No. L-63915. April 24, 1985.
* taken so vital significance than at this time when the people have
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners, vs. HON. JUAN C.
TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President,
HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive
Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of
Printing, respondents.
_______________
*
EN BANC.
28
28 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Mandamus; Private individuals who seek to procure the
enforcement of a public duty (e.g. the publication in the Official
Gazette of Presidential Decrees, LOI, etc.) are real parties in interest
in mandamus case.—The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a
private citizen’s legal personality in the aforementioned case apply
squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be
enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less
than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to
institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any
other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor
General, the government officer generally empowered to represent
the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Same; Statutes; Fact that a Presidential Decree or LOI states its
date of effectivity does not preclude their publication in the Official
Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the
present situation where the President may on his own issue laws.—
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim “ignorantia
legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Same; Same; Same.—Perhaps at no time since the
establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by
the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media
of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for
the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative records—no such
publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what
presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts
of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: “Bajo la
denoroinación genérica de leyes, se comprenden también los
reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales
ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en
uso de su potestad.”
Same; Same; C.A. 638 imposes a duty for publication of
Presidential decrees and issuances as it uses the words “shall be
29
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 29
Tañada vs. Tuvera
published.”—The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth
Act 638 reads: “There shall be published in the Official Gazette x x x.”
The word “shall” used therein imposes upon respondent officials an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right
of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be
given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should
be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be
included or excluded from such publication.
Same; Same; But administrative and executive orders and those
which affect only a particular class of persons need not be published.
—The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or
“of general applicability” is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Same; Same; Due Process; Publication of Presidential decrees
and issuances of general application is a matter of due process.—It is
needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a
1
public nature” or “of general applicability” is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Decrees and issuances of
general application which have not been published shall have no
force and effect.—The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite
apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might
have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential
decrees which were published only during the pendency of this
petition, have put the question as to whether the Court’s declaration of
invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented
prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar
situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic
course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank.
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Same; Same; Same; Implementation of Presidential Decrees
prior to their publication in the Official Gazette may have
consequences which cannot be ignored.—Similarly, the
implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their
publication in the Official Gazette is “an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration x x x that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified.”
Same; Same; Same; Only P.D. Nos. 1019 to 1030, 1278 and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been published. It is undisputed that
none of them has been implemented.—From the report submitted to
the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette,
only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive. 1278, and
1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Neither the
subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since
no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may
be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring with qualification:
Statutes; Due Process; I am unable to concur insofar as the
opinion written by Justice Escolin would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished
Presidential issuances to have a binding force and effect.—It is of
course true that without the requisite publication, a due process
question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not
even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having
the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required
need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic
standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is to be admitted. It does not follow, however, that
failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result
in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement
would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or
presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published
in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the
Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what
is decided now applies only to past “presidential issuances.”
31
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 31
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid
any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
Same; Same; The Civil Code rule on publication of statutes is
only a legislative enactment and does not and cannot have the force
of a constitutional command A later executive or legislative act can fix
a different rule.—Let me make clear therefore that my qualified
concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential
to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general
application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication
must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2
expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen
days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette is subject to this exception, “unless it is otherwise provided.”
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force
of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which
has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
2
 Same; Same; I am unable to agree that decrees not published
are devoid of any legal character.—Nor can I agree with the rather
sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the
Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would
be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted,
with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield
assent to such a pronouncement.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
Statutes; Unless laws are published there will no basis for the
rule that ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.—Without official publication in the Official Gazette as
required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative
Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of
Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the
provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official
repository where they are duly published) that “Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.”
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tañada vs. Tuvera
Same; Respondent’s theory that a Presidential Decree that fixes
its date of effectivity need not be published misreads Art. 2 of the Civil
Code.—Respondents’ contention based on a misreading of Article 2
of the Civil Code that “only laws which are silent as to their effectivity
[date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity” is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is
that “laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided,” i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself.
This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published
pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The
best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2
provides otherwise that it “shall take effect [only] one year [not 15
days] after such publication.” To sustain respondents’ misreading that
“most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this
reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their
effectivity” would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code’s
indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the
Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate
effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the
completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period
generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
Statutes; When a date of effectivity is mentioned in the Decree,
but becomes effective only 15 days after publication in the Gazette, it
will not mean that the Decree can have retroactive effect to the
expressed date of effectivity.—I agree. There cannot be any question
but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be
published. What I would like to state in connection with that
proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the
decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree
can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the
decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will
run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., separate opinion:
Constitutional Law; Statutes; Due Process; The Constitution
does not require prior publication for laws to be effective and while
33
VOL. 136, APRIL 24, 1985 33
Tañada vs. Tuvera
due process require prior notice, such notice is not necessarily
publication in the Official Gazette.—The Philippine Constitution does
not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the
guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties
before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily
by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not
that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official
Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if
said laws already provide for their effectivity date.
Same; Same; Same; C.A. 638 does not require Official Gazette
publication of laws for their effectivity.—Commonwealth Act No. 638,
in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said
3
law is simply “An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and
Distribution of the Official Gazette.” Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its
frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the
authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also
enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among
them, “important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of
the Congress of the Philippines” and “all executive and administrative
orders and proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability.” It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required
to be published in the Official Gazette but only “important” ones “of a
public nature.” Moreover, the said law does not provide that
publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws.
This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the
same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application
such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the
operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to
when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.
PETITION to review the decision of the Executive Assistant to the
President.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public
concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973
Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or
otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is
sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64,
103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303,
312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368,
404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503,
504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658,
661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935,
961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165,
1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644,
1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840,
1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108,
116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187,
188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-
224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261,
263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-
299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349,
357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405,
438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527,
561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612,
615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-
879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-
1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196,
1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538,
1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-
1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695,
1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744,
1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795,
1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816,
1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840,
1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933,
1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-
2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
4
 e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454,
457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528,
531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563,
567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-
857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-
27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122,
123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360-
378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning
of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal,
corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is
entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time,
to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of
the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by
the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910
case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the
general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is
for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object
of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that
he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for
the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of
authority supports the proposition that the relator is a
proper party to proceedings of this character when a
public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule
in America were otherwise, we think that it would not
be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is
always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular
case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule,
because, if under the particular circumstances the
reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not
applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to
error'
5
 No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround this
case are different from those in the United States,
inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these
proceedings no other person could be, as we have
seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the
Government to appear and represent the people in
cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4 this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those
cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity
date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered
in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official
Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions
of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines;
[2] all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general
applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may
be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be
so published; [4] such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by
law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents
as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication,
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic
has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have
no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
6
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of
Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads:
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall"
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to
be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential
decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which
apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law,
he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As
Justice Claudio Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of
instructions which all form part of the law of the land,
the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official
government repository promulgate and publish the
texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so
that the people may know where to obtain their official
and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that
the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v.
Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear,
however, that such broad statements as to the effect of
a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute,
prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and
may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling
as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to
have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public
policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and
of its previous application, demand examination. These
questions are among the most difficult of those which
have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal
and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive
invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
7
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees

prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact
which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an
all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity
cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it

appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be
published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019
to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been
so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs
can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But
whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of
these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by
the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice
Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the
public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of
this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government,
as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal
laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette
or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide
that they shall take effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the

Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.

Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

8

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and
MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to
the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy
Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA
CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the
disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law. The government argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. In
the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in
the dispositive portion as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to
publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for
reconsideration/clarification of that decision. 1Specifically, they ask the
following questions:
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability
and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication"?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed
first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and should
therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the
publication required therein was not always imperative; that
publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the Official
Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in
only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a
Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution
and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in
view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the
Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances intended
only for the internal administration of a government agency or for
particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that,
however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding because
it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as
follows:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
9
 is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the
parties, both on the original petition and on the instant motion, we
have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in
its discretion provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be
shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is
the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from
its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise
provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would
offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly
provide that a law e effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short
period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it
would be prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of
a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know of its
existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures,
like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the
persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person
knows the law, which of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is
no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed
especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or
as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and t to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules
and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is,
regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the
so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published
notwithstanding that it applies to only a portion of the national territory
and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
10
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain
prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary
Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but
to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say,
the Minister of Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in
petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel
or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local Government
Code.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
disclose information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices
were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six
others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the
present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on
this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the
necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be
made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and
limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation
could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this
kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law,
and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a
law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our
function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that
under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made
in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least
as soon as possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said
Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not suggested
by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere
refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication
as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to
examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant
motion is a request for an advisory opinion is untenable, to say the
least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over.
This is once again an open society, with all the acts of the government
subject to public scrutiny and available always to public cognizance.
This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with
sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the
authority to review the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it
11
according to their lights, through their freedom of expression and their
right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to
the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint
parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined

shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as
possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another
date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the
Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay,

Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ., concur.

12

No. L-80718. January 29, 1988. * rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply to
No. L-80718. January 29, 1988.*
FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS
BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OFMARISSABERNAL, namely, GLICERIA
DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Habaluyas and
Lacsamana cases, reiterated; Motion for extension of time to file
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, not
allowed; Under the Habaluyas and Lacsamana cases, the 15-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be ex-tended.—This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not
commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied petitioners’ motion
for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry
of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly
applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon,
[G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration,
promulgated on May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc
restated and clarified the rule. x x x Lacsamana v. Second Special
Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. Nos. 73146-
53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went
further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prospective application of the
Habaluyas rule.—Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
74824, Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 161], stressed the prospective
application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace
period.
________________
*
THIRD DIVISION.
758
758 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Non-publication of the Habaluyas
decision in the Official Gazette; There is no law requiring the
publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding; Duty of lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of Supreme Court decisions.—Petitioners contend that the
the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision
in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court
of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no
law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their
becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in
active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Civil Law; Damages; Petitioner is liable under Article 2190 of the
Civil Code for damages resulting from the total or partial collapse of a
building if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.—This
Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court’s decision holding
petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs.”
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari to review the resolutions of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two
(2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in
the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et
al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration and
759
VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 759
13
 De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had
become final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987
denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for having been filed out
of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for
not being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of
Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this
defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in
injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the
former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the
Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch X X XVIII, presided
by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners
guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in
toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17,
1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25,
1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners
filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this
was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987. This Court finds
that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their
motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5,
1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on
May 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and
clarified the rule, to wit:
760
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending
with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its
sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p.
212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA
643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the
modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept.
15, 1986, 144 SCRA 161], stressed the prospective application of said
rule, and explained the operation of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court’s Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the
rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on
February 27.1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on
June 30.1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate
Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners’ motion for extension of
time was filed on September 9,1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30,1986. Hence, it is no longer
within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time
from the expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners
cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case
should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was
761
VOL. 157, JANUARY 29, 1988 761
14
 De Roy vs. Court of Appeals
promulgated. Contrary to petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring
the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law
practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G.R.s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports
Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no
grave abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court’s decision holding
petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
that “the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs.”
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
respondents had the “last clear chance” to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and, therefore,
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
of “last clear chance,” which has been applied to vehicular accidents,
is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to
DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ.,
concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—The new matters raised on appeal should have been
raised before the trial court, hence, the CA committed no grave abuse
of discretion in denying the motion for reconsideration. (Congressional
Commercial Corp. vs. CA, 146 SCRA 90.)
Question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised
on appeal. (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Br. II, 134 SCRA
243.)

——o0o——

762

15

G.R. No. 187378. September 30, 2013.*
RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO
M. ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN,
petitioners, vs. MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as
Mayor, and MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal
Engineer and Building Official-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena
Municipality, Misamis Occidental, respondents.
Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Petitioners had the
burden of proving their own allegation.—Petitioners had the burden of
proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the
similar case of Figuerres v. Court of Appeals, 305 SCRA 206 (1999)
citing United States v. Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916), the Court upheld
the presumptive validity of the ordinance therein despite the lack of
controverting evidence on the part of the local
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
441
VOL. 706, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 441
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
government to show that public hearings were conducted in light
of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to
demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said
public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-
compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s
cause of action.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
R. E. Lorena-Broce for petitioners.
Lel M. Blanco for respondents.
RESOLUTION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the
Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated March 9,
2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN
which reversed and set aside the Decision4dated November 26, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil
Case No. 4684 for injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People’s Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc.
(PETAL) is a non-governmental organization,
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 9-22.
2 Id., at pp. 31-46. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson,
with Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Michael P. Elbinias,
concurring.
3 Id., at pp. 25-29.
4 Id., at pp. 55-71. Penned by Judge Bernadette S. Paredes-
Encinareal.
442
442 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in the
protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood
projects within Misamis Occidental.5 In line with its objectives, PETAL
built some cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island
(a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a seminar cottage in
20016which it rented out to the public and became the source of
livelihood of its beneficiaries,7 among whom are petitioners Hector
Acaac and Romeo Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor
Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. (Azcuna) and Building Official Marietes B.
Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against
PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No.
1096,8otherwise known as the “National Building Code of the
Philippines,” ordering it to stop all illegal building activities on Capayas
Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for the
issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal
Construction was issued by respondents against it on July 8,
2002,9 but still the same remained unheeded.
16
 It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayanof Lopez
Jaena (SB) adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of
200210 (subject ordinance) which prohibited, among others:
_______________
5 Id., at p. 32.
6 Id., at p. 11.
7 Id., at pp. 32-33.
8 “Adopting A National Building Code Of The Philippines (NBCP)
Thereby Revising Republic Act Numbered Sixty-Five Hundred Forty-
One(R.A. No. 6541).”
9 Rollo, p. 34.
10 Records, pp. 28-29. Entitled “An Ordinance Establishing
Capayas Island And Its Surroundings, Mansabay Bajo And Sibula As
Birds, Fish And Shells Sanctuary Located Within The Municipal
Waters Of Lopez Jaena With A Total Area Of Sixty
443
VOL. 706, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 443
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
(a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or organization
inside the sanctuaries;11 and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the
local government.12 On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject
ordinance; hence, the same was submitted to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a
joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the
designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises
as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress thereto.13
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served
upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas
Island. Among the reasons cited was its violation of the subject
ordinance. A similar notice was also served against individual
petitioners on October 25, 2002.14
On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action praying for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order, injunction and
damages15 against respondents before the RTC, docketed as Civil
Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy
and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-
interest have been in possession thereof since 1961, with whom it
entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the
said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the
issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as
they were deprived of their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the
validity of the subject ordinance on the following grounds: (a) it was
adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not
_______________
Three Point One Hundred Ninety Seven (63.197) Hectares, Three
(3) Hectares And Three (3) Hectares Respectively.”
11 Rollo, pp. 33-34.
12 Records, p. 28. See subject ordinance.
13 Rollo, pp. 34-35.
14 Id., at p. 35.
15 Id., at p. 36.
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as
required by Republic Act No. 7160,16 otherwise known as “The Local
Government Code of 1991” (LGC); and (c) it was not approved by the
SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined.17
In their Answer,18 respondents averred that petitioners have no
cause of action against them since they are not the lawful owners or
lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and
property belonging to the public domain. Further, they maintained that
they have complied with all the publication and hearing requirements
for the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed
approved by operation of law for failure of the SP to take any positive
action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it is valid and
enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision19declaring
the subject ordinance as invalid/void based on the following grounds:
(a) PETAL’s protest has not been resolved and that the subject
ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said ordinance
was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it
posted in public places; (c) Capayas Island is classified as timberland,
hence, not suited to be a bird or fish sanctuary; and (d) the authority
and control over timberlands belong to the national government,
through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR).20 Based on the foregoing, respondents were ordered, among
others, to desist from closing Capayas Island
_______________
16 “An Act Providing For A Local Government Code Of 1991.”
17
 17 Records, p. 5. Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
18 Id., at pp. 76-81. ity and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA
19 Rollo, pp. 55-71. pronounced that the subject ordinance is valid.30
20 Id., at pp. 67-68. On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC’s finding that
445 petitioners have no proprietary rights over the Capayas Island,
VOL. 706, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 445 thereby rendering their action for injunction improper.31
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration32 therefrom was denied by
to the public.21 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the the CA in a Resolution33 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant
structures they built thereon without valid building permits22 since they petition.
were found to have no title over the disputed property.23 The Issue Before the Court
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject
before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN. ordinance is valid and enforceable against petitioners.34
The Proceedings Before the CA The Court’s Ruling
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision24granting The petition lacks merit.
respondents’ appeal. Section 56 of the LGC provides:
Contrary to the RTC’s ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was SEC. 56. Review of Component City and Municipal
deemed approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid Ordinances or Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
within 30 days after its submission in accordance with Section 56 of —(a) Within three (3) days after approval, the secretary to
the LGC.25 It also gave credence to Azcuna’s testimony that the the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan shall
subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous places in forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of
their municipality, and in the bulletin board.26 Moreover, public approved ordinances and the resolutions approving the local
consultations were conducted with various groups before the subject development plans and public investment programs formulated
ordinance was passed.27 The CA further ruled that the Municipality of by the local development councils.
Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass (b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such
and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to ordinances and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawiganshall
Section 16 of the LGC.28 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could examine the documents or transmit
create and administer sanctuaries.29 Having enacted the subject _______________
ordinance within its powers as a municipal- 30 Id., at pp. 42-43.
_______________ 31 Id., at p. 45.
21 Id., at p. 71. 32 Id., at pp. 47-53.
22 Id. 33 Id., at pp. 25-29.
23 Id., at p. 70. 34 Id., at p. 13.
24 Id., at pp. 31-46. 447
25 Id., at pp. 39-40. VOL. 706, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 447
26 Id., at pp. 40-41. Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
27 Id., at p. 43. them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the
28 Id., at p. 42. provincial prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial
29 Id., at p. 43. attorney or provincial prosecutor shall, within a period of ten
446 (10) days from receipt of the documents, inform
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or

18
 recommendations, which may be considered by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in making its decision.
(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan finds that such an
ordinance or resolution is beyond the power conferred upon
the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang
Bayanconcerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution
invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawiganshall
enter its action in the minutes and shall advise the
corresponding city or municipal authorities of the action it has
taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan within thirty (30) days after submission of such an
ordinance or resolution, the same shall be presumed consistent
with law and therefore valid.
In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot
be deemed approved through the mere passage of time considering
that the same is still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and
Aquatic Resources of the SP.35 It, however, bears to note that more
than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said ordinance
was submitted to the latter for review by the SB;36 hence, it should be
deemed approved and valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As
properly observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order
to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, “action.” It is
clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that
must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang
panlalawigan is the declaration of the
_______________
35 See id., at pp. 14-15.
36 Id., at p. 14.
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole
or in part. x x x.
This construction would be more in consonance with the rule
of statutory construction that the parts of a statute must be read
together in such a manner as to give effect to all of them and
that such parts shall not be construed as contradicting each
other. x x x laws are given a reasonable construction such that
apparently conflicting provisions are allowed to stand and given
effect by reconciling them, reference being had to the moving
spirit behind the enactment of the statute.37
Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners’ contentions that
the subject ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance
with the provisions of the LGC.38It is noteworthy that petitioners’ own
evidence reveals that a public hearing39 was conducted prior to the
promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their bare
allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no
publication or posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast,
Azcuna had testified that they have complied with the publication and
posting requirements.40While it is true that he likewise failed to submit
any other evidence thereon, still, in
_______________
37 Id., at pp. 38-39.
38 SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal
Sanctions.—(a) ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at
prominent places in the provincial capitol, city, municipal or Barangay
hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of three (3)
consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a
newspaper of general circulation, where available, within the territorial
jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned, except in the case
of Barangay ordinances. Unless otherwise provided therein, said
ordinances shall take effect on the day following its publication, or at
the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.
xxxx
39 Records, p. 60. A “dialogue-consultation” was conducted by the
SB on June 13, 2002.
40 Rollo, pp. 40-41.
449
VOL. 706, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 449
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance,
its constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of any
controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not
observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of
proving their own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the
similar case of Figuerres v. CA,41 citing United States v.
Cristobal,42 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the ordinance
therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the
local government to show that public hearings were conducted in light
of: (a) the oppositor’s equal lack of controverting evidence to
19
demonstrate the local government’s non-compliance with the said
public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government’s non-
compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor’s
cause of action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare
assertions, petitioner Figuerres has not presented any evidence
to show that no public hearings were conducted prior to the
enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other hand, the
Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were
indeed conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted,
although it likewise failed to submit any evidence to establish
this allegation. However, in accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the
absence of evidence showing that the procedure
prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment. In
an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged
that the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct
waterways had not been submitted by the provincial board as
required by §§2232-2233 of the Administrative Code. In
rejecting this contention, the Court held:
_______________
41 364 Phil. 683; 305 SCRA 206 (1999).
42 34 Phil. 825 (1916).
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the
defendant appealed to this court upon the theory that the
ordinance in question was adopted without authority on
the part of the municipality and was therefore
unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no
proof adduced during the trial of the cause showing that
said ordinance had been approved by the provincial
board. Considering the provisions of law that it is the duty
of the provincial board to approve or disapprove
ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the
different municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, that the law has been complied
with. We have a right to assume that officials have
done that which the law requires them to do, in the
absence of positive proof to the contrary.
Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative
allegation essential to petitioner's cause of action in the
present case. Hence, as petitioner is the party asserting it,
she has the burden of proof. Since petitioner failed to rebut
the presumption of validity in favor of the subject ordinances
and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings
were conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are
constrained to uphold their constitutionality or
legality.43 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)
All told, the Court finds no reversible error committed by the CA in
upholding the validity of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title44 to the
property in dispute to be entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC’s
order directing the removal of the structures built by petitioners on
Capayas Island without building permits was not appealed. As such,
the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon them.
_______________
43 Figuerres v. Court of Appeals, supra note 41, at pp. 692-693;
pp. 214-215.
44 Rollo, p. 70.
451
VOL. 706, SEPTEMBER 30, 2013 451
Acaac vs. Azcuna, Jr.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—The burden rests on the debtor to prove payment rather
than on the creditor to prove nonpayment. (Crisologo vs. People, 686
SCRA 782 [2012])
If the plaintiff alleged in his complaint that he was damaged
because of the negligent acts of the defendant, he has the burden of
proving such negligence. (Huang vs. Philippine Hoteliers, Inc., 687
SCRA 162 [2012])
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