The Clean Development Mechanism and Community Forests in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reconsidering Kyoto's Moral Position'' On Biocarbon Sinks in The Carbon Market

Environ Dev Sustain (2010) 12:1025–1050
DOI 10.1007/s10668-010-9239-7
The clean development mechanism and community

forests in Sub-Saharan Africa: reconsidering Kyoto’s
‘‘moral position’’ on biocarbon sinks in the carbon
market
Mark Purdon
Received: 22 December 2008 / Accepted: 1 March 2010 / Published online: 18 March 2010
Ó Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010
Abstract Negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol reached what has been called a moral
position on biocarbon sinks which saw important limitations on their use in the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM), the Protocol’s main carbon offset system. After out-
lining this moral position, this article examines the consequences of these limitations on
the viability of community forest participation in the CDM through a case study of three
community forests in West Africa. Results suggest that there is significant carbon miti-
gation potential from forest conservation, reforestation as well as from improved fuelwood
cookstoves at the community level. Yet under the current rules of the CDM, little of this
overall carbon mitigation potential is able to be realized. Using qualitative research
methodologies, it was learned that community respondents showed a pragmatic, yet cau-
tious interest in the CDM while also emphasizing a need for land-use flexibility. The paper
closes with a political discussion of the ‘‘‘moral position’’ on biocarbon sinks in the carbon
market and concludes with policy recommendations for biocarbon sinks, in both the CDM
and REDD, in the post-Kyoto climate change regime.
Keywords Clean Development Mechanism Community forests Biocarbon sinks

REDD Sustainable development Community rights Sub-Saharan Africa
Renewable energy
1 Introduction
Negotiations of the Kyoto Protocol reached what has been called a ‘‘moral position’’ on
biocarbon sinks (Boyd et al. 2008: 106) which saw important limitations on their use under
the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), the Protocol’s main carbon offset system. By
Readers should send their comments on this paper to BhaskarNath@aol.com within 3 months of publication
of this issue.
M. Purdon (&)
Department of Political Science, University of Toronto, Sidney Smith Hall, Room 3018,
100 St. George Street, Toronto, ON M5S 3G3, Canada
e-mail: mark.purdon@utoronto.ca; mark_purdon@fastmail.fm
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‘‘biocarbon sinks’’, we refer to carbon stocks in trees, vegetation and soils in forest,
agricultural and other terrestrial ecosystems. This paper suggests there are two dimensions
to the moral position on biocarbon sinks: (1) that the use of biocarbon sinks is a political
diversion from the real cause of climate change, the consumption of fossil fuels, and (2)
biocarbon sink projects raise concerns about displacement and exploitation of local rural
communities and Indigenous peoples. As a result, the rules governing the CDM placed
important limits on biocarbon sinks because their inclusion in the carbon market was
deemed an inappropriate means of addressing climate change.
Reflection on the CDM is timely. There have recently been strong criticisms charging
that many of the carbon credits generated under the CDM carbon offset system are not
genuine (Schneider 2007; Wara 2007, 2008) as well as concerns about the contribution of
the CDM towards sustainable development (Flamos 2009; Gundimeda 2004; Lohmann
2005; Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007; Olsen 2007). Related to sustainable develop-
ment, the distribution of CDM projects continues to overlook some of the least developed
parts of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa (Capoor and Ambrosi 2007: 25; also see
UNEP-Risoe Centre 2009; UNFCCC 2008). Furthermore, some of the limitations on
biocarbon sinks in the CDM discussed here are now being addressed under the reducing
emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) initiative for the post-Kyoto period
(Forner et al. 2006; IISD 2009; Parker et al. 2009).
While sympathetic to the motivations of the moral position on biocarbon sinks in the
CDM, the main argument of this paper is that it has led to important and unintended
limitations on those sections of the carbon market available to local, forest-dependent
communities. The paper’s thesis instead is that the carbon market demonstrates a unique
‘‘virtual’’ character, which can allow rural communities to overcome the economy-of-scale
dilemma many such communities face. But what is the extent of carbon mitigation potential
of community forests in sub-Saharan Africa? How has this potential been shaped by the
rules surrounding the CDM? And how do local community residents view the carbon
market? These questions were the motivation for an empirical case study of community
forest biocarbon potential in West Africa. The case study used qualitative methods to
understand community concerns about the CDM as well as quantitative methods to assess
community carbon mitigation potential before and after the application of rules governing
the CDM, peeling away mitigation options to leave only those carbon pools permitted under
the CDM. The paper closes with a political discussion of the ‘‘‘moral position’’ on bio-
carbon sinks and concludes with policy recommendations for both the CDM and REDD.
2 The moral position on biocarbon sinks
The role of biocarbon sinks in the climate change regime has been amongst the most
contentious and nearly ruined early climate change negotiations (Doelle 2005; Fearnside
2001; Niles 2002; Wirth 2002). The agreement eventually achieved—notably reached after
the US withdrawal from the Kyoto negotiations in 2001—was pushed through by the EU,
which took a ‘‘moral’’ position on biocarbon sinks (Boyd et al. 2008: 106). This moral
position culminated in a set of limitations on biocarbon sinks in the CDM: avoided
deforestation (forest conservation) was excluded from the carbon market; reforestation
projects were limited, though not excluded, through delayed project methodologies and a
1% cap on the purchase of reforestation credits. Furthermore, these limitations have had the
unintended consequence of delaying renewable energy CDM projects, such as improved
cookstoves, that would help people shift away from unsustainable fuelwood consumption.
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The clean development mechanism and community forests 1027
The moral position discussed here needs to be distinguished from technical concerns
about monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) specific to biocarbon such as non-
permanence and leakage of biocarbon sinks as well as the ‘‘additionality’’ of the CDM
system. MRV poses a considerable challenge to biocarbon sinks, and Victor (2001) has
long argued that any economic efficiency gains associated with carbon trading would be
underminde by the costs of MRV. The MRV issues confronting biocarbon are three-fold.
First, as ecological systems subject to natural and anthropogenic disturbances, the non-
permanence of biocarbon sinks adds another layer of complexity to carbon accounting (see
Schlamadinger et al. 2007). This has been addressed for CDM reforestation projects
through the creation of a category of temporary credits that effectively only ‘‘store’’ carbon
for a limited period, afterwhich the CO2 is considered re-emitted (Kägi and Schöne 2005).
Other options outside the CDM would create a collective buffer account so that the carbon
stock across all individual projects is effectively permanent (VCS 2008). Leakage is the
increase in emissions outside the boundary of biocarbon project area that is attributable to
the project, perceived to be a more important issue for biocarbon sink projects (Dutschke
et al. 2006). CDM methodologies all denote ways of accounting for leakage, however, a
clear problem arises in that they focus their attention on the project area, not the sur-
rounding area or overall socio-economic context. Third, the moral position on biocarbon
sinks needs to be distinguished from criticisms of CDM additionality (Schneider 2007;
Wara 2007, 2008; Wara and Victor 2008). ‘‘Additionality’’ refers to the requirement that
credits are considered genuine only when it can be demonstrated that the CDM project
would not have been possible without the CDM. Otherwise, the CDM credits are false and
not fungible with domestic emission reductions. While important, non-permanence,
leakage and additionality stand to be improved upon as the CDM evolves from the current
project-based level to a more sectoral approach. We return to this issue later.
Rather, the moral position on the use of biocarbon sinks in the CDM is political and
comprised of two dimensions. The first dimension is that the use of biocarbon sinks
through the CDM’s carbon market is a political diversion from reducing consumption of
fossil fuels and the need for renewable energy and behavioural change (Lohmann 2000,
2005; Heinrich 2009): ‘‘The question of whether the CDM is promoting sustainable
development can be framed primarily in terms of whether it is promoting renewables in
developing countries and thus assisting in the transition away from fossil fuels’’ (Pearson
2007). Biocarbon sink projects have also been opposed because their implementation raises
concerns for sustainable development, the second dimension of the moral position.
Reforestation plantations, particularly when established in non-forest biomes such as sa-
vannahs, can lead to a host of ecological problems including depleted water resources and
changes in biodiversity (see World Rainforest Movement 2002). But more important are
instances where local peoples have been displaced as a consequence of reforestation
carbon offset projects (Lang and Byakola 2006; Lohmann 2006: esp 222–274; Orlando
et al. 2002). The concern here is that the CDM carbon offset market only replicates
international systems of exploitation through ‘‘CO2 lonialism’’ (Forsyth and Young 2007).
3 Community forests and the ‘‘virtual’’ character of the carbon market
While sympathetic to the motivations of the moral position on biocarbon sinks, this paper’s
main empirical argument is that the carbon market demonstrates a unique ‘‘virtual’’ char-
acter that lends itself to sustainable rural development by allowing different communities to
bundle together a network of discrete community-based projects and gain an economy-of-
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scale advantage unavailable to individual communities. Research on community-based

natural resource management such as community forests also permits us to identify ways of
designing institutions for biocarbon that will promote sustainable rural development.
3.1 The economy-of-scale dilemma of community forests
Community-based natural resource management such as community forests has often been
proposed as a rural development strategy because local communities have a vested interest
in the sustainability of local natural resources (Gibson et al. 2000; Purdon 2003; Wily
1999; World Bank 2004). Yet despite the promotion of community forestry (Ekoko 2000;
Wily 1999; World Bank 2004), problems with community forests abound. These include
governance problems (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Ribot et al. 2006) but also a fundamental
economy-of-scale dilemma, in both the developed (Ambus et al. 2007; Bliss and Kelly
2008) and developing worlds (Pourcq et al. 2009: 23; Garcı́a-Fernández et al. 2008).
What is this economy-of-scale dilemma? Economies of scale are cost advantages that
accrue to a private firm as its scale of operations expand (see Raup 1969; Stigler 1958). But
the opportunity for community forests to fully exploit economies of scale poses a dilemma:
(1) communities are not able to expand the size of their forest area to harness cost
advantages from increased production and (2) the generally poor state of infrastructure
(particularly roads) prevents the pooling of forest products and sharing of physical assets
(ie, portable sawmills).
One possible solution to the economy-of-scale dilemma is organizing community forests
into groups or cooperatives. Accordingly, the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) has devel-
oped group certification guidelines for smallholder forests (FSC 1998). Another solution has
been to ‘‘add’’ value to the timber and non-timber forest products originating from community
forests (Pourcq et al. 2009; Garcı́a-Fernández et al. 2008). This paper suggests that carbon
finance has the unique potential to contribute to both: adding-value in terms of carbon while
also allowing greater project pooling through the carbon market’s ‘‘virtual’’ character.
3.2 Carbon credits as a ‘‘virtual’’ economy
Transaction costs have been identified as important challenges to the CDM (Michaelowa
and Jotzo 2005), but they also bear witness to the unique ‘‘virtual’’ character of the carbon
market. This ‘‘virtual’’ character is currently evidenced by the shift from project-base CDM
to programmatic CDM and the anticipated move to sectoral CDM (Fig. 1). It also offers
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 1 Evolution of the CDM administration
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solutions to systemic problems associated with non-permanence, leakage and additionality

while also for the economy-of-scale dilemma facing community forests described above.
The first attempt to reduce transaction costs was to simplify the CDM administrative
process for small-scale projects, most notably through predefined and simplified method-
ologies and the bundling of discrete project activities (UNFCCC 2002). ‘‘Bundling’’ is a
term used to describe those CDM projects where a number of smaller project activities,
often from different locations, are coordinated under the same umbrella by a single project
manager. Size restrictions were, however, placed on such small-scale projects (UNFCCC
2006b: para. 28; UNFCCC 2007b). The market’s response though has been mute: small-
scale projects are expected to account for only 10% of the CDM (UNDP 2006). A more
recent attempt to manage transaction costs is ‘‘programmatic’’ CDM, which builds on the
bundling concept of small-scale projects but removes the size limitation (UNFCCC 2005b:
para. 20). This approach was intended to reduce transaction costs (Cosbey et al. 2007; Ellis
2006; Hinostroza et al. 2007), but it could alleviate the information asymmetries involved
in assessing the additionality of individual CDM projects (see Wara and Victor 2008).
Programmatic CDM may be best interpreted as an intermediate step towards sectoral CDM
(Figueres 2006), which would allow regulators to scan across an entire economic sector to
better evaluate whether an individual CDM project meets a predetermined ‘‘additionality’’
threshold. There are reasons to believe that a sectoral approach would lend itself to a
systematic buffer system as envisioned by VCS (2008) to account for non-permanence and
leakage.
But the move towards programmatic and sectoral CDM indicates that the carbon
market represents a transition from the agro-industrial to informational mode of devel-
opment (sensu Castells 1996). Indeed, the carbon market does not actually deal in carbon
at all, but rather in data about carbon reductions achieved through renewable energy
technology or sequestered in trees and soils. Such trade arguably lends itself better to
localized, small-scale development strategies such as community forests. While typical
rural economic development strategies have been based on the transfer of physical goods
such as timber, non-timber forest products and agricultural products, the carbon offset
market entails the purchase of virtual goods (i.e. data) that represent carbon. When
harnessed to information and communication technologies, the virtual character of the
carbon market has the potential to lower the economy-of-scale barriers faced by isolated
rural communities.
While this proposition is more of hypothesis than evidenced by the West African case
study undertaken here, trends in the carbon market towards programmatic CDM described
above as well as examples of existing CDM reforestation projects and cookstove projects
add credence to it. Indeed, two CDM reforestation projects in Eastern Europe demonstrate
this virtual character, where each project is comprised of a large number of disaggregated
parcels of land spread across the entire country. A CDM reforestation project in Moldova
consists of a total land area of 19,768 ha disseminated in 2,000 land parcels around the
entire country, involving 594 villages (Anonymous 2007: Section A.4.6). Similarly, a
CDM reforestation project being developed in Albania is comprised of 5,728 ha distributed
over 200 land parcels (Anonymous 2008: Section A.4.2.). This is not limited to refores-
tation projects; however, a cookstove CDM programme being developed in Tanzania will
involve 22,000 households when fully implemented (B. Larsen, personal communication).
However, the author is unaware of any studies delineating the carbon mitigation potential
of forests managed by communities themselves, for which reason the case study of three
communities in West Africa is presented below.
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4 West Africa community forest case study
4.1 Methodology
This West African case study relied on qualitative methods to understand community
concerns about the CDM in conjunction to a quantitative assessment of community carbon
mitigation potential. Fieldwork involved three communities: Ekuri (Nigeria) as well as
Tinto and Tali (Cameroon). Results presented are based largely on visits to Ekuri and Tinto
that were part of a 2-month research project in the region in 2004 (Purdon 2004). This
research was complimented by fieldwork for a community forest implementation project in
nearby Tali undertaken over four months in 2005 (Akumsi et al. 2005; Purdon 2005),
which furnished data for the assessment of cookstove project potential. The quantitative
assessment considers carbon mitigation potential before and after the detailed application
of rules governing the CDM, peeling away options to leave only those permitted under the
CDM.
4.1.1 Research sites
All three communities are located in the mature tropical rainforests zone of southeastern
Nigeria/southwestern Cameroon, a recognized global biodiversity hotspot (Comiskey et al.
2003). At approximately 33,000 ha, the Ekuri community forest in Nigeria is regarded as
the largest such project in West Africa (Morakinyo 1992). Ekuri has a total population of
about 6,000 and the standing forest encompasses 28,524 ha, though divided into different
land-use zones (Conservation Zone, Timber Extraction Zone, Cash Crop Zone, NTFP
Collection Zone) with the remaining 4,476 ha designated Farm-Fallowland. A conserva-
tive estimate of the forested Conservation Zone would place it at approximately 5,500 ha.
The Ekuri Initiative, the organization which manages the community forest, was founded
in 1992 as a cooperative and later gained international NGO support. Note that community
forests are not a legal land tenure structure in Nigeria (Ekanem 2001); rather, land own-
ership has been granted to government through the 1978 Land Use Decree. In practice
though, communities administer local lands and function very much like their owners.
Unlike in Nigeria, community forests of up to 5,000 ha are legally recognized in
Cameroon under the 1994 Forestry Act (Ekoko 2000; Essama-Nssah and Gockowski
2000). Compared to Ekuri, the community forest in Tinto (Cameroon) is quite small at
1,295 ha, though the surrounding buffer zone of degraded forest/farmland might double its
size. The community forest accreditation process was started in the late 1990s and com-
pleted in 2002. The Tinto community itself is comprised of slightly less than 2,000
inhabitants. The second Cameroon community investigated, Tali (Cameroon), is relatively
close to Tinto. It has a population of approximately 600 people, and the proposed Tali
community forest would consist of a 3,550 ha section of forest and farmland.
4.1.2 Qualitative research methodology
Fieldwork in Ekuri and Tinto consisted of qualitative methods including semi-structured

interviews, focus group discussions as well as participant observation (Burgess 1990) with
community residents to learn about the status of community forests as well as their con-
cerns about land use, the carbon market as well as rules surrounding the CDM. Approx-
imately, one week was spent in Ekuri and Tinto each for this purpose. Community-level
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Table 1 Qualitative Sampling

Focus group Interview Total
Effort across Nigerian
and Cameroon
Nigeria
Ekuri (community forest) 8 1 9
Calibar (Govt and NGOs) 2 5 7
Cameroon
Tinto (community forest) 1 7 8
Limbe (Govt and NGOs) 0 5 5
Total 14 15 29
fieldwork was complimented by interviews with local government officials and NGOs,
based in Calabar (Nigeria) as well as Buea and Limbe (Cameroon). A total of 15 interviews
and 14 focus groups were undertaken over the two-month period (Table 1).
As suggested by Goebel (1998), focus groups and interviews triangulated discussions
with community governing councils, women’s groups and youth associations. Triangula-
tion is a method of assessing the validity of research results, relying on approaches to
discover convergent or dissonant finding (Erzerberger and Prein 1997). Qualitative
research results presented here are thus those that demonstrated a significant degree of
convergence amongst respondents.
4.1.3 Quantitative carbon mitigation potential methodology
Quantitative carbon mitigation potential was assessed for reforestation, forest conservation
(i.e. avoided deforestation), improved cookstoves and electricity generation (see
‘‘Appendix 1’’ for details). Quantitative results for all four carbon mitigation strategies are
presented in Table 2. Land-use zoning and forest management planning had been under-
taken by the Ekuri and Tinto communities (though not yet of Tinto’s farm-fallowlands) but
not yet in Tali at the time of fieldwork (Akumsi et al. 2005).
Reforestation carbon mitigation potential was based on low-density implanting of agro-
forest species (Njansang—Rhicininodendron heudelotii; Plum—Dacroides edulis) and
only applied to farm-fallowlands in Ekuri because the extent of farm-fallowlands in Tinto
and Tali remains undocumented. Standing forest carbon sequestration in Ekuri and Tinto
was derived using parameters for forest biomass in West Africa and emissions factors for
the burning of forest biomass developed by the IPCC (2003). However, not all forest is
burned during land clearing for swidden agriculture. To estimate the change in carbon
dynamics after burning for swidden agriculture, as well as compared to a 25-year-old cocoa
plantation, a chronosequence study of tropical forests in central Cameroon was used
(Kotto-Same et al. 1997).
Fuelwood consumption was only empirically measured at Tali as part of improved
fuelwood cookstove assessment project (Akumsi et al. 2005; Purdon 2005). Because of
similar cooking methods observed across all three communities, fuelwood cookstove
results were extrapolated post hoc to Ekuri and Tinto. Estimating emission reductions from
fuelwood projects was undertaken via two methodologies. The first was estimated directly
from fuelwood (Meth-1) while the second has been approved by the CDM Executive Board
(CDM-EB 2008b), referred to hear as Meth-CDM. Reasons for this distinction are given
below. Lastly, emissions from diesel generators (generously estimated at approximately
*60 individual 5 kWe generators amongst the three communities as well as a single
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Table 2 Community carbon mitigation potential of reforestation, avoided deforestation and improved fuelwood cookstove project
Location Year Reforestation (low-density planting) Avoided deforestation Improved fuelwood cookstoves Solar electricity
Sequestration Area Vs Permanent crop Vs Cocoa farm Meth-1 Meth-CDM Vs Diesel generators
ha
Area Annual Total Value Total Value Total Value Reductions Value Reductions Value Reductions Value
planted tCO2/ tCO2 Thou- avoided Thou- avoided Thou- Thou- Thou- Thou-
(ha) year sand tCO2 sand tCO2 sand Annual Total sand Annual Total sand Annual Total sand
$USD $USD $USD tCO2/ tCO2 $USD tCO2/ tCO2 $USD tCO2/ tCO2 $USD
year year year
EKURI 2008 4,476 – 2,413 1,539 115

PopN 2009 4,476 – 2,413 1,539 115
*6,000 2010 4,476 8,191 2,413 1,539 115
Households 2011 4,476 15,666 2,413 1,539 115
*1,279 2012 4,476 23,141 46,998 $141.0 5,500 1,164,900 $3,494.7 485,650 $1,457.0 2,413 12,066 $120.7 1,539 7,693 $76.9 115 573 $5.7
TINTO 2008 na 804 512 81
PopN 2009 na 804 512 81
*2,000 2010 na 804 512 81
Householdsd 2011 na 804 512 81
*426 2012 na na na na 1,295 274,281 $822.8 114,348 $343.0 804 4,019 $40.2 512 2,562 $25.6 81 407 $4.1
TALI 2008 na 236 149 57
PopN 2009 na 236 149 57
=582 2010 na 236 149 57
Households 2011 na 236 149 57
=124 2012 na na na na na na na na na 236 1,178 $11.8 149 746 $7.5 57 286 $2.9
M. Purdon
25–30 kWe generator in Tinto) were contrasted to a scenario where they would be replaced
by a carbon neutral technology such as solar power. See Appendix 1.
An important consideration is the price of CDM credits. The prices used for the pur-
poses of this paper at $3 USD per tonne CO2e for reforestation and forest conservation, and
$10 USD per tonne CO2e for fuelwood cookstove and solar projects. Market prices suggest
that the price for CDM carbon credits fell from a range of $13–$21 USD on the primary
market (Thomson Reuters 2008a) and $25 USD on the secondary market (Thomson
Reuters 2008b) to about $10 USD and $15 USD, respectively, since the global economic
crisis (Capoor and Ambrosi 2009: Fig. 1). While hitting a low point in February 2009,
there has been some recovery at least in the secondary market over recent months. Note,
however, that the above CDM prices do not reflect reforestation projects; unlike other
CDM credits these have been prohibited from entering the EU-ETS (Schlamadinger et al.
2005). For these reasons, credits from reforestation projects are going for a much lower
price on the primary markets, which justifies the $3 USD price.
4.2 Results regarding West African community forest status
The Ekuri community was found isolated and lacking in fundamental infrastructure: a
limited-access road was only built (using community funds) in the 1990s, no viable health
clinic (though one has been constructed but lacks funds for staff and equipment), and no
running water. In terms of infrastructure, the conditions of the two community forests in
Cameroon, Tinto and Tali, were better: they both were found along an access road (except
for the much smaller Bara community, which is part of Tali). Tinto had also benefitted
from an international development project that had laid out a number of wells and water
pumps in the community. Electricity was generally unavailable in the communities though,
as noted earlier, some diesel generators were in use.
The economic base of all three communities remains agricultural, with a mix of sub-
sistence farming and commercial cocoa production. All three communities practiced
swidden agriculture, which consisted of burning and clearing forest land (though sparing
some trees), planting subsistence crops (yams, bananas, cassava, etc.) for 2–3 years, then
leaving the land fallow for 3–7 years before resuming farming thereafter. In Ekuri,
4,476 ha of such land were designated as farm-fallowlands. In Tinto, the community forest
core area was off limits to farming, but agricultural expansion was to be permitted in its
buffer zone—estimated at 1,300 ha. Using growth and yield information obtained from
respondents in Tinto, a 1 hectare plot of cocoa was estimated to produce 1.5 tonnes of
cocoa during time of peak productivity (5–25 years after establishment) generating a profit
of approximately $1,200 USD per hectare, though productivity declined thereafter.
The promise of economic development through community forestry amongst the
established community forests, Ekuri and Tinto, was yet to be realized at the time of
fieldwork. For Ekuri, only a few limited attempts at community logging had been
attempted and the few interactions with buyers had not been successful. At the same time,
there had been continual offers from logging companies to exploit the forest. Non-timber
forest products (NTFPs) in Ekuri were generating the most cash of any forest resource.
Tinto’s community forest was also stagnating. This was in part due to the forest’s physical
isolation: surrounded on three sides by rivers, it was considered by some as too far a trek
for collecting NTFPs. The community also lacked the tools to cut and process timber,
though was actively seeking a business partner. A recent update of the status of Tinto’s
community forest suggests little further change (Minang et al. 2007). A feeling of isolation
and stagnation was not uncommon amongst respondents—one woman described the
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community forest as ‘‘almost useless,’’ implying that the community forest designation had
not changed much in practice. While not the sole challenge facing the communities, the
community forests did not appear to be economically viable and demonstrated the econ-
omy-of-scale barrier discussed earlier.
Lastly, information technology that might facilitate conventional forest or CDM project
management were generally lacking. Ekuri did not have access to a computer, let alone a
reliable source of electricity. In Tinto, however, there was at least one computer available
in the rural council office. These observations are important as Minang et al. (2007) have
argued there to be insufficient skills and resources available to individual community
forests for their successful participation in the CDM.
4.3 Results regarding West African community forest carbon mitigation potential
4.3.1 Reforestation potential
4.3.1.1 Carbon mitigation Many respondents in Ekuri and Tinto supported limited
reforestation on farm-fallowlands with tree species that might serve alternative economic
functions, such as non-timber forest products that could be planted into existing farms (bush
mango (Irvingia gabonensis and I. wombulu), rubber, cocoa). Some thought trees also could
be planted for timber. However, youth respondents in both Ekuri and Tinto were concerned
there was not enough farmland and they would need to seek farm expansion in the future. As
one youth noted, ‘‘you can’t eat trees.’’ For this reason, reforestation potential was estimated
for low-density implanting (100 trees/ha) of agro-forest species on farm-fallowlands.
But all local community respondents interviewed emphasized the need for flexibility in
land-use decisions associated with reforestation. When asked what time period they would
be willing to commit lands to reforestation, a 5-year or 30-year period, community
respondents clearly favoured the 5-year period to be more flexible and to involve less risk
and liability. One leader noted high inflation in Nigeria and the carbon price paid now
might not reflect a tree’s long-term value.
Reforestation potential could only be quantified for Ekuri’s farm-fallowlands. Unfor-
tunately, land-use mapping in Tinto had only been undertaken of the standing forest, not
adjacent farm-fallowlands. Results indicate that carbon sequestration potential of low-
density planting agro-forest species in Ekuri’s farm-fallow lands is significant: generating
an expected 46,998 tCO2e over 5-years and, assuming a price of $3 USD per tonne CO2e,
associated with a market value of $141,000. See Table 2.
4.3.1.2 Realizing carbon mitigation potential under the CDM Reforestation potential
under the CDM was, however, low. This was mostly because it was difficult to determine
land eligibility. Under the CDM, lands can only be reforested if they can be demonstrated
to have been devoid of forest since 1990 (see Schlamadinger et al. 2007). As discussed
earlier, such a determination was only really possible in Ekuri, which had designated
4,476 ha of farm-fallowland. However, even the validity of this approach is questionable
under the CDM. The assessment of land eligibility in Ekuri relied on participatory methods
(interviews and focus group discussions about land-use history), rather than direct obser-
vation from aerial photography. The use of participatory methods for determining land
eligibility was possible for small-scale reforestation projects until 2006 when this possi-
bility was rescinded (CDM-EB 2006a: Appendix A). Without participatory methods, it
would be difficult to verify the reforestation potential of yet unmapped farm-fallowlands in
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Tinto and Tali. It would be noted that by its fifth year the Ekuri project would have anyway
exceeded the 16,000 tCO2e/year threshold for small-scale reforestation projects.
But it is unlikely there would be any market for reforestation projects because of other
limitations placed on CDM reforestation projects. A cap was placed on the amount of
credits that industrialized countries could purchase through CDM reforestation projects,
limited to 1% of a their 1990 baseline emission levels (UNFCCC 2001: para 7(b)). But the
market for reforestation credits has also been further reduced because of complexities
resulting from the non-permanence of reforestation credits, as described earlier. Currently,
both the EU and Canada prohibiting the use of credits from reforestation (Government of
Canada 2008: 18; Schlamadinger et al. 2005).
4.3.2 Forest conservation/avoided deforestation potential
4.3.2.1 Carbon mitigation From the Ekuri land-use plan, it was estimated that standing
forest set aside for conservation represented 5,500 ha. As for Tinto, because no forest
activities were taking place and the official community forest territory is intended for
sustainable forest management regardless, it seemed fair to include it in its entirety
(1,295 ha). The per hectare estimate of carbon content of the intact, standing forest was
268 tCO2e/ha. Against a scenario where the forest is burned for agricultural and kept in
permanent cultivation (i.e., five-year rotation), and thus the permanent release of
212 tCO2e/ha, keeping the forest intact would prevent an estimated 1.16 and 0.27 million
tonnes CO2e in Ekuri and Tinto (Table 2). Even at a low-value of $3 per tonne CO2e, this
is associated with a value of $3.5 and $0.8 million USD, respectively. Against a scenario
where the standing tropical was burned and replaced with cocoa plantations and releas-
ing 88 tCO2/ha, keeping the forest intact would prevent an estimated 0.5 and 0.1 mil-
lion tonnes CO2e in Ekuri and Tinto, with a value of $1.5 and $0.3 million $USD,
respectively.
One important finding during field interviews was that local community respondents
encountered in Ekuri and Tinto were in favour of compensation for forest conservation.
There was strong sentiment amongst respondents that the community was making a sac-
rifice by refraining from exploiting their entire forested territory. As one community
member in Ekuri put it: ‘‘Let the world know that we are willing to conserve our forest but
that there should be assistance for us.’’ This sacrifice was also evident in the opposition that
one woman in Tinto expressed to the prospect of extending the community forest con-
servation area to the buffer zone, citing that it should be reserved for farm expansion.
However, the interest expressed by community respondents in carbon finance of forest
conservation does not mean that carbon finance would trump any other community land-
use goals. For example, the woman from Tinto referred to above opposed the expansion of
community conservation area because of food security concerns, regardless of the carbon
value of the forest. Clearly, the extent of lands used for forest conservation and the price
paid would need to be negotiated with communities involved.
4.3.2.2 Realizing carbon mitigation potential under the CDM The standing forests set
aside for conservation purposes in the community forests visited have no current value in
the CDM. Under the current rules of the CDM, credits for forest conservation—generally
referred to as avoided deforestation—have been excluded. This was possibly the most
dramatic decision reached during negotiations about what projects would remain valid
under the CDM (Doelle 2005; Fearnside 2001; Niles 2002; Schlamadinger et al. 2007;
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1036 M. Purdon
Wirth 2002): reforestation was allowed (with the limitations described earlier) but not
avoided deforestation.
Key concerns which led to the exclusion of deforestation were technical ones such as
non-permanence and leakage. But there were also concerns about the effect of including
deforestation in the carbon market during the first commitment period the Kyoto Protocol.
Tropical deforestation is estimated to account for 20–30% of global emissions (Denman
et al. 2007; Fearnside 2000). Because of their size, carbon credits issuing from avoided
deforestation would flood the carbon market with cheap credits (Jung 2003) and would also
divert resources away from CDM energy projects (Jung 2005).
4.3.3 Improved fuelwood cookstove project potential
4.3.3.1 Carbon mitigation Field surveys in 2005 in Tali sought to determine patterns of
fuelwood consumption in order to establish a baseline from which to estimate the amount
of carbon credits possible through the introduction of improved fuelwood cookstoves. A
conservative estimate of fuelwood consumption amongst Tali’s 124 households was 362
tonnes fuelwood/year, the figure was used in estimating all remaining calculations. A
locally designed cookstove developed at IRAD-Batoke in Cameroon was found to reduce
fuelwood consumption by 38.5% versus a traditional three-stone hearth. If improved
cookstoves were adopted by all households in the Tali community, this would result in a
reduction of 139 tonnes fuelwood/year. If fuelwood was sourced from a dedicated
renewable wood supply, the 139 tonne/year reduction in fuelwood consumption across the
Tali community would be associated with emission reductions of 236 tonnes CO2e/year.
Over a 5-year window, the cookstove project in Tali would generate 1,178 tonnes CO2e
of carbon credits which, at a price of $10 per tonne CO2e, would have a value of $11,780.
Extrapolating these results to the larger communities of Ekuri and Tinto, improved fuel-
wood cookstove projects could over a five-year window reduce 12,066 tonnes CO2e
($120,660) and 4,019 tonnes CO2e ($40,190), respectively, by Meth-1.
4.3.3.2 Realizing carbon mitigation potential under the CDM The methodology avail-
able for improved fuelwood cookstove projects under the CDM (Meth-CDM), however,
would limit the amount of credits that could be generated from the cookstove project by
nearly half compared to the method described earlier (Meth-1). For Tali, the total amount
of credits available over a 5-year period would be reduced to 746 tCO2e associated with a
value of only $7,460. The carbon credits for Ekuri and Tinto would similarly also be
halved. Given that the loss of carbon credits is substantial, it would be important to explain
the origins of the Meth-CDM rules on fuelwood projects.
Until 2005, fuelwood projects were permitted as so-called non-renewable biomass
projects that proposed the switch from non-renewable biomass to renewable sources of
biomass or more efficient fossil fuels were permitted as a small-scale CDM project.
Emissions from the combustion of biomass were the baseline against which the CDM
project was able to be compared. Under the original list of simplified methodologies for
small-scale projects initially agreed upon in 2002, non-renewable biomass projects were
possible under small-scale project category I.C.: Thermal energy for the user (CDM-EB
2003: para 15 and 16). However, in September 2005, the CDM-EB formally decided to
remove non-renewable biomass as a small-scale project activity listed here (CDM-EB
2005a: Annex 8; CDM-EB 2005b). A fuelwood baseline posed a significant problem
123
because projects reducing fuelwood biomass consumption would lead to avoided defor-
estation, invalid under the CDM.
This decision did not go without comment. The CDM Small-Scale Working Group
(SSCWG), a subsidiary to the CDM-EB, acknowledged that ‘‘there is an increasing
potential in [developing countries] for situations where there may be a switch to fossil fuels
unless there is an improved efficiency in the use of non-renewable biomass’’ (CDM
SSCWG 2005: para. 19). The issue went all the way to the 2005 UN Climate Change
Conference, where the CDM-EB was requested to develop methodologies for small-scale
projects proposing the switch from renewable to non-renewable sources of biomass
(UNFCCC 2005b: para. 30). The subsequent methodologies recommended by SSCWG
permitted non-renewable biomass consumption to be represented in terms of the baseline
emissions associated with the equivalent energy use in terms of fossil fuels (CDM SSCWG
2006: Annexes 15 and 16). Other observers have emphasized, and results presented here
support, that this significantly underestimates the carbon mitigation potential in compari-
son with a fuelwood baseline (see responses under UNFCCC 2006a).
Despite this, the 2006 methodologies recommended were again rejected by the CDM-
EB for similar reasons—that accreditation for reductions in non-renewable biomass was
invalid because of the link to avoided deforestation (CDM-EB 2006b: para. 54).
Accordingly, at the 2006 UN Climate Change Conference, the CDM-EB was once more
called upon to develop methodologies (UNFCCC 2006b: para 28 and 29). This saw the
SSCWG respond by essentially resubmitting its earlier recommended methodologies
(CDM SSCWG 2007: Annexes 1 and 2). While both methodologies still rely on fossil fuel
baselines that underestimate the emissions reductions possible, they were both approved
finally at the 2007 UN Climate Change Conference in Bali (UNFCCC 2007a: para. 24).
4.3.4 Solar electricity generation
The replacement of diesel electricity generation with solar power is valid under the CDM,
and no distinction between mitigation potential before and after the application of CDM
rules is made. With the generous assumptions made about the use of generators in the
communities, over a 5-year window the replacement of generators with solar power in
Ekuri, Tinto and Tali would generate 573, 407 and 286 tonnes CO2e, respectively. This
would generate an estimated value of only between $3,000 and $6,000 USD over the
5-year project window (Table 2). Switching to solar electricity generation has the lowest
carbon mitigation potential.
5 Community carbon mitigation potential under the CDM
The most important result from the study was that forest communities were found to
possess significant carbon mitigation potential while community forest respondents
showed a pragmatic, but cautious interest in the carbon market and emphasized a need for
flexibility and community control over land-use decisions. Forest conservation (i.e. avoi-
ded deforestation) is clearly the most important carbon mitigation strategy, with com-
munities managing forests carbon with a value ranging from hundreds of thousands to
millions of dollars (Table 2). The potential of reforestation and improved fuelwood
cookstoves is similar at the community level, but with carbon values ranging from the tens
to hundreds of thousands. But the mitigation potential of replacing fossil fuel powered
electricity with renewable solar power was poor. Because of the low levels of fossil fuel
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1038 M. Purdon
consumption in the communities—and despite the generous assumptions made about the
use of generators—the amount of carbon credits that could be generated by switching to
solar power was at least an order of magnitude less than even the improved fuelwood
cookstoves scenario. The review of the rules surrounding biocarbon sinks in the CDM
demonstrate, however, that the only viable projects are reforestation and fuelwood cook-
stove projects, both which face important restrictions in terms of project size limitations
and market caps. While there is optimism that community forest conservation will be
rewarded under REDD, its broad-scale operationalization is still years away.
However, the mitigation opportunities of biocarbon sinks were not without concern,
the most important one being land-use flexibility. Reforestation is the most sensitive
because it can compete with land reserved for farming. Local respondents were interested
in entering the carbon market if reforestation could be done in a manner that could
accommodate farming (i.e. low-density planting of 100 trees/ha). Most importantly,
community respondents were interested in 5-year contracts for reforestation and wary of
long-term commitments. Communities were also generally in favour of compensation for
protecting standing forests, though not to the point of compromising food security. The
cookstove project is promising, though it remains to be seen if the improved fuelwood
cookstove used in Tali would be adopted across the entire community. There are,
however, strategies to ensure the usage of improved cookstoves such as requiring their
(subsidized) purchase and a warranty systems to retire unused stoves (CEIHD 2007).
Furthermore, the development of charcoal-producing cookstoves which can produce
biochar—an inert form of carbon that can be returned to soil as a near-permanent bio-
carbon sink (Lehmann 2007)—might avoid some of the non-permanence concerns with
improved fuelwood cookstove projects.
One final concern regards project management skills and information technology
available at the community level. In terms of bundling of CDM projects amongst various
communities, respondents in Ekuri were concerned about how funds generated from the
project would be shared between project participants. NGOs in West Africa also cautioned
that the bundling of community forests that were at different stages of development could
generate problems. However, capacity building and coordination would be addressed, at
least in the case of programmatic CDM, through a coordinating entity (CDM-EB 2008a:
para 4–6; Hinostroza et al. 2007). In this regard, communities need not master all aspects
of the management of the carbon market. Rather, a network of community forests bundled
together into a programmatic CDM scheme would require the appropriate allocation of
rights and responsibilities between the community forests involved and the coordinating
entity. Such a coordinating entity might also play an important governance role by func-
tioning as a ombudsperson, offering a level of accountability between communities and
government (see Ribot et al. 2006).
How valid are these case-study findings? A key challenge with case-study research is
the possibility of using such research to generalize about socioeconomic and political
phenomenon (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Niaz 2007). But case studies can make important
contributions to socioeconomic and political analysis by identifying causal mechanisms
(McKeown 1999). Thus, while the reader is cautioned that the results presented here are
not readily generalizable, findings do suggest that one explanation for disputes arising in
local communities involved in biocarbon projects is a lack of community control. But
because these results are derived from a single case study, they should serve as hypotheses
that require confirmation about the role of carbon finance in other socioeconomic, eco-
logical and political contexts.
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6 Reconsidering the moral position on biocarbon sinks
Recalling the two dimensions of the moral position on biocarbon sinks, results from the
West African case study presented here challenge us to reconsider both the relationship
between land-use, biocarbon sinks and renewable energy in developing countries as well as
the role of local forest communities in the UN climate change regime. And while the
movement on REDD is to be welcomed, there are still a number of lessons from the CDM
to be drawn for REDD.
6.1 Implications for carbon mitigation
In terms of the emphasis on renewables and the need to transition away from fossil fuels,
the first dimension of the moral claim, the West Africa case study suggests that the position
which views biocarbon sinks as an obstacle to renewable energy overlooks the nexus of
land-use, forests and energy in the developing world. Fuelwood accounts for between 61
and 86% of primary energy consumption in sub-Saharan Africa (Amous 1999), and in
many areas demand is expected to exceed supply (Arnold and Persson 2006; Drigo 2005).
Improved cookstoves programmes hold promise to improve indoor health conditions and
reducing drudgery for women and children (Hulscher 2000; Silveira 2005). Similarly, there
remains the possibility of combining reforestation and improved cookstove projects in the
CDM (Dutschke et al. 2006). Improved management of biocarbon sinks is not in oppo-
sition to renewable energy, but complimentary to it.
But there are also political developments at the international level that should also be
considered in evaluating the use of forests and land-use management more generally to
sequester carbon. First, as the full extent of climate change manifests itself, it is increas-
ingly becoming apparent that renewable energy and behavioural change alone will be
unable to solve the crisis (see Hansen et al. 2008; Victor et al. 2009), and there is increased
interest not only in the broad use of biocarbon sinks but also in geological carbon
sequestration such as carbon capture and storage (Jaccard 2005; Keith et al. 2006; Victor
and Cullenward 2007). While once only discussed on the margins, carbon capture and
storage is now gaining large support from both the EU and US (European Commission
2007a, b; Parker and Yacobucci 2008; US Department of State 2007).
These developments suggest that the ‘‘moral limit’’ (see Price 2008) of politically
acceptable responses to climate change is changing. Renewable energy and behavioural
change are coming to be viewed not as incorrect strategies, but insufficient. Carbon sinks will
have to play a role. Yet experience to date suggests that carbon capture and storage is going to
be more difficult and expensive than anticipated (see The Economist 2009). Appropriate
management of biocarbon sinks can buy time for the development and adoption of tech-
nology and behavioural strategies necessary for further climate change mitigation. Given
that CO2 has a long residency time in the atmosphere (Archer 2005), carbon removed from
the atmosphere today is worth more than future emission reductions (Keller et al. 2008). If
deeper emission reduction commitments are taken, the increased use of carbon sequestration
in the carbon market appears justifiable if MRV and additionality are improved.
6.2 Implications for sustainable development
In terms of sustainable development, the second dimension of the moral position, results
from the West Africa case study presented here suggest that community forests would be
interested in the carbon market if they were able to retain control over land-use decisions.
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1040 M. Purdon
However, the rights of local and Indigenous peoples are currently under-specified in the
CDM. The only mention of community development in the CDM is in the methodology for
small-scale reforestation projects. It insists that these projects ‘‘are developed or imple-
mented by low-income communities and individuals as determined by the host Party’’
(UNFCCC 2005a: para 1(i)). Granted, the CDM does have a general requirement for
stakeholder consultation embedded in the project template document, but linking biocar-
bon sink projects to local community-based tenure is one way of addressing concerns
regarding sustainable development. Lastly, CDM project developers might be asked to
donate funds towards the development of community-based land-use plans, which are
often lacking at the local level (Blomley and Ramadhani 2006; Sundet 2005).
Recognition of Indigenous peoples’ and community rights is something to which the
climate change regime is really only beginning to turn its attention to in the context of
REDD (Streck 2009). However, formal agreement at the UN Climate Change Conference
in Copenhagen was limited to recognition of the role of Indigenous peoples and local
communities in monitoring and reporting for REDD (UNFCCC 2009: preamble and para.
3). It is worth pointing out, however, that community land rights are explicitly recognized
in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (Gilbert 2007) as well as in the
provisions of the UN Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) and UN Convention to Combat
Desertification (UNCCD) (Oba et al. 2008). The UNDP’s new Commission for the Legal
Empowerment of the Poor (CLEP) has also stressed the importance of land tenure security
for rural development (CLEP 2008).
6.3 CDM and REDD: lessons learned
The emphasis of this paper on reconsidering biocarbon sinks in the CDM may appear
puzzling given recent interest in reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degra-
dation (REDD). The advent of REDD is welcome news for community forests visited here,
yet it is still not yet fully operational on the ground. Moreover, there are important lessons
to be learned for REDD from the CDM. First, as reviewed in this paper, REDD has been
bound up in the negotiating history of the CDM. Second, while the emerging consensus
that national REDD strategies are required might appear at odds with the current project-
based CDM, this paper has emphasized how the CDM is evolving from the individual
project level, to the current emphasis on a programmatic approach and points towards
future sectoral approaches. REDD and sectoral CDM, will be close-cousins: all will
struggle with monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) for baselines, leakage and
additionality. One novel approach seeking to diverge from the CDM baseline and moni-
toring system is that proposed by the Terrestrial Carbon Group (2008), under which each
participating country would conduct a detailed inventory of national biocarbon sinks and
then distribute or auction rights to emit biocarbon to private individuals or, quite plausibly,
communities who would then be able to sell these as biocarbon emission allowances.
The primary divergence between REDD and the CDM appears in terms of financing.
The most likely financing arrangement for REDD will be a phased approach (Wertz-
Kanounnikoff and Angelsen 2009): Phase 1—preparation of a national REDD strategy,
initiation of capacity building and demonstration activities; Phase 2—implementation of
the REDD strategy; while Phase 3 would see REDD being opened to the carbon market for
international compliance purposes. Phases 1 and 2 anticipate significant financing from the
public sector with the effect being that carbon mitigation achieved through REDD would
not offset private sector emission reductions in developed countries. But if the carbon
markets are to be eventually used for REDD, then similarities with the CDM become
123
apparent. Note also that while the CDM ostensibly prohibits any diversion of international
aid towards the carbon market (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007), the use of public
spending for everything except the final purchase of CDM carbon credits was approved by
the OECD Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC 2004). The CDM itself is not
a ‘‘pure’’ market mechanism.
But it is also important to consider private sector financing, particularly since the 2008
global financial crisis, in comparison with international aid: one report by the UN predicted
a 30% contraction in ODA financing (IRIN 2008). It is generally believed that while public
funding for REDD is likely to be more stable, the amount of financing made available is
also likely to be much less (Parker et al. 2009: 90; see also Morrissey and Osei 2004: 45).
These are important trade-offs that, unfortunately, remain unresolved despite Copenhagen.
7 Conclusions and policy recommendations
The Ekuri, Tinto and Tali communities in West Africa were found to be managing
important carbon reserves in their standing forests, and there is significant carbon miti-
gation potential for cookstove projects and reforestation. More importantly, community
respondents demonstrated a pragmatic, but cautious interest in the carbon market while
emphasizing a need for flexibility and community control over land-use allocation. In
conjunction with the evolving politics of climate change, this challenges us to reconsider
the moral position on biocarbon sinks in the carbon market. As the UN climate change
regime moves forward, recognizing community land tenure rights and building land-use
flexibility into biocarbon sink initiatives is a key step to ensuring that any mechanism that
seeks to harness private finance for biocarbon—whether through a reformed CDM and/or
REDD—delivers on sustainable rural development.
The results presented here also point to a number of policy recommendations for both a
reformed CDM or REDD. First, rules for biocarbon sink projects should be developed with
communities to delineate their rights and responsibilities in order to ensure land-use
flexibility. A second recommendation would require that any biocarbon project deliver a
share of its carbon profits to local community development projects. Third, the crediting
period of biocarbon sinks initiative should be brought down to 5–10 year, renewable terms
which appears most compatible with community needs for land-use flexibility. Recog-
nizing community land tenure rights and building land-use flexibility into biocarbon sink
projects is a key step to ensuring that the CDM and REDD delivers on sustainable
development through a harmonized mechanism that recognizes the nexus of biocarbon
sinks and renewable energy.
Acknowledgments The author wishes to acknowledge the many people who assisted in logistics, field
work and earlier drafts of this manuscript including: A. C. Akumsi, E. Asaah, N. Bird, S. Bailey-Stamler,
D. Brockington, J. Castleden, G. Eyabi, R. Kelly, F. Lecocq, T. Morakinyo, F. Njisuh, L. N. Nkembi,
E. Nuesiri, E. Ogar, N. Pulman, N. Robinson and R. Samson as well as two anonymous reviewers and the
residents of the communities of Ekuri, Tinto and Tali.
Appendix 1: Quantitative carbon mitigation potential methodology
Quantitative carbon mitigation potential was assessed for reforestation, forest conservation
(i.e. avoided deforestation), improved cookstoves and electricity generation. Field visits in
all three communities permitted information to be collected through participant observa-
tion, forest walks and the consultation of forest management plans. Land-use zoning and
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1042 M. Purdon
forest management planning had been undertaken by the Ekuri and Tinto communities but
not yet in Tali at the time of fieldwork, which was in the process of establishing a
community forest (Akumsi et al. 2005).
Reforestation methodology
Reforestation potential was based upon data provided by E. Asaah (pers. comm.) at IC-
RAF, Cameroon, on growth rates over the first 2–4 years of two key agro-forest species
(Njansang—Rhicininodendron heudelotii; Plum—Dacroides edulis) and their combination
under variable planting densities (100, 204 and 400 trees/ha). In order to assess refores-
tation potential within the short term, the combined growth data of Njansang and Plum at a
low density of 100 trees/ha were converted to CO2 and subject to linear regression to
estimate CO2 sequestration up to their fifth year (i.e., 2012, the end of the Kyoto Protocol’s
first commitment period). The low-planting density was selected as it is most compatible
with continued agro-forest activity. These data were then entered into a spread sheet
designed by the World Bank’s Biocarbon Fund to estimate CO2 sequestration (Noble et al.
2005) and applied over the period 2008–2012 over areas of farm-fallowlands in Ekuri.
Avoided deforestation methodology
The CO2 equivalent content of standing forest was determined using 2003 IPCC Good
Practice Guidelines for LULUCF (Anonymous 2003). This drew on above-ground biomass
(dry matter) presented in Table 3A.1.4: Cameroon = 131 tonnes/ha; Nigeria = 184 ton-
nes/ha. Below-ground biomass was derived from the root–shoot ratio for primary tropical
forest in Table 3A.1.8: 0.22–0.33. Emission factors for the burning of biomass are complex
(Fearnside 2000a). In this case, emissions factors were derived from parameters for tropical
forests in the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (Aalde et al.
2006: Table 2.5): 1,580 ± 90 g/kg DMB for CO2; 6.8 ± 2.0/kg DMB for CH4; 0.2/kg
DMB for N2O (DMB = Dry Matter Burnt). CH4 and N2O were further transformed by
multiplying by their global warming potential, 21 and 310, to convert into CO2 equivalent.
A conservative estimate (using lower bounds of all parameters), this led to an emission
factor for the burning of tropical forest at 216 tCO2e/ha for emissions from the combustion
of above-ground biomass and 51.3 tCO2e/ha for below-ground (267.7 tCO2e/ha total) if all
the forest were burned for the Cameroonian estimate. Since above-ground biomass esti-
mates in Cameroon were larger than those in Nigeria (Anonymous. 2003: Table 3A.1.4),
the Cameroonian data were applied to all standing forests to be conservative. It should be
noted that the above calculations did not include an assessment of carbon content in
understorey vegetation, deadwood and soils, which might increase total biomass to 450
tonnes/ha (Kotto-Same et al. 1997: 248–249) report 204 tC/ha based on a carbon content of
0.45). In other words, the carbon stock estimates here might underestimate CO2e losses by
30% (N. Bird, pers. comm.).
However, not all forest stock is burned during swidden agriculture, and the rate of
regrowth is important. To estimate this, the chronosequence (including 25-year-old cocoa
plantation) described by Kotto-Same et al. (1997: 249) was used. Note that discrepancies in
their biomass estimations, described above, precluded the use of their actual figures.
However, the relative change in carbon content was used to estimate change in CO2
equivalent content over the chronosequence. Note that below-ground biomass was not
observed to change significantly. Results are presented in Table 3 below. Total system
123
CO2e/ha emission released, at the appropriate stage of the chronosequence, was used when
estimating emissions avoided by forest conservation in Ekuri and Tinto.
Putting the conversion factor discussed earlier with empirical data from Kotto-Same
et al. (1997), These data demonstrate that conversion from standing tropical forest (which
initially retained 267.7 tCO2e/ha) by way of swidden agriculture results in the initial
release of 254.9 tCO2e/ha, nearly all of it due to a reduction in above-ground biomass. It
should be noted that over time, as the area is laid fallow, vegetative regrowth accumulates
CO2 so that 17 years after swidden agriculture clearance a net emission of only
77.6 tCO2e/ha has resulted. Carbon stocks would be replenished again to original
267.7 tCO2e levels after approximately of 25 years. Kotto-Same also compared the carbon
content of the standing forest against a 25-year-old cacao farm, which retain only about
179.4 tCO2e/ha. Cocoa can grow in the shade and a few large trees are generally pro-
ductive for 25 years. Therefore, converting standing tropical forest into a cocoa farm
results in the release for up to 25 years of 88.3 tCO2/ha (Table 3).
Improved fuelwood cookstove methodology
Fuelwood consumption was only empirically measured at Tali as part of improved fuel-
wood cookstove assessment project (Akumsi et al. 2005; Purdon 2005). Because of similar
cooking methods were observed across all three communities, fuelwood cookstove results
were extrapolated post hoc to populations of Ekuri and Tinto. A total of 41 households
were visited (n = 41) in Tali-Bara in 2005 in order to conduct semi-structured interviews,
primarily with women, to discuss and quantify fuelwood consumption (for a detailed
methodology consult Purdon (2005)). It should be noted that the survey was made in the
dry season (March and April) when fuelwood is plentiful. Domestic cooking was the
activity most frequently reported during interviews in Tali, while one-third of households
interviewed reported they cooked occasionally for market. Most women collected fuel-
wood from one-half to two-hours per day.
Average daily consumption of fuelwood was measured at approximately 8–9 kg fuel-
wood/day per household, mostly collected from household farms. Many of these farms
were recently burned (1–2 years), though they had initially been established as long as
Table 3 CO2-equivalent stock of standing forest derived from Kotto-Same, Woomer, Appolinaire and
Louis (1997: 249)
Chronosequence Land-use Relative change in biomass Associated tonnes CO2 equivalent
Year type over chronosequence emissions released relative to original
forest
Total Above- Below- Total Above- Below-

system ground ground system ground ground
(%) (%) (%) (tCO2e/ha) (tCO2e/ha) (tCO2e/ha)
0 years Original forest 100 100 100 267.7 216.4 51.3

2 years Slash-and-burn 21 4 92 -211.8 -207.7 -4.1
agriculture
4 years Bush fallow 21 4 92 -211.8 -207.7 -4.1
10 years Tree fallow 56 46 100 -116.9 -116.9 0
17 years Secondary forest 71 64 100 -77.6 -77.6 0
25 years Cacao farm 66 NA NA -88.3 NA NA
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1044 M. Purdon
15–25 years prior. Upscaling daily consumption across the community (approximately 124
households) and on an annual basis, Tali was estimated to consume 362–409 tonnes
fuelwood/year. The lower-boundary, conservative estimate of fuelwood consumption (362
tonnes fuelwood/year) was used in estimating all remaining calculations.
Fuelwood data gathered in Tali-Bara were converted into CO2e via two methods. The
first was estimated directly from fuelwood (Meth-1) while the second has been approved
by the CDM Executive Board (CDM-EB 2008), referred to hear as Meth-CDM. The first,
Meth-1, was based on an assessment of the emissions associated with the combustion of
fuelwood directly, using the same 2006 IPCC emission factors for assessing avoided
deforestation above (Aalde et al. 2006: Table 2.5): 1,580 ± 90 g/kg DMB for CO2;
6.8 ± 2.0/kg DMB for CH4; 0.2/kg DMB for N2O (DMB = Dry Matter Burnt). The lower
boundary of the emission factors was used in order to be conservative. Lastly, it was
assumed that there was near complete combustion of the fuelwood. One tonne of fuelwood
was estimated to result in the emission of 1.69 tonnes CO2e.
The second, Meth-CDM, used the small-scale methodology AMS I.E: Switch from Non-
Renewable Biomass for Thermal Applications by the User which requires fuelwood to be
converted into a fossil fuel baseline (CDM-EB 2008). This is accomplished by converting
fuelwood into its energy equivalent (the methodology provides an IPCC default for wood
fuel, 0.015 TJ/tonne) and then further converting this into emissions via an emission factor
of 71.5 tCO2/TJ for Kerosene, 63.0 tCO2/TJ for Liquefied Petroleum Gas). To achieve
maximum emissions most comparable to fuelwood, the emission factor for Kerosene was
used.
A locally designed cookstove developed by Dr. George Eyabi (pers. comm.) at IRAD-
Batoke was found to reduce fuelwood consumption by 38.5% versus a traditional three-
stone hearth. If improved cookstoves were adopted by all households in the Tali com-
munity, this would result in a reduction of 139 tonnes fuelwood/year.
Finally, note that in order to extrapolate Tali-Bara results to Ekuri and Tinto, the same
fuelwood consumption and associated emission reductions from the improved cookstove
via Meth-1 and Meth-CDM were extrapolated. Tali-Bara results were based on fuelwood
consumption at the household level. While the exact number of households was not
determined in Ekuri nor Tinto, the number of households could be estimate from the
population/household ratio derived empirically for Tali (4.69 persons per household). This
was applied back to the population estimates of Ekuri and Tinto to arrive at a household
number of 1,279 and 426, respectively.
Electricity generation/solar power methodology
A number of electric generators were encountered in each community, running on diesel

fuel. In Ekuri, there was little evidence of the use of electricity, though reportedly there
were a number (less than 30) of individual 5 kWe generators used intermittently. Tinto had
one 25–30 kWe diesel generator that had been donated to the community (which ran 4 h a
day, 5 days a week) and a weekly fuel consumption estimate of 430 l was provided by its
caretaker. Note that the generator was not in operation during field visits. In addition, both
Tinto and Tali had a number of smaller generators present. While a formal survey was not
undertaken, a generous estimate would suggest that each community in Cameroon pos-
sessed an additional 15 individual 5 kWe generators. To offer the best possible contrast to
carbon mitigation potential under biocarbon sinks, it was assumed that these generators
were also each running for four hours a day, five days a week and would be replaced by a
carbon neutral technology such as solar power (see Table 4 for details). Such a scenario
123
Table 4 Emissions from electricity generation

Community No. generator (s) Usage Fuel CO2 e) CH4 e) N2O e) Total
(h/year) consumption (t CO2 (t CO2 (t CO2 (t CO2e)
(L)
Tinto *25 kWe 1,040 8,580 23.78 0.02 0.06 23.86

*5 kWe 9 15 1,040 20,592 57.08 0.05 0.14 57.27
Total 2,080 29,172 80.86 0.07 0.20 81.13
Tali *5 kWe 9 15 1,040 20,592 57.08 0.05 0.14 57.27
Ekuri *5 kWe 9 30 1,040 41,184 114.17 0.10 0.29 114.55
would generate the greatest amount of carbon credits possible for comparison with the
carbon mitigation potential of biocarbon sinks.
The carbon mitigation potential for electricity generation was estimated by assuming
replacement of electricity generation via solar power, reducing all current emissions from
electricity generation. Emissions from electricity generation were based on the small-scale
methodology AMS 1.A. Electricity Generation for User and the energy baseline is the fuel
consumption of the technology in use or that would have been used in the absence of the
project activity to generate the equivalent quantity of energy For the large 25–30 kWe
diesel generator at Tinto, emissions could be derived from weekly fuel consumption
estimates provided by its caretaker (430 l at the time of fieldwork, 340 l when new). The
generator was reported to be used 5 days a week for 4 h a day (1,040 h/year). Emissions
were derived by first assuming the density of diesel to be 0.87 kg/l (IOR Energy 2003
reports a range of 0.85–0.88 kg/l). Diesel emission factors for CO2, CH4 and N2O were
then applied from Table 1.4 of the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas
Inventories (Garg et al. 2006) and then multiplied by each GHG’s global warming
potential. Obtaining fuel consumption rates for the smaller *5 kWe generators was not
possible in the field and needed to be estimated post hoc. The general rule of thumb for fuel
consumption is 7% of the rated generator output (GeneratorJoe 2008). For 5 kWe, this is
1.32 l/h. See Table 4.
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The Clean Development Mechanism and Community Forests in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reconsidering Kyoto's Moral Position'' On Biocarbon Sinks in The Carbon Market

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The Clean Development Mechanism and Community Forests in Sub-Saharan Africa: Reconsidering Kyoto's Moral Position'' On Biocarbon Sinks in The Carbon Market

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Environ Dev Sustain (2010) 12:1025–1050

The clean development mechanism and community

Keywords Clean Development Mechanism Community forests Biocarbon sinks

2 The moral position on biocarbon sinks

3 Community forests and the ‘‘virtual’’ character of the carbon market

scale advantage unavailable to individual communities. Research on community-based

3.1 The economy-of-scale dilemma of community forests

3.2 Carbon credits as a ‘‘virtual’’ economy

(a) (b) (c)

Fig. 1 Evolution of the CDM administration

solutions to systemic problems associated with non-permanence, leakage and additionality

4 West Africa community forest case study

4.1.1 Research sites

4.1.2 Qualitative research methodology

Fieldwork in Ekuri and Tinto consisted of qualitative methods including semi-structured

Table 1 Qualitative Sampling

4.1.3 Quantitative carbon mitigation potential methodology

EKURI 2008 4,476 – 2,413 1,539 115

4.2 Results regarding West African community forest status

4.3.1 Reforestation potential

4.3.2 Forest conservation/avoided deforestation potential

4.3.3 Improved fuelwood cookstove project potential

4.3.4 Solar electricity generation

5 Community carbon mitigation potential under the CDM

6 Reconsidering the moral position on biocarbon sinks

6.1 Implications for carbon mitigation

6.2 Implications for sustainable development

6.3 CDM and REDD: lessons learned

7 Conclusions and policy recommendations

Appendix 1: Quantitative carbon mitigation potential methodology

Avoided deforestation methodology

Improved fuelwood cookstove methodology

Total Above- Below- Total Above- Below-

0 years Original forest 100 100 100 267.7 216.4 51.3

Electricity generation/solar power methodology

A number of electric generators were encountered in each community, running on diesel

Table 4 Emissions from electricity generation

Tinto *25 kWe 1,040 8,580 23.78 0.02 0.06 23.86

OECD/DAC (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Com-

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