO 180
Republic v. CA
– national parks committee; right to strike; civil service –
The committee is a government agency and
its employees are covered by civil service rules and
regulations; While the committee’s employees are
allowed under the 1987 Constitution to organize and join
unions of their choice, there is yet a law permitting them
the right to strike.
De Vera v. NLRC
– illegal dismissal – Loss of confidence as a ground for
dismissal must rest on some basis
SUFFRAGE
Romualdez v. RTC
– domicile; residence – In election cases, the
Court treats domicile and residence as
synonymous terms thus: the term residence as
used in election law is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only an
intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in the place. Domicile
denotes a fixed, permanent residence. In order
to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
concur:
a. residence or bodily presence in the new
locality
b. intention to remain there
c. intention to abandon the old domicile
otherwise stated, there must be animus
manendi and animus non-revertendi.
Dual Citizenship
Valles v. COMELEC
– Australian citizenship; governor of Davao Oriental -
Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality
or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place of
his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which
determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of the
place of birth; The signing into law of the 1935
Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis
as basis for acquisition of Philippine citizenship; The
mere fact of a person is a holder of an Australian
passport and has an ACR are not acts constituting an
effective renunciation of citizenship and don’t militate
against her claim of Philippine citizenship; For candidates
with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
certificate of candidacy to terminate their status as
persons with dual citizenship; A declaration to support
and defend the Constitution is effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
Mercado v. Manzano
– candidates for vice-mayor of Makati -Dual citizenship is
different from dual allegiance. The former arises when,
as a result of the concurrent application of the different
laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance
refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is a result of an individual’s volition;
Under our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:
a. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in
foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli
b. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and
alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers’ country such
children are citizens of that country
c. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s
country the former are considered citizens, unless by
their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced their Philippine citizenship
Calilung v. Datumanong
constitutionality of the Dual Citizenship Law (RA 9225) –
What RA 9225 does is dual citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who has lost Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country; On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance; By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizenship
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Ermita
–appointment of Ong to the SC; naturalborn – the
alleged subsequent recognition of a person’s natural-
born status by the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ
cannot amend the final decision of the trial court stating
such individual and his mother were NATURALIZED along
with his father; No substantial change or correction in an
entry in a civil register can be made without a
judicial order; change of citizenship status is a substantial
change
Nicolas-Lewis v. COMELEC
– citizenship retention; absentee voting – There is no
provision in the law requiring “duals” to actually
establish residence and physically stay in the Philippines
first before they can exercise their right to vote; RA 9225
makes the implicit recognition that “duals” are most
likely non-residents; derivative citizenship (Derivative
citizenship - unmarried child below 18 years of those
who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
the Act shall be deemed citizens of the Philippines).
Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of Law of
Benjamin Dacanay
– A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another
country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine
citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225
but although he is also deemed to never have
terminated his membership in the Philippine Bar, no
automatic right to resume the practice of law accrues;
must comply with IBP requirements and take the
lawyer’s oath again.
Loss of Citizenship
Yu v. Defensor Santiago
– Portuguese passport – Yu’s act of applying for a
Portuguese passport despite his naturalization as a
Philippine citizen and his act of declaring his nationality
as Portuguese in commercial documents, constitute an
EXPRESS renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
acquired through naturalization; Philippine citizenship is
not a commodity or ware to be displayed when required
and suppressed when convenient
Yu v. Defensor Santiago

– Portuguese passport – Yu’s act of applying for a

Frivaldo v. COMELEC Portuguese passport despite his naturalization as a
Philippine citizen and his act of declaring his nationality
– governor-elect of Sorsogon; American citizenship; as Portuguese in commercial documents, constitute an
repatriation – Loss of naturalized Philippine citizenship EXPRESS renunciation of his Philippine citizenship
did not and could not have the effect of automatic acquired through naturalization; Philippine citizenship is
restoration of one’s Philippine citizenship; mere filing of not a commodity or ware to be displayed when required
certificate of candidacy wherein Frivaldo claimed that he and suppressed when convenient
is a natural born citizen is
not a sufficient act of repatriation; repatriation requires
an express and unequivocal act;
Frivaldo v. COMELEC

– governor-elect of Sorsogon; American citizenship;

Labo v. COMELEC repatriation – Loss of naturalized Philippine citizenship
did not and could not have the effect of automatic
– mayor of Baguio City; Australian citizenship; “bigamous restoration of one’s Philippine citizenship; mere filing of
marriage” – Res judicata does not apply to questions of certificate of candidacy wherein Frivaldo claimed that he
citizenship; is a natural born citizen is
Modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost: not a sufficient act of repatriation; repatriation requires
an express and unequivocal act;
a. naturalization in a foreign country
b. express renunciation of citizenship
c. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Labo v. COMELEC
Constitution or laws of a foreign country; annulment of
Labo’s Australian citizenship as a result of finding that his – mayor of Baguio City; Australian citizenship; “bigamous
marriage to an Australian national was bigamous did not marriage” – Res judicata does not apply to questions of
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship; citizenship;
Philippine citizenship may be acquired by direct act of
Congress; by naturalization or by repatriation. Modes by which Philippine citizenship may be lost:

a. naturalization in a foreign country

Aznar v. COMELEC
– disqualification of Osmeña; American citizenship –
Aznar failed to present direct proof that Osmeña
had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided by law; The fact the Osmeña was both a Filipino
and an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino;
b. express renunciation of citizenship
c. subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
Constitution or laws of a foreign country; annulment of
Labo’s Australian citizenship as a result of finding that his
marriage to an Australian national was bigamous did not
automatically restore his Philippine citizenship;
Philippine citizenship may be acquired by direct act of
Congress; by naturalization or by repatriation.

Aznar v. COMELEC

– disqualification of Osmeña; American citizenship –

Loss of Citizenship Aznar failed to present direct proof that Osmeña
had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes
provided by law; The fact the Osmeña was both a Filipino
and an American does not mean that he is not still a
Filipino;
CITIZENSHIP - Citizens by election
Co v. HRET
- representative; 2nd District of Samar; election of
citizenship – The exercise of the right to suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive
act of election of Philippine citizenship; Any election of
Philippine citizenship on the part of Jose Ong would not
only have been superfluous but would also have resulted
in absurdity considering that it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for him.
In re: Ching
– permission to take the lawyer’s oath; Ching elected
Filipino citizenship beyond the required “upon
reaching the age of majority” – If the citizenship of a
person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it
remains subject to challenge under the new charter even
if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before
the effectivity of the new Constitution; CA 625 and the
1935 Constitution did not prescribe a time within which
the election of Philippine citizenship should be made;
“reasonable time”; “upon reaching the age of majority” –
it was clearly beyond by any reasonable yardstick, the
able period to exercise the privilege.
EX POST FACTO LAWS; BILLS OF ATTAINDER
Article 3, SECTION 22
----- Ex post facto laws -----
People v. Jabinal
– possession of unlicensed firearms; secret agent; -
No criminal liability would attach to such possession of
said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and
permit. Jabinal must be absolved; Jabinal may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was
done was held not to be punishable; (case of SC
abandoning previous decisions; stare decisis)
----- Bill of Attainder -----
People v. Ferrer
– constitutionality of the [then] Anti-Subversion Act – A
bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts
punishment without a trial; Anti-Subversion act not a bill
of attainder; It does not specify the CPP or its members;
CPP is used for definition purposes only because in the
law, it also says “any other organization having the same
purpose and their successors”; mere membership to the
CPP not punished; even if the Act specifies individuals,
this feature is not enough to consider it a bill of attainder
People v. Sandiganbayan
– violation under Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
– The new 15-year prescriptive period (formerly 10) in
the Act cannot be given retroactive effect because it will
be prejudicial to the accused.
Article 2, SECTION 21- Philippines Constitution
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
----- Attachment of jeopardy -----
People v. Ylagan
– physical injuries –
A defendant is in legal jeopardy when he was put to trial
in the following conditions:
a. in a court of competent jurisdiction
b. upon a valid complaint or information
c. after he has been arraigned
d. after he has pleaded to the information
“without the consent of the accused” –
does not mean “over the objection of the accused” or
“against the will of the accused” ; mere silence or failure
to object
People v. Balisacan
– homicide – People v. Obsania
Existence of a plea is an essential requisite in order that
the accused may be in jeopardy. In this case, he first
entered a plea of guilty and subsequently, he was ed to
testify on the mitigating circumstances and he said he
acted in self defense: this had the effect of vacating his
plea of guilty;
court should have required a new plea.
Cudia v. CA
– requisites in order to successfully invoke the defense of
double jeopardy/ substantiate an claim of
jeopardy –
a. a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second
b. first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
c. second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt
to commit of frustration thereof. Jeopardy does not
attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective
indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the
prosecution
----- Termination of jeopardy -----
1. Bustamante v. Maceren
– reopening of a case –
No re-opening of a case may be ordered of a criminal
case after accused has
started serving his sentence; a judgment in a criminal
case becomes final after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been
partially or totally satisfied or served or the defendant ha
waived in writing his appeal; withdrawal of plea of guilty
does not constitute waiver of defense of double jeopardy
timely invoked.
– rape –
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may
inure in favor of an accused, the following
requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution/ double jeopardy attaches when:
a. a valid complaint or information
b. a competent court
c. defendant had pleaded to the charge
d. defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his consent dismissal with express consent of
the defendant constitutes waiver
Rivera v. People
– transportation of marijuana –
VERBAL ORDER OF DISMISSAL which was not reduced
into writing may be set aside by the judge and enter a
new one duly signed by him, reinstating the case
Cuison v. CA
– double homicide –
The promulgation of only one part of the decision i.e.
liability for civil indemnity, is NOT A BAR, to the
subsequent promulgation of the other part, the
imposition of the criminal accountability – doctrine on
double jeopardy same as in Cudia and Obsania cases.
People v. Velasco
– homicide and frustrated homicide – Requisites to
successfully invoke double jeopardy (refer to Obsania);
Where an acquittal is concerned, the rules do not
distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial
court or an appeal on a judgment of conviction. This
firmly establishes the finality-of-acquittal rule; An
acquittal is final and unappealable ON THE GROUND OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY whether it happens at the trial court
of before the Court of Appeals; doctrine that double
jeopardy may not be invoked after trial may apply only
when the Court finds that the criminal trial was a sham
because the prosecution
representing the sovereign people in the criminal case
was denied due process.
Salcedo v. Mendoza
– homicide through reckless imprudence –
General rule: dismissal of criminal case upon motion or
with express consent of accused will not be
a bar to the subsequent prosecution of the accused for
the same offense. EXCEPTION TO THE RULE: when
dismissal is grounded upon the right of the accused to a
speedy trial. This amounts to a judgment of acquittal on
the merits which bars the subsequent prosecution of
accused for the same offense
Oriente v. People
– homicide; lead pipe –
It is well settled that when an accused appeals from the
sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional
safeguard against double jeopardy; Courts have the
inherent power to amend their decisions to make them
conformable to law and justice; change in penalty by the
RTC did not involve
the consideration of new evidence but a mere
“correction”
People v. Cajigal
– homicide to murder –
The change of the offense charged from homicide to
murder is merely a formal amendment and not a
substantial amendment or a substitution;
----- Same offense; ordinance and states -----
People v. Relova –
theft of electricity; punishable by an ordinance and the
RPC – A person who was charged for violating a
city ordinance which was dismissed for prescription of
the offense may not be charged again under the RPC;
claim of double jeopardy is available even if prior offense
charged under an ordinance is different from subsequent
offense charged in a statue where both offenses spring
from the same act; where an offense is punished by
different sections of a statute, the inquiry, for the
purpose of double jeopardy,
is on identity of offenses charged. In contrast, where an
offense is penalized by an ordinance and a statute, the
inquiry is on the identity of acts; Identity of offenses
(examining elements of the two offenses); identity of
acts (examining the locus or such acts in time and place);
For double jeopardy
to be available, not all technical elements of the first
offense need be present in the definition of the second
offense; Damages, civil liability – will continue to be
heard
People v. City Court of Manila
– the defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper when
there is no identity of the offenses charged. Evidence
required to prove one offense is not the same evidence
required to prove the other; An appeal by the
prosecution from the order of dismissal by the trial court
SHALL NOT constitute double
jeopardy if:
a. the dismissal is made upon motion or with express
consent of the defendant;
b. dismissal is NOT an acquittal or based upon
consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the
case;
c. question to be passed upon the appellate court is
purely legal (if dismissal is incorrect, case will be
remanded to the court of origin)
----- Rule on supervening facts –
Melo v. People
– physical injuries; injured party dies; homicide – The
rule of identity does not apply when the
second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case,
there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with
physical injuries and after conviction, the injured person
dies, the charged for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy.
People v. Buling
– [less] serious physical injuries; X-ray; two physicians;
two complaints -
The prosecution of the accused for less serious physical
injuries is a bar for his prosecution with serious physical
injuries. If the X-ray examination disclosed the existence
of a fracture when the second examination was made,
this must have been present during the first
examination; There was therefore no supervening fact
which would justify application of the rule of double
jeopardy.
NON-IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT
Article 3, SECTION 20- Philippine Constitution
Lozano v. Martinez
– constitutionality of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) – BP
22 is constitutional. The gravamen of BP 22 involves the
issuance of a worthless check, not the non-payment of
debt.
Right Against Cruel and Inhuman
Punishment
ARTICLE 3, SECTION 19 Philippine Constitution
----- Cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment; excessive
fines -----
People v. Estoista
- illegal possession of firearms – Republic Act. No. 4 is
constitutional. It does not go against the constitutional
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment having due
regard to the prevalent conditions which the law
proposes to curb.
People v. Echegaray
– death penalty; constitutional – Courts are not the fora
for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of
the death sentence where the law itself provides
therefor specific and well defined criminal acts; Congress
has the power to re-impose the death penalty for
compelling reasons involving heinous
crimes; This entails: 1) define and describe what heinous
crimes mean; 2) specify and penalize by death only
crimes that qualify as heinous; 3) Congress be move by
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes.
----- Effect of abolition on application of penal laws -----
1. People v. Muñoz
– 1987 Constitution does not expressly declare the
abolition of the death penalty. It merely says that the
death penalty shall not be imposed and if already
imposed, shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua;
----- Death Penalty -----
1. People v. Bon
– repeal of RA 7659 by RA 9346 – There can be no
harmony between RA 9346 and the RPC unless the latte
statute is construed as having downgraded those
penalties ATTACHED to death by reason of the graduated
scale under Art. 71 of the RPC; RA 9346 unequivocally
bars the application of the death penalty
RIGHT AGAINST SELF–
INCRIMINATION
Article 3, Section 17, Case Doctrines
Bermudez v. Castillo
– handwriting; refused to provide; perjury – She was
completely entitled to the privilege invoked by her
because she was compelled to write and were it proven
by means of what she might right later that the
documents were written by her, it would be impossible
for her to evade persecution for perjury
Cabal v. Kapunan Jr.
– graft; corrupt practices, unexplained wealth –
Proceedings for the forfeiture of property are deemed
criminal and penal and hence, the exemption of the
defendants in criminal cases from the obligation to be a
witness against themselves are applicable thereto;
Almonte v. Vasquez
– subpoena duces tecum; government agency – At
common law, a governmental privilege is recognized
with respect to state secrets bearing on military,
diplomatic and similar matters. In this case, there is no
claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed
by the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of EIIB (economic something).
People v. Malimit
– robbery with homicide – The right against self-
incrimination is simply a prohibition against legal process
to extract from the accused’s own lips, against his ill,
admission of his guilt. It does NOT apply when the
evidence sought is NOT an incriminating statement but
an object evidence; Miranda rights –
covers only inadmissibility of extrajudicial confession or
admission made during custodial investigation; other
evidence (like IDs, wallet, keys, etc) is not affected even
if obtained or taken in the course of custodial
investigation.
US v. Tan Teng
– substance taken from the body of the defendant – The
prohibition against compelling a man in a criminal cause
to be a witness against himself is a prohibition against
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications
from him and not an exclusion of his body as evidence
when it may be material.
Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on
Banks et. al.
– The right of the accused against self-incrimination is
extended in administrative investigations that partake of
the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings –
the privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceeding sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness,
whether a party or not.
SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASES
Article 3, Section 16, Case Doctrines
Tatad v. Sandiganbayan
– due process; speedy disposition of cases – Long delay
in termination of the preliminary investigation
by the Tanodbayan in the instant case found to e
violative of the constitutional right of the accused to due
process; Undue delay in the conduct of preliminary
investigation can not be corrected
Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan
– when is a delay justified; balancing test - The right to a
speedy disposition of a case, like the right to a speedy
trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays;
unjustified postponements; balancing test: conduct of
prosecution and defense.
Criminal Due Process
Article 3, SECTION 14, Philippines Constitution (CRIMINAL
DUE PROCESS)
----- Military Tribunals -----
Olaguer v. Military Commission
–subversion – The trial contemplated in the Constitution
is trial by judicial process and military tribunals are not
courts; A military court is ousted with jurisdiction where
it did not accord accused a chance to adduce evidence.
Once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to
exist, the tribunal that rendered the judgment in
question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction.
----- Due process -----
Scoty’s Department Store v. Micaller
– discharge of employee – Court of Industrial Relations,
no criminal jurisdiction;
----- Presumption of innocence -----
US v. Luling
– customs; wharf watchman
– Presumption of innocence; The state has the right to
declare what acts are criminal, within certain well-
defined limitation and also a right to specify what acts or
acts shall constitute a crime, as well as what proof shall
constitute as PRIMA FACIE evidence of guilt, and then to
put upon the defendant the burden of showing that such
act or acts are innocent and were not committed with
any criminal intent.
People v. Mingoa
– malversation of public funds – There is no
constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing
that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by
a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of
human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence.
----- Right to Counsel -----
People v. Holgado
– slight illegal detention – When an accused unaided by
counsel qualifiedly admits his guilt to an ambiguous or
vague information, it is not prudent for the trial court to
render a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a
capital offense without absolutely any evidence to
determine and clarify the true facts of the case;
Duties of court when defendant appears without any
attorney:
1) inform him that he has a right to have an attorney
before arraignment;
2) after, court must ask him if he desires to have an
attorney;
3) if he desires but unable to employ an attorney, court
must assign an attorney de oficio;
4) if he desires to procure one on his own, court must
hive him reasonable time to do so; In criminal
cases, there can be no fair hearing unless the accussed
be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel.
People v. Sim Ben
– indecent and immoral cinematographic films – The
recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine be imposed
upon Sim Ben does not mean that he is not guilty of the
crime he is being charged; A promise to recommend a
specific penalty such as fine does not render the
sentence void of the Court ignores the recommendation
and metes out a penalty which is provided by law.
Delgado v. CA
– estafa thru falsification of public/official documents – A
part who was not represented by a member of the bar is
entitled to a new trial, otherwise, there would be a
denial of due process.
----- Right to be informed ------
People v. Regala
– murder with assault upon an agent of a person in
authority – defective information; Accused cannot be
convicted of the complex crime of homicide with assault
absent any allegations in the information of the essential
elements of an assault that appellant knew that the
assault victim was an agent of a person in authority; The
fact that the crime of assault was proved by evidence of
the prosecution without any objection on the part of the
accused does not cure the defect because to do so would
be convicting an accused of a crime not properly alleged
in the information.
People v. Ortega
– person cannot be convicted of homicide through
drowning in an information that charged murder by
means of stabbing – The hornbook doctrine is that an
accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information.
----- Right to speedy trial ------
Conde v. Rivera and Unson
– municipal midwife of Laguna – Philippine organic and
statutory law expressly guarantee that in all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to have a speedy trial; Where a prosecuting officer,
without good cause, secures postponements of the trial
of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable
time, accused is entitled relief through mandamus or
habeas corpus.
----- Right to impartial trial ------
Mateo Jr. v. Villaluz
– cold neutrality of an impartial judge – Due process
cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of
objectivity on the part of a judge sufficient to assure
litigants of his being fair and just; What a trial requires is
an impartial and disinterested tribunal.
----- Right to public trial ------
Garcia v. Domingo
– trial conducted in an air conditioned room – Public trial
– when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts proceedings;
----- Compulsory process/ confrontation -----
Fajardo v. Garcia
– request to serve written interrogatories to a doctor –
The constitutional guarantee to an accused to
compulsory process to secure the production of evidence
in his behalf was not violated by the trial judge who
refused to grant the request of the accused for leave to
serve written interrogatories to his doctor who treated
their injuries who already left abroad. That the said
medical testimony on the injuries they sustained was
vital to their defense can still be adduced thru other
witnesses and hospital records.
People v. Ortiz-Miyake
– malicious mischief – Accused may be compelled to be
present at the trial for the purposes of identification
unless he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his
arraignment that he is the person
named; The provision in the constitution allowing trial in
absentia means that he waives his right to meet the
witnesses face to face; an express waiver of appearance
has the same effect; HOWEVER, such waiver of right
does NOT release the accused from his obligation under
the bond to appear in court whenever so required; the
accused may waive the right but not the obligation to
appear in court.

– hearsay rule – the right of confrontation is not absolute

as it is recognized that it is sometimes impossible to
recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a
previous proceeding, in which event, his previous
testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of
evidence by way of exception
the hearsay rule; Exception contemplated by law covers
only the utilization of testimonies of absent witness
made is previous proceedings BUT DOES NOT cover
previous decisions or judgments (if used –
proof only that he was previously convicted of a crime
BUT not guilty in a subsequent case.
People v. Seneris
– parricide; prosecution witness died – While the right of
confrontation and cross-examination are fundamental
rights, they can be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right; If the
party was given the opportunity to confront or cross-
examine a witness but failed to take advantage of it, he
forfeits the right and the testimonies given in direct
examination will be received or ed on record; Where the
prosecution witness was partially cross-examined but
prior to the next hearing, he dies, his testimony cannot
be stricken off the record.
RIGHT TO BAIL
Article 3, SECTION 13 Philippines Constitution
to
----- Right to bail or recognizance -----
People v. Nitcha
– murder; claim that arrest was illegal for want of
preliminary investigation – Act of posting a bail bond,
apart from the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty, is
tantamount to foregoing the right to question the
assumed irregularity; Bail is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua (absolute); Bail is a matter of
discretion when the offense charged is punishable by
reclusion perpetua; If accused ins convicted by the crime
(reclusion perpetua), bail is neither a matter of right nor
a matter of discretion. Bail must not be granted.
Cardines v. Rosete
– illegal recruitment – life imprisonment (special laws),
reclusion perpetua (RPC), same standing with regard to
bail – under the new rule, life imprisonment (not granted
as a matter of right when evidence of guilt is strong.

---- Trial in absentia; right to be present -----

People v. Sandiganbayan (Special Division)

Carredo v. People
– Jinggoy Estrada; not a flight risk 2) voluntary relinquishment;
– Even if the capital offense charged is bailable owing to
the weaknesses of the evidence of guilt, the right to bail
Right to bail may be waived.
can justifiably still be denied if the probability of escape
is great; A grant of bail does not ----- Excessive bail -----
prevent the trier of facts from making a final assessment
of the evidence after full trial on the merits. A grant of de la Camara v. Enage
bail is predicated only on its preliminary appreciation of
– excessive bail – Where the right to bail exists, is should
the evidence adduced in the bail hearing to determine
not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
whether the deprivation of the right to bail is warranted.
that is so excessive;

Guidelines in fixing the bail:

Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia
1) ability of the accused to give bail;
– extradition; right to bail –If bail can be granted in
2) nature of the offense;
deportation cases,, the Court sees no justification why it
should not also be ed in extradition cases – clearly the 3) penalty for the offense charged;
right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail must be
viewed in light of the various treaty obligations of the 4) character and reputation of the accused;
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and
5) health of the accused;
protection of human rights.
6) character and strength of evidence;

7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;

Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC Manila Br. 17
8) forfeiture of other bonds;
– when can the right to bail in extradition be available -
Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a 9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when
clear and convincing showing: 1) that he will not be a arrested;
flight risk or a danger to the community and; 2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and compelling 10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in
circumstances. other cases.

----- Waiver of right -----

People v. Donato
– rebellion is a bailable offense; bail as a matter of right –
Right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended;
Prosecution does not have the right to present evidence
for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a
matter of right, such is required only bail is discretionary;
Waiver of the right
1) the right exists;
RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED UNDER
CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION
----- Rights under Section 12: origins and rationale -----
1. Magtoto v. Manguera
– murder; admissibility of confession – A confession
obtained from a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense, who has not been informed of
his right to silence and right to counsel is INADMISSIBLE
as evidence; Miranda and Escobedo
----- When the rights become available -----
2. People v. Taylaran
– “accidental killing”
– Right to silence and to counsel NOT applicable where
no written confession was to be presented in evidence as
a result of a formal custodial investigation
3. Galman v. Pamaran
– assassination of Ninoy; Agrava Commission – The fact
that the framers of the Constitution did not use the word
“custodial investigation” shows that it did not entirely
adopt the Miranda Doctrine; The accused are also
entitled to be admonished of their constitutional right to
remain silent, to counsel and be informed that any or all
statements given by them may be used against them;
This also applies in other cases, not just those criminal in
nature
4. People v. Ayson
– irregularity in the sale of plane tickets – Right against
self incrimination is accorded to every person
who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena in any proceeding. The right is
NOT to be compelled to be a witness against himself and
NOT a prohibition of inquiry; The right can only be
claimed when the specific question, incriminatory in
character, is actually put to the witness; It does not give
the right to refuse a subpoena. This right must be
claimed, it is not automatically operational | Miranda
rights | Custodial investigation – questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
away into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any
way; A defendant on a trial or preliminary investigation is
NOT under custodial investigation; “Accused”
RIGHTS: BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
(or with public prosecutor for preliminary investigation;
taken into custody)
a. right to remain silent
b. right to counsel
c. right to be informed
d. right to have evidence obtained in violation of those
above rejected
RIGHTS: AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a. right to refuse to be a witness
b. not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him
because of such refusal
c. right to testify in his own behalf , subject to cross
examination by the prosecution
d. while testifying: to refuse to answer an specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some crime
other that which he is being prosecuted
----- Police line-ups; paraffin test; signature -----
5. Gamboa v. Cruz
– vagrancy – The right to counsel attaches at the start of
the investigation (when investigating officers elicit
information/ admission/ confession. Police line-up not
part of the inquest.
6. People v. Dimaano
– robbery with homicide – A police line-up is not part of
the custodial inquest so at this stage, they have no right
to counsel yet. They are not being held to answer for
criminal offense for which they are being charged or
convicted.
----- Right to counsel -----
7. Estacio v. Sandiganbayan
- estafa thru falsification – When the waiver of the right
to remain silent and assistance by counsel was not made
in the presence of counsel, the defect was cured when
the lawyer arrived at the closing stage of the
interrogation, read the statement and talked to the
accused before the latter signed it.
8. People v. De Jesus
– robbery with homicide – Right to counsel attaches
upon the start of the investigation; Custodial
investigation is the stage where the police investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has began to focus on the particular suspect who had
been taken into custody; questions initiated when a
person is taken into custody and deprived of his freedom
of action
9. People v. Lucero
– extrajudicial confession; lawyer was away when
accused gave his uncounselled confession - doctrine
same as above
----- Right to be informed -----
10. People v. Pinlac
– robbery – The constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to counsel
contemplates the transmission of meaningful
information and not just a mere ceremonial and
perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional
principle. Police officer is duty bound not just to recite
the rights; he must explain it as well; Waiver MUST BE
MADE in the presence of counsel
----- Waiver -----
11. People v. Rous
– robbery with homicide
– A confession is admissible until the accused
successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward of
leniency; Presumption that a confession was made
deliberately and knowingly.
NON-IMPAIRMENT OF
CONTRACTS
Article 3, SECTION 10 Philippines Constitution
Abella v. NLRC
– illegal dismissal – To come under the constitutional
prohibition, the law must effect change in the rights of
the parties with reference to each other and not with
reference to non-parties. The contract in this case cannot
have the effect of annulling subsequent legislation for
the protection of the workers.
Ortigas and Co. v. CA
– MMDA ordinance; reclassification of a portion of
Ortigas Ave. – A later law which enlarges, abridges or in
any manner changes the intent of the parties to the
contract necessarily impairs the contract itself and
cannot be given retroactive effect without violating the
constitutional prohibition against the non-impairment of
contracts; Police power legislation is applicable not only
to future contracts but equally to those already in
existence. Non-impairment of contracts must yield to the
superior and
legitimate exercise by the State of police power to
promote health, morals, etc.
National Development Company v. Philippine Veteran’s
Bank
– mortgage liability; AGRIX – While it is true that police
power is superior to the impairment clause, the principle
will only apply only where the contract is so related to
the public welfare that it will be considered congenitally
susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of
the greater number.
Republic v. Caguioa
– tax exemptions; granted but was later withdrawn by a
latter law – There is no vested right in tax exemption,
more so when the latest expression of legislative intent
render its continuance doubtful; Congress in the
legitimate exercise of its lawmaking powers, can enact a
law withdrawing a tax
exemption just as efficaciously as it may grant the same.
THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO
INFORMATION ON MATTERS AND
DOCUMENTS OF PUBLIC
CONCERN
Article 3, SECTION 7- Philippines Constitution
The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
Legaspi v. CSC
– eligibility of sanitary people -
1. The right to information enshrined in the Bill of Rights
is self executing. They supply the rules by means of
which the right to information may be enjoyed by
guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford
access to sources of information. Hence, the
fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by
the people upon the ratification of the constitution
without need for any ancillary act of the legislature.
What may be provided by the legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded
which must, of
necessity be consistent with the declared state policy of
full disclosure of all transactions involving public interest.
2. Government agencies are without discretion in
refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public
concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable
regulations which may be imposed by said
agencies in custody of public records on the manner in
which the right to information may be exercised by the
public.
3. In determining whether or not a particular information
is of public concern, there is no rigid test which can be
applied. It a term that eludes exact definition.
Valmonte v. Belmonte
1. – loans from GSIS; Imelda Marcos as guarantor - The
right to information goes hand-in-hand with the
constitutional policies of full public disclosure and
honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the
widening role of the citizenry in the governmental
decisionmaking
as well as in checking abuse in the
government.
2. Right to information is not absolute, it is limited to
matters of public concern and interest, and is further
subject to limitations as may be imposed by law.
3. Public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the
public office held by the alleged borrowers make the
information sought clearly a manner of public interest
and concern.
4. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity and cannot be invoked by juridical
entities like the GSIS.
Gonzales v. Narvasa
- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform - The
information to which the public is entitled to are those
concerning “matters of public concern”, a term which
“embrace[s] a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply
because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an
ordinary citizen. It is for the courts to determine in a case
by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or
importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
BA-RA 7941 v. COMELEC
– names of partylist representatives are a matter of
public concer
Akbayan v. Aquino – JPEPA
– diplomatic communication; negotiation is privileged
information
Liberty Of Abode and Travel
SECTION 6, Philippines Constitution- The liberty of
abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be
impaired except in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health, as may be provided by
law.
Manotoc Jr. v. CA -
A court may prohibit an accused from leaving the
Philippines even if he was admitted to bail – necessary
consequence of a bail bond
Marcos v. Manglapus –
Marcos wants to return to country - The right to return
to one’s country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed under the Bill of Rights, though it may well
be considered as
a generally accepted principle of international law, which
is part of the law of the land. However, it is distinct and
separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and
Political Rights.
Non-establishment Clause Case
Doctrines
SECTION 5, Philippines Constitution- No law shall be
made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference shall forever be
ed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights.
A. Non-establishment of religion
Aglipay v. Ruiz - commemorative postage stamp – Act.
No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose. What it
gives is the discretionary power to determine when the
issuance if special postage stamps would be
advantageous to the government. The only purpose of
the commemorative postage stamps was to advertise
the Philippines and attract more tourists
Garces v. Estenzo – statue of San Vicente Ferrer – A
resolution of the barangay council for soliciting
contributions to buy a statue of the barangay’s patron
saint and the use of such fund for said purpose does not
violate the Constitution’s provision prohibiting use of
public funds for religious purpose; statue was purchased
by barangay funds so it belongs to the barangay and not
to the parish
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Worker’s Union – joining a
union is prohibited by the Iglesia ni Cristo – closed shop
agreement – freedom of religion takes precedent over
the right against impairment of contracts
Islamic Dawah v. Executive Secretary – Hala food
products – Islamic Dawah v. Office of Muslim Affairs
(OMA) – Classifying a food product as halal is a religious
function because the standards used are drawn from the
Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. State cannot classify food as
halal.
B. Free Exercise of Religion

American Bible Society v. City of Manila – selling bibles;

tax - The constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
FREEDOM OF SPEECH,
with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any
restraint of such right could only be justified like other EXPRESSION, OF THE PRESS,
restraints of freedom of expression on the grounds that
there is clear and present danger of any substantive evil
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE PEACEABLY
which the State has the right to prevent. TO ASSEMBLE
ase Doctrines Section 4- Constitution. No law shall be
Ebralinag v. Superintendent – saluting the flag; pledge –
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
abandoned the ruling in Gerona. The 2-fold aspect of
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
religious freedom, (1) the absolute freedom to believe as
assemble and petition the government for redress of
long as such is limited within the realm of thought, (2)
grievances.
the freedom to act on one’s belief, which may be
regulated. It underscored the rule that the only
justification for relief is the existence of clear and
present danger, both grave and imminent, which is of A. Prior Restraint
serious evil to public interest. In the case at bar, the
Court held that the Jehovah’s Witnesses’
Eastern Broadcasting v. Dans – The test of limitations on
nonparticipation in the flag ceremony in no way poses a
freedom of expression continues to be the CLEAR AND
clear and present danger to society. Thus, restraint on
PRESENT DANGER RULE – that words are used in such a
the part of the government would be unjustified.
circumstance and are of such a nature as to create a
Moreover, the petitioner’s right to quality education, as
clear and present danger that they will bring about the
granted by the Constitution was likewise violated by
substantial evils that a lawmaker has a right to prevent.
effecting the  expulsion.
Government has a right to be protected against
broadcasts which incite listeners to overthrow it
Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals – X rating of a TV
show - Mere criticisms of some of the deeply held
Chavez v. Gonzales – Hello Garci Case – Tests for
dogmas and tenets of other religions do not impose a
restraint – dangerous tendency doctrine, clear and
clear and present danger, which the State should protect
present danger rule and balancing of interest test;
its citizens from. X-rating not justified. The right to
aspects of freedom of the press – freedom from prior
religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect,
restraint and freedom from subsequent punishment
viz., freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's
beliefs . The first is absolute as long as the belief is B. Subsequent Punishment
confined within the realm of thought. The second is People v. Perez – seditious remarks – Criticisms against
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into the branches of government within the range of liberty
external acts that affect the public welfare… It is error to and speech unless the intention and the effect be
think that the mere invocation of religious freedom will seditious
stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting
the general welfare. The inherent police power can be
exercised to prevent religious practices inimical to Gonzales v. COMELEC – prolonged political campaigns –
society. However, prior restraint on speech, including freedom of expression not absolute; The speech and free
religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical press may be identified with the liberty to discuss
fears but only by the showing. publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest
without censorship or punishment. There is to be then
no previous restraint to the communication of views or
subsequent punishment unless there be a clear and
present danger of substantive evil that Congress has the
right to prevent.
C. Freedom of Expression and the electoral process
Sanidad v. COMELEC – prohibition regarding certain
forms of propaganda a valid exercise of police power of
the state to prevent perversion and prostitution of
electoral process
Adiong v. COMELEC – using stickers to campaign – ed
ABS-CBN v. COMELEC – exit polls – allowed
SWS v. COMELEC – releasing surveys results before the
election – allowed
D. Freedom of Expression and the Courts
IN RE: EMIL JURADO – journalist and lawyer at the same
time - Right to private reputation. Judges are commonly
and rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves
to norms of conduct which embody more stringent
standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than
are commonly required from private persons. Although
honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the
fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not
follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published
about a public
official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional
protection.
PEOPLE V. GODOY - cited for contempt based on the
latter’s article in the newspaper - (1) There’s a need to
make a distinction between adverse criticism of the
court's decision after the case is ended and
"scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism;
it is personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in
which case it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt.
Contempt proceedings dismissed. Such comments may
constitute a libel against the judge, but it cannot be
treated as in contempt of the court's authority. (2) In
case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair
criticism of the court, its
proceedings and its members, are allowed. However,
there may be a contempt of court, even though the case
has been terminated, if the publication is attended by
either of these two circumstances:
a. Where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in
other words, to scandalize the court; or
b. Where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. And this
brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of
expression usually resorted to as a defense in
contempt proceedings.
IN RE: RESOLUTION A.M. 98-7-02 SC - resolution
prohibiting demonstrations within a radius of 200 meters
from the boundary of any hall of Justice. - The Court, it
would seem, has the power to
promulgate “rules concerning conduct of
demonstrations in the vicinity of the courts to assure the
people of an impartial and orderly administration of
justice. It was anchored on Art. VIII Sec. 5 (5)
RE: RADIO/TV COVERAGE OF ESTRADA TRIAL - Can the
trial of Estrada in the Sandiganbayan or any other court
be broadcasted in TV or radio? NO. An accused has a
right to a public trial, but it is
not synonymous with a publicized trial. Freedom of the
press and the accused’s protection from a possible
prejudicial publicized trial must be taken into
consideration. And unless there are safety nets to
prevent this event, broadcast media cannot be allowed
to publicize the trial.
E. UNPROTECTED SPEECH – LIBEL, OBSCENITY
BORJAL V. COURT OF APPEALS - Borjal published in his
editorial column in the Philippine Star about certain
anomalous activities of an “organizer of a conference” -
(1) Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for
libel or slander. The
doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed
false, because every man is presumed innocent until his
guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is
deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable
imputation is directed against a public person in his
public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order
that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is
an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken, as long as it might
reasonably be inferred from the facts.
OCAMPO V. SUN STAR PUBLISHING - graft charges filed
against the judge. - (1) Generally, every defamatory
information is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown, except in the following instances:
a. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or social
duty;
b. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceeding which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report, or speech delivered
in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by
public officers in the exercise of their functions.—the
subject articles are under this exemption.
Pita v. CA – Pinoy Playboy - Miller test (3 Tests)
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary
standards’ would find the work, taken as a whole appeals
to the prurient interest. (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable
state law. (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
F. ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO - public meeting at Plaza Miranda
- (1) A statute requiring persons using the public streets
for a parade or procession to procure a special license
therefor from the local authorities is not an
unconstitutional abridgement of the rights of assembly
or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute
is construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities
are strictly limited, in them issuance of licenses, to a
consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade
and procession, with a view to conserving the public
convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide
proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary
discretion to issue or refuse license. (2) In the exercise of
police power, the council may, in its discretion, regulate
the exercise of such rights in a reasonable manner, but
cannot suppress them, directly or indirectly, by
attempting to commit the power of doing so to the
mayor or any other officer. The discretion with which the
council is vested is
a legal discretion, to be exercised within the limits of the
law, and not discretion to transcend it or to confer upon
any city officer and arbitrary authority, making him in its
exercise a petty tyrant.
NAVARRO V. VILLEGAS - Sunken Gardens as alternative
to Plaza Miranda - The Mayor cannot be compelled to
issue the permit. A permit should recognize the right of
the applicants to hold their assembly at a public place of
their choice, another place may be designated by the
licensing
authority if it be shown that a clear and present danger
of a substantive evil if no change was made.
JBL REYES V. MAYOR BAGATSING - a peaceful march and
rally from Luneta park to the gates of the US Embassy. -
(1) The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of  the date, the
public place where and the time when it will take place.
(2) If it were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is
required. (3) Application for permit should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official concerned to
appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant but at another place. It is an indispensable
condition to such refusal or modification that the clear
and present danger test be the standard for the decision
reached. If he is of the view that there is such imminent
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants AND CORRESPONDENCE
must be heard on the matter. (4) Decision of the
licensing authority must be transmitted to the applicants SECTION 3 Privacy Of Communication and
at the earliest opportunity. Correspondence- Philippines Constitution CASE
DOCTRINES
MIRIAM COLLEGE V. COURT OF APPEALS – Libog Article
- (1) The right of the students to free speech in school
premises is not absolute. The right to free speech must
(1)The privacy of communication and correspondence
always be applied in light of the special characteristics of
shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the
the school environment. Thus, while the court upheld
court, or when public safety or order requires
the right of the students to free expression in these
otherwise, as prescribed by law.
cases, disciplinary action by the school for "conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any reason -
whether it stems from time, place, or type of behavior -
which materially disrupts classwork or involves (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this and the
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others preceding section shall be inadmissible for anypurpose
were not ruled out. (2) The school cannot suspend or in any proceeding.
expel a student solely on the basis of the articles he or
A. Exclusionary Rule (Second paragraph of Section 3)
she has written, except when such articles materially
disrupt class work or involve substantial disorder or People v. Marti – package bound for Switzerland – The
invasion of the rights of others. Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against act of
private individuals. It is directed against the government
JACINTO V. COURT OF APPEALS – teachers and mass
and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law.
actions - mass actions then staged. That given the return-
The constitutional against unreasonable searches and
to-work orders issued by the then DECS Secretary, they
seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by a
still refused to return to work, they were then suspended
private individual.
and later on dismissed from service. - Where public
school teachers absent themselves without proper
authority, from their schools during regular school days,
in order to participate in mass protest, their absence B. Waiver of Rights
ineluctably results in the non-holding of classes and in
the deprivation of students of education, for which they
Veroy v. Layague – search of rebels in a house –
are responsible, and they may be penalized not for their
Permission was granted by Veroy to enter the house but
exercise of their right to peaceably assemble and to
only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers. Where
petition the government for a redress of grievances but
permission to enter a residence was given,
for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
it is illegal to search the rooms therein and seize firearms
without as search warrant.

Freedom of Speech, Expression, of the Press, Right of
the People Peaceably to Assemble
Okabe v. Gutierrez – estafa case – An application for or
admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefore.. An application for bail SHALL
NOT BE considered as a waiver of rights. A valid waiver,
requisites. 1) rights must exist; 2) there must be clear
and convincing proof that there was an actual intention
to relinquish the right

C. Anti-Wire Tapping Act
Navarro v. CA – police complaint gone bad – where the
exchange between two persons is not private, the tape
recording is not prohibited
Salcedo-Ordonez v. CA – annulment with damages –
husband is cheating on me case – Unauthorized tape
recordings of telephone conversations not admissible
D. Privacy of Bank Accounts
Marquez v. Desierto – secrecy of bank deposits –
exceptions: 1) depositor consents in writing; 2) subject of
an impeachment case; 3) by court order in cases of
bribery and dereliction by public officials, 4) deposit is
subject of litigation; 5) unexplained wealth
E. Privacy of Communication
Roxas v. Zuzuaregui – contempt of the Supreme Court –
the letter ceased to be private when Roxas furnished the
letter to the all the justices and not just to the one whom
it is addressed
 conscience to perform an act faithfully or truthfully
WARRANT OF ARREST; SEARCH
WARRANTS
SECTION 2 - The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by a judge
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
CASE DOCTRINES
by: C D R
A. When is a search a “reasonable search”?
Valmonte v. De Villa – checkpoints – Section 2 is a
personal right invocable only by those whose rights have
been infringed or threatened to be infringed;
reasonableness is determined by a fixed formula but
from the circumstances of the case; not all searches and
seizures are not allowed; between the inherent right of
the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual; right
against warrantless search which was reasonably
conductedm the former should prevail
B. Requisites of a Valid Warrant
Alvarez v. CFI of Tayabas – definition of a search warrant
– an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of
the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or justice of
peace and directed to a peace officer commanding him
to search for personal property and bring it before court,
OATH - any form of
attestation that a party signifies that he is bound by
People v. CA – the general rule is that search warrants
must be served during the daytime (protect the public
from the abrasiveness of official intrusions). Exception: a
search at any reasonable hour
of day or night may be made when the application
asserts that the property in on the person or place
ordered to be searched. Absence of abuse of discretion,
a search conducted at night where so allowed is not
improper
People v. Veloso – parliamentary club - JOHN DOE
WARRANTS – Valid IF the best description possible is
given in the arrest warrant – it must be sufficient to
indicate clearly on whom it is to be served by stating his
occupation, personal appearance or peculiarities, place
of residence or other circumstances which he may be
identified
Microsoft v. Maxicorp – software – probable cause –
such reasons, supported by facts and circumstances as
will warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action
and the means taken in prosecuting it are
legally just and proper; OATH must refer to the truth of
the facts WITHIN THE PERSONAL KNOLEDGE OF THE
PETITIONER OR HIS WITNESSES; probable cause deals
with probability and not absolute certainty
Burgos Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP – Metropolitan Mail and
We Forum – typographical error in specifying the address
to be searched not sufficient to invalidate search warrant
where the address intended appears on the face of the
warrant; probable cause – such facts or circumstances
which would lead a peripheral,
reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be searched
People v. CA – Abigail’s Variety Store – VOID warrant –
the claim that the place actually searched – although not
the one specified in the warrant – is exactly what they
had in view when they applied for the warrant is
unacceptable. What is material in determining the
validity of the warrant is the place stated in the warrant,
not the one they had in their thoughts; particularization
of description may properly be done only by the judge
and only in the warrant itself
Corro v. Lising – Philippine Times – conclusions of law of
military officers will not satisfy probable cause
requirement for issuance of search warrants
Soliven v. Makasiar – The judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
He shall: 1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest OR 2) if on the
basis thereof, he does not find probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal’s report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion of the
existence of probable cause
Lim Sr. v. Felix – certification by the fiscal of the
existence of probable cause does not bind the judge.
Preliminary inquiry – determines probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant (prosecutor);
preliminary examination (judge) - investigation for the
determination of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest; preliminary investigation   proper –
ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or be released.
Yao Sr. v. People – GASUL and SHELLANE v. MASAGANA -
examination of complainant and witnesses – must be
probing and exhaustive not merely routinary, general,
perfunctory or pro forma; law
does not require that the thihgs to be seized should be
described in very precise and minute details.
C. Warrantless Searches and Seizures
Nolasco v. Pano – articles seized by void warrants should
be retuned to its owners Papa v. Mago – Customs Search
– search warrant not necessary except if the place to be
searched is a dwelling or house – Tariff and Customs
Code
People v. CFI of Rizal – search of moving vehicle – Carroll
doctrine – search of moving vehicles or automobiles – no
search warrant needed
People. V. Lo Ho Wing - exception to the issuance of
search warrant: 1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2)
search of moving vehicle; 3) seizure of evidence in plain
view
People v. Evaristo – evidence in plain view – Harris v.
Coolidge, Coolidge v. New Hampshire – no search
warrant needed; Malacat v. CA – valid waiver – must be
made in writing and in the presence of
counsel; search incidental to a lawful arrest v. stop and
frisk – Terry Case – probable cause is not required to
conduct stop and frisk but mere suspicion or a hunch will
not validate it. A genuine reason must exist.
People v. De Gracia – Eurocar Sales Office – crime was in
fact being committed – search incidental to lawful arrest
valid
People v. Johnson – inspection at airports – Persons may
lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by
exposure of their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting lack of subjective
expectation of privacy
David v. Macapagal-Arroyo – PP 1017 case – doctrines
same as the ones above (related topics: freedom of
expression; freedom to peaceably assemble)
People v. Nuevas – illegal possession of marijuana - in
cases of searches incidental to a lawful arrest, the arrest
must precede the search; warrantless search, when
valid: 1) incidental to lawful arrest; 2) evidence in plain
view [a) valid prior intrusion, police are legally present in
the pursuit of their
official duties, b) evidence was inadvertently discovered,
c) evidence immediately apparent, d) plain view justified
mere seizure with =out further search]; 3) search of
moving vehicle; 4) consented warrantless search; 5)
customs search; 6) stop and frisk; 7) exigent and
emergency circumstances
D. Searches and seizures “of whatever nature for any
purpose”
E. Warrantless Arrests
Umil v. Ramos – subversion a continuing offense - arrest
without a warrant is justified if the person arrested in
caught in flagrante delicto
People v. Aminudin - M/V Wilcon; marijuana – not
caught in flagrante delicto; search was unreasonable;
evidence inadmissible
Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago – pedophiles – the rights
granted in Section 2 are available to all persons including
aliens, whether accused of a crime or not People v.
Mengote – suspicious man outside – a person may not
be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a bust street
on a mere unexplained suspicion
Posadas v. Ombudsan – Sigma Rho v. Scintilla Juris –
Arrest made without a valid warrant: Rule 113, Section 5
of the Rules of Court – when in the presence of a police
officer or a private individual: 1) the person arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or attempting to
commit an offense; 2) when an offense has actually been
committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that the
person to be arrested commited it; 3) when the person
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where his is serving final or
temporary judgment (pending), escaped while being
transferred
Ladlad v. Velasco – imprisoned by PP 1017;
rebellion/sedition – doctrine same as above and People
v. De Gracia
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS,
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS, DUE
PROCESS REQUISITES
Case Doctrines-
Constitutional Law 2
SECTION 1
No person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without
due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Alejano v. Cabuay – Oakwood Mutiny Case – writ
of habeas corpus is available where a person
continues to be unlawfully denied one or more of his
A. Life, Liberty or Property constitutional freedoms, where there is a denial of
due process, where the restraints are not merely
American Inter-Fashion v. Office of the
involuntary but also unnecessary, and where a
President – export quota allocation –
deprivation og freedom originally valid has later
Glorious Sun’s export quota allocation was a initially
become arbitrary. (related topic: privacy of
a privilege evolved into some form of property which
communication and correspondence)
should not be removed arbitrarily and without due
process and hurriedly confer it to another.
B. Procedural Due Process
Chavez v. Romulo – citizen’s right to bear arms -
Banco Espanol-Filipino v. Palanca – mortgage
The right to bear arms cannot be classified as a
foreclosure – due process implies that: 1) there must
fundamental right under the 1987 Constitution – the
be a court or tribunal clothed with the power to hear
right is a mere statutory privilege, not a 
or determine the matter before it; 2) that jurisdiction
constitutional right. It is erroneous to assume that
has been lawfully acquired; 3) defendant shall have
the US Constitution grants upon the people the
to opputunity to be heard; 4) judgment shall be
right to bear arms. The Second Amendment pertains
rendered upon lawful hearing. | NOTICE must be
to the citizen’s “collective right” to take arms in
given
defense of the state, not to the citizen’s “individual
right” to own and possess arms.
Bautista v. CA – land dispute – When a party was
afforded the opportunity to participate in the
Exec. Secretary V. CA – Migrant Worker’s and
proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 – A profession, trade
of deprivation of due process
or calling is a property right within the meaning of
our constitutional guarantees; one cannot be
deprived of the right to work or the right to make a Rural Bank of Buhi v. CA – bank receivership;

living because these rights are property rights, the insolvency – there is no requirement whether

arbitrary and unwarranted deprivation of which express or implied that a hearing must first be

normally constitutes an actionable wrong. conducted before a banking institution may be

Nevertheless, no right is absolute and the proper placed in receivership

regulation of a profesion is a valid exercise of police Pollution Adjudication Board v. CA – untreated
power. wastewater discharged to sewer – Ex parte
proceedings - permitted by law in situations like

Duncan v. Glaxo – not ed to have a relationship these because stopping the discharged of the

with an employee of a competitor company – Glaxo wastewater cannot be

has a right to guard its trade secrets. (related topic: made to wait until protracted litigation; standards set

equal protection)
by the board enough – not required to prove constitutionality principle that a governmental
immediate danger to life, health et. al purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may nor
be achieved by means
Fabella v. CA – public school teachers striking –
that sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
invade protected freedoms
PROCEEDINGS – 
requisites: 1) actual or constructive notice of the
institution of the proceedings which may affect one’s
legal rights; 2) real opportunity to be heard POLICE POWER, EMINENT
personally or with counsel; 3) to present witnesses
DOMAIN AND TAXATION
and
evidence is one’s favor and to defend his rights; 4) BILL OF RIGHTS CASE DOCTRINES
tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction –
POLICE POWER, EMINENT DOMAIN AND TAXATION
reasonable guarantee of honesty and impartiality; 5)
finding is supported by substantial evidence –
City of Manila v. Laguio - closing down houses of sin or
contained and made known to the parties
of ill-repute – Local government units exercise police
Guzman v. CA – kicked out from school – DUE power through their respective legislative bodies. Their
PROCESS IN STUDENT DISCPLINE power however is subordinate to the
certain constitutional limitations. (related topics:
PROCEEDINGS – requisites: 1) student must be
procedural and substantive due process, equal
informed in writing the nature and cause of the
protection of the laws, deprivation of property)
accusation against him; 2) right to answer the
charges against them, with the assistance of
Moday v. CA – expropriation of one hectare of land –
counsel if desired; 3) they shall
eminent domain – government’s right to appropriate, in
be informed of the evidence against them; 4) right to
the nature of compulsory sale to the state, private
adduce evidence in their own behalf; 5) evidence property for public use. Inheresnt
must be duly considered by the investigating possessed by the national legislature, it may be validly
committee or officials hearing the case delegated to local governments.

Lao Gi v. CA – DUE PROCESS IN DEPORTATION Roxas and Co. Inc. v. CA – application of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law – the
PROCEEDINGS – same requisites as those
implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the State’s
required in criminal proceedings (Rules of Court)
police power and the power of eminent domain – to the
Secretary of Justice v. Lantion – extradition case of extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the
Jimenez - DUE PROCESS IN QUASIJUDICIAL landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the
PROCEEDINGS – requisites: 1) taking and regulation of private property but where, to carry out
evaluation of evidence; 2) such regulation, the owners are deprived of their own
lands they own in excess of the maximum area ed, there
determining facts based upon the evidence
is taking
presented; 3) rendering an order based upon the
under the power of eminent domain (related topic: due
facts proved Chavez v. COMELEC – billboard of process – this must be observed in the exercise of the
Chavez as endorser – A statute or regulation is police power and eminent domain)
considered void for overbreadth when it offends the
 10. Informing power
LTO v. Butuan – registration of tricycles – LGU’s under
the Local Government Code now have the power to 11. Other powers
regulate the operation of tricycles for hire and grant
franchises thereof but they are still subject
to the guidelines prescribed by the DOTC. To regulate DOROMA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, GR NO. 85468,
means to fix, establish or control, to adjust by rule, SEPTEMBER 07, 1989
method or established mode. Taxation – the power of
FACTS:
the government to raise revenue in order to
support its existence and carry out legislative objectives  Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of
the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
St. Luke’s Employee’s Association v. NLRC – radiologic
Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his
technology – while the right of the workers to security of
shareholdings and position as president and director of
tenure is guaranteed by the constitution, its exercise
the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC)
may be reasonably regulated pursuant to the police
which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
power of the state to safeguard health, morals, peace,
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and
education et. al. The regulation is a reasonable method
airconditioning equipment to the Department of
of the protecting the public from the incompetence and
Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the National
ignorance among those
Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
who would practice such technology.
 An information was then filed by the
United BF Homeownes’ v. City Mayor of Paranaque –
“Tanodbayan” against Doromal for the said violation and
reclassification from residential to commercial areas –
a preliminary investigation was conducted.
the city council has the power to enact ordinances for
the general welfare of the municipality  The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari
or its inhabitants. Contractual restrictions on the use of and prohibition questioning the jurisdiction of the
property could not prevail over the reasonable exercise “Tanodbayan” to file the information without the
of police power approval of the Ombudsman.

 The Supreme Court held that the incumbent

Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987
The Powers Of The President Of The Philippines
Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and
1. Executive power duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to
2. Power of appointment direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman.
3. Power if removal
Subsequently annulling the information filed by the
4. Power of control “Tanodbayan”.

5. Military powers  A new information, duly approved by the

Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan, alleging
6. Pardoning power that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good
7. Borrowing power
Government, did then and there wilfully and unlawfully,
8. Diplomatic power participate in a business through the Doromal
International Trading Corporation, a family corporation
9. Budgetary power of which he is the President, and which company
participated in the biddings conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the
National Manpower & Youth Council, which act or
participation is prohibited by law and the constitution.
 The petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information on the ground that it was invalid since there
had been no preliminary investigation for the new
information that was filed against him.
 The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan
claiming that another preliminary investigation is
unnecessary because both old and new informations
involve the same subject matter.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a
violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary
even if both informations involve the same subject
matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as
invalid due to the absence of preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third
issue. Petition was granted by the Supreme Court.
RATIO:
 (1) The presence of a signed document bearing
the signature of Doromal as part of the application to bid
shows that he can rightfully be charged with having
participated in a business which act is absolutely
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family
corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect
interest."
 Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides that "the President, Vice-President, the
members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants
shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly...
participate in any business.
 (2) The right of the accused to a preliminary
investigation is "a substantial one." Its denial over his
opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects the
accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law" provided by the Constitution.
 Since the first information was annulled, the
preliminary investigation conducted at that time shall
also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a new
preliminary investigation must be conducted.
 (3) The absence of preliminary investigation does
not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case. Nor do
they impair the validity of the information or otherwise
render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary
investigations and the defendants, before entering their
plea, invite the attention of the court to their absence,
the court, instead of dismissing the information should
conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it
or remand the case to the inferior court so that the
preliminary investigation may be conducted.
 WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and
prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall
immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the
Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
and shall hold in abeyance the proceedings before it
pending the result of such investigation.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY-
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 284
FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R. Mauricio, Antonio
R. Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896 and
Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions
were consolidated and are being resolved jointly as both
seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on
July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners
allows members of the Cabinet, their undersecretaries
and assistant secretaries to hold other than government
offices or positions in addition to their primary positions.
The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may in addition to his primary position, hold
not more than two positions in the government and
government corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is
required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in
rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than two
positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of
such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality
because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII
other than those provided in the constitution. According
to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding
any other office or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet
under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of
justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of article VIII.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is
constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted. Executive
Order No. 284 was declared null and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to Section 13 of
Article VII, Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional.
By restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
hold in addition their primary position to not more that
two positions in the government and government
corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
of the express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of the
1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
constitution” must be given a literal interpretation to
refer only to those particular instances cited in the
constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8 Art. VIII.
G.R. NOS. 146710-15, MARCH 2, 2001, ESTRADA VS.
DESIERTO, ESTRADA VS. ARROYO
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner  VS. ANIANO DESIERTO,
in his capacity as Ombudsman, RAMON
GONZALES et.al, respondents
G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA, petitioner  VS. GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, respondent
FACTS:
The case basically revolves around the series of events
that happened prior and subsequent to the event we
know as EDSA II. During the 1998 elections, Joseph E.
Estrada and Gloria Macapagal Arroyo were elected as
president and vice-president respectively. The downfall
of the Estrada administration began when For. Gov. Luis
Chavit Singson went to the media and released his
exposé that petitioner was part of the Jueteng scandal as
having received large sums of money. After this expose,
a lot of different groups and many personalities had
asked for the resignation of the petitioner. Some of
which are the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP), Sen. Nene Pimentel, Archbishop of
Manila, Jaime Cardinal Sin, For. Pres. Fidel Ramos, and
For. Pres. Corazon Aquino who asked petitioner to make
the “supreme self-sacrifice”. Respondent also resigned as
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Services and also asked petitioner for his resignation. 4
senior economic advisers of the petitioner resigned and
then Speaker Manny Villar, together with 47
representatives, defected from Lapian ng Masang
Pilipino.
By November, an impeachment case was to be held as
Speaker Manny Villar had transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment to the senate. On November 20, the 21
senators took oath as judges to the impeachment trial
with SC CJ Hilario Davide, Jr., presiding. The
impeachment trial was one for the ages. It was a battle
royal of well known lawyers. But then came the fateful
day, when by the vote of 11-10, the judges came to a
decision to not open the second envelop allegedly
containing evidence showing that the petitioner had a
secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde”
containing P3.3 billion. The not opening of the
2nd envelop resulted to the people going to the streets
and the public prosecutors withdrawing from the trial.
On January 19, AFP Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes marched
to EDSA shrine and declared “on behalf of your Armed
Forces, the 130,000 strong members of the Armed
Forces, we wish to announce that we are withdrawing
our support to this government.” PNP Chief, Director
General Panfilo Lacson together with some Cabinet
members made the same announcement.
June 20 was the day of surrender. At around 12:20 AM,
negotiations started for the peaceful transition of power.
But at around 12 noon, respondent took oath as the
14th president of the Philippines. At 2:30 PM, petitioner
and his family left Malacanang. He issued the following
Press Statement:
“20 January 2001
STATEMENT FROM
PRESIDENT JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA
At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the
Republic of the Philippines.  While along with many other
legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious
doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor
that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our
civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation.  I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people.  I will not shirk from any future challenges that
may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and beloved people.
MABUHAY!
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
It also appears that on the same day, January 20, 2001,
he signed the following letter:
“Sir:
By virtue of the provisions of Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration
that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office.  By operation of law and the Constitution, the
Vice-President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA”
On January 22, this Court issued the following Resolution
in Administrative Matter No. 01-1-05-SC. The said
resolution confirmed the authority given by the 12 SC
justices to the CJ during the oath taking that happened
on January 20. Soon, other countries accepted the
respondent as the new president of the Philippines. The
House then passed Resolution No. 175 “expressing the
full support of the House of Representatives to the
administration of Her Excellency Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, President of the Philippines.” It also approved
Resolution No. 176 “expressing the support of the House
of Representatives to the assumption into office by Vice
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as President of the
Republic of the Philippines, extending its congratulations
and expressing its support for her administration as a
partner in the attainment of the nation’s goals under the
Constitution.”
On February 6, respondent recommended Teofisto
Guingona to be the vice president. On February 7, the
Senate adopted Resolution 82 which confirmed the
nomination of Senator Guingona. On the same day, the
Senate passed Resolution No. 83 declaring that the
impeachment court is functus officio and has been
terminated. Several cases were filed against the
petitioner which are as follows: (1) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1629, filed by Ramon A. Gonzales on October 23, 2000
for bribery and graft and corruption; (2) OMB Case No. 0-
00-1754 filed by the Volunteers Against Crime and
Corruption on November 17, 2000 for plunder,
forfeiture, graft and corruption, bribery, perjury, serious
misconduct, violation of the Code of Conduct for
government Employees, etc; (3) OMB Case No. 0-00-
1755 filed by the Graft Free Philippines Foundation, Inc.
on November 24, 2000 for plunder, forfeiture, graft and
corruption, bribery, perjury, serious misconduct; (4)
OMB Case No. 0-00-1756 filed by Romeo Capulong, et
al., on November 28, 2000 for malversation of public
funds, illegal use of public funds and property, plunder,
etc., (5) OMB Case No. 0-00-1757 filed by Leonard de
Vera, et al., on November 28, 2000 for bribery, plunder,
indirect bribery, violation of PD 1602, PD 1829, PD 46,
and RA 7080; and (6) OMB Case No. 0-00-1758 filed by
Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr. on December 4, 2000 for
plunder, graft and corruption.
A special panel of investigators was forthwith created by
the respondent Ombudsman to investigate the charges
against the petitioner.  It is chaired by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Margarito P. Gervasio with the following as
members, viz:  Director Andrew Amuyutan, Prosecutor
Pelayo Apostol, Atty. Jose de Jesus and Atty. Emmanuel
Laureso.  On January 22, the panel issued an Order
directing the petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and
the affidavits of his witnesses as well as other supporting
documents in answer to the aforementioned complaints
against him.
Thus, the stage for the cases at bar was set.  On February
5, petitioner filed with this Court GR No. 146710-15, a
petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction.  It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further
proceedings in Case Nos. OMB 0-00-1629, 1754, 1755,
1756, 1757 and 1758 or in any other criminal complaint
that may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted.” Thru another counsel, petitioner, on
February 6, filed GR No. 146738 for Quo Warranto.  He
prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of
his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her
oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of
the Constitution.” Acting on GR Nos. 146710-15, the
Court, on the same day, February 6, required the
respondents “to comment thereon within a non-
extendible period expiring on 12 February 2001.” On
February 13, the Court ordered the consolidation of GR
Nos. 146710-15 and GR No. 146738 and the filing of the
respondents’ comments “on or before 8:00 a.m. of
February 15.”
In a resolution dated February 20, acting on the urgent
motion for copies of resolution and press statement for
“Gag Order” on respondent Ombudsman filed by counsel
for petitioner in G.R. No. 146738, the Court resolved:
“(1) to inform the parties that the Court did not issue a
resolution on January 20, 2001 declaring the office of the
President vacant and that neither did the Chief Justice
issue a press statement justifying the alleged resolution;
(2) to order the parties and especially their counsel who
are officers of the Court under pain of being cited for
contempt to refrain from making any comment or
discussing in public the merits of the cases at bar while
they are still pending decision by the Court, and
(3) to issue a 30-day status quo order effective
immediately enjoining the respondent Ombudsman from
resolving or deciding the criminal cases pending
investigation in his office against petitioner Joseph E.
Estrada and subject of the cases at bar, it appearing from
news reports that the respondent Ombudsman may
immediately resolve the cases against petitioner Joseph
E. Estrada seven (7) days after the hearing held on
February 15, 2001, which action will make the cases at
bar moot and academic.”
ISSUES:
I Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.
II Assuming that the petitions present a justiciable
controversy, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on
leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting President.
III Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings
is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of
petitioner Estrada.  In the negative and on the
assumption that petitioner is still President, whether he
is immune from criminal prosecution.
IV Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should
be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity.
DECISION:
I No. The case is legal not political.
II No. He is not a president on leave.
III No. The impeachment proceedings was already It is a well settled rule that the legitimacy of a
aborted. As a non-sitting president, he is not entitled to government sired by a successful revolution by people
immunity from criminal prosecution power is beyond judicial scrutiny for that government
automatically orbits out of the constitutional loop. But
IV There is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to this would not apply as the Court finds substantial
enjoin the preliminary investigation of the petitioner by difference between the 2 EDSA Revolutions. It would
the respondent Ombudsman. show that there are differences between the 2
RATIO/REASON: governments set up by EDSA I and II. This was further
explained by the Court by comparing the 2 EDSA
1. I. Whether or not the case involves a political Revolutions.
question
EDSA I EDSA II
Respondents contend that the cases at bar pose a
political question. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo became a Extra-constitutional. Hence, Intra-Constitutional.
President through the People power revolution. Her “Xxx IN DEFIANCE OF THE Hence, the oath of the
legitimacy as president was also accepted by other 1973 CONSTITUTION, AS respondent as President
nations. Thus, they conclude that the following shall AMENDED”—cannot be includes the protection
serve as political thicket which the Court cannot enter. subject of judicial review and upholding of the
1987 Constitution.—
The Court rules otherwise. A political question has been resignation of the
defined by our Court as “those questions which, under President makes it
the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their subject to judicial review
sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the exercise of the people power exercise of people power
legislative or executive branch of the government.  It is of revolutionwhich overthrew of freedom of speech and
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, the whole government freedom of assembly to
not legality of a particular measure.” petition the government
for redress of
Respondents allege that the legality of the Arroyo grievances which only
administration should be treated similarly with the affected the office of the
Aquino administration. Respondents propose that the President
situation of the Arroyo and Aquino administrations are
similar. However, the Court finds otherwise. The Court Political question Legal Question
has made substantial distinctions which are the In this issue, the Court holds that the issue is legal and
following: not political.
Aquino Arroyo

Government was a result of Government was a result of 1. II. Whether or not petitioner resigned as
a successful revolution a peaceful revolution President
In the Freedom Arroyo took the oath of the Resignation is a factual question and its elements are
constitution, it was stated 1987 Constitution. She is beyond quibble:  there must be an intent to resign and
that the Aquino discharging the authority of the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.
government was instilled the president under the There is no required form of resignation. It can be
directly by the people in 1987 constitution. expressed, implied, oral or written. It is true that
defiance of the 1973 respondent never wrote a letter of resignation before he
Constitution as amended. left Malacanang on June 20, 2001. In this issue, the Court
would use the totality test or the totality of prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial
evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
Using this test, the Court rules that the petitioner had
resigned. The Court knows the amount of stress that the
petitioner had suffered. With just a blink of an eye, he
lost the support of the legislative when then Manny
Villar and other Representatives had defected. AFP Chief
of Staff General Angelo Reyes had already gone to EDSA.  President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as
PNP Chief Director General Panfilo Lacson and other
cabinet secretaries had withdrawn as well. By looking
into the Angara diaries, it was pointed out that the
petitioner had suggested a snap election at May on
which he would not be a candidate. Proposing a snap
election in which he is not a candidate means that he
had intent to resign. When the proposal for a dignified
exit or resignation was proposed, petitioner did not
disagree but listened closely. This is proof that petitioner
had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to
resign.  His mind was already concerned with the five-
day grace period he could stay in the palace.  It was a
matter of time.
The negotiations that had happened were about a
peaceful transfer of power. It was already implied that
petitioner would resign. The negotiations concentrated
on the following: (1) the transition period of five days
after the petitioner’s resignation; (2) the guarantee of
the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the
agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the
name of the petitioner. Also taken from the Angara
diaries, The President says. “Pagod na pagod na ako. 
Ayoko na masyado nang masakit.  Pagod na ako sa red
tape, bureaucracy, intriga.  (I am very tired.  I don’t want
any more of this – it’s too painful.  I’m tired of the red
tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.) I just want to clear
my name, then I will go.” The quoted statement of the
petitioner was a clear evidence that he has resigned.
The second round of negotiations were about the
consolidating of the clauses which were proposed by
both sides. The second round of negotiation cements the
reading that the petitioner has resigned.  It will be noted
that during this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given
fact.  The only unsettled points at that time were the
measures to be undertaken by the parties during and
after the transition period.
When everything was already signed by the side of the
petitioner and ready to be faxed by Angara, the
negotiator for the respondent, Angelo Reyes, called to
Angara saying that the SC would allow respondent to
have her oath taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang,
he made a last statement.
The statement reads: ‘At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice
President of the Republic of the Philippines.  While along
with many other legal minds of our country, I have
strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president, I do
not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration
of unity and order in our civil society.
It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace,
the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of
peace and in order to begin the healing process of our
nation.  I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude
for the opportunities given to me for service to our
people.  I will not shrik from any future challenges that
may come ahead in the same service of our country.
I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the
promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity.
May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved
people.
MABUHAY!’”
By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms
the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of
the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with
the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he
was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for
the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process of our nation.  He did not say he was leaving the
Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going
to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people
for the opportunity to serve them.  Without doubt, he
was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve
the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not
shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in
the same service of our country.  Petitioner’s reference is
to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his
supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.  Certainly,
the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could
not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.
Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary
leave of absence. This is evidenced by a letter which
reads as follows:
“Sir
By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the
Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration
that I am unable to exercise the powers and duties of my
office.  By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice
President shall be the Acting President.
(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”
The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use
this letter during the week long crisis. It would be very
easy for him to say before he left Malacanang that he
was temporarily unable to govern, thus, he is leaving
Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the
mysterious letter cannot negate the resignation of the
petitioner.  If it was prepared before the press release of
the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the
presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later
act.  If, however, it was prepared after the press release,
still, it commands scant legal significance.
Petitioner also argues that he could not resign. His legal
basis is RA 3019 which states:
“Sec. 12.  No public officer shall be allowed to resign or
retire pending an investigation, criminal or
administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for
any offense under this Act or under the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on bribery.”
During the amendments, another section was inserted
which states that:
During the period of amendments, the following
provision was inserted as section 15:
“Sec. 15. Termination of office — No public official shall
be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution
against him, for any offense under the Act or under the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery.
The separation or cessation of a public official from office
shall not be a bar to his prosecution under this Act for an
offense committed during his incumbency.”
The original senate bill was rejected because of the
2nd paragraph of section 15. Nonetheless, another similar
bill was passed. Section 15 then became section 13.
There is another reason why petitioner’s contention
should be rejected. In the cases at bar, the records show
that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the
cases filed against him before the Ombudsman were
OMB Case Nos. 0-00-1629, 0-00-1755, 0-00-1756, 0-00-
1757 and 0-00-1758. While these cases have been filed,
the respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting
the preliminary investigation of the petitioner for the
reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was
immune from suit.  Technically, the said cases cannot be
considered as pending for the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction to act on them.  Section 12 of RA No. 3019
cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioner for it
contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal
obstacle like the immunity from suit of a sitting
President.
Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is
an administrative investigation that, under section 12 of
RA 3019, bars him from resigning.  The Court holds
otherwise. The impeachment proceeding may be
arguable. However, even if the impeachment proceeding
is administrative, it cannot be considered pending
because the process had already broke down. There was
also a withdrawal by the prosecutors to partake in the
impeachment case. In fact, the proceeding was
postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was no
impeachment case pending when he resigned.
1. III. Whether or not the petitioner is only
temporarily unable to act as President
This issue arose from the January 20 letter which was
addressed to then Speaker Fuentebella and then Senate
President Pimentel. Petitioner’s contention is that he is a
president on leave and that the respondent is an acting
president. This contention is the centerpiece of
petitioner’s stance that he is a President on leave and
respondent Arroyo is only an Acting President.
An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order.  It
provides:
“SEC. 11.  Whenever the President transmit to the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives his written declaration that he is unable
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until
he transmits to them a written declaration to the
contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by
the Vice-President as Acting President.
Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet
transmit to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written
declaration that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall
immediately assume the powers and duties of the office
as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties
of his office.  Meanwhile, should a majority of all the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the
President of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
his office, the Congress shall decide the issue.  For that
purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in
session, within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its
rules and without need of call.
If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last
written declaration, or, if not in session within twelve
days after it is required to assemble, determines by a
two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting separately, that
the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as
President; otherwise, the President shall continue
exercising the powers and duties of his office."
After studying in-depth the series of events that
happened after petitioner left Malacanang, it is very
clear that the inability of the petitioner as president is
not temporary. The question is whether this Court has
jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary inability of
petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of
both Houses of Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. The Court says that they
cannot, for such is an example of a political question, in
which the matter has solely been left to the legislative,
1. IV. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys
immunity from suit. If yes, what is the extent of the
immunity
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the
cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has not
been convicted in the impeachment proceedings against
him; and second, he enjoys immunity from all kinds of
suit, whether criminal or civil. The “immunity” the
petitioner points to is the principle of non-liability.
The principle of non-liability simply states that a chief
executive may not be personally mulcted in civil
damages for the consequences of an act executed in the
performance of his official duties. He is liable when he
acts in a case so plainly outside of his power and
authority that he cannot be said to have exercise
discretion in determining whether or not he had the
right to act.  What is held here is that he will be
protected from personal liability for damages not only
when he acts within his authority, but also when he is
without authority, provided he actually used discretion
and judgment, that is, the judicial faculty, in determining
whether he had authority to act or not.  In other words,
he is entitled to protection in determining the question
of his authority.  If he decide wrongly, he is still protected
provided the question of his authority was one over
which two men, reasonably qualified for that position,
might honestly differ; but he is not protected if the lack
of authority to act is so plain that two such men could
not honestly differ over its determination.
The Court rejects the petitioner’s argument that before
he could be prosecuted, he should be first convicted of
impeachment proceedings. The impeachment
proceeding was already aborted because of the walking
out of the prosecutors. This was then formalized by a
Senate resolution (Resolution #83) which declared the
proceeding functus officio. According to the debates in
the Constitutional Convention, when an impeachment
proceeding have become moot due to the resignation of
the President, proper civil and criminal cases may be
filed against him.
We now come to the scope of immunity that can be of respondent Ombudsman flows to his
claimed by petitioner as a non-sitting President.  subordinates. Investigating prosecutors should not be
The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in treated like unthinking slot machines. Moreover, if the
character.  They involve plunder, bribery and graft and respondent Ombudsman resolves to file the cases
corruption.  By no stretch of the imagination can these against the petitioner and the latter believes that the
crimes, especially plunder which carries the death finding of probable cause against him is the result of
penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of bias, he still has the remedy of assailing it before the
a non-sitting president.  Petitioner cannot cite any proper court.
decision of this Court licensing the President to commit
criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure
immunity from liability.   It will be anomalous to hold
that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful
acts and omissions. As for civil immunity, it means
immunity from civil damages only covers “official acts”.

1. V. Whether of not the prosecution of petitioner

Estrada should be enjoined to prejudicial publicity

Petitioner contends that the respondent Ombudsman

should be stopped from conducting an investigation of
the cases filed against him for he has already developed
a bias against the petitioner. He submits that it is a
violation of due process. There are two (2) principal legal
and philosophical schools of thought on how to deal with
the rain of unrestrained publicity during the investigation
and trial of high profile cases. The British approach the
problem with the presumption that publicity will
prejudice a jury.  Thus, English courts readily stay and
stop criminal trials when the right of an accused to fair
trial suffers a threat. The American approach is different.  2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds
US courts assume a skeptical approach about the
potential effect of pervasive publicity on the right of an
accused to a fair trial. During cases like such, the test of
actual prejudice shall be applied. The test shows that
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have
been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity. The Court rules that there is
notenough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the
respondent Ombudsman.  Petitioner needs to offer more
than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.
According to the records, it was the petitioner who
assailed the biasness of the Ombudsman. The petitioner
alleges that there were news reports which said that the
Ombudsman had already prejudged the cases against
him. The Court rules that the evidence presented is
insufficient. The Court also cannot adopt the theory of
derivative prejudice of petitioner, i.e., that the prejudice
G.R. NO. 157013, JULY 10, 2003, MACALINTAL VS
COMELEC
FACTS:
Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions
of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
petitioner’s right to file the instant petition, stating in
essence that the petitioner has seriously and
convincingly presented an issue of transcendental
significance to the Filipino people, considering that
public funds are to be used and appropriated for the
implementation of said law.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:
(1) That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the
registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent
residents in other countries, by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in
Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution;
(2) That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the
COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for
national offices and party list representatives, including
the President and the Vice-President, violates the
constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution that the winning candidates for President
and Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners only
by Congress; and
(3) That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress
(through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created in the same section) to exercise the power to
review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall
promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC
under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1)     Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2)     Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution.
3)     Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
HELD:
1)     NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of
Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
2)     YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only
to the votes of the President and Vice-President, and not
to the votes of the Senators and party-list
representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the
Constitution.
3)     YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only
to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing
Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend,
and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate,
is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
REASONS:
1)  Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, entitled “An Act
Providing for a System of Overseas Absentee Voting by
Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,”
provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications.—The following shall be
disqualified from voting under this Act:
xxx            xxx            xxx
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she
executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval
of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall
also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the
removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent
resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters
and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in
absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional in
that it violates the requirement that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the
place where he proposes to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election, as provided under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution which reads: “Sec.
1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at
least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place
wherein they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election.”
For the resolution of this instant issue, the Court has
relied on, among others, the discussions of the members
of the Constitutional Commission on the topics of
absentee voting and absentee voter qualification, in
connection with Sec. 2, Art. V of the Constitution, which
reads: “Sec. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for
securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as
a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.” It was clearly shown from the said discussions
that the Constitutional Commission intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin,
which is in the Philippines. The Commission even
intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting
age abroad whose parents’ domicile of origin is in the
Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the
first time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission
provided for Section 2 immediately after the residency
requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, which may be
applied in construing constitutional provisions, the
strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the
Constitutional Commission provided for an exception to
the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with
respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same
Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos
who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote
even though they do not satisfy the residency
requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an
exception to the residency requirement found in Section
1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate
when Senate Bill No. 2104, which later became R.A. No.
9189, was deliberated upon on the Senate floor, further
weakening petitioner’s claim on the unconstitutionality
of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
2)Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas
absentee voter may vote for president, vice-president,
senators, and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
Sec. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.—
xxx            xxx            xxx
18.5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the
proclamation of a winning candidate if the outcome of
the election will not be affected by the results thereof.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning
candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election
has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if
the holding of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar
to such country or countries, in which events, factors and
circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the
Commission.
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of
R.A. No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to order the
proclamation of winning candidates for President and
Vice-President is unconstitutional and violative of the
following provisions of Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution:
Sec. 4.
xxx            xxx            xxx
The returns of every election for President and Vice-
President, duly certified by the board of canvassers of
each province or city, shall be transmitted to the
Congress, directed to the President of the Senate. Upon
receipt of the certificates of canvass, the President of the
Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of
the election, open all the certificates in the presence of
the Senate and the House of Representatives in joint
public session, and the Congress, upon determination of
the authenticity and due execution thereof in the manner
provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be
proclaimed elected, but in case two or more shall have
an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the
canvassing of the certificates.
xxx            xxx            xxx
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates,
in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too sweeping that
it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency,
granting merit to petitioner’s contention that said
Section appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally
disregarded the authority given to Congress by the
Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the
positions of President and Vice-President.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp
a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly
stated by petitioner, to encroach “on the power of
Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President and the power to proclaim the winners for the
said positions.”
3) Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 created the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC), as follows:
Sec. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.—a
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee is hereby
created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Constitutional Amendments, Revision of
Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators designated
by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven
(7) other Members of the House of Representatives
designated by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives: Provided, that of the seven (7) members
to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4)
should come from the majority and the remaining three
(3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have
the power to monitor and evaluate the implementation
of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission.
All the parties, petitioner and respondents alike, are
unanimous in claiming that Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is
unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on
this question raised by petitioner. However, the Court
finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress
through the JCOC vis-à-vis the independence of the
COMELEC as a constitutional body, as aptly provided for
under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1, which reads “Section 1. The
Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent,
are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on
Elections, and the Commission on Audit.”
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the
Constitution is circumscribed by other constitutional
provisions, one of which is the aforementioned provision
on the independence of constitutional commissions. The
Court has held that “whatever may be the nature of the
functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that
the framers of the Constitution wanted it to be
independent from the other departments of the
Government.”
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It
is intended to play a distinct and important part in our
scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions,
it should not be hampered with restrictions that would
be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err, so may this court
also. It should be allowed considerable latitude in
devising means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was
created — free, orderly and honest elections. We may
not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these
are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion,
this court should not interfere. Politics is a practical
matter, and political questions must be dealt with
realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory.
The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding
facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing
with political controversies, is in a peculiarly
advantageous position to decide complex political
questions.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over
COMELEC which is an independent body “except those
specifically granted by the Constitution,” that is, to
review its decisions, orders and rulings. In the same vein,
it is not correct to hold that because of its recognized
extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the
COMELEC by exercising supervisory powers over its rule-
making authority. In line with this, this Court holds that
Section 25 of R.A.  9189 is unconstitutional and must
therefore be stricken off from the said law.
SECTION 8.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President
shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from
office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-
President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his
inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
shall then act as President until the President or Vice-
President shall have been elected and qualified.
G.R. NO. 163193, JUNE 15, 2004 SIXTO S. BRILLANTES,
JR VS. COMELEC
FACTS :
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act
No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated
election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting
of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the
national and local elections. It also required the
COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines
(ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and
adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said
automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential
elections, particularly in counting the votes collected
from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to
correctly read a number of automated ballots
discontinued its implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted
that even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating
the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in
time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10,
2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 175
authorizing the release of a further supplemental P500
million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC.
The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain
the old and manual voting and counting system for the
May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with
companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the
computerized voting/counting machines) were
discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC
nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of
advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for
national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed
as an "unofficial quick count."
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No.
6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that its
advancement in tabulation procedures is allowed within
the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus
Election Code that:
Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest
technological and electronic devices, taking into account
the situation prevailing in the area and the funds
available for the purpose. Provided, That the
Commission shall notify the authorized representatives
of accredited political parties and candidates in areas
affected by the use or adoption of technological and
electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the
effectivity of the use of such devices.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004
issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of election
funds in consolidating the election results for the May
10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is
unconstitutional.
HELD:
YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said
Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the
Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for
the President and the Vice-President. 
REASONS:
Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole
and exclusive authority vested in the Congress to canvass
the votes for the election of President and Vice-
President. It is a grave error on the part of the
respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions
addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to
COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004
saying that such act would be in violation of the
Constitution (section 4 of Article VII):
"any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on
said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the
votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only
would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but
would also be lacking of any constitutional authority."
The existence of an accredited Citizen’s arm: Under
Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act
No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No.
8436, the accredited citizen’s arm - in this case,
NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the
election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial"
counting of the votes, whether for the national or the
local elections. No other entity, including the respondent
COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the
election returns for purposes of conducting an
"unofficial" count.
In addition, the second or third copy of the election
returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC
under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an
"unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and
unsealed only when needed by to verify election results
in connection with resolving election disputes that may
be established.
Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election
Code:  The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the
Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC
as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does
not cover the use of the latest technological and election
devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover,
the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized
representatives of accredited political parties and all
candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of
technological and electronic devices not less than thirty
days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices,
after failing to submit any document proving that it had
notified all political parties of the intended adoption of
Resolution No. 6712
SOLIVEN, petitioner  VS. JUDGE MAKASIAR, respondent
167 SCRA 393
FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to
review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners were denied due
process when information for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima
facie case was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently by the President
2. Whether or not the constitutional rights
of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without
personally examining the complainant and the witnesses,
if any, to determine probable clause
3. Whether or not the President of the Philippines,
under the Constitution, may initiate criminal proceedings
against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-
affidavit
DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess
or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
petitions.
The Order to maintain the status quo  contained in the
Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.
RATIO:
Background of the first issue
 MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
 APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied
by the Secretary of Justice
 MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through
Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice
 MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was
denied by the Executive Secretary
Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due
process of law.
-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his
counter-affidavits, he filed a  “Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed”, in effect, waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file his counter-
affidavits before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is that the
respondent be given the opportunity to submit
counter-affidavits if he is so minded.
Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional
provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature
and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution
requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witness in his determination of
probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests.
-However, what the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge
to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In
doing so, the judge is not required to personally examine
the complainant and his witness.
Following the established doctrine of procedure, the
judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause (and on the basis,
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis
thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal’s report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving
at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.
Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by
virtue of the President’s filing of her complaint-affidavit,
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court’s
jurisdiction. àThis would in an indirect way defeat
her privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on
the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to
possible contempt of court or perjury.
-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the
President by virtue of the office and may be invoked only
by the holder of the office; not by any other person in
the President’s behalf.
-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to
waive is solely the President’s prerogative. It is a decision
that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other
person (And there is nothing in our laws that would
prevent the President from waiving the privilege).
Additional Issue:
Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel
because of the privileged character of the publication. He
also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would
produce a “chilling effect” on press freedom.
-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court
finds no basis at this stage to rule on the “chilling effect”
point.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.
Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves
around the three principal issues. With regard to
whether or not the libel case would produce a “chilling
effect” on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that this
particular issue is the most important and should be
resolved now rather than later.
Quotable quotes: “Men in public life may suffer under a
hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.”  –United
States v. Bustos
“No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in
authority of such exalted position that the citizen must
speak of him only with bated breath.” –People v.
Perfecto
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS.
ENRIQUEZ- 235 SCRA 506
Facts:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General
Appropriations Bill of 1994) entitled “An Act
Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the
Government of the Philippines from January 1 to
December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was
approved by the President and vetoed some of the
provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a
member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category
claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution.
Issues of constitutionality were raised before the
Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare
unconstitutional and void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide
Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President of
the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs
of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the
Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and
Management and the National Treasurer and questions:
1.) Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the
President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the
constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in
the appropriation for debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the
writs of prohibition and mandamus against the same
respondents. Petitioners contest the constitutionality of:
1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the
GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the
conditions imposed by the President in the
implementation of certain appropriations for the
CAFGU’s, DPWH, and Nat’l Highway Authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special
provisions is constitutional and valid?
Held:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for
a debt-ceiling. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation for debt service. The said provisions are
germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They
are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o
vetoing the entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said
provision allows for the use of income & creation of
revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western Visayas
State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other
SCU’s enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres.
merely acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress
specified 30% ratio fo works for maintenance of roads be
contracted according to guidelines set forth by DPWH.
Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is
not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot be
veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP
modernization, prior approval of Congress required
before release of modernization funds. It is the so-called
legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval
must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions –
allows Chief of Staff to augment pension funds through
the use of savings. According to the Consttution, only the
Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law.
Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of
CAFGU’s – use of special fund for the compensation of
the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No.
1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act
cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO
VALID.
HUBERT J. P. WEBB VS. LAURO VIZCONDE- G.R. NO.
121234, AUGUST 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) filed with the Department of Justice a letter-
complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six (6) other persons
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and
her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at Number
80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes Paranaque, Metro Manila
on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of
prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
ARGUMENTS:
Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable
cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as
inherently weak and uncorroborated due to the
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22,
1995 sworn statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine
witnesses to clarify the alleged inconsistencies.
Petitioners charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon
and, later, respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued
warrants of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination.
Petitioners complain about the denial of their
constitutional right to due process and violation of their
right to an impartial investigation. They also assail the
prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the DOJ Panel likewise gravely
abused its discretion in holding that there is probable
cause to charge them with the crime of rape and
homicide
2. Whether or not respondent Judges de Leon and
Tolentino gravely abused their discretion when they
failed to conduct a preliminary examination before
issuing warrants of arrest against them
3. Whether or not the DOJ Panel denied them their
constitutional right to due process during their
preliminary investigation
4. Whether or not the DOJ Panel unlawfully
intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge
Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused.
HELD:
1. NO.
2. NO.
3. NO. There is no merit in this contention because
petitioners were given all the opportunities to be heard.
4. NO.
REASONS:
1. The Court ruled that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable
cause against the petitioners. A probable cause needs
only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and was committed by
the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear
and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence
establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt.
2. The Court ruled that respondent judges did not
gravely abuse their discretion. In arrest cases, there must
be a probable cause that a crime has been committed
and that the person to be arrested committed it. Section
6 of Rule 112 simply provides that “upon filing of an
information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant
for the accused. Clearly the, our laws repudiate the
submission of petitioners that respondent judges should
have conducted “searching examination of witnesses”
before issuing warrants of arrest against them.
3. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the panel
to study the evidence submitted more fully.
4. Petitioner’s argument lacks appeal for it lies on
the faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative of
the courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes
appertains to the executive department of government
whose principal power and responsibility is to see that
our laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component
of this power is the right to prosecute their violators
(See R.A. No. 6981 and section 9 of Rule 119 for legal
basis).
With regard to the inconsistencies of the sworn
statements of Jessica Alfaro, the Court believes that
these have been sufficiently explained and there is no
showing that the inconsistencies were deliberately made
to distort the truth.
With regard to the petitioners’ complaint about the
prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation, the Court finds nothing in the records that
will prove that the tone and content of the publicity that
attended the investigation of petitioners fatally infected
the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners
cannot just rely on the subliminal effects of publicity on
the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are
basically unbeknown and beyond knowing.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS- G.R. NO. 88211, SEPTEMBER
15, 1989
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from the presidency via the non-violent “people power”
revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his
deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino,
considering the dire consequences to the nation of his
return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is
just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly
on the decision to bar the return of Marcos and his
family.
Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible
threats & following supervening events:
1. failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos
leaders
2. channel 7 taken over by rebels & loyalists
3. plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries
aboard a chartered plane of a Lebanese arms dealer. This
is to prove that they can stir trouble from afar
4. Honasan’s failed coup
5. Communist insurgency movements
6. secessionist movements in Mindanao
7. devastated economy because of
1. accumulated foreign debt
2. plunder of nation by Marcos & cronies
Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition
to order the respondents to issue them their travel
documents and prevent the implementation of President
Aquino’s decision to bar Marcos from returning in the
Philippines. Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar
his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of
the President that the decision was made in the interest
of national security, public safety and health. Petitioner
also claimed that the President acted outside her
jurisdiction.
According to the Marcoses, such act deprives them of
their right to life, liberty, property without due process
and equal protection of the laws. They also said that it
deprives them of their right to travel which according to
Section 6, Article 3 of the constitution, may only be
impaired by a court order.
Issue:
1. Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit
the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
2. Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the
return of the Marcoses to the Philippines poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to
bar their return.
Decision:
No to both issues. Petition dismissed.
Ratio:
Separation of power dictates that each department has
exclusive powers. According to Section 1, Article VII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution, “the executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Philippines.”
However, it does not define what is meant by “executive
power” although in the same article it touches on
exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e., the
power of control over all executive departments,
bureaus and offices, the power to execute the laws, the
appointing power to grant reprieves, commutations and
pardons… (art VII secfs. 14-23). Although the constitution
outlines tasks of the president, this list is not defined &
exclusive. She has residual & discretionary powers not
stated in the Constitution which include the power to
protect the general welfare of the people. She is obliged
to protect the people, promote their welfare & advance
national interest. (Art. II, Sec. 4-5 of the Constitution).
Residual powers, according to Theodore Roosevelt,
dictate that the President can do anything which is not
forbidden in the Constitution (Corwin, supra at 153),  to die in the country. Compassion must give way to the
inevitable to vest discretionary powers on the President
(Hyman, American President) and that the president has
to maintain peace during times of emergency but also on
the day-to-day operation of the State.
The rights Marcoses are invoking are not absolute.
They’re flexible depending on the circumstances. The
request of the Marcoses to be allowed to return to the
Philippines cannot be considered in the light solely of the
constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode
and the right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or
of case law which clearly never contemplated situations
even remotely similar to the present one. It must be
treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to
those residual unstated powers of the President which
are implicit in and correlative to the paramount duty
residing in that office to safeguard and protect general
welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part
of the President to determine whether it must be
granted or denied.
For issue number 2, the question for the court to
determine is whether or not there exist factual basis for
the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses in the
Philippines. It is proven that there are factual bases in
her decision. The supervening events that happened
before her decision are factual. The President must take
preemptive measures for the self-preservation of the
country & protection of the people. She has to uphold
the Constitution.
Fernan, Concurring
1. The president’s power is not fixed. Limits would
depend on the imperatives of events and not on abstract
theories of law. We are undergoing a critical time and
the current problem can only be answerable by the
President.
2. Threat is real. Return of the Marcoses would
pose a clear & present danger. Thus, it’s the executive’s
responsibility & obligation to prevent a grave & serious
threat to its safety from arising.
3. We can’t sacrifice public peace, order, safety &
our political & economic gains to give in to Marcos’ wish
other state interests.
Cruz, Dissenting
1. As a citizen of this country, it is Marcos’ right to
return, live & die in his own country. It is a right
guaranteed by the Consti to all individuals, whether
patriot, homesick, prodigal, tyrant, etc.
2. Military representatives failed to show that
Marcos’ return would pose a threat to national security.
Fears were mere conjectures.
3. Residual powers – but the executive’s powers
were outlined to limit her powers & not expand.
Paras, Dissenting
1. AFP has failed to prove danger which would
allow State to impair Marcos’ right to return to the
Philippines. .
2. Family can be put under house arrest & in the
event that one dies, he/she should be buried w/in 10
days.
3. Untenable that without a legislation, right to
travel is absolute & state is powerless to restrict it. It’s
w/in police power of the state to restrict this right if
national security, public safety/health demands that such
be restricted. It can’t be absolute & unlimited all the
time. It can’t be arbitrary & irrational.
4. No proof that Marcos’ return would endanger
national security or public safety. Fears are speculative &
military admits that it’s under control. Filipinos would
know how to handle Marcos’ return.
Padilla, Dissenting
Sarmiento, Dissenting
1. President’s determination that Marcos’ return
would threaten national security should be agreed upon
by the court. Such threat must be clear & present.
G.R. No. 88211, October 27, 1989
Marcos, petitioner
VS.
Manglapus, respondent (Part 2)
Facts:
In its decision dated September 15, 1989, the Court by a
vote of eight to seven, dismissed the petition, after
finding that the President did not act arbitrarily or with
grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return
of former President Marcos and his family pose a threat
to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return to the Philippines. On September 28, 1989,
Marcos died in Honolulu, Hawaii.
President Corazon Aquino issued a statement saying that
in the interest of the safety of those who will take the
death of Marcos in widely and passionately conflicting
ways, and for the tranquility and order of the state and
society, she did not allow the remains of Marcos to be
brought back in the Philippines.
A motion for Reconsideration was filed by the petitioners
raising the following arguments:
1. Barring their return would deny them their
inherent right as citizens to return to their country of
birth and all other rights guaranteed by the Constitution
to all Filipinos.
government, to which the return of the Marcoses has
been viewed to provide a catalytic effect, have not been
shown to have ceased. Imelda Marcos also called
President Aquino “illegal” claiming that it is Ferdinand
Marcos who is the legal president.
3. President has unstated residual powers implied
from grant of executive power. Enumerations are merely
for specifying principal articles implied in the definition;
leaving the rest to flow from general grant that power,
interpreted in conformity with other parts of the
Constitution (Hamilton). Executive unlike Congress can
exercise power from sources not enumerates so long as
not forbidden by constitutional text (Myers vs. US). This
does not amount to dictatorship. Amendment No. 6
expressly granted Marcos power of legislation whereas
1987 Constitution granted Aquino with implied powers.
4. It is within Aquino’s power to protect & promote
interest & welfare of the people. She bound to comply
w/ that duty and there is no proof that she acted
arbitrarily

2. The President has no power to bar a Filipino

from his own country; if she has, she had exercised it
arbitrarily.

3. There is no basis for barring the return of the

family of former President Marcos.

Issue:

Whether or not the motion for reconsideration that the

Marcoses be allowed to return in the Philippines be
granted.

Decision:

No. The Marcoses were not allowed to return. Motion

for Reconsideration denied because of lack of merit.

Ratio:

1. Petitioners failed to show any compelling reason

to warrant reconsideration.

2. Factual scenario during the time Court rendered

its decision has not changed. The threats to the