No. L-63915. April 24, 1985.
*
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the
President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director,
Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity
as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.
Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the enforcement of a
public duty (e.g. the publication in the Official Gazette of Presidential
Decrees, LOI, etc.) are real parties in interest in mandamus case.—The
reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen’s legal personality
in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the
right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized
by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General,
the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its date of
effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official Gazette as they
constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present situation where
the President may on his own issue laws.—The clear object of the above-
quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Same; Same; Same.—Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the
Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance
than at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast
by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa
—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without
publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees
have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing
themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme
Court of Spain ruled: “Bajo la denoroinación genérica de leyes, se
comprenden también los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,
Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.”
Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of Presidential decrees
and issuances as it uses the words “shall be published.”—The very first clause
of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be published in
the Official Gazette x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon
respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern
is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should
be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or
excluded from such publication.
Same; Same; But administrative and executive orders and those which affect
only a particular class of persons need not be published.—The publication of
all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines,
forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
Page | 1
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on
the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential decrees and issuances
of general application is a matter of due process.—It is needless to add that the
publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general
applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278 and 1937 to 1939,
inclusive, have not been published. It is undisputed that none of them has been
implemented.—From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court,
it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published
in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030,
inclusive. 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.
Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since
no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or
enforced by the government.

Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and issuances of general application

which have not been published shall have no force and effect.—The Court
therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the
Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have
put the question as to whether the Court’s declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The
answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken
the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District
vs. Baxter Bank.

Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential Decrees prior to their

publication in the Official Gazette may have consequences which cannot be
ignored.—Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which
may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-inclusive
statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.”

Page | 2

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC.,
petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES-PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, respondent.
G.R. No. 187654. June 5, 2013.*
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
represented by its Board of Directors, petitioner, vs. MILITARY SHRINE
SERVICES-PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, respondent.
Statutes; Publication; The requirement of publication is indispensable to give
effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided.—Considering
that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots),
their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos
to Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to
include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort
Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the
printed version of Proclamation No. 2476. However, it is undisputed that the
handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was
published in the Official Gazette. The resolution of whether the subject lots
were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of
whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and
effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication. Under
the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give
effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided.
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. vs. Military Shrine Services-
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, Department of National Defense
The phrase “unless otherwise provided” refers to a different effectivity date
other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication
in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication
may be dispensed with.
Same; Same; The Supreme Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was
not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note
never had any legal force and effect.—This Court cannot rely on a
handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published.
Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code,
“[t]he publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the
Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority.” Thus, whether
or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the
probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.
This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is
none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano, 310 SCRA 354 (1999), we
ruled that “[u]nder Article 8 of the Civil Code, ‘[j]udicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.’ This does not mean, however, that courts can create
law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow
otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers,
inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues,
but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating.” The remedy sought
in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another legislation that
would amend the law to include petitioners’ lots in the reclassification.
Page | 3

Nos. L-27860 & L-27896. March 29, 1974.*
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton Hodges (Sp. Proc.
No. 1672 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo), petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE VENICIO ESCOLIN, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, and AVELINA A. MAGNO,
respondents.
Nos. L-27936 & L-27937. March 29, 1974.*
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE LINNIE JANE HODGES (Sp. Proc. No.
1307). TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE CHARLES NEWTON HODGES
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672). PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL
BANK, administrator-appellant, vs. LORENZO CARLES, JOSE PABLICO,
ALFREDO CATEDRAL, SALVADOR GUZMAN, BELCESAR CAUSING,
FLORENIA BARRIDO, PURIFICACION CORONADO, GRACIANO
LUCERO, ARITEO THOMAS JAMIR, MELQUIADES BATISANAN,
PEPITO IYULORES, ESPERIDION PARTISALA, WINIFREDO ESPADA,
ROSARIO ALINGASA, ADELFA PREMAYLON, SANTIAGO
PACAONSIS, and AVELINA A. MAGNO, the last as Administratrix in Sp.
Proc. No. 1307, appellees, WESTERN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY,
INC., movant-appellee.
Appeals; Certiorari; Certiorari available when remedy of appeal not adequate;
Case at bar.—There is a common thread among the basic issues involved in all
these thirty-three appeals which, unless resolved in one single proceeding, will
inevitably cause the proliferation of more or less similar or closely related
incidents and consequent eventual appeals. If for this consideration alone, and
without taking account anymore of the unnecessary additional effort, expense
and time which would be involved in as many individual appeals as the
number of such incidents, it is logical and proper to hold that the remedy of
appeal is not adequate in the present cases.
Same; Same; Same; Circumstances considered in determining inadequacy of
appeal.—In determining whether or not a special civil action of certiorari or
prohibition may be resorted to in lieu of appeal, in instances wherein lack or
excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion is alleged, it is not enough
that the remedy of appeal exists or is possible. It is indispensable that taking
all the relevant circumstances of the given case, appeal would better serve the
interests of justice. Obviously, the longer delay, augmented expense and
trouble and unnecessary repetition of the same work attendant to the present
multiple appeals, which, after all, deal with practically the same basic issues
that can be more expeditiously resolved or determined in a single special civil
action, make the remedies of certiorari and prohibition preferable for purposes
of resolving the common basic issues raised in all of them, despite the
conceded availability of appeal. Besides, the settling of such common
fundamental issues would naturally minimize the areas of conflict between the
parties and render more simple the determination of the secondary issues in
each of them.
Special proceedings; Settlement of estate of deceased persons; Where estate
settled when spouses are both deceased.—We are not unmindful of the fact
that under section 2 of Rule 73, “When the marriage is dissolved by the death
of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the
conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings
of either.” Indeed, it is true that the last sentence of this provision allows or
permits the conjugal partnership of spouses who are both deceased to be
settled or liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either, but
precisely because said sentence allows or permits that the liquidation be made
in either proceeding, it is a matter of sound judicial discretion in which one it
should be made. After all, the former rule referring to the administrator of the
husband’s estate in respect to such liquidation was done away with by Act
Page | 4
3176, the pertinent provisions of which are now embodied in the rule just
cited.
Same; Same; When proceedings for settlement of estate deemed ready for
final closure.—The provisions of section 1 of Rule 90 cannot mean anything
less than that in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have
been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the
decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such
order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the “debts, funeral
expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the
estate” have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an
order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of
the interested party or parties, and not of the court.
Same; Same; Administration of estate; Factors considered in appointment of
administrator.—An administrator is not supposed to represent the interests of
any particular party and his acts are deemed to be objectively for the
protection of the rights of everybody concerned with the estate of the
decedent. On the other hand, however, it is evidently implicit in section 6 of
Rule 78 fixing the priority among those to whom letter of administration
should be granted that the criterion in the selection of the administrator is not
his impartiality alone, but more importantly, the extent of his interest in the
estate, so much so that the one assumed to have greater interest is preferred to
another who has less.
Wills and succession; Substitution of heirs; Simple or vulgar substitution;
Fideicommissary substitution; Requisites; Case at bar.—Legally speaking,
Mrs. Hodges’ will provide neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under
article 859 of the Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under
article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution therein because there is no
provision for either (1) predecease of the testator by the designated heir or (2)
refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as required by
article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary substitution therein because
no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve the estate or any
part thereof for anyone else.
Same; Same; When substitution of heir occurs.—Substitution occurs only
when another heir is appointed in a will “so that he may enter into inheritance
in default of the heir originally instituted.”
Same; Institution of heirs simultaneously; Institution considered partially
resolutory; Reasons; Case at bar.—The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges
are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however, to
certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It
is partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate
to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute
dominion over them only during his lifetime, which means that while he could
completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter rivos to anyone
other than himself, he was not free to do so mortis causa, and all his right to
what might remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the occurrence
of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers and sisters-in-law to
the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs. Hodges,
would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of
Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Same; Same; Same; Institution in case at bar without legal impediment but
cannot apply to legitime.—The Court sees no legal impediment to this kind of
institution, in this jurisdiction or under Philippine law, except that it cannot
apply to the legitime of Hodges as the surviving spouse, consisting of one-half
of the estate, considering that Mrs. Hodges had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants.
Same; Order of succession and amount of successional rights; Conflict of
laws; Question of foreign law governing matters in issue one of fact; Foreign
Page | 5
law has to be proven.—The question of what are the laws of Texas governing
the matters in issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary
is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be
proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding,
with the rare exception in instances when the said laws are already within the
actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally
known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none
of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Exception.—When, with respect to certain
aspects of the foreign laws concerned, the parties in a given case do not have
any controversy or are more or less in agreement, the Court may take it for
granted for the purposes of the particular case before it that the said laws are
as such virtual agreement indicates, without the need of requiring the
presentation of what otherwise would be competent evidence on the point.
Evidence; Judicial admissions; Case at bar.—PCIB’s representations in regard
to the laws of Texas virtually constitute admissions of fact which the other
parties and the court are being made to rely and act upon. PCIB is “not
permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position contradictory to
or inconsistent with them.”
G.R. No. 169364. September 18, 2009.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EVANGELINE SITON
y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Police Power; The power to define crimes and prescribe
their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the
sovereign power of the state to maintain social orders as an aspect of police
power.—The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding
penalties is legislative in nature and inherent in the sovereign power of the
state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The legislature may
even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful
provided that no constitutional rights have been abridged. However, in
exercising its power to declare what acts constitute a crime, the legislature
must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends to
prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and
know what acts it is his duty to avoid. This requirement has come to be known
as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which states that “a statute which either
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application, violates the first essential of due process of law.”
Same; Same; Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searchers and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complaint and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.—Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be
Page | 6
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement of probable
cause provides an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may
otherwise be abused in relation to the search or arrest of persons found to be
violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents, echoing
Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to
make an arrest or search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional
requirement of probable cause, which is one less than certainty or proof, but
more than suspicion or possibility.
Same; Same; Probable Cause; The requirement of probable cause cannot be
done away with arbitrarily without pain of punishment, for absent this
requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse.—The requirement
of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of
punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty
of abuse. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,
i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the
probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion
therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith of the
peace officers making the arrest.
Criminal Law; Vagrancy; Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be
considered constitutionally offensive.—Article 202 (2) does not violate the
equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor and the
unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status,
as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such
circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or
a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct. Vagrancy
must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It
is a public order crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a
certain place and time which orderly society finds unusual, under such
conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and
norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as
would engender a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members
of the community.
Constitutional Law; Vagrancy; We agree with the position of the State that
first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and
constitutional.—We agree with the position of the State that first and
foremost, Article 202 (2) should be presumed valid and constitutional. When
confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that every court
must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind
that every statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be
resolved in favor of its constitutionality. The policy of our courts is to avoid
ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political
departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to
the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine
of separation of powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming
respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act
of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully
studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law
before it was finally enacted.
Criminal Law; Vagrancy; As an obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2)
must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.—It must not be forgotten
that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and
ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and
for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and
Page | 7
pervasive, reaching and justifying measures for public health, public safety,
public morals, and the general welfare. As an obvious police power measure,
Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
G.R. No. 173615. October 16, 2009.*
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. CAYETANO A.
TEJANO, JR., respondent.
Civil Service Commission; Public Officers; Privatization; Revised Charter of
the Philippine National Bank (E.O. No. 80); By no stretch of intelligent and
reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 be
interpreted in such a way as to divest the Civil Service Commission of
jurisdiction over pending disciplinary cases involving acts committed by an
employee of the Philippine National Bank (PNB) at the time that the bank was
still a government-owned and controlled corporation.—In a language too plain
to be mistaken, the quoted portion of the law only states no more than the
natural, logical and legal consequences of opening to private ownership the
majority of the bank’s voting equity. This is very evident in the title of the
section called Change in Ownership of the Majority of the Voting Equity of
the Bank. Certainly, the transfer of the majority of the bank’s voting equity
from public to private hands is an inevitable effect of privatization or,
conversely, the privatization of the bank would necessitate the opening of the
voting equity thereof to private ownership. And as the bank ceases to be
government depository, it would, accordingly be coming under the operation
of the definite set of laws and rules applicable to all other private corporations
incorporated under the general incorporation law. Perhaps the aspect of more
importance in the present case is that the bank, upon its privatization, would
no longer be subject to the coverage of government service-wide agencies
such as the CSC and the Commission on Audit (COA). By no stretch of
intelligent and reasonable construction can the provisions in Section 6 of E.O.
No. 80 be interpreted in such a way as to divest the CSC of jurisdiction over
pending disciplinary cases involving acts committed by an employee of the
PNB at the time that the bank was still a government-owned and controlled
corporation. Stated otherwise, no amount of reasonable inference may be
derived from the terms of the said Section to the effect that it intends to
modify the jurisdiction of the CSC in disciplinary cases involving employees
of the government.
Same; Same; Same; It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4 of the Civil
Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a prospective effect and must not
be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and
cases—the fact that Section 6 of Executive Order No. 80 states that Philippine
National Bank (PNB) would be removed from the coverage of the Civil
Service Commission must be taken to govern acts committed by the bank’s
employees after privatization.—It is binding rule, conformably with Article 4
of the Civil Code, that, generally, laws shall have only a prospective effect and
must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes
and cases. This is expressed in the familiar legal maxim lex prospicit, non
respicit (the law looks forward and not backward.) The rationale against
retroactivity is easy to perceive: the retroactive application of a law usually
divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of
contract and, hence, is unconstitutional. Although the rule admits of certain
well-defined exceptions such as, for instance, where the law itself expressly
provides for retroactivity, we find that not one of such exceptions that would
otherwise lend credence to petitioner’s argument obtains in this case. Hence,
in other words, the fact that Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 states that PNB would be
removed from the coverage of the CSC must be taken to govern acts
committed by the bank’s employees after privatization.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Jurisdiction is conferred by no other source
than law, and once acquired, it continues until the case is finally terminated.—
Jurisdiction is conferred by no other source than law. Once jurisdiction is
acquired, it continues until the case is finally terminated. The disciplinary
jurisdiction of the CSC over government officials and employees within its
Page | 8
coverage is well-defined in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 807, otherwise
known as The Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Section 37 thereof
materially provides that the CSC shall have jurisdiction over appeals in
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of the penalty of
suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an amount exceeding thirty
days’ salary; demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or dismissal from
office. It bears to stress on this score that the CSC was able to acquire
jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent merely upon its filing, followed by
the submission of his memorandum on appeal. From that point, the appellate
jurisdiction of the CSC at once attached, thereby vesting it with the authority
to dispose of the case on the merits until it shall have been finally terminated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Nowhere in Section 6 of Executive Order No. 80
can we find even the slightest indication that indeed it expressly authorizes the
transfer of jurisdiction from the Civil Service Commission to another tribunal
over disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said
Commission even prior to the enactment of the law.—Petitioner derives
support from the exceptions laid down in the cases of Latchme Motoomull
and Bengzon quoted above. Yet, as discussed above, the provisions in Section
6 of E.O. No. 80 are too clear and unambiguous to be interpreted in such a
way as to abort the continued exercise by the CSC of its appellate jurisdiction
over the appeal filed before the privatization of PNB became effective. Suffice
it to say that nowhere in the said Section can we find even the slightest
indication that indeed it expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from
the CSC to another tribunal over disciplinary and administrative cases already
pending with the said Commission even prior to the enactment of the law.
Philippine National Bank vs. Tejano, Jr., 604 SCRA 147, G.R. No. 173615
October 16, 2009
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996.*
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996.*
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
Political Law; Citizenship; Having been declared as a non-citizen, it is
incumbent upon Frivaldo to show that he has reacquired citizenship.—
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is
therefore incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in
fine, that he possesses the qualifications prescribed under the said statute
(R.A. 7160).
Same; Same; Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation.—Under Philippine law, citizenship may be
reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.
Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 and during the oral argument in
this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress, but
that the bill allowing him to do so “failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives” due,
according to him, to the “maneuvers of his political rivals.” In the same case,
his attempt at naturalization was rejected by this Court because of
jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
Page | 9

Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Memorandum dated March 27, 1987
cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning
or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725.—This memorandum dated March 27,
1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law
sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no
express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum
—based on the copy furnished us by Lee—did not categorically and/or
impliedly state that P.D. 725 was being repealed or was being rendered
without any legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by
implication are not favored.—On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored. An implied repeal
will not be allowed “unless it is convincingly and unambiguously
demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent
that they cannot co-exist.”
Same; Same; The law does not specify any particular date or time when the
candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age.—From
the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or
time when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence
(which must consist of at least one year’s residency immediately preceding the
day of election) and age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
Same; Same; Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
Qualifications of Elective Officials not of candidates.—So too, even from a
literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted that
Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of “Qualifications” of
“ELECTIVE OFFICIALS,” not of candidates. Why then should such
qualification be required at the time of election or at the time of the filing of
the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists? Literally, such qualifications—
unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of age and residence—
should thus be possessed when the “elective [or elected] official” begins to
govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term—in this
case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court’s ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap
and Li Seng Giap & Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to
ensure that our people and country do not end up being governed by aliens,
i.e., persons owing allegiance to another nation, that aim or purpose would not
be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the citizenship qualification as
applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and at the start of
his term.
Same; Same; Same; The Local Government Code requires an elective official
to be a registered voter, it does not require him to vote actually.—If the law
intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election
consistent with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not
have made citizenship a SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a
redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that the law intended CITIZENSHIP
to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if being a voter
presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from “citizenship”),
not to reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be
registered as a voter IN THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e.,
the law states: “a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or
province x x x where he intends to be elected.” It should be emphasized that
the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be a registered
voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration—not the
actual voting—is the core of this “qualification.” In other words, the law’s
purpose in this second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is
actually registered in the area he seeks to govern—and not anywhere else.
Same; Same; The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the filing of
his application on August 17, 1994.—But to remove all doubts on this
Page | 10
important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED
to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
Same; Same; Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted
by his repatriation.—Being a former Filipino who has served the people
repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws and
whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted
by his repatriation.
Same; Same; In case of doubt on the interpretation or application of laws, it is
to be presumed that the law making body intended right and justice to prevail.
—Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would
prevent prejudice to applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive
effect, and the Special Committee decides not to act, i.e., to delay the
processing of applications for any substantial length of time, then the former
Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already renounced his
American citizenship—was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their
control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or
application of laws, it is to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.
Same; Same; Decision declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
govern a person’s future status with finality.—Indeed, decisions declaring the
acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that
matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The power to annul a proclamation
must be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation.—The Court
however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must “be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation.” Inasmuch as Frivaldo’s
petition was filed only six (6) days after Lee’s proclamation, there is no
question that the Comelec correctly acquired jurisdiction over the same.
Same; Same; It is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections.—This claim is now moot and
academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed superseded by the
subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on December 19,
1995, affirmed en banc on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his election.
At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for
disqualifications even after the elections.
Same; Same; A decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections
is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of
time.—In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the
Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion because “Section 6 of R.A.
6646 authorizes the Comelec to try and decide disqualifications even after the
elections.” In spite of his disagreement with us on this point, i.e., that Section
78 “is merely directory,” we note that just like us, Mr. Justice Davide
nonetheless votes to “DISMISS G.R. No. 120295.” One other point. Loong, as
quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section
78 must be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case
however deals with the period during which the Comelec may decide such
petition. And we hold that it may be decided even after the fifteen day period
mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a decision promulgated by the
Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed
beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor
conflict.
Page | 11

G.R. No. 187521. March 14, 2012.*
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. HR CONSTRUCTION CORP.,
respondent.
Construction Contracts; Construction Industry Arbitration Commission
(CIAC); Jurisdiction; Arbitration; Appeals; Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008
vests upon the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) original
and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from, or connected with,
contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines;
The arbitral award of Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC)
shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court.—Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1008 vests
upon the CIAC original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from,
or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in
the Philippines. Under Section 19 of E.O. No. 1008, the arbitral award of
CIAC “shall be final and inappealable except on questions of law which shall
be appealable to the Supreme Court.” In Hi-Precision Steel Center, Inc. v. Lim
Kim Steel Builders, Inc., 228 SCRA 397 (1993), we explained raison d’ etre
for the rule on finality of the CIAC’s arbitral award in this wise: Voluntary
arbitration involves the reference of a dispute to an impartial body, the
members of which are chosen by the parties themselves, which parties freely
consent in advance to abide by the arbitral award issued after proceedings
where both parties had the opportunity to be heard. The basic objective is to
provide a speedy and inexpensive method of settling disputes by allowing the
parties to avoid the formalities, delay, expense and aggravation which
commonly accompany ordinary litigation, especially litigation which goes
through the entire hierarchy of courts. Executive Order No. 1008 created an
arbitration facility to which the construction industry in the Philippines can
have recourse. The Executive Order was enacted to encourage the early and
expeditious settlement of disputes in the construction industry, a public policy
the implementation of which is necessary and important for the realization of
national development goals. Aware of the objective of voluntary arbitration in
the labor field, in the construction industry, and in any other area for that
matter, the Court will not assist one or the other or even both parties in any
effort to subvert or defeat that objective for their private purposes. The Court
will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful
allegation that such body had “misapprehended the facts” and will not pass
upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how cleverly
disguised they might be as “legal questions.” The parties here had recourse to
arbitration and chose the arbitrators themselves; they must have had
confidence in such arbitrators. x x x.
Questions of Law; A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the
law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the
doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.—A question of law
arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what
the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the
issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.
Page | 12

Waivers; Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by
him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such
person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it.”—In People of the Philippines v. Donato, 198
SCRA 130 (1991), this Court explained the doctrine of waiver in this wise:
Waiver is defined as “a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or
privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the
voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by
him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be surrendered and such
person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it.” As to what rights and privileges may be
waived, the authority is settled: x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights
and privileges of any character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers every
conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is
the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether
secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution,
provided such rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his
sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the
waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not
contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that everyone has a
right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely
for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can
be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and
without detriment to the community at large. x x x.
Reciprocal Obligations; Rescission; While the right to rescind reciprocal
obligations is implied, that is, that such right need not be expressly provided in
the contract, nevertheless the contracting parties may waive the same.—The
right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations. Article
1191 of the Civil Code pertinently reads: Art. 1191. The power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not
comply with what is incumbent upon him. The injured party may choose
between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment
of damages in either case. He may also seek rescission, even after he has
chosen fulfillment, if the latter should become impossible. The court shall
decree the rescission claimed, unless there be just cause authorizing the fixing
of a period. This is understood to be without prejudice to the rights of third
persons who have acquired the thing, in accordance with Articles 1385 and
1388 and the Mortgage Law. The rescission referred to in this article, more
appropriately referred to as resolution is on the breach of faith by the
defendant which is violative of the reciprocity between the parties. The right
to rescind, however, may be waived, expressly or impliedly. While the right to
rescind reciprocal obligations is implied, that is, that such right need not be
expressly provided in the contract, nevertheless the contracting parties may
waive the same. Contrary to the respective dispositions of the CIAC and the
CA, we find that HRCC had no right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement in
the guise of a work stoppage, the latter having waived such right.
Page | 13

G.R. No. 79269. June 5, 1991.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. PROCORO J.
DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander
Bilog, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Law; Rebellion; Bail; Rebellion is a bailable
offense under Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.––We agree
with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent
for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code to which is attached the penalty of prision mayor and a
fine not exceeding P20,000.00. It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Before conviction bail is either a matter of right or
of discretion; When a matter of right and a matter of discretion.––Therefore,
before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute. Upon the other hand, if
the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter
of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court’s
discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.––The 1987 Constitution
strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prosecution does not have the right to present
evidence for the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right,
such is required only where the grant of bail is discretionary.––Accordingly,
the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of
bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases
where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time,
all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve
the motion for bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The guidelines for the fixing of the amount
of bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not
matters left entirely to the discretion of the court; Guidelines in the fixing of a
bailbond.––We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the
respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00
without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of
bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not
matters left entirely to the discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs.
Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495: “Certain guidelines in the fixing of a
bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for
the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and circumstances of
the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence
Page | 14
against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or
not the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is
under bond in other case. x x x.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent has unequivocably waived his
right to bail.––Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in
legal custody, private respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Definition of waiver.––Waiver is defined as
“a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for
such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or
surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the
intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of
its benefit; or such conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of
such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent with claiming it.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What rights and privileges may be
waived.––As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is
settled: “x x x the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word ‘waiver’ covers every conceivable right, it is the
general rule that a person may waive any matter which affects his property,
and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs
to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether secured by contract,
conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not
infringe on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or
privilege is not forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and
the principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to
waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and
protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with
and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without detriment
to the community at large. x x x Although the general rule is that any right or
privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a
waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be
inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be against
public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived. While it has
been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that
constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and
even some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are
subjects of waiver.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rights to bail is another of the
constitutional rights which can be waived.––We hereby rule that the right to
bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to
law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.
Same; Same; Same; Under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer
punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.––It must,
however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no
longer punishable by prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect
after publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation, amended,
among others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty
for rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads: “Article 135. Penalty for
rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat.––Any person who promotes, maintains,
or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. Any person merely participating or executing the commands of
others in a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.”
Page | 15

G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002.*
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian
ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.
Civil Law; Family Code; Maternity and Filiation; Under the new law, an
action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the
lifetime of the alleged parent.—Under the new law, an action for the
recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the
alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former
was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the
new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that “illegitimate
children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate
family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be
given the opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she
cannot do if he or she is already dead.”
Same; Same; Same; The Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have
already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired.—
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already
vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
“ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil
Code or other laws.”
Same; Same; Same; The rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment
of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action,
may likewise be applied to spurious children.—Moreover, in the earlier case
Divinagracia v. Rovira, the Court said that the rules on voluntary and
compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive
period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children.
G.R. No. 125129. March 29, 1999.*
JOSEPH H. REYES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
respondent.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Audit; Appeals; Article IX-A, Section 7
of the Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the
Commission on Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party.—To begin with, Article IX-A, Section 7 of the
Constitution provides that decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission on
Audit may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party. Under Rule 64, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment or
final order of the Commission on Audit may be brought by an aggrieved party
to this Court on certiorari under Rule 65.
Page | 16
Same; Same; Same; The mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission
on Audit to this Court is only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as
provided by the 1987 Constitution.—The petition in this case was filed on
June 17, 1996, prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Nevertheless, the mode of elevating cases decided by the Commission on
Audit to this Court was only by petition for certiorari under Rule 65, as
provided by the 1987 Constitution. The judgments and final orders of the
Commission on Audit are not reviewable by ordinary writ of error or appeal
via certiorari to this Court. Only when the Commission on Audit acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, may this Court entertain a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. Hence, a petition for review on certiorari or appeal by
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 44 or 45 of the 1964 Revised
Rules of Court is not allowed from any order, ruling or decision of the
Commission on Audit.

Words and Phrases; A vested right is one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency.—There
is no merit to petitioner’s claim that the members of the Provident Fund
acquired a vested right over the government contributions. “A vested right is
one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which
no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency.” As previously stated, the government
contributions were subject to the condition that the funds would be used to
augment the retirement and other fringe benefits of TLRC employees. What is
more, the Provident Fund was dissolved due to lack of statutory basis. Thus,
contributions made were unauthorized, if not unlawful.
G.R. No. 163707. September 15, 2006.*
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 138, Makati City
and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES, respondents.
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Forum Shopping; The certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.—
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-
forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party.
Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the
case. However, a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher
interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA
673 (2000), we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the
certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the
party, this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial
justice. So it is in the present controversy where the merits of the case and the

Page | 17
absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered
as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules.
Same; Succession; Waivers; A waiver may not be attributed to a person when
its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.—As
regards Remedios’ Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar
private respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and
effective, a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which
leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its
terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. In this
case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and
Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It
merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for
her minor daughters “by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of
any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the
late Rufino Guy Susim.” Considering that the document did not specifically
mention private respondents’ hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it
cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents and guardians may not
repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval.—Even
assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter’s claim. Article 1044 of the
Civil Code, provides: ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his
property may accept or repudiate an inheritance. Any inheritance left to
minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or
guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their
wards only by judicial authorization. The right to accept an inheritance left to
the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the
beneficiaries and distribute the property, or in their default, to those mentioned
in Article 1030. (Emphasis supplied) Parents and guardians may not therefore
repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. This is
because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property which must pass the
court’s scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is
void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of
the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Illegitimate Children; Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest—ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent
given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact; One who is yet to prove his
status as acknowledged illegitimate child of the deceased cannot possibly
waive his successional right.—It must be emphasized that waiver is the
intentional relinquishment of a known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent
given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. In the present case, private
respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because
they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents
are his coheirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their
hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right.
Hence, petitioner’s invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents
must fail.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Illegitimate children who were still
minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up
to four years from attaining majority age.—We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo, 374
SCRA 180 (2002), that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time
the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their
minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away
by the passage of the Family Code.
Page | 18

Same; Same; Settlement of Estates; Probate Courts; Pleadings and Practice;
The court before which a petition for letters of administration is not precluded
from receiving evidence on a person’s filiation—its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in
handling the settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status
of each heir; Two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to
claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint.—While the original action
filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the
trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents’
filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate,
including the determination of the status of each heir. That the two causes of
action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be
joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
G.R. No. 164527. August 15, 2007.*
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL HOUSING
AUTHORITY, R-II BUILDERS, INC., R-II HOLDINGS, INC.,
HARBOUR CENTRE PORT TERMINAL, INC., and MR. REGHIS
ROMERO II, respondents.
Judicial Review; Locus Standi; Taxpayer’s Suit; In cases where issues of
transcendental public importance are presented, there is no necessity to show
that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and
personal injury as the requisite injury is assumed; Issues averred to be in
breach of the fair diffusion of the country’s natural resources and the
constitutional right of a citizen to information are matters of transcendental
public importance.—Only a person who stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit or entitled to the avails of the suit can file a complaint
or petition. Respondents claim that petitioner is not a proper party-in-interest
as he was unable to show that “he has sustained or is in immediate or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct and personal injury as a result of
the execution and enforcement of the assailed contracts or agreements.”
Moreover, they assert that not all government contracts can justify a
taxpayer’s suit especially when no public funds were utilized in contravention
of the Constitution or a law. We explicated in Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA
744 (1998), that in cases where issues of transcendental public importance are
presented, there is no necessity to show that petitioner has experienced or is in
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury as the requisite injury is
assumed. We find our ruling in Chavez v. PEA, 384 SCRA 152 (2002), as
conclusive authority on locus standi in the case at bar since the issues raised in
this petition are averred to be in breach of the fair diffusion of the country’s
natural resources and the constitutional right of a citizen to information which
have been declared to be matters of transcendental public importance.
Moreover, the pleadings especially those of respondents readily reveal that
public funds have been indirectly utilized in the Project by means of Smokey
Mountain Project Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) bought by some
government agencies. Hence, petitioner, as a taxpayer, is a proper party to the
instant petition before the court.
Same; Hierarchy of Courts; While direct recourse to the Supreme Court is
generally frowned upon and discouraged, such resort may be allowed if the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within
and calling for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s primary jurisdiction;
Serious constitutional challenges allegedly affecting the right of Filipinos to
the distribution of natural resources in the country and the right to information
of a citizen compel the Court to turn a blind eye to the judicial structure meant
to provide an orderly dispensation of justice and consider the instant petition
as a justified deviation from an established precept.—While direct recourse to
this Court is generally frowned upon and discouraged, we have however ruled
in Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633 (1993), that such resort to us may be
allowed in certain situations, wherein this Court ruled that petitions for
Page | 19
certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus, though cognizable by other courts, may
directly be filed with us if “the redress desired cannot be obtained in the
appropriate courts or where exceptional compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of [this Court’s]
primary jurisdiction.” The instant petition challenges the constitutionality and
legality of the SMDRP involving several hectares of government land and
hundreds of millions of funds of several government agencies. Moreover,
serious constitutional challenges are made on the different aspects of the
Project which allegedly affect the right of Filipinos to the distribution of
natural resources in the country and the right to information of a citizen—
matters which have been considered to be of extraordinary significance and
grave consequence to the public in general. These concerns in the instant
action compel us to turn a blind eye to the judicial structure meant to provide
an orderly dispensation of justice and consider the instant petition as a
justified deviation from an established precept.
Natural Resources; Judgments; Stare Decisis; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority (PEA), 384 SCRA 152 (2002), is not a binding precedent to the
instant petition because the facts in said case are substantially different from
the facts and circumstances in the case at bar.—The Court finds that PEA is
not a binding precedent to the instant petition because the facts in said case are
substantially different from the facts and circumstances in the case at bar, thus:
(1) The reclamation project in PEA was undertaken through a JVA entered into
between PEA and AMARI. The reclamation project in the instant NHA case
was undertaken by the NHA, a national government agency in consultation
with PEA and with the approval of two Philippine Presidents; (2) In PEA,
AMARI and PEA executed a JVA to develop the Freedom Islands and reclaim
submerged areas without public bidding on April 25, 1995. In the instant NHA
case, the NHA and RBI executed a JVA after RBI was declared the winning
bidder on August 31, 1992 as the JVA partner of the NHA in the SMDRP after
compliance with the requisite public bidding. (3) In PEA, there was no law or
presidential proclamation classifying the lands to be reclaimed as alienable
and disposal lands of public domain. In this RBI case, MO 415 of former
President Aquino and Proclamation No. 39 of then President Ramos, coupled
with Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, classified the reclaimed lands
as alienable and disposable; (4) In PEA, the Chavez petition was filed before
the amended JVA was executed by PEA and AMARI. In this NHA case, the
JVA and subsequent amendments were already substantially implemented.
Subsequently, the Project was terminated through a MOA signed on August
27, 2003. Almost one year later on August 5, 2004, the Chavez petition was
filed; (5) In PEA, AMARI was considered to be in bad faith as it signed the
amended JVA after the Chavez petition was filed with the Court and after
Senate Committee Report No. 560 was issued finding that the subject lands
are inalienable lands of public domain. In the instant petition, RBI and other
respondents are considered to have signed the agreements in good faith as the
Project was terminated even before the Chavez petition was filed; (6) The
PEA-AMARI JVA was executed as a result of direct negotiation between the
parties and not in accordance with the BOT Law. The NHA-RBI JVA and
subsequent amendments constitute a BOT contract governed by the BOT Law;
and (7) In PEA, the lands to be reclaimed or already reclaimed were
transferred to PEA, a government entity tasked to dispose of public lands
under Executive Order No. (EO) 525. In the NHA case, the reclaimed lands
were transferred to NHA, a government entity NOT tasked to dispose of
public land and therefore said alienable lands were converted to patrimonial
lands upon their transfer to NHA. Thus the PEA Decision cannot be
considered an authority or precedent to the instant case. The principle of stare
decisis has no application to the different factual setting of the instant case.
Reclamation Projects; Public Estates Authority (PEA); Requisites for Legal
and Valid Reclamation Projects.—EO 525 reads: Section 1. The Public Estates
Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating, directing, and
coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a
proper contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that,
reclamation projects of any national government agency or entity authorized
Page | 20
under its charter shall be undertaken in consultation with the PEA upon
approval of the President. (Emphasis supplied.) The aforequoted provision
points to three (3) requisites for a legal and valid reclamation project, viz.: (1)
approval by the President; (2) favorable recommendation of PEA; and (3)
undertaken by any of the following: a. by PEA, b. by any person or entity
pursuant to a contract it executed with PEA, and c. by the National
Government agency or entity authorized under its charter to reclaim lands
subject to consultation with PEA.
Same; Same; While Public Estates Authority (PEA) under PD 1084 has the
power to reclaim land and under EO 525 is primarily responsible for
integrating, directing and coordinating reclamation projects, such authority is
not exclusive and such power to reclaim may be granted or delegated to
another government agency or entity or may even be undertaken by the
National Government itself, Public Estates Authority (PEA) being only an
agency and a part of the National Government.—Without doubt, PEA under
EO 525 was designated as the agency primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects. Primarily means “mainly,
principally, mostly, generally.” Thus, not all reclamation projects fall under
PEA’s authority of supervision, integration, and coordination. The very charter
of PEA, PD 1084, does not mention that PEA has the exclusive and sole
power and authority to reclaim lands of public domain. EO 525 even reveals
the exception—reclamation projects by a national government agency or
entity authorized by its charter to reclaim land. One example is EO 405 which
authorized the Philip-pine Ports Authority (PPA) to reclaim and develop
submerged areas for port related purposes. Under its charter, PD 857, PPA has
the power “to reclaim, excavate, enclose or raise any of the lands” vested in it.
Thus, while PEA under PD 1084 has the power to reclaim land and under EO
525 is primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating
reclamation projects, such authority is NOT exclusive and such power to
reclaim may be granted or delegated to another government agency or entity
or may even be undertaken by the National Government itself, PEA being
only an agency and a part of the National Government.
Same; National Housing Authority (NHA); Administrative Law; Basic in
administrative law is the doctrine that a government agency or office has
express and implied powers based on its charter and other pertinent statutes;
When a general grant of power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular
power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is
also conferred by necessary implication—implied powers are those that can be
inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or
fair implication in the enabling act; The power to reclaim on the part of the
National Housing Authority (NHA) is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO
415, RA 6957, and PD 3-A.—Basic in administrative law is the doctrine that a
government agency or office has express and implied powers based on its
charter and other pertinent statutes. Express powers are those powers granted,
allocated, and delegated to a government agency or office by express
provisions of law. On the other hand, implied powers are those that can be
inferred or are implicit in the wordings of the law or conferred by necessary or
fair implication in the enabling act. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63
Phil. 139 (1936), the Court clarified and stressed that when a general grant of
power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the
exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred by
necessary implication. It was also explicated that when the statute does not
specify the particular method to be followed or used by a government agency
in the exercise of the power vested in it by law, said agency has the authority
to adopt any reasonable method to carry out its functions. The power to
reclaim on the part of the NHA is implicit from PD 757, RA 7279, MO 415,
RA 6957, and PD 3-A.
Same; Same; Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP); Even without an implied power to reclaim lands under National
Housing Authority (NHA’s) charter, we rule that the ,authority granted to
National Housing Authority (NHA), a national government agency, by the
President under PD 3-A reinforced by EO 525 is more than sufficient statutory
basis for the reclamation of lands under the Smokey Mountain Development
Page | 21
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP); Under PD 3-A, “national government”
can only mean the Executive Branch headed by the President—it cannot refer
to Congress as it was dissolved and abolished at the time of the issuance of PD
3-A.—Even without an implied power to reclaim lands under NHA’s charter,
we rule that the authority granted to NHA, a national government agency, by
the President under PD 3-A reinforced by EO 525 is more than sufficient
statutory basis for the reclamation of lands under the SMDRP. PD 3-A is a law
issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos under his martial law powers on
September 23, 1972. It provided that “[t]he provisions of any law to the
contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas, underwater, whether
foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any person
authorized by it under the proper contract.” It repealed, in effect, RA 1899
which previously delegated the right to reclaim lands to municipalities and
chartered cities and revested it to the National Government. Under PD 3-A,
“national government” can only mean the Executive Branch headed by the
President. It cannot refer to Congress as it was dissolved and abolished at the
time of the issuance of PD 3-A on September 23, 1972. Moreover, the
Executive Branch is the only implementing arm in the government with the
equipment, manpower, expertise, and capability by the very nature of its
assigned powers and functions to undertake reclamation projects. Thus, under
PD 3-A, the Executive Branch through the President can implement
reclamation of lands through any of its departments, agencies, or offices.
Subsequently, on February 4, 1977, President Marcos issued PD 1084 creating
the PEA, which was granted, among others, the power “to reclaim land,
including foreshore and submerged areas by dredging, filling or other means
or to acquire reclaimed lands.” The PEA’s power to reclaim is not however
exclusive as can be gleaned from its charter, as the President retained his
power under PD 3-A to designate another agency to reclaim lands. On
February 14, 1979, EO 525 was issued. It granted PEA primary responsibility
for integrating, directing, and coordinating reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government although other national government
agencies can be designated by the President to reclaim lands in coordination
with the PEA. Despite the issuance of EO 525, PD 3-A remained valid and
subsisting. Thus, the National Government through the President still retained
the power and control over all reclamation projects in the country.
Same; Same; Same; President; Power of Control; Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR); The President can exercise executive power
motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of a subordinate with the
President’s own; The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) is a department in the executive branch under the President, and it is
only an alter ego of the latter; There is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the
President decides on the implementation of a certain project or activity and
requires said department to implement it.—Section 17, Art. VII of the
Constitution provides that “the President shall have control of all executive
departments, bureaus and offices.” The President is assigned the task of seeing
to it that all laws are faithfully executed. “Control,” in administrative law,
means “the power of an officer to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” As such, the President can
exercise executive power motu proprio and can supplant the act or decision of
a subordinate with the President’s own. The DENR is a department in the
executive branch under the President, and it is only an alter ego of the latter.
Ordinarily the proposed action and the staff work are initially done by a
department like the DENR and then submitted to the President for approval.
However, there is nothing infirm or unconstitutional if the President decides
on the implementation of a certain project or activity and requires said
department to implement it. Such is a presidential prerogative as long as it
involves the department or office authorized by law to supervise or execute
the Project. Thus, as in this case, when the President approved and ordered the
development of a housing project with the corresponding reclamation work,
making DENR a member of the committee tasked to implement the project,
the required authorization from the DENR to reclaim land can be deemed
satisfied. It cannot be disputed that the ultimate power over alienable and
disposable public lands is reposed in the President of the Philippines and not
the DENR Secretary. To still require a DENR authorization on the Smokey
Page | 22
Mountain when the President has already authorized and ordered the
implementation of the Project would be a derogation of the powers of the
President as the head of the executive branch. Otherwise, any department head
can defy or oppose the implementation of a project approved by the head of
the executive branch, which is patently illegal and unconstitutional.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; When a statute imposes a specific
duty on the executive department, the President may act directly or order the
said department to undertake an activity.—In Chavez v. Romulo, 431 SCRA
534 (2004), we stated that when a statute imposes a specific duty on the
executive department, the President may act directly or order the said
department to undertake an activity, thus: [A]t the apex of the entire executive
official-dom is the President. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution
specifies [her] power as Chief executive departments, bureaus and offices.
[She] shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. As Chief Executive,
President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course of her
government. She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and
programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has her subordinates to
implement them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific
function is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act
directly or merely direct the performance of a duty x x x. Such act is well
within the prerogative of her office (emphasis supplied).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The power to order the reclamation
of lands of public domain is reposed first in the Philip-pine President.—The
power to order the reclamation of lands of public domain is reposed first in the
Philippine President. The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 grants
authority to the President to reserve lands of public domain for settlement for
any specific purpose, thus: Section 14. Power to Reserve Lands of the Public
and Private Domain of the Government.—(1) The President shall have the
power to reserve for settlement or public use, and for specific public purposes,
any of the lands of the public domain, the use of which is not otherwise
directed by law. The reserved land shall thereafter remain subject to the
specific public purpose indicated until otherwise provided by law or
proclamation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Same; Same; Alienable and Disposable Lands; The Court finds that the
conclusion that the lands to be reclaimed by National Housing Authority
(NHA) are classified as alienable and disposable is derived and implicit from
the authority given to the National Housing Authority (NHA) to transfer the
reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries.—It cannot be said that MO 415,
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are explicit declarations that the lands to be
reclaimed are classified as alienable and disposable. We find however that
such conclusion is derived and implicit from the authority given to the NHA to
transfer the reclaimed lands to qualified beneficiaries.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The reclaimed lands became alienable and
disposable only after the special patents covering said areas were issued; MO
415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken
together with Special Patent Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the
requirement in Public Estates Authority (PEA) that “[t]here must be a law or
presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.”—The query is,
when did the declaration take effect? It did so only after the special patents
covering the reclaimed areas were issued. It is only on such date that the
reclaimed lands became alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
This is in line with the ruling in PEA where said issue was clarified and
stressed: PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a
special patent covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands
of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and President Aquino’s issuance of a land
patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom Islands are no longer
needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to
qualified parties. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, MO 415 and Proclamations Nos.
39 and 465 cumulatively and jointly taken together with Special Patent Nos.
Page | 23
3591, 3592, and 3598 more than satisfy the requirement in PEA that “[t]here
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and open to disposition or
concession (emphasis supplied).”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law
(R.A. No. 6957); RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 provides ample authority
for the classification of reclaimed land in the Smokey Mountain Development
and Reclamation Project (SMDRP) for the repayment scheme of the Build-
Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) project as alienable and disposable lands of
public domain—a conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else can the land
be used as the enabling component for the Project if such classification is not
deemed made?—Apropos the requisite law categorizing reclaimed land as
alienable or disposable, we find that RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718
provides ample authority for the classification of reclaimed land in the
SMDRP for the repayment scheme of the BOT project as alienable and
disposable lands of public domain. Sec. 6 of RA 6957 as amended by RA
7718 provides: For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of
any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and transfer
arrangement or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the
project proponent x x x may likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the
revenue of the project or other non-monetary payments, such as, but not
limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land, subject
to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of the land.
(Emphasis supplied.) While RA 6957 as modified by RA 7718 does not
expressly declare that the reclaimed lands that shall serve as payment to the
project proponent have become alienable and disposable lands and opened for
disposition; nonetheless, this conclusion is necessarily implied, for how else
can the land be used as the enabling component for the Project if such
classification is not deemed made?
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Patrimonial Properties; The National
Housing Authority (NHA) is a government agency not tasked to dispose of
public lands under its charter—it is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands; The moment titles over reclaimed
lands based on the special patents are transferred to the National Housing
Authority (NHA) by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted
to patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino citizens
and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos.—It may be
argued that the grant of authority to sell public lands, pursuant to PEA, does
not convert alienable lands of public domain into private or patrimonial lands.
We ruled in PEA that “alienable lands of public domain must be transferred to
qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of
public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands
(emphasis supplied).” To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a
private person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of
public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens but not to a
private corporation. This is because PEA under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked
to hold and dispose of alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it
is transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the
other hand, the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public
lands under its charter—The Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The NHA
is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to administer and dispose of
reclaimed lands. The moment titles over reclaimed lands based on the special
patents are transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the State which can be
sold to Filipino citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos. The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless to transfer
it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate lands of public
domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals
since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified beneficiaries and
prospective buyers to raise funds for the SMDRP. From the foregoing
considerations, we find that the 79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared
alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of NHA,
it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.
Page | 24

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The combined and collective
effect of Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and
3598 is tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that
the reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain.—
Petitioner’s sole reliance on Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 without taking
into consideration the special patents issued by the DENR demonstrates the
inherent weakness of his proposition. As was ruled in PEA cited by petitioner
himself, “PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquino’s actual issuance of a
special patent covering the Freedom Islands is equivalent to an official
proclamation classifying the Freedom islands as alienable or disposable lands
of public domain.” In a similar vein, the combined and collective effect of
Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 with Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 is
tantamount to and can be considered to be an official declaration that the
reclaimed lots are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. The
reclaimed lands covered by Special Patents Nos. 3591, 3592, and 3598, which
evidence transfer of ownership of reclaimed lands to the NHA, are official
acts of the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his power of supervision and
control over alienable and disposable public lands and his exclusive
jurisdiction over the management and disposition of all lands of public domain
under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Special Patent No. 3592
speaks of the transfer of Lots 1 and 2, and RI-003901-000012-D with an area
of 401,485 square meters based on the survey and technical description
approved by the Bureau of Lands. Lastly, Special Patent No. 3598 was issued
in favor of the NHA transferring to said agency a tract of land described in
Plan RL-00-000013 with an area of 390,000 square meters based on the
survey and technical descriptions approved by the Bureau of Lands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The issuance of certificates of
titles in National Housing Authority’s (NHA’s) name automatically converts
the reclaimed lands to patrimonial properties of the National Housing
Authority (NHA); The laws of the land have to be applied and interpreted
depending on the changing conditions and times—one such law that should be
treated differently is the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law (RA 6957)
which brought about a novel way of implementing government contracts by
allowing reclaimed land as part or full payment to the contractor of a
government project to satisfy the huge financial requirements of the under-
taking.—Subsequently, the special patents in the name of the NHA were
submitted to the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila for registration, and
corresponding certificates of titles over the reclaimed lots were issued based
on said special patents. The issuance of certificates of titles in NHA’s name
automatically converts the reclaimed lands to patrimonial properties of the
NHA. Otherwise, the lots would not be of use to the NHA’s housing projects
or as payment to the BOT contractor as the enabling component of the BOT
contract. The laws of the land have to be applied and interpreted depending on
the changing conditions and times. Tempora mutantur et legis mutantur in illis
(time changes and laws change with it). One such law that should be treated
differently is the BOT Law (RA 6957) which brought about a novel way of
implementing mgovernment contracts by allowing reclaimed land as part or
full payment to the contractor of a government project to satisfy the huge
financial requirements of the undertaking. The NHA holds the lands covered
by Special Patents Nos. 3592 and 3598 solely for the purpose of the SMDRP
undertaken by authority of the BOT Law and for disposition in accordance
with said special law. The lands become alienable and disposable lands of
public domain upon issuance of the special patents and become patrimonial
properties of the Government from the time the titles are issued to the NHA.
As early as 1999, this Court in Baguio v. Republic, 301 SCRA 450 (1999),
laid down the jurisprudence that: It is true that, once a patent is registered and
the corresponding certificate of title is issued, the land covered by them ceases
to be part of the public domain and becomes private property, and the Torrens
Title issued pursuant to the patent becomes indefeasible upon the expiration of
one year from the date of issuance of such patent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Judgments; It is a settled
precept that decisions of the Supreme Court can only be applied prospectively
as they may prejudice vested rights if applied retroactively.—The ruling in
Page | 25
PEA cannot even be applied retroactively to the lots covered by Special
Patents Nos. 3592 (40 hectare reclaimed land) and 3598 (39-hectare reclaimed
land). The reclamation of the land under SMDRP was completed in August
1996 while the PEA decision was rendered on July 9, 2002. In the meantime,
subdivided lots forming parts of the reclaimed land were already sold to
private corporations for value and separate titles issued to the buyers. The
Project was terminated through a Memorandum of Agreement signed on
August 27, 2003. The PEA decision became final through the November 11,
2003 Resolution. It is a settled precept that decisions of the Supreme Court
can only be applied prospectively as they may prejudice vested rights if
applied retroactively.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Even if it is conceded that
there was no explicit declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public
use or public service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that
the reclaimed areas are not necessary anymore for public use or public service
when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the National
Housing Authority (NHA) partly for housing project and related commercial/
industrial development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain
beneficiaries and not the public in general and partly as enabling component
to finance the project.—Even if it is conceded that there was no explicit
declaration that the lands are no longer needed for public use or public
service, there was however an implicit executive declaration that the
reclaimed areas R-10 are not necessary anymore for public use or public
service when President Aquino through MO 415 conveyed the same to the
NHA partly for housing project and related commercial/industrial
development intended for disposition to and enjoyment of certain beneficiaries
and not the public in general and partly as enabling component to finance the
project. President Ramos, in issuing Proclamation No. 39, declared, though
indirectly, that the reclaimed lands of the Smokey Mountain project are no
longer required for public use or service, thus: These parcels of land of public
domain are hereby placed under the administration and disposition of the
National Housing Authority to develop, subdivide and dispose to qualified
beneficiaries, as well as its development for mix land use
(commercial/industrial) to provide employment opportunities to on-site
families and additional areas for port related activities. (Emphasis supplied.)
While numerical count of the persons to be benefited is not the determinant
whether the property is to be devoted to public use, the declaration in
Proclamation No. 39 undeniably identifies only particular individuals as
beneficiaries to whom the reclaimed lands can be sold, namely—the Smokey
Mountain dwellers. The rest of the Filipinos are not qualified; hence, said
lands are no longer essential for the use of the public in general.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; MO 415 and Proclamations
Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that proclaimed the non-use of the reclaimed
areas for public use or service as the Project cannot be successfully
implemented without the withdrawal of said lands from public use or service.
—MO 415 and Proclamations Nos. 39 and 465 are declarations that
proclaimed the non-use of the reclaimed areas for public use or service as the
Project cannot be successfully implemented without the withdrawal of said
lands from public use or service. Certainly, the devotion of the reclaimed land
to public use or service conflicts with the intended use of the Smokey
Mountain areas for housing and employment of the Smokey Mountain
scavengers and for financing the Project because the latter cannot be
accomplished without abandoning the public use of the subject land. Without
doubt, the presidential proclamations on SMDRP together with the issuance of
the special patents had effectively removed the reclaimed lands from public
use.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Reclaimed lands that are made
the enabling components of a Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT)
infrastructure project are necessarily reclassified as alienable and disposable
lands under the BOT Law; otherwise, absurd and illogical consequences
would naturally result.—Re-claimed lands that are made the enabling
components of a BOT infrastructure project are necessarily reclassified as
alienable and disposable lands under the BOT Law; otherwise, absurd and
Page | 26
illogical consequences would naturally result. Undoubtedly, the BOT contract
will not be accepted by the BOT contractor since there will be no
consideration for its contractual obligations. Since reclaimed land will be
conveyed to the contractor pursuant to the BOT Law, then there is an implied
declaration that such land is no longer intended for public use or public
service and, hence, considered patrimo-nial property of the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 60 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141 applies only to “a province, municipality or branch or subdivision
of the Government”—the National Housing Authority (NHA) is not a
government unit but a government corporation performing governmental and
proprietary functions.—Petitioner relies on Sec. 60 of Commonwealth Act
(CA) 141 to support his view that the NHA is not empowered by any law to
sell reclaimed land, thus: Section 60. Any tract of land comprised under this
title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to any person, corporation or
association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for agricultural
purposes. The area of the land so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the
judgment of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be
reasonably necessary for the purposes for which such sale or lease if requested
and shall in no case exceed one hundred and forty-four hectares: Provided,
however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, transfers,
made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government
for the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but
the land so granted donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered,
or otherwise disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when
authorized by Congress; Provided, further, That any person, corporation,
association or partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for
agricultural purposes under the provisions of this Act, may lease land included
under this title suitable for industrial or residential purposes, but the lease
granted shall only be valid while such land is used for the purposes referred to.
(Emphasis supplied.) Reliance on said provision is incorrect as the same
applies only to “a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government.” The NHA is not a government unit but a government
corporation performing governmental and proprietary functions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The transfer of the reclaimed
lands by the National Government to the National Housing Authority (NHA)
for housing, commercial, and industrial purposes transformed them into
patrimonial lands which are of course owned by the State in its private or
proprietary capacity—perforce, the National Housing Authority (NHA) can
sell the reclaimed lands to any Filipino citizen or qualified corporation.—PD
757 is clear that the NHA is empowered by law to transfer properties acquired
by it under the law to other parties, thus: Section 6. Powers and functions of
the Authority. The Authority shall have the follow-ing powers and functions to
be exercised by the Boards in accordance with the established national human
settlements plan prepared by the Human Settlements Commission: x x x x (k)
Enter into contracts whenever necessary under such terms and conditions as it
may deem proper and reasonable; (l) Acquire property rights and interests, and
encumber or otherwise dispose the same as it may deem appropriate
(Emphasis supplied.) Letter (l) is emphatic that the NHA can acquire property
rights and interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem
appropriate. The transfer of the reclaimed lands by the National Government
to the NHA for housing, commercial, and industrial purposes transformed
them into patrimonial lands which are of course owned by the State in its
private or proprietary capacity. Perforce, the NHA can sell the reclaimed lands
to any Filipino citizen or qualified corporation.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Bids and Bidding; The lands
reclaimed by and conveyed to the National Housing Authority (NHA) are no
longer lands of public domain—these lands became proprietary lands or
patrimonial properties of the State upon transfer of the titles over the
reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence outside the ambit of CA 141; The
National Housing Authority (NHA) can legally transfer patrimonial land to
any interested qualified buyer without any bidding conducted by the Director
of Lands because the National Housing Authority (NHA), unlike Public
Page | 27
Estates Authority (PEA), is a government agency not tasked to sell lands of
public domain.—Sections 63 and 67 of CA 141, as amended, are in point as
they refer to government sale by the Director of Lands of alienable and
disposable lands of public domain. This is not present in the case at bar. The
lands reclaimed by and conveyed to the NHA are no longer lands of public
domain. These lands became proprietary lands or patrimonial properties of the
State upon transfer of the titles over the reclaimed lands to the NHA and hence
outside the ambit of CA 141. The NHA can therefore legally transfer
patrimonial land to RBI or to any other interested qualified buyer without any
bidding conducted by the Director of Lands because the NHA, unlike PEA, is
a government agency not tasked to sell lands of public domain. Hence, it can
only hold patrimonial lands and can dispose of such lands by sale without
need of public bidding.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction;
Reclaimed lands cannot be considered unserviceable properties; Sec. 79 of PD
1445 cannot be applied to patrimonial properties like reclaimed lands
transferred to a government agency like the National Housing Authority
(NHA) which has entered into a Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) contract
with a private firm—if the patrimonial property will be subject to public
bidding as the only way of disposing of said property, then Sec. 6 of RA 6957
on the repayment scheme is almost impossible or extremely difficult to
implement considering the uncertainty of a winning bid during public auction;
The law does not intend anything impossible (lex non intendit aliquid
impossibile).—Reclaimed lands cannot be considered unserviceable
properties. The reclaimed lands in question are very much needed by the NHA
for the Smokey Mountain Project because without it, then the projects will not
be successfully implemented. Since the reclaimed lands are not unserviceable
properties and are very much needed by NHA, then Sec. 79 of PD 1445 does
not apply. More importantly, Sec. 79 of PD 1445 cannot be applied to
patrimonial properties like reclaimed lands transferred to a government
agency like the NHA which has entered into a BOT contract with a private
firm. The reason is obvious. If the patrimonial property will be subject to
public bidding as the only way of disposing of said property, then Sec. 6 of
RA 6957 on the repayment scheme is almost impossible or extremely difficult
to implement considering the uncertainty of a winning bid during public
auction. Moreover, the repayment scheme of a BOT contract may be in the
form of non-monetary payment like the grant of a portion or percentage of
reclaimed land. Even if the BOT partner participates in the public bidding,
there is no assurance that he will win the bid and therefore the payment in
kind as agreed to by the parties cannot be performed or the winning bid prize
might be below the estimated valuation of the land. The only way to
harmonize Sec. 79 of PD 1445 with Sec. 6 of RA 6957 is to consider Sec. 79
of PD 1445 as inapplicable to BOT contracts involving patrimonial lands. The
law does not intend anything impossible (lex non intendit aliquid impossibile).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; RA 6957 as amended by RA
7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid “a portion as percentage of
the reclaimed land” subject to the constitutional requirement that only Filipino
citizens or corporations with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the
same.—RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor
can be paid “a portion as percentage of the reclaimed land” subject to the
constitutional requirement that only Filipino citizens or corporations with at
least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. It cannot be denied that RBI is
a private corporation, where Filipino citizens own at least 60% of the stocks.
Thus, the transfer to RBI is valid and constitutional.
Right to Information; The government agencies, without need of demand from
anyone, must bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to
the consummation of the transaction and the contents of the perfected contract
—such information must pertain to “definite propositions of the government,”
meaning official recommendations or final positions reached on the different
matters subject of negotiation.—Sec. 28, Art. II compels the State and its
agencies to fully disclose “all of its transactions involving public interest.”
Thus, the government agencies, without need of demand from anyone, must
bring into public view all the steps and negotiations leading to the
Page | 28
consummation of the transaction and the contents of the perfected contract.
Such information must pertain to “definite propositions of the government,”
meaning official recommendations or final positions reached on the different
matters subject of negotiation. The government agency, however, need not
disclose “intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or communications
during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the exploratory stage.” The limitation also covers
privileged communication like information on military and diplomatic secrets;
information affecting national security; information on investigations of
crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the accused;
information on foreign relations, intelligence, and other classified information.
Same; It is unfortunate that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the
1987 Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics
for the compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on
government transactions; In the meantime, it would suffice that government
agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents incorporating the
information on the steps and negotiations that produced the agreements and
the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload said information
on their respective websites for easy access by interested parties.—It is
unfortunate, however, that after almost twenty (20) years from birth of the
1987 Constitution, there is still no enabling law that provides the mechanics
for the compulsory duty of government agencies to disclose information on
government transactions. Hopefully, the desired enabling law will finally see
the light of day if and when Congress decides to approve the proposed
“Freedom of Access to Information Act.” In the meantime, it would suffice
that government agencies post on their bulletin boards the documents
incorporating the information on the steps and negotiations that produced the
agreements and the agreements themselves, and if finances permit, to upload
said information on their respective websites for easy access by interested
parties. Without any law or regulation governing the right to disclose
information, the NHA or any of the respondents cannot be faulted if they were
not able to disclose information relative to the SMDRP to the public in
general.
Same; The other aspect of the people’s right to know apart from the duty to
disclose is the duty to allow access to information on matters of public
concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution; The duty to disclose
information should be differentiated from the duty to permit access to
information—there is no need to demand from the government agency
disclosure of information as this is mandatory under the Constitution, while,
on the other hand, the interested party must first request or even demand that
he be allowed access to documents and papers in the particular agency.—The
other aspect of the people’s right to know apart from the duty to disclose is the
duty to allow access to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7,
Art. III of the Constitution. The gateway to information opens to the public the
following: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions; and (3) government research data used as a
basis for policy development. Thus, the duty to disclose information should be
differentiated from the duty to permit access to information. There is no need
to demand from the government agency disclosure of information as this is
mandatory under the Constitution; failing that, legal remedies are available.
On the other hand, the interested party must first request or even demand that
he be allowed access to documents and papers in the particular agency. A
request or demand is required; otherwise, the government office or agency
will not know of the desire of the interested party to gain access to such papers
and what papers are needed. The duty to disclose covers only transactions
involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a broader scope of
information which embraces not only transactions involving public interest,
but any matter contained in official communications and public documents of
the government agency.
Operative Fact Doctrine; Words and Phrases; Under the “operative fact”
doctrine a legislative or executive act, prior to its being declared as
unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with.—The
Page | 29
“operative fact” doctrine is embodied in De Agbayani v. Court of Appeals, 38
SCRA 429 (1971), wherein it is stated that a legislative or executive act, prior
to its being declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be
complied with, thus: As the new Civil Code puts it: “When the courts declare
a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws of the Constitution.”
It is understandable why it should be so, the Constitution being supreme and
paramount. Any legislative or executive act contrary to its terms cannot
survive. Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of
simplicity. It may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of
doubt that prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or
executive act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so
as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is
entitled to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may
have changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect awareness
that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the
final say on whether or not a legislative or executive measure is valid, a period
of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its
quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had
transpired prior to such adjudication.
Same; The existence of the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) Law (RA
6957) relied upon by the parties and the executive issuances is an “operative
fact” to which legal consequences have attached—the Court is constrained to
give legal effect to the acts done in consonance with such executive and
legislative acts, since to do otherwise would work patent injustice.—In the
instant case, RA 6957 was the prevailing law at the time that the joint venture
agreement was signed. RA 6957, entitled “An Act Authorizing The Financing,
Construction, Operation And Maintenance Of Infrastructure Projects By The
Private Sector And For Other Purposes,” which was passed by Congress on
July 24, 1989, allows repayment to the private contractor of reclaimed lands.
Such law was relied upon by respondents, along with the above-mentioned
executive issuances in pushing through with the Project. The existence of such
law and issuances is an “operative fact” to which legal consequences have
attached. This Court is constrained to give legal effect to the acts done in
consonance with such executive and legislative acts; to do otherwise would
work patent injustice on respondents.
Same; Vested Rights Doctrine; The Smokey Mountain Development and
Reclamation Project (SMDRP) agreements have produced vested rights in
favor of the slum dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles
over said land, and the agencies and investors who made investments in the
project or who bought SMPPC’s—these properties and rights cannot be
disturbed or questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the
start of the Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project
(SMDRP) implementation.—When the ruling in PEA was rendered by this
Court on July 9, 2002, the JVAs were all executed. Furthermore, when
petitioner filed the instant case against respondents on August 5, 2004, the
JVAs were already terminated by virtue of the MOA between the NHA and
RBI. The respondents had no reason to think that their agreements were
unconstitutional or even questionable, as in fact, the concurrent acts of the
executive department lent validity to the implementation of the Project. The
SMDRP agreements have produced vested rights in favor of the slum
dwellers, the buyers of reclaimed land who were issued titles over said land,
and the agencies and investors who made investments in the project or who
bought SMPPCs. These properties and rights cannot be disturbed or
questioned after the passage of around ten (10) years from the start of the
SMDRP implementation. Evidently, the “operative fact” principle has set in.
The titles to the lands in the hands of the buyers can no longer be invalidated.
Page | 30
Prohibition; Words and Phrases; A ministerial duty is one which is so clear
and specific as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance—it is a duty which an officer performs in a given state of facts in
a prescribed manner in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without
regard to the exercise of his/her own judgment upon the propriety of the act
done.—It has not been shown that the NHA exercised judicial or quasi-
judicial functions in relation to the SMDRP and the agreements relative to it.
Likewise, it has not been shown what ministerial functions the NHA has with
regard to the SMDRP. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific
as to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its performance. It is a
duty which an officer performs in a given state of facts in a prescribed manner
in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to the exercise
of his/her own judgment upon the propriety of the act done. Whatever is left to
be done in relation to the August 27, 2003 MOA, terminating the JVA and
other related agreements, certainly does not involve ministerial functions of
the NHA but instead requires exercise of judgment. In fact, Item No. 4 of the
MOA terminating the JVAs provides for validation of the developer’s (RBI’s)
claims arising from the termination of the SMDRP through the various
government agencies. Such validation requires the exercise of discretion.

Same; Prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is already a fait
accompli.—Prohibition does not lie to restrain an act which is already a fait
accompli. The “operative fact” doctrine protecting vested rights bars the grant
of the writ of prohibition to the case at bar. It should be remembered that
petitioner was the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was formulated and
implemented. He had the opportunity to question the SMDRP and the
agreements on it, but he did not. The moment to challenge the Project had G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002.*
passed. GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, petitioner, vs. Hon.
GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIO BATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.]

Page | 31
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Certiorari; Motions for Reconsideration; As a
general rule, a petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper
unless the inferior court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration,
a chance to correct the errors imputed to it; Exceptions.—As a general rule, a
petition for certiorari before a higher court will not prosper unless the inferior
court has been given, through a motion for reconsideration, a chance to correct
the errors imputed to it. This rule, though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the
issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public interest is involved, or (3) in case
of urgency. As a fourth exception, the Court has also ruled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration before availment of the remedy of certiorari is not
a sine qua non, when the questions raised are the same as those that have
already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower
court. Aside from being of this nature, the issues in the present case also
involve pure questions of law that are of public interest. Hence, a motion for
reconsideration may be dispensed with. Likewise, this Court has allowed a
direct invocation of its original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari when
there are special and important reasons therefor.
International Law; Extradition; Treaties; A cardinal rule in the interpretation of
a treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent.—The substantive
issues raised in this case require an interpretation or construction of the treaty
and the law on extradition. A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a treaty or a
law is to ascertain and give effect to its intent. Since PD 1069 is intended as a
guide for the implementation of extradition treaties to which the Philippines is
a signatory, understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in
properly deciding the issues raised here.
Same; Same; Postulates of Extradition; Extradition is a major instrument for
the suppression of crime.—Extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose
of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a
fugitive from one state to the other. With the advent of easier and faster means
of international travel, the flight of affluent criminals from one country to
another for the purpose of committing crime and evading prosecution has
become more frequent. Accordingly, governments are adjusting their methods
of dealing with criminals and crimes that transcend international boundaries.
Today, “a majority of nations in the world community have come to look upon
extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in
the suppression of crime.” It is the only regular system that has been devised
to return fugitives to the jurisdiction of a court competent to try them in
accordance with municipal and international law.
Same; Same; Same; The requesting State will accord due process to the
accused.—An extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have
examined, and that both accept and trust, each other’s legal system and
judicial process. More pointedly, our duly authorized representative’s
signature on an extradition treaty signifies our confidence in the capacity and
the willingness of the other state to protect the basic rights of the person
sought to be extradited. That signature signifies our full faith that the accused
will be given, upon extradition to the requesting state, all relevant and basic
rights in the criminal proceedings that will take place therein; otherwise, the
treaty would not have been signed, or would have been directly attacked for
its unconstitutionally.
Same; Same; Same; Extradition proceedings are sui generis.—As pointed out
in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, extradition proceedings are not criminal in
nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the accused are at
fore; in extradition which is sui generis—in a class by itself—they are not.
“An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding
which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence,
as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee x x x.
Page | 32
Same; Same; Same; The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in court
is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the
Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is extraditable.—Given the
foregoing, it is evident that the extradition court is not called upon to ascertain
the guilt or the innocence of the person sought to be extradited. Such
determination during the extradition proceedings will only result in needless
duplication and delay. Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a crime is
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person. It is not part of
the function of the assisting authorities to enter into questions that are the
prerogative of that jurisdiction. The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.
Same; Same; Same; Pacta Sunt Servanda; We are bound by pacta sunt
seruanda to comply in good faith with our obligations under the Extradition
Treaty.—Our executive branch of government voluntarily entered into the
Extradition Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty
carries the presumption that its implementation will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity with
the requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations
thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the world community.
Such failure would discourage other states from entering into treaties with us,
particularly an extradition treaty that hinges on reciprocity. Verily, we are
bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. This principle requires that we deliver the accused to the
requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, “[t]he demanding government, when it
has done all that the treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled to the
delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the surrender.” Accordingly, the
Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be
found proper.
Same; Same; Same; Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks.—
Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch:
nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the
jurisdiction of the requested state in order to thwart their extradition to the
requesting state.
Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Section 6 of PD 1069, our Extradition
Treaty, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the accused, a
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance
of the arrest warrant—arrest subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered “immediate.”—It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069,
our Extradition Law, uses the word “immediate” to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing
the issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing entails sending notices to the
opposing parties, receiving facts and arguments from them, and giving them
time to prepare and present such facts and arguments. Arrest subsequent to a
hearing can no longer be considered “immediate.” The law could not have
intended the word as a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of
imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
Same; Same; Same; By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law fur ther
conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage.—By
using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. The trial court is not expected to make
an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the
material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
Page | 33
impression—a prima facie finding—sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
Same; Same; Warrants of Arrest; Grave Abuse of Discretion; A judge gravely
abuses his discretion when he sets for hearing the application for the issuance
of an arrest warrant in an extradition proceeding after having already
determined from the petition itself and its supporting documents that a prima
facie finding exists.—We stress that the prima facie existence of probable
cause for hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence,
after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist,
respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for
hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The silence of the Extradition
Law and the Treaty leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.
—Moreover, the law specifies that the court sets a hearing upon receipt of the
answer or upon failure of the accused to answer after receiving the summons.
In connection with the matter of immediate arrest, however, the word
“hearing” is notably absent from the provision. Evidently, had the holding of a
hearing at that stage been intended, the law could have easily so provided. It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary
in nature. Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing
every little step in the entire proceedings.
Same; Same; Same; Proper Procedure in Extradition Proceedings.— Since
this is a matter of first impression, we deem it wise to restate the proper
procedure: Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima
facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they
show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person
sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission
of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and
witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima
facie finding is possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined,
then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the
extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to
appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant,
the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of
the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the
proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will “best serve the ends
of justice” in extradition cases.
Same; Same; Bail; Statutory Construction; As suggested by the use of the
word “conviction” in Art. III, Section 13 of the Constitution, the constitutional
provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws—it does not apply to extradition proceedings where
the presumption of innocence is not at issue.—We agree with petitioner. As
suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.” It follows that the constitutional provision
on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of
innocence is not at issue.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The provision in the Constitution stating that the
“right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
Page | 34
habeas corpus is suspended” does not detract from the rule that the
constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings.—The
provision in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended”
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available
only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds application “only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
with invasion.” Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on
bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in criminal proceedings for the
aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available
even in extradition proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
Same; Same; Same; Due Process; The detention of a potential extraditee prior
to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation
of his right to due process—while the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard, it does not always call for a prior opportunity to be
heard.—Contrary to his contention, his detention prior to the conclusion of the
extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his right to due
process. We iterate the familiar doctrine that the essence of due process is the
opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances—
such as those present in an extradition case—call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. In the present case, respondent will be
given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court
hears the Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.
Same; Same; Same; In the absence of any provision—in the Constitution, the
law or the treaty—expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition
proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule,
would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to
hide from or evade their prosecutors.—Too, we cannot allow our country to be
a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the
consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be
good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through
overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be
extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence
of any provision—in the Constitution, the law or the treaty—expressly
guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice
of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring
fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their
prosecutors.
Same; Same; Same; To best serve the ends of justice, the Court holds that,
after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear
and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community, and (2) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.—The rule, we repeat, is
that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the judiciary
has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as
well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional
rights. Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough
to induce the grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due
process extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every person. It is
“dynamic and resilient, adaptable to every situation calling for its
application.” Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and
so hold that, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the
custody of the law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only
upon a clear and convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant
will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
Page | 35
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
Same; Same; Same; Since the exception to the grant of bail in extradition
proceedings has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived
essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness.—Since this exception has no express or specific
statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of
justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-
tiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic forcefulness. The
Court realizes that extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising from the presidential power to conduct foreign relations.
In its barest concept, it partakes of the nature of police assistance amongst
states, which is not normally a judicial prerogative. Hence, any intrusion by
the courts into the exercise of this power should be characterized by caution,
so that the vital international and bilateral interests of our country will not be
unreasonably impeded or compromised. In short, while this Court is ever
protective of “the sporting idea of fair play,” it also recognizes the limits of its
own prerogatives and the need to fulfill international obligations.
freedom of action. They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison. To give a more drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full
knowledge that he is suffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that
at any time, he may no longer serve his full term in office. x x x It must be
noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat
in Manila, it was already of public knowledge that the United States was
requesting his extradition. Hence, his constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the extradition case against their
representative, including his detention pending the final resolution of the case.
Premises considered and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained to rule
against his claim that his election to public office is by itself a compelling
reason to grant him bail.

Same; Same; Congress; The constituents of a potential extraditee who elected

him to Congress while a foreign country was requesting his extradition were
or should have been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case
against their representative, including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case—his election to public office is not, by itself, a
compelling reason to grant him bail.—While his extradition was pending,
Respondent Jimenez was elected as a member of the House of
Representatives. On that basis, he claims that his detention will disenfranchise
his Manila district of 600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In People v.
Jalosjos, the Court has already debunked the disenfranchisement argument
when it ruled thus: “When the voters of his district elected the accused-
appellant to Congress, they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his

Page | 36

G.R. No. 174269. August 25, 2010.*
POLO S. PANTALEON, petitioner, vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS
INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondent.
Credit Cards; Words and Phrases; A credit card is defined as “any card, plate,
coupon book, or other credit device existing for the purpose of obtaining
money, goods, property, labor or services or anything of value on credit”; It
traces its roots to the charge card first introduced by the Diners Club in New
York City in 1950; In the Philippines, the now defunct Pacific Bank was
responsible for bringing the first credit card into the country in the 1970s.—A
credit card is defined as “any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device
existing for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor or services
or anything of value on credit.” It traces its roots to the charge card first
introduced by the Diners Club in New York City in 1950. American Express
followed suit by introducing its own charge card to the American market in
1958. In the Philippines, the now defunct Pacific Bank was responsible for
bringing the first credit card into the country in the 1970s. However, it was
only in the early 2000s that credit card use gained wide acceptance in the
country, as evidenced by the surge in the number of credit card holders then.
Same; Every credit card transaction involves three contracts— the sales
contract, the loan agreement, and the promise to pay.—Simply put, every
credit card transaction involves three contracts, namely: (a) the sales contract
between the credit card holder and the merchant or the business establishment
which accepted the credit card; (b) the loan agreement between the credit card
issuer and the credit card holder; and lastly, (c) the promise to pay between the
credit card issuer and the merchant or business establishment.
Same; Contracts of Adhesion; In our jurisdiction, we generally adhere to the
rule recognizing the relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit
card holder as a contractual one that is governed by the terms and conditions
found in the card membership agreement; We note that a card membership
agreement is a contractvof adhesion as its terms are prepared solely by the
credit card issuer, with the cardholder merely affixing his signature signifying
his adhesion to these terms.—In our jurisdiction, we generally adhere to the
Gray ruling, recognizing the relationship between the credit card issuer and
the credit card holder as a contractual one that is governed by the terms and
conditions found in the card membership agreement. This contract provides
the rights and liabilities of a credit card company to its cardholders and vice
versa. We note that a card membership agreement is a contract of adhesion as
its terms are prepared solely by the credit card issuer, with the cardholder
merely affixing his signature signifying his adhesion to these terms. This
circumstance, however, does not render the agreement void; we have
uniformly held that contracts of adhesion are “as binding as ordinary
contracts, the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to
reject it entirely.” The only effect is that the terms of the contract are construed
strictly against the party who drafted it.
Same; In more concrete terms, when cardholders use their credit cards to pay
for their purchases, they merely offer to enter into loan agreements with the
credit card company—only after the latter approves the purchase requests that
the parties enter into binding loan contracts.—Although we recognize the
existence of a relationship between the credit card issuer and the credit card
holder upon the acceptance by the cardholder of the terms of the card mem-
bership agreement (customarily signified by the act of the cardholder in
signing the back of the credit card), we have to distinguish this contractual
relationship from the creditor-debtor relationship which only arises after the
credit card issuer has approved the cardholder’s purchase request. The first
relates merely to an agreement providing for credit facility to the cardholder.
The latter involves the actual credit on loan agreement involving three
contracts, namely: the sales contract between the credit card holder and the
Page | 37
merchant or the business establishment which accepted the credit card; the
loan agreement between the credit card issuer and the credit card holder; and
the promise to pay between the credit card issuer and the merchant or business
establishment. From the loan agreement perspective, the contractual
relationship begins to exist only upon the meeting of the offer and acceptance
of the parties involved. In more concrete terms, when cardholders use their
credit cards to pay for their purchases, they merely offer to enter into loan
agreements with the credit card company. Only after the latter approves the
purchase requests that the parties enter into binding loan contracts, in keeping
with Article 1319 of the Civil Code.
Same; Default; Requisites; Since the credit card company has no obligation to
approve the purchase requests of its credit cardholders, the cardholder cannot
claim that the former defaulted in its obligation—without a demandable
obligation, there can be no finding of default.—Since American Express
International, Inc. (AMEX) has no obligation to approve the purchase requests
of its credit cardholders, Pantaleon cannot claim that AMEX defaulted in its
obligation. Article 1169 of the Civil Code, which provides the requisites to
hold a debtor guilty of culpable delay, states: “Article 1169. Those obliged to
deliver or to do something incur in delay from the time the obligee judicially
or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.”
x x x. The three requisites for a finding of default are: (a) that the obligation is
demandable and liquidated; (b) the debtor delays performance; and (c) the
creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the debtor’s performance. Based
on the above, the first requisite is no longer met because AMEX, by the
express terms of the credit card agreement, is not obligated to approve
Pantaleon’s purchase request. Without a demandable obligation, there can be
no finding of default.
Same; Same; A demand presupposes the existence of an obligation between
the parties.—Apart from the lack of any demandable obligation, we also find
that Pantaleon failed to make the demand required by Article 1169 of the Civil
Code. As previously established, the use of a credit card to pay for a purchase
is only an offer to the credit card company to enter a loan agreement with the
credit card holder. Before the credit card issuer accepts this offer, no
obligation relating to the loan agreement exists between them. On the other
hand, a demand is defined as the “assertion of a legal right; x x x an asking
with authority, claiming or challenging as due.” A demand presupposes the
existence of an obligation between the parties.
Same; The right to review a card holder’s credit history, although not
specifically set out in the card membership agreement, is a necessary
implication of the credit card company’s right to deny authorization for any
requested charge.—AMEX’s credit authorizer, Edgardo Jaurigue, explained
that having no pre-set spending limit in a credit card simply means that the
charges made by the cardholder are approved based on his ability to pay, as
demonstrated by his past spending, payment patterns, and personal resources.
Nevertheless, every time Pantaleon charges a purchase on his credit card, the
credit card company still has to determine whether it will allow this charge,
based on his past credit history. This right to review a card holder’s credit
history, although not specifically set out in the card membership agreement, is
a necessary implication of AMEX’s right to deny authorization for any
requested charge.
Same; Even if the cardholder did prove that the credit card company, as a
matter of practice or custom, acted on its customers’ purchase requests in a
matter of seconds, this would still not be enough to establish a legally
demandable right—as a general rule, a practice or custom is not a source of a
legally demandable or enforceable right.—As for Pantaleon’s previous
experiences with AMEX (i.e., that in the past 12 years, AMEX has always
approved his charge requests in three or four seconds), this record does not
establish that Pantaleon had a legally enforceable obligation to expect AMEX
to act on his charge requests within a matter of seconds. For one, Pantaleon
failed to present any evidence to support his assertion that AMEX acted on
purchase requests in a matter of three or four seconds as an established
practice. More importantly, even if Pantaleon did prove that AMEX, as a
Page | 38
matter of practice or custom, acted on its customers’ purchase requests in a
matter of seconds, this would still not be enough to establish a legally
demandable right; as a general rule, a practice or custom is not a source of a
legally demandable or enforceable right.
Same; A survey of Philippine law on credit card transactions demonstrates that
the State does not require credit card companies to act upon its cardholders’
purchase requests within a specific period of time.—Nor can Pantaleon look
to the law or government issuances as the source of AMEX’s alleged
obligation to act upon his credit card purchases within a matter of seconds. As
the following survey of Philippine law on credit card transactions
demonstrates, the State does not require credit card companies to act upon its
cardholders’ purchase requests within a specific period of time. Republic Act
No. 8484 (RA 8484), or the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, approved
on February 11, 1998, is the controlling legislation that regulates the issuance
and use of access devices, including credit cards. The more salient portions of
this law include the imposition of the obligation on a credit card company to
disclose certain important financial information to credit card applicants, as
well as a definition of the acts that constitute access device fraud. As financial
institutions engaged in the business of providing credit, credit card companies
fall under the supervisory powers of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
BSP Circular No. 398 dated August 21, 2003 embodies the BSP’s policy when
it comes to credit cards—“The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) shall foster
the development of consumer credit through innovative products such as
credit cards under conditions of fair and sound consumer credit practices. The
BSP likewise encourages competition and transparency to ensure more
efficient delivery of services and fair dealings with customers.” (Emphasis
supplied)
Same; The Court holds that AMEX is neither contractually bound nor legally
obligated to act on its cardholders’ purchase requests within any specific
period of time, much less a period of a “matter of seconds”—the standard
therefore is implicit and, as in all contracts, must be based on fairness and
reasonableness, read in relation to the Civil Code provisions on human
relations.—In light of the foregoing, we find and so hold that AMEX is neither
contractually bound nor legally obligated to act on its cardholders’ purchase
requests within any specific period of time, much less a period of a “matter of
seconds” that Pantaleon uses as his standard. The standard therefore is implicit
and, as in all contracts, must be based on fairness and reasonableness, read in
relation to the Civil Code provisions on human relations, as will be discussed
below.
Same; Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Damages; In the context of a credit
card relationship, although there is neither a contractual stipulation nor a
specific law requiring the credit card issuer to act on the credit card holder’s
offer within a definite period of time, the principles set out in Article 19 of the
Civil Code provide the standard by which to judge the credit card company’s
actions.—Article 19 pervades the entire legal system and ensures that a person
suffering damage in the course of another’s exercise of right or performance
of duty, should find himself without relief. It sets the standard for the conduct
of all persons, whether artificial or natural, and requires that everyone, in the
exercise of rights and the performance of obligations, must: (a) act with
justice, (b) give everyone his due, and (c) observe honesty and good faith. It is
not because a person invokes his rights that he can do anything, even to the
prejudice and disadvantage of another. While Article 19 enumerates the
standards of conduct, Article 21 provides the remedy for the person injured by
the willful act, an action for damages. We explained how these two provisions
correlate with each other in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona 462 SCRA 466
(2005): “[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the
principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal
because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the
Page | 39
source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does
not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the
government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages
under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.” In the context of a
credit card relationship, although there is neither a contractual stipulation nor
a specific law requiring the credit card issuer to act on the credit card holder’s
offer within a definite period of time, these principles provide the standard by
which to judge AMEX’s actions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that
good faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the
party alleging it; So long as the credit card company exercises its rights,
performs its obligations, and generally acts with good faith, with no intent to
cause harm, even if it may occasionally inconvenience others, it cannot be
held liable for damages.—It is an elementary rule in our jurisdiction that good
faith is presumed and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon the party
alleging it. Although it took AMEX some time before it approved Pantaleon’s
three charge requests, we find no evidence to suggest that it acted with
deliberate intent to cause Pantaleon any loss or injury, or acted in a manner
that was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. We give credence
to AMEX’s claim that its review procedure was done to ensure Pantaleon’s
own protection as a cardholder and to prevent the possibility that the credit
card was being fraudulently used by a third person. Pantaleon countered that
this review procedure is primarily intended to protect AMEX’s interests, to
make sure that the cardholder making the purchase has enough means to pay
for the credit extended. Even if this were the case, however, we do not find
any taint of bad faith in such motive. It is but natural for AMEX to want to
ensure that it will extend credit only to people who will have sufficient means
to pay for their purchases. AMEX, after all, is running a business, not a
charity, and it would simply be ludicrous to suggest that it would not want to
earn profit for its services. Thus, so long as AMEX exercises its rights,
performs its obligations, and generally acts with good faith, with no intent to
cause harm, even if it may occasionally inconvenience others, it cannot be
held liable for damages.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A person who knowingly and voluntarily exposes
himself to danger cannot claim damages for the resulting injury.—In Nikko
Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, 452 SCRA 532 (2005), we ruled that a person
who knowingly and voluntarily exposes himself to danger cannot claim
damages for the resulting injury: “The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to
which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-
inflicted injury or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery of
damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to
danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.” This doctrine, in our view, is
wholly applicable to this case. Pantaleon himself testified that the most basic
rule when travelling in a tour group is that you must never be a cause of any
delay because the schedule is very strict. When Pantaleon made up his mind to
push through with his purchase, he must have known that the group would
become annoyed and irritated with him. This was the natural, foreseeable
consequence of his decision to make them all wait.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Principle of Damnum Absque Injuria; Words and
Phrases; There is a material distinction between damages and injury—injury is
the illegal invasion of a legal right while damage is the loss, hurt, or harm
which results from the injury; There can be damage without injury in those
instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty.—More importantly, AMEX did not violate any legal duty to Pantaleon
under the circumstances under the principle of damnum absque injuria, or
damages without legal wrong, loss without injury. As we held in BPI Express
Card v. CA, 296 SCRA 260 (1998): “We do not dispute the findings of the
lower court that private respondent suffered damages as a result of the
cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right;
Page | 40
damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or
harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no
remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal
injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.” In
other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of
which he complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a G.R. No. 162333. December 23, 2008.*
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of BIENVENIDO C. TEOCO and JUAN C. TEOCO, JR., petitioners, vs.
injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, respondent.
underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise that an
individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a Mortgages; A mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property upon
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be to the fulfillment of the
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the obligation for whose security it was constituted.—The mortgage directly and
proximate cause of the injury. immediately subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the
possessor may be to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted. Otherwise stated, a mortgage creates a real right which is
enforceable against the whole world. Hence, even if the mortgage property is
sold or its possession transferred to another, the property remains subject to
the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.

Same; Agency; Special Power of Attorney; Conflict of Laws; A special power

of attorney executed in a foreign country is generally not admissible in
evidence as a public document in our courts.—Anent the CA observation that
the assignment of the right of redemption was not properly executed and/or
authenticated, Lopez v. Court of Appeals is instructive. In Lopez, this Court
ruled that a special power of attorney executed in a foreign country is
generally not admissible in evidence as a public document in our courts.

Same; Assignment of Credit; Evidence; Where there was implied admission of

the due execution and genuineness of the assignment of the right of
redemption, a private document evidencing the same is admissible in

Page | 41
evidence.—Would the exercise by the brothers Teoco of the right to redeem prejudice to such third person, thus: x x x In Lichauco vs. Olegario, et al., 43
the properties in question be precluded by the fact that the assignment of right Phil. 540, this Court held that “whether or not x x x an execution debtor was
of redemption was not contained in a public document? We rule in the legally authorized to sell his right of redemption, is a question already decided
negative. Metrobank never challenged either the content, the due execution, or by this Court in the affirmative in numerous decisions on the precepts of
the genuineness of the assignment of the right of redemption. Consequently, Sections 463 and 464 and other sections related thereto, of the Code of Civil
Metrobank is deemed to have admitted the same. Having impliedly admitted Procedure.” (The mentioned provisions are carried over in Rule 39 of the
the content of the assignment of the right of redemption, there is no necessity Revised Rules of Court.) That the transfers or conveyances in question were
for a prima facie evidence of the facts there stated. In the same manner, since not registered is of miniscule significance, there being no showing that PNB
Metrobank has impliedly admitted the due execution and genuineness of the was damaged or could be damaged by such omission. When CITADEL made
assignment of the right of redemption, a private document evidencing the its tender on May 5, 1976, PNB did not question the personality of CITADEL
same is admissible in evidence. at all. It is now too late and purely technical to raise such innocuous failure to
comply with Article 1625 of the Civil Code. Teoco vs. Metropolitan Bank and
Same; Same; Same; The necessity of a public document for contracts which Trust Company, 575 SCRA 82, G.R. No. 162333 December 23, 2008
transmit or extinguish real rights over immovable property, as mandated by
Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for convenience—it is not essential for
validity or enforceability.—True it is that the Civil Code requires certain
transactions to appear in public documents. However, the necessity of a public
document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights over
immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only
for convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability. Thus, in
Cenido v. Apacionado, 318 SCRA 688 (1999), this Court ruled that the only
effect of noncompliance with the provisions of Article 1358 of the Civil Code
is that a party to such a contract embodied in a private document may be
compelled to execute a public document.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “effect as against a third person”
found in Article 1625 of the Civil Code has been interpreted to be damage or
prejudice to such third person.—Article 1625 of the Civil Code provides that
“[a]n assignment of a credit, right or action shall produce no effect as against
third person, unless it appears in a public instrument, or the instrument is
recorded in the Registry of Property in case the assignment involves real
property.” In Co v. Philippine National Bank, 114 SCRA 842 (1982), the
Court interpreted the phrase “effect as against a third person” to be damage or

Page | 42

G.R. No. 171365. October 6, 2010.*
ERMELINDA C. MANALOTO, AURORA J. CIFRA, FLORDELIZA J.
ARCILLA, LOURDES J. CATALAN, ETHELINDA J. HOLT,
BIENVENIDO R. JONGCO, ARTEMIO R. JONGCO, JR. and JOEL
JONGCO, petitioners, vs. ISMAEL VELOSO III, respondent.
Appeals; Fresh Period Rule; Pleadings and Practice; Words and Phrases;
Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh period rule,” according to which, an
ordinary appeal from the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to the Court of Appeals,
under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of the trial court or from
receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or denying the motion for
new trial or motion for reconsideration.—Jurisprudence has settled the “fresh
period rule,” according to which, an ordinary appeal from the RTC to the
Court of Appeals, under Section 3 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days either from receipt of the original judgment of
the trial court or from receipt of the final order of the trial court dismissing or
denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In Sumiran v.
Damaso, 596 SCRA 450 (2009), we presented a survey of the cases applying
the fresh period rule: As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in
Neypes v. Court of Appeals, 469 SCRA 633 (2005), that by virtue of the
power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules
in all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file a notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration.
This would standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and do away
with the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted.
Same; Same; Same; The fresh period rule has retroactive application to cases
pending and undetermined upon its effectivity—procedural laws may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.—Also in
Sumiran, we recognized the retroactive application of the fresh period rule to
cases pending and undetermined upon its effectivity: The retroactivity of the
Neypes rule in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to the date
of promulgation of Neypes on September 14, 2005, was clearly explained by
the Court in Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. v. Homena-Valencia, stating thus: The
determinative issue is whether the “fresh period” rule announced in Neypes
could retroactively apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior
to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated. That question may be
answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may be
given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of procedure.
Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as
they do not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in
furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing.
Actions; Motions to Dismiss; When the ground for dismissal is that the
complaint states no cause of action, such fact can be determined only from the
facts alleged in the complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider
other matters aliunde.—According to Rule 2, Section 2 of the Rules of Court,
a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states no cause of
action, such fact can be determined only from the facts alleged in the
complaint and from no other, and the court cannot consider other matters
aliunde. The test, therefore, is whether, assuming the allegations of fact in the
complaint to be true, a valid judgment could be rendered in accordance with
the prayer stated therein.
Page | 43

Same; Same; Elements.—A cause of action (for damages) exists if the
following elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the
part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. We find
that all three elements exist in the case at bar. Respondent may not have
specifically identified each element, but it may be sufficiently determined
from the allegations in his complaint.
Same; Human Relations; Abuse of Rights; Torts and Damages; Every man has
a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good name; A party is obliged to
respect the other party’s good name even though they are opposing parties in
the unlawful detainer case; A violation of the principle embodied in Article 19
of the Civil Code constitutes an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct.—First,
respondent filed the complaint to protect his good character, name, and
reputation. Every man has a right to build, keep, and be favored with a good
name. This right is protected by law with the recognition of slander and libel
as actionable wrongs, whether as criminal offenses or tortuous conduct.
Second, petitioners are obliged to respect respondent’s good name even
though they are opposing parties in the unlawful detainer case. As Article 19
of the Civil Code requires, “[e]very person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.” A violation of such principle constitutes
an abuse of rights, a tortuous conduct.
Same; Same; Same; Same; While a prevailing party in a case is free to copy
and distribute copies of a favorable judgment to the public, he must not do so
with the intent of humiliating the other party and destroying the latter’s good
name and reputation in the community.—It is already settled that the public
has a right to see and copy judicial records and documents. However, this is
not a case of the public seeking and being denied access to judicial records
and documents. The controversy is rooted in the dissemination by petitioners
of the MeTC judgment against respondent to Horseshoe Village homeowners,
who were not involved at all in the unlawful detainer case, thus, purportedly
affecting negatively respondent’s good name and reputation among said
homeowners. The unlawful detainer case was a private dispute between
petitioners and respondent, and the MeTC decision against respondent was
then still pending appeal before the RTC-Branch 88, rendering suspect
petitioners’ intentions for distributing copies of said MeTC decision to non-
parties in the case. While petitioners were free to copy and distribute such
copies of the MeTC judgment to the public, the question is whether they did
so with the intent of humiliating respondent and destroying the latter’s good
name and reputation in the community.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad Faith; Words and Phrases; Good faith refers to
the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned; Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty
to prove the same.—The finding of the Court of Appeals of bad faith and
malice on the part of petitioners has no factual basis. Good faith is presumed
and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers
to the state of the mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an
unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith, on the
other hand, does not simply connote bad judgment to simple negligence. It
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a
wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that
partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not
in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable
harm.
Same; A finding that the complaint sufficiently states a cause of action does
not necessarily mean that the complaint is meritorious—it shall only result in
the reinstatement of the complaint and the hearing of the case for presentation
Page | 44
of evidence by the parties.—We cannot subscribe to respondent’s argument
that there is no more need for the presentation of evidence by the parties since
petitioners, in moving for the dismissal of respondent’s complaint for
damages, hypothetically admitted respondent’s allegations. The hypothetical
admission of respondent’s allegations in the complaint only goes so far as
determining whether said complaint should be dismissed on the ground of
failure to state a cause of action. A finding that the complaint sufficiently
states a cause of action does not necessarily mean that the complaint is
meritorious; it shall only result in the reinstatement of the complaint and the G.R. No. 151866. September 9, 2004.*
hearing of the case for presentation of evidence by the parties.
SOLEDAD CARPIO, petitioner, vs. LEONORA A. VALMONTE,
respondent.

Civil Law; Damages; Abuse of Rights; To find the existence of an abuse of

right, the following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty;
(2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.—In the sphere of our law on human relations, the victim of a
wrongful act or omission, whether done willfully or negligently, is not left
without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury he
sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not only principles of equity but
also universal moral precepts which are designed to indicate certain norms
that spring from the fountain of good conscience and which are meant to serve
as guides for human conduct. First of these fundamental precepts is the
principle commonly known as “abuse of rights” under Article 19 of the Civil
Code. It provides that “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.” To find the existence of an abuse of right, the
following elements must be present: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another. When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these
norms resulting in damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for which
the actor can be held accountable.

Page | 45
Same; Same; Same; A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right, that is when he acts with prudence and good
faith; but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.—One is not allowed to
exercise his right in a manner which would cause unnecessary prejudice to
another or if he would thereby offend morals or good customs. Thus, a person
should be protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
that is when he acts with prudence and good faith; but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse.
Same; Same; Same; To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved
with reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork.—Owing to the rule that great weight and even
finality is given to factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm
those of the trial court, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the
appellate court that respondent’s claim for actual damages has not been
substantiated with satisfactory evidence during the trial and must therefore be
denied. To be recoverable, actual damages must be duly proved with
reasonable degree of certainty and the courts cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork.
G.R. No. 150092. September 27, 2002.*
GLOBE TELECOM, INC., DELFIN LAZARO, JR., and ROBERTO
GALANG, petitioners, vs. JOAN FLORENDO-FLORES, respondent.
Labor Law; Appeals; Equity Jurisdiction; In the review of an NLRC decision
through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only to
issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor
tribunal; The principles that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction may look into the records of the case and re-examine the
questioned findings, and that the Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal, if it finds
that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case, are
now necessarily adhered to and are applied by the Court of Appeals in its
expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated through a petition for
certiorari.—In the review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action
for certiorari, resolution is confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains
from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising
adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC. Occasionally, however, the Court is
constrained to delve into factual matters where, as in the instant case, the
findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter. In this instance,
the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records of
the case and re-examine the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is
clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned
Page | 46
as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to
arrive at a just decision of the case. The same principles are now necessarily
adhered to and are applied by the Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction
over labor cases elevated through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see no
error on its part when it made anew a factual determination of the matters and
on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.
Same; Judgments; Dispositive Portions; Where there is conflict between the
dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof, the dispositive
portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body.—Where there is
conflict between the dispositive portion of the decision and the body thereof,
the dispositive portion controls irrespective of what appears in the body. While
the body of the decision, order or resolution might create some ambiguity in
the manner the court’s reasoning preponderates, it is the dispositive portion
thereof that finally invests rights upon the parties, sets conditions for the
exercise of those rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
Hence, for the Court of Appeals to have affirmed the assailed judgment is to
adopt and uphold the NLRC finding of abandonment and its award of full
back wages to respondent as an “act of grace” from petitioners. However, we
believe this is not the proper view as the records reveal that respondent was
constructively dismissed from service.
Same; Illegal Dismissals; Words and Phrases; Constructive dismissal exists
where there is cessation of work because “continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
and a diminution in pay”; There is constructive dismissal even though an
employee may not have suffered any diminution in her basic salary but she
was deprived of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits
which she apparently used to receive.—Constructive dismissal exists where
there is cessation of work because “continued employment is rendered
impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as an offer involving a demotion in rank
and a diminution in pay.” All these are discernible in respondent’s situation.
She was singularly edged out of employment by the unbearable or undesirable
treatment she received from her immediate superior Cacholo M. Santos who
discriminated against her without reason—not preparing and submitting her
performance evaluation report that would have been the basis for her
increased salary; not forwarding her project proposals to management that
would have been the source of commendation; diminishing her supervisor
stature by assigning her to house-to-house sales or direct sales; and
withholding from her the enjoyment of bonuses, allowances and other similar
benefits that were necessary for her efficient sales performance. Although
respondent continued to have the rank of a supervisor, her functions were
reduced to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales agent. This was
tantamount to a demotion. She might not have, suffered any diminution in her
basic salary but petitioners did not dispute her allegation that she was deprived
of all benefits due to another of her rank and position, benefits which she
apparently used to receive.
Same; Same; Abandonment; Requisites; A charge of abandonment is totally
inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal,
more so when it includes a prayer for reinstatement.—The unauthorized
absence of respondent should not lead to the drastic conclusion that she had
chosen to abandon her work. To constitute abandonment, there must be: (a)
failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and,
(b) a clear intention, as manifested by some overt act, to sever the employer-
employee relationship, requisites that are negated by the immediate filing by
respondent Florendo-Flores of a complaint for constructive dismissal against
petitioners. A charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the
immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal; more so, when it
includes a prayer for reinstatement.
Same; Demotion; Reduction in an employee’s functions which were originally
supervisory in nature to a mere house-to-house sales agent or direct sales
agent constitutes a demotion in rank.—The reduction of respondent’s
functions which were originally supervisory in nature to a mere house-to-
house sales agent or direct sales agent constitutes a demotion in rank. For this
Page | 47
act of illegal dismissal, she deserves no less than full back wages starting from
the time she had been illegally dismissed until her actual reinstatement to her
former position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits—earned,
accrued and demandable. She shall continue to enjoy her benefits, privileges
and incentives including the use of the company car and “handyphone.”
Same; Management Prerogatives; Transfers; The managerial prerogative to
transfer personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion—
having the right should not be confused with the manner that right is
exercised.—The managerial prerogative to transfer personnel must be
exercised without grave abuse of discretion. It must always bear in mind the
basic elements of justice and fair play. Having the right should not be
confused with the manner that right is exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a
subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable worker.
Same; Constructive Dismissals; Burden of Proof; In constructive dismissal,
the employer has the burden of proving that the transfer and demotion of an
employee are for just and valid grounds such as genuine business necessity.—
In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer and demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds such as
genuine business necessity. The employer must be able to show that the
transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee. It
must not involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of salary and other
benefits. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the
employee’s demotion shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.
they contemplate only the award of separation pay and/or financial assistance,
and only as a measure of social justice when the circumstances of the case so
warrant, such as instances of valid dismissal for causes other than serious
misconduct or those reflecting on the employees’ moral character. Proper
regard for the welfare of the labor sector should not dissuade us from
protecting the rights of management such that an award of back wages should
be forthcoming only when valid grounds exist to support it.
Same; Damages; An award of actual and moral damages is not proper where
the dismissal is not shown to be attended by bad faith, or was oppressive to
labor, or done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
—An award of actual and moral damages is not proper as the dismissal is not
shown to be attended by bad faith, or was oppressive to labor, or done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Exemplary
damages are likewise not proper as these are imposed only if moral,
temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages are awarded.

Same; Social Justice; Proper regard for the welfare of the labor sector should
not dissuade the Court from protecting the rights of management such that an
award of back wages should be forthcoming only when valid grounds exist to
support it.—It should be noted that the award of back wages in the instant case
is justified upon the finding of illegal dismissal, and not under the principle of
“act of grace” for past services rendered. There are occasions when the Court
exercises liberality in granting financial awards to employees, but even then

Page | 48

G.R. No. 156109. November 18, 2004.*
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by
ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and
ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.
Schools and Universities; Administrative Law; Doctrine of Exhaustion of
Administrative Remedies; Commission on Higher Education (CHED); The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application where a
student is not asking for the reversal of the policies of an educational
institution nor demanding that she be allowed to take the final examinations
that she was prevented from taking but is praying for damages.—Respondents
anchored their Motion to Dismiss on petitioner’s alleged failure to exhaust
administrative remedies before resorting to the RTC. According to them, the
determination of the controversy hinge on the validity, the wisdom and the
propriety of PCST’s academic policy. Thus, the Complaint should have been
lodged in the CHED, the administrative body tasked under Republic Act No.
7722 to implement the state policy to “protect, foster and promote the right of
all citizens to affordable quality education at all levels and to take appropriate
steps to ensure that education is accessible to all.” Petitioner counters that the
doctrine finds no relevance to the present case since she is praying for
damages, a remedy beyond the domain of the CHED and well within the
jurisdiction of the courts. Petitioner is correct. The doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies has no bearing on the present case. In Factoran, Jr. v.
CA, the Court had occasion to elucidate on the rationale behind this doctrine:
“The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for
reasons of law, comity, and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the
available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper
authorities have been given the appropriate opportunity to act and correct their
alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. x x x.” Petitioner
is not asking for the reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she
demanding it to allow her to take her final examinations; she was already
enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the acts complained
of would not adequately redress her grievances; under the circumstances, the
consequences of respondents’ acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Exhaustion of administrative remedies is
applicable when there is competence on the part of the administrative body to
act upon the matter complained of—the CHED does not have the power to
award damages.—Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when
there is competence on the part of the administrative body to act upon the
matter complained of. Administrative agencies are not courts; they are neither
part of the judicial system, nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically,
the CHED does not have the power to award damages. Hence, petitioner could
not have commenced her case before the Commission.
Same; Same; Same; Same; One of the exceptions to the exhaustion doctrine is
when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of the trial court
—an action for damages inevitably calls for the application and interpretation
of the Civil Code.—The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions, one of
which arises when the issue is purely legal and well within the jurisdiction of
the trial court. Petitioner’s action for damages inevitably calls for the
application and the interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within
the jurisdiction of the courts.
Page | 49
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Motions to Dismiss; Every complaint must
sufficiently allege a cause of action, and failure to do so warrants its dismissal;
A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the alleged facts.—As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege
a cause of action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal. A complaint is said to
assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face
to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming
the facts that are alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A motion to dismiss
based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged
facts. In their Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of
petitioner’s allegations, and they admitted that “x x x the crux of plaintiff’s
cause of action is the determination of whether or not the assessment of P100
per ticket is excessive or oppressive.” They thereby premised their prayer for
dismissal on the Complaint’s alleged failure to state a cause of action. Thus, a
reexamination of the Complaint is in order.
Schools and Universities; Contracts; The school-student relationship is
contractual in nature.—In Alcuaz v. PSBA, the Court characterized the
relationship between the school and the student as a contract, in which “a
student, once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one semester.”
Two years later, in Non v. Dames II, the Court modified the “termination of
contract theory” in Alcuaz by holding that the contractual relationship
between the school and the student is not only semestral in duration, but for
the entire period the latter are expected to complete it.” Except for the
variance in the period during which the contractual relationship is considered
to subsist, both Alcuaz and Non were unanimous in characterizing the school-
student relationship as contractual in nature. The school-student relationship is
also reciprocal. Thus, it has consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all
contracts of such kind—it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with education
sufficient to enable them to pursue higher education or a profession. On the
other hand, the students agree to abide by the academic requirements of the
school and to observe its rules and regulations.
Same; Same; The terms of the school-student contract are defined at the
moment of its inception—upon enrolment of the student.—The terms of the
school-student contract are defined at the moment of its inception—upon
enrolment of the student. Standards of academic performance and the code of
behavior and discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new
students at the start of every school year. Further, schools inform prospective
enrollees amount of fees and the terms of payment. In practice, students are
normally required to make a down payment upon enrollment, with the balance
to be paid before every preliminary, midterm and final examination. Their
failure to pay their financial obligation is regarded as a valid ground for the
school to deny them the opportunity to take these examinations.
Same; Education is not a measurable commodity; The importance of grades
cannot be discounted in a setting where education is generally the gate pass to
employment opportunities and better life—such grades are often the means by
which a prospective employer measures whether a job applicant has acquired
the necessary tools or skills for a particular profession or trade.—Education is
not a measurable commodity. It is not possible to determine who is “better
educated” than another. Nevertheless, a student’s grades are an accepted
approximation of what would otherwise be an intangible product of countless
hours of study. The importance of grades cannot be discounted in a setting
where education is generally the gate pass to employment opportunities and
better life; such grades are often the means by which a prospective employer
measures whether a job applicant has acquired the necessary tools or skills for
a particular profession or trade.
Same; A fee that was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the
start of the school year could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of
the enrollees.—In the present case, PCST imposed the assailed revenue-
raising measure belatedly, in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance
Page | 50
party fee as a condition for the students’ taking the final examinations, and
ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a course. The fee,
however, was not part of the school-student contract entered into at the start of
the school year. Hence, it could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of
the enrollees.

Same; Quasi-Delicts; Torts; An academic institution may be held liable for tort
even if it has an existing contract with its students where the act that violated
the contract may also be a tort.— Generally, liability for tort arises only
between parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution,
however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing contract with its
students, since the act that violated the contract may also be a tort.

Same; Academic Freedom; Words and Phrases; “Academic Freedom,”

Explained.—In their Memorandum, respondents harp on their right to
“academic freedom.” We are not impressed. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the independence of an
academic institution to determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may
be taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study. In
Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, the
Court upheld the respondent therein when it denied a female student’s
admission to theological studies in a seminary for prospective priests. The
Court defined the freedom of an academic institution thus: “to decide for itself
aims and objectives and how best to attain them x x x free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when overriding public welfare calls for
some restraint.”
G.R. No. 156168. December 14, 2004.*
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T.
CALDERON, respondent.
Civil Law; Damages; In culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral
damages are recoverable only if the defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad
faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligations.—In culpa contractual or
breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the
defendant has acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross
negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of his contractual
obligations. Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad
faith, oppressive or abusive.

Same; Same; Distinction between damages and injury.—Injury is the illegal

invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In

Page | 51
such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise
that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first
be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury.
Same; Contracts; A contract of adhesion is “as binding as ordinary contracts,
the reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it
entirely.”—On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a
contract is “as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason being that the party
who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.” Equitable Banking
Corporation vs. Calderon, 446 SCRA 271, G.R. No. 156168 December 14,
2004
G.R. No. 154259. February 28, 2005.*
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA,” respondent.
Actions; Human Relations; Torts and Damages; Doctrine of Volenti Non Fit
Injuria; The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to a self-inflicted injury or to the
consent to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not
negligent in doing so.—Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that
pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable
for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave
(and being embarrassed and humiliated in the process) as he was a “gate-
crasher.” The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria (“to which a person assents is
not esteemed in law as injury”) refers to self-inflicted injury or to the consent
to injury which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has knowingly
and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing
so. As formulated by petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find
application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes assumed the
risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of
Page | 52
the New Civil Code, were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not
to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Same; Same; Same; Appeals; Where the trial court and the appellate court
reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts
and evidence of the case, the Supreme Court is left without choice but to use
its latent power to review such findings of facts.—The general rule is that we
are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and revising
errors of law. One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains
herein as the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court. The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The
appellate court, on the other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as
she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to finish his food and
to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts,
however, were in agreement that it was Dr. Filart’s invitation that brought Mr.
Reyes to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who
alleges proves.—Another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version of the story is that
it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil cases that he who alleges proves.
Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All
his witnesses—Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva—proved
only that it was Dr. Filart who invited him to the party.
Same; Same; Same; Party Gatecrashers; A person who did not abuse her right
in asking a person to leave a party to which he was not invited cannot be made
to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.—Ms. Lim, not
having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was
not invited, cannot be made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21
of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer, Hotel Nikko, be held
liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.
Same; Same; Same; Principle of Abuse of Rights; Article 19 of the Civil
Code, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances, the
object of the article being to set certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
—Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances.
Article 19 states: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith. Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this
article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only
in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.
These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing
bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for
damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,
and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.—Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms.
Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on
the other hand, states: Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury
to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. Article 21 refers to acts
contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which
is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs
Page | 53
through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be
intentional.

Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the

Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but
innuendos and conjectures.—As applied to herein case and as earlier
discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the
evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an
explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that
Ms. Lim, being “single at 44 years old,” had a “very strong bias and prejudice
against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the
hotel with foreign businessmen.” The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the
Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but
innuendos and conjectures.
FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE
Same; Same; Same; Same; Bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. THEMISTOCLES PACILAN,
cannot amount to bad faith.—The manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes JR., respondent.
to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the circumstances. In this
regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate court’s declaration that Actions; Human Relations; Doctrine of Abuse of Rights; Elements; Words and
Ms. Lim’s act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying Phrases; “Good Faith,” “Bad Faith” and “Malice,” Defined.—The elements of
from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes) gave rise to a cause of action abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b)
“predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity.” injuring another. Malice or bad faith is at the core of the said provision. The
Without proof of any ill-motive on her part, Ms. Lim’s act of by-passing Mrs. law always presumes good faith and any person who seeks to be awarded
Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted
from Mrs. Filart’s companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. in bad faith or with ill-motive. Good faith refers to the state of the mind which
Reyes. If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of bad judgment which, if done with is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the
good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith. Nikko Hotel Manila Garden vs. intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous
Reyes, 452 SCRA 532, G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005 advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or
simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or

Page | 54
ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite
and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.
Same; Same; Same; Banks and Banking; No malice or bad faith could be
imputed on a bank for closing the account of a depositor for frequently
drawing checks against insufficient funds.—It is observed that nowhere under
its rules and regulations is petitioner bank required to notify the respondent, or
any depositor for that matter, of the closure of the account for frequently
drawing checks against insufficient funds. No malice or bad faith could be
imputed on petitioner bank for so acting since the records bear out that the
respondent had indeed been improperly and irregularly handling his account
not just a few times but hundreds of times. Under the circumstances, petitioner
bank could not be faulted for exercising its right in accordance with the
express rules and regulations governing the current accounts of its depositors.
Upon the opening of his account, the respondent had agreed to be bound by
these terms and conditions.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The act of a bank of accepting a deposit made by a
depositor the day following the closure of his account does not constitute bad
faith—the same could be characterized as simple negligence by its personnel.
—Neither the fact that petitioner bank accepted the deposit made by the
respondent the day following the closure of his account constitutes bad faith
or malice on the part of petitioner bank. The same could be characterized as
simple negligence by its personnel. Said act, by itself, is not constitutive of
bad faith.
Same; Same; Damages; Words and Phrases; There is a material distinction
between damages and injury—injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right
while damages is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; There
can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was
not the result of a violation of a legal duty—situations often called damnum
absque injuria.—It has not been shown that these acts were done by petitioner
bank with the sole intention of prejudicing and injuring the respondent. It is
conceded that the respondent may have suffered damages as a result of the
closure of his current account. However, there is a material distinction
between damages and injury. The Court had the occasion to explain the
distinction between damages and injury in this wise: . . . Injury is the illegal
invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from
the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action
for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such injuries
resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person
causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise
that the individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first
be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before
damages may be awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the
proximate cause of the injury. Far East Bank and Trust Company vs. Pacilan,
Jr., 465 SCRA 372, G.R. No. 157314 July 29, 2005
Page | 55

G.R. No. 158805. April 16, 2009.*
VALLEY GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., petitioner, vs. ROSA O.
VDA. DE CARAM, respondent.
Corporation Law; Non-Stock Corporations; The procedure under Section 67
of the Corporation Code for the stock corporation’s recourse on unpaid
subscriptions is inapt to a non-stock corporation vis-à-vis a member’s
outstanding dues.—To bolster its cause, Valley Golf proffers the proposition
that by virtue of the by-law provisions a lien is created on the shares of its
members to ensure payment of dues, charges and other assessments on the
members. Both the SEC and the Court of Appeals debunked the tenability or
applicability of the proposition through two common thrusts. Firstly, they
correctly noted that the procedure under Section 67 of the Corporation Code
for the stock corporation’s recourse on unpaid subscriptions is inapt to a non-
stock corporation vis-à-vis a member’s outstanding dues. The basic factual
backdrops in the two situations are disperate. In the latter, the member has
fully paid for his membership share, while in the former, the stockholder has
not yet fully paid for the share or shares of stock he subscribed to, thereby
authorizing the stock corporation to call on the unpaid subscription, declare
the shares delinquent and subject the delinquent shares to a sale at public
auction. Secondly, the two bodies below concluded that following Section 6 of
the Corporation Code, which provides: The shares of stock of stock
corporation may be divided into classes or series of shares, or both, any of
which classes or series of shares may have such rights, privileges or
restrictions as may be stated in the articles of incorporation x x x the lien on
the Golf Share in favor of Valley Golf is not valid, as the power to constitute
such a lien should be provided in the articles of incorporation, and not merely
in the by-laws.
Same; Same; By-Laws; The right of a non-stock corporation to expel a
member through the forfeiture of such member’s share may be established in
the by-laws alone.—There is a specific provision under the Title XI, on Non-
Stock Corporations of the Corporation Code dealing with termination of
membership. Section 91 of the Corporation Code provides: SEC. 91.
Termination of membership.—Membership shall be terminated in the manner
and for the causes provided in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws.
Termination of membership shall have the effect of extinguishing all rights of
a member in the corporation or in its property, unless otherwise provided in
the articles of incorporation or the by-laws. Clearly, the right of a non-stock
corporation such as Valley Golf to expel a member through the forfeiture of
the Golf Share may be established in the by-laws alone, as is the situation in
this case. Thus, both the SEC and the appellate court are wrong in holding that
the establishment of a lien and the loss of the Golf Share consequent to the
enforcement of the lien should have been provided for in the articles of
incorporation.
Same; Same; Same; Generally in theory, a non-stock corporation has the
power to effect the termination of a member without having to constitute a
lien on the membership share or to undertake the elaborate process of selling
Page | 56
the same at public auction.—Valley Golf has sought to accomplish the
termination of Caram’s membership through the sale of the Golf Share,
justifying the sale through the constitution of a lien on the Golf Share under
Section 1, Article VIII of its by-laws. Generally in theory, a non-stock
corporation has the power to effect the termination of a member without
having to constitute a lien on the membership share or to undertake the
elaborate process of selling the same at public auction. The articles of
incorporation or the by-laws can very well simply provide that the failure of a
member to pay the dues on time is cause for the board of directors to terminate
membership. Yet Valley Golf was organized in such a way that membership is
adjunct to ownership of a share in the club; hence the necessity to dispose of
the share to terminate membership.
Same; Same; Share ownership introduces another dimension to the case—the
reality that termination of membership may also lead to the infringement of
property rights.—Share ownership introduces another dimension to the case—
the reality that termination of membership may also lead to the infringement
of property rights. Even though Valley Golf is a non-stock corporation, as
evinced by the fact that it is not authorized to distribute to the holder of its
shares dividends or allotments of the surplus profits on the basis of shares
held, the Golf Share has an assigned value reflected on the certificate of
membership itself. Termination of membership in Valley Golf does not merely
lead to the withdrawal of the rights and privileges of the member to club
properties and facilities but also to the loss of the Golf Share itself for which
the member had fully paid. The claim of Valley Golf is limited to the amount
of unpaid dues plus incremental costs. On the other hand, Caram’s loss may
encompass not only the amount he had paid for the share but also the price it
would have fetched in the market at the time his membership was terminated.
Same; Same; When the loss of membership in a non-stock corporation also
entails the loss of property rights, the manner of deprivation of such property
right should also be in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.—
Does the Corporation Code permit the termination of membership without due
notice to the member? The Code itself is silent on that matter, and the
argument can be made that if no notice is provided for in the articles of
incorporation or in the by-laws, then termination may be effected without any
notice at all. Support for such an argument can be drawn from our ruling in
Long v. Basa (366 SCRA 113 [2001]), which pertains to a religious
corporation that is also a non-stock corporation. Therein, the Court upheld the
expulsion of church members despite the absence of any provision on prior
notice in the by-laws, stating that the members had “waived such notice by
adhering to those by-laws[,] became members of the church voluntarily[,]
entered into its covenant and subscribed to its rules [and by] doing so, they are
bound by their consent.” However, a distinction should be made between
membership in a religious corporation, which ordinarily does not involve the
purchase of ownership shares, and membership in a non-stock corporation
such as Valley Golf, where the purchase of an ownership share is a condition
sine qua non. Membership in Valley Golf entails the acquisition of a property
right. In turn, the loss of such property right could also involve the application
of aspects of civil law, in addition to the provisions of the Corporation Code.
To put it simply, when the loss of membership in a non-stock corporation also
entails the loss of property rights, the manner of deprivation of such property
right should also be in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code.
Same; Same; It is unmistakably wise public policy to require that the
termination of membership in a non-stock corporation be done in accordance
with substantial justice.—It is unmistakably wise public policy to require that
the termination of membership in a non-stock corporation be done in
accordance with substantial justice. No matter how one may precisely define
such term, it is evident in this case that the termination of Caram’s
membership betrayed the dictates of substantial justice.
Same; Same; The non-stock corporation acted in clear bad faith when it sent
the final notice to a member under the pretense they believed him to be still
alive, when in fact it had very well known that he had already died.—Valley
Golf did not claim before the Court of Appeals that they had learned of
Page | 57
Caram’s death only after the auction sale. It also appears that Valley Golf had
conceded before the SEC that some of the notices it had sent were addressed
to the estate of Caram, and not the decedent himself. What do these facts
reveal? Valley Golf acted in clear bad faith when it sent the final notice to
Caram under the pretense they believed him to be still alive, when in fact they
had very well known that he had already died. That it was in the final notice
that Valley Golf had perpetrated the duplicity is especially blameworthy, since
it was that notice that carried the final threat that his Golf Share would be sold
at public auction should he fail to settle his account on or before 31 May 1987.
Same; Same; Human Relations; Non-stock corporations and their officers are
not exempt from the obligation imposed by Articles 19, 20, and 21 under the
Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code, which provisions enunciate a
general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in good faith
towards one another.—Valley Golf could have very well addressed that notice
to the estate of Caram, as it had done with the third and fourth notices. That it
did not do so signifies that Valley Golf was bent on selling the Golf Share,
impervious to potential complications that would impede its intentions, such
as the need to pursue the claim before the estate proceedings of Caram. By
pretending to assume that Caram was then still alive, Valley Golf would have
been able to capitalize on his previous unresponsiveness to their notices and
proceed in feigned good faith with the sale. Whatever the reason Caram was
unable to respond to the earlier notices, the fact remains that at the time of the
final notice, Valley Golf knew that Caram, having died and gone, would not
be able to settle the obligation himself, yet they persisted in sending him
notice to provide a color of regularity to the resulting sale. That reason alone,
evocative as it is of the absence of substantial justice in the sale of the Golf
Share, is sufficient to nullify the sale and sustain the rulings of the SEC and
the Court of Appeals. Moreover, the utter and appalling bad faith exhibited by
Valley Golf in sending out the final notice to Caram on the deliberate pretense
that he was still alive could bring into operation Articles 19, 20 and 21 under
the Chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code. These provisions
enunciate a general obligation under law for every person to act fairly and in
good faith towards one another. Non-stock corporations and its officers are not
exempt from that obligation.
Same; Same; The by-laws of Valley Golf is discomfiting enough in that it fails
to provide any formal notice and hearing procedure before a member’s share
may be seized and sold.—The by-laws of Valley Golf is discomfiting enough
in that it fails to provide any formal notice and hearing procedure before a
member’s share may be seized and sold. The Court would have been satisfied
had the by-laws or the articles of incorporation established a procedure which
assures that the member would in reality be actually notified of the pending
accounts and provide the opportunity for such member to settle such accounts
before the membership share could be seized then sold to answer for the debt.
As we have emphasized, membership in Valley Golf and many other like-
situated non-stock corporations actually involves the purchase of a
membership share, which is a substantially expensive property. As a result,
termination of membership does not only lead to loss of bragging rights, but
the actual deprivation of property.
Same; Same; The arrangement provided for in the by-laws of Valley Golf
whereby a lien is constituted on the membership share to answer for
subsequent obligations to the corporation finds applicable parallels under the
Civil Code—membership shares are considered as movable or personal
property, and they can be constituted as security to secure a principal
obligation, such as the dues and fees; There are at least two contractual modes
under the Civil Code by which personal property can be used to secure a
principal obligation—the first is through a contract of pledge, while the
second is through a chattel mortgage.—The arrangement provided for in the
afore-quoted by-laws of Valley Golf whereby a lien is constituted on the
membership share to answer for subsequent obligations to the corporation
finds applicable parallels under the Civil Code. Membership shares are
considered as movable or personal property, and they can be constituted as
security to secure a principal obligation, such as the dues and fees. There are
at least two contractual modes under the Civil Code by which personal
Page | 58
property can be used to secure a principal obligation. The first is through a
contract of pledge, while the second is through a chattel mortgage. A pledge
would require the pledgor to surrender possession of the thing pledged, i.e.,
the membership share, to the pledge in order that the contract of pledge may
be constituted. Is delivery of the share cannot be effected, the suitable security
transaction is the chattel mortgage. Under Article 2124 of the Civil Code,
movables may be the object of a chattel mortgage. The Chattel mortgage is
governed by Act No. 1508, otherwise known The Chattel Mortgage Law, and
the Civil Code. Valley Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs. Vda. de Caram, 585
SCRA 218, G.R. No. 158805 April 16, 2009
G.R. No. 164785.  April 29, 2009.*
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P.
LAGUARDIA, in her capacity as Chairperson of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board, MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, JESSIE L. GALAPON,
ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ, MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L.
LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO, BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL
M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN A. GAVINO, respondents.
G.R. No. 165636.  April 29, 2009.*
ELISEO F. SORIANO, petitioner, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD, ZOSIMO G. ALEGRE,
JACKIE AQUINO-GAVINO, NOEL R. DEL PRADO, EMMANUEL
BORLAZA, JOSE E. ROMERO IV, and FLORIMONDO C. ROUS, in
their capacity as members of the Hearing and Adjudication Committee of
the MTRCB, JESSIE L. GALAPON, ANABEL M. DELA CRUZ,
MANUEL M. HERNANDEZ, JOSE L. LOPEZ, CRISANTO SORIANO,
BERNABE S. YARIA, JR., MICHAEL M. SANDOVAL, and ROLDAN
A. GAVINO, in their capacity as complainants before the MTRCB,
respondents.
Administrative Law; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB); Powers of an administrative agency is ascertained from the law
itself which is liberally construed. Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) has the power to issue a preventive suspension
order.—Administrative agencies have powers and functions which may be
administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial, or
a mix of the five, as may be conferred by the Constitution or by statute. They
have in fine only such powers or authority as are granted or delegated,
expressly or impliedly, by law. And in determining whether an agency has
certain powers, the inquiry should be from the law itself. But once ascertained
as existing, the authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the
MTRCB’s basic mandate under PD 1986 reveals the possession by the agency
of the authority, albeit impliedly, to issue the challenged order of preventive
suspension. And this authority stems naturally from, and is necessary for the
exercise of, its power of regulation and supervision.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative Agencies.—But the mere absence of
a provision on preventive suspension in PD 1986, without more, would not
work to deprive the MTRCB a basic disciplinary tool, such as preventive
suspension. Recall that the MTRCB is expressly empowered by statute to
regulate and supervise television programs to obviate the exhibition or
broadcast of, among others, indecent or immoral materials and to impose
sanctions for violations and, corollarily, to prevent further violations as it
investigates. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the aforequoted Sec. 3 of the
IRR neither amended PD 1986 nor extended the effect of the law. Neither did
Page | 59
the MTRCB, by imposing the assailed preventive suspension, outrun its
authority under the law. Far from it. The preventive suspension was actually
done in furtherance of the law, imposed pursuant, to repeat, to the MTRCB’s
duty of regulating or supervising television programs, pending a determination
of whether or not there has actually been a violation. In the final analysis, Sec.
3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 IRR merely formalized a power which PD 1986
bestowed, albeit impliedly, on MTRCB.
Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board’s
(MTRCB’s) power to issue a preventive suspension order includes TV
programs.—We cannot agree with petitioner’s assertion that the aforequoted
IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable only to motion pictures
and publicity materials. The scope of the MTRCB’s authority extends beyond
motion pictures. What the acronym MTRCB stands for would suggest as
much. And while the law makes specific reference to the closure of a
television network, the suspension of a television program is a far less
punitive measure that can be undertaken, with the purpose of stopping further
violations of PD 1986. Again, the MTRCB would regretfully be rendered
ineffective should it be subject to the restrictions petitioner envisages.
Same; Same; Due Process; Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) issued the assailed order after a hearing.—Just as untenable
is petitioner’s argument on the nullity of the preventive suspension order on
the ground of lack of hearing. As it were, the MTRCB handed out the assailed
order after petitioner, in response to a written notice, appeared before that
Board for a hearing on private respondents’ complaint. No less than petitioner
admitted that the order was issued after the adjournment of the hearing,
proving that he had already appeared before the MTRCB. Under Sec. 3,
Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension shall issue “[a]ny
time during the pendency of the case.” In this particular case, it was done after
MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated PD 1986 and
of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for such
violation.
Evidence; Constitutional Law; Petitioner has not been denied the equal
protection of the law as the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC) ministers he criticized are
not facing any administrative charges.—Petitioner’s position does not
persuade. The equal protection clause demands that “all persons subject to
legislation should be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions
both in the privileges conferred and liabilities imposed.” It guards against
undue favor and individual privilege as well as hostile discrimination. Surely,
petitioner cannot, under the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the
INC ministers, who, for one, are not facing administrative complaints before
the MTRCB. For another, he offers no proof that the said ministers, in their
TV programs, use language similar to that which he used in his own,
necessitating the MTRCB’s disciplinary action. If the immediate result of the
preventive suspension order is that petitioner remains temporarily gagged and
is unable to answer his critics, this does not become a deprivation of the equal
protection guarantee. The Court need not belabor the fact that the
circumstances of petitioner, as host of Ang Dating Daan, on one hand, and the
INC ministers, as hosts of Ang Tamang Daan, on the other, are, within the
purview of this case, simply too different to even consider whether or not
there is a prima facie indication of oppressive inequality.
Same; Same; Religious Freedom; Plain and simple insults to another
person cannot be elevated to the status of a religious speech.—There is
nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of the complaints expressing any
particular religious belief, nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission.
The fact that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition
program does not automatically accord them the character of a religious
discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person cannot be
elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioner’s attempts to place
his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to seek
retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim, assuming its veracity,
that some INC ministers distorted his statements respecting amounts Ang
Dating Daan owed to a TV station does not convert the foul language used in
retaliation as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his
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statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they constitute no
intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies being spread by a rival
religious group. They simply illustrate that petitioner had descended to the
level of name-calling and foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have
chosen to contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low road.
Same; Same; Same; A TV program rated “G” or for general viewership
reaches adults and children alike. What may not be obscene speech to adults
may be considered obscene for children.—A cursory examination of the
utterances complained of and the circumstances of the case reveal that to an
average adult, the utterances “Gago ka talaga x x x, masahol ka pa sa putang
babae x x x. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito]
kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!” may not constitute obscene but
merely indecent utterances. They can be viewed as figures of speech or merely
a play on words. In the context they were used, they may not appeal to the
prurient interests of an adult. The problem with the challenged statements is
that they were uttered in a TV program that is rated “G” or for general
viewership, and in a time slot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of
children.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases.—While adults may have understood
that the terms thus used were not to be taken literally, children could hardly be
expected to have the same discernment. Without parental guidance, the
unbridled use of such language as that of petitioner in a television broadcast
could corrupt impressionable young minds. The term “putang babae” means
“a female prostitute,” a term wholly inappropriate for children, who could
look it up in a dictionary and just get the literal meaning, missing the context
within which it was used. Petitioner further used the terms, “ang gumagana
lang doon yung ibaba,” making reference to the female sexual organ and how
a female prostitute uses it in her trade, then stating that Sandoval was worse
than that by using his mouth in a similar manner. Children could be motivated
by curiosity and ask the meaning of what petitioner said, also without placing
the phrase in context. They may be inquisitive as to why Sandoval is different
from a female prostitute and the reasons for the dissimilarity. And upon
learning the meanings of the words used, young minds, without the guidance
of an adult, may, from their end, view this kind of indecent speech as obscene,
if they take these words literally and use them in their own speech or form
their own ideas on the matter. In this particular case, where children had the
opportunity to hear petitioner’s words, when speaking of the average person in
the test for obscenity, we are speaking of the average child, not the average
adult. The average child may not have the adult’s grasp of figures of speech,
and may lack the understanding that language may be colorful, and words may
convey more than the literal meaning. Undeniably the subject speech is very
suggestive of a female sexual organ and its function as such. In this sense, we
find petitioner’s utterances obscene and not entitled to protection under the
umbrella of freedom of speech.
Same; Same; Same; Freedom of Speech; As a standard of limitation on
freedom of speech and press, the clear and present danger test is not a magic
incantation.—It was originally designed to determine the latitude which
should be given to speech that espouses anti-government action, or to have
serious and substantial deleterious consequences on the security and public
order of the community. The clear and present danger rule has been applied to
this jurisdiction. As a standard of limitation on free speech and press,
however, the clear and present danger test is not a magic incantation that
wipes out all problems and does away with analysis and judgment in the
testing of the legitimacy of claims to free speech and which compels a court to
release a defendant from liability the moment the doctrine is invoked, absent
proof of imminent catastrophic disaster. As we observed in Eastern
Broadcasting Corporation vs. Dans, Jr., 137 SCRA 628 (1985), the clear and
present danger test “does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State has a compelling interest to protect
minors, against offensive language in TV programs.—The State has a
compelling interest in extending social protection to minors against all forms
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of neglect, exploitation, and immorality which may pollute innocent minds. It
has a compelling interest in helping parents, through regulatory mechanisms,
protect their children’s minds from exposure to undesirable materials and
corrupting experiences. The Constitution, no less, in fact enjoins the State, as
earlier indicated, to promote and protect the physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social well-being of the youth to better prepare them fulfill
their role in the field of nation-building. In the same way, the State is
mandated to support parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and
the development of moral character. Petitioner’s offensive and obscene
language uttered in a television broadcast, without doubt, was easily
accessible to the children. His statements could have exposed children to a
language that is unacceptable in everyday use. As such, the welfare of children
and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,
constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating
petitioner’s utterances in TV broadcast as provided in PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; The assailed order penalized petitioner for past speech,
not future speeches in a TV program.—Neither can petitioner’s virtual
inability to speak in his program during the period of suspension be plausibly
treated as prior restraint on future speech. For viewed in its proper
perspective, the suspension is in the nature of an intermediate penalty for
uttering an unprotected form of speech. It is definitely a lesser punishment
than the permissible cancellation of exhibition or broadcast permit or license.
In fine, the suspension meted was simply part of the duties of the MTRCB in
the enforcement and administration of the law which it is tasked to implement.
Viewed in its proper context, the suspension sought to penalize past speech
made on prime-time “G” rated TV program; it does not bar future speech of
petitioner in other television programs; it is a permissible subsequent
administrative sanction; it should not be confused with a prior restraint on
speech. While not on all fours, the Court, in MTRCB, sustained the power of
the MTRCB to penalize a broadcast company for exhibiting/airing a pre-taped
TV episode without Board authorization in violation of Sec. 7 of PD 1986.
Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Presidential Decree No. 1986 is
constitutional; The investiture of supervisory power would be meaningless if
it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised as may be
proportionate to the offense proved.—Complementing this provision is Sec.
3(k) of the decree authorizing the MTRCB “to exercise such powers and
functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of the purpose
and objectives of [the law].” As earlier explained, the investiture of
supervisory, regulatory, and disciplinary power would surely be a meaningless
grant if it did not carry with it the power to penalize the supervised or the
regulated as may be proportionate to the offense committed, charged, and
proved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Administrative regulation or subordinate
legislation to promote public interest is a necessity in modern life.—The grant
of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the non-delegation of
legislative powers. Administrative regulations or “subordinate legislation”
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of “the
growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
law.” Allowing the MTRCB some reasonable elbow-room in its operations
and, in the exercise of its statutory disciplinary functions, according it ample
latitude in fixing, by way of an appropriate issuance, administrative penalties
with due regard for the severity of the offense and attending mitigating or
aggravating circumstances, as the case may be, would be consistent with its
mandate to effectively and efficiently regulate the movie and television
industry.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB) may suspend a TV program but not its host.—But even as
we uphold the power of the MTRCB to review and impose sanctions for
violations of PD 1986, its decision to suspend petitioner must be modified, for
nowhere in that issuance, particularly the power-defining Sec. 3 nor in the
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MTRCB Schedule of Administrative Penalties effective January 1, 1999 is the
Board empowered to suspend the program host or even to prevent certain
people from appearing in television programs. The MTRCB, to be sure, may
prohibit the broadcast of such television programs or cancel permits for
exhibition, but it may not suspend television personalities, for such would be
beyond its jurisdiction. The MTRCB cannot extend its exercise of regulation
beyond what the law provides. Only persons, offenses, and penalties clearly
falling clearly within the letter and spirit of PD 1986 will be considered to be
within the decree’s penal or disciplinary operation. And when it exists, the
reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the person charged with
violating the statute and for whom the penalty is sought. Thus, the MTRCB’s
decision in Administrative Case No. 01-04 dated September 27, 2004 and the
subsequent order issued pursuant to said decision must be modified. The
suspension should cover only the television program on which petitioner
appeared and uttered the offensive and obscene language, which sanction is
what the law and the facts obtaining call for. Soriano vs. Laguardia, 587
SCRA 79, G.R. No. 164785 April 29, 2009
G.R. No. 120639. September 25, 1998.*
BPI EXPRESS CARD CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and RICARDO J. MARASIGAN, respondents.
Commercial Law; Checks; Settled is the doctrine that a check is only a
substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument does
not, by itself operate as payment.—As agreed upon by the parties, on the
following day, private respondent did issue a check for P15,000. However, the
check was postdated 15 December 1989. Settled is the doctrine that a check is
only a substitute for money and not money, the delivery of such an instrument
does not, by itself operate as payment. This is especially true in the case of a
postdated check.
Same; Same; The issuance by the private respondent of the postdated check
was not effective payment.—The issuance by the private respondent of the
postdated check was not effective payment. It did not comply with his
obligation under the arrangement with Miss Lorenzo. Petitioner corporation
was therefore justified in suspending his credit card.
Civil Law; Damages; Elements to Find the Existence of an Abuse of Right
Under Article 19.—To find the existence of an abuse of right under Article 19
the following elements must be present: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.
Same; Same; Good faith is presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on
the party alleging it.—Time and again this Court has held that good faith is
presumed and the burden of proving bad faith is on the party alleging it. This,
private respondent failed to do. In fact, the action of the petitioner belies the
existence of bad faith. As early as 28 October 1989, petitioner could have
suspended private respondent’s card outright. Instead, petitioner allowed
private respondent to use his card for several weeks. Petitioner had even
notified private respondent of the impending suspension of his credit card and
made special accommodations for him for settling his outstanding account. As
such, petitioner cannot be said to have capriciously and arbitrarily canceled
the private respondent’s credit card.
Same; Same; There can be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty.—We do not
dispute the findings of the lower court that private respondent suffered
damages as a result of the cancellation of his credit card. However, there is a
material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion
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of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the
injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances
in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the
law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not
amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria.
Same; Same; There must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of
liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of
such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury.—In other words, in
order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty
which the defendant owed to the plaintiff—a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis
for the award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in
contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of some duty and the
imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and
the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. BPI
Express Card Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 296 SCRA 260, G.R. No.
120639 September 25, 1998
G.R. No. 195670. December 3, 2012.*
WILLEM BEUMER, petitioner, vs. AVELINA AMORES, respondent.
Civil Law; Succession; Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private
lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.―In In
Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut
Muller, 500 SCRA 65 (2006), the Court had already denied a claim for
reimbursement of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land instituted
by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena
Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement
on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly
bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of
Philippine land enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution which reads: Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.
Same; Equity; The time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.―As also
explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity
must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded equity.
Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.
Same; Same; Equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.―In
any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant
reimbursement to petitioner given that he acquired no right whatsoever over
the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to
be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and void,
vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.
Corollary thereto, under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have
the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the money he had
spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal
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contract or agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them. Indeed, one applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements built
cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction knowingly thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
entered into. properly declared to be co-owned by the parties subject to partition. Needless
to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony
Same; Principle of Unjust Enrichment; No person should unjustly enrich and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect. Beumer vs.
himself at the expense of another.―Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s Amores, 686 SCRA 770, G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in Frenzel
v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement
for money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the provision on unjust
enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution, to
wit: Futile, too, is petitioner’s reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code
which reads: Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something
at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same
to him. The provision is expressed in the maxim: “MEMO CUM ALTERIUS
DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST” (No person should unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been
paid without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This
provision does not apply if, as in this case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair
and unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the
subject properties, or from recovering the money he paid for the said
properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v.
Johnson: “The objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the
plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the
defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed;
but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the G.R. No. 158143. September 21, 2011.*
advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him and the plaintiff.” PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs.
ANTONIO B. BALMACEDA and ROLANDO N. RAMOS, respondents.
Same; The constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of
Philippine land and not to the improvements built thereon.―Precisely, it is the Appeals; An exception to the rule that petitions for review on certiorari only
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in involve questions of law is when the findings of fact in the tribunals below are
owning Philippine land. To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners conflicting, in which case the Supreme Court can delve into evidence and the

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factual circumstance of the case, and when the exception applies, the Court is
given latitude to review the evidence on record to decide the case with finality.
—At the outset, we observe that the petition raises mainly questions of fact
whose resolution requires the re-examination of the evidence on record. As a
general rule, petitions for review on certiorari only involve questions of law.
By way of exception, however, we can delve into evidence and the factual
circumstance of the case when the findings of fact in the tribunals below (in
this case between those of the CA and of the RTC) are conflicting. When the
exception applies, we are given latitude to review the evidence on record to
decide the case with finality.
Actions; Evidence; Quantum of Proof; Words and Phrases; “Preponderance of
Evidence,” Explained; “Preponderance of evidence” is the weight, credit, and
value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight
of the credible evidence”—preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in
the last analysis, means probability of the truth, evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in
opposition thereto.—In civil cases, the party carrying the burden of proof must
establish his case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which, to the
court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence offered in opposition. This
Court, in Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., 443 SCRA 293 (2004), defined
“preponderance of evidence” in the following manner: Preponderance of
evidence” is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either
side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight
of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.”
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. The party,
whether the plaintiff or the defendant, who asserts the affirmative of an issue
has the onus to prove his assertion in order to obtain a favorable judgment,
subject to the overriding rule that the burden to prove his cause of action never
leaves the plaintiff. For the defendant, an affirmative defense is one that is not
merely a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiff's cause of action, but
one which, if established, will constitute an “avoidance” of the claim.
Same; Same; Same; Even if the evidence adduced by the plaintiff appears
stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be entered in
the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of
action.—Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos’ participation in
Balmaceda’s scheme, it was not even necessary for Ramos to provide an
explanation for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant,
a judgment cannot be entered in the plaintiff’s favor if his evidence still does
not suffice to sustain his cause of action; to reiterate, a preponderance of
evidence as defined must be established to achieve this result.
Banks and Banking; Negotiable Instruments Law; Checks; Crossed Checks;
Words and Phrases; A crossed check is one where two parallel lines are drawn
across its face or across its corner; The crossing of a check has the following
effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank; (b)
the check may be negotiated only once—to the one who has an account with
the bank; and (c) the act of crossing the check serves as a warning to the
holder that the check has been issued for a definite purpose and he must
inquire if he received the check pursuant to this purpose; otherwise, he is not a
holder in due course.—Another telling indicator of PCIB’s negligence is the
fact that it allowed Balmaceda to encash the Manager’s checks that were
plainly crossed checks. A crossed check is one where two parallel lines are
drawn across its face or across its corner. Based on jurisprudence, the crossing
of a check has the following effects: (a) the check may not be encashed but
only deposited in the bank; (b) the check may be negotiated only once—to the
one who has an account with the bank; and (c) the act of crossing the check
serves as a warning to the holder that the check has been issued for a definite
purpose and he must inquire if he received the check pursuant to this purpose;
otherwise, he is not a holder in due course. In other words, the crossing of a
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check is a warning that the check should be deposited only in the account of
the payee. When a check is crossed, it is the duty of the collecting bank to
ascertain that the check is only deposited to the payee’s account. In complete
disregard of this duty, PCIB’s systems allowed Balmaceda to encash 26
Manager’s checks which were all crossed checks, or checks payable to the
“payee’s account only.”
Same; Same; Same; The diligence required of banks is more than that of a
Roman pater familias or a good father of a family—the highest degree of
diligence is expected.—The General Banking Law of 2000 requires of banks
the highest standards of integrity and performance. The banking business is
impressed with public interest. Of paramount importance is the trust and
confidence of the public in general in the banking industry. Consequently, the
diligence required of banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a
good father of a family. The highest degree of diligence is expected.
Equity; Unjust Enrichment; To substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the
claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received
something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are
such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit.—To have a
cause of action based on unjust enrichment, we explained in University of the
Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc., 439 SCRA 467 (2004), that: Unjust
enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the
efforts or obligations of others, but instead it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally or
unlawfully. Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the
claimant must unequivocally prove that another party knowingly received
something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are
such that it would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust
enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make
remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that
give rise to legal or equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to
remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or request.
Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite
for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.
Banks and Banking; Compensation; A bank does not have a unilateral right to
freeze the account of a depositor based on its mere suspicion that the funds
therein were proceeds of some shady transactions; For legal compensation to
take place, two persons, in their own right, must first be creditors and debtors
of each other.—We also find that PCIB acted illegally in freezing and debiting
Ramos’ bank account. In BPI Family Bank v. Franco, 538 SCRA 184 (2007),
we cautioned against the unilateral freezing of bank accounts by banks, noting
that: More importantly, [BPI Family Bank] does not have a unilateral right to
freeze the accounts of Franco based on its mere suspicion that the funds
therein were proceeds of the multi-million peso scam Franco was allegedly
involved in. To grant [BPI Family Bank], or any bank for that matter, the right
to take whatever action it pleases on deposits which it supposes are derived
from shady transactions, would open the floodgates of public distrust in the
banking industry. We see no legal merit in PCIB’s claim that legal
compensation took place between it and Ramos, thereby warranting the
automatic deduction from Ramos’ bank account. For legal compensation to
take place, two persons, in their own right, must first be creditors and debtors
of each other. While PCIB, as the depositary bank, is Ramos’ debtor in the
amount of his deposits, Ramos is not PCIB’s debtor under the evidence the
PCIB adduced. PCIB thus had no basis, in fact or in law, to automatically
debit from Ramos’ bank account.
Same; Damages; One may err, but error alone is not a ground for granting
moral damages.—Although PCIB’s act of freezing and debiting Ramos’
account is unlawful, we cannot hold PCIB liable for moral and exemplary
damages. Since a contractual relationship existed between Ramos and PCIB as
the depositor and the depositary bank, respectively, the award of moral
damages depends on the applicability of Article 2220 of the Civil Code, which
provides: Article 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for
awarding moral damages if the court should find that, under the
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circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches
of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. [emphasis
ours] Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it
imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
commission of a wrong; it partakes of the nature of fraud. As the facts of this
case bear out, PCIB did not act out of malice or bad faith when it froze
Ramos’ bank account and subsequently debited the amount of P251,910.96
therefrom. While PCIB may have acted hastily and without regard to its
primary duty to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care and
utmost fidelity, we find that its actions were propelled more by the need to
protect itself, and not out of malevolence or ill will. One may err, but error
alone is not a ground for granting moral damages.
Attorney’s Fees; Taking into consideration the time and efforts involved that
went into this case, the Court increases the award of attorney’s fees from
P20,000.00 to P75,000.00.—We deem it just and equitable, however, to
uphold the award of attorney’s fees in Ramos’ favor. Taking into consideration
the time and efforts involved that went into this case, we increase the award of
attorney’s fees from P20,000.00 to P75,000.00. Philippine Commercial
International Bank vs. Balmaceda, 658 SCRA 33, G.R. No. 158143 September
21, 2011
G.R. No. 190846. February 3, 2016.*
TOMAS P. TAN, JR., petitioner, vs. JOSE G. HOSANA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Supreme Court; The Supreme Court
(SC) does not address questions of fact which require us to rule on “the truth
or falsehood of alleged facts,” Exceptions.—This Court does not address
questions of fact which require us to rule on “the truth or falsehood of alleged
facts,” except in the following cases: (1) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its
findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in
the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and
(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
Same; Evidence; Preponderance of Evidence; Words and Phrases;
Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term “greater weight of the evidence” or “greater weight of the credible
evidence.”—In civil cases, the basic rule is that the party making allegations
has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Moreover,
the parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence, not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their opponent. Preponderance of evidence
is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term “greater weight of the
evidence” or “greater weight of the credible evidence.” Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase that, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It
is evidence that is more convincing to the court as it is worthier of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.
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Civil Law; Obligations; Payment; One who pleads payment has the burden of
proving it; the burden rests on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on
the plaintiff to prove nonpayment.—It is settled in jurisprudence that one who
pleads payment has the burden of proving it; the burden rests on the defendant
to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove nonpayment. A mere
allegation is not evidence, and the person who alleges has the burden of
proving his or her allegation with the requisite quantum of evidence, which in
civil cases is preponderance of evidence.
Same; Contracts; Void Contracts; A void or inexistent contract has no force
and effect from the very beginning.—A void or inexistent contract has no
force and effect from the very beginning. This rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal
property without the other spouse’s written consent. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be
validated either by ratification or prescription. When, however, any of the
terms of a void contract have been performed, an action to declare its
inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given under it. It
is basic that if a void contract has already “been performed, the restoration of
what has been given is in order.” This principle springs from Article 22 of the
New Civil Code which states that “every person who through an act of
performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same.” Hence, the restitution of what each party has
given is a consequence of a void and inexistent contract.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Documentary Evidence; Deed of Sale; The deed of
sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment.—The deed of
sale as documentary evidence may be used as a means to ascertain the
truthfulness of the consideration stated and its actual payment. The purpose of
introducing the deed of sale as evidence is not to enforce the terms written in
the contract, which is an obligatory force and effect of a valid contract. The
deed of sale, rather, is used as a means to determine matters that occurred in
the execution of such contract, i.e., the determination of what each party has
given under the void contract to allow restitution and prevent unjust
enrichment.
Same; Same; It is settled in jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which
appears to be of doubtful relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer
policy is to be liberal and not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admit them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the
reason that their rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if
they are thereafter found relevant or competent.—It is also settled in
jurisprudence that with respect to evidence which appears to be of doubtful
relevancy, incompetency, or admissibility, the safer policy is to be liberal and
not reject them on doubtful or technical grounds, but admit them unless
plainly irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent; for the reason that their
rejection places them beyond the consideration of the court, if they are
thereafter found relevant or competent. On the other hand, their admission, if
they turn out later to be irrelevant or incompetent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding them or ignoring them. In the present case, the deed of
sale was declared null and void by positive provision of the law prohibiting
the sale of conjugal property without the spouse’s consent. It does not,
however, preclude the possibility that Tomas paid the consideration stated
therein. The admission of the deed of sale as evidence is consistent with the
liberal policy of the court to admit the evidence which appears to be relevant
in resolving an issue before the courts.
Civil Law; Unjust Enrichment; Unjust enrichment exists “when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity, and good conscience.”—Unjust enrichment exists “when a person
unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity, and good conscience.” The prevention of unjust enrichment is a
Page | 69
recognized public policy of the State and is based on Article 22 of the Civil
Code. The principle of unjust enrichment requires Jose to return what he or
Milagros received under the void contract which presumably benefited their
conjugal partnership. Tan, Jr. vs. Hosana, 783 SCRA 87, G.R. No. 190846
February 3, 2016
G.R. No. 170479. February 18, 2008.*
ANDRE T. ALMOCERA, petitioner, vs. JOHNNY ONG, respondent.
Sales; Contracts to Sell; Words and Phrases; A contract to sell is akin to a
conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and
uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the
parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.—It
cannot be disputed that the contract entered into by the parties was a contract
to sell. The contract was denominated as such and it contained the provision
that the unit shall be conveyed by way of an Absolute Deed of Sale, together
with the attendant documents of Ownership—the Transfer Certificate of Title
and Certificate of Occupancy—and that the balance of the contract price shall
be paid upon the completion and delivery of the unit, as well as the acceptance
thereof by respondent. All these clearly indicate that ownership of the
townhouse has not passed to respondent. In Serrano v. Caguiat, 517 SCRA 57
(2007) we explained: A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the
efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor’s obligation to transfer title is
subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the
conditional obligation had never existed. The suspensive condition is
commonly full payment of the purchase price.
Same; Same; Reciprocal Obligations; Where one of the parties to a contract
did not perform the undertaking to which he was bound by the terms of the
agreement to perform, he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the
other party.—The contract subject of this case contains reciprocal obligations
which were to be fulfilled by the parties, i.e., to complete and deliver the
townhouse within six months from the execution of the contract to sell on the
part of petitioner and FBMC, and to pay the balance of the contract price upon
completion and delivery of the townhouse on the part of the respondent. In the
case at bar, the obligation of petitioner and FBMC which is to complete and
deliver the townhouse unit within the prescribed period, is determinative of
the respondent’s obligation to pay the balance of the contract price. With their
Page | 70
failure to fulfill their obligation as stipulated in the contract, they incurred
delay and are liable for damages. They cannot insist that respondent comply
with his obligation. Where one of the parties to a contract did not perform the
undertaking to which he was bound by the terms of the agreement to perform,
he is not entitled to insist upon the performance of the other party.
Same; Same; Same; Delay; Demand would be useless where there would be
impossibility of the other party complying with its obligation due to its fault.
—Demand is not necessary in the instant case. Demand by the respondent
would be useless because the impossibility of complying with their (petitioner
and FBMC) obligation was due to their fault. If only they paid their loans with
the LBP, the mortgage on the subject townhouse would not have been
foreclosed and thereafter sold to a third person.
Same; Same; Same; Same; For failure of one party to assume and perform the
obligation imposed on him, the other party does not incur delay.—The
obligation of respondent to pay the balance of the contract price was
conditioned on petitioner and FBMC’s performance of their obligation.
Considering that the latter did not comply with their obligation to complete
and deliver the townhouse unit within the period agreed upon, respondent
could not have incurred delay. For failure of one party to assume and perform
the obligation imposed on him, the other party does not incur delay.
Doctrine of Unjust Enrichment; Elements; The fundamental doctrine of unjust
enrichment is the transfer of value without just cause or consideration.—
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that respondent is
justified in refusing to pay the balance of the contract price. He was never in
possession of the townhouse unit and he can no longer be its owner since
ownership thereof has been transferred to a third person who was not a party
to the proceedings below. It would simply be the height of inequity if we are
to require respondent to pay the balance of the contract price. To allow this
would result in the unjust enrichment of petitioner and FBMC. The
fundamental doctrine of unjust enrichment is the transfer of value without just
cause or consideration. The elements of this doctrine which are present in this
case are: enrichment on the part of the defendant; impoverishment on the part
of the plaintiff; and lack of cause. The main objective is to prevent one to
enrich himself at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this
doctrine simply means a person shall not be allowed to profit or enrich himself
inequitably at another’s expense. Hence, to allow petitioner and FBMC keep
the down payment made by respondent amounting to P1,060,000.00 would
result in their unjust enrichment at the expense of the respondent. Thus, said
amount should be returned.
Pleadings and Practice; Due Process; Points of law, theories, issues and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and ought
not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal—it would be unfair to the adverse party who would have
no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory not
ventilated before the trial court.—This issue of piercing the veil of corporate
fiction was never raised before the trial court. The same was raised for the first
time before the Court of Appeals which ruled that it was too late in the day to
raise the same. The Court of Appeals declared: In the case below, the
pleadings and the evidence of the defendants are one and the same and never
had it made to appear that Almocera is a person distinct and separate from the
other defendant. In fine, we cannot treat this error for the first time on appeal.
We cannot in good conscience, let the defendant Almocera raise the issue of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction just because of the adverse decision
against him. x x x. To allow petitioner to pursue such a defense would
undermine basic considerations of due process. Points of law, theories, issues
and arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court will not be and
ought not to be considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for
the first time on appeal. It would be unfair to the adverse party who would
have no opportunity to present further evidence material to the new theory not
ventilated before the trial court. Almocera vs. Ong, 546 SCRA 164, G.R. No.
170479 February 18, 2008
Page | 71

G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002.*
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO,
petitioner, vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
Civil Law; Damages; An act or omission causing damage to another may give
rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the offender.—An act or
omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil
liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony
[e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the
Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted
a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action
[Article 33, Civil Code]. Either of these two possible liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject; however, to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party “cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission” or under both causes.
Same; Same; Actions; Under the present Rules, the independent civil actions
may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any
reservation in the criminal action.—Anent the independent civil actions under
Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules considered
them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to
institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Under the present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the
criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not
a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on
these articles of the Civil Code.
Remedial Law; Res Judicata; The action filed by petitioner is an independent
civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act.—One of the elements of res judicata is
identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the
action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains
separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not
being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said
independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e.,
culpa contractual.
Same; Forum-shopping; There can be no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.—The essence of forum-
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable
judgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or
omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action.
The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action
for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no
forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing
of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
action. Cancio, Jr. vs. Isip, 391 SCRA 393, G.R. No. 133978 November 12,
2002
Page | 72

G.R. No. 157547. February 23, 2011.*
HEIRS OF EDUARDO SIMON, petitioners, vs. ELVIN** CHAN AND
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Criminal Procedure; Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; Civil Liability; Civil liability to
the offended party cannot be denied; the payee of the check is entitled to
receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.—
The Supreme Court has settled the issue of whether or not a violation of BP 22
can give rise to civil liability in Banal v. Judge Tadeo, Jr., 156 SCRA 325
(1987), holding: x x x Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be
denied. The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for
which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is
entitled to recompense.
Same; Same; Same; There is no independent civil action to recover the value
of a bouncing check issued in contravention of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; The
criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action; No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed.—There is no independent civil action to recover
the value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear
from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which
relevantly provides: x x x (b) The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action.
No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Same; Same; Same; It is axiomatic that the retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable; The reason is simply that, as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise from, procedural laws;
except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they
permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required
at the time of the commission of the offenses.—The aforequoted provisions of
the Rules of Court, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced Civil Case
No. 915-00 on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. It is axiomatic that
the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any right of a
person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it constitutionally
objectionable. The reason is simply that, as a general rule, no vested right may
attach to, or arise from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made
to apply to cases pending at the time of their promulgation, considering that
no party to an action has a vested right in the rules of procedure, except that in
criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively apply if they permit or require
a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is required at the time of the
commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would be
unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Although the court has ruled that the issuance of a
bouncing check may result in two separate and distinct crimes of estafa and
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, the procedures for the recovery of the
civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes are different and non-
interchangeable.—The CA’s reliance on DMPI Employees Credit Association
v. Velez, 371 SCRA 72 (2001), to give due course to the civil action of Chan
independently and separately of Criminal Case No. 275381 was unwarranted.
DMPI Employees, which involved a prosecution for estafa, is not on all fours
with this case, which is a prosecution for a violation of BP 22. Although the
Court has ruled that the issuance of a bouncing check may result in two
separate and distinct crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22, the procedures
for the recovery of the civil liabilities arising from these two distinct crimes
are different and non-interchangeable. In prosecutions of estafa, the offended
party may opt to reserve his right to file a separate civil action, or may
institute an independent action based on fraud pursuant to Article 33 of the
Civil Code, as DMPI Employees has allowed. In prosecutions of violations of
BP 22, however, the Court has adopted a policy to prohibit the reservation or
institution of a separate civil action to claim the civil liability arising from the
Page | 73
issuance of the bouncing check upon the reasons delineated in Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corporation, supra.
Remedial Law; Actions; Litis Pendentia; Requisites for litis pendentia to be
successfully invoked as a bar to an action.—For litis pendentia to be
successfully invoked as a bar to an action, the concurrence of the following
requisites is necessary, namely: (a) there must be identity of parties or at least
such as represent the same interest in both actions; (b) there must be identity
of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same
facts; and, (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment
that may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful,
amount to res judicata in respect of the other. Absent the first two requisites,
the possibility of the existence of the third becomes nil. Heirs of Eduardo
Simon vs. Chan, 644 SCRA 13, G.R. No. 157547 February 23, 2011
No. 46496. February 27, 1940]
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and
proprietor, and NATIONAL WORKERS' BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL
LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
1.COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER.—The nature of the
Court of Industrial Relations and of its power is extensively discussed in the
decision.
2.ID.; ID.; TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE; DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.—The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by
technical rules of procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to
act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial
Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673). The fact, however, that the Court of
Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain
procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases coming
before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS.—There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character.
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in
support thereof. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his
case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty to
Page | 74
deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to
support its decision. Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be substantial. The decision must
be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record and disclosed to the parties affected. The Court of Industrial
Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court
of Industrial Relations should, in all controvercial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The
performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR; NEW TRIAL GRANTED.—In the
light of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here
that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Workers' Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does
not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a rational
way, a conclusion of law. This result, however, does not now preclude the
concession of a new trial prayed for by the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc. The interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given
opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion
and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. The
legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it
acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the
motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby, granted, and the
entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it re-open the case, receive all such evidence as
may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
set forth in the decision. Ang Tibay vs. Court oh Industrial Relations etc., 69
Phil. 635, No. 46496 February 27, 1940
G.R. No. 88373. May 18, 1990.*
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO CAPULONG
and AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD., respondents.
G.R. No. 82380. May 18, 1990.
AYER PRODUCTIONS PTY. LTD. and McELROY & McELROY FILM
PRODUCTIONS, petitioners, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG and
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 82398. May 18, 1990.
HAL McELROY, petitioner, vs. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Branch 134, and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Injunction; Damages; Rule that a claim for damages arising
from a wrongful injunction shall be filed in the main case with notice to the
surety firmly settled; Action must commence before judgment attains finality,
otherwise it is barred.—A rule firmly settled in this jurisdiction is that a claim
for damages arising from a wrongful injunction should be filed in the main
case within notice to the surety. If the lower court’s decision, denying
injunction, is however appealed to the Appellate Court, and the latter affirms
the denial, the application may be commenced in the Appellate Court, which
may either direct a remand of the case for reception of evidence or otherwise
hear the claim itself. So also, it must be commenced before judgment attains
finality. Otherwise, it is barred.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The procedure is mandatory and failure to observe
it deprives the aggrieved party the right to proceed against the surety bond.—
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It has been held that this procedure is mandatory, and the failure to observe it
deprives the aggrieved party the right to proceed against the surety bond.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent’s claim for damages
brought about by a wrongful injunction should have been commenced prior to
June 20, 1988 either with this Court or with the Court below.—The Court’s
ruling, therefore, is that the private respondent’s claim for damages brought
about by a wrongful injunction should have been commenced prior to June 20,
1988 (the date Ayer judgment was entered) either with this Court or with the
court below. What is plain is that it had neglected to file its claim speedily and
seasonably, and for what clearly emerges as an effort to revive a lost
opportunity, it sought a court order to raise the case long decided by this Court
as having had no leg on which to stand.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Distinction between the Talavera case and Ayer
case is for purposes hereof tenuous because in both cases there was a final
resolution on the merits that left nothing for the trial court to adjudicate.—The
private respondent can not deny the application of Rivera v. Talavera, where
we said that the request for damages arising from injunction may be ventilated
in the Appellate Court, because although Talavera involved an appeal, whereas
Ayer was one for certiorari (special civil action), the distinction is, for
purposes hereof, tenuous because, in both cases, there was a final resolution
on the merits that left nothing for the trial court to adjudicate. , 185 SCRA
504, G.R. No. 88373, G.R. No. 82380, G.R. No. 82398 May 18, 1990
G.R. Nos. 159017-18. March 9, 2011.*
PAULINO S. ASILO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and Spouses VISITACION AND CESAR C. BOMBASI,
respondents.
G.R. No. 159059. March 9, 2011.*
VICTORIA BUETA VDA. DE COMENDADOR, IN
REPRESENTATION OF DEMETRIO T. COMENDADOR, petitioner,
vs. VISITACION C. BOMBASI AND CESAR C. BOMBASI,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.—The elements of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as follows: (1) that the accused are
public officers or private persons charged in conspiracy with them; (2) that
said public officers commit the prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions; (3) that they caused
undue injury to any party, whether the Government or a private party; (4) OR
that such injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference to the other party; and (5) that the public officers have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
Same; Same; Nuisance; Causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence.—Causing undue injury to any party, including the
government, could only mean actual injury or damage which must be
established by evidence. In jurisprudence, “undue injury” is consistently
interpreted as “actual.” Undue has been defined as “more than necessary, not
proper, [or] illegal”; and injury as “any wrong or damage done to another,
Page | 76
either in his person, rights, reputation or property [that is, the] invasion of any
legally protected interest of another.” Actual damage, in the context of these
definitions, is akin to that in civil law. It is evident from the records, as
correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, that Asilo and Mayor Comendador
as accused below did not deny that there was indeed damage caused the
Spouses Bombasi on account of the demolition.
Same; Nuisance; The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible if it is nuisance per se.—The abatement of a nuisance without judicial
proceedings is possible if it is nuisance per se. Nuisance per se is that which is
nuisance at all times and under any circumstance, regardless of location and
surroundings. In this case, the market stall cannot be considered as a nuisance
per se because as found out by the Court, the buildings had not been affected
by the 1986 fire. This finding was certified to by Supervising Civil Engineer
Wilfredo A. Sambrano of the Laguna District Engineer Office.
Same; Estoppel; Article 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, through
estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon.—Art. 1431 of the New Civil Code provides that, through
estoppel, an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the
person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person
relying thereon. The representation made by the municipality that the Spouses
Bombasi had the right to continuously operate its store binds the municipality.
It is utterly unjust for the Municipality to receive the benefits of the store
operation and later on claim the illegality of the business. Asilo, Jr. vs. People,
645 SCRA 41, G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011
G.R. No. 108017. April 3, 1995.*
MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor
children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and
NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION
AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, respondents.
Remedial Law; Actions; The filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a
compliance with the requirement of an express reservation.—It is well-settled
that the filing of an independent civil action before the prosecution in the
criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the
requirement of an express reservation (Yakult Philippines v. Court of Appeals,
190 SCRA 357 [1990]). This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in
this case. However, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the
ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict as the
shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the
nature of the petitioner’s cause of action.
Same; Same; Nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in
the complaint as constituting the cause of action.—The nature of a cause of
action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the
cause of action (Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). The purpose of
Page | 77
an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim
of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.
Same; Same; The general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are
sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting
the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon thesame in
accordance with the prayer therein; Elements of a cause of action.—With
respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause
of action, the general rule is that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to
constitute a cause of action against the defendants if, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance
with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are
present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and
under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the
named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.
Same; Same; To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain.—In
determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a
cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the
outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros
Hotel Corporation v. CA, supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a
sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should
not be dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the
defendants (Rava Dev’t. Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA 152 [1992] citing
Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 663
[1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain
(Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]).
Civil Law; Damages; Negligence; There is no justification for limiting the
scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence.—Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no
justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or
omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that
Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional.
Same; Same; Same; The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already
been construed to include bodily injuries causing death.—Private respondents
further aver that Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries
intentionally committed pursuant to the ruling in Marcia v. CA (120 SCRA
193 [1983]), and that the actions for damages allowed thereunder are ex-
delicto. However, the term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been
construed to include bodily injuries causing death (Capuno v. Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of the Philippines, 121 Phil. 638 [1965]; Carandang v. Santiago,
97 Phil. 94 [1955]). It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in the
Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also
consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide (Madeja v. Caro, 126 SCRA
293 [1983]). Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220, G.R. No. 108017
April 3, 1995
Page | 78

G.R. No. 159323. July 31, 2008.*
COCA-COLA BOTTLERS (PHILS.), INC. and ERIC MONTINOLA,
petitioners, vs. SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION and DR. DEAN
CLIMACO, respondents.
Actions; Prejudicial Questions; Legal Research; Words and Phrases; Our
concept of prejudicial question was lifted from Spain, where civil cases are
tried exclusively by civil courts, while criminal cases are tried exclusively in
criminal courts, each kind of court being jurisdictionally distinct from and
independent of the other; The rule is that there is prejudicial question when (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately
related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the
resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed; A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which must
precede the criminal action, that which requires a decision with which said
question is closely related.—Our concept of prejudicial question was lifted
from Spain, where civil cases are tried exclusively by civil courts, while
criminal cases are tried exclusively in criminal courts. Each kind of court is
jurisdictionally distinct from and independent of the other. In the Philippines,
however, courts are invariably tribunals of general jurisdiction. This means
that courts here exercise jurisdiction over both civil and criminal cases. Thus,
it is not impossible that the criminal case, as well as the civil case in which a
prejudicial question may rise, may be both pending in the same court. For this
reason, the elements of prejudicial question have been modified in such a way
that the phrase “pendency of the civil case in a different tribunal” has been
eliminated. The rule is that there is prejudicial question when (a) the
previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. It
comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action both pend and there exists in the former an issue which must be
preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed. This is so
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be
determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. Here, no prejudicial question exists because there is no pending
criminal case. The consolidated NLRC cases cannot be considered as
“previously instituted civil action.” In Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837
(1920), it was held that a prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which must precede the criminal action, that which requires a decision with
which said question is closely related.
Same; Same; It is settled that the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature
must be determinative of the case before the court.—Neither can the doctrine
of prejudicial question be applied by analogy. The issue in the case filed by
Dr. Climaco with the SSC involves the question of whether or not he is an
employee of Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. and subject to the compulsory
coverage of the Social Security System. On the contrary, the cases filed by Dr.
Climaco before the NLRC involved different issues. In his first complaint, Dr.
Climaco sought recognition as a regular employee of the company and
demanded payment of his 13th month pay, cost of living allowance, holiday
pay, service incentive leave pay, Christmas bonus and all other benefits. The
second complaint was for illegal dismissal, with prayer for reinstatement to
his former position as company physician of the company’s Bacolod Plant,
without loss of seniority rights, with full payment of backwages, other unpaid
benefits, and for payment of damages. Thus, the issues in the NLRC cases are
not determinative of whether or not the SSC should proceed. It is settled that
the question claimed to be prejudicial in nature must be determinative of the
case before the court.
Page | 79
Same; Forum Shopping; Conflict of Laws; The grave evil sought to be
avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by two (2)
competent tribunals of two (2) separate and contradictory decisions—
unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals,
may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is
reached; It is well to note that forum shopping traces its origin in private
international law on choice of venues, which later developed to a choice of
remedies.—Forum shopping is a prohibited malpractice and condemned as
trifling with the courts and their processes. It is proscribed because it
unnecessarily burdens the courts with heavy caseloads. It also unduly taxes
the manpower and financial resources of the judiciary. It mocks the judicial
processes, thus, affecting the efficient administration of justice. The grave evil
sought to be avoided by the rule against forum shopping is the rendition by
two (2) competent tribunals of two (2) separate and contradictory decisions.
Unscrupulous litigants, taking advantage of a variety of competent tribunals,
may repeatedly try their luck in several different fora until a favorable result is
reached. It is well to note that forum shopping traces its origin in private
international law on choice of venues, which later developed to a choice of
remedies.
Same; Same; Judgments; Res Judicata; There is res judicata when (1) there is
a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits; and
(4) there is between the two cases identity of parties, subject matter and causes
of action.—There is forum shopping when one party repetitively avails of
several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively,
all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending
in, or already resolved adversely, by some other court. In short, forum
shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a
final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. There is res
judicata when (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it
has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or
order is on the merits; and (4) there is between the two cases identity of
parties, subject matter and causes of action. Measured by the foregoing
yardstick, Dr. Climaco is not guilty of forum shopping. While it is true that the
parties are identical in the NLRC and in the SSC, the reliefs sought and the
causes of action are different.
Same; Same; Litis Pendentia; For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1)
identity of the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both
actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity of the two cases such that
judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.—For litis pendentia to exist, there must be (1) identity of
the parties or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief founded on
the same facts; and (3) identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,
regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other. In the case under review, there is no litis pendentia to speak of. As
previously explained, although the parties in the cases before the NLRC and
the SSC are similar, the nature of the cases filed, the rights asserted, and
reliefs prayed for in each tribunal, are different.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Action means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong—every other
remedy is a special proceeding.—In Solancio v. Ramos, the issue centered on
whether the pending administrative case before the Bureau of Lands is
“another action,” which would justify the dismissal of the complaint of
plaintiff against defendants before the then Court of First Instance (now RTC)
of Cagayan. Ruling in the negative, the Court noted that “both parties as well
as the trial court have missed the extent or meaning of the ground of the
motion to dismiss as contemplated under the Rules of Court.” Mr. Justice
Regala, who wrote the opinion of the Court, explained the phrase “another
action” in this wise: This is not what is contemplated under the law because
Page | 80
under Section 1(d), Rule 16 (formerly Rule 8) of the Rules of Court, [now
Rule 1, Section 16(e) of the Rules of Court, supra] one of the grounds for the
dismissal of an action is that “there is another action pending between the
same parties for the same cause.” Note that the Rule uses the phrase “another
action.” This phrase should be construed in line with Section 1 of Rule 2,
which defines the word action, thus—“Action means an ordinary suit in a
court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. Every other
remedy is a special proceeding.” Coca-Cola Bottlers (Phils.), Inc. vs. Social
Security Commission, 560 SCRA 719, G.R. No. 159323 July 31, 2008

Nos. L-50441-42. September 18, 1980.*

ALEJANDRO RAS, petitioner, vs. HON. JAINAL D. RASUL, District
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Basilan, and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Civil Law; Prejudicial question, nature and concept of.—Aprejudicial

question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question
must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Same; Same; When is a civil case considered prejudicial to a criminal action

as to cause suspension of the criminal action pending determination of the
civil action.—For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action
as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of
the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of
the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused.

Page | 81
Same; Same; Criminal action for estafa (for alleged double sale of property) is
a prejudicial question to a civil action for nullity of the alleged deed of sale
and defense of the alleged vendors of forgeries of their signatures in the deed.
—On the basis of the issues raised in both the criminal and civil cases against
petitioner and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial question,
there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering
that petitioner Alejandro Ras’ defense (as defendant) in Civil Case No. 73 of
the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Luis Pichel
(plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is
based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of
petitioner Ras’ guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. If the first
alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no
double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A
conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be
a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the
civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and
spurious. Ras vs. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125, Nos. L-50441-42 September 18,
1980
G.R. No. 159186. June 5, 2009.*
JESSE Y. YAP, petitioner, vs. HON. MONICO G. CABALES, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, General Santos City;
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT, Branch 1, General Santos City; COURT
OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, JOVITA
DIMALANTA and MERGYL MIRABUENO, respondents.
Criminal Procedure; Prejudicial Questions; It generally exists in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in
the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the latter may
proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in the criminal case; Elements.—A prejudicial question generally exists in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there
exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the
latter may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of
the accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of
prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
Page | 82
the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Same; Same; If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine
the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the
same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first
before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial
question; Neither is there a prejudicial question of the civil and the criminal
action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other.—If both
civil and criminal cases have similar issues, or the issue in one is intimately
related to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would
likely exist, provided the other element or characteristic is satisfied. It must
appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues
raised in the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will
not determine the criminal responsibility of the accused in the criminal action
based on the same facts, or if there is no necessity that the civil case be
determined first before taking up the criminal case, the civil case does not
involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a prejudicial question if the
civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of
each other. Yap vs. Cabales, 588 SCRA 426, G.R. No. 159186 June 5, 2009
G.R. No. 120600. September 22, 1998.*
ERNESTO C. DAWSON, LOUIS P. DAWSON, JR., BENJAMIN C.
DAWSON, JOSEPHINE DAWSON SOLIVEN, RALPH D. CUDILLA,
ELIZA C. ISIP and LARRY D. ISIP, petitioners, vs. REGISTER OF
DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY and JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85, respondents.
Contracts; Sales; “Contract to Sell” and “Contract of Sale,” Distinguished;
Words and Phrases; In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the
vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold whereas in a contract to sell,
ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and does not pass to the
vendee until full payment of the purchase price.—On May 2, 1967, Louis P.
Dawson and Siska Development Corporation executed a contract to sell, the
subject of which was the parcel of land in question. By the nature of a contract
to sell, the title over the subject property is transferred to the vendee only upon
the full payment of the stipulated consideration. Unlike in a contract of sale,
the title does not pass to the vendee upon the execution of the agreement or
the delivery of the thing sold. In Salazar v. Court of Appeals, this Court
explained the distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale: “In a
contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery
Page | 83
of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in
the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase
price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over
the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or
rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full
payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive
suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that
prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming
effective.”
Same; Same; Succession; Civil Personality; Juridical Capacity; A seller cannot
transfer title over a lot, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, to a person who has
already died, as the deceased has no more civil personality or juridical
capacity.—It is undisputed that Louis P. Dawson died in June 1971, without
having completed the installments on the property. His heirs, herein
petitioners, then took over the contract to sell, assumed his obligations by
paying the selling price of the lot from their own funds, and completed the
payment in 1978. Accordingly, the ownership of the lot had not been vested in
Louis P. Dawson during his lifetime. Indeed, on March 16, 1978, Siska
Development Corporation could not have transferred the title over the lot,
through a Deed of Absolute Sale, to Louis P. Dawson who had died seven
years earlier in 1971. In 1978, the deceased had no more civil personality or
juridical capacity. “His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject
of legal relations, was lost through death.”
Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Property Registration Decree (Presidential
Decree 1529); Where the installments agreed on in a contract to sell have not
been completely paid upon the death of the original vendee and the certificate
of title was erroneously issued in his name, his heirs, who assumed his
obligations and completed the payment, can resort to the summary
proceedings under Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 to correct the
manifest mistake.—In other words, the said property did not become part of
the estate of Louis P. Dawson. Necessarily, partition is not the remedy to
determine ownership thereof and to consolidate title in herein petitioners.
Hence, we agree with the following assertion of the solicitor general: “Having
stepped into the shoes of the deceased Louis P. Dawson upon his death in
June, 1971 with respect to the said contract, and being the ones who continued
the installment payments of the selling price from their own funds until its full
payment in 1978, petitioners necessarily became the lawful owners of the said
lot in whose favor the deed of absolute sale should have been executed by
vendor Siska Development Corporation.” In view of the circumstances of this
case, Section 108 of PD 1529 is clearly available as a remedy to correct the
erroneous issuance of the subject TCT in the name of Louis P. Dawson. The
issue is not really novel. Faced with substantially similar facts in Cruz v. Tan,
this Court also allowed the application of Section 112 of the Public Land Act,
which is identical to Section 108 of PD 1529.
Courts; Actions; Motives; The Court cannot withhold the relief prayed for by
a party merely on the basis of some speculation of improper motivation.—
Respondent Court questioned the filing of the petition for cancellation only in
1993, hinting that the remedy was “designed to evade the payment of the
necessary taxes to the government.” Respondent Court, however, failed to
state which taxes petitioners sought to avoid. Although they are required to
pay capital gains tax and, thereafter, real estate tax, there is no showing that
said taxes have not been paid. Thus, we cannot withhold the relief prayed for
by petitioners, merely on the basis of some speculation of improper
motivation. Dawson vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 295 SCRA 733,
G.R. No. 120600 September 22, 1998
Page | 84

G.R. No. 182836. October 13, 2009.*
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR
ALLAN S. MONTAÑO and NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG
CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN
THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS
(NMCSC-SUPER), respondents.
Civil Law; Civil Personality; Death of a Party; Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death; While the Civil Code
expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality
could die—one need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
—Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired juridical personality could die. And third, death has
been defined as the cessation of life. Life is not synonymous with civil
personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could
die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State
must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death.
Same; Same; Same; Labor Law; Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBAs);
Bereavement Leave and Death Benefits; The unborn child can be considered a
dependent under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the
parties in the instant case.—The unborn child can be considered a dependent
under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a dependent is “one who
relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without
the power or aid of someone else.” Under said general definition, even an
unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano’s child could not have
reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano’s wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA
provisions in question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child
of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee.
The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the
child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality, as
Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be
understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the
mother’s womb.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; A legitimate
child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.—
The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent child’s status in relation
to his/her parents. In Angeles v. Maglaya, 469 SCRA 363 (2005) we have
expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz.: A legitimate child is a product
of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of
lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and
child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:
“Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate.”
Page | 85
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The legitimacy or illegitimacy
of a child attaches upon his/her conception.—It is apparent that according to
the Family Code and the aforecited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it
was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that
their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child
legitimate upon her conception.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Being for the benefit of the
employee, Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) provisions on
bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to
give life to the intentions thereof; It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case,
had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than
that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.—We
emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an
employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee
and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the
parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child,
who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during
delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently. Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on
bereavement leave and other death benefits should be interpreted liberally to
give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific
in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the
same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of
labor. Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation vs. Montaño, 603 SCRA
621, G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009
G.R. No. 203775. August 5, 2014.*
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR
HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY
BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, INC., and
WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Parties; Real Party-in-Interest; Under
Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, only natural or juridical
persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which
must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest.—
Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3, only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action, which must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Article 44 of the Civil
Code lists the juridical persons with capacity to sue, thus: Art. 44. The
following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2)
Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,

Page | 86
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and
distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Capacity to Sue; Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of
Court mandates that “[f]acts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued
or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the
legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party,
must be averred.—Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court mandates that
“[f]acts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an
organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred.” In
their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims “is a
nonprofit and nonpartisan organization in the process of formal incorporation,
the primary purpose of which is for the benefit of the common or general
interest of many flood victims who are so numerous that it is impracticable to
join all as parties,” and that petitioner Hernandez “is a Tax Payer and the Lead
Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims.” Clearly, petitioner Association
of Flood Victims, which is still in the process of incorporation, cannot be
considered a juridical person or an entity authorized by law, which can be a
party to a civil action. Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an
unincorporated association not endowed with a distinct personality of its own.
An unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling law, has no
juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the association. Such
unincorporated association is not a legal entity distinct from its members. If an
association, like petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no juridical
personality, then all members of the association must be made parties in the
civil action.
Same; Same; Same; Locus Standi; Words and Phrases; Locus standi or legal
standing is defined as: x x x a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain a direct injury as a result of the
governmental act that is being challenged.—Petitioners have no locus standi
or legal standing. Locus standi or legal standing is defined as: x x x a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain a direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The term “interest” means a material interest, an interest in issue
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. The gist of the question of standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Association of Flood Victims vs. Commission on Elections, 732
SCRA 100, G.R. No. 203775 August 5, 2014
G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007.*
AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR
SCHOOL TEACHERS AND ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER—
HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the
Secretary of Justice, respondent .
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who has lost
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country; On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance; By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign
citizen-ship.—From the excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the
intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225 is to do away with the
provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine
Page | 87
citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of
other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not
recognize dual allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the
Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly,
from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not
there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the
other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.
Same; Same; Same; Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would
set specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance; Until this is
done, it would be premature for the judicial department including this Court to
rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.—To begin with, Section 5, Article
IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing
provision. The legislature still has to enact the law on dual allegiance. In
Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with
dual citizenship per se, but with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain
their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization.
Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it
would be premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule
on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.
Same; Same; Same; The case of Mercado did not set the parameters of what
constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual
allegiance and dual citizenship.—Neither can we subscribe to the proposition
of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set
the guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado.
That case did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but
merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.
Same; Same; Same; Court cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters
of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly
delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for
study and legislation by Congress.—In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA
394 (2001), we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws
with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right
and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the
acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed
with judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. The doctrine of
separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the duty of setting
the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself
has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual
allegiance for study and legislation by Congress. Advocates and Adherents of
Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member vs.
Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108, G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007
G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999.*
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS
MANZANO and theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Certainly, petitioner had, and still has,
an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to
intervene; The rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only
applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may
be declared the winner.—Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither
legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is
“a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot
be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private
respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.” The
flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
Page | 88
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for
Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private
respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that
time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private
respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene.
The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases,only applies to
cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is
whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared
the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave
to File Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the
winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private respondent
disqualified “from running for [an] elective local position” under §40(d) of
R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was
competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Same; Same; Same; That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the
proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6
of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of
1987.—Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation any less because
he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private
respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes
among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene
at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private
respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987.
Same; Same; Same; Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment
rendered.—Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification
even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
Same; Same; Same; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner’s
motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.—The failure of the
COMELEC enbanc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant
petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC enbanc instead decided the merits of
the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of
petitioner’s motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondent’s alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance.—Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of
two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the
said states.For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose
parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is
born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto
and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen
of both states.
Same; Same; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship.—Considering the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens
of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino
fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus
soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if
by the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have
renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
Page | 89
loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
Same; Same; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No. 7160, §40(d)
and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual
allegiance.”—In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in R.A.
No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring
to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing
of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is
the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. Mercado
vs. Manzano, 307 SCRA 630, G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999
G.R. No. 182701. July 23, 2008.*
EUSEBIO EUGENIO K. LOPEZ, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and TESSIE P. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Election Law; Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003 (Republic Act No. 9225); The case of Valles v. Commission on
Elections, 337 SCRA 543 (2000), has been superseded by the enactment of
Republic Act No. 9225 or the Dual Citizenship Act in 2003—R.A. No. 9225
expressly provides for the conditions before those who re-acquired Filipino
citizenship may run for a public office in the Philippines, i.e., that they make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.—The
Court’s 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by the enactment of R.A.
No. 9225 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225 expressly provides for the conditions before
those who re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public office in the
Philippines. Section 5 of the said law states: Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines
and the following conditions: x x x x (2) Those seeking elective public office
in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer
an oath.
Same; Same; Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.—While it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath
and began to discharge the functions of Barangay Chairman, his victory can
not cure the defect of his candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does
not validate the election of a disqualified candidate because the application of
the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
G.R. No. 162224. June 7, 2007.*
2nd LT. SALVADOR represented by his daughter Myrna P. Caintic,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and CHIEF OF STAFF,
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Commission on Audit; A money claim is “a demand for payment of a sum of
money, reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due from
or owing to a government agency.”— Petitioner filed his money claim before
the COA. A money claim is “a demand for payment of a sum of money,
reimbursement or compensation arising from law or contract due from or
owing to a government agency.” Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, money claims against the
government shall be filed before the COA.
Page | 90
Same; Jurisdictions; The jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit (COA) over
money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on
the constitutionality or validity of laws.—The jurisdiction of the COA over
money claims against the government does not include the power to rule on
the constitutionality or validity of laws. The 1987 Constitution vests the power
of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law, treaty,
international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation in this Court and in all Regional Trial Courts.
Petitioner’s money claim essentially involved the constitutionality of Section
27 of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the COA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing petitioner’s money claim.
Armed Forces of the Philippines; Retirement; Since PD 1638, as amended, is
about the new system of retirement and separation from service of military
personnel, it should apply to those who were in the service at the time of its
approval.—We do not agree with the interpretation of petitioner and the OSG
that PD 1638, as amended, should apply only to those who joined the military
after its effectivity. Since PD 1638, as amended, is about the new system of
retirement and separation from service of military personnel, it should apply
to those who were in the service at the time of its approval. In fact, Section 2
of PD 1638, as amended, provides that “th[e] Decree shall apply to all military
personnel in the service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” PD 1638, as
amended, was signed on 10 September 1979. Petitioner retired in 1982, long
after the approval of PD 1638, as amended. Hence, the provisions of PD 1638,
as amended, apply to petitioner.
Same; Same; Due Process; Vested Rights; It is only upon retirement that
military personnel acquire a vested right to retirement benefits.—PD 1638, as
amended, does not impair any vested right or interest of petitioner. Where the
employee retires and meets the eligibility requirements, he acquires a vested
right to the benefits that is protected by the due process clause. At the time of
the approval of PD 1638 and at the time of its amendment, petitioner was still
in active service. Hence, petitioner’s retirement benefits were only future
benefits and did not constitute a vested right. Before a right to retirement
benefits or pension vests in an employee, he must have met the stated
conditions of eligibility with respect to the nature of employment, age, and
length of service. It is only upon retirement that military personnel acquire a
vested right to retirement benefits. Retirees enjoy a protected property interest
whenever they acquire a right to immediate payment under pre-existing law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Retirement benefits of military personnel are
purely gratuitous in nature.—The retirement benefits of military personnel are
purely gratuitous in nature. They are not similar to pension plans where
employee participation is mandatory, hence, the employees have contractual
or vested rights in the pension which forms part of the compensation.
Same; Same; Equal Protection; Requisites for Valid Classification.—The
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws is not absolute but is subject
to reasonable classification. To be reasonable, the classification (a) must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (b) must be
germane to the purpose of the law; (c) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (d) must apply equally to each member of the class.
Same; Same; Same; Compulsory Military Service; The constitutional right of
the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service
necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have
retired from military service.—There is compliance with all these conditions.
There is a substantial difference between retirees who are citizens of the
Philippines and retirees who lost their Filipino citizenship by naturalization in
another country, such as petitioner in the case before us. The constitutional
right of the state to require all citizens to render personal and military service
necessarily includes not only private citizens but also citizens who have
retired from military service. A retiree who had lost his Filipino citizenship
already renounced his allegiance to the state. Thus, he may no longer be
compelled by the state to render compulsory military service when the need
arises. Petitioner’s loss of Filipino citizenship constitutes a substantial
distinction that distinguishes him from other retirees who retain their Filipino
Page | 91
citizenship. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that condition of the law, that is, he can receive his retirement benefits provided he
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from is a Filipino citizen. Parreño vs. Commission on Audit, 523 SCRA 390, G.R.
another. No. 162224 June 7, 2007

Same; Same; Same; Same; Even when a retiree is no longer in the active
service, he is still a part of the Citizen Armed Forces.— Republic Act No.
7077 (RA 7077) affirmed the constitutional right of the state to a Citizen
Armed Forces. Section 11 of RA 7077 provides that citizen soldiers or
reservists include ex-servicemen and retired officers of the AFP. Hence, even
when a retiree is no longer in the active service, he is still a part of the Citizen
Armed Forces. Thus, we do not find the requirement imposed by Section 27 of
PD 1638, as amended, oppressive, discriminatory, or contrary to public policy.
The state has the right to impose a reasonable condition that is necessary for
national defense. To rule otherwise would be detrimental to the interest of the
state.

Same; Same; Same; Repatriation; An AFP retiree who lost his retirement
benefits as a result of his naturalization in some other country will be entitled
to receive his monthly pension should he reacquire his Filipino citizenship
since he will again be entitled to the benefits and privileges of Filipino
citizenship reckoned from the time of his reacquisition of Filipino citizenship.
—Petitioner has other recourse if he desires to continue receiving his monthly
pension. Just recently, in AASJS Member-Hector Gumangan Calilung v. G.R. No. 142840. May 7, 2001.*
Simeon Datumanong, 523 SCRA 105 (2007), this Court upheld the ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF
constitutionality of RA 9225. If petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship, REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C.
he will even recover his natural-born citizenship. In Tabasa v. Court of CRUZ, respondents.
Appeals, 500 SCRA 9 (2006), this Court reiterated that “[t]he repatriation of
the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship x x Constitutional Law; Citizenship; There are two ways of acquiring citizenship:
x.” Petitioner will be entitled to receive his monthly pension should he (1) by birth and (2) by naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a
reacquire his Filipino citizenship since he will again be entitled to the benefits citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.—There are
and privileges of Filipino citizenship reckoned from the time of his two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization.
reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. There is no legal obstacle to the These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens:
resumption of his retirement benefits from the time he complies again with the

Page | 92
the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time
of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
Same; Same; Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.—
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the
former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To
be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to become a
Filipino citizen.
Same; Same; Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be Reacquired by a
Former Citizen.—Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
Same; Same; Same; Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.—Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.
This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored
to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was
originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he
will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
Same; Same; Same; A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino; As respondent Cruz was not required by
law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino.—Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2)
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a
naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization
to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for
persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it.
The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship
and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As
respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born
Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.
Remedial Law; Certiorari; The Court’s jurisdiction over the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) is merely to check “whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction” on the part of the latter; There is no showing of grave abuse of
discretion in this case.—The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution
to be the “sole judge” of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the House. The Court’s jurisdiction over the
HRET is merely to check “whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction” on the part of the latter.
In the absence thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court’s judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the
office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision. There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
Bengson III vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545,
G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001
Page | 93

G.R. No. 187567. February 15, 2012.*
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORA FE
SAGUN, respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; A direct recourse to the Supreme
Court from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved.
—At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court
from the decisions, final resolutions and orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. On the other hand, there is a
question of fact when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the
question of whether the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct or not, is a
question of law.
Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Citizenship; The Supreme Court has
consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or the Rules
for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual.—For sure, this
Court has consistently ruled that there is no proceeding established by law, or
the Rules for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. There
is no specific legislation authorizing the institution of a judicial proceeding to
declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. This was our ruling in Yung
Uan Chu v. Republic, 159 SCRA 593 (1988), citing the early case of Tan v.
Republic of the Philippines, 107 Phil. 632 (1960), where we clearly stated:
Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial
declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for
settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally
demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a
remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident
only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court
may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative totheir status. Otherwise,
such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power.
Same; Same; Same; If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge
under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter
even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity
of the new Constitution.—Under Article IV, Section 1(4) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother
and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon
Page | 94
reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. The right
to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it
provided that “[t]hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens
of the Philippines. Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was
carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that “[t]hose born before
January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority” are Philippine citizens. It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on
any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935
Constitution. If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the
old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new
Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; It is a settled rule that only legitimate children follow the
citizenship of the father and that illegitimate children are under the parental
authority of the mother and follow her nationality.—Being a legitimate child,
respondent’s citizenship followed that of her father who is Chinese, unless
upon reaching the age of majority, she elects Philippine citizenship. It is a
settled rule that only legitimate children follow the citizenship of the father
and that illegitimate children are under the parental authority of the mother
and follow her nationality. An illegitimate child of Filipina need not perform
any act to confer upon him all the rights and privileges attached to citizens of
the Philippines; he automatically becomes a citizen himself. But in the case of
respondent, for her to be considered a Filipino citizen, she must have validly
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
Same; Same; Same; Procedure in Making a Valid Election of Philippine
Citizenship.—Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 625, enacted pursuant to
Section 1(4), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that
should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship,
to wit: Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with
subsection (4), [S]ection 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in
a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil
registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath
of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. Based
on the foregoing, the statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship
are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the
statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.
Furthermore, no election of Philippine citizenship shall be accepted for
registration under C.A. No. 625 unless the party exercising the right of
election has complied with the requirements of the Alien Registration Act of
1950. In other words, he should first be required to register as an alien.
Pertinently, the person electing Philippine citizenship is required to file a
petition with the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) for the cancellation of his alien certificate of registration based
on his aforesaid election of Philippine citizenship and said Office will initially
decide, based on the evidence presented the validity or invalidity of said
election. Afterwards, the same is elevated to the Ministry (now Department) of
Justice for final determination and review.
Same; Same; Same; There is no specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of
Philippine citizenship before the courts.—It should be stressed that there is no
specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct filing of a
petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship before the courts.
The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely
allows any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of
entry in the civil registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which
is not the relief prayed for by the respondent. Be that as it may, even if we set
aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s conclusion that respondent
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duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the records undisputably the same with the nearest civil registry. Having failed to comply with the
show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements for a valid foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial court must be
election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her denied. Republic vs. Sagun, 666 SCRA 321, G.R. No. 187567 February 15,
election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted 2012
by respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of
allegiance, executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was
unregistered. As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo
that respondent’s oath of allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a
reasonable time after respondent attained the age of majority and was not
registered with the nearest civil registry as required under Section 1 of C.A.
No. 625. The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made generally within three (3) years from reaching the age
of majority. Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation proffered by
respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local civil
registry.

Same; Same; Same; The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and

uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise
of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of Philippine
citizenship.—Respondent clearly failed to comply with the procedural
requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in
election exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship since the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of citizenship by election. The mere exercise of suffrage,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts
showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of election of G.R. No. 119976. September 18, 1995.*
Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
clearly she has failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in
Ching, the prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the
not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled
execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file meaning in our jurisdiction.—A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’S

Page | 96
Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled
concepts of “Domicile” and “Residence” in election law. While the
COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the
Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile
for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining
a candidate’s qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as
required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.—Article 50 of the Civil Code
decrees that “[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence.” In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to
mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing,
domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning
there permanently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an
individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and
domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose
for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for
purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose
is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual
to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons
his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.—For
political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our
election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution
speaks of “residence ” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.”—
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for
certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when
the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only
“domicile.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s
residency qualification requirement.—It is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her
disqualification.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of
candidacy regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of
residence in a congressional district if such fact is established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.—Having been forced by
private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead
of petitioner’s claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her
period of stay in her actual residence in a space which required her period of
stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8—the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile—coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an
unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First
District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere
entry on a piece of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places.—We have
stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence,
it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a
profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent
nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the
COMELEC that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and
domicile for election law purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile
of his parents.—A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile,
once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of
the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile
of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she
reached the age of eight years old, when her father brought his family back to
Leyte contrary to private respondent’s averments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.—
Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence
and establishing a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the
voluntary act of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to supplant the
former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).—In
the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing
concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same
time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly
lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner’s former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption
that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law
upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term “residence” in
Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the
two concepts are well delineated.—In this connection, it cannot be correctly
argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For
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there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
“domicile” and “residence.” The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be
inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields
nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon
marriage.—A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts
of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields
nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art.
110 of the Civil Code refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.”—The duty
to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or
transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him
in order that they may “live together.” Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we shall be
faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband,
for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence—she did not lose her domicile of origin.—
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in
1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to
follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here
is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which
were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of
these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s residence. But assuming that
Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what
petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her
domicile of origin.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law
concept of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a
result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code.—On the other hand, the common law
concept of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a
result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of
1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the
intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence
has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art.
69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110.
The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of
mutual agreement between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or
under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.—Without as
much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law
(or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands
clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and
obligations of husband and wife-the term residence should only be interpreted
to mean “actual residence.” The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married
the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a
settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a
specified time is generally construed to be merely directory.—It is a settled
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doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time
is generally construed to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had
intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.”
Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory
provision is often made on grounds of necessity.—The difference between a
mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity.
Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in
Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The difference between a mandatory and
directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason
being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law.
Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of
the House of Representatives.—As to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’S
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections return and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a
member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.
ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion :
Husband and Wife; A widow can no longer be bound by the domicile of the
departed husband, if at all she was before—and, exercising free will, she may
opt to reestablish her domicile of origin.—I submit that a widow, like the
petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the
domicile of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she
automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she
may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First
District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of
a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to
meet the one-year requirement to run as Representatives of the First District of
Leyte.
PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion :
Husband and Wife; It is not the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice
of a different domicile by the husband that will change the domicile of a wife
from what it was prior to their marriage.—It is not, therefore, the mere fact of
marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that
will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage.
The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right
conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of
a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband
cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These
acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her
domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.
Same; Family Code; In light of the Family Code which abrogated the
inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the
common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife
still retains the domicile of her dead husband.—In light of the nFamily Code
which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and
perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the
anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband.
Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this
stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its appeal, it
becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it
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further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still
bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; It can hardly be doubted
that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband’s
domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women—it
cannot survive a constitutional challenge.—Aside from reckoning with the
Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of
due process and equal protection of law. It can hardly be doubted that the
common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband’s domicile
even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-
based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting
family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge.
Same; Domicile; The better stance is to rule that petitioner reac-quired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989.—Prescinding from
these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that
petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in
1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner’s Batac
dictated domicile did not continue after her husband’s death; otherwise, she
would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person
can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the
right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article
110 of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and
protected by the Constitution.
Constitutional Law; Election Law; Statutory Construction; Political
Harassment; Equal Protection; There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos
—petitioner cannot be adjudged by a “different” Constitution, and the worst
way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation bile and
bitterness.—All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are
forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against petitioner to
deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic
violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end
result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who
has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is
but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a
“different” Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to
inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.
FRANCISCO, J., Concurring Opinion :
Husband and Wife; Domicile; Petitioner reverted to her original domicile
upon her husband’s death without even signifying her intention to that effect.
—Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner’s domicile of origin which was involuntarily
supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954
with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of
her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and
effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another. The
question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal
or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus,
while the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists,
she automatically loses it upon the latter’s termination, for the reason behind
the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the
death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of
having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one
which no longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view therefore that
petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her
husband’s death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for
the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner
has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some
other place/s. Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA
300, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
Page | 101
G.R. No. 191970. April 24, 2012.* insist that the candidate own the house where he lives would make property a
ROMMEL APOLINARIO JALOSJOS, petitioner, vs. THE qualification for public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR., respondents. things: actual physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his
domicile. Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 670 SCRA 572, G.R. No.
Election Law; Local Government Code; Residence; Governors; The Local 191970 April 24, 2012
Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial
governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year before the
election—for purposes of the election laws, the requirement of residence is
synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to
reside in a particular place but must also have personal presence in such place
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.—The Local Government
Code requires a candidate seeking the position of provincial governor to be a
resident of the province for at least one year before the election. For purposes
of the election laws, the requirement of residence is synonymous with
domicile, meaning that a person must not only intend to reside in a particular
place but must also have personal presence in such place coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. There is no hard and fast rule to
determine a candidate’s compliance with residency requirement since the
question of residence is a question of intention. Still, jurisprudence has laid
down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or residence
somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains until he
acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile at a time.

Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is
not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or
domicile in a particular place—it is sufficient that he should live there even if
it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative.—The
COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his domicile in Ipil
since he has merely been staying at his brother’s house. But this circumstance
alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly held
that a candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his
residence or domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live
there even if it be in a rented house or in the house of a friend or relative. To

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G.R. No. 120265. September 18, 1995.*
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO ICARO,
respondents.
Election Law; Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not
automatically vest the position in the winning candidate.—Petitioner
conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to
the House of Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the
highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position
in the winning candidate.
Same; Electoral Tribunals; Jurisdiction; The electoral tribunal assumes
jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications
of candidates for either the Senate or the House only when the latter become
members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives—and, a
candidate who has not been proclaimed and has taken his oath of office cannot
be said to be a member.—Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for
either the Senate or the House only when the latter become members of either
the Senate or the House of Representatives. A candidate who has not been
proclaimed and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to be a
member of the House of Representatives subject to Section 17 of Article VI of
the Constitution.
Same; Same; Commission on Elections; While the proclamation of a winning
candidate is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646
allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein—
even after the elections the COMELEC is empowered to continue to hear and
decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates.—While the
proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in
conjunction with Sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation
under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus, petitioner’s contention that
“after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the
winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC
is automatically divested of authority to pass upon the question of
qualification” finds no basis in law, because even after the elections the
COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646
to continue to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of
candidates.
Same; Domicile; Residence; In order for a person to qualify as a candidate for
a district, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile
of choice.—We agree with COMELEC’s contention that in order that
petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City the latter “must prove that he has established not just
residence but domicile of choice.”
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Residence, for election law purposes,
has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.—The Constitution requires that a
person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a resident
of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1)
year prior to the elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Clearly, the place “where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home,” i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election
law.—Clearly, the place “where a party actually or constructively has his
permanent home,” where he, no matter where he may be found at any given
time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to
which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual
conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is “to exclude
Page | 103
strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the
community” from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain.
Same; Same; Same; While there is nothing wrong with the practice of
establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements,
this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place
through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the n eeds
of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify.—While there is nothing wrong with the
practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law
requirements, this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is
to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of
residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be
obviously best met by individuals who have either had actual residence in the
area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the same area either by
origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire
into the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a
resident for a period of one year in the area now encompassed by the Second
Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election or whether or not he
was domiciled in the same.
Same; Same; Same; The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions in the instant case—
sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and the suspicious
circumstances under which a lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioner’s claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution.—
While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to
vote or to be voted upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has
other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short length of time he
claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact of his
stated domicile in Tarlac) “indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in
transferring his physical residence” is not to acquire a new residence or
domicile “but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City.” The absence of clear and positive proof showing a
successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the
lack of identification—sentimental, actual or otherwise—with the area, and
the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all
belie petitioner’s claim of residency for the period required by the
Constitution, in the Second District of Makati.
Same; Same; Same; Domicile of origin is not easily lost—to successfully
effect a change of domicile, a person must prove an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose.—Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred
his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly
supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. These requirements are
hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner’s claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the
absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed
to continue.
Same; Same; Same; Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take
advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting
themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the
process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.—Finally,
petitioner’s submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one
year residency requirement in a newly created political district is specious and
lacks basis in logic. A new political district is not created out of thin air. It is
carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in this case the old
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Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the
area encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day
carpetbaggers cannot be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts,
prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its
assailed resolution, that petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate
because of the constitutional two-term limit, and had to shop around for a
place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he
must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
residence for election law purposes for the period required by law. This he has
not effectively done.
Same; The second placer is just that, a second placer—he lost the elections, he
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters—he could not be
proclaimed winner as he could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates.—To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the
“first” among the qualified candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to
misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral process and the sociological
and psychological underpinnings behind voters’ preferences. The result
suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the
doctrines firmly entrenched in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec but also to a
massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of voters who cast their vote in
favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the
elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice,
moreover, would have been different. The votes for Aquino given the
acrimony which attended the campaign, would not have automatically gone to
second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have substantially
changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received
the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter.
The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be
considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which
excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such
circumstances.
Same; The Court cannot, in another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the
contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has been
disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates
because this clearly represents a minority view supported only by a scattered
number of obscure American state and English court decisions.—This, it bears
repeating, expresses the more ogical and democratic view. We cannot, in
another shift of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in
an election in which the winner has been disqualified is actually the winner
among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly represents a
minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American
state and English court decisions. These decisions neglect the possibility that
the runner-up, though obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and
insignificant in number that the votes they receive would be tantamount to
rejection. Theoretically, the “second placer” could receive just one vote. In
such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the
voters’ “choice.”
Same; By any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot
be construed to have obtained a majority or plurality of votes cast where an
“ineligible” candidate has garnered either a majority or plurality of the votes.
—Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second placer
may not be considered numerically insignificant, voters preferences are
nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the result among qualified
candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an
ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent
though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to
candidates other than the second placer. By any mathematical formulation, the
runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a majority or
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plurality of votes cast where an “ineligible” candidate has garnered either a
majority or plurality of the votes.
Same; Constitutional Law; Republicanism; As petitioner clearly lacks one of
the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
district would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law
itself.—A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people.
Through their representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for
service in government positions. And as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the
Second District of Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated
by the fundamental law itself.
PADILLA, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as
representative in the 2nd district of Makati City because he failed altogether to
prove that he had actually and physically resided therein for a period of not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the elections.—To my mind,
petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd
district of Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to
prove his residence therein as his domicile of choice, but because he failed
altogether to prove that he had actually and physically resided therein for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8 May 1995
elections.
Same; The candidate who received the highest number of votes from among
the qualified candidates should be proclaimed.—At this point, what I said in
Marcos, supra, follows: “What happens then when after the elections are over,
one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him “shall not be counted”
and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer
the winner simply because a “winning candidate is disqualified,” but that the
law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of
votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being
counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the
matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that
“the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility” most especially when it is mandated by no less
than the Constitution.” Therefore the candidate who received the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates , should be proclaimed.
FRANCISCO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:
Election Law; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; HRET jurisdiction applies
only to the members of the House of Representatives, and the operative acts
necessary for an electoral candidate’s rightful assumption of the office for
which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of office.—Petitioner
emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) can declare his disqualification, especially after the
elections. To bolster this stand, the cases of Co. v. HRET , 199 SCRA 692
(1991); Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin v. HRET , 168 SCRA
391 (1988); and Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as
supporting authorities. To my mind, this position is untenable. Section 17 of
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is clear and unambiguous that HRET
jurisdiction applies only to the members of the House of Representatives. The
operative acts necessary for an electoral candidate’s rightful assumption of the
office for which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of office.
Petitioner cannot in anyway be considered as a member of the House of
Representatives for the purpose of divesting the Commission on Elections of
jurisdiction to declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET’s
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jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing that he has yet to be proclaimed, much
less has he taken an oath of office. Clearly, petitioner’s reliance on the
aforecited cases which when perused involved Congressional members, is
totally misplaced, if not wholly inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred
upon HRET extends only to Congressional members is further established by
judicial notice of HRET Rules of Procedure, and HRET decisions consistently
holding that the proclamation of a winner in the contested election is the
essential requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; Estoppel; A party who objects to the
jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-jurisdictional
ground for dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court.—Clearly then, petitioner has actively participated in
the proceedings both before the COMELEC’s Second Division and the
COMELEC En Banc asking therein affirmative reliefs. The settled rule is that
a party who objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time
any non-jurisdictional ground for dismissing the action is deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Where a party voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the merits, he
may not thereafter be heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an
adverse decision.—In Jimenez v. Macaraig , the Court, citing Crisostomo v.
Court of Appeals , 32 SCRA 54, 60 (1970), elaborated on the rationale for this
doctrine in this wise: “The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice
Bautista Angelo (People vs. Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1
SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot adopt a posture of double-dealing without
running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel. The principle of estoppel is in the
interest of a sound administration of the laws. It should deter those who are
disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions contrary to
the elementary principles of right dealing and good faith (People v. Acierto, 92
Phil. 534, 541, [1953]). It is not right for a party who has affirmed and
invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an
adverse decision. Perforce, petitioner’s asseveration that the COMELEC has
no jurisdiction to rule on his qualification must fail.
Same; Domicile; Residence; The argument that if a person decided to transfer
his legal residence so he can qualify for public office he is entirely free to do
so, to hold water, must be supported by clear and convincing proofs that he
has effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not
doubtful.—Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention.
Thus, petitioner asserts that if he decides to transfer his legal residence so he
can qualify for public office then he is entirely free to do so. This argument to
hold water, must be supported by clear and convincing proofs that petitioner
has effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not
doubtful. Indeed, domicile once established is considered to continue and will
not be deemed lost until a new one is established (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of
the House of Representatives , 199 SCRA 692, 711 [1991]). Petitioner from
childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained
Concepcion, Tarlac, as his domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm
Village, Makati, and thereafter claimed the same to be his new domicile. This
claim, however, is dismally unsupported by the records. The lease contract
entered into by petitioner for a period of two years on the third floor
condominium unit in Palm Village, Makati, in my view, does not prove his
intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to establish domicile
must be an intention to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place.
This element is lacking in this instance.
Same; Same; Same; The best test of intention to establish legal residence
comes from one’s acts and not by mere declarations alone.—Worse, public
respondent Commission even found that “respondent Aquino himself testified
that his intention was really for only one (1) year because he has other
‘residences’ in Manila or in Quezon City ([citing] TSN, May 2, 1995, p. 92)”.
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Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the
constitutional consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he
could further and continue his political career and sudden transfer thereto
make his intent suspect. The best test of intention to establish legal residence
comes from one’s acts and not by mere declarations alone. To acquire, or
effect a change of domicile, the intention must be bona fide and unequivocal
(28 C.J.S. §11). Petitioner, in my view, miserably failed to show a bona fide
and unequivocal intention to effect the change of his domicile.
Same; Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; A legislative enactment
cannot render nugatory the constitution.—Furthermore, to subscribe to
petitioner’s contention that the constitutional qualification of candidates
should be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7854 will
indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision
of the constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A
legislative enactment, it has to be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the
constitution. The constitution is superior to a statute. It is the fundamental and
organic law of the land to which every statute must conform and harmonize.
Same; Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be penalized
alongside a disqualified candidate—the other qualified candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes should be proclaimed duly elected; The
Labo doctrine ought to be abandoned.—Finally, it has been contended that a
second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a substitute winner. I find the
proposition quite unacceptable. A disqualified “candidate” is not a candidate
and the votes which may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray
votes of no legal consequence. A disqualified person like the petitioner
receives no vote or zero vote. In short, no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had
therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim first place for he has nothing to
base his right. The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section
6, in that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they
are considered stray (Section 211, Rule 24, Omnibus Election Code). It is only
from the ranks of qualified candidates can one be chosen as first placer and
not from without. Necessarily, petitioner, a disqualified candidate, cannot be a
first placer as he claims himself to be. To count the votes for a disqualified
candidate would, in my view, disenfranchise voters who voted for a qualified
candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a qualified candidate should not be
penalized alongside a disqualified candidate. With this in mind, the other
qualified candidate who garnered the highest number of votes should be
proclaimed the duly elected representative of the district. I feel that the Labo
doctrine ought to be abandoned. Aquino vs. Commission on Elections, 248
SCRA 400, G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
G.R. No. 167684. July 31, 2006.*
JAIME O. SEVILLA, petitioner, vs. CARMELITA N. CARDENAS,
respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; The certification to be issued by the
Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist
in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite
diligent search.—The certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar
must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the
particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Presumption of Regularity of Performance of Official Duty; The presumption
of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty.—Given the documentary and
testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate
the logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted. According
to Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official
duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions. The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption of
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regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome
by other evidence as in the case at
bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the
first and second certifications.
Marriages; The rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans
toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds;
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.—The
rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity
of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds. The courts look
upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight. The Court is mindful of the
policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Same; Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere
contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.—Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested.
The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families.
The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.
Same; Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new
relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested; Every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony.
—“The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married. Sevilla vs. Cardenas, 497 SCRA 428, G.R. No. 167684 July
31, 2006
G.R. No. 186400. October 20, 2010.*
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, petitioner, vs. DANILO T. BOLOS, respondent.
Husband and Wife; Marriages; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; The Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which the Court
promulgated on 15 March 2003, extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on 3 August 1988.
—Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs this case. Her stance
is unavailing. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
which the Court promulgated on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope.
Section 1 of the Rule, in fact, reads: Section 1. Scope—This Rule shall govern
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and annulment
of voidable marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines. The Rules of
Court shall apply suppletorily. The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends only to those
marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988. The rule sets a demarcation line between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the Civil Code.
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 Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Verba Legis (Plain Meaning
Rule); A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear
and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or
interpretation—there is only room for application.—The Court finds Itself
unable to subscribe to petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase “under the
Family Code” in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the word “petitions” rather
than to the word “marriages.” A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that
when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room
for construction or interpretation. There is only room for application. As the
statute is clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This is what is known
as the plain-meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the maxim, index
animi sermo, or “speech is the index of intention.” Furthermore, there is the
maxim verba legis non est recedendum, or “from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.”
Same; Same; Same; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Time and again the
Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied with
and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of claiming substantial
merit.—There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that the tenets of
substantial justice, the novelty and importance of the issue and the meritorious
nature of this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her favor. Time and
again the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure must be faithfully
complied with and should not be discarded with the mere expediency of
claiming substantial merit. As a corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing
specific acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered absolutely
indispensable to prevent needless delays and to orderly and promptly
discharge judicial business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as
mandatory.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; The rule is and has
been that the period for filing a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible.
—The appellate court was correct in denying petitioner’s motion for extension
of time to file a motion for reconsideration considering that the reglementary
period for filing the said motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. As
pronounced in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
473 SCRA 490 (2005), the rule is and has been that the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The Court has made this clear as
early as 1986 in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon, 142 SCRA 208 (1986).
Since then, the Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Appeals; While the right to appeal is a statutory,
not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.—Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its purpose
is to bring up for review a final judgment of the lower court. The courts
should, thus, proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right to
appeal. In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of Las Piñas City, Br. 254, 563
SCRA 447 (2008), the Court reiterated: While the right to appeal is a statutory,
not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial system and
courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest opportunity
for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
Same; Same; Same; Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not
a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested
—the break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.—This
Court is not unmindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage
is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State finds no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
Page | 110
families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and,
hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
Bolos vs. Bolos, 634 SCRA 429, G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
G.R. No. 158298. August 11, 2010.*
ISIDRO ABLAZA, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Marriages; As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated
cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.—A
valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife
and to give rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such
relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the
validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already
celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing
law. To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister was void
under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family Code;
yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void
nature of a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under
the regime of the Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void,
considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in force at
the time of the marriage ceremony.
Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC); Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly
provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife; A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect
on 3 August 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in
application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after 15 March 2003.
—The Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages),
which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife.
Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by
the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.
Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the
Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003. Based on Carlos v. Sandoval, 574 SCRA
116 (2008), the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit: 1. Those commenced before
March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and 2. Those
filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code
and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15,
2003.
Same; Same; Legal Research; The old and new Civil Codes contain no
provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and
when.—The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a
petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal
v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 (2000), the children were allowed to file after the
Page | 111
death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s
marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a
marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and
a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned.
Same; Same; Parties; The right of a sibling to bring an action to declare the
nullity of a marriage contracted under the old Civil Code hinges upon a prior
determination of whether the decedent had any descendants, ascendants, or
children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether such sibling was the
decedent’s surviving heir.—The petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming that the petitioner was as
he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.
Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the
laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother
under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code,
as follows: Article 1001, should brothers and sisters or their children survive
with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
Article 1003, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or
a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased in accordance with the following articles. Pursuant to these
provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of
the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding
to the deceased’s estate. Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to
bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had
any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of
whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves
questions of fact.
party—such party’s absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null
and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even
as to those present.—We note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila,
who, as the late Cresenciano’s surviving wife, stood to be benefited or
prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is relevant to observe,
moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required
a marriage license for their validity; hence, her participation in this action is
made all the more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage
had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage
might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a marriage
license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein: x x x
under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the
exercise of judicial power. It is precisely “when an indispensable party is not
before the court [that] the action should be dismissed. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present. Ablaza vs. Republic, 628 SCRA 27, G.R. No. 158298 August
11, 2010

Same; Same; Same; The surviving spouse must be impleaded in an action for
the declaration of nullity of a marriage since he or she is an indispensable

Page | 112

G.R. No. 103047. September 2, 1994.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.
Marriages; Absence of a marriage license renders the marriage void ab initio.
—At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law
governing marital relations was the New Civil Code. The law provides that no
marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a local
civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Same; Evidence; Civil Registrars; The certification of “due search and
inability to find” issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value and
sufficiently proves that his office did not issue a particular marriage license.—
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required
to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. The certification of “due search and inability to find” issued by the civil
registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to
Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of “due search and
inability to find” sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage
license no. 3196182 to the contracting parties.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Secret marriage” is a legally non-existent
phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the
knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or both of the contracting
parties.—The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in
support of her petition is, in itself, not a ground to deny her petition. The
failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to
the peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject
marriage was a civil ceremony performed by a judge of a city court. The
subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a “secret marriage”—a
legally non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage
celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives and/or friends of either or
both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between
Castro and Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 257, G.R. No. 103047 September 2,
1994
Page | 113

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002.*
(Formerly IPI No. 01-1049-MTJ)
MERCEDITA MATA ARAÑES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M.
OCCIANO, respondent.
Administrative Law; Judges; The authority of the regional trial court judges
and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.—Under the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial
court judges and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined
to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
Same; Same; Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside the court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.—“A priest who is
commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is
authorized to do so only within the area or diocese or place allowed by his
Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said
areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s
jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.”
Same; Same; Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that
gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.—In
People vs. Lara, we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the
marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing
officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not
possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Same; Same; The withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the
legal effect of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action.—Respondent
judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by
petitioner. This Court has consistently held in a catena of cases that the
withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect of
exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and
fair administration of justice, as well as the discipline of court personnel,
would be undermined. Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the
will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Court’s constitutional power to discipline judges.
Page | 114
Otherwise, that power may be put to naught, undermine the trust character of a
public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a
disciplining authority. Arañes vs. Occiano, 380 SCRA 402, A.M. No. MTJ-02-
1390 April 11, 2002
G.R. No. 183896. January 30, 2013.*
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, petitioner, vs. GLORIA GOO ABBAS,
respondent.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Formal Requisites of Marriage.―As the
marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993, Executive
Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable law.
The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles 3,
4 and 35(3), which read as follows: Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage
are: (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer; (2) A valid marriage license
except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and (3) A marriage
ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties
before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take
each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses
of legal age. Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2). A
defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45. An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect
the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Art. 35. The
following marriages shall be void from the beginning: x x x x (3) Those
solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Disputable Presumptions; Presumption of
Regularity; Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary; The presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.―Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,
it is a disputable presumption that an official duty has been regularly
performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held,
“The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No such affirmative
evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in performing
her duty of checking the records of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search having been conducted, as
Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and submitted to the court.
The fact that the names in said license do not correspond to those of Gloria
and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.
Civil Law; Family Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Evidence; The
certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license.―In
the case of Cariño v. Cariño, following the case of Republic, it was held that
the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of a
marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
Page | 115
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging
a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden,
and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the
marriage license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no
license was presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to
have been issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that
a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except
those exempt from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2,
Title I of the same Code.―All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a
wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does
not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the
Family Code is clear when it says, “The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35(2).” Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except those exempt
from the license requirement under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the
same Code. Abbas vs. Abbas, 689 SCRA 646, G.R. No. 183896 January 30,
2013
G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF
LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO,
HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA
DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN
DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and
HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO
CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO
CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA
DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-
MADARANG, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA.

Page | 116
DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R.
DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely,
TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-
RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.;
HEIRS OF ROMAN RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA
ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR.,
SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-
MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and
GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor, 2 respondents.3
Civil Law; Marriages; Although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact
took place.—Although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence
of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no marriage in fact took
place. Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be
presented in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly
establish the marriage but must at least be enough to strengthen the
presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa
Delgado as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia, the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo Rustia that he was
married to Josefa Delgado and the titles to the properties in the name of
“Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado,” more than adequately support
the presumption of marriage. These are public documents which are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was
presented by petitioners.
Same; Same; Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage are presumed
to be in fact married.—Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage
of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment
of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together
apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual
order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they hold themselves
out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of
law and propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.
Same; Same; Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable.—
Presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive
presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no
contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them. On the other hand,
disputable presumptions, one of venor was identified as “intervenor-
respondent.” For clarity, we shall refer to them collectively as “respondents”
in this decision. The Court of Appeals was also impleaded as public
respondent but this was not necessary since this is a petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. which is the presumption of marriage, can be
relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Same; Succession; The right of representation in the collateral line takes place
only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces); It
cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.—We note, however,
that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews
and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code,
the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot
be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces. Therefore, the only collateral
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate
are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of
her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the
inheritance. The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial
court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their
children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo
Rustia, they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with
Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:
Page | 117
Same; Same; Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir of the estate.—
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could
not have validly adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1
of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedent’s entire
estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir
to the estate.
Same; Paternity and Filiation; Under the new law, recognition may be
compulsory or voluntary; Cases of Compulsory Recognition.—Under the new
law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary. Recognition is compulsory
in any of the following cases: (1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction,
when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the
conception; (2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child
of the alleged father (or mother) by the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited
with the supposed father; (4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father. On the other hand, voluntary recognition
may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record
or in any authentic writing.
Same; Same; Dual limitation in a judicial action for compulsory
acknowledgement: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.—There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative father
Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a
mere ground by which she could have compelled acknowledgment through
the courts. Furthermore, any (judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment
has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent. On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no
longer be filed. In this case, intervenor Guillerma’s right to claim compulsory
acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February
28, 1974.
Same; Same; An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is
understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent.—The claim of
voluntary recognition (Guillerma’s second ground) must likewise fail. An
authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a
genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia).
This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to
be his. Did intervenor’s report card from the University of Santo Tomas and
Josefa Delgado’s obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia qualify as authentic
writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of
intervenor Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact
that his name appears there as intervenor’s parent/guardian holds no weight
since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses
testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death
of Josefa Delgado which was published in the Sunday Times on September
10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated
by the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the
original manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia
himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The
failure to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenor’s
claim.
Remedial Law; Settlement of Estate; Administrator; Words and Phrases; An
administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate
estate of the decedent; Order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator prescribes in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.—An
administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate
estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an
order of preference in the appointment of an administrator.
Same; Same; Same; In the appointment of an administrator, the principal
consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed; Order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators specially in
Page | 118
cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates.—In the appointment of an
administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one
to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of
co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that
opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a
situation which obtains here. Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa vs. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian, 480 SCRA 334, G.R. No. 155733 January
27, 2006
G.R. No. 206220. August 19, 2015.*
LUIS UY, substituted by LYDIA UY VELASQUEZ and SHIRLEY UY
MACARAIG, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES JOSE LACSAMANA and
ROSAURA** MENDOZA, substituted by CORAZON BUENA,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Presumptions; Marriages; There is a presumption
established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.”—The
main issue in determining the validity of the sale of the property by Rosca
alone is anchored on whether Uy and Rosca had a valid marriage. There is a
presumption established in our Rules “that a man and woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.” Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage.
However, this presumption may be contradicted by a party and overcome by
other evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Same; In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), the
Supreme Court (SC) held that testimony by one (1) of the parties to the
marriage, or by one of the witnesses to the marriage, as well as the person who
officiated at the solemnization of the marriage, has been held to be admissible
to prove the fact of marriage.—Marriage may be proven by any competent
and relevant evidence. In Pugeda v. Trias, 4 SCRA 849 (1962), we held that
testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the witnesses to
the marriage, as well as the person who officiated at the solemnization of the
marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove the fact of marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since Uy failed to discharge the burden that he
was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would be governed by
Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple living together
were not incapacitated from getting married.—Since Uy failed to discharge
the burden that he was legally married to Rosca, their property relations would
be governed by Article 147 of the Family Code which applies when a couple
living together were not incapacitated from getting married.
Civil Law; Co-ownership; Properties acquired during cohabitation are
presumed co-owned unless there is proof to the contrary.—The provision
states that properties acquired during cohabitation are presumed co-owned
unless there is proof to the contrary. We agree with both the trial and appellate
courts that Rosca was able to prove that the subject property is not co-owned
but is paraphernal. Uy vs. Lacsamana, 767 SCRA 672, G.R. No. 206220
August 19, 2015
Page | 119

G.R. No. 169766. March 30, 2011.*
ESTRELLITA JULIANO-LLAVE, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, HAJA PUTRI ZORAYDA A. TAMANO and ADIB
AHMAD A. TAMANO, respondents.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; An application for certiorari is an independent
action which is not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the
rendition of the judgment complained of.—Estrellita argues that the trials
court prematurely issued its judgment, as it should have waited first for the
resolution of her Motion to Dismiss before the CA and, subsequently, before
this Court. However, in upholding the RTC, the CA correctly ailed that the
pendency of a petition for certiorari does not suspend the proceedings before
the trial court. “An application for certiorari is an independent action which is
not part or a continuation of the trial which resulted in the rendition of the
judgment complained of.”
Same; Answer; Her failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her
evidence were attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to
benefit from her own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party.—Her
failure to file an answer and her refusal to present her evidence were
attributable only to herself and she should not be allowed to benefit from her
own dilatory tactics to the prejudice of the other party. Sans her answer, the
trial court correctly proceeded with the trial and rendered its Decision after it
deemed Estrellita to have waived her right to present her side of the story.
Civil Law; Marriages; The Civil Code governs their personal status since this
was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage.—Even granting
that there was registration of mutual consent for the marriage to be considered
as one contracted under the Muslim law, the registration of mutual consent
between Zorayda and Sen. Tamano will still be ineffective, as both are
Muslims whose marriage was celebrated under both civil and Muslim laws.
Besides, as we have already settled, the Civil Code governs their personal
status since this was in effect at the time of the celebration of their marriage.
In view of Sen. Tamano’s prior marriage which subsisted at the time Estrellita
married him, their subsequent marriage is correctly adjudged by the CA as
void ab initio.
Family Code; Marriages; In a void marriage, any interested party may attack
the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.—While the Family
Code is silent with respect to the proper party who can file a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage prior to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, it has been
held that in a void marriage, in which no marriage has taken place and cannot
be the source of rights, any interested party may attack the marriage directly
Page | 120
or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the
lifetime of the parties to the marriage. Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not
apply, Adib, as one of the children of the deceased who has property rights as
an heir, is likewise considered to be the real party in interest in the suit he and
his mother had filed since both of them stand to be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the suit. Juliano-Llave vs. Republic, 646 SCRA 637, G.R. No.
169766 March 30, 2011
G.R. No. 119190. January 16, 1997.*
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-
TSOI, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; Marriage; The prolonged refusal of a spouse to have
sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological
incapacity.—“If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological
incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is
equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse
to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.”
Same; Same; Same; One of the essential marital obligations under the Family
Code is “to procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.”—
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is
“To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of
children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage.” Constant
non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted
refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent
to psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Same; While the law provides that the husband and the wife are
obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, the sanction
therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order.—While the law provides that
the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually
the “spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any
legal mandate or court order” (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno, 120 Phil. 1298). Love
is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.”
This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing
but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the
mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of
Appeals, 266 SCRA 324, G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
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G.R. No. 150677. June 5, 2009.*
RENATO REYES SO, petitioner, vs. LORNA VALERA, respondent.
Family Code; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological Incapacity;
Characterization of Psychological Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must
be confined to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.—The petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage is anchored on Article 36 of the Family Code which provides that “a
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations
of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.” In Santos v. Court of Appeals (240 SCRA 20
[1995]), the Court first declared that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to “no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” It must be
confined to “the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; There is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity.—A later case, Marcos v. Marcos
(343 SCRA 755 [2000]), further clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the
Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes
and occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of
psychological incapacity.—In Molina (268 SCRA 198 [1997], we ruled that
“mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and occasional emotional
outbursts cannot be accepted as indicative of psychological incapacity. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, the root cause should
be a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
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element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person
from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.” So vs. Valera, 588 SCRA 320, G.R. No. 150677 June 5, 2009
G.R. No. 112019. January 4, 1995.*
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Circular 28–91; Circular 28–91 requires a certification of non-
forum shopping.—The petition should be denied not only because of its non-
compliance with Circular 28–91, which requires a certification of non-forum
shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Civil Law; Family Code; Void and Void able Marriages; Psychological
Incapacity; Psychological incapacity must be characterized by a) gravity, b)
juridical antecedence, and c) incurability.—Justice Sempio-Diy cites with
approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the
Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila
(Branch I), who opines that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties, required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing
precepts in our law on marriage.—It should be obvious, looking at all the
foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the deliberations of
the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase
‘psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to
comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by
some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and
like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma’s “Void and Voidable
Marriages in the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law,” quoting from
the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder by the American
Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson’s “Handbook II for Marriage Nullity
Cases”). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our
law on marriages. Thus correlated, “psychological incapacity” should refer to
no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
Page | 123
Same; Same; Same; Same; The intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensibility or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.—There is hardly any doubt that the
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other
hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This
conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers
children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void
marriage to be “legitimate.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Other forms of psychoses, if existing at the

inception of marriage merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code.—The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the
inception of marriage, like the state of a party being of unsound mind or
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article
46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere
grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These
provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of G.R. No. 173294. February 27, 2008.*
these various circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and RENNE ENRIQUE BIER, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES A. BIER and
severity of the disorder, indicia of psychological incapacity. Santos vs. Court THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20, G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Annulment of Marriage; Psychological
Incapacity; The Supreme Court has been consistent in holding that if a petition
for nullity based on psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its
gravity, root cause, incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the
time of celebration of the marriage must always be proved; Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and

Page | 124
(c) incurability.—The trial court apparently overlooked the fact that this Court
has been consistent in holding that if a petition for nullity based on
psychological incapacity is to be given due course, its gravity, root cause,
incurability and the fact that it existed prior to or at the time of celebration of
the marriage must always be proved. As early as Santos v. CA, et al., 240
SCRA 20 (1995), we already held that: [P]sychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the
history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it
were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved. x
x x This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; The granting of a petition for nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.—These must be
strictly complied with as the granting of a petition for nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This is specially so
since the Family Code does not define psychological incapacity. The
determination thereof is left solely to the discretion of the courts and must be
made on a case-to-case basis.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure or
refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as a married person and
eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the
basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some
psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.—Petitioner was able to
establish that respondent was remiss in her duties as a wife and had become a
happy-go-lucky woman who failed to attend to her husband’s needs and who
eventually abandoned him. However, the totality of her acts, as testified to by
petitioner and his brother, was not tantamount to a psychological incapacity, as
petitioner would have us believe. Habitual alcoholism, chain-smoking, failure
or refusal to meet one’s duties and responsibilities as a married person and
eventual abandonment of a spouse do not suffice to nullify a marriage on the
basis of psychological incapacity, if not shown to be due to some
psychological (as opposed to physical) illness.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Although absence can indeed make the heart grow
fonder, the opposite can just as well be true—out of sight, out of mind—the
couple drifted apart and respondent obviously fell out of love with petitioner.
—The undeniable fact is that the marriage, according to petitioner’s own
evidence, was off to a good start. According to him, respondent used to be a
sweet, loving and caring wife who took good care of him and their home. She
even willingly consented to the difficult living arrangement of taking turns in
going back and forth between the Philippines and Saudi Arabia just so they
could be together. Perhaps it was this unusual arrangement which took a heavy
toll on their relationship. They barely saw and spent time with each other.
Respondent could have gotten used to petitioner’s absence. And although
absence can indeed make the heart grow fonder, the opposite can just as well
be true: out of sight, out of mind. The couple drifted apart and respondent
obviously fell out of love with petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It was not enough that respondent, the party
adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital
obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same—proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from
complying with her essential marital obligations.—We agree with the CA that
the change in respondent’s feelings towards petitioner could hardly be
described as a psychological illness. It was not enough that respondent, the
party adverted to as psychologically incapacitated to comply with her marital
obligations, had difficulty or was unwilling to perform the same. Proof of a
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natal or supervening disabling factor, an adverse integral element in
respondent’s personality structure that effectively incapacitated her from
complying with her essential marital obligations, had to be shown. This
petitioner failed to do. Consequently, we are unconvinced that respondent’s
condition was rooted in some incapacitating or debilitating disorder. Bier vs.
Bier, 547 SCRA 123, G.R. No. 173294 February 27, 2008
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
Family Code; Marriage; Psychological incapacity must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.—In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, this Court,
speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that “psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity x x x and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition
must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated.” Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a
former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic
Archdiocese of Manila, Justice Vitug wrote that “the psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.”
Same; Same; Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.—On the other
hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological
defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a “difficulty,”
if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting
personalities” in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough
to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.
Same; Same.—The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she
and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no
showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its
incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity.
Same; Same; Guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code.—From their submissions and the Court’s own deliberations, the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the
bar: (1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and
continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity
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of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It
decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected”
by the state.
Same; Same; Root cause of psychological incapacity must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.—
The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical,
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of
ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a
psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
Same; Same; The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the
celebration” of the marriage.—The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
“the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
Same; Same; Such incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable.—Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or
even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated
to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.
Same; Same; Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability
of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.—Such illness
must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
Same; Same; Non-complied marital obligation(s) must be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.—The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71
of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220,
221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision. Interpretations given by
the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision
Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides: “The following are incapable of
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contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”
Same; Same; Trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state.—The trial court must
order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095. Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA
198, G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
G.R. No. 161793. February 13, 2009.*
EDWARD KENNETH NGO TE, petitioner, vs. ROWENA ONG
GUTIERREZ YU-TE, respondent, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
oppositor.
Marriages; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Judgments; In
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198
(1997), in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity; The unintended
consequences of Molina has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which,
like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our
basic social institutions—far from what was intended by the Court, Molina
has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.—In
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of
rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity.
Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the
dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSG’s exaggeration of
Article 36 as the “most liberal divorce procedure in the world.” The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who
have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality
anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of
their families, our basic social institutions. Far from what was intended by the
Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be
bound by it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs,
narcissists and the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of
marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of the
personality disorders of the said individuals.
Same; Same; In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s
psychological incapacity, the Court is not demolishing the foundation of
families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it
refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot
comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in
that sacred bond; To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under
Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.—The
Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by
Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this contingency, among
which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard
against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence. The
Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving
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marital abuse, child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape. In
dissolving marital bonds on account of either party’s psychological incapacity,
the Court is not demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually
protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person
afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or assume the
essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be
stressed that the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or
laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychosexual anomaly are
manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let it be noted that in
Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
Same; Same; Judgments; Legal Research; Lest it be misunderstood, the Court
is not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in the instant case—it is simply
declaring that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which
should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under
Article 36.—Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment
of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante
O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353 (2006), there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of
petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being
redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case must be judged,
not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of
church tribunals.
Same; Same; Evidence; Witnesses; Expert Witnesses; By the very nature of
Article 36 of the Family Code, courts, despite having the primary task and
burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.—The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more
or less six (6) months. They met in January 1996, eloped in March, exchanged
marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided
expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s
behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality
disorder, and respondent’s, that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality
disorder. By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary
task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must
consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and
mental temperaments of the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The presentation of expert proof presupposes a
thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.—Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 320 SCRA 76
(1999) emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish
the precise cause of a party’s psychological incapacity, and to show that it
existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcos, 343 SCRA
755 (2000) asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself. This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that
the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity. Parenthetically, the Court, at this point, finds it fitting to suggest
the inclusion in the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages
and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, an option for the trial judge to refer the
case to a court-appointed psychologist/expert for an independent assessment
and evaluation of the psychological state of the parties. This will assist the
courts, who are no experts in the field of psychology, to arrive at an intelligent
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and judicious determination of the case. The rule, however, does not dispense
with the parties’ prerogative to present their own expert witnesses. Ngo Te vs.
Yu-Te, 579 SCRA 193, G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
G.R. No. 139676. March 31, 2006.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. NORMA CUISON-
MELGAR and EULOGIO A. MELGAR, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Family Code; Marriages; It is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.—It bears
stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage
is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and
happy families. The break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric
and, hence, their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
Family Code; Marriages; Only the active participation of the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is represented
and protected in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence.—In this case, the State did not actively participate in
the prosecution of the case at the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutor’s
Manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending parties and the
brief cross-examination which had barely scratched the surface, no pleading,
motion, or position paper was filed by the Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The
State should have been given the opportunity to present controverting
evidence before the judgment was rendered. Truly, only the active
participation of the Public Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
Same; Same; Psychological Incapacity; In Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 240
SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court declared that psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability—it should refer to “no less than a mental, not physical, incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
—In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. It should refer to “no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
Page | 130
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.” The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

Same; Same; Same; In Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755 (2000) the
Supreme Court clarified that there is no requirement that the
defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or
psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity.—The Court clarified in Marcos
v. Marcos that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by
the totality of the evidence presented during the trial.

Same; Same; Same; There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity

where there is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present
at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.—In order that the
allegation of psychological incapacity may not be considered a mere
fabrication, evidence other than Norma’s lone testimony should have been
adduced. While an actual medical, psychiatric or psychological examination is
not a conditio sine qua non to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert
witness would have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged
psychological incapacity. Norma’s omission to present one is fatal to her G.R. No. 104818. September 17, 1993.*
position. There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
is absolutely no showing that the “defects” were already present at the DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Republic vs. Cuison- MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Melgar, 486 SCRA 177, G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006
Marriages; A marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such
fact under the. Family Code even for purposes other than remarriage.—Came
the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence

Page | 131
on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now
explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for
said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
Same; Same.—In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of
a marriage is also for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or
her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration of
the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be
charged with bigamy.
Same; Same.—That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant
clause denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void
need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can
conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in
case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of
property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody
and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters’
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such
a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a marriage
which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is
legally unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was
an absolute nullity. But this he may do on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Same; Actions; Declaration of nullity of marriage carries ipso facto a
judgment for the liquidation of property, custody and support of children, etc.
There is no need of filing a separate civil action for such purposes.—Based on
the foregoing provisions, private respondent’s ultimate prayer for separation
of property will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial
declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Thus, petitioner’s suggestion
that in order for their properties to be separated, an ordinary civil action has to
be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is
the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them. It stands to reason that the lower court before whom the issue
of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with jurisdiction to
decide the incidental questions regarding the couple’s properties. Accordingly,
the respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower
court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to
dismiss SP No. 1989-J. Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, G.R.
No. 104818 September 17, 1993
G.R. No. 183824.  December 8, 2010.*
MYRNA P. ANTONE, petitioner, vs. LEO R. BERONILLA, respondent.
Remedial Law; Pleadings and Practice; Verification; A pleading required to be
verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as unsigned
pleading; A pleading is required to be verified only to ensure that it was
Page | 132
prepared in good faith and that the allegations were true and correct and not
based on mere speculations.—The Rules of Court provides that a pleading
required to be verified which lacks a proper verification shall be treated as
unsigned pleading. This, notwithstanding, we have, in a number of cases,
opted to relax the rule in order that the ends of justice may be served. The
defect being merely formal and not jurisdictional, we ruled that the court may
nevertheless order the correction of the pleading, or even act on the pleading
“if the attending circumstances are such that xxx strict compliance with the
rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice xxx may be
served.” At any rate, a pleading is required to be verified only to ensure that it
was prepared in good faith, and that the allegations were true and correct and
not based on mere speculations.
Criminal Procedure; Double Jeopardy; Requisites for Jeopardy to Attach.—
Well-settled is the rule that for jeopardy to attach, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed
before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or
plea to the charges; and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is
otherwise dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
Same; Same; Jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of
an order sustaining a motion to quash; The granting of a motion to quash
anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense is
not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.—We reiterate, time and
again, that jeopardy does not attach in favor of the accused on account of an
order sustaining a motion to quash. More specifically, the granting of a motion
to quash anchored on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense is “not a bar to another prosecution for the same offense.”
Same; Motion to Quash Information; Definition of a Motion to Quash an
Information; Court cannot consider allegation contrary to those appearing on
the face of the information.—We define a motion to quash an Information as
— the mode by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint
or Information filed against him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or
for defects which are apparent in the face of the Information. This motion is “a
hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the Information,” for which
reason, the court cannot consider allegations contrary to those appearing on
the face of the information.
The Family Code; Annulment of Marriage; Under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial
in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated.
—The specific provision, which reads: “ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.” was exhaustively
discussed in Mercado, where this Court settled the “conflicting” jurisprudence
on “the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.”
After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity of a prior marriage and examining a long line of
cases, this Court, concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial
in a bigamy case because, by then, the crime had already been consummated.
Otherwise stated, this Court declared that a person, who contracts a
subsequent marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
one, is guilty of bigamy. Antone vs. Beronilla, 637 SCRA 615, G.R. No.
183824 December 8, 2010
G.R. No. 188775. August 24, 2011.*
CENON R. TEVES, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
DANILO R. BONGALON, respondents.
Criminal Law; Bigamy; Elements.—Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code
states: The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
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shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has marriage with Edita. The finality on 27 June 2006 of the judicial declaration
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared of the nullity of his previous marriage to Thelma cannot be made to retroact to
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper the date of the bigamous marriage. Teves vs. People, 656 SCRA 307, G.R. No.
proceedings. The elements of this crime are as follows: 1. That the offender 188775 August 24, 2011
has been legally married; 2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; 3. That he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and 4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for validity.

Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Where the absolute nullity of

a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.—It is evident therefore that petitioner has committed the crime
charged. His contention that he cannot be charged with bigamy in view of the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage is bereft of merit. The Family Code
has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required
either as a cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void.

Same; Same; Same; The finality of the judicial declaration of the nullity of
previous marriage of the accused cannot be made to retroact to the date of the
bigamous marriage.—Settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense, and from that instant,
liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law, and that the G.R. No. 159614. December 9, 2005.*
time of filing of the criminal complaint (or Information, in proper cases) is REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
material only for determining prescription. The crime of bigamy was COURT OF APPEALS (TENTH DIVISION) and ALAN B. ALEGRO,
committed by petitioner on 10 December 2001 when he contracted a second respondents.

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 of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries made by present
Civil Law; The Family Code; Declaration of Absence; The spouse present is spouse.
burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse Same; Same; Same; Court warned against collusion between the parties when
may contract a subsequent marriage.—The spouse present is, thus, burdened they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal
to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief means.—Although testimonial evidence may suffice to prove the well-
that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a founded belief of the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, in
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well- Republic v. Nolasco, the Court warned against collusion between the parties
grounded belief. Cuello Callon writes that “es menester que su creencia sea when they find it impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing
firme se funde en motivos racionales.” legal means. It is also the maxim that “men readily believe what they wish to
be true.” Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 477 SCRA 277, G.R. No. 159614
Same; Same; Same; Belief may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial December 9, 2005
evidence which may tend even in a slight degree to elucidate the inquiry or
assist to a determination probably founded in truth.—Belief is a state of the
mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by
direct evidence or circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight
degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to a determination probably founded
in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character, habits, conditions,
attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct
of men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain
or characterize their disappearance or throw light on their intentions,
competence evidence on the ultimate question of his death.

Same; Same; Same; Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-
founded belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be
drawn from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.—The belief of the present spouse must be the result
of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive
or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded
belief of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000.*
from a great many circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance

Page | 135
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA
CALISTERIO, respondent.
Civil Law; Marriages; Judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse
is not necessary in the new Civil Code as long as the prescribed period of
absence is met.—A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is
not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally
noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit
mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid “until declared null and void by a
competent court.” It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases,
on the party assailing the second marriage.
Same; Same; Conditions in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid.—Under the 1988 Family Code, in order
that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be considered valid,
the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the
contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two
years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article
391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has
a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is,
unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in
court to ask for that declaration. Armas vs. Calisterio, 330 SCRA 201, G.R.
No. 136467 April 6, 2000
G.R. No. 187061. October 8, 2014.*
CELERINA J. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. RICARDO T. SANTOS,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Annulment of Judgment; Annulment of
judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court’s (RTC’s) judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief (or other appropriate remedies) are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner.”—Annulment of judgment is the remedy
when the Regional Trial Court’s judgment, order, or resolution has become
final, and the “remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief (or other
appropriate remedies) are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner.” The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction. This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City
of Legaspi, 316 SCRA 523 (1999): For fraud to become a basis for annulment
of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent
acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated. It is extrinsic or
collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that
there is no fair submission of the controversy.
Civil Law; Family Code; Declaration of Presumptive Death; The Family Code
provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four(4) consecutive
years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent
spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage.—The Family Code provides that it
is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled with a
well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already
dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage during the
subsistence of another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the
second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead
spouse when he or she reappears.
Page | 136
Same; Same; Same; Affidavit of Reappearance; The filing of an affidavit of
reappearance is an admission on the part of the first spouse that his or her
marriage to the present spouse was terminated when he or she was declared
absent or presumptively dead.—The Family Code provides the presumptively
dead spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent marriage by mere
reappearance. The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an admission on the
part of the first spouse that his or her marriage to the present spouse was
terminated when he or she was declared absent or presumptively dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination
of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions:
(1) the nonexistence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of
the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must
either be undisputed or judicially determined.
Same; Same; Same; When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is
already dead and that the second marriage is legal.—When subsequent
marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second
marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the
marital relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all
marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity
of the second marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent
marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there
was “no step taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by filing an
affidavit of reappearance or by court action.”—This court recognized the
conditional nature of reappearance as a cause for terminating the subsequent
marriage in Social Security System v. Vda. de Bailon, 485 SCRA 376 (2006).
This court noted that mere reappearance will not terminate the subsequent
marriage even if the parties to the subsequent marriage were notified if there
was “no step . . . taken to terminate the subsequent
marriage, either by [filing an] affidavit [of reappearance] or by court action[.]”
“Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that
the former spouse is dead, such presumption continues inspite of the spouse’s
physical reappearance, and by fiction of law, he or she must still be regarded
as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as provided
by law.”
Same; Same; Same; Conditions for a Bigamous Subsequent Marriage to be
Considered Valid.—A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists.
However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the
following are present: 1) The prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years; 2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse was already dead; 3) There must be a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse; and 4) There is a
court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Bigamous Marriages; Marriages contracted prior to the
valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous
and void.—A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of presumptive death, lacks the
requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The first
marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted
prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered
bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law.
Same; Same; Same; A subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing
“an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.”—The
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provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the
termination of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was
declared presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law.
This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be
terminated by filing “an action in court to prove the reappearance of the
absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution or termination of the
subsequent marriage.”
Same; Same; Same; Legitimate Children; Since an undisturbed subsequent
marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid until terminated, the
“children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as in valid
marriages.”—Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of
the Family Code is valid until terminated, the “children of such marriage shall
be considered legitimate, and the property relations of the spouse[s] in such
marriage will be the same as in valid marriages.” If it is terminated by mere
reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the
termination shall still be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment
declaring presumptive death is a defense against prosecution for bigamy. It is
true that in most cases, an action to declare the nullity of the subsequent
marriage may nullify the effects of the subsequent marriage, specifically, in
relation to the status of children and the prospect of prosecuting a respondent
for bigamy. Santos vs. Santos, 737 SCRA 637, G.R. No. 187061 October 8,
2014
G.R. No. 174451. October 13, 2009.*
VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, petitioner, vs. REY C.
ALCAZAR, respondent.
Family Law; Husband and Wife; Marriages; Annulment of Marriage; Article
45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate; Incapacity to
consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to
perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.—Article 45(5) of the Family
Code refers to lack of power to copulate. Incapacity to consummate denotes
the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act
of sexual intercourse. Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of
the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural
defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness
and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical
conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block
or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of
performing the marriage act.
Same; Same; Same; Attorneys; It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is
bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural
technique.—One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can
be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of
the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually
seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the
latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner attributes the filing
of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or
gross ignorance. But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from
dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique. Although
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this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the
mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the
violation of his client’s substantive rights, petitioner failed to convince us that
such exceptional circumstances exist herein.
Same; Same; Declaration of Nullity; Psychological Incapacity; Words and
Phrases; “Psychological incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code is
not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses—it should refer,
rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.—In Santos v. Court of
Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995) the Court declared that “psychological
incapacity” under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend
all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations.—Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences
during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said
conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the “pattern of behavior” that
showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag
likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent
psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We
emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that
respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders him “truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties
to the marriage.” Psychological incapacity must be more than just a
“difficulty,” a “refusal,” or a “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations.
Same; Same; Same; To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s
spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness, and neither can
falling out of love be so labeled; An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and
void marriage.—In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence
adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceive a
simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to
each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible from his wife. To be tired and give up on one’s
situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the
remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their
separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our
laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation—a
relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the
parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable
psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not
appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly
entered into a marriage. An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void
marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Sexual Infidelity; Sexual infidelity, per se, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code.—As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null,
petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a
Manifestation and Motion dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner
claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the
same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-
in with another woman named “Sally.” Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does
not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family
Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s
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unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.
Alcazar vs. Alcazar, 603 SCRA 604, G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009
G.R. No. 146683. November 22, 2001.*
CIRILA ARCABA, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA TABANCURA VDA. DE
BATOCAEL, SEIGFREDO C. TABANCURA, DORIS C. TABANCURA,
LUZELLI C. TABANCURA, BELEN C. TABANCURA, RAUL A.
COMILLE, BERNADETTE A. COMILLE, and ABNER A. COMILLE,
respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court; Exceptions.—The general rule is that
only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, subject only to certain exceptions: (a) when the conclusion
is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; (b)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (c)
where there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant and
appellee; (g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those
of the trial court; (h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence but is
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (j) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. It
appearing that the Court of Appeals based its findings on evidence presented
by both parties, the general rule should apply.
Husband and Wife; Common-Law Relationships; Cohabitation; Words and
Phrases; Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when
one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex—at the
very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the
marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such, and secret meetings or nights
clandestinely spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such
kind of cohabitation.—In Bitangcor v. Tan, we held that the term
“cohabitation” or “living together as husband and wife” means not only
residing under one roof, but also having repeated sexual intercourse.
Cohabitation, of course, means more than sexual intercourse, especially when
one of the parties is already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the
very least, cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a woman of the
marital relation, and dwelling together as man and wife, thereby holding
themselves out to the public as such. Secret meetings or nights clandestinely
spent together, even if often repeated, do not constitute such kind of
cohabitation; they are merely meretricious. In this jurisdiction, this Court has
considered as sufficient proof of common-law relationship the stipulations
between the parties, a conviction of concubinage, or the existence of
illegitimate children.
Same; Same; Same; Donations; Where it has been established by
preponderance of evidence that two persons lived together as husband and
wife without a valid marriage, the inescapable conclusion is that the donation
made by one in favor of the other is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
—Respondents having proven by a preponderance of evidence that Cirila and
Francisco lived together as husband and wife without a valid marriage, the
inescapable conclusion is that the donation made by Francisco in favor of
Cirila is void under Art. 87 of the Family Code. Arcaba vs. Vda. de Batocael,
370 SCRA 414, G.R. No. 146683 November 22, 2001
Page | 140

A.C. No. 3405. June 29, 1998.*
JULIETA B. NARAG, complainant, vs. ATTY. DOMINADOR M.
NARAG, respondent.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; Immorality; Disbarment; Good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar.—Thus, good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing
qualification for all members of the bar. Hence, when a lawyer is found guilty
of gross immoral conduct, he may be suspended or disbarred.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Immoral conduct is that conduct
which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show indifference to the
opinion of good and respectable members of the community.—Immoral
conduct has been defined as that conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or
shameless as to show indifference to the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. Furthermore, such conduct must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to constitute a
criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the
common sense of decency.
Same; Same; Same; A member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only
required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses
but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by
creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.—We explained in
Barrientos vs. Daarol that, “as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in
fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral
character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of
the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing
the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.”
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; Quantum of Proof; The burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Supreme Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and
satisfactory evidence.—Respondent Narag is accused of gross immorality for
abandoning his family in order to live with Gina Espita. The burden of proof
rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its disciplinary power
only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.
Same; Same; Same; Evidence; Handwritings; Handwriting may be proved
through a comparison of one set of writings with those admitted or treated by
the respondent as genuine.—Further, the complainant presented as evidence
the love letters that respondent had sent to Gina. In these letters, respondent
clearly manifested his love for Gina and her two children, whom he
acknowledged as his own. In addition, complainant also submitted as evidence
the cards that she herself had received from him. Guided by the rule that
handwriting may be proved through a comparison of one set of writings with
those admitted or treated by the respondent as genuine, we affirm that the two
sets of evidence were written by one and the same person. Besides, respondent
did not present any evidence to prove that the love letters were not really
written by him; he merely denied that he wrote them.
Same; Same; Same; Burden of Proof; While the burden of proof is upon the
complainant, respondent has the duty not only to himself but also to the court
to show that he is morally fit to remain a member of the bar.—While the
burden of proof is upon the complainant, respondent has the duty not only to
himself but also to the court to show that he is morally fit to remain a member
of the bar. Mere denial does not suffice. Thus, when his moral character is
Page | 141
assailed, such that his right to continue practicing his cherished profession is
imperiled, he must meet the charges squarely and present evidence, to the Same; Same; Same; Disbarment; A lawyer may be disbarred for any
satisfaction of the investigating body and this Court, that he is morally fit to misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him
have his name in the Roll of Attorneys. This he failed to do. to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.—In the present case, the
Same; Same; Same; Parent and Child; Parents have not only rights but also complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that
duties—e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children according to right respondent had breached the high and exacting moral standards set for
precepts and good example; and to give them love, companionship and members of the law profession. As held in Maligsa vs. Cabanting, “a lawyer
understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance.—Respondent may may be disbarred for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private
have provided well for his family—they enjoyed a comfortable life and his capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty,
children finished their education. He may have also established himself as a probity and good demeanor or unworthy to continue as an officer of the
successful lawyer and a seasoned politician. But these accomplishments are court.” Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451, A.C. No. 3405 June 29, 1998
not sufficient to show his moral fitness to continue being a member of the
noble profession of law. We remind respondent that parents have not only
rights but also duties—e.g., to support, educate and instruct their children
according to right precepts and good example; and to give them love,
companionship and understanding, as well as moral and spiritual guidance. As
a husband, he is also obliged to live with his wife; to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity; and to render help and support.

Same; Same; Same; Husband and Wife; A husband is not merely a man who
has contracted marriage—he is a partner who has solemnly sworn to love and
respect his wife and remain faithful to her until death.—Although respondent
piously claims adherence to the sanctity of marriage, his acts prove otherwise.
A husband is not merely a man who has contracted marriage. Rather, he is a
partner who has solemnly sworn to love and respect his wife and remain
faithful to her until death. We reiterate our ruling in Cordova vs. Cordova:
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to
continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral
standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes a mockery of
the inviolable social institution of marriage.” In Toledo vs. Toledo, the
respondent was disbarred from the practice of law, when he abandoned his
lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child.

Page | 142

G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989.*
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA
IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity
as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING,
respondents.
Criminal Law; Actions; Rule that the crime of adultery as well as four other
crimes against chastity cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse, a jurisdictional requirement.—Under
Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four
other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been
established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. While in point of strict
law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a
mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding and
without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Same; Same; Same; In prosecutions for adultery and concubinage, the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody
else.—Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents,
grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned
do not apply to adultery and concubinage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Complainant must have the status, capacity or
legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.—
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute
the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal
action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal
capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the
institution of the criminal action for adultery.—This policy was adopted out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in
silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of
the criminal action for adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison
d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposed offended
party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the
filing of the criminal case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and indubitably
exist as of the time he initiates the action.—In these cases, therefore, it is
indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to commence the
action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would
be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status
before or subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or
status existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did
Page | 143
not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the
anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is
without the legal capacity to do so.
Same; Same; Divorce; Fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in
his country is admitted and its legal effects may be recognized in the
Philippines.—In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted.
Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar
as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Same; Same; Same; Rule under American jurisprudence that after a divorce
has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute
proceedings against the offender is in pari materia with ours.—American
jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the
innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the
offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the
exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,
proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Court sees no reason why the same doctrinal rule
should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction.—We see no reason why
the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,
considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused
must be determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person
who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is
meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of
the complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Private respondent being no longer the
husband of petitioner has no legal standing to commence the adultery case.—
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time
he filed suit.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Allegation that private respondent
could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of
knowledge even if true is of no legal significance or consequence.—The
allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case
before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal
significance or consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the
divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would no longer be a family
nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family,
which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law
on adultery, since there would thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak
of The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former
spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653, G.R. No.
80116 June 30, 1989
Page | 144

G.R. No. 152577. September 21, 2005.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CRASUS L. IYOY,
respondent.
Marriages; Annulment and Declaration of Nullity; Psychological Incapacity;
Guidelines; Characteristics; Words and Phrases; Psychological incapacity
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support.—Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes
psychological incapacity. In a series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines
for determining its existence. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the term
psychological incapacity was defined, thus—“. . . [P]sychological incapacity”
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a
party to be truly cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly
must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations
to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.
There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychological
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated… The
psychological incapacity must be characterized by—(a) Gravity—It must be
grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) Juridical Antecedence—It must be
rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and (c) Incurability—It
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; While it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in
a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, such
psychological incapacity must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.—A later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified
that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua
non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological
incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a
petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such
psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the
evidence presented during the trial.
Same; Same; Same; Divorce; Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the material bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves—it refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage.—It is worthy to
emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the
basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less,
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under
the said Article. As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases,
Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond
at the time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage.
It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”
Page | 145
Same; Same; Same; Even when the rules have been relaxed and the personal
examination of a spouse by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage, the totality of
evidence presented during trial by the spouse seeking the declaration of nullity
of marriage must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability
of the alleged psychological incapacity.—Fely’s hot-temper, nagging, and
extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her marriage to an
American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her American
surname, may have hurt and embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of
the family. Nonetheless, the afore-described characteristics, behavior, and acts
of Fely do not satisfactorily establish a psychological or mental defect that is
serious or grave, and which has been in existence at the time of celebration of
the marriage and is incurable. Even when the rules have been relaxed and the
personal examination of Fely by a psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer
mandatory for the declaration of nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, the totality of evidence presented during
trial by respondent Crasus, as the spouse seeking the declaration of nullity of
marriage, must still prove the gravity, judicial antecedence, and incurability of
the alleged psychological incapacity; which, it failed to do so herein.
Same; Same; Divorce; Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, by its plain
and literal interpretation, cannot be applied to the case of a Filipino couple
where one spouse obtained a divorce while still a Filipino citizen.—As it is
worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of
the married couple is a foreigner who divorces his or her Filipino spouse. By
its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the
case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the
United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and
duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living
abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize
divorce between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained
a divorce from respondent Crasus.
Same; Same; Solicitor General; That Article 48 of the Family Code does not
expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar him or his Office from
intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of nullity of
marriages.—That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment
or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as
the principal law officer and legal defender of the Government. His Office is
tasked to represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding,
investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the
Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers. The intent of
Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the interest
of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind
that the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the
land, then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute
to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Same; Same; Same; While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court, the Office
of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of
Appeals or the Supreme Court.—The general rule is that only the Solicitor
Page | 146
General is authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this Court or the
Court of Appeals. While it is the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively
participates, on behalf of the State, in a proceeding for annulment or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor
General takes over when the case is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this
Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for taking the case to the
appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and
practical that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and control
over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein to better
guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
and sustains the validity and existence of the marriage between respondent
Crasus and Fely. At most, Fely’s abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy,
give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article 55 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this Court commiserates
with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to what is now a
hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither
law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.
Republic vs. Iyoy, 470 SCRA 508, G.R. No. 152577 September 21, 2005

Same; Same; Same; The issuance of the Supreme Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriage and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant petition for
review on behalf of the State.—The issuance of this Court of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages, which became effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other
doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file
the instant Petition on behalf of the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of
the Solicitor General to intervene and take part in the proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on
appeal to higher courts.

Same; Same; In the instant case, at most, the wife’s abandonment, sexual
infidelity, and bigamy, give the husband grounds to file for legal separation,
but not for declaration of nullity of marriage—while the Court commiserates
with the latter for being continuously shackled to what is now a hopeless and
loveless marriage, this is one of those situations where neither law nor society
can provide the specific answer to every individual problem.—This Court
arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals,

Page | 147

G.R. No. 168785. February 5, 2010.*
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, petitioner, vs. SHARON DEL MUNDO
DACASIN, respondent.
Civil Law; Contracts; Parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms of
agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.—In this jurisdiction, parties to a
contract are free to stipulate the terms of agreement subject to the minimum
ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy. Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence, deemed
“inexistent and void from the beginning.” For lack of relevant stipulation in
the Agreement, these and other ancillary Philippine substantive law serve as
default parameters to test the validity of the Agreement’s joint child custody
stipulations.
Same; Same; The Family Code; Child Custody; Sole parental custody of a
child less than seven years old—The relevant Philippine law on child custody
for spouses separated in fact or in law is that no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother; This is mandatory grounded on sound
policy of consideration; Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce joint
custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under
seven years old contravenes Philippine Law.—At the time the parties executed
the Agreement on 28 January 2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie
was under seven years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2)
petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United
States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child
custody for spouses separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of
Article 213 of the Family Code) is also undisputed: “no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother x x x.” (This statutory
awarding of sole parental custody to the mother is mandatory, grounded on
sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow exception not alleged to
obtain here.) Clearly then, the Agreement’s object to establish a post-divorce
joint custody regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under
seven years old contravenes Philippine law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The agreement would be valid if the spouses have
not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority
when spouses live together.—The Agreement is not only void ab initio for
being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she
refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if
the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint
parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of
the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below
seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law
suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated
or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for
commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced
parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the
separated mother.
Same; Family Code; Marriages; Divorce; An alien spouse of a Filipino is
bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.—The argument that foreigners in
this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van
Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 (1985) settled the matter by holding that an
alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.
There, we dismissed the alien divorcee’s Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission that the
foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not valid in this
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; It should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree
carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does
in the jurisdiction of the alien’s nationality irrespective of who obtained the
divorce.—We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653
(1989) to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee
(who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse
Page | 148
because he no longer qualified as “offended spouse” entitled to file the
complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now
that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien
divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the alien’s
nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.
G.R. No. 186571. August 11, 2010.*
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL STO.
TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, respondents.
Marriages; Family Code; Husband and Wife; Declaration of Nullity; Divorce;
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages—void and
voidable marriages—and in both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of
the marriage; Divorce contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for
cause arising after the marriage.—The Family Code recognizes only two types
of defective marriages—void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis
for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage. Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino
citizens.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legal Research; Through the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Executive Order No. (EO) 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA
653 (1989).—Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages
between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise
of her legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted Executive
Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present
wording, as follows: “Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.” Through the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated
into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139
(1985), and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989). In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights
after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The
Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry.—As the RTC correctly stated, the
provision was included in the law “to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.” The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status,
settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a
substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a
related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against
absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family
Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for
Page | 149
recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and
his or her alien spouse.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of
the foreign divorce decree—if the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is
likewise capacitated to contract another marriage.—An action based on the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to the
recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this
jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse
(other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Parties; Only the Filipino spouse can invoke
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code—the alien spouse can
claim no right under this provision.—Given the rationale and intent behind the
enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the
provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the
Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Conflict of Laws; Recognition of
Foreign Judgments; The unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip such aliens of legal
interest to petition the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree—direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an
action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment.—We
qualify our above conclusion—i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens—with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss
Gerbert’s petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In other words, the
unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to
aliens does not necessarily
strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity
and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides
for the effect of foreign judgments. * * * To our mind, direct involvement or
being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with
the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition
of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The starting point in
any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws—the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect
of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.—The starting point in any
recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, “no sovereign is bound to give effect within
its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country.” This
means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law
to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself. The
recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.
Page | 150

Conflict of Laws; Recognition of Foreign Judgments; In the instant case
where the foreigner seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree attached
to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the foreign law on
divorce, the Court deems it more appropriate to remand the case to the trial
court to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the foreign
divorce law, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wife’s obvious conformity with the petition.—In Gerbert’s case, since both the
foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her
capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This
Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine
foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b) authenticated by the seal of his office. The records show that Gerbert
attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the required
certificates proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply
dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem
it more appropriate to remand the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law. We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the
Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s)
obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow
other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with
our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as
provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Same; Same; More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice
of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound
by its terms.—More than the principle of comity that is served by the practice
of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis
for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound
by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the
Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Same; Same; Civil Registry; While the law requires the entry of the divorce
decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by
themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration—there must
first be a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given
res judicata effect; The registration of the foreign divorce decree without the
requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal
effect.—But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso
facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law should be read in relation
with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it
can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial
order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City
Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law
when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s
marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited National Statistics Office (NSO)
Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181,
Page | 151
series of 1982—both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of
the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce
decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.
Same; Same; Same; Cancellation of Entries; The recognition that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) may extend to a foreign divorce decree does not, by itself,
authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry—a petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated
under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry;
The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected—Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be
complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry.—Another point we wish to draw
attention to is that the recognition that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) may
extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the
cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules
of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the
Civil Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of Court supplements Article 412
of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding
by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of
the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties
to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published
in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional
requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the
petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings
(such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the
status or right of a party or a particular fact.—We hasten to point out,
however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry
—one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for
cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party
or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign
judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas, 628 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010
Page | 152

G.R. No. 149615. August 29, 2006.*
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA
BUENAVENTURA MULLER, petitioner, vs. HELMUT MULLER,
respondent.
National Patrimony; Aliens; The primary purpose of the constitutional
provision disqualifying aliens from acquiring lands of the public domain and
private lands is the conservation of the national economy.—Section 7, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution states: Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from
acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is
the conservation of the national patrimony.
Same; Same; Trusts; Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, an alien’s disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute—not even an ownership in trust is allowed; Where the purchase is
made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision,
no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty of the fraud.—
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly
admitted his knowledge thereof to this Court. He declared that he had the
Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner because of the said
prohibition. His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that
an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of law in view of
petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases
of hereditary succession, respondent’s disqualification from owning lands in
the Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides,
where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute and in evasion
of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is guilty
of the fraud. To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the
constitutional prohibition.
Equity; It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be
done directly—he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into
equity must come with clean hands.—Invoking the principle that a court is not
only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise misplaced. It has
been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to
be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly.
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come
with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated maxim which is also
expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity.
It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the
ground that his conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. Thus, in the instant case,
respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the
constitutional prohibition.
National Patrimony; Aliens; The distinction made between transfer of
ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on alien
spouse’s part—to allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to
Page | 153
enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.—The distinction
made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile
exercise on respondent’s part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own.
Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law. As expressly held in Cheesman v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 193 SCRA 93 (1991): Finally, the fundamental
law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, “Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private land shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain.” Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with
knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the
lot in question be purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right
whatever over the property by virtue of that purchase; and in attempting to
acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he knowingly G.R. No. 164401. June 25, 2008.*
violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, vs. THE
he had and has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; THE HONORABLE
the same property by his wife on the theory that in so doing he is merely PRESIDING JUDGE, Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan,
exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of conjugal property. To Zamboanga Del Norte; THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHERIFF,
sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte; THE CLERK OF COURT
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to OF MANILA, as Ex Officio Sheriff; and LAMBERTO T. CHUA,
the alien husband a not insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would respondents.
then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or disposition. This is a right that
the Constitution does not permit him to have. Muller vs. Muller, 500 SCRA Obligations and Contracts; Interests; Words and Phrases; The legal interest at
65, G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006 12% per annum under Central Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged
only in cases involving the loan or forbearance of money, and for transactions
involving payment of indemnities in the concept of damages arising from
default in the performance of obligations in general and/or for money
judgment not involving a loan or forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the
governing provision is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6%
interest; The term “forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has been
described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a
given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan

Page | 154
or debt then due and payable.—In Reformina v. Tomol, Jr., 139 SCRA 260 husband’s benefit. Sunga-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 555 SCRA 275, G.R.
(1985), the Court held that the legal interest at 12% per annum under Central No. 164401 June 25, 2008
Bank (CB) Circular No. 416 shall be adjudged only in cases involving the
loan or forbearance of money. And for transactions involving payment of
indemnities in the concept of damages arising from default in the performance
of obligations in general and/or for money judgment not involving a loan or
forbearance of money, goods, or credit, the governing provision is Art. 2209
of the Civil Code prescribing a yearly 6% interest. Art. 2209 pertinently
provides: Art. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of
money, and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being
no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon,
and in the absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per
annum. The term “forbearance,” within the context of usury law, has been
described as a contractual obligation of a lender or creditor to refrain, during a
given period of time, from requiring the borrower or debtor to repay the loan
or debt then due and payable. G.R. No. 153788. November 27, 2009.*
ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO,
Same; Husband and Wife; Absolute Community Property Regime; Family Presiding Judge, RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T.
Code; Under Article 94 of the Family Code, the absolute community property GO, doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES,
may be held liable for the obligations contracted by either spouse.—The respondents.
records show that spouses Sunga-Chan and Norberto were married on
February 4, 1992, or after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, Civil Procedure; Parties; The 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that
1988. Withal, their absolute community property may be held liable for the every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
obligations contracted by either spouse. Specifically, Art. 94 of said Code interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
pertinently provides: Art. 94. The absolute community property shall be liable in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.—The 1977 Rules of
for: (1) x x x x (2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community, or by the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited
both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the other. (3) Debts and or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
obligations contracted by either spouse without the consent of the other to the suit.
extent that the family may have been benefited. (Emphasis ours.) Absent any
indication otherwise, the use and appropriation by petitioner Sunga-Chan of Civil Law; Conjugal Properties; Registration of the trade name in the name of
the assets of Shellite even after the business was discontinued on May 30, one person—a woman—does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
1992 may reasonably be considered to have been used for her and her trade name as a property is hers alone, particularly when the woman is

Page | 155
married; By law, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the
acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in one or both
spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved.—The
registration of the trade name in the name of one person—a woman—does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is hers
alone, particularly when the woman is married. By law, all property acquired
during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been made,
contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be
conjugal unless the contrary is proved.
Same; Same; The conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract
of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
this chapter or by spouses in their marriage settlement. In other words, the
property relations of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily, by the spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on
partnership under the Civil Code.—Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the
conjugal partnership is governed by the rules on the contract of partnership in
all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or
by the spouses in their marriage settlements. In other words, the property
relations of the husband and wife shall be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the Family Code and, suppletorily, by the
spouses’ marriage settlement and by the rules on partnership under the Civil
Code. In the absence of any evidence of a marriage settlement between the
spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code provision on partnership for guidance.
Same; Partnership; In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides
that “[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership
property.” Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds
used to finance the four checks used to pay for the petitioners’ stocks
subscription, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of
the conjugal funds.—In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code
provides that “[a] partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific
partnership property.” Taken with the presumption of the conjugal nature of
the funds used to finance the four checks used to pay for petitioners’ stock
subscriptions, and with the presumption that the credits themselves are part of
conjugal funds, Article 1811 makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-
owners of the alleged credit.
Same; Same; Only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the
suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party
thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable partners. They are not even
necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in a suit even without
their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit
of all co-owners.—In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real
parties in interest. However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and
relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of
action, for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-
owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-
owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not
indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete
relief can be accorded in the suit even without their participation, since the
suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-owners.
Civil Law; Property; Replevin; We see nothing in these provisions which
requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the possessor of the property
before he can file an action for a writ of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a
condition precedent to an action for a writ of replevin.—We see nothing in
these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior demand on the
possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ of replevin.
Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a writ of
replevin. Navarro vs. Escobido, 606 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 153788 November 27,
2009
Page | 156

G.R. No. 145222. April 24, 2009.*
SPOUSES ROBERTO BUADO and VENUS BUADO, petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Division, and
ROMULO NICOL, respondents.
Appeals; Certiorari; Pleadings and Practice; Where the error is not one of
jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of judgment, the proper
remedy should be appeal.—A petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy
that is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or
quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of
such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Where the
error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is a mistake of
judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal. In addition, an independent
action for certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Actions; Third-Party Claims; Pleadings and Practice; Apart from the remedy
of terceria available to a third-party claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure
suit against the sheriff or officer effecting the writ by serving on him an
affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, a third-
party claimant may also resort to an independent separate action, the object of
which is the recovery of ownership or possession of the property seized by the
sheriff, as well as damages arising from wrongful seizure and detention of the
property.—Apart from the remedy of terceria available to a third-party
claimant or to a stranger to the foreclosure suit against the sheriff or officer
effecting the writ by serving on him an affidavit of his title and a copy thereof
upon the judgment creditor, a third-party claimant may also resort to an
independent separate action, the object of which is the recovery of ownership
or possession of the property seized by the sheriff, as well as damages arising
from wrongful seizure and detention of the property. If a separate action is the
recourse, the third-party claimant must institute in a forum of competent
jurisdiction an action, distinct and separate from the action in which the
judgment is being enforced, even before or without need of filing a claim in
the court that issued the writ.
Same; Same; Husband and Wife; Conjugal Properties; Parties; A third-party
claim must be filedby a person other than the judgment debtor or his agent—
only a stranger to the case may file a third-party claim; In determining
whether the husband is a stranger to the suit, the character of the property
must be taken into account.—A third-party claim must be filed by a person
other than the judgment debtor or his agent. In other words, only a stranger to
the case may file a third-party claim. This leads us to the question: Is the
husband, who was not a party to the suit but whose conjugal property is being
executed on account of the other spouse being the judgment obligor,
considered a “stranger?” In determining whether the husband is a stranger to
the suit, the character of the property must be taken into account. In Mariano
v. Court of Appeals, 174 SCRA 59 (1989), which was later adopted in Spouses
Ching v. Court of Appeals, 423 SCRA 356 (2004) this Court held that the
husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a “stranger” to the case
Page | 157
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has redounded
to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. On the other hand, in Naguit v.
Court of Appeals, 347 SCRA 60 (2000), and Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 378
(1990), the Court stated that a spouse is deemed a stranger to the action
wherein the writ of execution was issued and is therefore justified in bringing
an independent action to vindicate her right of ownership over his exclusive or
paraphernal property.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Unlike in the system of absolute community where
liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is
chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same
advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains; By
no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising
from the crime of slander committed by the spouse redounded to the benefit of
the conjugal partnership.—There is no dispute that contested property is
conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code explicitly provides that
payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except
insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. Unlike in the system of
absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a G.R. No. 158040. April 14, 2008.*
crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in SPOUSES ONESIFORO and ROSARIO ALINAS, petitioners, vs.
the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the SPOUSES VICTOR and ELENA ALINAS, respondents.
same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains.
The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for Land Titles; As in De Pedro vs. Romasan Development Corporation, 452
the liability of the debtor-spouse. Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination SCRA 564 (2005), the complaint filed by herein petitioner with the RTC is
can it be concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of slander also one for recovery of possession and ownership. Verily, the present case is
committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. merely a collateral attack on TCT No. 17394, which is not allowed by law and
Buado vs. Court of Appeals, 586 SCRA 397, G.R. No. 145222 April 24, 2009 jurisprudence.—Pursuant to Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the
Court ruled in De Pedro v. Romasan Development Corporation, 452 SCRA
564 (2005), that: It has been held that a certificate of title, once registered,
should not thereafter be impugned, altered, changed, modified, enlarged or
diminished except in a direct proceeding permitted by law. x x x The action of

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the petitioners against the respondents, based on the material allegations of the
complaint, is one for recovery of possession of the subject property and
damages. However, such action is not a direct, but a collateral attack of TCT
No. 236044. (Emphasis supplied) As in De Pedro, the complaint filed by
herein petitioners with the RTC is also one for recovery of possession and
ownership. Verily, the present case is merely a collateral attack on TCT No. T-
17394, which is not allowed by law and jurisprudence.
Appeals; Judgments; It is a basic principle that no modification of judgment or
affirmative relief can be granted to a party who did not appeal.—It is a basic
principle that no modification of judgment or affirmative relief can be granted
to a party who did not appeal. Hence, not having appealed from the RTC
Decision, petitioners can no longer seek the reversal or modification of the
trial court’s ruling that respondent spouses had acquired ownership of Lot
896-B-9-A by virtue of the sale of the lot to them by RBO.
Family Code; Conjugal Partnership; By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the
other spouse, any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be
void.—Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal
partnership property shall belong to both spouses jointly. x x x In the event
that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole
powers of administration. These powers do not include the powers of
disposition or encumbrance which must have the authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or
consent the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. x x x (Italics and
emphasis supplied) In Homeowners Savings & Loan Bank v. Dailo, 453
SCRA 283 (2005), the Court categorically stated thus: In Guiang v. Court of
Appeals, 291 SCRA 372 (1998), it was held that the sale of a conjugal
property requires the consent of both the husband and wife. In applying
Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared that the absence of the
consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. x x
x x x x x x x By express provision of Article 124 of the Family Code, in
the absence of (court) authority or written consent of the other spouse, any
disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property shall be void.
Civil Law; Sales; As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares (410
SCRA 97 [2003]), a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put
a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.—The
Court does not see how applying Article 124 of the Family Code would lead
to injustice or absurdity. It should be noted that respondent spouses were well
aware that Lot 896-B-9-B is a conjugal property of petitioners. They also
knew that the disposition being made by Onesiforo is without the consent of
his wife, as they knew that petitioners had separated, and, the sale documents
do not bear the signature of petitioner Rosario. The fact that Onesiforo had to
execute two documents, namely: the Absolute
Deed of Sale dated March 10, 1989 and a notarized Agreement likewise dated
March 10, 1989, reveals that they had full knowledge of the severe infirmities
of the sale. As held in Heirs of Aguilar-Reyes v. Spouses Mijares, 410 SCRA
97 [2003], “a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.” Such
being the case, no injustice is being foisted on respondent spouses as they
risked transacting with Onesiforo alone despite their knowledge that the
subject property is a conjugal property.
Same; Obligations; Interests; It was held that the interest on obligations not
constituting a loan or forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually. If
the purchase price could be established with certainty at the time of filing of
the complaint, the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date
the complaint was filed until finality of the decision.—In Heirs of Aguilar-
Reyes vs. Spouses Mijares, 410 SCRA 97 [2003], the husband’s sale of
conjugal property without the consent of the wife was annulled but the
spouses were ordered to refund the purchase price to the buyers, it was ruled
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that an interest of 12% per annum on the purchase price to be refunded is not Thus, in the absence of evidence upon which to base the amount of rentals, no
proper. The Court elucidated as follows: The trial court, however, erred in compensation or set-off can take place between petitioners and respondent
imposing 12% interest per annum on the amount due the respondents. In spouses. While the courts are empowered to set an amount as reasonable
Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 78 (1994), it was compensation to the owners for the use of their property, this Court cannot set
held that interest on obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of such amount based on mere surmises and conjecture. Alinas vs. Alinas, 551
money is six percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price could be established SCRA 154, G.R. No. 158040 April 14, 2008
with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint, the six percent (6%)
interest should be computed from the date the complaint was filed until
finality of the decision. In Liu vs. Loy, 405 SCRA 316 (2003), involving a suit
for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first buyer against the
seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first buyer and
annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to refund to the second buyer
(who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of the lots. It was
held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the date of the
filing of the complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment becomes final
and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the amount due shall earn
interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed equivalent to a
forbearance of credit. Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the
respondent spouses which could be determined with certainty at the time of
the filing of the complaint shall earn 6% interest per annum from June 4, 1986
until the finality of this decision. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or
any part thereof) remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve G.R. No. 160708. October 16, 2009.*
percent (12%) per annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA, petitioners, vs.
and executory until it is fully satisfied. MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID
D’LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK D’WIGHT VILLA
Same; Same; Compensation; Offsetting; In the absence of evidence upon ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN
which to base the amount of rentals, no compensation or set-off can take place DYAN VILLA ABRILLE, respondents.
between petitioners and respondent spouses.—Under paragraph 4 of the
foregoing provision, compensation or set-off is allowed only if the debts of Husband and Wife; Marriages; Conjugal Partnerships; The presumption of the
both parties against each other is already liquidated and demandable. To conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory
liquidate means “to make the amount of indebtedness or an obligation clear and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the
and settled in the form of money.” In the present case, no definite amounts for subject property is exclusively owned by one of the spouses.—There is no
rentals nor for expenses for repairs on subject house has been determined. issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an

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exclusive property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage
to Mary Ann. However, the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in
1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No evidence was adduced
to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter.
The presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence
of clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence to overcome said presumption
or to prove that the subject property is exclusively owned by Pedro.
Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that
TCT No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is
conjugal. Likewise, the house built thereon is conjugal property, having been
constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had even obtained a
loan from DBP to construct the house.
Same; Same; Same; Sales; A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property
concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is
governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to
be void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or
(b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the authority of the court.—A sale or
encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code
that now treats such a disposition to be void if done (a) without the consent of
both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s inability, the
authority of the court. Article 124 of the Family Code, the governing law at
the time the assailed sale was contracted, is explicit:
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the husband, without knowledge and consent of
the wife, sells conjugal property, such sale is void, and if the sale was with the
knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a
disagreement, such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given
five (5) years from the date the contract implementing the decision of the
husband to institute the case.—The particular provision in the New Civil Code
giving the wife ten (10) years to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not
carried over to the Family Code. It is thus clear that alienation or encumbrance
of the conjugal partnership property by the husband without the consent of the
wife is null and void. Hence, just like the rule in absolute community of
property, if the husband, without knowledge and consent of the wife, sells
conjugal property, such sale is void. If the sale was with the knowledge but
without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in a disagreement, such
sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given five (5) years from
the date the contract implementing the decision of the husband to institute the
case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Buyer in Good Faith; For a person dealing with
land registered in the name of and occupied by the seller whose capacity to
sell is restricted, such as by Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article
124 of the Family Code, he must show that he inquired into the latter’s
capacity to sell in order to establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.
—As correctly held by the Court of Appeals, a purchaser in good faith is one
who buys the property of another without notice that some other person has a
right to, or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same
at the time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other person in the property. To establish his status as a buyer for value
in good faith, a person dealing with land registered in the name of and
occupied by the seller need only show that he relied on the face of the seller’s
certificate of title. But for a person dealing with land registered in the name of
and occupied by the seller whose capacity to sell is restricted, such as by
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code or Article 124 of the Family Code, he
must show that he inquired into the latter’s capacity to sell in order to
establish himself as a buyer for value in good faith.
Same; Same; Same; Same; If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of
what has been given is proper.—If a voidable contract is annulled, the
restoration of what has been given is proper. The relationship between the
parties in any contract even if subsequently annulled must always be
characterized and punctuated by good faith and fair dealing. Hence, in
consonance with justice and equity and the salutary principle of non-
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enrichment at another’s expense, we sustain the appellate court’s order
directing Pedro to return to petitioner spouses the value of the consideration
for the lot covered by TCT No. T-88674 and the house thereon. However, this
court rules that petitioners cannot claim reimbursements for improvements
they introduced after their good faith had ceased. As correctly found by the
Court of Appeals, petitioner Patrocinia Ravina made improvements and
renovations on the house and lot at the time when the complaint against them
was filed. Ravina continued introducing improvements during the pendency of
the action. Thus, Article 449 of the New Civil Code is applicable. It provides
that, “(h)e who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of another, loses
what is built, planted or sown without right to indemnity.”

Human Relations; Damages; Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine
that: “Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance
of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.”—The manner by which respondent and her children were
removed from the family home deserves our condemnation. On July 5, 1991,
while respondent was out and her children were in school, Pedro Villa Abrille
acting in connivance with the petitioners surreptitiously transferred all their
personal belongings to another place. The respondents then were not allowed
to enter their rightful home or family abode despite their impassioned pleas.
Firmly established in our civil law is the doctrine that: “Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” When a right is G.R. No. 152716. October 23, 2003.*
exercised in a manner that does not conform with such norms and results in ELNA MERCADO-FEHR, petitioner, vs. BRUNO FEHR, respondent.
damages to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrong
doer must be held responsible. Similarly, any person who willfully causes loss Remedial Law; Certiorari; A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages caused. It is patent in acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
this case that petitioners’ alleged acts fall short of these established civil law amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any
standards. Ravina vs. Villa Abrille, 604 SCRA 120, G.R. No. 160708 October plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law; Definition of Grave Abuse of
16, 2009 Discretion.—A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted

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without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any
plain speedy, and adequate remedy at law. Grave abuse of discretion is defined
as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. As a general rule, a petition for certiorari will not lie if an
appeal is the proper remedy such as when an error of judgment or procedure is
involved. As long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely
abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it
will amount to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely
appeal and not assailable by a special civil action of certiorari. However, in
certain exceptional cases, where the rigid application of such rule will result in
a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the provisions of the Rules of
Court which are technical rules may be relaxed. Certiorari has been deemed to
be justified, for instance, in order to prevent irreparable damage and injury to
a party where the trial judge has capriciously and whimsically exercised his
judgment, or where there may be danger of clear failure of justice, or where an
ordinary appeal would simply be inadequate to relieve a party from the
injurious effects of the judgment complained of.
Same; Same; Where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a
substitute for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice,
the provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.
—The issue on the validity of the marriage of petitioner and respondent has
long been settled in the main Decision and may no longer be the subject of
review. There were, however, incidental matters that had to be addressed
regarding the dissolution of the property relations of the parties as a result of
the declaration of nullity of their marriage. The questioned Order pertained to
the division and distribution of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, pursuant to the court’s directive in its main decision to dissolve
the conjugal partnership. Said Order is a final Order as it finally disposes of
the issues concerning the partition of the common properties of petitioner and
respondent, and as such it may be appealed by the aggrieved party to the Court
of Appeals via ordinary appeal. However, considering the merits of the case,
the Court believes that a blind adherence to the general rule will result in
miscarriage of justice as it will divest the petitioner of her just share in their
common property, and thus, deprive her of a significant source of income to
support their children whom the court had entrusted to her care. We have held
that where a rigid application of the rule that certiorari cannot be a substitute
for appeal will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, the
provisions of the Rules of Court which are technical rules may be relaxed.
Civil Law; Family Code; Elements for Article 147 to Operate.—For Article
147 to operate, the man and the woman: (1) must be capacitated to marry each
other; (2) live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their
union is without the benefit of marriage or their marriage is void. All these
elements are present in the case at bar. Mercado-Fehr vs., 414 SCRA 288,
G.R. No. 152716 October 23, 2003
G.R. No. 122749. July 31, 1996.*
ANTONIO A.S. VALDES, petitioner, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 102, QUEZON CITY, and CONSUELO M. GOMEZ-
VALDES, respondents.
Civil Law; Family Code; In a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof,
the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.
—The trial court correctly applied the law. In a void marriage, regardless of
the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of
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cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, such
as the case may be, of the Family Code.
Same; Same; Property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership.—Under this
property regime, property acquired by both spouses through their work and
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal co-ownership. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the acquisition of
the property shall still be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if
said party’s “efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family
household.” Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the couple’s
separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Same; Same; When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal impediment
to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each other, only the
property acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned in common and in proportion to
their respective contributions.—When the common-law spouses suffer from a
legal impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively with each
other (as husband and wife), only the property acquired by both of them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares, however, are prima facie presumed to
be equal. The share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership, as the case may be, if so existing
under a valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner already
heretofore expressed.
Same; Same; The first paragraph of Article 50 of the Family Code, applying
paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 relates only by its explicit terms,
to voidable marriages and exceptionally, to void marriages under Article 40 of
the Code.—The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute
community or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until the
contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the co-ownership that
exists between common-law spouses. The first paragraph of Article 50 of the
Family Code, applying paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5)of Article 43, relates
only, by its explicit terms, to voidable marriages and, exceptionally, to void
marriages under Article 40 of the Code, i.e., the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior void marriage before
the latter is judicially declared void. The latter is a special rule that somehow
recognizes the philosophy and an old doctrine that void marriages are
inexistent from the very beginning and no judicial decree is necessary to
establish their nullity. Valdes vs. Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City,
260 SCRA 221, G.R. No. 122749 July 31, 1996
G.R. No. 146294. July 31, 2006.*
JOHN ABING, petitioner, vs. JULIET WAEYAN, respondent.
Property; Ownership; Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone through
his own funds and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the
construction of the annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked
claim.—Other than John’s bare allegation that he alone, thru his own funds
and money he borrowed from his relatives, spent for the construction of the
annex structure, evidence is wanting to support such naked claim. For sure,
John even failed to reveal how much he spent therefor. Neither did he divulge
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the names of the alleged relatives from whom he made his borrowings, let
alone the amount of money he borrowed from them. All that petitioner could
offer by way of reinforcing his claim of spending his own funds and borrowed
money in putting up the subject structure was the affidavit executed by a
certain Manuel Macaraeg to the effect that petitioner borrowed P30,000.00
from him. Even then, Macaraeg stated in his affidavit that it was sometime in
1990 when John borrowed said amount from him. With the petitioner’s own
admission that the subject structure was constructed only in 1992, or two years
after he borrowed P30,000.00 from Macaraeg, it is even doubtful whether the
amount he allegedly borrowed from the latter went into the construction of the
structure in dispute.

Same; Same; Neither tax receipts nor declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are evidence of ownership or of the right to possess realty when not
supported by other effective proofs.—Sure, petitioner has in his favor the tax
declaration covering the subject structure. We have, however, ruled time and
again that tax declarations do not prove ownership but at best an indicia of
claims of ownership. Payment of taxes is not proof of ownership, any more
than indicating possession in the concept of an owner. Neither tax receipts nor
declaration of ownership for taxation purposes are evidence of ownership or
of the right to possess realty when not supported by other effective proofs.

Co-ownership; In the absence of proofs to the contrary, any property acquired
by common-law spouses during their period of cohabitation is presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts and is owned by them in equal
shares.—The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the contrary,
any property acquired by common-law spouses during their period of
cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru their joint efforts and is
owned by them in equal shares. Their property relationship is governed by the
rules on co-ownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in
common “in equal shares.” Being herself a co-owner of the structure in
question, Juliet, as correctly ruled by the CA, may not be ejected therefrom.
Abing vs. Waeyan, 497 SCRA 202, G.R. No. 146294 July 31, 2006
G.R. No. 165427. March 21, 2011.*
BETTY B. LACBAYAN, petitioner, vs. BAYANI S. SAMOY, JR.,
respondent.
Ownership; Co-Ownership; Partition; The determination as to the existence of
co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition.—Our
disquisition in Municipality of Biñan v. Garcia, 180 SCRA 576 (1989), is
definitive. There, we explained that the determination as to the existence of
co-ownership is necessary in the resolution of an action for partition. Thus:
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, and a partition

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is proper (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by
voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase
may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition
either because a co-ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited.
It may end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and
profits received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order.
x x x The second phase commences when it appears that “the parties are
unable to agree upon the partition” directed by the court. In that event[,]
partition shall be done for the parties by the [c]ourt with the assistance of not
more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with
the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the [c]ourt after the
parties have been accorded opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for
the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the
rents and profits of the real estate in question. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Same; Land Titles; Words and Phrases; What cannot be collaterally attacked is
the certificate of title and not the title itself; Title as a concept of ownership
should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such
ownership although both are interchangeably used.—Would a resolution on
the issue of ownership subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed
realties to a collateral attack? Most definitely, it would not. There is no dispute
that a Torrens certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked, but that rule is
not material to the case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The certificate referred to is that
document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the TCT. In contrast, the
title referred to by law means ownership which is, more often than not,
represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses title with the
certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with
the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are
interchangeably used.
Same; Same; Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system
does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed—the
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.
—Placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the Torrens system does not
mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. Ownership is different
from a certificate of title, the latter only serving as the best proof of ownership
over a piece of land. The certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive
evidence of ownership. In fact, mere issuance of the certificate of title in the
name of any person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property
may be under co-ownership with persons not named in the certificate, or that
the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other parties may have acquired
interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title.
Needless to say, registration does not vest ownership over a property, but may
be the best evidence thereof.
Co-Ownership; Partition; Evidence; Admissions; Requisites; Words and
Phrases; An admission is any statement of fact made by a party against his
interest or unfavorable to the conclusion for which he contends or is
inconsistent with the facts alleged by him.—As to whether respondent’s assent
to the initial partition agreement serves as an admission against interest, in that
the respondent is deemed to have admitted the existence of co-ownership
between him and petitioner, we rule in the negative. An admission is any
statement of fact made by a party against his interest or unfavorable to the
conclusion for which he contends or is inconsistent with the facts alleged by
him. Admission against interest is governed by Section 26 of Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court, which provides: Sec. 26. Admissions of a party.—The act,
declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in
evidence against him. To be admissible, an admission must (a) involve matters
of fact, and not of law; (b) be categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and
voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter’s interests, otherwise it
would be self-serving and inadmissible.
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Waiver; Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.—A careful perusal
of the contents of the so-called Partition Agreement indicates that the
document involves matters which necessitate prior settlement of questions of
law, basic of which is a determination as to whether the parties have the right
to freely divide among themselves the subject properties. Moreover, to follow
petitioner’s argument would be to allow respondent not only to admit against
his own interest but that of his legal spouse as well, who may also be lawfully
entitled co-ownership over the said properties. Respondent is not allowed by
law to waive whatever share his lawful spouse may have on the disputed
properties. Basic is the rule that rights may be waived, unless the waiver is
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Estoppel; A party does not have any right to insist on the contents of an
agreement she intentionally refused to sign.—Petitioner herself admitted that
she did not assent to the Partition Agreement after seeing the need to amend
the same to include other matters. Petitioner does not have any right to insist
on the contents of an agreement she intentionally refused to sign.
BRION, J., Separate Opinion:
Family Code; Co-Ownership; Co-ownership only arises when there is clear
proof showing the acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the
parties, and the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same.—
Any property acquired during the cohabitation can only be considered
common property if two (2) conditions are met: first, there must be evidence
showing that the properties were acquired by the parties during their
cohabitation; and second, there must be evidence that the properties were
acquired through the parties’ actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry. Stated plainly, co-ownership only arises when there is clear proof
showing the acquisition of the property during the cohabitation of the parties,
and the actual joint contribution of the parties to acquire the same. These two
(2) conditions must concur.
Same; Same; Mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code,
without proof of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership—proof of
actual contribution must be established by clear evidence showing that the
party either used his or her own money or that he or she actually contributed
his or her own money to purchase the property.—On the contribution aspect of
these elements, mere cohabitation under Article 148 of the Family Code,
without proof of contribution, will not result in a co-ownership; proof of
actual contribution must be established by clear evidence showing that the
party either used his or her own money or that he or she actually contributed
his or her own money to purchase the property. Jurisprudence holds that this
fact may be proven by evidence in the form of bank account statements and
bank transactions as well as testimonial evidence proving the financial
capacity of the party to purchase the property or contribute to the purchase of
a property.
Same; Same; Unless there is a clear showing to the contrary, income from a
business cannot automatically be considered as personal earnings, especially
in this case where the income referred to is corporate income.—Unless there is
a clear showing to the contrary, income from a business cannot automatically
be considered as personal earnings, especially in this case where the income
the petitioner referred to is corporate income. The petitioner should have
presented evidence showing that the income she referred to actually accrued to
her in the form of salaries, bonuses, commissions and/or dividends from the
manpower business. Otherwise, the rule regarding the corporation’s distinct
legal personality from its officers, stockholders and members applies. Unless
otherwise shown, the source of the earnings would be the corporation’s, not
the petitioner’s.
Courts; Judgments; The phrase, “without prejudice to any claim his legal wife
may have filed or may file against him” in the last part of the dispositive
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portion of the Decision, is objectionable—for one, no issue exists in this case
between the legitimate spouses regarding the nature of the properties they
commonly or individually hold, and, additionally, the phrase creates the
impression that the Court is giving legal advice to the wife of the respondent
on what course of action to take against her husband.—The phrase, “without
prejudice to any claim his legal wife may have filed or may file against him”
in the last part of the dispositive portion of the Decision, is similarly
objectionable. For one, no issue exists in this case between the legitimate
spouses regarding the nature of the properties they commonly or individually
hold. Additionally, the phrase creates the impression that the Court is giving
legal advice to the wife of the respondent on what course of action to take
against her husband. This statement is beyond what this Court should properly
state in its Decision given the facts and issues posed, and is plainly uncalled
for.
G.R. No. 137359. September 13, 2004.*
EDWIN N. TRIBIANA, petitioner, vs. LOURDES M. TRIBIANA,
respondent.
Remedial Law; Dismissal of Actions; A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule
16 is warranted only if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent.
Given that the alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a
condition precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the
action, but an amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.—A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted only
if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the
alleged defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition
precedent, the proper solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an
amendment under Section 1 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
It would have been a different matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to
arrive at a compromise have been made at all.
Same; Habeas Corpus; In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare
and custody of a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve
immediately the issue of who has the legal custody of the child. Technicalities
should not stand in the way of giving such child of tender age full protection.
—In a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of a child
of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of
who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way
of giving such child of tender age full protection. This rule has sound statutory
basis in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, “No child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.” Tribiana vs. Tribiana, 438 SCRA 216,
G.R. No. 137359 September 13, 2004
G.R. No. 185922. January 15, 2014.*
HEIRS OF DR. MARIANO FAVIS, SR., represented by their co-heirs
and Attorneys-in-Fact MERCEDES A. FAVIS and NELLY FAVIS-
VILLAFUERTE, petitioners, vs. JUANA GONZALES, her son
MARIANO G. FAVIS, MA. THERESA JOANA D. FAVIS, JAMES
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MARK D. FAVIS, all minors represented herein by their parents, SPS.
MARIANO FAVIS and LARCELITA D. FAVIS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Dismissal of Actions; Under the new rules, a
court may motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or
evidence on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when
there is another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same
cause, or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of
limitations.—Section 1, Rule 9 provides for only four instances when the
court may motu proprio dismiss the claim, namely: (a) lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter; (b) litis pendentia; (c) res judicata; and (d)
prescription of action. Specifically in Gumabon v. Larin, 370 SCRA 638
(2001) cited in Katon v. Palanca, Jr., 437 SCRA 565 (2004), the Court held:
x x x [T]he motu proprio dismissal of a case was traditionally limited to
instances when the court clearly had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
and when the plaintiff did not appear during trial, failed to prosecute his action
for an unreasonable length of time or neglected to comply with the rules or
with any order of the court. Outside of these instances, any motu proprio
dismissal would amount to a violation of the right of the plaintiff to be heard.
Except for qualifying and expanding Section 2, Rule 9, and Section 3, Rule
17, of the Revised Rules of Court, the amendatory 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure brought about no radical change. Under the new rules, a court may
motu proprio dismiss a claim when it appears from the pleadings or evidence
on record that it has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; when there is
another cause of action pending between the same parties for the same cause,
or where the action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations.
Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; No suit between members from the same
family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified complaint that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had failed.—That a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with, a ground
for a motion to dismiss emanating from the law that no suit between members
from the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made but had
failed, is, as the Rule so words, a ground for a motion to dismiss.
Significantly, the Rule requires that such a motion should be filed “within the
time for but before filing the answer to the complaint or pleading asserting a
claim.” The time frame indicates that thereafter, the motion to dismiss based
on the absence of the condition precedent is barred. It is so inferable from the
opening sentence of Section 1 of Rule 9 stating that defense and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.
There are, as just noted, only four exceptions to this Rule, namely, lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter; litis pendentia; res judicata; and
prescription of action. Failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts at
a compromise has been made but had failed is not one of the exceptions. Upon
such failure, the defense is deemed waived.
Same; Same; Same; Cause of Action; A failure to allege earnest but failed
efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is
not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of
action.—Thus was it made clear that a failure to allege earnest but failed
efforts at a compromise in a complaint among members of the same family, is
not a jurisdictional defect but merely a defect in the statement of a cause of
action. Versoza was cited in a later case as an instance analogous to one where
the conciliation process at the barangay level was not priorly resorted to. Both
were described as a “condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in
Court.” In such instances, the consequence is precisely what is stated in the
present Rule. Thus: x x x The defect may however be waived by failing to
make seasonable objection, in a motion to dismiss or answer, the defect being
a mere procedural imperfection which does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court.
G.R. No. 185920. July 20, 2010.*
JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS, ALMA RAMOS WORAK, MANUEL T.
RAMOS, JOSEFINA R. ROTHMAN, SONIA R. POST, ELVIRA P.
MUNAR, and OFELIA R. LIM, petitioners, vs. DANILO PANGILINAN,
Page | 169
RODOLFO SUMANG, LUCRECIO BAUTISTA and ROLANDO not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made
ANTENOR, respondents. answerable must have been incurred after August 3, 1988. Ramos vs.
Pangilinan, 625 SCRA 181, G.R. No. 185920 July 20, 2010
Civil Law; Family Home; Judgments; Execution; If the family home was
constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code, or before 3 August
1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code; For family
homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need to
constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption from execution is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein.—For the family home to
be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what law applies
based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied
with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence,
two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home was constructed before the
effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have
been constituted either judicially or extrajudicially as provided under Articles
225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Judicial constitution of the family
home requires the filing of a verified petition before the courts and the
registration of the court’s order with the Registry of Deeds of the area where
the property is located. Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by
Articles 240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public
instrument which must also be registered with the Registry of Property.
Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of constitution will bar a
judgment debtor from availing of the privilege. On the other hand, for family
homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
there is no need to constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family
home should belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001.*
exclusively by one spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,
other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts depending upon the area minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS,
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON,

Page | 170
ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN
DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS
MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER
SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Parent and Child; Filiation; Illegitimate Children; Actions; The due
recognition of illegitimate children in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in itself, a
consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action
is required, but where a claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence
merely tending to prove paternity, judicial action within the applicable statute
of limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.—
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is established by
(1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or (2)
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence
thereof, filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession of
the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of
Court and special laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record
of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic
writing is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and
no further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not
just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. Where, instead, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of
limitations is essential in order to establish the child’s acknowledgment.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Presumptions; There is perhaps no presumption of
the law more firmly established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate; Upon the expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in
proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status
conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.—There is
perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly established and founded on
sounder morality and more convincing reason than the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of
access between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the physical incapacity
of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the
husband and wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents
sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods set
forth in Article 170, and in proper cases Article 171, of the Family Code
(which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of
a child would no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil
status for the child born in wedlock, and only the father, or in exceptional
instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an appropriate action the legitimacy
of a child born to his wife—it is only when the legitimacy of a child has been
successfully impugned that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.—
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan
G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being
children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be
aptly done because the law itself establishes the legitimacy of children
conceived or born during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and only the
father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only
Page | 171
when the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the
paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The issue whether the petitioners are indeed the
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having first been instituted to impugn their
legitimacy as being the children of some other couple born in lawful wedlock.
—The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the deceased Juan G.
Dizon establishes petitioners’ alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent
cannot be validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue,
i.e., whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of
the decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first
been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B.
de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock. Jurisprudence is
strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be
attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct
suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such
wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an
adulteress. De Jesus vs. Estate of Decedent Juan Gamboa Dizon, 366 SCRA
499, G.R. No. 142877 October 2, 2001

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