THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES – VOLUME 3

Forever Wars
Afghanistan-Iraq. Part 1: 2001/2004

FOREVER WARS   1

Cover photo: Mujahideeen facing al-Qaeda at Tora Bora, Afghanistan, December 2001.
Photo: Pepe Escobar
I
have the pleasure to welcome you to the third in
a series of e-books recovering the Pepe Escobar
archives on Asia Times.
The archives track a period of 20 years – starting with
the columns and stories published under The Roving
Eye sign in the previous Asia Times Online from 2001
all the way to early 2015.
The first e-book tracked the interplay between China,
Russia and the U.S. between 2017-2020.
The second tracked the Islamic Republic of Iran
throughout the “axis of evil” era, the Ahmadinejad
years, the nuclear deal, and “maximum pressure” im-
posed by the Trump administration.
This one closely tracks the Forever Wars in Afghani-
stan and Iraq, starting one month before 9/11 in the
heart of Afghanistan.
The unifying idea behind this e-book series is to
recover the excitement of what is written as “the first
draft of History”.
Once again, you may read the whole compilation
chronologically, as a thriller, following in detail all the
plot twists and cliffhangers.
You will find the last interview by commander Masoud
before he was killed two days before 9/11; the expan-
sion of jihad as a “thermonuclear bomb”; life in “liber-
ated” Kabul; life in Iraq in the last year under Saddam
Hussein; on the trail of al-Qaeda in the Afghan bad-
lands; who brought us the war on Iraq; the Fallujah
tragedy; what went wrong – from Kabul to Helmand
and from Baghdad to the “triangle of death”; the failed
surge in Iraq; the failed surge in Afghanistan; the
myth of “Talibanistan”; all the games of Pipelineistan;
the – still unanswered – key questions about 9/11; the
killings of Osama bin Laden and al-Baghdadi; Afghan-
istan and Iraq dreaming of the New Silk Roads.
The absolute majority of the articles, essays and inter-
views selected for this e-book were written in Af-
ghanistan and in Iraq and/or before and after multiple
visits to both countries.
So welcome to a unique geopolitical road trip – de-
picting in detail the slings and arrows of outrageous
(mis)fortune that continue to shape a great deal of the
young 21st century.
Pepe Escobar, Bangkok, December 2020

2   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS   3

 A screen capture
of the FBI’s wanted
poster – updated
with Osama bin
Laden’s “status”.

Get Osama! Now!

Or else …
Less than two weeks before 9/11, Asia Times revealed the original Ameri-
can plan: to snatch Osama bin Laden inside Afghanistan and “bring him
to justice”. The plan was scotched by Pakistani President Musharraf.
By PEPE ESCOBAR
AUGUST 30, 2001

PESHAWAR, Pakistan – American commandos likely to descend on

Pakistan’s tribal areas may not be too keen on acquiring the supreme
fashion accessory of 2001 in the region, the Osama bin Laden T-shirt,
boasting such inscriptions as “World Hero” and “The Great Mujahid of
Jihad.” They’re selling briskly in Peshawar’s Saddar bazaar for less than
US$2 a pop.

4   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS   5

 The US special forces guys could also take back
home a few examples of Osama rappin’, available on
cassette tapes. They could collect Osama mug shots
with lovely psychedelic overtones, and even an Osama
video – where the No 1 on the FBI’s most wanted list
on charges of international terrorism preaches from
a mosque and talks to his faithful jihadis in the field.
Osama says, “You gotta leave all these places run by
‘allies of Jews and Christians’ and come to me to do
the jihad.” He calls for “blood, blood and destruction,
destruction” – referring to an array of Muslim victims
from Palestine to Chechnya, from Lebanon to Kash-
mir.
Osama bin Laden – also the No 1 target of the CIA’s
counter-terrorism center – is now a superstar play-
ing the bad guy in some sort of planetary Hollywood
fiction. Yet inside Afghanistan today, where the Saudi
Arabian lives in exile, Osama is a minor character. He
is ill and always in hiding – usually “somewhere near
Kabul.” Once in a while he travels incognito to Pesha-
war. His organization, the Al Qa’Ida, is split, and in
tatters. The Taliban owe him a lot for his past deeds
towards the movement and in putting them in power
in Afghanistan – contributing with a stack of his own
personal fortune of millions of dollars. But no longer
an asset, he has become a liability.
General President (or vice-versa) Pervez Musharraf of
Pakistan is not sleeping very well these days since the
full force of the George W administration requested
his direct input into a high-tech “Get Osama” oper-
ation any time soon. Peshawar is full of rumors con-
cerning an American commando infiltrating Afghani-
stan from Pakistan, supported by formidable airpower.
Call Jerry Bruckheimer! This is the stuff Hollywood is
made of – and also the stuff of debacles such as Jimmy
Carter’s attempted rescue of US hostages in Iran. Any
Mujahid worth his Kalashnikov in Afghanistan these
days – up to commander Ahmadshah Masoud himself
– is on the record as saying that Cruise missile attacks
will cause no damage whatsoever to the already rav-
aged country.
Officially, Musharraf has rejected his support for this
6   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
latest Hollywood ploy, and has been frantically trying and also all the accounts held by jihadi outfits inside
to convince the Americans any brutal action against Pakistan.
Osama or his so-called “terrorist sanctuaries” will fuel
Pakistani government officials, though, remain afraid.
a radical Islamic backlash in Pakistan, Afghanistan
They know that even a semblance of minimal cooper-
and Central Asia of “burn, baby, burn” proportions.
ation with the “Get Osama” scheme will be devastating
It doesn’t matter that the strike would have the full
for the Musharraf government. They know that since
approval of the United Nations and the G-8 countries
1996 the Taliban have become masters at using any
– this would be an added reason for a series of Islamic
kind of conflict inside the Pakistani establishment to
counter-strikes across the industrialized world.
their full advantage. They always extract maximum
Under an army of spinners, this nifty “George W benefit from Pakistan without any political conces-
does Rambo” number will be played to the galleries sions.
as one of the latest American foreign policy initiatives
The Taliban are closely intertwined with Pakistani so-
concerning Afghanistan. It’s no secret America wants
ciety. Their ultra-conservative – and for the West, de-
even more sanctions against the Taliban – and may-
mented form of Islam – is widely admired by a young
be against Pakistan. But as many people either in the
generation of Pakistani madrassas (fundamentalist
Pashto belt on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border or in
religious school) students. All it takes to understand
the Tajik-speaking areas have been saying out loud
the process is a visit to one of the thousands of madras-
for months, there is no Western policy concerning
sas in the tribal areas where Osama is the “World Hero
Afghanistan – except the UN sanctions, which among
of jihad.”
others, call on the Taliban to hand over bin Laden.
It is quite clear that one way or another the jihad
The UN has now posted more than 20 monitors in
T-shirt vendors in the Peshawar bazaars will keep on
countries bordering Afghanistan – part of a sanctions
rollin’ – with or without customers from the land of
enforcement support team – to ensure full imple-
George W.
mentation. This means, in practice, a lot of electronic
surveillance on the very porous 1,200 kilometer Pa-
kistan-Afghanistan border, and a lot of “counter-ter-
rorism tactics.” An array of hardcore Islamic parties in
Pakistan have already announced that they will make
the life of the “Team” as miserable as possible.
Most of all, Musharraf cannot sleep well because one
thing he doesn’t need in Pakistan right now is more
trouble from Islamic hardliners. What he needs is a lot
of cash from the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank to keep the economy afloat. If he
says yes to the Americans, all hell will break loose con-
cerning the radicals, but he will certainly bag a crucial
US$3.5 billion Poverty Reduction Growth Fund from
the IMF, as well as other loans from Western nations.
There are some signs that the Musharraf administra-
tion is at least doing something to restrain the hardlin-
ers. It has frozen all the accounts of the Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan held with the State Bank of Pakistan,
FOREVER WARS   7
 Masoud just after our interview. Photo: Jason Florio

Masoud: From warrior

to statesman
The Lion of the Panjshir’s next to last interview, granted only two weeks
before he was assassinated on the eve of 9/11

By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 12, 2001

THE PANJSHIR VALLEY, Afghanistan – For millions all over a digital world
desperate for a bit of romance, he is as iconic as Che Guevara: the romantic
ideal of the intellectual warrior.
He looks like a beat generation poet – with his trademark felt Chitral hat
from the Pakistan region of the Hind Kush always cocked to the side, and a

8   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS   9

Sartrean existential twinkle in his eyes. He wanted to
be an architect when, as a youth, he was studying at the
French Lycee in Kabul. Instead, he was to spend half
his life as Afghanistan’s Master of Guerrilla Warfare.
He started waging war with just 20 men, 10 Kalash-
nikovs, one machine-gun and two rocket launchers.
The intellectual arsenal was certainly deadlier: Mao,
Che, Ho Chi Minh, revolutionary tactics adapted to
the Afghan mind to rouse rural peasants. In more than
two decades he defeated an Afghan dictator (Muha-
mad Daoud) and then the mighty Red Army of the
Soviet Union. For someone who escaped countless
total encirclement situations by ultra-hardcore Soviet
generals, fighting the black hordes of the almost Monty
Pythonish Taliban could even be labeled a joke.
Ahmad Shah Masoud is as modern as one can be in a
legendary crossroads of empires such as Afghanistan.
His Islam is as soft as a Panjshir peach – bearing not
even a remote comparison with the demented Taliban
version. According to Afghan astrologers, Masoud will
live another 40 years – he is 48. This should be enough
time for him to liberate Afghanistan, put the house in
order, and die in peace. It is a mythology as uplifting as
the Shangri-La landscape of the Panjshir Valley in the
north of the country which is his home.
Masoud sleeps less than four hours a day. Officially,
he is the vice president of the Islamic State of Afghan-
istan – a government that despite controlling only 10
percent of Afghanistan is recognized by the United
Nations and the international community as the legit-
imate. The Taliban control the non-recognized Islamic
Emirate of Afghanistan.
It is Masoud though, who has the final word on prac-
tically everything regarding the Panjshir Valley and
the war effort. Through a bunch of satellite phones and
walkie-talkies he coordinates a war financed mostly
through revenue from emerald and lapis lazuli mining.
In the morning immediately after our interview, Ma-
soud received two commanders from torrid Shamali
plains in the central region of the country to discuss
war strategies, attended Friday prayers at the Bazarak
mosque, signed a mountain of executive orders, and
10   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
departed to inspect one of the frontlines. A dedicated
Francophile, he understands French well, but does not
speak the language, out of shyness: the conversations
are always in Dari, a Persian language.
Whenever he is not commuting in his military heli-
copter number 570 between the Panjshir, the various
frontlines, and the Tajik capital Dushanbe, he may take
some time off to swim in his pool with his five chil-
dren, or to read in his fabulous library which contains
more than 3,000 volumes – including some that are
centuries old.
Madame Masoud – also a Panjshiri – is proud to
open her closet to reveal she does not wear a chadri,
the Afghan dress that completely veils a woman’s body
and which is obligatory attire in Taliban-controlled
parts of the country.
All over the Panjshir, Masoud is revered as a feudal
lord – almost as a king. He appears to have learned
much from his major setback, between 1992 and 1996,
when he controlled Kabul after the Soviet withdrawal,
but could not effect the transition from strategist to An Afghan guard of honour places a wreath in memory of slain Afghan national hero Ahmad Shah Massoud during a ceremony marking the
statesman. Nowadays, he is midway through the com- twelfth anniversary of his death in Kabul on September 9, 2013. Photo: Shah Marai / AFP
plex process. War is not his only strategy: he is actually
creating a state from scratch – with key ministries such
an offensive to recapture the key city of Taloqan in the “Most of the people with economic problems living
as foreign affairs, defense and education. Nevertheless,
northern province of Takhar. Masoud smiles when in Afghanistan are non-Pashtuns, especially in Kabul.
everything is still subordinated to the war effort. He has
asked about the possibility of legendary commander [Pashtuns, or Pathans, are the dominant ethnic and
only 10 military helicopters and no jets – compared to
Ismail Khan reconquering the Persianized Herat in linguistic community in the country.] The Taliban are
the Taliban, who now may have no more than three jets
western Afghanistan – a key source of revenue for the trying to intensify these problems so these people leave
from an original total of 10 old MiGs and Sukhois.
Taliban by way of taxes. “I’m not saying we’re going to Afghanistan for Pakistan. Half of the financial budget
Masoud wants to establish a regular state army take it back today or tomorrow, but he’s going further of Osama bin Laden’s organization is spent on buying
trained by experienced Mujaheddin (fighters), sta- step by step.” the houses of people who are not Pashtun.”
tioned in a base in Khwaja Bahaouddin, a desert
Masoud is closely monitoring the arrest and trial in Masoud does not believe there will be a dramatic
wasteland near excavations of Greek ruins, the Amu
Kabul of several foreign non-government organiza- American attempt to capture bin Laden inside Afghan-
Darya River and the Tajik border. This army will have
tion workers from Shelter Now International, accused istan, as has been widely rumored in Pakistan. The
between 10,000 and 14,000 fighters. The Taliban militia
of attempting to convert Afghans to Christianity. He exiled Saudi Arabian is wanted on charges of interna-
is believed to number about 45,000 – but most have
explains the big picture. “The Taliban have a special tional terrorism by the United States. “There will be
minimal training.
program to expel foreigners. They need excuses for it, negotiations between the Taliban and the American
Masoud’s military mantra in 2001 is “active defense”: and to fill their places with Arabs and Pakistanis. There government, but no action.”
opening many fronts simultaneously, a strategy that is an organization named Al Rashid which has promised
Masoud is keen to emphasize that “Cruise missiles
is driving the Taliban crazy. One of the most brilliant the Taliban it will help accomplish this task. In the next
don’t have any effect in Afghanistan. Thousands of
among his young commanders has been capable not weeks and months there will be more and more episodes
Scuds were fired inside Afghanistan during Najibullah’s
only of resisting the Taliban, but is about to unleash like this. And behind all this there is a tribal problem.
FOREVER WARS   11
regime [1986-1992]. Around 14 or 15 Scuds were fired
into the Panjshir. Actually we don’t know where they
landed, and what effect they had.” Masoud’s forces still
have around 20 Scuds stationed in the Panjshir.
Masoud believes that the UN economic sanctions
against the Taliban “are a very positive step.” The UN
sanctions include a travel ban on senior Taliban offi-
cials, an arms embargo which has not yet been mon-
itored, and a ban on international flights. “They’re
saying these sanctions are against the Afghan people,
but that is not true. We want these sanctions enforced.”
He emphasizes “there is no military solution” to the
Afghan crisis. “But to make the Taliban ready for nego-
tiation – because they are not ready right now – there
are two points to be considered: the resistance inside
Afghanistan, and the international pressure against
Pakistan. The resistance inside Afghanistan is getting
stronger day by day, especially this year. And if the
government of Pakistan stops interfering in the Afghan
issue, I’m sure there will be no Taliban in five or six
months.”
He acknowledges, though, that the Taliban are an
ultra-hard nut to crack: “We have had negotiations
with the Taliban in the past, especially the one in the
presence of the UN in Ishq Abad two years ago. We
had some agreements, but when their delegation went
back to Kandahar, everything was refused.”
Tribalism is rampant, but Masoud refuses the notion
that all of the troubles in Afghanistan are tribal-related.
“For example, (exiled king) Zahir Shah is Pashtun, and
he cannot live under the Taliban. In the same breath,
we have some Tajiks who cannot live with us. The trib-
al problems that exist now are intensified by Pakistan.”
So it’s inevitable that Masoud does not trust Pakistan’s
President General Musharraf, who is trying hard to
project a moderate image despite assuming power in
a bloodless coup. “He is following the same line of his
military, from General Zia [ul Haq] to now.”
Masoud is in close contact and receives a lot of help
from his former foes, the Russians. But when asked
about the human rights abuses of the Russian army
12   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
against the civilian population of Chechnya, he de-
clines a direct answer. “It is a conflict that should be
solved by diplomatic means.” The same applies to the
independent Chechen president, the moderate Aslan
Maskhadov, elected in 1997. Masoud says, “nobody
recognizes him for the moment, not even the UN.
When the UN does, I’ll state my position.” Indepen-
dent European sources confirm that Masoud is defi-
nitely pro-Chechnya. But of course he cannot afford to
publicly antagonize Moscow.
Even in Masoud’s tolerant brand of Islam some things
are forbidden. Cigarettes, for instance. Two of Ma-
soud’s bodyguards recently assembled all the cigarette
packs confiscated in Panjshiri bazaars and set fire to
them in the middle of a busy road. The commander
explains, “cigarettes have been banned since the be-
ginning of the resistance against the Russians – for
economic reasons. People smoke too much. The region
spends too much money on cigarettes, and they don’t
eat as much as they should.” Nobody actually respects
the ban – decided by a council of elders: people contin-
ue to puff away by driving south to the Shamali plains,
north of Kabul, where the ban does not apply.
The most striking contrast between Masoud’s Islam
and the Taliban’s ultra-hardcore version regards the
situation of women. For Masoud, on paper, women
could even compete in free elections. He asked a recent
visitor for a copy of the Swiss constitution: for him, this
is a typical example of democracy that could work in
Afghanistan, with different ethnic groups and different
languages.
According to Masoud, officially there are no Mu-
jaheddin women. Actually there is one – an already
famous commander in Takhar province, but she is not
regarded as a Mujaheddin. Masoud insists, though,
that all the women in the Panjshir are combat-ready –
and this is normal in a war situation. “They all know
how to operate a weapon. Not to make war, but to
defend themselves in case the Taliban attack.” There
is a Kalashnikov in every home, but informally it was
possible to ascertain that most women in the Panjshir
don’t know how to fire a gun.
Masoud is adamant that in Afghanistan women have
suffered oppression for generations. He says that “the
cultural environment of the country suffocates women.
But the Taliban exacerbate this with oppression.” His
most ambitious project is to shatter this cultural prej-
udice and so give more space, freedom and equality to
women – they would have the same rights as men.
This means giving Afghan women the chance to
study. Masoud even wants to build a university in the
Panjshir Valley – besides developing more schools for
women. “But these are things that I can do only step by
step.” For him, “women themselves also have to follow
an evolution, and this could take one generation, may-
be two.” As far as the university project is concerned, it
is essential because under the Taliban reign of cultural
terror people cannot go to the capital Kabul anymore
to study, they are forced to go to the northern town of
Faizabad, or to Pakistan, Iran or New Delhi – if they
have a lot of money. Most, including the most able,
don’t come back.
For Masoud, unlike the Taliban, equality between
men and women is totally logical. In Afghan practice,
it is another matter. Masoud develops a political dis-
course that does not correspond to the reality on the
ground. His eagerness for more opening contrasts with
a 95 percent illiteracy rate among women across the
country. Many are still enveloped in the chadri because
the culture is like that. Masoud recognizes the hurdles:
“I don’t have the power to change Afghan culture.” It is
important to note that for his democratic plans, Ma-
soud refers to the Panjshir Valley, a much less conser-
vative area than, for instance, Faizabad in Badakhshan
province, where Burhanuddin Rabbani, the titular
head of the Islamic State, lives. Rabbani himself is very
conservative about women.
There are only two high schools for girls in the Pan-
jshir, compared to about 10 for boys. Basically, there
is no money available for education, but the priority is
to educate the boys first. Masoud again recognizes he
can’t go against this cultural tendency.
His obsessive dream, though, is more democracy for
more of Afghanistan. In the unlikely event of a referen-
dum in the near future, Masoud says that “depending
on the time of the election, most of the population of
Afghanistan would vote for a national political party
that could have the power to reconstruct the country.”
For him, “the future has to be solved through only one
way: democracy.” And in a unified country. “I’m not
interested in a partition of Afghanistan. We have our
country and we respect its integrity.”
This could only happen, of course, if he is capable
of reconquering Afghanistan. “I’m not waging war
against the Taliban. I’m at war with Pakistan.” Ma-
soud is certain that “forty percent of the people in the
frontlines are not Afghans, they are foreigners – mostly
Pakistani military, Taliban-educated in Pakistani ma-
drassas, [fundamentalist religious schools] and Saudis
faithful to Osama bin Laden. These people can come
from all over – since Osama has issued a worldwide
appeal for ‘good Muslims’ to come to Afghanistan to
engage in a jihad [holy war].” So, along with Russians,
Americans, Chinese and everybody else, Masoud is
also clearly worried about the possible Talibanization
of Central Asia.
Masoud has spent most of his life at the frontlines.
Today he is regarded world-wide as the only credible
savior of Afghanistan. But he knows he is no solitary
Messiah. “It’s not only me resisting the Taliban. This
involves people from all over Afghanistan. Their num-
bers grow larger and larger every day. As you can see in
the IDP [internally displaced persons] camps and with
other refugees in the Panjshir. They don’t have enough
food and clothes. But even with these problems they
do not want to live under the Taliban, they prefer to
stay here [in the Panjshir Valley]. I’m completely sure
our resistance will be successful one day, Inch’ Allah
[By the grace of God]. This country will go toward
peace.”
And when it does, Masoud’s vision for the future
couldn’t be more straightforward. “To be honest, I
would spend the rest of my life reconstructing my
country.” This way, and only this way, the warrior
turned statesman can die in peace – as the Afghan
seers read it in the stars.
FOREVER WARS   13
 The student leader
of Pakistan’s main
fundamintalist
party, Jamaat-i-Is-
lami, holds a copy
of the koran and a
sword as he takes
an oath of jihad
during an anti-US
rally in Islamabad
in 2001. Photo:
AFP

Jihad: ‘The ultimate

thermonuclear bomb’
A Pakistani scholar deconstructs everything “infidels” need to know about jihad

By PEPE ESCOBAR
OCTOBER 10, 2001

ISLAMABAD – Arif Jamal, born in Lahore into a traditional Punjabi

family, is arguably the leading Asian expert on jihad. He was educated in
Pakistan, France and the US. He is married and lives in Islamabad, where
he works as a consultant for leading media organizations in Europe and in
Pakistan. Although he describes himself as a journalist, he is also a schol-
ar. For the past three years Arif Jamal has been engaged in monumental
research that will yield at least four books – all of them related to jihad.

14   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    15

 “Jihad” is now the supreme mantra in Pakistan’s
tribal areas after the beginning of American strikes on
Afghanistan. Jamal is fond of remembering a certain
scene at the White House in the mid-’80s, when Ron-
ald Reagan – with his unflinching Californian eye for
drama – was receiving a bunch of bearded and rugged
frontier characters in the Oval Office: they were the Af-
ghan mujahideen fighting the mighty Red Army of the
“Evil Empire,” the Soviet Union. Reagan on that occa-
sion proclaimed the mujahideen “the moral equivalent
of the Founding Fathers.” Among these mujahideen a
place could easily be found for a certain Arab million-
aire named Osama bin Laden.
Today Osama bin Laden – formerly the “moral equiv-
alent” of George Washington and Thomas Jefferson –
on the receiving end of America’s fury. History can be
very fond of symmetries. In the ’80s, the Afghans were
fighting a jihad against an Evil Empire, financed in part
by America’s CIA. At the beginning of the 21st century,
Afghans are about to engage in a jihad against America
itself. As Jamal puts it: “Now it’s time for America to
pay the price for the jihad in Afghanistan.”
Asia Times Online: What is the true meaning of
jihad?
Jamal: Jihad literally means “holy struggle.” But in
common parlance, when people use the word jihad,
it means jihad in the way of Allah – or “the holy war.”
Prophet Muhamad stressed a lot the concept of jihad all
his life. And he fought jihad more than 20 times in his
own life. The real objective of jihad in the life of Proph-
et Muhamad was to defeat the infidels and establish an
Islamic state in Mecca, Medina and the Arabian island
later on. This essential meaning of jihad remains even
today. The main objective of jihad even today is to de-
feat the infidels and establish Islamic states all over the
world. Muslims believe that the Earth belongs to Allah
and they should establish the system of Allah on Allah’s
Earth. The infidel system must go.
ATol: What are the rewards of waging jihad?
16   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Jamal: Prophet Muhamad also offered a lot of incen-
tives for those who would wage jihad in their lives.
The mujahideen were assured of entering Paradise
before the first drop of their blood fell to earth. The
Holy Scriptures of Islam also say that houris [beau-
tiful virgins of the Koranic Paradise] come down to
Earth to take the spirit of the mujahid who is about
to die before the first drop of his blood falls to earth.
The martyrs are promised 72 hours in Paradise. These
hours are more beautiful than all the beauties of the
world combined. I have studied more than 600 wills
of Pakistani mujahideen who were fighting in Kash-
mir. There is hardly any will that escapes this concept.
All the mujahideen have mentioned the houris as an
important incentive for waging jihad. The Paradise
with hours is the prime objective of these mujahi-
deen.
ATol: What is the Koranic view of “infidels” – espe-
cially Christians and Jews?
Jamal: In the beginning Prophet Muhamad did try to
evolve alliances with Jews of the Arabian island against
the nonbelievers. But they did not prove long-lasting.
And ultimately the Jews, Christians and nonbelievers
were bracketed in the same fashion by the Prophet.
Prophet Muhamad wanted to establish an Islamic State
in the Arabian island. It was not possible by evolving
alliances with non-Muslims in those days. The Holy
Koran is very clear about Jews and Christians; it very
clearly says in several places that Jews and Christians
cannot be friends with Muslims. The mujahideen
today are propagating this concept from every avail-
able pulpit. Prophet Muhamad also asked to throw
Christians and Jews out of the Arabian island. And
this is the foundation of the concept of jihad of Osama
bin Laden. Osama’s contention is that it is un-Islamic
to have the Christian and Jewish army of the United
States of America in the Arabian island. He wants
them out. Many of his close associates say that if the
American troops leave Saudi Arabia, Osama bin Laden
can be convinced to appear before an Islamic court of
law. This shows that his jihad is based on the sayings
of Prophet Muhamad. A big problem is that jihad has
intensified the hatred between Muslims and Christians interpret different concepts according to their own
and Jews. wishes.
ATol: Could we say that Osama’s jihad is a misinter-
pretation of jihad according to Prophet Muhamad?
ATol: The concept of jihad itself was elaborated in
Jamal: I don’t think it is a misinterpretation of the seventh century Arabia. In your opinion, what is the
Islamic concept of jihad. It may be a narrow interpreta- relevance of such a concept to the 21st century?
tion of the concept.
Jamal: Jihad as we know it now started only after
the CIA and ISI [Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence
agency] started jihad in Afghanistan. Before that, jihad
ATol: So Osama’s jihad in thesis only applies to Saudi
was a dormant concept, and Muslims were waging
Arabia, it would not apply to Palestine and Israel.
mostly nationalistic struggles. In the last two decades,
Jamal: Basically, the important thing is the presence jihad has come to mean “armed struggle.” After the
collapse of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European
of Christians and Jews of the American army on Sau-
empire, jihad has been adopted by the have-nots in
di soil. But with the passage of time his jihad has also
Muslim countries. And these have-nots are waging a
assumed many other aspects. It has come to be a jihad
sort of class struggle against the Western haves. Jihad
to liberate the whole world from the infidels, and estab-
has become a thermonuclear bomb in the hands of the
lish an Islamic system all over the world. The practical
have-nots in Muslim states. So if Marx were alive today
problem is once you start jihad or guerrilla warfare you
he would say that the new class struggle is the Islamic
cannot come back to normal life. Your interest lies in
have-nots against the Western haves Sum Probably
the continuation of jihad.
Marx would not agree with this because he was in favor
of a class struggle without the involvement of religion
Sum But this is one form of class war, yes.
ATol: Do great Islamic religious authorities like grand
muftis, for instance, agree with the concept of a global
jihad?
ATol: Who is entitled to start and wage a jihad? Do
Jamal: I think no Muslim on Earth would disagree you need special qualifications for it?
with the concept of jihad, because if they did they
Jamal: According to the Holy Scriptures, it is the
would become infidels. Most Muslims don’t take part
Commander of the Faithful – the Amir-ul-Momineen
in practical jihad. Even moderate Muslims would not
– who is entitled to declare jihad. But in the absence
disagree with the concept of jihad. They may disagree
of a commander-in-chief, any Muslim can wage jihad.
with the attacks on the World Trade Center, but they
The Holy Scriptures say that jihad will continue till the
do not disagree with the concept of jihad as such. Most
Day of Judgement. This means that the mujahideen will
would certainly like to see the establishment of an
not revert to ordinary life. You cannot simply abandon
Islamic state all over the world. Most Sunni Muslims
jihad. Once you get training to wage jihad, and you
condemned the Iranian revolution which established
wage jihad, you only change locations, but you have to
a Shia Islamic state. This is a sectarian problem. Shias
continue the struggle. That is why the mujahideen from
believe they waged a real Islamic revolution, and Iran
Afghanistan were directed to Kashmir.
is the only Islamic state at the moment. Sunnis don’t
believe so. The Wahhabis, for example, believe that
Saudi Arabia is the only Islamic state in the world. As
I said, Islam is a very sectarian religion. Different sects ATol: So how do you internalize jihad? Apparently
FOREVER WARS   17
once you start waging jihad, your whole world-view is
subordinated to jihad. Everything else is not important.
Even if you have to kill innocent people, this is subordi-
nated to the higher purpose of jihad.
Jamal: The end justifies the means. When you start
jihad, it starts dominating you, because it gives you
power over the rest of the world. All other things
become subordinated to jihad. Even the concept of
Islam boils down to jihad for the mujahideen. All other
Islamic concepts – even when they are important –
they become subordinated to jihad. Jihad becomes the
ultimate end even for the Islamic belief system. These
mujahideen ignore many, many important Islamic
concepts. For example, Prophet Muhamad said that
marriage is important for Muslims. It is “half of your
belief,” according to Him. But when I read the wills of
mujahideen, I find they refuse to get married because
they want to get married in Paradise.
ATol: So most mujahideen are single.
Jamal: Yes, most mujahideen prefer to get married in
Paradise. Apart from jihad, they do practice namaz (the
ritual of five prayers a day) regularly, they very regu-
larly fast, but they ignore other concepts of Islam. They
say jihad is the summit of Islam. So if you have found
the summit, you have found the whole thing. This is
what they are taught. They believe jihad will bring them
honor in the world, they will become powerful. The
heroes of the mujahideen have always been generals.
No Muslim scientist, or intellectual, or artist has ever
become a hero. It’s a military tradition that dominates
the mujahideen.
ATol: Some influential Muslim scholars say that the
great problem with Islam is that unlike Christianity, it
did not go through a Renaissance and a Reformation.
Jamal: Something to this effect has been said by the
Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi. Regarding your
question, I think this is an influence of Christian
scholars on Muslim scholars. I think the West devel-
18   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
oped only after it abandoned Christianity and adopted
science. It did not develop because it had Renaissance
and Reformation. They developed only after they
abandoned Jewish and Christian dogmas and adopted
science as a way of life. I think this is the only solution
for Muslim societies as well. Unless they adopt science
and technology, they will not be able to fight the West.
ATol: How many different faces may jihad adopt?
Jamal: Jihad can take many forms. The concept of
many Pakistani organizations of mujahideen is the
liberation of Kashmir from Hindu domination. Many
of them say that if India quits Kashmir they will stop
jihad.
ATol: Could we make a comparison with the jihad
in Afghanistan in the ’80s? Many might have said that
after the Soviets were expelled, they would quit jihad;
instead they started fighting with each other.
Jamal: Certainly this will happen in Kashmir as well
if India quits, because Islam is very sectarian in the
Indian subcontinent. All the jihadi and Islamist parties
in the subcontinent are based on sects. They cooperate
with one another for the sake of convenience. But es-
sentially they do not consider other sects as the “right”
sects.
ATol: How do you describe the current jihad against
Shias inside Afghanistan itself?
Jamal: When the CIA started jihad in Afghanistan,
Shias in Afghanistan also participated in the struggle
against the Soviets. But later the anti-Shia forces took
over jihad – and the jihad started eating its own chil-
dren. The Shias in Afghanistan are mostly concentrated
in the Hazarajat region. They are also slightly spread
out in the west. This phenomenon has internation-
al aspects as well. One reason is the Saudi influence
on the Afghan jihad. You remember the Saudis were
matching America dollar for dollar. And Saudis had a
lot of influence over the mujahideen in Afghanistan.
This influence was one of the important factors which
turned the mujahideen and the Taliban against the
Shias in Afghanistan. The second reason is related to
internal Pakistani politics. In Pakistan, Zia-ul-Haq was
seeking a support base among the Sunnis of this coun-
try. And he strengthened a lot of Sunni organizations
and parties, a lot of them Deobandi – which eventually
turned against the Shias because they were also receiv-
ing money from the Saudis and other Middle Eastern
shaykhdom (kingdoms). Since the Middle Eastern
monarchs were against Iran, these parties also turned
against Shia in Pakistan. The Afghan factor multiplied
the tension between Pakistani Shias and the Deobandi
organizations.
ATol: Why are the Taliban so fiercely anti-Shia?
Jamal: Shias have always been part of Muslim societ-
ies. They are a significant part of most Islamic countries
in the world. Normally Shias are associated with Iran
only, but there are many other countries with a sizable
Shia majority, like Syria or Iraq. In Pakistan, 10 percent
of the population is Shia. But in Afghanistan, when
the Taliban came to power, they represented a certain
Islamic sect – the Deobandis. And Deobandi is the
most aggressively and ferociously anti-Shia sect. This
hatred is rooted in history and politics. In 18th centu-
ry Lucknow (in India), the rulers , the Muslim rajahs,
were Shias, whereas the populaton was Sunni. When
the Deoband movement emerged, they used the class
hatred of common people in Lucknow and the environs
against the Shia rulers. From that point in history, the
tension between the Deoband movement and Shias
started rising. But it never took a bloody shape until the
military regime of Zia had to depend on the Deobandi
organizations and parties in Pakistan to prop up and
support his government.
ATol: Can you mention some examples of Deobandi
parties and organizations? Which ones are considered
terrorist organizations?
Jamal: The important Deobandi political parties are
the three factions of the JUI (Jamiat Ulema Islam) –
directed by Fazlur Rahman, Samiul Haq and Maulana
Ajmal Qadri. The other national parties are Sipah-I-Sa-
haba Pakistan (“The Soldiers of the Companions of
Prophet Muhamad”), and there are also four Deobandi
organizations involved in the jihad in Kashmir. One is
Harakat-ul-Mujahideen – which has been designated a
terrorist organization by the US. The others are Harkat-
ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Jaish Muhamad and Jamiat-ul-Muja-
hideen. The Taliban, of course, are also Deobandis.
ATol: Is there any substantial difference between Deo-
band practiced by the Taliban and Deoband practiced
by these religious parties in Pakistan?
Jamal: There’s very little difference. In Pakistan they
cannot practice their version of Islam the way the
Taliban can in Afghanistan. Given freedom in Pakistan,
they would behave in the same way as the Taliban do.
And this is exactly what they are striving for. And their
influence is of course increasing day by day.
ATol: In terms of percentage, how big are they?
Jamal: It’s very difficult to estimate. It’s an important
minority, maybe around 10 percent, spread all over the
country. Once again, it’s important to say that Islam in
the subcontinent is very sectarian. The Islamic sects
in the subcontinent are as well defined as the castes
are defined for Hindus. All the sects hate one another.
Deobands believe that Shias are not Muslims. This has
come to be their fundamental principle. The Brelevis –
which are the largest sect in Pakistan and India – be-
lieve Deobandis are not Muslims. Brelevis also believe
that Wahhabis are not Muslims. It’s a war of all sects
against all sects. They could unite sometimes against
a bigger enemy – like the United States. But given a
relaxed atmosphere, they are at each other’s throats.
ATol: Could we talk about different manifestations of
FOREVER WARS   19
jihad – in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, maybe South-
east Asia?
Jamal: I believe jihad has been spreading since the
Afghan jihad started. Before that, the nationalist
struggles were mere nationalist struggles even when
Muslims were involved. In the case of Palestine, it was
not jihad unless the jihad in Afghanistan started in
1980. In the last two decades, jihad has been spreading
because the Muslims have found a very lethal way of
combating their enemies – and expressing themselves
– thanks to the CIA. The reasons and the causes of the
spread of jihad are certainly valid – but it is an irra-
tional way of reacting to those real problems in life.
Hamas did not come into being in the early days of the
Palestinian struggle. It was only after the Palestinians
learned armed jihad in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In
the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf group is very much
linked with organizations in Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. In Chechnya as well, the Saudis are very much
involved – through Wahhabi organizations in Pakistan.
There is an international network of jihadi movements
which has come into being. All these organizations all
over the world are becoming closer and closer linked to
one another. They give all kinds of assistance to other
jihadi organizations, and civil society is unable to resist
them. Most of these jihadi movements are one way or
another linked to jihadi movements in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. And both countries have become a source
of training, arms and ammunition to these organiza-
tions. There is a respite sometimes, because of some
government policies, but once these policies go away
the jihadis re-emerge. One of the latest examples is in
Burma. The jihad in Burma subsided when there was
an arms embargo by the Huseena Wajid government
in Bangladesh, and the price of a Kalashnikov went up
three times – but now the jihadis can again support
the Burmese mujahideen against the Buddhist govern-
ment of Burma. These mujahideen are concentrated in
the Burmese province of Arakan. A sizable number of
Burmese fighters came to Pakistan; here they collect
donations, and get religious military training.
20   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
ATol: Is there a Javanese connection to the jihad, or
maybe from Aceh?
Jamal: I haven’t come across any visible link between
Pakistani and Afghani jihad organizations and Indo-
nesian or Malaysian mujahideen. But some Indonesian
and Malaysian mujahideen got training in Pakistan and
Afghanistan. There are no significant organizational
ties – as yet.
ATol: Could we explain the attacks on America as
organized by a coalition of jihadi organizations – with
no Super-Brain giving the executive orders?
Jamal: Yes, in the sense that there are mujahideen
from many countries involved in this operation. But we
have to wait for the details. It is certainly not the handi-
work of one organization, one group or one individual.
If Osama and the Al-Qaeda are involved, they are not
alone. It was certainly a collective effort.
ATol: Let’s talk about the training of a jihadi. How do
you form a jihadi? What do they learn in those training
camps?
Jamal: In 1980, when the CIA and ISI started jihad
in Afghanistan, they concentrated on training the
Afghans in the art of guerrilla warfare. There was very
little religious indoctrination. According to a former
ISI officer, they trained something like 80,000 Afghans
in the art of guerrilla warfare during the ’80s. But after
some time they found out that military training was
not enough. So the CIA and the ISI – with the help of
Saudi money – started establishing madrassas (Koranic
schools) all over the country, for Afghans and Paki-
stanis, and certainly along the Pakistan-Afghan border.
These madrassas produced hardened Islamist guerril-
las. The early fighters were freedom fighters. But they
were slowly replaced by the Islamist guerrillas. And that
is why when the mujahideen came to power in Afghan-
istan after the overthrow of Dr Najibullah’s government
in 1992, they could not sustain power. The students
from these madrassas took over the government in the
name of the Taliban Islamic movement.
ATol: So they were the second generation of jihadis.
Jamal: Yes – and these madrassa-trained students
were the best jihadis. The CIA and the ISI set up many
training camps inside Afghanistan and in the North-
west Frontier Province of Pakistan. When the jihad in
Afghanistan came to an end, these guerrillas needed
employment somewhere. And luckily for them, the
Kashmir front was opened. So most of them were di-
verted to Kashmir. Kashmir was a nationalist cause for
Pakistan. And Pakistanis responded to it very liberal-
ly – unlike in Afghanistan, where the cause was not a
Pakistani cause. Kashmir was a Pakistani cause. So they
set up scores of training camps. My own calculations
show there are somewhere near half a million mili-
tary-trained Islamist guerrillas in this country.
ATol: How many of these are operating right now in
Kashmir?
Jamal: At any one time, there are between 3,000-4,000
Islamist guerrillas inside Indian-controlled Kashmir.
These guerrillas are full-time guerrillas. Military train-
ing is only a part of their syllabus. Most of the time they
learn about the holy scriptures of Islam and the rituals
of Islam. The stress in the training camps is on religious
training rather than military training. Once you train
somebody to give his life in the way of Allah, it com-
pensates for lack of training. This is why 3,000-4,000
guerrillas are holding more than half a million Indian
troops in Kashmir. And the Indian army does not seem
to be winning. If they were only mercenaries fighting
for money, they would not have done so well. It’s their
Islamist belief, it’s their desire to establish the sovereign-
ty of Allah all over the world which keeps them going.
ATol: So they don’t study anything else apart from the
Koran – no history of the subcontinent, no math, no
languages?
Jamal: Certainly not. They read the Holy Koran and
other religious texts like the sayings of the Holy Proph-
et. These organizations also produce a lot of literature
of their own. They are encouraged to read that litera-
ture as well. Once the students finish their training they
come back to society and start proselytizing. They don’t
sit back at home. So half a million guerrillas in Pakistan
are very much active in imparting to others the Islamist
solution to their problems.
ATol: What does the military training consist of? And
who are the instructors?
Jamal: Most of the instructors are Pakistanis. There
are some Muslim deserters from the Indian army as
well. The concept is not to wage jihad only. The im-
portant thing is to get prepared to fight jihad if one
has to. That is why all the trained mujahideen do not
go to Kashmir or elsewhere. They get training because
the Koran orders Muslims to remain always prepared
to fight against the infidels. They usually follow a basic
military course of 21 days – to get minimum training
in Kalashnikov-handling, hand grenades, ambushing.
You come back to get advanced training only when
you are planning to practically wage jihad. Even those
who have minimum guerrilla training are better fight-
ers than the Pakistani policemen. And the advanced
guerrillas are certainly better than most conventional
armies. The proof is what is going on in Indian-held
Kashmir.
ATol: Have you had any reports of a massive transfer
of jihadis from Kashmir to wage jihad against America
in Afghanistan?
Jamal: No, there is no mass transfer to Afghanistan.
There are only four organizations who are engaged both
in Kashmir and Afghanistan. But they have different
agendas for Kashmir and Afghanistan. Those who fight
in Kashmir are not necessarily involved in Afghani-
stan, and vice-versa. In Kashmir the fighters are mostly
Punjabis – and Punjabis have proved themselves to
be very good guerrilla fighters. In Afghanistan they
FOREVER WARS   21
need Pashtun fighters, because the Pashtuns do not
like guerrilla warfare. They feel they are being cowards,
because they attack the enemy from behind. They have
the tradition of coming out in the open and fighting the
enemy. Most of the Pashtun fighters in Kashmir failed
and died: they could not match the Indian army be-
cause they came into the open. Only Deobandi organi-
zations are involved both in Kashmir and Afghanistan.
The Taliban expelled all other jihadi organizations from
Afghanistan when they came into power – because they
consider only Deobandis as good Muslims.
ATol: What is the future direction of jihad?
Jamal: Jihad has tremendously affected Pakistani
society. With increasing poverty, most people have very
little to do with their lives. In this uneducated society,
they have found a solution – an irrational solution – to
their problems. They don’t want to labor to find bet-
ter solutions. They think if they wage jihad all their
problems will be solved. It is very interesting: all their
problems are worldly, and the solution is spiritual. But
when they join jihad, they forget about their worldly
problems.
The Kalashnikov in their hands gives them respect,
power and raison d’etre. Somebody who has nothing in
life and nothing to lose, who has been for many years
idling away his time in the streets of a Pakistani village,
suddenly finds a cause to live for in a jihadi camp. And
that gives him not only spiritual power but also practi-
cal power over one of the biggest armies in the world.
He is almost intoxicated with that power. And he will
do everything to retain that power. These guerrillas
very often praise themselves for winning against the
22   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Soviet Union – a former superpower. They have turned A Taliban fighter
the Indian army – a big conventional army – into a sits in front of a
house destroyed
wreck. And they believe they can defeat the sole super- by a US air strike
power today – the United States. And they believe they near Jalalabad in
are the intermediaries who can establish the rule of October of 2001.
Photo: AFP
Allah on Allah’s Earth.
ATol: Assuming the scenario of the fall of the Tali-
ban government – which is now the supreme desire of
the “fantastic coalition,” as George W. Bush put it, do
you think jihad will be waged against the government
inside Pakistan?
Jamal: In Afghanistan there is no viable alternative
for the Taliban at the moment. The Afghan king, Zahir
Shah, has been away from the country for more than
25 years now. He doesn’t know anything about today’s
Afghanistan. He ruled Afghanistan in different times.
The Northern Alliance is itself divided. It can speak for
small minorities such as the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Shias –
but they cannot provide strong government in Afghan-
istan.
The removal of Taliban will create a vacuum, which
A glimpse into the
will ultimately lead to further bloodshed. In Pakistan,
where the state is stronger, there is every possibility of
bloodshed, but not on the same scale, at least in the
beginning. The Pakistani jihadi organizations have an
Taliban mind
enemy before them: the United States and their collab-
orators in Pakistan. Ultimately Pakistani jihadi and Is-
lamist organizations won’t agree to form a government
because they hate one another more than they hate the
biggest enemy – the United States. So there is more of Trying to decipher a riddle by talking to the Afghan vice-consul in Peshawar
a possibility of an eternal clash among the jihadi and
By PEPE ESCOBAR
Islamist parties than jihadis against the Pakistani gov-
OCTOBER 30, 2001
ernment.
PESHAWAR – Ahmad Faiz, a soft-spoken young man, is the Afghan
vice-consul and official spokesman in Peshawar. In this capacity he is
one of the few Taliban diplomats – or Taliban, for that matter – with a
window to the outside world: the Taliban, the most isolated regime on
the planet, are left nowadays with just an embassy in Islamabad, and two
consulates – in Peshawar and Karachi.
It was Faiz who revealed to Asia Times Online early last Friday that
commander Abdul Haq had been captured by the Taliban (although
FOREVER WARS    23
at the time he did not know that Haq would be exe-
cuted). Faiz is not exactly keen on disclosing a lot of
information: he says he is “from Afghanistan” – but as
he speaks Dari, not Pashto, it is fair to assume he may
be from Kabul. He says he “studied in Afghanistan”
– which means he does not hail from the network of
Pakistani madrassas which contributed most of the
Taliban leadership.
Faiz comes across not as a hardliner, but not as a
“moderate” Taliban either: the Taliban themselves have
been trying hard to demonstrate to the world lately
that a moderate Taliban is a dead Taliban. As infuri-
ating as interviews with Taliban officials can be – and
considering many overtones that are lost in translation
– Faiz’s words and silences can be a useful barometer
of the Taliban mindset as the relentless bombing cam-
paign reaches its fourth week.
On a post-Taliban coalition government including
“moderate” Taliban:
“In the name of Allah, many people are saying some-
thing about an adventure in our country that has not
happened yet. They object to our government. And
some of them made some government against us –
they want to send them here as government. And some
say we are pulling out. I don’t know who has given this
authority to them. Our present and future time is in
the hands of only one God.”
On what is the Taliban strategy from now on –
compared to the American strategy of destroying the
Taliban:
“The American strategy is clearly understood, it is to what the world does to them. But we are not nervous
trouble the people, with aggression over the freedom of or frightened – as the American union is so nervous
other peoples. I think Americans are taking pleasure in killing the people. We will resist against this crime.
killing innocent people. Our strategy is very clear: we They are bombing hospitals, common living places,
will do the same as we did to the past aggressors of our killing children, women. Where are these organi-
country.”
24   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
On the Taliban strategy to counter various plans to
capture Kabul:
“Up to now they didn’t take Kabul. They have failed.
And they will never take Kabul. And even if they take
Kabul, they will never be able to keep it. The people
who took Kabul in the past, at first they were very
proud. But whenever they were escaping, they could
never find their way out.”
On the willingness of the Taliban to talk to the UN
envoy Lakdar Brahimi:
“He hasn’t come yet.”
On Iran and Russia saying the Taliban cannot be
part of a future Afghan government:
“The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan’s government
is a government made by the people of Afghanistan.
Destroying such a government is not easy because the
people won’t let them. The people who are coming
with the airplanes of America will not be accepted by
the Afghan people. The Russians created many prob-
lems, they destroyed our country. How can they say
such words?”
On what’s the situation inside Afghanistan, and
how many civilians have been killed:
“The people have not healed from the suffering
during the war against the Russians. Now another
powerful country attacks us, which is a criminal action
against human beings. The people clearly understand
zations which claimed in favour of human rights to
question these cruel people?”
On the use of cluster bombs and maybe chemical
weapons by American forces:
“For three weeks crimes have been committed against
our people. The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan has
asked the Organization of the Islamic Conference to
send a delegation into Afghanistan to see what is hap-
pening to civilian life. Again I ask organizations who
take care of human rights: why they are so quiet now?”
Once again, on how many civilians have been
killed:
“The crimes of America have no limitations. They say
by themselves that in one strike more than a hundred
aircraft take part. They don’t understand what is hu-
man rights. As they are failing, everything else they try
will fail in the future. The protests against their crimes
are increasing day by day in the world.”
On how public opinion in the West cannot fully
measure the suffering of the Afghan civilian popula-
tion – because information disclosed by the Taliban
is always so vague:
“Americans always try to trick and deceive other peo-
ple in the world. In their actions they are not standing
on truth. So why is the press hiding what is happening?
Basic circles of the press are in the hands of America.
I wish the press could have freedom. This is why we
called the OIC to send an envoy to Afghanistan.”
On freedom of the press:
“Some press organizations are not showing the reality,
the real pictures, they are just explaining the opinions
of the American government. Why does the press
not object to these media organizations? Our policy
is clear for real journalists. Many people coming to
Afghanistan introduce themselves as journalists. We
deal with them as journalists. If there is any delay now
for travelling to Afghanistan, that is because we respect
the security of the journalists. When the American
bullets are killing innocent people, these are blind bul-
lets – they don’t see if somebody is a journalist, a child,
a woman. We are winning this war. When we finally
win, then we will let people in to see what happened to
the Americans.”
On the remote possibility of allowing the media
into Afghanistan:
“We may consider that, taking into account the fact
that any real journalist has to be independent. But
Bush or Blair will have no place on the soil of Afghan-
istan.”
FOREVER WARS   25
 Ahmad Wali Karzai,
the brother of Af-
ghan President Ha-
mid Karzai, speaks
at a press confer-
ence in Kandahar in
2008. Photo: AFP

Operator, call a sat-phone

number in Toba
The harrowing scene in Quetta, Balochistan, as an invisible Hamid
Karzai becomes the most sought after Afghan on the planet

By PEPE ESCOBAR
NOVEMBER 10, 2001

QUETTA, Pakistan – Baluchistan this Friday felt like Tibet, and Quetta
a sister city to Lhasa – under an occupation army in full regalia. A general
strike was called by the Pak-Afghan Defense Council – a coalition of reli-
gious parties – against the Musharraf government’s support for Washing-
ton. As far as the strike was concerned, it was a total success: virtually all
businesses were shut down, the streets deserted – and not because Islam-
abad had made it a public holiday in honor of the national poet Iqbal.

26   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    27

 But street protests were another matter entirely.
Roughly 100 protesters, mainly Afghan, gathered in
front of Kandahari mosque, in Quetta’s famous Kan-
dahari bazaar after Jumma prayers. There were at least
2,500 fully armed police – but no troops – in the city
and its surrounds, according to Dr. Muhamad Shoaib
Suddle, inspector-general of police for the whole of
Baluchistan. With a rate of more than 25 police for
each protester, and with 25 religious leaders in custody,
to be released only late in the afternoon – including the
vice-president of the Jamaat-I-Islami, Maulana Ab-
dul Haq – Dr. Suddle was country-club-relaxed in his
Toyota Hi-Lux. The protest turned into a media parade
with a few “Down with Musharraf ” cries thrown in for
the cameras.
Journalists in Quetta don’t get a security guard as part
of their visit: they get an apprentice spy, some with
guns, some with bamboo sticks, generally gentle, shy
souls who earn 2,000 rupees a month (little more than
US$30) and can barely fire a gun. The spy is the media’s
American Express: don’t leave home (the New Mex-
ico-style Serena Hotel ) without it. This is a glimpse
of Musharraf ’s democracy in action. The official line
invokes the usual suspect – “security reasons.” But the
real picture reveals an Islamabad extremely alarmed
with foreign press snooping around American-con-
trolled bases in strategic Baluchistan.
Mohin Khan Baluch, head of the Baluchistan Nation-
al Party, which he defines as a “nationalist Baluch and
secular party,” confirms America is using four landing
strips in Baluchistan – Pasni, Omara, Gowader and
Jiwni – and fully controlling four airports – Pasni,
Panjgur, Shansi and Dalbandin: “And they tried to get
Quetta airport as well,” he adds. All the roads leading
to these bases are blocked.
Mohin Khan says that “angry people already fired at
Panjgur, a crowd tried to get hold of Dalbandin,” and
according to a report in a Baluch local paper, “fired
at US personnel in Pasni, killing two Americans.”
He does not measure his words: “Pakistan has made
Baluchistan a US cantonment, which has affected a lot
the relationship between the Afghan and the Baluch
28   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
peoples.” In Ghousabad bazaar – an extended Afghan
village and a center for around 25,000 people, most
living in the place for the last 10 or even 20 years –
most semi-destitute locals agree with Mohin Khan’s
assessment.
In a more sedate part of this desert frontier town,
Ahmad Wali Karzai – Hamid Karzai’s younger broth-
er – juggles more pressing questions concerning a
sat-phone. Ahmad Wali lived in the US for 10 years.
He even had an NGO, from 1992 to ’98 – the Envi-
ronmental Foundation Agency (EFA). Until recently
he was basically concerned with the show-stopping
French soccer superstar Zinedine Zidane: nowadays he
has to hold court to the world media trying to find out
where exactly his brother is.
Hamid Karzai, 45, educated in Kabul, holder of a
Master of Political Science degree from India, former
deputy foreign minister of the pre-Taliban Rabbani
government, with a wife living in Quetta, and now
a man on a mission of peace, may be at the moment
the most sought after Afghan in the whole planet. But
where, exactly, is Hamid Karzai?
According to his brother, Hamid Karzai “is safe, in
Afghanistan, in the south of Uruzgan province” – in
Deh Rawad village, not far from Tarin Kowt, where
elusive Taliban supremo Mullah Omar was born. His
brother says Karzai is “talking to tribal leaders, on a
peace mission, continuing his work to try to form a
loya jirga [grand council] and a broad-based govern-
ment in Afghanistan.” This is obviously a long-term
process: nobody expects Hamid Karzai to round up a
couple of tribals and topple the Taliban before Rama-
dan.
Ahmad Wali stresses that “loya jirga.” This is the real
Afghanistan. “If we have a problem in a village, the
elders come together and solve the problem.” In trib-
al Uruzgan, according to Ahmad Wali, “there is very
strong support for us. The Taliban are only 6 years old,
but our relation to the tribes is more than 100 years
old.” In the view of both Karzai brothers, former king
Zahir Shah’s return is “an acceptable solution to Tajiks
and also to Pashtuns.”
Ahmad Wali says “Afghan people were always reli-
gious – not fundamentalists. Islam didn’t come with
the Taliban. The Taliban have nothing to do with
Islam. People even in the countryside do not agree
with them.” But he admits, “In the beginning we even
supported them, until the middle of 1996,” because
the Taliban were promising security. At the time, he
adds, the Taliban were saying, “We are mullahs, we
will go back to the madrassas. But then they became
power-hungry.” Ahmad Wali insists that nowadays
“everyone is in favor of a Loya Jirga all over Afghan-
istan.” Farid, Karzai’s cousin, adds that “People think
that Afghans are Taliban. But we want freedom, and a
government with rights. Islam says every human being
has rights. We don’t want to insult our religion.”
The younger brother stresses that “Hamid is always in
touch with the people.” Ahmad Wali also reveals that
Hamid left Quetta almost a month ago – that is, even
before the capture and execution of former jihad com-
mander Abdul Haq by Taliban intelligence. On the day
he left Quetta, “he said he would drive to Karachi and
then take a plane to Islamabad. But he drove straight to
Kandahar, and crossed the main checkpoints with no
problem.” After all, Hamid Karzai is an Afghan, and a
beard is the only passport for a travelling Afghan.
Unlike Abdul Haq, Hamid Karzai was never a fighter
or commander. Neutral sources note that the Karzai
clan – which originates from the small village of Kar –
supports the Taliban morally, but does not take active
part in Afghan politics. Before the Taliban, Hamid
Karzai was a representative of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s
government at the UN: “But then America approached
him, bought him, and he withdrew himself from the
Taliban, still in their early stages,” says a source. That’s
when he started his campaign in favor of a loya jirga.
Ahmad Wali says Hamid Karzai, for the moment,
“is not contacting any Taliban commanders. He is
just working with tribal leaders.” He has not been in
contact with the Northern Alliance either: their last
meeting – which included the presence of the subse-
quently assassinated “Lion of the Panjshir,” Ahmad
Shah Masoud, was in early 2001. The Karzai political
mantra is predictable: “The Pashtuns have to be part of
any government in Kabul. Otherwise, it won’t survive.
The largest, most populous areas are Pashtun.”
As we talk, Ahmad Wali says he just spoke with his
brother a few hours ago – by sat-phone. The BBC also
talked to Karzai on his sat-phone. He placed the call –
not the network. The BBC forgot to mention that they
wanted badly to call Karzai, and then Ahmad Wali
arranged for his brother to make the call. We ask for
the sat-phone number. Ahmad Wali replies: “He will
call you.” But a few minutes later he says “he called”
his brother to tell him about Abdul Haq’s execution.
On his BBC appearance, Karzai said he was in Afghan-
istan, he had to fight his way to safety, and then he
made a worldwide appeal so Afghanistan can “get rid
of these foreigners” – meaning the Al-Qaeda Arabs.
Last Tuesday, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
said off the record during his return trip from Central
and South Asia that Hamid Karzai had been “extricat-
ed” from Afghanistan. A number of American sources
have confirmed they had sent a helicopter to “extricate”
Karzai from Afghanistan. Afghan Islamic Press, on the
other hand, said more than a week ago he had been
arrested with 25 other people and could be hanged.
Will Hamid Karzai be back? “Nobody knows. But
it won’t be soon,” says Ahmad Wali. The road is long,
“and our mission started already 20 years ago.” The
Taliban insist that Hamid Karzai is in Toba, a deserted
Baluch area northeast of Quetta. An usually well-in-
formed source in Islamabad, a consultant to Al-Ja-
zeera, confirms that he is in Toba. The fact is, Hamid
Karzai could be in Deh Rawad. Hamid Karzai could be
in Toba. And Hamid Karzai, a confirmed bon vivant,
could be hitting jackpots in Vegas. Place your bets –
and track that sat-phone number.
FOREVER WARS   29
 A member of the
International
Security Assistance
Force shows his
rifle to Northern
Alliance soldiers
while on patrol
near Kabul airport
in 2002. Photo:
Mandel Ngan / AFP

Friend or foe?
Deep into the New Afghan War, only 30 km away from Kabul, with the
Taliban surrounded on three sides

By PEPE ESCOBAR
NOVEMBER 27, 2001

MAIDANSHAR, Vardak province, Afghanistan – It may sound and feel

sometimes like a toy battle in slow motion around desert and bare moun-
tains – without the drama of thunderous mayhem in the trenches. But in
a minute it can become ferociously deadly. The New Afghan War is alive
and kicking a mere 30 kilometers southwest of Kabul – less than a half-
hour’s drive, in the village of Maidanshar, on the main road to Ghazni
and Kandahar.
Figures in Afghanistan notoriously stretch the imagination, but local
commanders say about 4,000 Taliban – including Arabs, Pakistanis and
Chechens – are holding back 5,000 Northern Alliance troops. Arabs are
basically concentrated on bunkers on top of three hills and in high moun-

30   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    31

tains, armed basically with cannons.
According to Maulavi Ahmad Jan Ahmadi, editor of
the now-defunct “The Islamic Emirate” – the Taliban’s
wacky monthly mouthpiece in English – “the month of
Ramadan is a month of jihad, martyrdom and action,
and not a month of idleness, inactivity and laziness.”
The Taliban are strictly following the dictum. Although
some argue these Taliban and Arabs were left behind
during the Mullah Omar-induced “strategic retreat”
from Kabul, most probably they’ve positioned them-
selves to cause maximum trouble to Northern Alliance
forces in the capital.
In Maidanshar, the Taliban are actually surrounded
on three sides. Northern Alliance positions encircle
them on a 180-degree arc across the newly-paved
road to Ghazni. The Alliance is receiving help from
troops of Rasool Sayyaf, the Pashtun intellectual
heavily supported by Saudi Arabia. Behind the hills
are 600 to 1,000 Hazara troops – who answer directly
to commander Khalil Khalili, one of the top Northern
Alliance commanders. The Taliban have two possi-
bilities for a way out, according to local commanders:
to Bamiyan province, towards the northwest, or to
Ghazni province, towards the west, through a series of
mountain passes.
The Taliban have no tanks, but a cluster of RPGs and
BM-12 heavy mortar launchers, with a range of fire of
around six kilometers, and a few rocket launchers.
The Northern Alliance started with a T-55 tank with
a 10- to 12-kilometer range on top of a hill, a BM-40
opposite, plus another two T-55 tanks and a few extra
BM-12s – but soon got reinforcements. Local muja-
hideen are extremely upbeat. One of them, from the
north side of Kabul province, relishes his prospects, “I
will kill the Taliban,” he says with a smile.
These mujahideen answer to commander Amanullah
Guzer – for the moment in Kabul for consultations with
General Mohammed Fahim, army chief of the Northern
Alliance. Another mujahideen insists that the Taliban
“can resist only for a few days. Then they will run out of
ammunition. They cannot receive more supplies.”
32   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Further on down the road, the situation is far murk-
ier. Ghazni is controlled by the Northern Alliance, but
with many Taliban lurking outside the city’s perim-
eters. There are also plenty of Taliban on the road to
Kandahar. It is clear that the Taliban are adopting the
classic guerrilla strategy outlined in 1998 by Al-Qaeda’s
Al Zawiri – the “government forces” may control the
day, but the Taliban want to control the night.
The main Arab commander in Maidanshar is Abu
Yousuf, a close supporter of Osama bin Laden. The
main Taliban commander is Ghulam Muhamad – no-
torious for his financial gluttony and elaborated ruses
to deceive his enemies. The “government forces” – as
the Northern Alliance is now referred to – tried to buy
his surrender and that of his troops for US$300,000.
When they were about to deliver the money, apparent-
ly there was $100,000 missing, so Ghulam decided to
open fire.
The mujahideen, a lot of them coming from Parwan,
with the Sayyaf people coming from Paghman, are now
waiting for permission from commander Fahim – now
minister of defense in Kabul – to mount an offensive.
Ghulam added more sauce to the mix when he decided
that if resistance was impossible against the mujahi-
deen, he would surrender – but to the ethnic Hazaras.
The Hazaras are reportedly unhappy with the “govern-
ment forces” because they were not given permission
to enter Kabul. The Hazaras are not attacking Taliban’s
positions: they are adopting a wait-and-see attitude.
Ghulam is sure to explore these ill feelings, although a
knowledgeable source from Takhar province says that
the relationship between Fahim and Khalili is “good”
and that they are “determined to agree with each other.”
If the whole set-up sounds tortuous, it’s because it
is. In an improvised press conference in a mujahi-
deen-filled room inside a dilapidated roadside gas
station – the local commander’s headquarters – tight-
lipped commander Abdul Ahmad Dorani, with a hash-
ish-like gaze in his eyes, tried to share some perspec-
tive. It’s a miracle that the glaringly obvious gas station
has not been shelled yet by the Taliban.
Dorani is a former member of the Taliban forces, but
he now has pledged his allegiance to “the Islamic State
of Afghanistan.” It’s very simple: you just trade the
turban for a camouflage jacket. He still looks and talks
like a mullah, though. Dorani says that he has given
a deadline for the evacuation of civilians from nearby
villages – between 15 and 20, according to him – “and
then we resume fighting.” The reason, “We don’t fire on
civilian targets.” Dorani quotes a hard-to-believe figure
of 30,000 to 40,000 civilians living in the area. Some of
them can be seen walking by the roadside, bumping
into incoming tanks, carrying their few belongings on
their way to Kabul.
In one of his famous “messages,” Amir-ul-Momineen
(Leader of the Faithful) Mullah Omar said, “We order
you gravely and severely to refrain from killing wom-
en and children, irrespective of the party with which
they are affiliated. And if there falls into your hands
combatants and elderly men, we forbid you from kill-
ing them without permission, even if the field com-
manders order you to kill them.” The Taliban and the
Northern Alliance are not exactly following this code
of ethics of not killing without permission, much to
the horror of the “deeply concerned” United Nations,
invoking a number of international humanitarian
conventions in the daily press briefings in Kabul. There
were massacres in Mazar-e-Sharif, there could still
be a massacre in Kunduz, and nothing would prevent
another massacre in Maidanshar.
But according to Dorani, “if we capture Afghans, we
will let them escape because they are Afghans.” Fight-
ing in Afghanistan is a way of life, regardless of who
you fight for, and since allegiances can be forgotten
without a blink, today’s enemy may be tomorrow’s best
friend. Both sides – Northern Alliance and Taliban –
are in constant radio communication.
They devise specific breaks in the action to collect
casualties – not many so far, because “there has not
been fierce fighting.” Dorani negotiates extensively
with the Taliban: he is a local, and he knows the local
elders. But the Arabs and Pakistanis are another matter
entirely. “We will keep them and then send them to the
defense ministry in Kabul.”
Dorani would welcome American aerial bombing to
smash the Maidanshar front. “We’ve already pointed
their positions to the Americans.” As we mention the
possibility of a coordinated offensive with the Hazaras
to dislodge the Taliban – after all, the Hazaras are on
the other side of the hills – he simply says, “We are in
contact with Khalili.” Dorani agrees that the situation
in Maidanshar is similar to Kunduz: the Taliban are
willing to surrender – or merely switch sides – but
the Arabs are bent on becoming martyrs and earning
eternal glory. As we finish talking, a Taliban shell lands
only a few yards away from a Northern Alliance tank.
The mujahideen disperse and engage in a lot of radio
talk. It’s time to pack up, and come back the next day
for the sequel.
The sequel is relatively uneventful. The village in
the first line of fire is empty. Some 2,000 Taliban did
surrender – according to commander Amanullah. An
unspecified number fled to Vartak town, 10 kilometers
ahead through the mountains. The mujahideen “will
go after them.” Commander Amanullah – from the
Shamali plains – steps out of his jeep filled with muja-
hideen to tell us there were no Arabs. The area is now
totally controlled by the Northern Alliance – and it will
be one of their bases. But “the battle is not finished.”
We jump onto a Toyota pick-up filled with deliriously
happy mujahideen – Panjshiris, Hazaras – to visit the
fallen village in the first line of fire. We meet a few of
the Taliban who surrendered. One of them – a Tal-
iban who should be featured as a cover story of the
men’s fashion magazine L’Uomo Vogue – tells us that
he abandoned the Taliban two years ago: “And what
have you been doing all these years?” we ask. He’s been
living in the village as a shepherd – he replies. He still
keeps his turban, though. Commander Ziahuddin –
not dressed in military fatigues, but simply enveloped
in a blanket, in charge of 300 mujahideen – looks at
him and declares, “It’s a talib.” But he’s now a free Talib
– socializing with the mujahideen. We go back to the
main road, catching a lift with commander Ziahuddin
– happily enjoying the ride in his brand new, confiscat-
ed, former Taliban Toyota Corolla. “The battle is not
finished.”
FOREVER WARS   33
 Afghan refugees
flee US-led military
strikes on their
homes in 2001.
Photo: AFP

Freedom riders
In the heart of liberated Kabul

By PEPE ESCOBAR
NOVEMBER 28, 2001

KABUL – The feeling on a splendid late autumn afternoon is one of

absolute elation. Thousands of beardless, grinning Kabulis are cycling
about, enveloped in their dark brown blankets, welcoming the Northern
Alliance patrol units in their brand new Russian-made combat fatigues.
This joy, though, is juxtaposed with images of death – endless carcass-
es of bombed buildings. Trucks loaded with TV sets speed past in the
direction of liberated Jalalabad. Women walk around unescorted, many
of them burqa-less. A Fiddler-on-the-Roof look-alike taxi driver plays
his Indian pop music cassettes at ear-splitting volume while performing
Formula-1 stunts in his white-and-yellow Corolla.
He takes us to the remains of the house of the Taliban’s former minister of

34   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    35

education, Amir Mutaqqi, gutted by formidable Amer-
ican precision bombing. He also takes us to the former
office of the ATC – a United Nations-sponsored demin-
ing agency – near the airport, totally destroyed by Amer-
ican imprecision bombing. Ragged kids roam about
collecting precious scrap metal. Welcome to the ultimate
21st Century Devastation Showpiece: Liberated Kabul.
We arrived in Kabul a few hours before the beginning
of Ramadan, not by the north – like the Northern Alli-
ance – but by the improbable east, by taxi, through the
mountains, straight from a Jalalabad voided of Taliban
a few days earlier. In Jalalabad, the mujahideen were so
excited they were about to eat their rocket launchers.
They said that they comprised no less than 20,000 fight-
ers, mostly from Nangarhar province, but also from the
neighboring Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan regions –
all of Pashtun majority areas. Brandishing their Kalash-
nikovs in front of the governor’s palace, they stressed
that the Pashtuns were united. An anti-Taliban Kunar
was a big surprise: according to surefire sources in the
pakistani border city of Peshawar, this was to be the
Taliban’s strategic retreat headquarters.
There were absolutely no Taliban at the Pakistan-Af-
ghan border. There was not even a border. The Durand
Line that officially divides the country had just melted
away, as if in a dream. On the way to Jalalabad we were
saluted like we were in the Paris-Dakar rally. Every-
body was out in force in Jalalabad – previously a Tali-
ban stronghold – wanting to know who would decide
their future. A shura (tribal council) was hastily con-
vened to determine power: 100 wise men representing
the wishes of a key Afghan province bordering vola-
tile tribal areas in Pakistan. The mujahideen said that
they had captured nine Arabs, but a few thousand had
fled in the direction of Kandahar, soon after Pashtun
commander Azad Ali entered the city. Some would be
hiding in the hills and caves of Nangarhar. There was
virtually no gunfight.
The next day we finally learned for sure that Abdul
Qadir, the de facto man in control of Nangarhar prov-
ince, had been elected by the shura as the new governor.
Qadir, a former governor, is the brother of Abdul Haq
– the 1980s jihad commander executed by the Taliban
36   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
during his mission to convince Pashtun commanders to
subvert the Taliban rule. Ironies of history: as Ahmed
Shah Masoud, the Lion of the Panjshir, only conquered
Kabul after he was murdered, Abdul Haq only con-
quered eastern Afghanistan after he was executed.
The bloodless fall of Jalalabad was even more surpris-
ing than the fall – or the Taliban’s “strategic retreat”
– from Kabul, according to Mullah Omar’s perverse
formula. Nobody saw anything because of the dazzling
speed of the facts accumulating on the ground, and
because there were absolutely no reporters to verify
whatever happened. It is amazing how a state is capable
of melting away without leaving any traces.
In Jalalabad, the only remains of Taliban rule are a
few white billboards with black Koranic inscriptions.
The Radio Shariat building is in ruins. Only less than
a week ago, according to the mujahideen, the streets
were empty: everybody was afraid of the Taliban and
afraid of the devastating American bombing.
By this time it was clear that eastern Afghanistan was
living an involuntary experiment in anarchy. Anarchy
under control – by the Northern Alliance – but with
some worrying signs already in the horizon. On the
way to Kabul we passed through Khuram, a former
village totally destroyed by bombing, with more than
100 civilian deaths. The survivors are now grinning to
passing cars and trucks from the dusty roadside.
In Sarobi, the danger is palpable. Sarobi clings to a
strategic pass – ideal for staging guerrilla operations.
The local population is hyper-religious, and pro-Tali-
ban: “They guaranteed law and order,” says a crowd in
the dreadfully poor bazaar. And in a curve of the road,
between the naked Tagao mountains, our translator –
an engineer student in Jalalabad, born in Kabul – points
in the distance to a column of Arab fighters, clearly
visible as they march towards their caves. The guerrilla
army is in place and ready to strike at any moment.
Liberated Kabul is all smiles, even fighting the Is-
lamic-induced daylight hunger of Ramadan. About
10 minutes after five in the evening everybody grabs
a bucket and drinks from water pumps on the side-
walks, and eats plenty of delicious potato pancakes
from street stalls. There are pressing rumors that Dr
Abdullah Abdullah, the Northern Alliance’s minister
of foreign relations, fluent in English, the Alliance’s de
facto spokesman, has presidential intentions.
The splendidly dilapidated Kabul Intercontinen-
tal – an early 1960s bossa nova relic which should be
packed for a permanent exhibit at the Design Museum
in London – is the new epicenter of the media planet.
Ultra high-tech digital equipment worth the GNP of a
cluster of Afghan provinces is now camped out on the
roof of the hotel, in one of the poorest corners of the
world. And still the media is struggling to put all the
pieces of the puzzle together as no-one knows for sure
what is happening in allegedly divided Kandahar – the
news trickle in via Pakistan – or how may Taliban are
actually encircled in Kunduz city.
It is a great pleasure to meet again young Jabah, a Ka-
buli, our translator during an interview with commander
Masoud, the last he gave in the Panjshir before his assas-
sination in Khwaja Bahauddin by an Al-Qaeda suicide
commando two days before September 11 – a “gift” to
Mullah Omar from his best mate Osama bin Laden. “Ev-
erybody is happy, but not very happy because he is not
here,” says Jabah, visibly moved. Every Northern Alliance
truck or jeep in Kabul displays a Masoud photo.
Saturday morning in Mandaii bazaar, near Kabul’s fa-
mous Blue Mosque, the largest in Afghanistan: scenes
straight from a Central Asian take of a Renaissance
Brueghel painting. Probably for the first time since the
late 1970s the streets are absolutely thronged with peo-
ple feeling normal, relaxed, under no pressure at all.
Piles of Afghani notes change hands in the money
market. Before September 11, the official rate was
66,000 Afghanis to the dollar. Now it is 40,000 Af-
ghanis. The money changers say that the Taliban
looted the market before fleeing. All the fresh money
comes via the United Arab Emirates, American dollars
changed into Afghanis. Young, educated Kabulis are
adamant: they and everybody else are in favor of the
return of former King Zahir Shah. Some are keen to re-
mind us, “Please give thanks to Tony Blair and George
Bush.” They say that even before the Taliban fled, “kids
were flying kites and women were going to the market
alone.” This means that the Taliban, discreetly, spent
days preparing their flight.
In the middle of the hustle and bustle we find Palwan
Janagha, a celebrated wrestler in the Afghan national
team during three successive Olympic Games: Tokyo
(’64), Mexico (’68) and Munich (’72). Palwan claims
that he is just 48. For the past 20 years he has had a
shop in the bazaar, fixing broken bones and supporting
his family of eight. He is wildly happy with the libera-
tion. And he is of course in favor of Zahir Shah.
In the bombed-to-oblivion (during the mujahideen
wars) and predominantly Hazara neighborhood of
Karte Sakchi – not far from the prison where the Tal-
iban used to lock up men with short beards – there is
a Shia mosque where Hazaras flock to their prayers on
Wednesdays and Sundays. The Hazaras – descendants
of Genghis Khan’s army – were routinely harassed and
massacred by the Taliban. Thousands of them still live
in the extremely poor surrounding bare hills.
A Hazara man who came from Uruzgan province six
months ago, because of the drought, sells dates and
dried fruit to invisible customers. He says, “there were
too many Pakistanis and Arabs in Kabul. Now I’m very
happy.” He doesn’t bother about the heavy presence of
the Northern Alliance in town. “We just want peace.”
Like virtually anyone else, he wants Zahir Shah back.
“I don’t know if he can control our country because
he’s been away for more than 20 years.” But it does not
matter. “Long live the king” is the new mantra. Zahir
Shah was the monarch during an Afghan golden age,
when Afghanistan was a proper country, not a heap of
spectacular ruins.
Afghans want their country back. Muhamad Ali, an
old man, remembers vividly life under Zahir Shah,
when he was a shopkeeper. He remembers the wild
street parties during the anniversary of independence
– usually celebrated at the end of August. Today, Muha-
mad Ali is a beggar. He says, “the Northern Alliance is
not bad,” but he is hoping to “kiss Zahir Shah’s hands.”
The ministry of interior is where the political action is
FOREVER WARS   37
swinging in Kabul. It’s being entirely run by the North- Eric Falt proudly announcing in the Intercontinental
ern Alliance military – mostly Panjshiris. There is a vaults, “The UN international staff returned to Kabul
uniform behind every desk, beside their inseparable after 65 days.” The mission, led by Francesc Vendrell,
walkie-talkies, portable heaters and the Afghan flag, deputy special emissary to Afghanistan – with 10
not the white Taliban version but the green-white-and- members from 10 countries and seven different agen-
black Islamic State of Afghanistan version. cies – has a Herculean, or more appropriately Genghis
Khanian task ahead. On the political front, Vendrell met
Some rooms even have working phones – another
again with UN-recognized Afghan President Barhanud-
tribute to miraculous Afghan handiwork. The acting
din Rabbani (the previous time was in Dushanbe), and
minister of interior is Younous Qanooni, probably the
for the first time with Rasool Sayyaf, a key element in
busiest man in Kabul at the moment. At the office of
the bag-of-tricks United Front (the Northern Alliance
brigadier Salam Ichan, every morning we are told to
plus everybody else, minus the Taliban). Vendrell is cer-
wait for Qanooni and then come back the next day. It
tainly meeting everybody and his neighbor – including
is surprising that a machinery of government is run-
commander Mohammed Fahim (the acting minister of
ning after all – and relatively smoothly. Kabul feels
defense), Qanooni, Hazara leaders, and sooner or later
exceedingly “normal.”
representatives of shuras in the Pashtun south.
Ali Ahmad spent three months in a Taliban jail. His
The whole political carousel now spins around the
“crime” was to have a brother living in Khwaja Bahaud-
new bible: the Brahimi plan, concocted by UN Sec-
din, in northern Afghanistan: for the Taliban, this meant
retary-General Kofi Annan’s special representative,
that he was a collaborator. Ali took us back to his cell in
Algerian diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi. The extremely
Kabul jail. He lived in a lower bunk on cell number 5, a
complex Brahimi plan is inexplicable to the average
tiny compartment, with 22 other inmates who were later
Kabuli in the bazaar – who just want Zahir Shah back.
reduced to 15. Ali explains that the real Taliban motive
And it is inexplicable to most other people for that
for keeping him in jail – with no trial – was that they
matter, including UN officials. Kabul cinemas introduced Hollywood movies after the fall of the Taliban. Photo: Shah Marai / AFP
wanted the Ali family house. This is absolutely in line
with a Taliban policy outlined to this correspondent by As far as the Northern Alliance is concerned, it is a

Masoud himself last August: Masoud said that the Taliban
were engaged in repopulating Kabul, expelling as many
Afghans as possible and bringing in Pakistanis and Arabs.
A prison guard tells us that 40 Taliban had manned
the compound. They all left at about 7 pm on Sunday,
the day before Kabul fell. There were 800 prisoners
at the time. The prisoners escaped at 10 pm. And the
Northern Alliance forces arrived at the empty prison
on Monday morning. Now it’s not that empty: there are
six new “guests,” including one-legged Wali Muhamad,
wearing dark glasses even inside the corridors: he was
caught selling heroin in Kabul. The Northern Alliance
also caught “some Arabs and Pakistanis,” and 10 Afghan
Taliban, according to the prison guards, but they were
taken to the “intelligence police,” an unidentified new
body that should be answering to the interior ministry.
The UN was quick to return to Kabul, with spokesman
waste of time: after all, there is already a “government”
in place. Anyway, the plan breaks down roughly into
five steps, as Eric Falt explained: 1) A conference of all
Afghan factions – including moderate Pashtuns – lead-
ing to an agreement; 2) a loya jirga (Grand Council),
according to Afghan tradition, leading to; 3) adoption
of a constitution; 4) another loya jirga to ratify the con-
stitution, and; 5) the creation of a new government.
Meanwhile, Masoud, the hero, survives in Kabul as a
legend. And so does the sheik, as Kabulis call bin Lad-
en – in many parts of the world. Between controlled
anarchy and euphoria, between the bombing apoca-
lypse and a deep yearning for peace, the hardcore Tali-
ban nucleus, the Al-Qaeda Arabs and fugitive supreme
bin Laden prepare to spend the Afghan winter hid-
ing in their caves, and they are deadlier than ever. In
Afghanistan, all players should remember that history
always repeats itself – not as farce, but as tragedy.
Life is a movie
Bollywood bliss: The First Picture Show in liberated Kabul
By PEPE ESCOBAR
NOVEMBER 29, 2001
KABUL – Scenes of absolute mayhem are taking place right in front of
the Bakhtar cinema in Kabul. It’s Tuesday morning, November 20, and
the crowd is going mad, getting ready for the midday show of El An (The
Announcement), an Indian Bollywood movie.
The Bakthar had finally reopened the day before – more than five years
after the Taliban took over Kabul – and instantly became the greatest
show in town. The capacity crowd is 650 – but there may be at least 5,000
trying to catch this performance.

38   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    39


One ticket costs only 5,000 Afghanis (a little more
than 10 US cents). Lost in the crowd, Naseem can
barely contain his excitement. The last film he saw in
his life was Rambo 4: “There wasn’t any life here. For
us, it’s like being born. We feel like we died.”
The Bakthar lobby is filled with ragged posters of
dodgy Indian movies such as Aatish (directed by
Sanjay Gupta), Sadak (directed by Makesh Bhatt) and
Kaali Ganga (directed by Raj Sippy). Some 40-odd
prints miraculously survived the Taliban cultural holo-
caust, according to cinema owner and “businessman”
(he used to sell pottery), Saleh Muhamad. This is his
cinema, and has been for 28 years now. When the Tali-
ban rode into town in 1996, he was arrested and jailed
for 22 days. The cinema was closed and he had to pay
a fine of 500,000 Afghanis (almost US$20 at the time).
“Because for the Taliban, I was a criminal,” he says.
An extraordinary cast of characters manages to get
past the human and iron barriers on the way to the
screening room. There are soldiers, heavily injured
people, kids; there are Tajiks and Hazaras; they are
enveloped in robes and blankets or in ghastly “Made in
China” leather jackets. But in this sweating sea of hu-
manity there’s not a single woman or girl in sight. And
if there were any, they would not be able to survive the
mayhem.
A guard intervenes, “Please don’t take a picture when
we are beating people.” People are indeed being merci-
lessly beaten with sticks and leather whips. Everybody
is frisked. The improvised security team manages to
confiscate two machine guns, one revolver, four knuck-
le dusters, 14 knifes, eight radios (“there could be a
bomb inside”) and a menacing collection of butcher’s
knives. Northern Alliance soldiers leave their maga-
zines at the security check, but they keep their rifles.
Local police, dressed in gray uniforms, do the same.
Even in the middle of this crazy mess, everybody is
deliriously happy, like the punter exclaiming, “All of
six years I wanted to see a movie! Very good! Good
night!”
40   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
The Bakhtar will now be in business with three or
four shows a day – fascinating thousands with Rambo
4, old Jackie Chan epics and even an Afghan movie,
Uroj, whose poster features a “bad” communist smash-
ing a bottle of vodka on some poor soul’s head. Flush
with literally mountains of cash, the manager hopes to
start importing films from India pretty soon – “Ameri-
can films are very expensive.”
Life is a movie in liberated Kabul – so many dramatic,
extraordinary stories that would have driven Federico
Fellini crazy. Gogochor – a ravishing Iranian singer –
is the ultimate music smash in all cassette mini-booths.
A satellite dish factory is making 25 units a week – and
selling them all. The Kabul branch of the City Bank
of Afghanistan is very well protected – the security
includes a guy with a rocket launcher – but there’s
absolutely no money inside the bank: people saved
their money at home during Taliban time, and they
never spent it. Now they are having fun buying radios,
cassettes – and satellite dishes.
Speaking perfect French, Abdul Aziz Bakhshi – an
electronics engineer who received his degree in Uz-
bekistan – can be found in a stall in an open-air bazaar
selling tacky second-hand Chinese clothes. Bakhshi
studied in Kabul’s famous Lycee Istliqal, just as leg-
endary commander Ahmad Shah Masoud, the slain
army head of the Northern Alliance, who was one year
his senior. He used to work for French NGO Acted –
which is still conducting many projects in Northern
Afghanistan (but not in Kabul, because of the Taliban).
He makes roughly 400,000 Afghanis a day (about
$10) in the bazaar, he keeps educating all the family
in French, and most of all he is happy with the return
of his female customers, shopping by themselves, with
no harassment, and many not bothering to wear even
a scarf. Bakhshi’s dream: to get his job back with the
NGO.
Hajatullah’s bakery used to be supported by the
World Food Program (WFP) until five months ago.
Hajatullah, a Panjshiri, has been the proud owner of
this bakery for the past eight years. He used to get flour
from the WFP, but under the Taliban he had to start
buying the flour himself: 950,000 Afghanis (about $24)
for 100 kilos. He employs 11 people and sells around
2,000 nans – the Afghan flat bread – a day. He says, “If
the WFP starts helping us again, we can even help the
poor.”
All over town, the Taliban’s psychotic hatred of
women’s education has left deep scars, but still they
could not beat the Kabulis’ resourcefulness. Samira,
15, from an upper middle class, secular Kabuli family,
recalls how she was beaten up by a young Taliban from
the religious police in the bazaar because she was not
wearing her burqa properly. But her “revenge” was
sweet. She managed to fool the Taliban, along with
other 17 girls, for a whole year, one hour a day, from 4
pm to 5 pm. They were involved in a highly anti-Shari-
at and subversive activity: learning English. Every day
they sneaked into the teacher’s house – a 27-year-old
woman – clad in their burqas. Inside the house, when
the Taliban came – which could be almost every week
– they would instantly switch their English textbooks
to portable versions of the Koran.
Samira says, “Our teachers were very intelligent. We
were happy. But the Taliban closed the school three
months ago. One of our neighbors informed them.
They were jealous people.” The English teacher is now
gone, probably to Logar province, and there are no
more classes. But Samira is hopeful her English les-
sons will resume, this time in an officially-recognized
school.
Kamila Yaltali also was an extremely dangerous ele-
ment – a sort of Brechtian Mother Courage. She is the
headmaster of what until a while ago was an under-
ground school for boys and girls, the Urfan Course,
in a small three-bedroom rented house in the Kabul
neighborhood of Khairkhana, run by herself and three
other teachers – Zahira, Saleha and Aziza. Classes 1, 2
and 3 run from 7 am to 9 am, and classes 4, 5, 6 and 7
run from 9 am to 11:30 am. Kamila set up the school
herself five years ago, immediately after the Taliban
took power in Kabul. She had only four students then,
including her son Anil. By the time the Taliban left
Kabul she had 180 students – 120 of them girls, aged
five to 17.
It’s always been a very risky job. Kamila is from Bada-
khshan province in the northeast, and for the Taliban
that meant an inevitable connection with the Northern
Alliance. In the beginning her own house was sealed
and everything inside was taken by the Taliban. But
she persisted. She says that the children always came to
the school “one by one,” very discreetly. “But even then
the Taliban kept coming here many times. We told
them repeatedly that we were like a madrassa [school]
– teaching the Koran but also sowing.”
Kamila says that “women working as Taliban intelli-
gence” would also drop in to ask her about the school’s
program. “I always sent them away.” Taliban tactics
also included surrounding the school and firing in the
air to intimidate her.
In the beginning she had some books provided by
Save the Children – but basically the teachers bought
everything themselves, and they handmade a lot
of their teaching materials. “It was like a campaign
against the Taliban,” says Kamila.
The Urfan Course teaches a variety of subjects: Dari,
Pashto, English, geography, science, mathematics,
religion, history, geometry, art and sewing. There are
gym classes too, performed in a very small central
garden in the backyard. During a Dari class, a group of
30 students are extraordinarily quiet. Kamila, smiling,
attributes it to the fact that “I’m a dictator.”
The big change from now on is that the Urfan Course
“will not be secret anymore.” They still need pretty
much everything: teachers, books, carpets, blankets.
Kamila will be very happy if she eventually gets the
first computer for the school: her son Anil, 16, is study-
ing computing in a nearby school with eight other
teenagers.
In another part of town, we cross a group of 10
women in the middle of a street – burqa-less, showing
their smiling faces, and “feeling very good.” They prefer
to walk in a group because “the situation is not com-
pletely safe.” All around them young, wary Panjshiri
FOREVER WARS   41
soldiers can be seen in combat fatigues carrying their
Kalashnikovs. The women are doctors, lawyers, faculty
teachers. They have just visited the offices of the WFP –
the UN agency promised them there could have some
job openings in an unspecified future. This happened
just a day after a group of a thousand women – most of
them burqa-less and totally unveiled – staged a kind of
demonstration, filmed by newly-reopened Afghan TV,
and broadcast in the nightly news by a woman wearing
just a pale blue scarf. The aim of the demonstration: we
want our rights, most of all the right to work and the
right of education.
There is a mind-boggling social abyss in Kabul. Fami-
lies like Sayed Nabi Hashimi’s are hard to find. Hashimi
is the chief pilot of Ariana Airlines – the beleaguered
Afghan national carrier, now under sanctions from the
UN and with practically all of its planes bombed by the
US. Hashimi lives in a spacious two-storey house with
a fine garden – in front of a former Al-Qaeda guest-
house with tinted windows, not bombed by the US
– with his young wife and three children, including a
four-month-old boy. The older boy, 7, is studying com-
Mazar-e-Sharif, got a bullet in his left leg 20 years ago. Crew members of
Later, he became very ill, stayed in a hospital for two an Ariana Afghan
Airlines’ Boeing
years and his leg was cut off. He could have a plastic leg 727-200 after land-
for next to nothing – like the ones made by landmine ing at Kabul Inter-
victims in Cambodia. national Airport in
2002. Photo: Jimin
Lai / AFP
The immediate consequence of the family drama was
that Nouria was forced into begging – something she
always does carrying two of her children. The husband
stays home sewing. If they have any serious health
problems, they have to borrow money from her rela-
tives.
The Taliban and the Arabs did not help the family
at all. Under their system, says Nouria, “if you have a
house, they would take your house number, and then
you would get daily bread rations.” But “connections”
were needed to receive the precious card for access to
either a WFP or an Al-Rashid Trust (charity organiza-
tion) bakery. The Red Crescent didn’t help her either.
Now she has to buy the daily bread: there are no work-
ing bakeries at the moment supported by either WFP
or the Al-Rashid Trust.

puting at home with a private teacher. Hashimi drives
the only Chevy in Kabul, which he brought during one
of his trips in Dubai.
Back to what can only be described as a slum,
Nouria’s eyes are incredibly sad. Nouria, 35, a Kabuli,
was a beautiful woman when she was younger – as we
can attest by the photos hanging on a wall of the family
rental house Now Nouria is a beggar, supporting five
children, including a nine-month-old baby. Every day,
Nouria goes out from door to door, asking for a little
help. But her neighbors are as poor as she is. On an
average day, she gets something like 15,000 Afghanis
– less than 50 cents. She has already sold most of her
precious belongings and house appliances. She also
collects old clothes and sells them in street bazaars.
Nouria’s husband, Atta Muhamad, a bus driver from
Nouria and Atta have been married for 12 years. They
both come from rural families. She is his second wife:
the first one died. The last two years “the situation
is very hard.” They need 1,200,000 Afghanis ($30) a
month to pay the rent and feed the family (the average
Afghan annual income per capita is $24).
The owner of their house lives in Peshawar – and
soon will raise the rent. The kids get no schooling.
Nouria teaches them the Koran. They couldn’t afford to
flee anywhere during the American bombing: “It was
like an earthquake. The rooms were filled with dust.
The children were crying.” Now at least they are “very
happy” because the Taliban are gone. Nouria hopes
to find a job, but no amount of hope can disguise the
brutal sadness reflected in her eyes.
Air Osama
An extraordinary conversation with the chief pilot of Ariana – the Af-
ghan national carrier – who may, or may not, have transported Osama
bin Laden from Khartoum in Sudan to Jalalabad in Afghanistan in 1996.
By PEPE ESCOBAR
NOVEMBER 30, 2001
KABUL – Upper middle class families like Sayed Nabi Hashimi’s are
extremely rare in Afghanistan. Hashimi, 54, is the chief pilot of Ariana –
the Afghan national carrier, founded in 1955, still under United Nations
sanctions, and with practically all its planes bombed by the United States.
Hashimi lives in a spacious two-storey house with a well-tendered gar-
den, along with his young wife and three kids, including a four-month-
old baby. The older boy, aged seven, is studying computing with a private
tutor at home. Hashimi drives the only Chevy in Kabul: he imported it

42   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    43

himself from Dubai in one of his flights.
Hashimi recalls that on Monday morning of Novem-
ber 12, the day that Kabul was liberated, “there was a
lot of looting, by local criminals.” The looters wanted to
take his car. He had to call 10 people, among relatives
and friends, to protect his house. Barhanuddin Rabba-
ni – the president of the UN-recognized Islamic State
of Afghanistan – has a house very close to Hashimi’s.
He was not so lucky. “Around 60 people entered his
house and took everything away.”
Hashimi used to live literally surrounded by Taliban –
who confiscated the best houses in his neighborhood.
There was an Al-Qaeda guesthouse across the street –
“with more or less 40 Arabs, but they fled the first day
of the bombing.” For Hashimi, “the worst thing for the
people of Afghanistan is no education.” He hates the
Taliban with a vengeance. “Everybody had to wear a
turban, even to go to school. They were brainwashing
all Afghan children. You could bring a kilo of heroin to
Kabul, but I had to smuggle English textbooks for my
children.”
Hashimi also hated the communists who occupied
Afghanistan in the 1980s, but the Taliban were in a
class of their own. “For one year, I boycotted the Tali-
ban.” He is sure that Pakistan “is playing a double game
in Afghanistan.” He does not believe in the UN peace
plan. “If you think that Hazaras and Pashtuns will sit
on the same table to form a government, you must be
dreaming. They are only used to fighting.” And he is
convinced that “there will be many more terrorists 10
years from now.”
Hashimi, still a handsome man, is nothing less than
Ariana’s living legend – the man who saw everything
in his three-decade career. We met on a visit to the
Ariana main offices in Kabul – when most of the pilots
talked to us in a mixed Romanov-Soviet style room
with velvet chairs, a faded tribute to a more glorious
past when the airline had Pan American as a share-
holder, 1,500 employees and seven weekly flights to
Europe. Ariana never flew to Pakistan, though. Its last
international flight was to Jeddah, during Haj, in April
44   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
2001. Its last scheduled flight was on October 7 – a Ka-
bul-Kunduz round-trip. And its last flight to date was
on the next day, when a Boeing 727 was flown to Logar
for safety, just before the American bombing.
Captain Jamaluddin and flight engineer Abdul Fateh
say that “the Taliban needed us. The relations were
good. We had to wear beards. They didn’t have any
crew: they only liked mullahs. They did not under-
stand aviation, agriculture or politics.” Before the UN
sanctions, Ariana operated a domestic schedule of
about 18 weekly flights, linking Kabul with Kandahar,
Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, Kunduz and Herat, using
five Antonov 24s and three Boeing 727s. According to
the pilots, one Boeing 727 and the five Antonovs were
destroyed by the American bombing.
Ariana “may” have two aircraft left: an old Tupolev
Tu-154 M in Mashad, Iran, and a Boeing in Shandan,
a military airport near Herat. While we were talking,
corporate secretary Feda Mohd Fedawi was writing a
telex to the new Herat governor, Ismail Khan, to send
somebody for an on-site investigation: it’s impossible
to simply pick up the phone and ask, because there are
no working phones. Fedawi says that “if the Boeing is
OK, we could be back in business within a week.”
Although conceding that Al-Qaeda operatives con-
stantly boarded Ariana domestic flights, they say that
they “never saw these kinds of Arabs coming from
Dubai.” Also, they say that “we didn’t bring any arms
from Sharjah [in the United Arab Emirates], weap-
ons usually came overland from Pakistan.” And if an
Al-Qaeda operative was to travel disguised as a pilot or
an engineer, “we would recognize him, because we’ve
been working together for 20 years.” All Ariana pilots
and engineers were trained in the late 70s, in Miami.
“After the Soviet intervention,” says secretary Fedawi,
“we were sending them to Lufthansa in Germany and
also to Air France, and for the last six or seven years to
Royal Jordanian, in Aman: they did the maintenance
of the 727s.”
Regarding the Arabs, the pilots insist that they would
be easily spotted “because they always look angry.” One
of the pilots tells the eye-opening story of an Arab who
castigated a steward because he was serving Pepsi to
“kaffirs” (infidels) on a domestic flight. Most of all, the
pilots are adamant: “We never carried anything that
was property of Osama bin Laden.”
Secretary Fedawi’s words are more nuanced. He says,
“maybe sometimes the Taliban authorities asked for
a plane to carry their armed people from one city to
another.” And if there were any Arabs on international
flights, “they did not come as fighters. They must have
come as normal passengers, with passports. It’s not
the airline’s responsibility to verify these documents,
it concerns immigration.” Concerning the possibility
of Al-Qaeda operatives flying as pilots, he adds, “If
these Arabs were trained as pilots, it was in secrecy:
we would have known. We have not trained new pilots
for six or seven years now. And for the Antonov 24, we
train them locally.” The Taliban authorities, says Feda-
wi, seldom left Kandahar. “The minister of civil avia-
tion came here only once or twice a year. Everything
was controlled by telephone.”
Hashimi, relaxing in his own house, told us a com-
pletely different story. He said that “when communists
ruled, Ariana was their private airline. When the mu-
jahideen ruled, it was the same thing. And when the
Taliban ruled, it was the same thing. You see, this is not
a democratic country. So they used it as they wanted.
The Taliban used it as a military airline.”
Hashimi was the commander of flight 801 from
Kabul to Mazar-e-Sharif, a Boeing 727-200 – the air-
line’s most modern plane – hijacked in the beginning
of 2000 and involved in an odyssey across Tashkent,
Aktapunsky (in Russia), Moscow, and Stansted, near
London, until its final destination in Kandahar. There
was nothing political about it: the hijackers and their
gang just wanted to leave Afghanistan.
But most of all, Hashimi was the commander in many
crucial flights from the United Arab Emirates between
1997 and 1999, which brought, according to him, “many
Arabs and Chechens, and a lot of weapons.” Hashimi
says that the cargo “was always in big boxes. We never
knew what was inside. It was always very heavy.”
Hashimi is absolutely positive that the senior man-
agement in Ariana was distributing false Ariana identi-
ty cards. These were very easy to forge. In addition, he
says that in the Emirates, “they don’t check passports,
visas are not required, and the general declaration for
each flight can be easily reproduced. And it was very
easy to get an Ariana uniform.”
The implication of Ariana management in “secret
activities” is not far-fetched, considering that the pres-
ident, the communications director and the controller
of Ariana were all Taliban. “On their very first day in
power in Kabul, the Taliban installed their people in
Ariana.”
Hashimi says that “all flights were overnight. When
the crew arrived, the planes were already loaded, in a
military area of Kandahar’s airport. Sometimes we had
14 to 15 weekly flights to and from Sharjah. And some-
times we had special flights.”
One of these special flights happened during the
mujahideen government, in 1996, a few weeks before
the Taliban took over Kabul. Hashimi relishes retelling
the story. “Some Sudanese people came and wanted
a charter plane. They got it. I was the captain, with
a flight engineer, two co-pilots and attendants. The
Ariana head office had permission for a few countries,
but not for Saudi Arabia. The flight was Kabul-Jalala-
bad-Sharjah-Khartoum. The Sudanese said that by the
time we got to Jalalabad, the permit for Saudi would be
OK. They said that they would bring some cargo and
take it to Sharjah. In Jalalabad, we went to the gover-
nor’s house and waited. They called, and we took off.
They said in Dubai that we would get our permission
by telephone. When we were flying close to Jeddah,
the controller asked. ‘Where are you going, you have
no permission!’ Five minutes later, they said ‘You can
cross, but on the way back you need permission.’”
Hashimi says that the crew waited for five days in
Khartoum for their “cargo.” “Our plane had two con-
figurations: with 56 passengers and with 79. They
wanted 84 passengers. They asked how many extra
seats we wanted. They installed the seats overnight. In
the end, we flew women, children, clothes, rickshaws,
FOREVER WARS   45
old bikes, mattresses, blankets. It took three days to
get permission to fly over Saudi. We finally reached
Jalalabad early in the morning. And then I knew we
had transported the bodyguards and the families of bin
Laden’s inner circle. At the airport in Jalalabad, all sorts
of important people came to see them, in six or seven
big cars. This was before the Taliban took over. Abdul
Qadir may have been there. And Sayyaf as well.”
Hashimi does not know for sure if Osama bin Laden
46   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
was on that flight. “The Sheik” – as Kabulis used to “I never left Ka-
refer to him – may have been a passenger. After all, bul,” said Mullah
Khaksar Akhund.
nobody knew his face, and still today average Kabulis A Kabul horse and
in the bazaar gape when confronted with their fist-ever cart taxi stops for
bin Laden pic. More than five years after this “special passengers in the
streets of old Kabul
flight” – with the Taliban now converted into a guerril- in 2001. Photo: AFP
la force – bin Laden is still alive, hiding in a cave some-
where in Afghanistan. One thing is certain though, he
won’t be on the next Ariana flight.
Super defector
Talking to a Taliban super-defector may not be as enlightening as
meeting the man bound to become the new Afghan Foreign Minister
By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 1, 2001
KABUL – The super defector entered the media-packed ballroom of the
splendidly dilapidated Intercontinental hotel like he was Clint Eastwood
at the Cannes film festival. He kept his turban – and his cool.
The super defector is Mullah Khaksar Akhund, the former deputy
minister of the interior for the Taliban. When the Taliban took power in
Kabul in 1996 he was minister of security.
Akhund is very much an insider with Taliban intelligence – which is
not, as cynics might infer, a contradiction in terms: they communicate
FOREVER WARS    47
with radios powerful enough to tune into as far as
Moscow, and they definitely know what’s happening
on the ground in Afghan – unlike the US intelligence
services that have been sending e-mail messages to
journalists in Kabul trying to gather fresh information.
Akhund also bears the closest resemblance to that elu-
sive specimen – the “moderate Taliban.”
Akhund’s highly publicized photo op was a convolut-
ed operation mounted by the foreign ministry of the
Islamic States of Afghanistan – that is, the Northern
Alliance people actually in power in Kabul. The tone
was definitely theater of the absurd, and the mullah
even supplied a mantra, “I never left Kabul.” He blamed
the Afghan drama on “interference from other coun-
tries,” and stressed that Afghans should “unite together
to fight those interfering.” He said that “a lot of people
were martyred.” He “wants to make one Afghanistan”
and of course he “wants to participate in the peace
process.” And, most important of all, he announced his
support to the United Front – in theory the Northern
Alliance plus other Afghan parties minus the Taliban.
But he is not in Bonn to participate in the UN-spon-
sored peace conference of theoretically all Afghan par-
ties. He said a vague “the people” would decide about
that. He is in favor of a loya jirga, which would be the
second step in Lakhdar Brahimi’s UN plan.
But is he or is he not a Taliban? He says that “he never
left the Taliban. I have been in Kabul for the last five
years. The Taliban left Kabul. I never left Kabul.” For
him, “the Taliban left Kabul because the United Front
was stronger.” Essentially, Akhund is trying to position
himself as part of the significant minority of Pashtuns
in Kabul now involved, in his own words, “in work
for the betterment of Afghanistan to bring all ethnic
groups together.”
Akhund’s credentials seem to fit his new-found
moderate, politically correct public persona. For many
years, he says, he had discussions with the legendary
Ahmad Shah Masoud, the assassinated former army
chief of the Northern Alliance, which has now visibly
embraced him.
48   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
He is not exactly fond of the Al-Qaeda Arabs. “I told
the Taliban that under foreign fighters there cannot
be peace in Afghanistan.” He says that “Al-Qaeda is
all over Afghanistan.” And he agrees that “Osama [bin
Laden] is an international terrorist.” But he refuses to
tell where bin Laden and Taliban leader Mullah Omar
actually are – much to the disappointment of the glob-
al media. With a perverse smile, he said that “proba-
bly” the two men are in contact with each other.
Akhund condemned the UN for “always consider-
ing the Taliban as a warring faction” – and this might
explain why he is not part of the Bonn conference.
He prefers to stay in Kabul and enjoy the camaraderie
with his “mujahideen brothers.” He is definitely living
a happy life on their side and free of the Taliban. “I can
move freely. I have my own private car. And I have not
committed any actions against humanity.” Akhund left
the Intercontinental back to his new breezy life in the
backseat of a 4X4 bearing a poster of Masoud on the
windshield.
While “moderate Taliban” reposition themselves for
the new realities and the UN follows its ultra-complex,
five-step Brahimi peace plan for Afghanistan – which
started this week with the Bonn meeting – the still
deliriously happy Kabulis are certain that former king
Zahir Shah will come back any day soon in a golden
chariot and lead them to a bright new peaceful era.
Meanwhile, events change at breakneck speed. Who
could imagine just a few days ago that 1,000 unveiled
Afghan women would be out in the streets demand-
ing more rights, and specially the right to work and to
receive an education – and all of this filmed by Afghan
TV, and broadcast on the nightly news by a couple of
anchors, one wearing a light blue scarf, and not even a
burqa.
Once again loads of weapons are being dumped in
Afghanistan – not only by Russia, but also by Iran
and Pakistan. This would figure with the nightmarish
scenario of the return of the mujahideen wars of the
1992-1996 period. On man, though, remains unflap-
pably confident about the future. Groomed by Masoud
himself, Abdullah Abdullah is now ready to make his
grand entrance on the world stage as the alliance’s
foreign minister. He is not in Germany, though: the
Northern Alliance’s top representative is Younous Qa-
nooni, the acting minister of the interior, and currently
Kabul’s busiest man. But Abdullah, a qualified medi-
cal doctor and fluent English speaker, is definitely the
voice of an emerging, hopefully modern Afghanistan.
He recently shared some thoughts with Asia Times
Online.
Asia Times: There are widespread fears that a bal-
kanization of Afghanistan is almost inevitable – the
country will be divided.
Dr. Abdullah: This is not the feeling of the Afghan
people. This is not my feeling. There is a cement that
kept Afghan people together – despite the efforts from
outside to divide Afghanistan. All Afghans consider
themselves as Afghans. Then the situation has changed,
inside Afghanistan as well as in the region and in the
international community – to the positive. We will be
helped to keep Afghanistan united.
Asia Times: Walking around Kabul and talking to
average Afghanis in the bazaars, 10 people in 10 say
the same thing: They are expecting King Zahir Shah
to come back. This is the popular expectation. How do
you react to it?
Dr. Abdullah: There is no reaction from my side. I
would say I accent that there is some nostalgia and
that there are some good feelings as well about it. The
people remember that there was peace under the for-
mer king, and the former king has not fought against
other Afghan groups, he has not been part of the war
of the past two decades, this might help, or might give
him the chance to play a role in making peace. Then
the realistic expectation would be that he has influence
over the situation, he has some credibility with the in-
ternational community as well as in Afghanistan; that
credibility, that influence should be used, should be
seized in order to achieve peace and to give the people
of Afghanistan the right of self-determination.
Asia Times: Do you think it is realistic to expect a
strong central government in Kabul capable of influ-
encing the way the provinces are governed – consid-
ering that many governors will be extremely powerful
and very well armed?
Dr. Abdullah: Not only because of that situation,
but also because of the new realities of the situation
in Afghanistan, there is some polarization. Never-
theless, among the Afghans, I think a strong central
government might not be a recipe for a lasting peace in
Afghanistan, while local authorities with more power,
with affiliation to the central government, might be a
solution. We are thinking of something in the middle.
Asia Times: Are you going to be pushing for this
kind of settlement in the conference in Germany? A
sort of decentralized government with lots of autono-
my for the provinces?
Dr. Abdullah: I would not say that this will be decid-
ed on in this conference. This conference will be the
framework, the road map, how we decide to go ahead
towards the formation of a broad-based government.
Asia Times: What about the lack of substantial Pash-
tun representation in Germany?
Dr. Abdullah: Of course there are Pashtuns in Ger-
many, many of them.
Asia Times: Are you afraid that the Taliban will be
able to survive as a guerrilla movement and disrupt
any kind of broad-based government in Kabul?
Dr. Abdullah: No. A guerrilla force, the first thing it
requires is popular support. They lack popular support.
There’s no chance.
FOREVER WARS   49
 Destroyed Russian tanks on the outskirts of Kabul in 2009. Russia’s return in 2001 may have caused a few laughs in Moscow. Photo: AFP

Afghan democracy in action

It’s as messy as it gets. The only certainty, says Pakistani intelligence, is that
this time the Russians ‘got’ Afghanistan ‘without spending a single rupee’

By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 4, 2001

KABUL – The New Great Game is taking some really wacky twists and
turns. Slowly but surely, the Russian Bear is back in Kabul – 12 years after
its ignominious end-of-the-Cold War retreat from Afghanistan after 10
years of occupation. Kabulites couldn’t be more amused – while President
Vladimir Putin is laughing his mink coats off in Moscow – as a Pakistani
intelligence source summed it up three weeks ago. “This time they [Rus-
sia] got Afghanistan without spending a single rupee.”
Russian advisers are eating dinner over white tablecloths at the Intercon-

50   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    51

tinental Hotel, while British troops have to settle for
tepid cans of baked beans, freezing off their bottoms
in distant Bagram airport, 47 kilometers north of the
capital. Afghans couldn’t be more pragmatic: Rus-
sians are in because they are providing weapons and
humanitarian help through a “military medical unit”
of the Ministry of Emergency Situations in Moscow.
Brits are out because they are basically just helping the
American military campaign: they are not providing
anything substantial.
The Russians, billing themselves as “civilians” – and
enjoying a high level of armed protection – are build-
ing a rescue hospital, at no cost to the Afghans, with a
capacity to care for 300 patients a day. The Russians are
not under a United Nations mandate. They did not tell
the UN they were coming. And the UN, although a bit
startled, doesn’t seem too bothered, at least on the re-
cord. Afghans in Kabul certainly need all the help they
can get. Inayatullah Nazeri, the new Afghan minister
for refugees, says that about 1,000 needy people arrive
in Kabul every day.
But south of Kabul province, in Logar province,
something entirely non-Great Game is happening: a
local taste of things to come in the form of a vigorous
experiment in participative democracy, Afghan-style.
The last Northern Alliance outpost before Taliban
and/or warlord territory – guarded by two tanks – is
only 20 kilometers south of Kabul. Farther afield, in
Logar province, the region is totally controlled by local
commanders. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the radical Pash-
tun hothead and former prime minister of Afghani-
stan, used the then recently repaved roads as landing
strips during the mujahideen wars of 1992-96. The
countryside is ravishing, although people are bitterly
poor. Seventy percent to 80 percent are Pashtuns. The
main crops are wheat and corn. In Muhamad Agha
district – the most strategic in Logar – we learn from
the locals in the bazaar that after convening a shura
(tribal council), the local commanders finally estab-
lished total control over the province – and told the
Northern Alliance not to interfere.
At Muhamad Agha, we met Janahamed, the North-
52   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
ern Alliance representative for Logar province, who In the middle of the current, extremely murky priori- Alliance – something that would never go down well
showed up in battle fatigues in a packed room to ties are “negotiations with the people of this province” in other Pashtun-dominated areas. And as far as for-
confirm that “the local people control the region”. He and then to establish security – something completely mer King Zahir Shah is concerned, “He is an old man,
is from Parwan, is based in Kabul, and says that he will absent in provinces such as Nangarhar, Ghazni and he has had much authority, and he has the right now to
visit Logar “every day” for consultations. Kunduz. He does not name his preference for the next participate in the negotiations.”
Afghan leader, preferring to state that he is in favor of
Haidari, the district governor, says that the Tali- Hopefully, the players in Bonn – intellectuals under
“self-determination to the people of Afghanistan”. This,
ban left Logar barely 12 hours after the fall of Kabul. the banner of the Cyprus process, a Peshawar delega-
in local parlance, means a loya jirga.
There was no gunfight. There were only 60 Taliban in tion (the Pir Syed Ahmad Gailani group), the Rome
the district, according to him, and roughly only 200 Logar did not send a representative to the UN Bonn delegation (Zahir Shah’s people), the United Front (led
controlling all seven districts of the province. Haidari conference of all Afghan parties: Whatever the Islamic by Younous Qanooni, the acting minister of the interi-
says that the Taliban used to “annoy and put a lot of State of Afghanistan finally decides, Logar will accept. or), and the UN – will have as much good sense as the
pressure on the people”, but that the general passive Dr Faizullah is even in favor of a government headed good people of Logar.
reaction was a result of their lack of weapons. by Burhanuddin Rabbini, the leader of the Northern
In Waghjan bazaar, a foreign presence almost causes
a riot. Ghulam, a villager, says “in our area there are
no Taliban any more. We are waiting for a loya jirga,
[grand council] and for the UN peacekeepers”. An-
other villager, Baba, says, “We didn’t do anything. Let
our children have education and live in peace.” Among
“the people”, not a lot of bitterness seems to remain
regarding the Taliban. “They were Muslim and we are
Muslim. We just wish peace and security. We are needy
people. We are facing hunger.”
As far as the representative democracy process in
this region is concerned, it seems to basically involve
the rich and the respected. No women are allowed –
“forget women forever” – exclaims an exalted villager.
But respected engineer Akajan Barakzai – the man in
charge of the electricity supply of Logar – is adamant:
“This is a kind of democracy. We are building a gov-
ernment of all tribes.”
A while later, at the capital Pol-e Alam – little more
than a noisy collection of mudhouses – we finally meet
the newly-elected governor of the whole of Logar prov-
ince, Dr Faizullah. According to locals, he was elect-
ed after a shura [assembly] was finalized on Tuesday
morning. Dr Faizullah was a previous commander of
the Jamiat-I-Islami, the largest political party in the
Northern Alliance. He says that he is prepared to share
power with the Northern Alliance: “Yes, we recognize
the Northern Alliance, we are with the United Front,
and we recognize the Islamic State of Afghanistan.”
FOREVER WARS   53
 Residents walk past
the devastated Tali-
ban Ministry for the
Promotion of Virtue
and the Prevention
of Vice, in Kanda-
har in 2001. The
ministry was one of
many key instal-
lations destroyed
by US air strikes in
the former Taliban
stronghold. Photo:
John MacDougall
/ AFP

Cultural holocaust
Surveying the cultural devastation inflicted to Kabul by the Taliban,
and what’s left of the spectacular artifacts housed by the National Mu-
seum, which the Taliban saw as an ‘embodiment of sin’

By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 5, 2001

“The dust of Kabul’s blowing soil smarts lightly in my eyes,

But I love her, for knowledge and love both come from her dust.”
– Kabul, by 17th century Persian poet Sa’ib-I-Tabrizi.

KABUL – Was it a vision, or a waking nightmare? The Taliban’s grip

on power in Kabul (1996-2001) may have simply melted away. They are
ghosts from a recent and tragic past. But their legacy as an “adminis-
tration” remains – nothing less than a terrifying picture of desolation,
devastation and nothingness.

54   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    55

 “All the people hate the US. They cannot get close
to us. Like cowards, you want to strike us from afar.”
The graffiti, in black, is written over the white exterior
wall of one of the Taliban Ministry for the Promotion
of Virtue and repression of Vice buildings in central
Kabul. Hated or not, the fact is that the US did get as
close as it could to the dreaded V&V; – the Taliban re-
ligious police, answerable only to “Amir-ul Momineen”
Mullah Omar. Everybody scurried out of the building
in the first few days of the American bombing. Now,
nothing except rubble and junk paper remains of an
“Islamic school for prisoners,” run “under the guidance
of Muhamad Nasir.”
Sifting through the rubble, it is still possible to find
some fascinating stuff – printed versions of fatwas (re-
ligious orders); plastic car licenses; “Let us go on jihad”
stickers (in Pashto and in English); a copy of the diplo-
ma of one M Z Sha Mushtaq (with photo), certifying
that he was an Islamic ulema (teacher) approved by
the Education Minister and Chief of Islamic Madras-
sas (schools); English books for Taliban children; and
most of all all sorts of compromising evidence about
the evangelizing work of the seven detainees from the
US-based Shelter Now International (SNI): books on
the Power of Jesus, and very basic ABCs of Christiani-
ty. This once again proves that the Taliban intelligence
was not a contradiction in terms. The SNI workers
seemed to be doing what the Taliban said that they
were doing. They were detained for almost two months
in a few rooms in this building. In one of the rooms,
the Taliban visibly compiled all the evidence and went
through all the SNI workers’ belongings, including
holiday photos and postcards.
This was one of the main V&V; headquarters in
Afghanistan. Prisoners were kept here for all sorts of
un-Islamic offenses. Like the poor man who did not
perform his Islamically-correct prayers one day and
so his shop in the bazaar was closed by the V&V.; The
offenses were all recorded and signed on official Islam-
ic Emirate of Afghanistan paper. One of the printed
fatwas says, among other things, “Try to be careful
about the Islamic Emirate. Try to find the enemies of
Islam. Try to promote Islam to all the world. It will be
56   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
very difficult, but bring the people closer to Islam. This
will give you merit in paradise.” The fatwa is signed by
Mullah Omar himself, and it concerns “all the people
of Afghanistan.”
Scenes of utter devastation in Badanbagh garrison, in
Kabul – bombed out buildings, tanks upside down, like
in a conceptual art installation in a European art show
– are reproduced in a much grander scale in Rishk-
hor, a mere half hour drive from Kabul. The delightful
“Historical Guide to Kabul,” published in 1972 by the
Afghan Tourist Organization, describes “the public
gardens of Gulbagh where you may picnic in perfectly
delightful surroundings on the banks of the river,” and
mentions “a military area where entrance is forbidden.”
Entrance remained forbidden as Al-Qaeda turned the
military area into a training camp – set up in idyllic
scenery, totally surrounded by hills: this proves among
other things that the Arabs had a certain aesthetic,
apart from military sense. The camp even included a
palace built by Sarder Shar Ghazi: the palace gardens,
according to the Historical Guide, “are amongst the
loveliest in Kabul.”
Rishkhor satisfied all Al-Qaeda conditions in terms
of perfect location – but it had a fatal flaw: it could not
be protected from aerial ballistic might. It was bombed
twice in one night, a 2,000-pound bomb left an enor-
mous crater right in front of the main building, bed-
side another building that looked like an Italian villa.
Reportedly 80 Arabs died in the bombing. Pakistanis
were also being trained, and an arch in one of the
buildings bears the inscription “Bravery” in Urdu.
In an interview last year with the then minister of in-
formation and culture in Kandahar, Abdul Haiy Mut-
main, he imparted to this correspondent the Taliban’s
definition of culture, “People here are Muslims. This is
a religious culture. We are against the customs that go
against Islam. We protect Islamic and Afghan culture.”
He refused to elaborate. Last march, the Taliban lead-
ership elaborated by bombing the Bamiyan Buddhas,
which had withstood absolutely everything for 1,500
years. For the Taliban, the National Museum was one
of Kabul’s prime embodiments of sin.
But now the museum has been opened for the first
time since the Taliban took power in Kabul. A banner
above the entrance, beside a portrait of Ahmed Shah
Masoud, reads in English and in Dari, ” A nation stays
alive when its culture stays alive.” The first museum in
Afghanistan was set up in 1919. The original collection
has been especially enriched since 1922 following the
first excavations of a French archeological delegation
and the museum has been in the same building since
1931. The collection – before the Taliban cultural holo-
caust – spanned many millennium: prehistoric, classi-
cal, Buddhist, Hindu and Islamic.
As we enter, we see two of the few preserved pieces of
the collection: a 15th century black marble basin from
Kandahar, and a 2nd century limestone inscription in
Greek from Surkh Kotal. But nobody has been able to
see the legacy of Taliban art destruction until now.
In the vault of the museum, one of the curators was
showing the remains of a 2nd century Kushan stat-
ue of a king, discovered by accident by engineers 10
miles from Mazar-e-Sharif. The limestone statue was
smashed to pieces last April. Showing a fragment, the
curator said “maybe” the statue could be restored, “be-
cause it was reduced on purpose to powder.” He also
talked about how he was able to rescue an 8th century
fresco of a Buddha from Kakrak, near Bamiyan, from
the Taliban’s destructive fury.
The museum was systematically looted and vandal-
ized by the Taliban. The archive rooms were reduced
to sorrowful piles of rubble. In one of the rooms some
restoration materials imported from France can still
be found. A few faded black-and-white photos doc-
ument part of the collection – friezes from Bamiyan,
Ghandara Buddhas, Indian sculpture, marble Buddha
feet. The collection, according to another guidebook,
published by the Afghan Tourist Organization in 1974,
was absolutely splendid: it included 4th century clay
Boddhisattvas, a fabulous painted and gilded clay 7th
century Boddhisattava, Buddha stucco heads from the
2nd to the 7th centuries, a 1st century relief of Aph-
rodite, from Bagram, a 1st century bust of Mars from
Bagram that would have driven Italian Renaissance
master Benvenutto Cellini green with envy, an 11th
century marble relief of Turkish dancers from Ghan-
zi, and carved wooden figures from Nuristan, among
other extremely precious items.
Mir Ghulam Nabi and Muhamad Tahir Niazi, special-
ists in sculpture restoration, were at the museum when
the Taliban destroyers arrived: they describe a working
party of 10, all armed with hammers, under the or-
ders of nothing less than a Mullah Omar delegation,
comprising the minister of culture and the minister of
finance, all of them solemnly supervising the destruc-
tion. Nabi and Niaz were helpless, “They said that if
you try to do something we will kill you.”
Nabi and Niaz say that the Taliban came for 10 days
in a row, “Everything that looked like a person was de-
stroyed, like Buddhas. Our history and culture was de-
stroyed.” They are eager to stress that “our culture was
never un-Islamic.” Even under such trauma, they have
managed to save “many” statues from destruction,
storing them in safe places. But they are unable to say
how many of the museum pieces had been stolen and
sold for collectors in the West in the past five years.
Their only consolation for the moment is that “we will
try to restore everything.” According to Said Mutahar,
an official of the newly set up ministry of culture, the
Northern Alliance is apparently in favor. It is possible
that the Taliban in the end won’t have succeeded in
reducing Afghanistan to culture’s ground zero.
FOREVER WARS   57
 Multiple explosions
rock al-Qaeda po-
sitions in the Tora
Bora mountains
after an attack by
US warplanes in
December of 2001.
Photo: Romeo
Gacad / AFP

Taking a spin in Tora Bora

On this side of the mountains, the Afghan mujahideen; on the other
side, the al-Qaeda Arabs. Overhead, American B-52s ready to unload
their heavy metal luggage. Welcome to the theater of war. Osama bin
Laden has ‘disappeared’. Endgame? Not yet.

By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 7, 2001

TORA BORA, Spin Mountains, eastern Afghanistan – “War is evil. Who

said that war is holy? War is unholy.” The anonymous Pashtun muja-
hideen couldn’t possibly be in a more spectacular setting: crouching,
holding his prized Kalashnikov, contemplating the majestic Spin (White)
Mountains on the horizon, while a B-52 circles slowly overhead in the
crisp blue sky, about to unload its lethal heavy metal luggage.
The setting is Tora Bora, a South Pacific-sounding, mountainous Pash-
tun area in Nangarhar province. For some this is the end game, for others

58   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    59

just the beginning of the real hunt for Osama bin Lad-
en and Al-Qaeda Arabs by Afghan mujahideen and the
United States and its allies.
The theatre of war can be contemplated in a 180-de-
gree arc from a natural stage: the desert plateau of
Bamo Khel. The mujahideen have positioned three
T-55 tanks on the plateau. Downhill, there is a valley
around a dry riverbed, close to the village of Melawa.
On the road skirting Melawa, and across the surround-
ing hills, the mujahideen have positioned another 10
tanks. Beyond the valley are three superimposed layers
of mountains. Al-Qaeda positions are on top of the
second range of mountains.
This is the area known as Tora Bora – under which
there is a complex network of caves, some natural,
some man-made. The rock face is now subjected to
massive B-52 bombing. Beyond the highest layer of
mountains – which include some 4,000-meter-plus
eastern Afghan versions of Mont Blanc in the Alps –
are the tribal areas of Pakistan: some locals say that
they can be reached only after taking an 80-kilometer
circuit around the mountains.
We had finally arrived face-to-face with the bomb-
ing of Tora Bora, thanks to Hazrat Ali – known in
Jalalabad about 35 miles to the northeast as the “chief
of law and order.” Commander Ali, a Pachi – a fierce
Pashtun subtribe with its own dialect and its own code
of fighting – ordered the organization overnight of an
armed convoy to take some reporters from Jalalabad to
the frontline. The caravan of Toyota pick-ups, driven
by Pashtun adrenalin junkies with the mental age of
10-year-olds, rumbled off the next morning through
dusty Pashtun villages.
Osama bin Laden is said to have last been seen by
villagers around Tora Bora last weekend. Bin Laden
knows the area extremely well: he fought some of his
first 1980s mujahideen battles in this terrain. Tora Bora
has also been a center of operations for mujahideen
stalwarts Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Younous Khalis.
Afghan sources stress that this has been the most
well-organized area of jihad operations for the past
60   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
25 years. In characteristically evasive Afghan fashion,
though, nobody from Jalalabad to Tora Bora is able
to confirm the whereabouts of bin Laden. Neverthe-
less, the mujahideen keep insisting that they have cut
Al-Qaeda’s main supply route from Pakistan – which
originates in the tribal city of Parachinar.
Hazrat Ali is an extremely optimistic commander.
Just like bin Laden, he knows the area very well: he
fought against the Soviets based in these caves. He be-
lieves that the Tora Bora battle “could take at least two
weeks or more.” He is absolutely sure that “the coming
snow will create more problems for them, not for us,
because they won’t be able to get oil or food.”
Ali is part of the crucial post-Taliban triangle of
power in Jalalabad. Haji Abdul Qadir, the governor
of Nangarhar province, has just returned from Bonn,
where he was instrumental in securing the post of new
de facto Afghan prime minister for the next six months
for Pashtun Hamid Karzai. Haji Zaman is the military
chief of the province: he was the acting governor in the
absence of Haji Qadir. Hazrat Ali is the “chief of law
and order.” There is tremendous competition between
Zaman and Ali to deliver the best soundbites on global
TV.
The Eastern Shura – which comprises the provision-
al governments of Nangarhar, Laghman, Kunar and
Kapisa provinces – did ask the Arabs around Tora Bora
to surrender – to no avail. The Shura may have been
willing to give safe passage to the Arabs, according to
sources in Jalalabad. But Hazrat Ali is adamant, “Our
Shura simply cannot keep them.” The Arabs can sur-
render, escape or die in battle as shaheeds (martyrs),
he says. Villagers in Gudara still swear that “the Arabs
are heroes of Islam” – and they have vowed to protect
them. But now even the Eastern Shura has abandoned
the Arabs.
On the frontline, two commanders – Aum Shah
Hashimi and Sorab Khan – add a little nuance to Haz-
rat Ali’s spin. They say that “half of the Tora Bora is un-
der our control, the other half under Al-Qaeda. They
are on top of the mountains, shelling us.” According to
the commanders, Al-Qaeda operatives are basically fir-
ing mortars down on the valley. The mujahideen have
deployed around 600 men to the frontline – with an-
other 1,200 in a second line of attack. They don’t know
for sure how many Arabs are hidden in the mountains:
it could be anything between 600 and 1,500. Hazrat Ali
spoke of at least 600 hardcore Chechen fighters.
The mujahideen insist that at least 10 “important”
Al-Qaeda Arabs have died in the past few days. But it’s
absolutely impossible to confirm the fate of “The Sur-
geon,” top Al-Qaeda mastermind Ayman Al Zawahiri,
who “might” have been wounded. The mujahideen
insist that the Arabs are totally surrounded. But a clos-
er look at the topography reveals that there are many
possible escape routes – though extremely laborious,
according to locals from Gudara and Melawa.
Commander Hashimi himself cannot tell how long
will it take to extricate or even annihilate the Arabs.
According to Hashimi, there is no coordination be-
tween B-52 bombing and tanks firing. But the cumula-
tive effect this past few days has been nothing less than
impressive, by Afghan standards: the tanks shot 14
shells, while a B-52 unloaded its massive bombs three
times. Frightened American reporters – afraid that the
convoy might be pinpointed as a target – were franti-
cally asking their bureaus to call the Pentagon.
During the night, the B-52 bombing is boosted by
F-16 raids. The pace is almost relentless. But Pakistani
geologists have said many times that the Spin Moun-
tains are the real thing – as far as hard rock is con-
cerned: practically impenetrable.
Between two tank blasts, a mujahideen did not mince
his words when approached by a loud and lost-in-
the-maze American reporter, “We are not fighting for
a reward from America. We are fighting to get rid of
invaders,” in reference to the US$25 million tag on bin
Laden’s head. Another mujahideen, when asked about
his feelings on fighting other Muslims – bin Laden
and Al-Qaeda – went straight to the point, “They are
mujahideen. But they should go back to their country.
We have a lot of mujahideen.”
The Pashtun mujahideen admit no casualties for the
moment – except a maximum of “five or six” wounded
in the valley. On the base of a recently-captured hill,
they have started concentrating what they describe as
“heavy weapons” – mostly rocket launchers and heavy
machine guns, plus a few tanks, “some captured from
Al-Qaeda.” And more Pachi Hazrat Ali reinforcements
– about 200 men in pick-ups – have poured in in the
past day.
The possible end game – or beginning of the end
game – in Tora Bora does not hide the fact that Af-
ghanistan under the United Front is technically a law-
less state. Our small group of journalists only braved
the bandit-infested road from Kabul to Jalalabad – via
the extremely tricky stretch in ultra-pro-Taliban Sarobi
– because we were able to tag along with the mini-con-
voy of Jalalabad mayor Abdul Ghaffar. He traveled
with 25 heavily-armed men in Toyota pick-ups – rock-
et launchers and grenade launchers included. Ghaffar
has been mayor only since the Taliban abandoned
Jalalabad in mid-November. In the two days that he
spent in Kabul he met President Burhanuddin Rabbani
– who badly needed Pashtun support for his bid for the
leadership council. He also met hardcore Saudi Wa-
habbi-supported Professor Abdul Rasul Sayaf. But the
Northern Alliance’s military commander Mohammad
Fahim snubbed him.
In the end, Rabbani got nothing in Bonn – while Fa-
him kept his post as defense minister and Dr Abdullah
Abdullah kept his post as foreign minister. Pashtuns in
Jalalabad were jubilant with the prospect of moderate
Pashtun Hamiz Karzai as the de facto prime minister
for the next six months. The Taliban were nowhere to
be seen – or heard.
Meanwhile, in remote Tora Bora, nobody can as-
certain the number of dead Arabs. Al-Qaeda is “still
firing” – as a mujahideen put it. The bombing is relent-
less. And bin Laden has disappeared. End game? Not
yet.
FOREVER WARS   61
 A meeting between
(left to right) Haji
Zaman Gamarsha-
reek, Hazret Ali
and CIA Juliet Team
leader ‘George’,
during a Tora Bora
battle. Photo: Wiki-
media

The last battle?

“Kandahar has fallen”. Radio cackle and a fire burning inside a former
Taliban prison – a cement box beside a depot filled with grenades and
rocket launchers - where deep into the night 14 mujahideen and two
journalists learn the news. And then, the next day, amid relentless B-52
bombing, an awkward meeting with the US Special Forces.

By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 12, 2001

TORA BORA, White Mountains, eastern Afghanistan – “Omar Omar.”

Silence. “Omar Omar.” Radio cackle barely interferes with the bang of
another set of cluster bombs showered from an F-16 over the mountains
of Tora Bora – less than four miles away. But the message is merciless:
“Kandahar has fallen” – repeats commander Ali Shah, enveloped in his
light-gray blanket. This is the way the Taliban ends: not with a bang, but
a whimper. This is the way the last frontier in the New Afghan War got
hold of it all.

62   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    63

 The mujahideen don’t even smile under their pakool
caps They bob their heads – a way of commenting on
this weird pact between new Afghan interim govern-
ment leader Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun moderate very
close to former king Zahir Shah’s family, and Mullah
Naqibullah, a pro-Taliban Pashtun mujahideen. They
recharge their tanks, anti-aircraft guns and Kalash-
nikovs, and continue to wait for new orders from com-
mander Ali Shah. One mujahideen, contemplating the
mountains, volunteers, “Maybe Osama [bin Laden] is
there after all, because Kandahar is being conquered.”
Mini-earthquakes shake the cold night in Bamo Khel
plateau. Massive B-52s continue to bomb Tora Bora at
regular one-hour intervals. In a former Taliban pris-
on – a cement box beside a depot filled with grenades,
rocket launchers, ammunition, the works – 14 mujahi-
deen under commander Shah and two journalists pile
up amid the blankets. “Omar Omar.” Silence. “Omar
Omar.” The silence is pierced only by radio cackle and
a fire burning – our only source of heat and light. We
sleep in a cell literally filled with smoke. Everybody ris-
es at 4 am. It’s time for Ramadan breakfast: stale pieces
of nan and the remains of a chicken stew from the pre-
vious night. During the whole day of war, nothing in
the stomach until iftar, the breaking of the fast at 5 pm.
War starts at 6:30 am: the mujahideen go to work
elbowing each other in the trunks of Toyota pickups,
smiling like the kids they mentally are. One of them
plays with a hand grenade, oblivious to the possibility
of sending us all to paradise. The B-52s resume their
circular ballet at 6:30 am. Flashes of light emerge from
the mountains. The mind boggles when we think that
less than four miles away a lethal concentration, ac-
cording to the mujahideen, of 3,000 Arabs, Chechens,
Uzbeks and Pakistanis bent on fighting to the last man
is being bombed to oblivion.
These mujahideen – harder than Tora Bora rock –
are the commandos of Hazrat Ali, currently “chief of
law and order” in the eastern Afghan city of Jalalabad.
They may be members of the loosely configured East-
ern Alliance. But above all they are Pachis – a Pashtun
subtribe with its own language and fierce code of war.
64   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Many of them spent years living in Peshawar in Paki-
stan during the Taliban holocaust. They have arrived
at the frontline only a few days ago. They number
a maximum of 2,000 – operating strange hardware
inherited from the anti-Soviet jihad. They swear that
on the other side there are no Afghan Taliban. The last
frontline in the New Afghan War is an affair between
Arabs and Afghans.
The Arab commander is feared Abdul Kuduz –
known by the mujahideen because they always in-
tercept Al-Qaeda’s radio communications. But none
of them speaks Arabic – just like none of the Arabs
understand the Pachi dialect. The mujahideen say that
the Arabs have only two tanks – both in shambles. All
the time we spent in the frontline – almost three days –
the Arabs produced only scattered mortar fire.
The war between Arabs and Afghans evolves in slow
motion. A few dozen mujahideen are surrounded by
the Arabs: only two are captured. A mujahideen arrives
at our cell extremely depressed: one of the captured is
his friend. He displays some of Arab belongings: pass-
port photos (one of them with a bullet hole), letters, an
ammunition belt, a ghostly photo of a black woman in
Nigerian dress with a note in Arabic. The feared Arab
fighters are revealed to be beardless young men look-
ing like well-behaved graduate students.
Zarin Jan, 40, a mujahideen since 1979 (“I have no
other career.”) knows the Tora Bora caves by heart:
“They are enormous holes. You can go inside with a big
car. The caves are at the base of the mountain. When
the Arabs want to fight they come to the top.” Drawing
on his experience, he says, “the Russians had many
heavy weapons and a complete army. War was very
difficult. These people only disappear inside the moun-
tains.” Jan says that the Arabs “have everything inside:
schools, hospitals, even parking.” It’s hard to believe
they don’t have Kalashnikovs: according to the muja-
hideen, only “heavy weapons,” which for them means
rocket launchers.
The most absurd aspect in this absolutely asymmetri-
cal war is the lack of coordination between the dev-
astating B-52 and F-16 attacks and the slow offensive
of the 2,000 mujahideen. The mujahideen took three
B-52 attacks just to position a Zu – a double-bar-
reled anti-aircraft gun from Soviet pre-history. But
their knowledge of the terrain is matchless: not the
commanders, but the soldiers say that the Americans
should be bombing the base of the mountain, not the
top. The only sat-phone on sight – a Thoraya belonging
to commander Hazrat Ali, bought in Dubai – remains
absolutely mute.
Suddenly, we are presented with evidence of the
“invisible war” constantly evoked by US Defense
Secretary Donald Rumsfeld: two pick-ups with tint-
ed windows with six men inside and their high-tech
kits. Two journalists approach them: “We believe you
wouldn’t like to speak to us.” Surprised, one of them
reacts with an “Er … good morning.” Security tries to
push us away.
These gentlemen are nothing less than a mixed com-
mando of American Special Forces and British SAS.
They don’t seem very pleased to see the media. They go
to the top of a hill and study the war map. The result
comes less than an hour later: a tank and an anti-per-
sonnel carrier are repositioned. The offensive will
restart from zero.
The Taliban have been dislodged from every single
Afghan province. But are the Taliban dead? Not really.
Most of the men who matter have already comfortably
parked their turbans in Peshawar – global capital of the
Afghan diaspora, including six former Taliban min-
isters and diplomats who now want … a voice in the
new Afghan government. Taliban leader Mullah Omar
may have – or may have not – left Kandahar, depend-
ing on which Kandahari faction you listen to. Details
about the famous pact brokered by Hamid Karzai with
Gul Agha – former governor of Kandahar – and Mul-
lah Naqibullah are extremely sketchy. Omar may have
been offered – and may have already used – protec-
tion to go quietly underground. Of the three Durrani
subtribes in control of the border city of Spinbaldak
– essentially a canyon of containers full of smuggled
goods in the middle of the desert – two say they would
protect fellow Pashtun Omar, and one says they would
prefer to capture him.
In Tora Bora, the mujahideen know that this war
could last weeks, or even months. Muhamad Issa
Mishin, a hardcore Pachi from Dar-i-Noor, also fought
here during the jihad in the 1980s. “The Russians
came here many times, but they never managed to
advance.” This happened 18 years ago. The Russians
were attacking the mujahideen exactly from the same
position where Hazrat Ali’s Pachis are attacking the
Arabs. Mishin remembers, “We had enough to light a
fire every night. We spent the whole winter here. The
Russians bombed the mountains many times. Nothing
happened.” And nobody – not least the Pentagon –
really knows what is happening right now.
Osama bin Laden was apparently sighted a few days
ago on horseback commanding his troops – or maybe
that was a mujahideen’s imagination fired up by good
hashish. Osama bin Laden may still be hiding in the
caves of Tora Bora. Or he may be in the neighboring
province of Paktia. He may be in Khost. Or he may
be in Khurram agency, already inside Pakistan’s tribal
areas. Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda leaders – includ-
ing presumed dead Amyan Al-Zawahiri – are moving
in the shadows where B-52s and F-16s are not able to
penetrate.
FOREVER WARS   65
 Former Afghan
president Hamid
Karzai speaks
during an interview
in Kabul. Photo:
AFP/ Anadolu
Agency

Afghanistan, year zero

The Northern Alliance – a mixed cauldron of warlords, opportunists,
gangsters and drug traffickers – could never have imagined itself in
such a powerful position, backed by American military might

By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 22, 2001

ISLAMABAD – All roads lead to Rome. In Afghanistan, all roads lead

to Kabul. This time, they also led to Rome. Hamid Karzai, the de facto
Afghan interim prime minister for the next six months, starting on Satur-
day, went to Rome to get the blessing of former Afghan king Zahir Shah.
The first British Royal Marines – leading a multinational, 16-country,
3,000-plus force – are already in Kabul. Afghanistan is finally, officially,
back within the concert of nations after the social holocaust of Taliban
theocracy.

66   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    67

 But this is no Kosovo or East Timor. This is a much
more complex operation. The six billion dollar ques-
tion is inevitable – for Afghans and Pakistanis, for
Russians and Chinese, for members of the European
Union: what do the Americans really want?
Afghanistan is at present totally liberated from the
Taliban – thanks to the precision and imprecision
of American ballistic wrath. And the US are on the
ground in force – inside the strategic Bagrum and
Kandahar airports, inside the newly reopened Ameri-
can Embassy.
But the facts on the ground are also implacable. Not
a single Taliban leader – Mullah Omar included – has
been captured. They all have comfortably parked their
turbans, for the moment, in Pakistani tribal areas
– after buying their security from avid mujahideen
commanders through the surrendering of territories.
Only a few dozen minor, exhausted Al-Qaeda fighters
– and a few dozen families – were captured in the Tora
Bora caves. Osama bin Laden and his “thousands” (sic)
of ferocious fighters theoretically escaped to the tribal
areas, according to Eastern Alliance commanders in
Jalalabad.
Reality is even more brutal – as Asia Times Online
has already revealed. A bunch of Afghan commanders
were rewarded with increased local prestige, cash and
weapons by reassuring gullible Americans that bin
Laden was still in Tora Bora, when in fact he may have
escaped weeks ago to deserted Helmand province, and
then to the Iranian part of tribal Baluchistan.
Without the capture of “The Sheik” bin Laden, or
Al-Qaeda’s No 1, Ayman “The Surgeon” Al-Zawahiri,
not to mention Mullah Omar, American “victory” is
nothing less than bitter. And the consequences of this
inconclusive “victory” are bound to affect the perfor-
mance of the next Afghan interim government serious-
ly.
This is a government as fragile as a premature baby. Shah, but this will happen only in the first semester of
Hamid Karzai has repeatedly broadcasted his No 1
priorities: “peace and security.” He hails from one of jirga, a grand council of about 1,500 Afghans who will
the most traditional families of southern Afghanistan, choose a transitional 18-month government.
68   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
which reigned over Kandahar for more than a centu-
ry, with very close connections to the royal family. He
knows all the major and minor players, he speaks Dari
and Pashto fluently, not to mention English, and he
considers himself to be most of all an Afghan. But he is
up against some formidable “invisible” opposition.
Uzbek warlord Rashid Dostum – essentially a dan-
gerous gangster – will be working against him. And so
will the recently destitute former United Nations-rec-
ognized president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan,
Tajik theology professor Barhanuddin Rabbani. Pir
Syed Gillani, the Pashtun leader of the so-called Pe-
shawar group, is also extremely unhappy with the
Bonn arrangements. And Ismail Khan, the charismatic
former and current governor of Persianized Herat, will
not pay too much attention to a distant government in
Kabul, where he has no representation.
Dostum and Rabbani, especially, will try to discredit
or simply ignore moderate Pashtun and royalist Hamid
Karzai’s set up. Sources related to Pakistan’s Inter-Ser-
vices Intelligence (ISI) insist that Karzai is nothing but
an American-imposed figurehead. Anyway, not Karzai
but the Northern Alliance will really be in control of
this government: they are the hard and soft core of the
Panjshir valley: Tajik “children.” Younous Qanooni, a
Tajik, will be the minister of the interior. Dr Abdullah
Abdullah, a Pashtun by birth, will be the foreign minis-
ter. And General Fahim will be minister of defense. In
the UN-sponsored Bonn conference, the trio had their
say over the Pashtun ethnic majority, over the Hazara
and Uzbek ethnic minorities, and also over old-guard
Tajiks such as the disgruntled Rabbani – who after-
ward openly accused Qanooni of betrayal.
It won’t be exactly a popular government, but one
has to remember that not a single Afghan government
since the communists in 1978 had popular support.
As far as Kabul is concerned, the only overwhelmingly
popular solution is the return of former king Zahir
2002, when the king will be back to preside over a loya
The new Afghan interim setup will deal directly with
a plethora of concerned foreign governments, and also
with hundreds of millions of dollars bound to flow into
the country as humanitarian aid. Those opposed to
Karzai’s government may not have direct access to the
goodies, but some will control large amounts of territo-
ry and loads of weapons.
Dostum’s case is the most worrying: he controls the
vital supply route used by humanitarian convoys from
Uzbekistan, and he is idolized by thousands of fanatic
soldiers. Rabbani has very close relations with many
warlords – including the devious Pashtun leader,
Professor Sayyaf. Behind these characters there’s the
shade of an even more sinister warlord: radical Pash-
tun Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, still exiled in Iran, and still
bitterly accusing the US of imposing an agreement in
Bonn. For many in Pakistan, the accusation is more
plausible than it seems. Hekmatyar holds the dubious
record of being the only prime minister in history to
have bombed his own capital with rockets, during the
chaotic mujahideen wars of 1992-96.
The fact remains that the Northern Alliance – a
mixed cauldron of warlords, opportunists, gangsters
and drug traffickers – could never have imagined itself
in such a powerful position, and is backed, so far, by
American military might. But the eventual success of
Hamid Karzai’s government will depend on an array
of very crucial factors. Afghan warlords will have to
decide whether their priority is revenge or reconcili-
ation. If the atavistic Afghan tribal instinct of solving
any problem with a Kalashnikov remains, the country
will never leave the black void.
The overall national and international focus must
be humanitarian: 5 million refugees, about 7 million
displaced people in the country, and at least 150,000
children on the verge of dying because of malnutrition.
The Afghan warlords – for the first time in history –
will have to overcome their personal rivalries and work
for a common cause: peace and development. But even
their best intentions will not be enough if neighboring
countries continue to play the same destructive game
of positioning themselves in Afghanistan for their own
geopolitical gains. It’s no secret that a few influential
sectors of the Pakistani ISI told the Taliban not only
not to fight, but also to retreat in the next few months,
reorganize in the tribal areas, and come back in a not
too distant future as a Pashtun force.
There’s only one major difference in relation to the
tragic past. The US is apparently committed to contrib-
uting major political, military and financial help. The
marines are in the airports. The diplomats are in Ka-
bul. Multilateral financial organizations are apparently
ready. A few weeks ago in Kabul, Molloch Brown, Af-
ghan administrator of the UN Development Program
(UNDP), said that until the end of January the UNDP
would have set the priorities and the total cost of the
Afghan rebuilding effort, to be shared by the UN, the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. Brown
said that he was “confident about donor potential,” and
that he would do his best to “lock them into a multi-
year plan.”
International cynics might say this is just business,
because Washington would never be interested in a
war-stricken and famine-driven wasteland in the first
place. The fact is Afghanistan’s natural wealth and
status as a conduit for the pipelines transporting the
riches of Central Asia are essential parts of the US$5
trillion oil and gas business of the New Great Game.
Pakistan also has much to gain from the $2 billion gas
pipeline to be built from Turkmenistan to Pakistan
via Afghanistan, not to mention the boost to its indig-
enous industries, such as logistics, construction and
food with new opportunities in its neighbor market.
Among all these uncertainties, though, only one thing
is certain. “Pipelinestan” or not, hidden American
agenda or not, hidden Pakistani agenda or not, the
historic opportunity for Afghanistan to emerge from
the black void is now. Or never.
FOREVER WARS   69
 French President
Jacques Chirac (R)
greets Afghan interim
leader Hamid Karzai on
February 28, 2002 before
their lunch at the Elysee
Palace in Paris. Photo:
Patrick Kovarik / AFP

An Afghan in Paris
After visiting India, Pakistan and Iran, interim government leader
Hamid Karzai enjoys a little joie de vivre, and insists Afghanistan
is now ‘stable’

By PEPE ESCOBAR
MARCH 5, 2002

PARIS – “Trust me! There is no ethnic war in Afghanistan!” Interim

government leader Hamid Karzai – impeccably dressed as usual and
displaying his trademark esprit – was not exactly pleased by the question
from Asia Times Online. “The war was imposed on us by outsiders. Our
best strength is that all Afghans are in favor of unity. Every Afghan con-
siders himself above all an Afghan.”
So, according to Karzai, any ethnic consideration is superfluous: “Our
national identity is very strong. Any other country would have been de-

70   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    71

stroyed by the civil war. Afghanistan is now probably
more stable than the people around us.”
So much optimism does not conceal the fact that
“Afghanistan needs a national army” – and needs the
help of everybody: the US, the International Security
Force, the European Union. But this is “not to suggest
Afghanistan is insecure”, insists Karzai. He wants, in
fact badly needs, “commitment from the international
community.” Karzai assures that “the extension of the
mandate of the Security Force is demanded by delega-
tions from all the Afghan provinces.”
In five or six weeks’ time, the first soldiers of the na-
tional army will take their posts. Six-thousand to 7,000
men will be trained in the next 18 months – not exactly
enough to secure a country as volatile as Afghanistan.
Globetrotting Karzai – with an entourage of around
20 – has been visiting a cluster of crucial latitudes lately
– especially India, Pakistan and Iran. India has always
supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban.
His visit to Pakistan was meant to pre-empt any possi-
ble moves instigated by Islamist sectors inside the In-
ter-Services Intelligence agency against his government.
In Iran, Karzai was royally received – as he is fond of
remembering at every opportunity. Hard-line Iranian
Shia clerics consider him a puppet of the US, while
Washington has been accusing Tehran of turning a
blind eye to the escape of Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders
(it’s not true: they sneaked in via the southeast sup-
ported by anti-Tehran Sunni mujahideen).
Karzai is keen to emphasize that there is no “misunder-
standing” regarding Iran. He mentions cultural agree-
ments signed with Tehran and a common engagement
in the fight against drug trafficking. He thanks both Iran
and the US for their help, and stresses that “if we can
work as mediators between the US and Iran , this would
be a good thing … But they certainly must cooperate in-
side Afghanistan.” Afghanistan, stresses Karzai, now has
“strategic freedom of choice: we are now a free country.”
Karzai is fond of singling out many examples of good-
will towards his government.
In Herat and Jalalabad, he’s been seeing many young
72   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
people now proud of their “freedom and dignity”, who
believe in the new political set-up and especially praise A US military
the fact that “national dignity has been restored.” The vehicle drives
past the Om Al
same kind of response was elicited when he attended
Maariq mosque in
a concert of Afghan music in Tehran. And at George- Baghdad. Photo:
town University in Washington, he says, “all the girls Wikimedia
wanted to be president of Afghanistan.”
There are no women in the Hamid Karzai travel party,
though. That’s because his women ministers “prefered to
stay, working in the countryside; they had more import-
ant things to do inside Afghanistan.” Karzai assures that
“we will have a good representation of women in the
Loya Jirga [grand council]” expected to be called in June.
During his Paris visit, he diplomatically exalted
France’s “multidimensional role” in aiding Afghanistan
and helping set up its national army and national po-
lice. France actually is not campaigning for an expan-
sion of the International Security Force (ISAF): Paris
considers “this is not necessary at the time.” But France
would be in favor of a “longer mandate.” Karzai also
said Afghanistan accepts a Turkish command of the
ISAF in the near future.
Baghdad glued to Beirut
Housed in style at the lush quarters of the Raphael
Hotel in Paris, Karzai also visited the Guimet Muse-
um – where he inaugurated a fabulous exhibition of
Afghan art. He expects that most of the works – drawn
from the Guimet Collection, the Hermitage in Saint In this land at war, which has suffered the ravages of Sumerians,
Petersburg, the Museum fur Indische Kunst in Berlin
and private collectors – “will be exhibited permanently Akkadians, Elamites, Babylonians, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Greeks,
Parthians, Sassanians, Ummayyads, Abbassids, Seljuks, Safavids,
in Kabul.” He said his government had already opened
“the National Archives, galleries and music schools.” Ottomans and British, another war may be inevitable – but nobody
Among the precious relics, visitors to the exhibition seems to be running for cover yet
are able to follow the period when Indo-Greeks dom-
inated the Indus basin as far as contemporary Lahore.
By PEPE ESCOBAR
The supreme masterpiece is a splendid 2nd century MARCH 28, 2002
Apollonian Buddha marble head from Peshawar,
bought in New York by a Swiss collector. Its power BAGHDAD – Saddam Hussein ordered the construction of the Om Al
reminds one how the clumsy Taliban tried so hard to Maariq mosque in 1998, slightly before a US bombing campaign. The
annihilate even memories of this crucial civilization. magnificent mosque – sort of Islam meets art deco – is capable of holding
1,800 worshipers and is the largest in Baghdad.
The Taliban? Never again, says Karzai: “We are Mus-
lims, and we are going to have our democracy, in the It was finished last year, but Thamir Ibrahim, the chief of the protocol
framework of our religion.” department at the mosque, refuses to say how much it cost. But despite
FOREVER WARS    73
the secrecy surrounding many sensitive buildings in
Baghdad, it would be a stretch of the imagination to
accuse the mosque’s authorities of hiding weapons of
mass destruction.
Saddam has visited the complex only once, last Sep-
tember. He did not go to the inauguration but during
the three years of construction he was very busy
writing – in handsome Arabic calligraphy – a copy of
the Holy Koran. This is now solemnly displayed at the
mosque behind a circular glass wall.
Iraq’s Islamic credentials could be very handy at this
crucial juncture in the history of the Middle East. Al-
ready in Jordan’s capital city, Amman, before crossing
the Jordanian-Iraqi border and cruising the 551 kilo-
meters of impeccable freeway through the desert to-
wards Baghdad, it is possible to sense the Arab world’s
refusal to link Washington’s involvement to defuse the
tragic spiral of violence in the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict with support for a military strike against Iraq.
From Amman to Baghdad, and including echoes
from Cairo, Damascus and Beirut, Arab diplomats ad-
mit in private that a collective Arab position support-
ing Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s proposal is the key
to breaking the impasse in Palestine and to preempting
a US military strike against Iraq.
But this would mean less American dominance of
the whole Middle Eastern peace process – while the
European Union is busy reconfiguring itself as the big
player-in-waiting. The EU is more than eager to as-
sume an extremely high profile. Talks have been going
on since 1991. The Arab world is definitely considering
a formal “invitation”. Not accidentally, endless German
delegations travel to Baghdad.
Arab diplomats – echoing Brussels – also comment
that the US and Israel definitely don’t want the EU to
have a strong role in the Middle East. Musa Kellani, a
respected Jordanian columnist, observes, “The Euro-
pean posture is based on the realization that Europe
stands to bear the brunt of instability in the Middle
East – by sheer proximity and the historical European
involvement in the region’s affairs.”
74   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
From the point of view of both Amman and Baghdad,
and for a number of not necessarily the same reasons,
it is fair to assume that increasingly the Arab world
is going to rely on Europe. Arab diplomats, including
those present at the Arab League summit that began in
Beirut on Wednesday, are convinced that Washington’s
interest in the Middle East revolves around one issue
only: oil. And they have also seen how Washington has
simply ignored the EU collective criticism of the Bush
administration’s obsession on attacking Iraq.
Baghdad has its eyes set firmly on Beirut. In the past
few weeks Iraq has staged a complex diplomatic dance
around many Arab capitals – designed to offset US
Vice President Dick Cheney’s 11-nation Middle East
trip. The vice president of the Iraqi Revolutionary
Command Council, Izzat Ibrahim, and Foreign Min-
ister Naji Sabri visited Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt,
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.
Vice President Taha Yassin Ramadan visited Sudan
and Yemen. Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz went to
Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Cheney left the
Middle East without an Arab mandate to attack Iraq.
Unlike the Arab street, the official Arab world wants
the US to play a strong, resolute role in resuming the
Araraeli peace process – but on one condition: Iraq
cannot be sacrificed. This is the “message” likely to
emerge from the ongoing Beirut summit. Consequent-
ly, an impasse is inevitable: the US wants a solution
to Palestine, but also a free hand to attack Iraq. Amir
Musa, the Arab League’s secretary general, has repeat-
ed again and again, “The Arab-Israeli conflict is one
thing. The Iraqi-Kuwait conflict is a different one.” The
Arab world’s version of “saving face” in this confronta-
tion would be to extract a maximum of concessions to
the benefit of Palestine, since Washington has already
made up its mind regarding Iraq.
While politics is the main axis of the Arab summit in
Beirut, economic issues are equally important. Arabs
are finally realizing that they must put aside political
differences for the sake of economic interests. The
Arab world is facing a common challenge: countries
as diverse as Saudi Arabia and Iraq are confronted by
low economic growth, high unemployment, very high At a “Scientific Conference on the Impact of Weapons
internal and external debt and weak exports. on Humans and the Environment in Iraq”, the best sci-
entists in the land denounced the effects of US bomb-
Oil wealth of late has meant practically nothing in
ing with depleted uranium, while the president of the
terms of achieving a better standard of living. The
organizing committee stressed that “evil powers want
Arab countries’ combined gross domestic product
to destroy Iraq in the name of peace.”
(GDP) was US$440 billion in 1980. It was about $730
billion in 2001. The annual growth rate was about 2 For educated Iraqis, the martyrs of the second intifa-
percent – with an average inflation of about 3 percent. da in Palestine are as cherished as the martyrs of the
So real GDP growth was actually negative. The average Gulf War – thousands of them victims of bombing by
real GDP growth globally was 3 percent in these two depleted uranium. No wonder: for people of the Book
decades. – Jews, Christians, Muslims – Iraq is a holy land, as
well as Palestine. The Biblical Eden was situated some-
The Arab countries’ population in 1980 was 140 mil-
where between the Tigris and the Euphrates. When
lion. It was 285 million in 2001. So per capita income
God chased Adam and Eve from paradise, paradise
has also declined. In Saudi Arabia, for instance, it fell
was located in Mesopotamia (in Greek: “the earth be-
from $25,000 in 1988 to $8,500 in 2001.
tween the rivers”.)
Trade has not provided a solution. The Arab Free
At the traditional souk Al Alabi, in old Baghdad,
Trade Agreement (AFTA) has existed since 1998,
vendors of shirts and socks from Syria are unanimous,
with 14 member countries. Total exports of the Arab
“I am Iraqi. I am strong.” Ministry of Information of-
world in 2000 – including oil – were $243 billion: this
ficials assure that no bunkers are being built to protect
is less than the combined exports of Hong Kong and
the civilian population from possible US bombing.
Singapore ($250 billion in 2000). Inter-Arab trade was
only $33.5 billion in 2000, only 8.6 percent of the total.
In the relatively upscale Masba neighborhood, Bagh-
Excluding oil and minerals, inter-Arab trade is only 16 dad boys cruise in luxury cars and eat pizzas at Califor-
percent of the total. nia-style cafes. In this land at war, which has suffered
the ravages of Sumerians, Akkadians, Elamites, Baby-
As the Arab world struggles in Beirut to find the same
lonians, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, Greeks, Parthians,
voice politically as well as economically, Iraq – as we
Sassanians, Ummayyads, Abbassides, Seljuks, Safavids,
hear everywhere in Baghdad prone at the moment to
Ottomans and British, another war may be inevitable –
extremely metaphoric sandstorms – remains a country
but nobody seems to be running for cover yet.
at war. But the popular mood is defiant.
FOREVER WARS    75
 US soldiers patrol a
market in the cen-
tre of Mosul. Photo:
Nicolas Asfouri /
AFP

The vanishing middle class

Surveying, on the ground, the progressive impoverishment of Iraq

By PEPE ESCOBAR
MARCH 30, 2002

BAGHDAD – Tahir (not his real name) used to be a teacher in Bagh-

dad. He can be found at the traditional streetwalk book souk (market) in
Moutanabi street, perusing dusty copies of biographies and dictionaries.
A made-in-Iraq pirated copy of the Complete Idiot’s Guide to Windows
98 sells briskly for the equivalent of about US$3. The vendor, Abil, used
to be a civil engineer. He’s been jobless for the past nine years. Now these
pirated computer manuals and English dictionaries help him feed his
family of five.

76   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    77

 Tahir, speaking faultless Spanish, reminisces about his
days in southern Europe in the 1980s. He once worked
for the Ministry of Culture, but the pay was too low, so
he quit to support his family of four. Now he is an oc-
casional driver, “My wife is also a teacher,” he says. “Do
you know how much she makes? Six dollars a month.”
Shown a remarkable war-photography book by Iraqi
lensman Rahim Hasan, published in 1987, both Abil
and Tahir are reminded of the “forgotten” – at least
in the Western press – Iran-Iraq war. “I fought in that
war,” says Tahir. “There were one million and a half
dead. It was the elite of the population – doctors, engi-
neers.”
Abil and Tahir are survivors. They are now part of a
vanishing group: the Iraqi middle class. They cannot
exercise their chosen profession. They don’t have the
“connections” to obtain an exit visa and try a new life,
maybe in Jordan, maybe in the Gulf, maybe in Europe.
They are bewildered when told that Iraq is going to be
attacked – again – by the United States, and they ask,
“Has the decision been made? Is it inevitable?”
Dr Humam Al Shamaa, professor of economy and
finance at Baghdad University, explains the progressive
impoverishment of Iraq. “The state made a tremendous
effort to rebuild the infrastructure of the country after
the war ended [in 1988]. With no financial resources,
it was forced to resort to emission of currency, which
accelerated the rhythm of inflation four and a half
times a year until 1995. Wealth disappeared under
the inflationary pressure. The currency deteriorated.
People depending on salaries were gradually impover-
ished. Tens of thousands of Iraqi families now rely only
on government rations to survive. Iraq’s riches disap-
peared under the pressure of inflation on one side and
the embargo – which is the cause of this inflation. The
value of the Iraqi currency fell 6,000 times compared
to the 1980s. Poverty is everywhere.”
The rations supplied by the state are at least sufficient
to prevent a famine, according to Shamaa. “They’re
enough to assure the survival of the Iraqi people. The
rations are calculated according to basic necessities:
wheat, oil, rice, tea, sugar, soap. It’s impossible to raise
78   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
the amount of ration tickets because we cannot sup-
port a people that does not work. That was the aim of
the ‘oil for food’ program. We think that if we import
everything we need to feed ourselves, we will forget the
agriculture sector – and that would instigate a crisis in
all other economic activities in Iraq. The agricultural
sector employs 50 percent of the population. Iraq can-
not be turned into a country that eats without produc-
ing anything.”
According to the United Nations’ Food and Agricul-
ture Organization, had Iraq not organized a rationing
and distribution system, the country would certainly
have faced a terrible famine. Apart from any political
considerations, this is an Iraqi merit that is never ac-
knowledged in the West. Denis Halliday, former assis-
tant secretary general of the UN, the man who started
the oil-for-food program in Iraq – and later resigned
from the UN, calling the US-inspired embargo “a
genocide” – has never stropped criticizing the United
States and Britain for blocking the shipping of human-
itarian supplies to Iraq. As much as US and British
politicians and the media accuse the Iraqi regime of
“punishing” Iraqis, the US and Britain themselves
increase the punishment by withholding humanitarian
shipments of vaccines and painkillers.
Shamaa says that unlike in most developing coun-
tries, there is no migration in Iraq from the country-
side to the urban centers – rather the reverse. “There
are no jobs in the cities. Jobs are in agriculture. Many
people left the cities to work in the countryside, rais-
ing cattle and poultry.” But in the bazaars of Baghdad,
some people who agree to talk stress that there is no
work in the provinces: workers have to migrate to
Baghdad. And in Baghdad, there are no jobs even for
qualified people such as Abil and Tahir.
According to Shamaa, “The industrial sector in Iraq
also faced enormous difficulties. Access to raw materi-
als and intermediate materials was assured by income
from the oil industry. But with the embargo, we could
not import these materials anymore. Seventy percent
of the industrial sector is practically paralyzed. We try
to start things over by providing at least some materials
allowed by the oil-for-food program. We have man-
aged to reactivate 50 percent of the private industrial
sector.”
Yet Iraq has very few pockets of excellence in the
industrial sector: cement and the chemical and petro-
chemical industries. “But they are handicapped. They
work at a maximum 30 percent capacity. The embargo
prohibits the import of almost any heavy machines.
Only spare parts are allowed.” And even if Iraq man-
aged to bypass the hellish UN bureaucratic machine –
controlled and vetoed by the US and Great Britain – it
would not have enough means to pay for these parts as
it does not have enough foreign currency.
Baghdad now displays the same floating population
of street kids that can be found in Jakarta or Rio de
Janeiro. Signs of impoverishment are everywhere, con-
trasting with the bland and usually gray intimations of
Islamist-Stalinist architecture.
Madinat-es-Salam (“The city of peace”), the dream of
its founder, the caliph Al-Mansur, in the 8th century,
has seen it all in terms of misery and massacre. Yet
it remains defiant. It’s historically a city of survivors.
Everybody mentions with pride how the destruction
caused by the Gulf War has been rebuilt. There’s even
a Challenge Museum – painstakingly detailing the
reconstruction of telecom centers, bridges or schools
bombed during the war.
After the Gulf War, only a “minority that practices
commerce,” according to Shamaa, managed to main-
tain their standard of living. “There are no official
statistics, but they are not more than 10 percent of the
population.” So would it be fair to say that the middle
class simply vanished? “There is no more middle class
in Iraq. Before they were rich, then they became semi-
rich, but now the majority is poor.”
In Baghdad’s two or three relatively upscale streets
are a cluster of “investment banks.” Shamaa dismisses
them outright. “They call themselves investment banks
but they are in reality commercial banks, of a very
mediocre level. Capital does not surpass 1 billion or 2
billion Iraqi dinars [the current exchange rate is $1 to
1,960 dinars; it used to be about $1 to three dinars be-
fore the Gulf War]. There is not a lot of investment in
Iraq. There is no Arab investment to speak of. Every-
thing is frozen because of the embargo. There is only
one authorized investor, a Lebanese. That’s it.”
Iraq’s national budget for 2002 is about 1 trillion
dinars. Unemployment is officially estimated at 17 per-
cent, but Shamaa says actual unemployment is closer
to 30 percent, including disguised unemployment.
But among informal opinions in the bazaar, unem-
ployment is placed at almost 50 percent. At a Chinese
restaurant in the relatively upscale Masba quarter, a
lawyer behind his Yamaha synthesizer singing Que
Sera Sera allows himself a smile: He may be living a
surreal life staring at empty tables, but at least he’s got
a job.
FOREVER WARS   79
 Iraqi men exchange
local dinar in
front of packets of
money showing
toppled leader
Saddam Hussein
and counterfeit
bills (L) showing
Imam Ali, the cous-
in and son-in-law
of Islam’s Prophet
Mohammed, in
Baghdad in June
2003. Photo: Sabah
Arar / AFP

Sorry, your credit is no good

In an exclusive interview, Iraq’s Minister of Trade says the ‘axis of evil’ is ‘the
United States and Britain. Not Iraq, Iran or other Muslim countries’

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 4, 2002

BAGHDAD – The United States consistently accuses Iraq of being

a country incapable of development, and under a “merciless Stalinist
dictatorship.” Iraq consistently accuses the US of enforcing an inhuman
embargo which has caused hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.
Some voices in the West recognize that the United Nations embargo and
sanctions are not only playing against the interests of Iraq, but against the
interests of the international community as well.

80   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS   81

 Mohamed Mamdi Salim, Iraq’s Minister of Trade,
received Asia Times in his office, dressed in military
uniform, to talk about the UN embargo.
Excerpts:
Asia Times: What kind of trade is Iraq still allowed,
considering the country is subjected to an array of UN
sanctions?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: As you know, Iraq is
allowed the “oil for food” program, in certain limited
quantities: food, medicine, and other requirements for
education, sanitation, agricultural equipment, etc. But
there are severe difficulties in the process of approval
of contracts, and consequently opening letters of credit
and delivering the commodities.
Asia Times: How many contracts are blocked at the
moment?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: More than US$8 billion
worth of contracts.
Asia Times: Most of them are with European, Arab
or Asian companies?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: With Arabian countries,
Russia, France …
Asia Times: Who blocks these contracts?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: The United States, of
course, and the British. There’s no objection at all from
other members of the Security Council. Only the Unit-
ed States and Britain, since the beginning of “oil for
food” in 1996. Sometimes Japan supports the United
States, although the support is limited. The United
States and Britain have a political attitude, rather than
[an attitude] relating to the procedure of “oil for food.”
Asia Times: In the Iraqi government’s view, what
82   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
could be done to circumvent this dead-end situation?
Is there a way out?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: No, unless they change
their position. The situation of approval runs through
the veto system. [If] any country rejects any contract,
or has any complaints on any contract, then that con-
tract will be on hold. They have the power over the Se-
curity Council 661 Committee. So they are doing their
job efficiently, rejecting contracts for the Iraqi people.
The implementation of “oil for food” has reflected
that policy and has become a project for meeting the
requirements of United Nations compensation, Unit-
ed Nations expenses, balancing of oil prices, and not
for the Iraqi people, due to the fact that Iraq received,
from the US$52 billion during this program, only
US$17 billion worth of commodities. US$10 billion
was deducted by the United Nations for compensation
and their expenses, and the remaining contracts are on
hold.
Asia Times: So who is benefiting from the embargo
and the “oil for food” program?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: The United Nations. And
those who import oil.
Asia Times: What kind of contracts are blocked?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: Even food and medicine,
they are blocking it. Basically the humanitarian side,
which is related to water supply and purification of
water. We are not allowed imports of pipes for supply-
ing water to houses, for example. They have actually a
policy of selecting any contract at random. Sometimes
they approve a contract to import a commodity from
certain countries, and reject one [for importing] from
others.
Asia Times: Is there a fixed list of what you cannot
import?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: They don’t say, “We are not
allowing you to buy.” So we have to decide what kind of
items to buy, we put them on the list, then we submit cines it needs by evading the blockade?
this list to the Sanctions Committee, and the commit-
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: No. The important thing
tee decides whether to allow it or not.
is how to pay. And we can pay only through an escrow
account. The money is under United Nations approval.
If you have the money controlled by the United Na-
Asia Times: Hospital doctors in Baghdad say they
tions no one can sell you anything unless he gets the
cannot import incubators, for instance. And you can-
money.
not import computers as well.
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: Yes. We are not allowed.
Everything is 100 percent politically motivated. Asia Times: Is Iraq part of an “axis of evil”?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: The “axis of evil” is the
United States and Britain. Not Iraq, Iran or other Mus-
Asia Times: Diplomatically and politically, would
lim countries.
Iraq be able to change the situation with more support
from other parts of the world?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: Europe itself has benefited Asia Times: So there are other motives for demoniz-
from the contracts. “Oil for food” reflects the reality ing Iraq?
of the policy of the United States for the international
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: Now Israel is destroying
community – using the blockade policy against their
the Palestinian people, the Palestinian state, and Pales-
contracts with Iraq. They [the Europeans] know what
tinian entities which are approved by the international
is the real intention of the United States and Britain
community through the Oslo agreement supervised by
against Iraq. They [the Europeans] are trying but they
the United States. The terrorist Sharon and the terrorist
cannot do much.
state Israel are destroying everything, even hijacking
President Arafat. And the United States is supporting
this policy.
Asia Times: Is this all oil motivated?
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: Of course it is oil, to stabi-
lize the supply of oil rather than deliver food and med- Asia Times: Will the Arab world finally unite, politi-
icine to the Iraqi people. This is entirely for the United cally and economically?
States and United Nations compensation and expenses.
Mohamed Mamdi Salim: Well, they should. And
The United Nations has been saved by this program,
they must. Because the United States will never look to
which has financed it significantly. Who works in this
their interests, even those who are under [the greatest]
program? The richest people in the United Nations.
control of the United States. But the Arab people, even
in Saudi Arabia or Kuwait, are rejecting United States
policy toward Arabs and toward Palestinians.
Asia Times: Wouldn’t Iraq be able to get the medi-
FOREVER WARS   83
 Almustansyria
University in
Baghdad. Photo:
Wikimedia

What is terrorism?
After a lively lecture on European History at the Almustansyria University –
where the students eagerly intervene with lots of questions and comments – the
answers to questions posed by the foreign visitor quickly turn into questions
themselves, and sharp comments on American and Western foreign policy

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 6, 2002

BAGHDAD – The 57-country Organization of the Islamic Conference

(OIC), in a meeting of foreign ministers in the Malaysian capital Kuala
Lumpur this week, could not manage to define what is terrorism. But
at least the gathering managed to define what is not terrorism: and that
applies in full to the Palestinian struggle against Israeli occupation.
The OIC firmly stressed support for last week’s Beirut declaration of
Arab leaders to establish peace and normal relations with Israel in ex-
change for withdrawal from all Arab lands occupied in 1967.

84   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS   85

 This was all happening while Washington was ac-
cusing three OIC member nations – Iran, Iraq and
Syria – of using terror in a “war against civilization.”
Baghdad took no time to react. Foreign Minister Naji
Sabri branded the allegations, made by Defense Secre-
tary Donald Rumsfeld, as part of a US campaign aimed
at deflecting attention from Washington’s support for
Israel, “These are lies. It’s an excuse to promote Amer-
ican policies, which are completely biased in favor of
the Zionist entity.”
Washington’s tirade, though, managed to accomplish
a miracle: to unite Iran and Iraq – and not in an axis of
evil mode. Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi
not only rebuffed Rumsfeld, but also voiced strong
support for an Iraqi proposal for Muslim nations to
restrict oil supplies to pressure the United States and
Israel. This probable replay of the 1973 oil shock might
be the only way out for Muslim nations to counteract
what their public opinions consider an ongoing, perva-
sive process of humiliation by the West.
The hawkish, isolationist American right, Rums-
feld-style, loves to deride “resentful foreigners” for
criticizing the contours of the global American Em-
pire. But now even the New York Times has picked up
on an Asia Times Online article published last Octo-
ber on “The New Imperialism.” Solid scholars such as
Yale’s Paul Kennedy or would-be scholars like journal-
ist-turned think tank cheerleader Robert Kaplan are
now examining or theorizing the benefits of an empire.
Part of the American intelligentsia is trying to sell itself
the concept of an “attractive empire,” as if imperial
domination – military, political, economic, cultural –
could be condensed into a one-size-fits-all centerfold
bunny.
A visit to an Iraqi university classroom is always in-
structive. Here, the concept of an attractive empire is a
non-starter. After a lively lecture on European History
at the Almustansyria University – where the students
eagerly intervene with lots of questions and comments
– the answers to questions posed by the foreign visi-
tor quickly turn into questions themselves, and sharp
comments on American and Western foreign policy.
86   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
“Is Europe a slave of America?” “Does Europe have as an American leadership void. The White House Mid- did that might alienate the hardcore Republican right.
many prejudices against Muslims as America?” “Why dle East “policy” since the beginning of 2002 has been Ariel Sharon at the same time knew his government
does the West does not react to what the Israelis are reduced to announcing an attack on Saddam Hussein, would implode if compelled to a peace negotiation.
doing to the Palestinians?” probably between June and October. There has been The Bush administration had been giving him the
absolutely no effort to prevent an escalation of violence green light to invade the West Bank for weeks – since
A dead-serious bespectacled girl has a message for
between Israelis and Palestinians. George W Bush refused to even shake hands with Yass-
Donald Rumsfeld, “The real axis of evil is the US and
er Arafat at the United Nations.
Britain.” An overweight girl, with a smile on her face, A Washington-based scholar has told Asia Times
says, “Look at me. I’m strong. We will defend our Online that as far as the Arab world was concerned, The Washington-based scholar says that the hawks in
country against an attack the best we can.” it all boiled down to an image problem. Washington control of the Bush administration would never ad-
had to polish its extremely tarnished image in the Arab mit to it. But the facts are, for them, as follows. Arafat
In three of the four authorized, official Iraqi TV chan-
world before attacking a controversial and still crucial is over. Israeli colonies in Palestinian land are OK. A
nels – Al-Iraq, The Youth Channel and Iraqi Satellite
Arab nationalist leader. Washington pressed pliable Palestine state is not a viable option.
Chain – the only news is Palestine tragedy news. But
Saudi Arabia for an opening. Saudi Arabia delivered –
these students were not told by the ruling Baath Party But life is slightly more complicated than a Texas hol-
in the form of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah’s “land for
what to say. They buy Backstreet Boys pirate cassettes iday. There’s only one interlocutor for a peace process
peace” proposal, unanimously adopted at the Beirut
for less than US$1 in stalls in front of the university, in Palestine: Yasser Arafat. A delegation of the Brazil-
summit last week.
and they cruise the Internet searching for English ian Movement of Landless Peasants has just offered
editions of Muslim explorer Ibn Batutta’s travels or the It was too little, too late. The void had turned into one of their flags to Arafat. He is considered by many
writings of Shakespeare. a deep black hole. George W Bush is under a terror to be the number one landless person in the world.
of doing anything that the hard-worker and aspiring “Terrorist” Iraqi university students could not agree
And they theorize about the Empire – on the re-
Middle East peacemaker Bill Clinton did. And he is more.
ceiving end – more sharply than many a self-satisfied
also under a terror of doing anything his father George
scholar.
Trying to understand the point of view expressed
by young people in Baghdad, one can also figure out
the impossibility for the West to comprehend what it
means for the Arab world to watch every day on their
TVs the abominable humiliations suffered by the Pal-
estinians.
This “voice of the Arab university,” represented by
Baghdad students, has understood too well that the
Bush administration is not remotely interested in a
peace agreement in the Middle East. They have un-
derstood that a world leader mentally in perpetual
holidays in a cowboy ranch has got a single obsession:
to blame all the evils of the world on terrorism – and
terrorism only.
But “terrorism” – undefinable even by a congregation
of Muslim nations essentially on the receiving end of
the American accusations – does not explain the war
going on in Palestine.
The latest Palestinian war has happened because of
FOREVER WARS   87
 Iraq’s largest oil
refinery in the
northern town of
Baiji in 2003. Photo:
Stan Honda / AFP

Oil and troubled waters

Crisscrossing Iraq, from holy sites Kufa and Najaf to Basra and the
Shatt-al-Arab, in the middle of the rich oil fields of both Iraq and Iran

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 11, 2002

FAO, on the Iran-Iraq border – From this particular point of view –

right in the middle of the rich oilfields of both Iraq and Iran – Saddam
Hussein’s decision to freeze all Iraqi oil exports for one month from Mon-
day as punishment for United States support of Israel’s military onslaught
in Palestine feels like a nuclear bomb is about to be exploded.
For the moment, the measure affects only 3 percent of the world market.
But if followed by other Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) member nations – such as Iran, Libya or Venezuela – it could

88   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS   89

provide the White House and the Pentagon with the
perfect excuse to attack Iraq sooner rather than later.
The United States ranks ninth as an importer of Iraqi
oil.
The all-important paragraph of Saddam Hussein’s
speech – endlessly replayed on Iraqi TV – reads as
follows in the official Iraqi News Agency translation:
“The Revolution Command Council, the Iraqi leader-
ship of the Baath Arab Socialist Party, and the cabinet
in their meeting on April 8, 2002, declare, in the name
of the faithful, honest, mujahid, noble, Iraqi people:
completely stopping oil exports starting from this
afternoon April 8, through the pipelines going to the
Turkish port on the Mediterranean, and our ports in
Basra for a period of 30 days, after which we will fur-
ther decide, or until the Zionist entity’s armed forces
have unconditionally withdrawn from the Palestinian
territories they have occupied and have shown respect
for the will of the Palestinian people and the Arab na-
tion to sovereignty, security, dignity and life.”
For the Revolutionary Command Council – the
supreme executive power in Iraq – both Baghdad and
Ramallah in Palestine represent the same struggle.
This is the core of the Iraqi diplomacy for the crucial
next few months – while for the Bush administration
the two thorny issues are absolutely delinked. The only
foreign news on Iraqi TV is Palestine, most of the im-
ages borrowed from al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV. The
pan-Arabism of the regime is more than evident in an
array of explosive video clips dedicated to the Palestin-
ian cause.
Recently, in Kufa and Najaf – the holiest cities in
Islam after Mecca, Medina and al-Quds (Jerusalem)
– Asia Times Online learned about the existence
of training camps where Iraqi volunteers are being
prepared to fight a jihad against the “Zionist entity”
alongside their Muslim brothers in Palestine.
Muhamad Abdel Saheb is in charge of the proto-
col department of the Kufa mosque – where Ali, the
Prophet Muhammad’s brother-in-law, was mortally
blessed in 631. Kufa is the birthplace of the Shi’ite faith.
Saheb says that “we Iraqis are waiting for a sign from
90   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
the president to declare a jihad. If the president makes
a sign, everybody will answer his call.” Saheb stresses
that “jihad and political struggle, it is the same thing.”
In Najaf, where the “Prince of the Believers” Ali is
buried in a magnificent mausoleum, the imam, Dr
Haider Muhamad Hasan Alkelydar, confirmed the
existence of the jihad training camps, some of them
shown on Iraqi TV. Government officials such as
Ahmed, who works in the Najaf administration, are
able to say, “I want to be a martyr in Palestine. I can’t
do it only because I have to take care of my mother and
my wife.”
Fao is also Shi’ite country. On the road from Basra
to Fao, about 10 kilometers away, lies Iran, with Iraq
and North Korea a part of Washington’s axis of evil.
Behind a bridge over the river Al Karon it is possible to
see Abadan – arguably the largest refinery in the world
– its steel tubes gleaming against the sky. Most of the
terrain is still heavily mined, a memory of the Iran-
Iraq war of several decades ago. By the roadside, black
billboards exhort the glory of Iraqi martyrs.
Fao lies beside the Shatt-el-Arab, where Iran and
Iraq are separated by a river stream no wider than 800
meters. About 5,000 fishermen live on the Iraqi side.
Iranian police boats patrol the river, enforcing a virtual
divide to ensure that the locals don’t practice their fish-
ing in the neighboring country’s waters. The absolute
majority of the boats and trawlers carry the Iraqi flag.
On the Iranian margin there’s a “monument to the
martyrs.” During the Iran-Iraq war, the Iranians re-
peatedly tried to build a bridge over the river, always
bombed by the Iraqis. The Iranians thought the occu-
pation of Fao during the war, in 1986, was definitive.
But the Iraqis took the city back in 1988 through the
operation “Blessed Ramadan” coordinated by Saddam
Hussein. After Fao, Iran lost any hopes of winning the
war. Fao was rebuilt through a popular campaign, but
again partially destroyed by American bombing during
the Gulf War in 1991.
To learn about Saddam Hussein’s desire to coordinate
an oil shock such as in 1973, uniting all the Arab world
is all the more powerful when juxtaposed with the fact
that Iran has already approved an Iraqi proposal to use
oil as a weapon.
Even before Monday’s decision, oil was the incendiary
issue in Iraq. Asia Times Online had definitive assur-
ances from Paris and then Baghdad that it was possible
to examine the current state of the Iraqi oil industry in
Basra. But then we learned on the spot, on Saturday,
that since April 1 there’s been absolutely no way to visit
the oilfields. We were still in Baghdad at the time, but
we were not informed.
A spokesman from the governor’s office in Basra says
that the order came from the Ministry of Communi-
cation. He adds that a British Broadcasting Corp team
waited in Basra for a week trying to do the same thing,
and then left empty-handed. The reason for the ban,
“We are in a state of war.” Later, we learn from the In-
formation Ministry in Baghdad that the order actually
came from the Oil Ministry: the decision was made by
the Revolutionary Command Council.
We remind Basra officials that the Ministry of In-
formation in Baghdad stressed that the governorship
of Basra would facilitate any authorizations for a visit
to the oil fields in southern Iraq, and also to the port
of Abu Bakr. A cabinet secretary finally agrees to
set up an interview so that we can have some sort of
explanation straight from the governor of Basra. The
next day, one Karin Murad, the governor’s director of
information, again changes the rules. For starters, all
the questions in the interview have to be submitted in
advance. And the governor does not take questions
related to oil.
Ten minutes later, even more changes. Murad says
that Basra was waiting for permission from the Minis-
try of Interior for the governor to be interviewed – and
the permission was denied. The previous day, the cab-
inet secretary had the permission from the governor
himself for the interview. Murad then says that we can
“shake the governor’s hands.” We decline.
The episode reveals one of two things: either the
Shi’ite southern administration does not care to ob-
serve any demands from the central government – and
it is already busy preparing a secession; or, more prob-
ably, the “state of war” paranoia is a diversionist tactic
to cover the fact that any minor decision in Iraq has to
be fully scrutinized by the central government. Conse-
quently, for the moment the oil industry is off-limits to
“foreign spies.”
As far as Saddam Hussein’s explosive gesture is con-
cerned, for the Iraqi and Arab world mindset, the US
has given a free hand for Israel to destroy the Palestin-
ian Authority. An united Arab world might be able to
exert some kind of pressure for the US to rein in Ariel
Sharon. But it is getting increasingly harder to figure
out how Iraq might be able to convince the Arab world
and other OPEC countries to stand up against Ameri-
ca – and simultaneously prevent a wrathful, inevitable
American attack on itself.
FOREVER WARS   91
 The Great Ziggurat
temple, a massive
Sumerian stepped
mudbrick construc-
tion dedicated
to the moon god
Nanna, which dates
back to 2100 BC in
the ancient city of
Ur that falls now in
southern Iraq’s Dhi
Qar province, 375
kilometers south-
east of Baghdad.
Photo: Wikimedia

All guided up with

nowhere to go
Traveling across Iraq: an inglorious battle against the logic of secrecy and fear

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 13, 2002

UR and BASRA – It’s absolutely impossible to get close to the legendary

ziggurat of Ur without a letter of authorization. Ur, the Biblical city of the
Chaldeans, is the land of the prophet Abraham, father of the three great
monotheist religions. What is presented as the ruins of his house from
around 4000 BC can also be seen near the ziggurat.
According to the Holy Koran, Abraham was not Jewish, but a true be-
liever in Allah. Around 4000 BC, Abraham left Ur for what is now south-
ern Turkey, and then went to Palestine. Later he went to Egypt, and then

92   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    93

visited Arabia, where he helped his son Ishmael recon-
struct the Kaaba in Mecca, built by Adam.
According to theologian Hamidullah, a Koran trans-
lator, the personality and events in the life of Abraham
even inspired the Ramayana, the great Sanskrit poem.
The ziggurat of Ur (Entemen-ni-Gur) is a massive
three-staged pyramid built by King Ur-Namu and
his son Dungi, “kings of Sumer and Akkad, kings of
the four corners of the Earth,” around 2300 BC. The
ziggurat was re-engineered by the famous Nebuchad-
nezzar (Nabochodonosor) II. A monumental staircase
– rebuilt by order of Saddam Hussein – allows the
visitor to ascend to the second stage. The facade of the
ziggurat still bears traces of American bombing during
the Gulf War – or “Mother of All Battles” as it’s known
in Iraq.
Nowadays the ziggurat is protected by a checkpoint,
with two sleepy guards battling giant mosquitoes and
equipped with a single, rattled Kalashnikov. An iso-
lated house occupies the middle of the plain, in ruins,
they say, due to American bombing three months ago.
The house is about 1.8 kilometers away from the zig-
gurat. There’s an electricity plant 3km away. The strike
against the house might be another example of Ameri-
can not-so-smart bombing. Or maybe someone in the
Pentagon believes the ziggurat is a cover for a weapons
of mass destruction site.
There’s no need of a letter of authorization from a “di-
rector” to visit the pyramids in Egypt, Palmyra in Syria
or Petra in Jordan. But in Iraq, even historical mon-
uments are a matter of national security. There’s a lot
of visible military activity around Ur. On the highway
from Nassiriya to Basra, there’s a military post every
20km, with a single soldier equipped with the same
rattled Kalashnikov: not exactly a match for the F-16s.
Basra – from where Sinbad sailed to Legend – is in
the heart of oil country. Iraq literally floats over oil.
One liter of gas costs only 20 Iraqi dinars (500 Iraqi
dinars equals 40 US cents). Twenty-five liters of gas is
the same price as a 1.5-liter bottle of Furat, a brand of
mineral water from Baghdad.
But Basra is not Dallas. Desperadoes and their kids
roam the streets. The foul smell of rotten meat is per-
94   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
vasive. Trash is piled up everywhere. The odd foreign-
er, Ukrainian or Algerian, works in the spare parts an official guide from the Ministry of Information in Education. The justification for all this: “We are sur-
business related to the oil industry, and drowns his Baghdad. But this official guide is little more than a rounded by enemy countries” (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait
tourist in Basra. One needs a specialized Basra guide. and most of all Iran).
malaise in “cabarets” straight out of a Fellini movie.
Depending on the occasion – a visit to a hospital, a
At the level of the ordinary citizen, Iraq works Iraq officially ends about 20km south of Basra. There
visit to a mosque, a visit to the Kuwait border – an-
through a logic of secrecy and fear. It’s sometimes pos- are only two guards on the Iraqi side of the border, a
other guide guides the Basra guide. One is soon in the
barrier, a small billboard in Arabic, and a “Stop” sign in
sible to learn from a bazaar merchant or from a teacher surreal situation of being a single foreigner surrounded
Arabic and English. On the other side of an absolute-
doubling as a taxi driver that the regime fears the pos- by a horde of minders, like a rapper or a mafia don.
ly void 1km no man’s land between Iraq and Kuwait
sibility of Israel exporting its “repression” to Iraq. It’s
Basra guides are particularly effective in guiding one is the point where America decided to end the Gulf
very easy to get arrested in Iraq: one just has to go out
nowhere. Dr Jawad al-Ali is a consultant physician at War. To cross this no man’s land one needs to address
in the street unaccompanied and film or photograph
the Saddam Hospital. He is responsible for statistics a message to the International Committee of the Red
one of a plethora of Saddam Hussein portraits and
concerning patients with leukemia – caused, they say, by Cross, which is then relayed to the Ministry of Foreign
murals: Koranic Saddam, Artistic Saddam, Bedouin
American bombing with depleted uranium. Dr Ali man- Affairs. The reply might take weeks.
Saddam, Saladin Saddam, Rifle-toting Saddam.
ages to give us the address of a family with four cases of
Even trying to photograph a cinema lobby – full of On the outskirts of Basra, we find a former soldier
leukemia, living in a heavily bombed area near Basra.
posters of cheap American flicks – could be a one-way who fought the eight-year Iran-Iraq war. He is weary.
But the guide says a visit to the family is a no-go: we
ticket to jail: one is immediately thrown out by a “se- Most of his friends died in battle. He still carries a bul-
don’t have an authorization from the Ministry of Health.
let in his left shoulder. Looking at the smoke and fire
curity officer”. The bazaar merchant or the taxi driver
We go to a primary school, trying to check the state breathing from the oil and gas fields in the distance, he
will then tell us that every foreigner is under suspicion
of the educational system in southern Iraq. The guide decides not to mince his words: “The Arab world is not
of being a spy. To show the merits of Iraq – and they do
even knows the director of the school. But we cannot good. This government is no good. Before the war, Iraq
exist – is even harder because of this pervasive paranoia.
visit: we don’t have authorization from the Ministry of was good. Iran now is better.”
We try to find the representatives of a French
non-governmental organization (NGO), Medecins du
Monde (Doctors of the World), in Basra: there are only
two nurses, one French, one Dutch. We learn they are
“on vacation in Baghdad.” In Baghdad we were told
they were working in Basra, helping to rebuild and re-
equip hospitals.
At 16h30 practically every afternoon in Basra there’s a
siren. Then another at 17h30. The first day we are told
a “Kuwaiti civilian helicopter” violated Iraqi airspace.
It’s a joke, of course: the reality may be an incursion
by American F-16s. The next day – after another siren
– we learn from an official Basra guide that the last
American bombing was actually five months ago: “Mil-
itary installations,” he remarks. In Baghdad, officials
from the Ministry of Information swear the bombard-
ments happen every day. A comprehensive tour of
Basra reveals that the visible anti-aircraft artillery is
not capable of even shooting pigeons – not to mention
F-16s. So much for the myth – built by the Pentagon –
of the “fourth strongest army in the world.”
One cannot even go to a restaurant in Iraq without
FOREVER WARS   95
 A bronze statue of
Saddam Hussein
stands beside the
Saddam Tower in
Baghdad. Photo:
EyePress News /
EyePress via AFP

Ghosts
Saddam City is a dirty, derelict, depressing sleeping-bag city: during the day
everybody is out trying to make ends meet, in the formal or mostly the infor-
mal economy. Whenever there are siren calls announcing American bombing
raids, special police reinforcements are sent to Saddam City: the “system” takes
the possibility of a Shi’ite rebellion of the masses very seriously

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 18, 2002

BAGHDAD – “People here are afraid even of their Mrs Shukur, wearing black pants and an elegant blue
own shadow,” says the Ghost Man. He should know. blazer, is bewildered in front of a bilingual instruc-
He’s dead scared. tion panel telling Iraqis that they are allowed to leave
the country carrying only US$50 – roughly the rate
Saddam International Airport boasts its own VVIP
for one night at an Amman hotel. Mrs Shukur, Iraqi-
(very VIP) terminal – for government ministers, ruling
born, hadn’t been back since 1989. She stayed for only
Baath Party notables and high-roller traders profiting
10 days, attending the seventh conference under the
from the United Nations trade embargo. Mere mortals
official motto “Roots remain home wherever we are” –
use the Babylon terminal, the only one not idle among
during which, according to official government news-
others with suggestive names (Ninive, Samarra).
papers, “expatriates express support for their country’s
Saddam International – an impeccably neat and very legitimate demands.”
modern airport by developing-world standards – is
As an expatriate, secular, upper middle-class wom-
basically a green-and-white ghost town for most of the
an living in the United Arab Emirates, Mrs Shukur
day because of the embargo – it is fully equipped with
prefers to declare herself “shocked” – basically with
nowhere to go. International flights depart only to Am-
the resurgence of Islam in Iraq. “My cousin forces
man and Damascus, and domestic flights to Basra and
his nine-year-old daughters to go around wrapped
Mosul. The solitary midnight Royal Jordanian flight to
in veils.” She boards her plane to Amman with her
Amman barely alleviates the boredom of customs and
family decked out California-casual style, mumbling
security officials.
that her relatives in Baghdad have at least “somehow”

96   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    97

managed to survive.
Saddam International Tower is a ghost tower – ab-
solutely off-limits to any cameras. A Saddam Hussein
statue sits at the base of the tower, pointing to the sky
and surrounded by scraps of American missiles that
fell during the “Mother of All Battles.” On the top of
the tower there is a slowly revolving restaurant – abso-
lutely off-limits to 99 percent of the Iraqi population:
a tough steak costs 6,500 Iraqi dinars (about $3.50),
more than the average person will see in weeks. At
lunchtime in the middle of the week, the only busy
table was occupied by a delegation from the Russian
parliament.
From the top of Saddam Tower, Baghdad looks
like a Los Angeles suburb, with a lot more sand, and
mosques instead of gas stations. Less than a kilome-
ter from the tower lies the huge, gray, grim mass of
half-finished domes of the Al Rahman mosque, be-
ing built by the government. Mansions ranging from
$400,000 to $1 million apiece are visible closer to the
tower: this is the embassy quarter, and also home to
families lucky enough to bypass completely the hard-
ships caused by the trade embargo and the UN sanc-
tions.
The main reason for the strict no-photo policy lies
500 meters away – visible only from above, never from
street level: Saddam Hussein’s Islamic-high-tech pres-
idential palace. Entrances are far away from the main
building, all of them protected by heavily fortified
watchtowers.
Any other top-of-the-tower revolving restaurant on
the planet is an instant photo opportunity – but not in
Iraq: foreign spies might sell their snaps of the palace
to enemy security agencies. Instead, one can have one’s
photo taken beside a huge Saddam Hussein painting
and buy a “Made in China” doll at the tower shop. No
Saddam toys are on sale just yet.
Saddam City during the day is – what else – a ghost
city. Locals say it’s home to at least 4 million peo-
ple, which unofficially would compose 40 percent of
98   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
the population of Baghdad, roughly estimated at 10 Iraqi Oil Minister
million. Saddam City owes its name to a visit by the Amer Mohammed
Rashid speaks at a
president himself: the last of these visits was three press conference
years ago. in Baghdad in June
of 2002 about the
Saddam City is a dirty, derelict, depressing sleep- possibility that
Iraq may lower its
ing-bag city: during the day everybody is out trying to export of crude oil
make ends meet, in the formal or mostly the informal by the middle of
economy. That’s why locals say there is no unemploy- June because of
the United Nations
ment. Part of the city is off-limits even to locals: it’s pricing mechanism.
the realm of petty crime. Almost everybody is Shi’ite: Photo: Karim Sahib
most of their parents came to Baghdad from the south / AFP
in search of a better life. Whenever there are siren calls
announcing American bombing raids, special police
reinforcements are sent to Saddam City: the “system”
takes the possibility of a Shi’ite rebellion of the masses
very seriously.
Saddam City is where the Ghost Man lives. The Ghost
Man lives in fear. He fears the system, he fears the gov-
Using the oil weapon
ernment, he fears fear itself. In another land and under
different historical circumstances, he could have been
a contender. He is not a hollow man: he is educated, he
reads, he’s been to Europe. But the Ghost Man is a vic-
tim of every strike of bad luck – or Allah’s wrath – that For each barrel sold at around $18 – the price during the first two
has fallen over Iraq since the 1980s.
months of 2002 – Iraq actually only gets $6. Syria, for instance, can pay
The Ghost Man may live in Saddam City. But he’s $10 a barrel in cash. So the UN infernal machine obviously encourag-
never been to Saddam Tower. And there’s no point
going to Saddam Airport either because he cannot find
es smuggling. An unimpeachable source told Asia Times Online that
the money, or the connections, to board that precious the reason we did not get our visit to the oil fields and refineries in the
flight to Amman. So he keeps slouching around the south is that Basra is a base for Iranian smuggling boats
streets of Baghdad, chain-smoking, eating the odd
kebab, lucky to keep an odd job for a few weeks to feed
By PEPE ESCOBAR
his family of four.
APRIL 23, 2002
He may abhor “the system,” but he is too weary even
to try to fight back. He persistently asks whether the BAGHDAD – Three days after Saddam Hussein’s landmark April 8
Americans will attack again – as if it might be the coup speech which spelled out Iraq’s decision to halt exports of oil for one
de grace capable of relieving him from his misery. month, Minister of Oil Amir Muhamad Rasheed said this was in agree-
Paraphrasing Bob Dylan, he’s not busy being born, and ment with the official motto “Iraq and Palestine is one cause and trench
he’s not busy dying. But the Ghost Man of Saddam City to confront the joint foe represented by the US-Zionist administration.”
is not totally defeated. Not yet. Until then, he remains a The measure was supposed to “hurt the US economy and put pressure on
Dead Man Walking. the Zionist entity to withdraw from occupied Arab territories.”
According to Iraq’s Oil Ministry, the proportion of Iraqi crude import-
FOREVER WARS    99
ed by the US is between 10 percent and 15 percent,
“through a number of companies Iraq is dealing with.”
According to Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, Iraq is the
sixth largest oil supplier to the US. The ministry swears
the oil market has been affected by Iraq’s decision,
“because of the withdrawal of more than 2 million oil
barrels a day.” Oil sources in Jordan say that Iraq is
currently producing around 2.6 million barrels a day,
of which 2 million are exported: these account for 4
percent of internationally traded supplies.
According to the Iraqi oil minister, “The ugly crimes
perpetrated by the Zionist entity against Palestinians
will prevent OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries] states from increasing their pro-
duction.” He is right on this one. He also hopes OPEC
states “will adopt more active measures, decreasing or
halting oil exports, to support the Palestinian cause
and halt savage massacres.” On this one, he is wrong.
The massacres perpetrated by Israel’s army – already
being compared around the Arab world and in Chi-
na to the Holocaust – may have ceased, at least for a
while. But no OPEC member dared follow Iraq’s steps
to withdraw, even temporarily, from the oil market.
In another widely broadcast speech last week, titled
“Arabs shouldn’t submit to American-Zionist black-
mail” by Iraq Daily, Saddam emphasized that “all
means are legal to a people whose land is occupied”
and who are suffering from aggression. He says “Iraq
has stopped its oil flow for one month after it heard
from Iran its suggestion to halt oil flow for one month.
It is worthy that those who suggest something should
apply it.” Iran though, has not followed Iraq’s move.
Saddam also appreciates Iran’s suggestion that oil
countries should provide “one month of oil export
revenue out of twelve for the Palestinians.” His main
point is that when “America and the Zionist entity real-
ize that Arabs are supporting Palestinians in solidarity
with the region’s countries, including the neighbors of
Arabs, then it is as if we have sent armies to support
Palestinians.”
Asia Times Online was repeatedly assured by Iraqi
100   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
authorities in Europe and then in Baghdad that a visit
to oil industry installations in Basra or Kirkuk would
be approved. The oil minister was in principle in favor
of a face-to-face interview – “the next day.” On one of
these “next days” we finally learned that everything
was cancelled: the visits, of course, and even the pre-
agreed interview. It’s virtually impossible for a regime
like the Ba’ath Party’s to understand that this paranoia
about all foreign media certainly does not advance the
Iraqi cause.
No OPEC member country joined – or will join –
an oil embargo. Libya and Iran gave only rhetorical
support. They would join the embargo only if it were
backed by all Arab oil producers. Since the Gulf War,
the largest OPEC member, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait
have totally abandoned the use of oil as a political
weapon.
Oil prices did indeed rise, but only marginally (a dol-
lar or two), to around US$25 a barrel due to the Iraqi
move. Saudi Arabia (10 percent of world production),
Kuwait (2.6 percent) and the Emirates (2.7 percent)
have an enormous excess capacity of 6 million barrels
a day. They could easily step up their production to
compensate for the Iraqi loss. But they won’t. The Arab
street would never forgive them, after watching the de-
struction in Jenin, Ramallah and Bethlehem on al-Ja-
zeera or Abu Dhabi TV. After the Iraqi decision, US oil
giants which have contracts to import Iraqi oil took no
time to request extra supplies from Saudi Aramco: they
were all turned down.
Middle East oil analysts like Henry Azzam, from
Jordinvest, suggest that to put pressure on the US to
press Israel to behave in a civilized manner, “the best
strategy to follow is to keep the lid on oil production
in order to push oil prices higher.” An oil embargo
– although very unlikely – would be suicidal for the
Arab oil producers and hurt “the noble cause they are
defending.”
Fuel prices have already risen 20 percent since the
Israeli army started rampaging through the West Bank.
The Arab capitals know that if there ever was an oil
embargo, Israeli Prime Minister Sharon would be able
to say he is the one and only friend of the West in the
Middle East. And to top it all, history shows that the
1973 oil embargo did not work: Israel did not leave
Arab territories occupied in the 1973 war.
Oil prices certainly won’t go down after the Iraqi
decision or the failed, cartoonish coup d’etat against
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, which the US, embarrass-
ingly, was quick to endorse. Venezuela is the fourth
largest OPEC producer, and the world’s fourth largest
exporter (2 million barrels a day). It competes with
Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Canada as the leading oil
exporter to the US. American hawks certainly haven’t
forgotten that Chavez was one of the brains behind the
OPEC supply cuts that helped oil prices recover from
their very low $10 a barrel in 1998.
But the question remains: what is Iraq doing with all
these non-exported barrels of oil?
A thorough examination of the labyrinth of Iraqi oil
sales – documented or not, and subjected or not to the
UN “oil for food” program – yields … another laby-
rinth. But there’s no doubt Iraq will be trying to sell
and smuggle to its neighbors at least part of the oil not
available on the international market.
It is impossible to exactly ascertain how much oil Iraq
exported in the first months of 2002. The figure of 2
million barrels a day from Jordan oil sources is con-
tradicted by a figure of 1.7 million barrels a day from
industry sources in Southeast Asia. Tragic irony or not,
the US is itself Iraq’s main oil client: 74 percent of its
Iraqi imports come from Basra, and 36 percent from
Kirkuk – a total of no less than 700,000 barrels a day.
By comparison, it is fair to assume that at least 400,000
barrels a day are consumed internally in Iraq.
In the past few years since the implementation of the
United Nations’ “oil for food” program, 59 percent of
Iraqi revenues from oil sales went to an escrow account
in the Banque Nationale de Paris (BNP) in New York,
controlled by the UN. Only 13 percent of the money
actually went to Iraq. The Iraqis are trying harder and
harder to avoid using the UN-controlled (but in fact
US-controlled) BNP account. The Russians, mean-
while, are closing in: a crucial Russian delegation was
recently in Baghdad.
From Kirkuk, a pipeline carries oil to Turkey – at least
700,000 barrels a day. This pipeline is subject to Iraq’s
one-month embargo. But the bulk of Iraqi oil is usually
exported from Basra, by ship, to the Persian Gulf and
beyond: around 1.2 million barrels a day. So-called
“semi-legal” sales go to Jordan – as much as 200,000
barrels a day, transported by a serpent of tanker trucks
that use a special road parallel to the Baghdad-Jor-
dan border highway, and then a hairy Jordanian side
road. Fifty percent of this oil is practically “donated”
to Jordan at a huge discount. The UN Security Council
more or less tolerates the practice, because it alleviates
Jordanian economic problems.
The Iraqis’ biggest coup to date to escape the back-
breaking UN sanctions is an arrangement with Syria.
Hundreds of import contracts are on hold in New York
– blocked by the US and Britain. In the past six years,
Iraq had access to only 16 percent of the revenues of its
sales. But when the Iraq-Syria pipeline was reopened,
the UN allowed it, “as a test.” The “test” still goes on,
at a rhythm of 250,000 barrels a day. It’s a swap: Syria
exports its own oil.
For each barrel sold at around $18 – the price during
the first two months of 2002 – Iraq actually only gets
$6. Syria, for instance, can pay $10 a barrel in cash. So
the UN infernal machine obviously encourages smug-
gling. There is indeed a lot of smuggling – and not
only of oil. Between 40,000 and 100,000 barrels a day
float to the Gulf toward Dubai on small cargo ships.
An unimpeachable source told Asia Times Online that
the reason we did not get our visit to the oil fields and
refineries in the south is that Basra is a base for Iranian
smuggling boats. They sail at night from Iraq, carrying
no flag, and as soon as they are in international waters
they start displaying the Iranian flag. The days of the
Iran-Iraq war are long gone. Today Iran suggests an oil
embargo, Iraq applies it, and a lively smuggling inter-
change keeps on going between the two. Call it the axis
of business.
FOREVER WARS   101
 Iraqis take to the
streets with signs
calling for an Is-
lamic government
alone without a
Sunni or Shi’ite
focus. Photo: AFP

The Shi’ite factor

Iraqi Shi’ites cannot be kept politically marginalized because sooner
or later there will be a rebellion. Saddam and the Baath Party know it,
and they try to seduce the Shi’ite leadership with a few carrots – but
not real political say in the government. Washington perhaps has got
part of the picture: what it hasn’t got is the impossibility of sponsoring
Shi’ites in a rebellion against the government: these people consider
themselves most of all Iraqis, and would never accept American help

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 25, 2002

KUFA and NAJAF – The future of Iraq itself depends on the resolu-
tion of the Shi’ite problem. Nearly 70% of the Arab population of Iraq is
Shi’ite, but they have always been a political minority to the Sunnis.
Kufa, founded in AD 638 under caliph Omar, is the birthplace of the
Shi’ite faith – and also where Arab calligraphy was perfected into the
102   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    103
splendid Kufic style. Ali, Prophet Muhamad’s brother-
in-law, the fourth caliph and first imam, was mortally
wounded in the Great Mosque in 658: his magnificent
mausoleum is in neighboring Najaf – Islam’s fourth
sacred city after Mecca, Medina and Al Quds (Jerusa-
lem).
It’s not easy for a foreigner – even accompanied by
the requisite Ministry of Information guide – to get
inside the Kufa mosque. An angry crowd repeats “it’s
prohibited to infidels.” What’s the solution, then? “To
become a Muslim. Allah prefers Islam.” Muhamad
Abdel Saheb, from the ministry’s protocol department,
intervenes to solve the problem and allow access.
According to Saheb, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein
makes “donations” to help the maintenance of the
mosque – which are then distributed among hundreds
of workers. Pilgrims are everywhere – straight out of
a mass of tour buses. Saheb explains that for Shi’ite
pilgrims living in the Gulf, no visa is necessary. But
Iranians are allowed only on a seven-day Iraqi visa –
enough for them to tour the holy places. At any given
time, at least 8,000 Iranian pilgrims are doing the reli-
gious circuit in Baghdad, Kufa and Najaf.
Saheb’s discourse is the standard Shi’ite one to be
heard all over Iraq. He says that “most of all, I am
Iraqi, and also a Muslim. Here there is no difference
between Shi’ite and Sunni. The difference was imposed
by the Zionists. Of course, we are members of the Arab
Nation. And we are also known for our courage. Our
force comes from Allah.”
He is not afraid of a new American attack, “The
Americans are enemies of humanity.” He laughs at the
mention of the axis of evil. “The Americans want to
dominate the whole world.” And he has a few words
to say about Osama bin Laden, “Even if he did it, the
Americans had no right to bomb Afghanistan. He is an
Arab. The whole thing is about oil.”
The great Moroccan voyager Ibn Battuta wrote in the
14th century that Ali’s tomb in Najaf was on a road
right beside the tombs of Adam and Noah. Today, the
tombs are housed in a magnificent mausoleum at the
104   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Al Rawdah Al Haidaria Al Mukadasa mosque – one of
the most splendid all over Islam, evoking the intoxi-
cating atmosphere of mosques in Samarkand, Isfahan
or the Ummayad mosque in Damascus. Ayatollah
Khomeini lived as a refugee in Najaf – the top Shi’ite
religious center – between 1965 and 1978. The current
imam – Dr Haider Muhamad Hassan Alkelydar – does
not remember the ayatollah very well, he was too
young. Dr Haider is the ninth imam in a 200-year-old
religious family.
At his office, looking through a large window at a
seemingly endless, hypnotizing procession of wom-
en in black contrasting with the shiny white floor, Dr
Haider swears that there is no official discrimination
against Shi’ites. He points out that the governor of
Najaf is Shi’ite. Saddam Hussein himself came to the
mosque a few times: in fact, there is a striking ceramic
portrait of a praying president, close to the entrance to
the tombs.
The imam confirms the existence of jihad training
camps near Najaf – not to fight the government, but
Israelis oppressing Palestinians. As well as Saheb in
Kufa, he confirms, “We are waiting for a sign from the
president to declare a jihad. Everywhere in Iraq people
are ready – they have received military training.” The
majority of these jihadi trainees in Najaf are of course
Shi’ite. But the camps are absolutely off-limits for
foreign visitors. Later in Baghdad, Asia Times Online,
after repeated requests, received a definitive “no” from
the Ministry of Information.
To understand the importance of the Shi’ite factor, it
is essential to remember how contemporary Iraq is a
“made in Britain” affair. Immediately after Sykes-Picot
– representing an Anglo-French colonial entente –
divided the Ottoman Empire, London in 1920 grouped
three regions – around Baghdad, Basra and Mosul –
into a country under British “mandate.” To govern this
country, London placed the Hashemite dynasty, which
had already been chased out from Saudi Arabia by the
Saudis, and from Syria by the French.
This 1920s Iraq offered the British Empire very
important advantages. It had oil fields, and because
the British wanted to build a transcontinental railroad
from Europe, across Turkey, and down through Iraq to
Kuwait on the Persian Gulf, this railroad would allow
a direct trade route with India without having to skirt
Africa.
This “made in Britain” Iraq more or less united
Shi’ites from Lower Mesopotamia, Sunni regions
around Baghdad and Kurd regions around Mosul –
which in the beginning were French-controlled: but
French premier Georges Clemenceau did not know
they were oil-rich, and the British got them. Political-
ly, from the beginning, the Sunnis were the dominant
power – and the Shi’ites the dominated: the same
status quo that had existed during centuries of the
Ottoman Empire.
So whatever the dominant power – Ottomans, Hash-
emites, British, lay, and finally the Baath Party – the
Shi’ites, the majority of the population, have always
remained politically inferior.
The Baath Party, and then Saddam Hussein, have
always had a very straightforward policy towards the
Shi’ite majority. The aim of this political elite – mem-
bers of the generation of the 1958 revolution which
ended the monarchy – was to create a strong nation:
Iraq. Iraq had everything it took to become a regional
power: millions of people, lots of oil and – a blessing
for an Arab country – lots of water, thanks to the Tigris
and Euphrates rivers.
So Iraq had to become a modern, Arab and secular
nation. The political elite’s imperative was to destroy
any alternative manifestation of religious and ethnic
power – such as Kurd nationalism in the north and the
Shi’ite majority communalism in the south and even
the Madan (Marsh Arabs) .
The victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979
was a tremendous blow for Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s
recurrent nightmare at the beginning of the 1980s was
Shi’ite Iran dismembering Iraq into three different
countries: Kurd, Sunni and Shi’ite. This nightmare
was one of the driving factors of the eight-year Iran-
Iraq war that began in 1980, during which the West,
especially the US, relished occupying the best ringside
seats.
Saddam Hussein thought that Iran would attack first,
so he pre-empted by using the pretext of getting back
the regions of Iranian Khuzistan – which the Iraqis call
Arabistan. Arabistan is basically populated by Arab
tribes: the majority are Shi’ite. So Saddam Hussein –
under the banner of Arab nationalism and under the
pretext of rectifying an unjust borderline – went to war
to destroy the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Irani-
ans destroyed Iraq.
As far as the Shi’ite factor is concerned, the crucial
fact in the war was that Iran did not manage to coax
Iraqi Shi’ites into destabilizing the Baath Party regime.
As everyone knows, the war was technically a draw.
But internally in Iraq, the Baath Party accomplished a
tremendous victory: the integration of all its commu-
nities into a strong Arab nationalist state.
The Shi’ite factor is also crucial to explain why the
armies of George Bush Senior did not go all the way
to Baghdad in 1991. The US assumed that Iraq might
implode. A Kurd country might spring up in the north.
And most of all, a second Shi’ite Islamic Republic
might spring up in the south, allied in a sense to Iran,
and right on the spot of the all-important oil fields.
At the end of the Gulf War, the Shi’ite masses in
southern Iraq did rebel anyway. Saddam Hussein’s
repression was absolutely devastating. Western apol-
ogists of “human rights” looked the other way. More
than 40,000 people were killed and hundreds of thou-
sands of Arab Shi’ites had to become refugees in neigh-
boring Iran. The aftermath of the Gulf War reveals how
the Shi’ite factor is the heart of the matter in Iraq.
The miserable masses of the south are overwhelming-
ly Shi’ite. They have been the main victims of the UN
embargo and sanctions. There is absolutely no visible
evidence in southern Iraq that they would support
an American-induced rebellion against the regime in
Baghdad – as some supremely disinformed Washing-
ton hawks would have it. But there is also some invisi-
ble evidence that they would do anything to get rid of
FOREVER WARS   105
Saddam Hussein and the Baath Party.
The imam of the lavish Masjid Al Musaoi al Kabir, in
Basra – a private mosque financed by a high-ranking
Shi’ite leader of Saudi Arabian origin – is very happy
about the resurgence of Islam in Iraq. “Yes, people now
are turning to religion. They have suffered so much –
after the Iran-Iraq war, the Mother of all Battles [the
Gulf War], and the embargo.” He refuses to admit
Shi’ites are oppressed.
But some locals – members of the Shi’ite miserable
masses – and willing to talk to foreigners after a lot of
persuasion, finally admit that they “hate the king” (as
Saddam is referred to), although they hate the Amer-
icans even more for taking away “our jobs, our clean
106   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
water, our medicine and the future of our children.” Pashtun tribals
raise their hands in
Iraqi Shi’ites cannot be kept politically marginalized support of former
because sooner or later there will be a rebellion: the Afghanistan King
Zahir Shah during a
government is even afraid of Saddam city, the Baghdad gathering in Quetta
neighborhood. Saddam and the Baath Party know it, in 2001. Photo: AFP
and they try to seduce the Shi’ite leadership with a few
carrots – but not real political say in the government.
Washington perhaps has got part of the picture: what it
hasn’t got is the impossibility of sponsoring Shi’ites in a
rebellion against the government: these people con-
sider themselves most of all Iraqis, and would never
accept American help. So the US prefers the status quo:
Saddam in power, always menaced by America, and
always having to look behind his back in fear of Shi’ite
instability.
Tribal land, Taliban land
Reached on a satellite telephone through an elaborate series of go-be-
tweens, the former deputy chief of Taliban intelligence confirmed that
he and ‘several thousand Taliban commanders and troops’ were now
deeply involved in organizing a guerrilla war through which, ‘Allah
willing, we will throw the foreigners out of our country’
By PEPE ESCOBAR
AUGUST 27, 2002
PESHAWAR – He used to wear a black turban, khol (eyeliner) and a bat-
tered brown shalwar kameez (knee length tunic and loose pants). He sport-
ed a very long beard, carried a Kalashnikov and rode a Toyota pick-up.
He now wears a small white round cap and a light cream-colored shal-
war kameez. His face is clean-shaven, he is unarmed and he moves by
rickshaw or public bus. He is the same man. Yesterday he was a Talib. To-
day he is a nondescript tribal in Peshawar, Kohat or even Miram Shah – a
rugged frontier Pakistani town swarming with American special forces.
FOREVER WARS    107
 Or he is one of the top men being hunted down by
these forces, such as Mullah Taj Mohammed, former
deputy chief of intelligence of the Taliban. During the
regime’s five years in power in Afghanistan, he was one
of the selected few with full access to Taliban leader
Mullah Omar in Kandahar, and a self-proclaimed
“close friend” of Osama bin Laden.
Reached on a satellite telephone through an elabo-
rate series of go-betweens, Taj Mohammed confirmed
that he and “several thousand Taliban commanders
and troops” were now deeply involved in organizing
a guerrilla war through which, “Allah willing, we will
throw the foreigners out of our country.”
Taj Mohammed may have been one of the most il-
lustrious Taliban who looted and fled Kabul on Sun-
day, November 10 last year, the day before Northern
Alliance troops entered the city in triumph. Taj, with
other Taliban commanders and, he says, “thousands”
of soldiers, went southeast and crossed the border
to Pakistan east of Khost – probably to Miram Shah.
He confirms that “a few thousand” Taliban held the
ground against US-led forces in the Tora Bora moun-
tains in December, alongside Arabs from al-Qaeda,
but most managed to escape. Taj himself came back to
Afghanistan in March, where he says he fought against
the Americans at Shah-e-Kot, near Khost.
To wage a guerrilla war foretold since last Decem-
ber, the Taliban can count on the full support of the
Pashtuns in their tribal belt in south and southeastern
Afghanistan – where everybody and his neighbor
deeply resents the Tajik stranglehold on Hamid Kar-
zai’s government in Kabul, not to mention American
military movements and constant incursions into
Pashtun areas. Faithful to the Pashtun warrior code,
Taj Mohammed and other commanders swear they
fear neither American forces nor the Pakistani military.
Other Afghan Pashtun sources confirm the undercov-
er Taliban are still following instructions delivered by
Mullah Omar himself. At the beginning of the Amer-
ican bombing of Afghanistan last October, Mullah
Omar said that the Taliban and Afghans had weapons
to fight foreign invaders for another 100 years. The
108   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Taliban have already devised their guerrilla strategy
– with a crucial input from their former top military
commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani, and they may have
already elected another leader in the event of Mullah
Omar being found and “smoked out” by the Ameri-
cans.
Some reliable Pashtun sources in Peshawar swear
that Mullah Omar is not holed up in the mountains of
Uruzgan, north of Kandahar province, but in Kunar
province, not far from the Chitral Valley on the Pa-
kistani side of the border. Only a few hours before
General Tommy Franks – head of the US Central
Command – arrived last Sunday at Bagram air base in
Afghanistan, US soldiers came under Taliban rocket
fire near Asadabad, in southern Kunar.
As early as last June a fatwa against the American
military forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan was cir-
culating in Peshawar, issued by the notorious fugitive
Pashtun leader Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former ul-
tra-hardcore mujahideen and Afghan premier, calling
for a “new jihad against the foreign invaders.” Accord-
ing to privileged Pashtun sources, Hekmatyar is also
hidden in Kunar province, where he has access to “an
unlimited amount of weapons.”
Hekmatyar’s jihad call has been echoed by none other
than Osama bin Laden in a handwritten letter posted
this past Sunday on the website IslamOnline.net. The
letter – which according to the site was written a few
weeks ago – was received by a Pakistani correspondent
from an Afghan source. It is signed “Abi Abdallah”
– “the father of Abdallah,” the name of bin Laden’s
elder son. The jihad calls confirm that the Americans
in Afghanistan face a guerrilla coalition of remaining
al-Qaeda, Taliban and Hekmatyar’s Pashtun followers,
which should not be underestimated at any cost.
Military sources in Peshawar remain confident that
the operations against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as far
as the Pakistani side of the border is concerned, will be
successful because of a key strategic switch: now the
Pakistani commandos are no longer working along-
side FBI or American special forces. The government’s
position is that Pakistani commandos and paramilitary
forces acting alone are receiving more tribal cooper-
ation – citing as evidence the situation in North and
South Waziristan, ultra-hardcore tribal areas very close
to the Taliban.
Part of the new intelligence strategy is to recruit chil-
dren for 200 rupees a day (a little more than US$3) to
find people who were or who had harbored al-Qaeda
and Taliban fighters. Some tribal leaders, like Malik
Mamoor Khan, chief of the Toorikhel tribe, are saying
that “siding with al-Qaeda or the Taliban may hurt our
own interests.” And others, like Malik Tooti Gul, chief
of the Daryakhel tribe, remark that “if we don’t back
the government against al-Qaeda, our freedom will be
taken away from us.” All this may be only pro-forma,
because tribal leaders simply cannot afford to ignore
the overwhelming popular perception of the Amer-
icans as an invading force which totally controls the
Pakistani military.
The main worries for the average tribal in Pesha-
war or elsewhere in the Northwest Frontier Province
(NWFP) are far from being the Taliban regrouping
or the whereabouts of bin Laden. An influential local
player observes that “even average people now think
that America wants to fight and finish with Islam in
this part of the world, starting with Pakistan.” There is
plenty of resentment against President General Pervez
Musharraf, his blind following of US priorities in the
war against terrorism, and his latest alleged rigging of
the forthcoming October 10 elections. The resentment
is not necessarily expressed in political language, but
in comments like “Why doesn’t Musharraf ask the US
to finish poverty in Pakistan?” A Peshawar analyst
says that the population is extremely frustrated: “They
are even attacking the police because they have been
constantly harassed.” Peshawar’s police department is
notoriously corrupt, even by Pakistani standards.
On the political front, many are saying that the
only hope is to vote for the Mutahida Majlis-e-Amal
(MMA), a coalition of six religious parties which will
contest the October elections. MMA’s secretary-gen-
eral is the notorious Fazlur Rehman, chief of his own
faction of the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI), which had
and still has extremely close ties with the Taliban.
From his headquarters at Dera Ismail Khan, Fazlur
Rehman keeps doubting the impartiality of the Octo-
ber elections, but he assures that the MMA is engaged
in bringing “a social, mental, economic and political
revolution” into Pakistan. And he warns that in the
event of the MMA coming to power, it would finish
with “foreign interference,” devolve real sovereignty to
the country and combat unemployment.
Other leaders? Their rhetoric is more incendiary.
Maulana Samiul Haq, chief of his own faction of
the JUI and also one of the leaders of the MMA, has
warned from Haqqania – his sprawling and wealthy
madrassa (religious school) that educated most of the
Taliban elite – that “the West is in a pact with the en-
emies of Muslims all over the world.” For Samiul Haq,
“One billion Muslims will become a military force
because of these policies.”
Qazi Hussain Ahmad, chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami,
has been more moderate, concentrating his attacks on
Musharraf, whom he accuses of “imposing constitu-
tional amendments at gunpoint” – an act that “remind-
ed him of the age of Genghis Khan.”
The overall sentiment in Peshawar is that Musharraf
will rig the October elections to a point where, accord-
ing to an influential local player, “he can say that the
MMA has no popular support, and then he can move
to smash the religious parties for good.” If that is the
case, Taliban support will be unbeatable in the Pashtun
tribal belt – on both sides of the border.
FOREVER WARS   109
 Osama bin Laden in
a television screen
grab from June of
1999. Photo: AFP

Osama is in Kunar,
but the US can’t get him
Al-Qaeda has been getting very cozy with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the ultra
hardline Pashtun mujahideen and former prime minister who devastated his own
capital, Kabul, with rockets in mid-1992. In early August a key meeting took place
in eastern Afghanistan. Every intelligence service on the planet is now scrambling
like mad to find out exactly who else was there. Perhaps Osama bin Laden himself

By PEPE ESCOBAR
AUGUST 29, 2002

PESHAWAR – Al-Qaeda, “the base,” is now extinct. Al-Qaeda has a

brand new name: Fath-e-Islam (Victory of Islam). And Fath-e-Islam’s
leader, none other than Osama bin Laden, is very much alive. But not
anymore in Pakistan. Osama has returned to Afghanistan. More precisely,
the Kunar province.

110   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    111

 Key players in the ultra-complex Pakistan-Afghani-
stan game had been saying that since the fall of Kabul
in November 2001 that “the last battle” in this ongoing
war would be in Kunar. The scenario now seems more
than likely. The Taliban and the rebranded al-Qaeda
have full tribal support in Kunar – where everybody
seems to know someone who died from the American
bombing of Afghanistan. A Pashtun notable puts the
issue succinctly, “If the Americans are serious about
grabbing Osama, they will have to put up a fight. On
the ground. Man to man. There will be a lot of body
bags.”
On August 10, the Daily Ummat, the number one Ur-
du-language paper in the Pakistani port city of Kara-
chi, published a front-page story filed from Asadabad,
Afghanistan (the capital of Kunar). The story did not
appear in other Pakistani English-language papers, nor
in the international media, for that matter.
The story was headlined “Osama spotted in Pakistani
area – Dir.” Dir, in the northern strip of the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) is about 80 kilometers from
the Afghan border in Kunar province. The story also
said that Ayman al-Zawahiri, aka “The Surgeon,” was
reorganizing al-Qaeda something like 50 kilometers
west of Chitral. Chitral, north of Dir, is at the base of
the Hindu Kush mountains.
The story was essentially quoting an Afghan defense
ministry source – that is, a source close to the power-
ful Northern Alliance commander and now Defense
Minister Mohammed Fahim in Kabul. Pashtuns and
even Tajiks (Fahim is Tajik) comment that in the cur-
rent scenario, “the Americans in Kabul cannot control
Fahim – well, maybe 10 percent of him,” according to
a Pakistan-Afghanistan insider. Anyway, American
military sources, according to the story, were “fearing
al-Qaeda may launch full-scale activity in the coming
few weeks or months,” starting with an attack in east-
ern Afghanistan.
According to the Afghan defense ministry, al-Qaeda
– or Fath-e-Islam – has reorganized and has estab-
lished training centers in Pakistan; it is trying to get
hold of surface-to-air missiles from China; and will
112   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
launch a series of attacks against the Afghan govern-
ment. The Afghans add that the Americans believe that
these two al-Qaeda training centers enjoy cooperation
from China. One of them is identified as being 140
kilometers north of Gilgit – the capital of the Pakistani
northern areas – in an area called Markash, close to the
Chinese border.
The story gets some of the facts right. Al-Qaeda has,
indeed, been in touch with Hezb-e-Islami (the Islamic
Party founded in 1975) and has been assured of the
cooperation of its volatile leader, Gulbuddin Hekmat-
yar, the ultra hardline Pashtun mujahideen and former
prime minister who devastated his own capital, Ka-
bul, with rockets in mid-1992. And al-Qaeda has also
extended its network of informers in Asadabad, the
capital of Kunar, capitalizing on the unrest the Ameri-
can presence is causing all over the Pashtun tribal belt.
But a key Pashtun source – who required anonym-
ity – fluent in Pashto, Dari, Urdu and English and
acquainted with all the major players in the complex
Afghanistan-Pakistan new great game, identifies not
a few but a whole collection of holes in the story.
Let’s call him Haji S. For starters, Haji S dismisses the
notion of an al-Qaeda training center in northern
Pakistan near China: “This region simply does not
accept foreigners. People speak only local languages,
like Balti or Brushiski.” He points to Afghan-Ameri-
can disinformation trying somehow to involve China,
“The Chinese are being accused of harboring terrorists
and selling weapons to al-Qaeda. This is serious. The
Chinese know they are being encircled.”
As far as the sheik with a US$25 million price tag on
his head is concerned, Haji S is adamant: “Osama bin
Laden would never have crossed that border. Pakistan
has extensive military forces there – in the constabu-
lary, the Bajaur Scouts, paramilitary forces. And now,
whatever the Pakistani army knows, is immediately
shared with the FBI.”
This means, according to Haji S, only one thing: bin
Laden and the Fath-e-Islam leadership are themselves
based in Kunar. “The Americans know it, of course.
But they simply cannot get into Kunar. It is full of
mountains and the area is religiously ultra-conserva- and Western – public opinion to digest the fact that
tive, and 100 percent pro-Taliban. these soldiers are being sent on futile missions, and
some in the process are being killed for it. But a lot of
Another Pashtun source confirms the analysis of
information about the war simply does not travel – or
Haji S: “Americans in Kabul are scared. They get bad
is edited out by the Western media. Veterans of the
information all the time. They don’t understand that
jihad against the Soviets in the 1980s remember that
Afghans take the money today and forget about it to-
loads of Russian equipment used to be available in
morrow. The Americans came too early, they didn’t do
the bazaars of Quetta and Peshawar in Pakistan. Now
their homework.”
anybody can buy night-vision devices, brand new
American forces in Afghanistan to date seem to have M-16s, fireproof jackets and trekking boots. Where? In
followed a pattern of highly-publicized operations in the bazaar in Miram Shah, in the NWFP, close to the
the wrong places. The latest example happened this Afghani Paktia province, where the Americans have
past weekend, when hundreds of Special Forces backed a base. The goods are all-American, captured from
by helicopter gunships and planes, and with the help American casualties.
of Afghan government units, encircled the village of
Pashtuns swear that American casualties are mount-
Tani, south of Khost, and also advanced to Zormat, the
ing, although for the Pentagon they don’t exist. Differ-
biggest district of Paktia province – an area where an-
ent sources in Peshawar and Islamabad confirm there
ti-American sentiment is as extreme as anywhere else
are American casualties every week. Even now in the
in the Pashtun belt. Locals hate the Northern Alliance’s
tribal areas there is a lot of talk on what happened in
grip on Hamid Karzai’s government in Kabul. Zormat
Helmand province last December – when 200 Amer-
is near the area of the huge Operation Anaconda last
icans were surrounded in a valley by only 37 Taliban,
March – the biggest US offensive in the war so far.
and many were slaughtered, with some beheaded. A
Anaconda was basically a failure: most Taliban and
humble porter of Shaheen Cargo confirmed the story
al-Qaeda fighters managed to escape to the NWFP.
at the time: he complained that his shoulders were sore
This time in Zormat, the Americans carried house-to- because he had spent the night carrying coffins to a
house searches and apprehended a few guns – nothing transport plane.
extraordinary as any tribal Pashtun male has been
If American forces venture into Kunar they will be
carrying a gun for centuries. Basically, the Americans
against tremendous odds. Kashmir Khan – the most
found no Taliban and no al-Qaeda. The escape pattern
powerful Hezb-e-Islami commander – keeps his base
is always the same: Taliban and al-Qaeda – in this last
in the mountains of Kunar. Haji S says that “even the
case Chechens – are tipped off by local tribals, hide in
Taliban at the time did not disturb him. He is not
the mountains or melt into the local population, cross
interested in ideology or politics. He is interested in
to the NWFP, and then return.
power.” This also means that Kashmir Khan is unbrib-
The commander of the 3rd Brigade Task Force of the able by the Americans.
82nd Airborne Division, James Huggins, was forced to
Before the Taliban came to power, adds Haji S, “the
admit the failure of this operation in Zormat: “It was
provinces of Nangarhar and Kunar were the stron-
clear to me there was advance warning at each of the
gest and most fortified hubs of the Hezb-e-Islami.
sites we went to.” The “advance warning” always comes
They were captured from the Soviets. And of course
from the local population and even from warlords
Hekmatyar himself is in Kunar.” Hekmatyar allegedly
whose alliances lie with suitcases full of dollars, not
still controls 80-odd Stinger missiles – another major
with the American agenda.
reason preventing an American attack.
It may be totally un-Hollywoodish for American –
For Haji S, the notion that the Pakistani military
FOREVER WARS   113
would know about the presence of al-Qaeda in Dir and
Chitral and do nothing about it is nonsense: “Either
the military are conniving with al-Qaeda, which of
course is impossible: or they are helpless, which is not
the case, not with [Pakistan President General Pervez]
Musharraf acting as such a good pal of Bush’s.” General
Tommy Franks, the head of the US Central Command,
said at Bagram air base in Afghanistan last Sunday that
the war on terror needed to be expanded to the coun-
tries neighboring Afghanistan. Pashtun insiders inter-
pret this as an admission of failure to find the Taliban
and al-Qaeda where they really are: in Kunar.
The Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman, the ex-
tremely able diplomat Aziz Khan, took no time to
reply to Franks: there’s no reason for the US to enter
Pakistan to look for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. When
asked how Pakistan would act if the US made a formal
request for American troops to cross to Pakistan to
go after terrorists, Aziz Khan was unflappable, “Why
should we suppose that the US would make such a
request now that we are at the fag end of the exercise.”
There’s the rub. This may be the “fag end” from the
Pakistani perspective, but American generals from
Tommy Franks down are now increasingly talking of
staying in Afghanistan “for years.” In Afghanistan, and
of course in Pakistan as well, where America is operat-
ing its own air bases, in strategic Baluchistan.
The key player to watch in the next few moves in
the game is “Engineer” Hekmatyar – as he is known
in Afghanistan. The man is back with a vengeance.
It is important to remember that during the jihad in
the 1980s he always placed the long-term goal of an
Islamic revolution above resistance to the Soviets.
And during the Taliban rule starting in 1996 he was
patiently waiting for an opening in self-imposed exile
in Iran. Haji S insists that Hekmatyar has access to “an
114   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
unlimited amount of weapons.” “And despite the oppo- A crowd waits in
sition of Hamid Karzai and the Americans, he had 319 front of the Bagh
Tar cinema in
members in the loya jirga [grand council] in June [that Kabul in Novem-
finalized the current government in Kabul] and he ber of 2001. The
controls four loyal governors. He has installed his own city’s most famous
theater, reopened
governor even in Kunduz.” Hekmatyar is a Kharruti after a five-year
Pashtun who comes from a family of traders settled in closure imposed
a district of Kunduz, in the predominantly Tajik north- by the Taliban
regime. Thousands
ern Afghan plains. came out to see the
Afghan-produced
According to Haji S, Hekmatyar’s first move in a ‘Afghan Attack,’ a
showdown against the Karzai government could be to movie telling the
fight of the Afghan
block Sarobi, a religiously hardcore strategic bottle-
people with the
neck on the Jalalabad-Kabul road. And that would be Soviet army. Photo:
only the beginning. Haji S adds that a few weeks ago AFP
Hekmatyar said strictly off the record that “Americans
won’t be here [in Afghanistan] in one-and-a-half years.
Two years will be the maximum.” Tommy Franks may
not be aware of these plans.
Kabul: Rocking, rolling and
Another top intelligence source revealed to Asia
Times Online that in the beginning of August a key
meeting took place in eastern Afghanistan – more
‘carpet-bombing’
exactly in Kunar. The importance of this meeting can
be attested by two subsequent visits to Islamabad this
week: US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage,
next Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Abdullah Abdul-
lah. They did not visit Islamabad just to talk about the Kabul rocks – and rolls. Now there are parties – apparently – every week.
easing of Indian-Pakistan tensions or the situation of ‘Everything is flown in from Russia by helicopter – caviar, champagne and the
Afghan prisoners in Pakistani jails.
women,’ proclaims an insider. George W Bush said that 2002 would be ‘a year of
It is known for sure Hekmatyar was one of the key
war.’ The new Iraqi war is coming, while the new Afghan war is far from over
guests at the Kunar meeting. Every intelligence service
on the planet is now scrambling like mad to find out
exactly who else was there – and what was decided. By PEPE ESCOBAR
If they had the answers, they would indubitably un- SEPTEMBER 4, 2002
veil the road map for the next two years in the South
Asia-Central Asia new great game. KABUL – The rooftop at Mustapha’s is arguably the coolest place in
post-Taliban, foreign-policed Kabul. Mustapha is basically a safe house
for United Nations personnel, NGO staff and the odd Afghan-American
returnee. At the end of a hot, dusty, exhausting day dodging mesmeriz-
ing traffic jams of taxis, buses, donkey carts and Toyota Land Cruisers
belonging to every imaginable humanitarian agency or NGO on earth,
to feel the breeze at Mustapha’s rooftop contemplating the stars and the
mountains is the closest to peace one can aspire to in troubled Kabul.
FOREVER WARS    115
 There are signs of a new life everywhere. Foreign Of-
fice staff proudly display their brand new Transitional
Islamic State of Afghanistan stationery – the country’s
third appellation in a year. There’s an internet cafe
in the basement of that derelict modernist pearl, the
Intercontinental Hotel, terribly expensive by Afghan
standards (US$5 an hour), when late last year the sole
tattered battery of the sole battered satellite phone in
the lobby was dead on an everyday basis.
Ariana Afghan Airlines is flying again – to the delight
of its heroic technical advisor, Feda Fedawi. The Cin-
ema Bakthar is doing a roaring business with Indian
flicks. There’s a video shop with the latest Bollywood
specials in every corner. There are many more bur-
qa-less women and many more female smiles – as
women are finally able to lead normal public lives again
without having to hide behind a veil. Spanish peace-
keeping soldiers armed to the teeth kill time during the
day hunting for souvenirs at impromptu street bazaars.
Greedy merchants in Chicken Street salute foreigners
disposed to shell out almost $100 for B-52 and Apache
helicopter-themed carpets, which add a new mean-
ing to the term “carpet bombing.” Kabul rocks – and
rolls. Now there are parties – apparently – every week.
“Everything is flown in from Russia by helicopter – cav-
iar, champagne and the women,” proclaims an insider.
Who gets to these parties? “The people you see driven
around on those huge 4X4s,” he notes evasively.
Some things never change, though. Nothing beats
the experience of entering a tea shop in the sprawling
Naderpashtun bazaar and watching a fabulous river
of humanity pass by. And armies of street kids are still
begging everywhere. At least 1.5 million refugees have
already trickled back home since the beginning of 2002
– mostly from Pakistan and Iran, only to find the same
dreadful catalogue of crippling poverty, shaky security
as close as 5 kilometers outside of Kabul, the still un-
disputed reign of the Kalashnikov culture, and – de-
spite a few hundred working schools – a literacy rate of
no more than 30 percent. Just like in Cambodia during
the UN jamboree 10 years ago, the sight of foreigners
with expense accounts ordering lasagna al fresco is not
exactly a sign of progress.
116   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
One question is essential: where is the money? There
may be signs of crippling poverty everywhere in Kabul,
but there’s a lot of money in the two money changing
markets. Anyone with a stack of afghanis ($1 = 40,000
afghanis) sits down on the sidewalk and gets to busi-
ness. Soon there will be a new afghani – equal to 1,000
old ones – with no pictures of Afghan heroes (just
like the euro) to avoid controversies among Pash-
tuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras, only with pictures
of mosques and historical monuments. Six different
versions of the afghani can still be found in the coun-
try: a lot of people still have problems identifying
the real thing from the fakes. “Dostum” afghanis are
everywhere – and are promptly rejected: the Russians
used to print special afghanis for Uzbek mega-warlord
Abdul Rashid Dostum.
It is widely suspected that Dostum’s people are now
plundering customs revenue in the north. According
to Mohamad Rahim, customs director in the province
of Balkh, more than 25 billion Afghans were collected
in the past 12 months just at Hayratan, a strategic river
port 30 kilometers from the Uzbek border. But the
government has not seen the color of money since July.
According to customs officials in Hayratan, gunmen
are showing up regularly to collect the revenues. One
of the officials says that “nothing happens in Hayratan
without Dostum’s permission.” There may be trading
and commerce money for the moneychangers, and
money collected at customs, but there’s certainly no
money to pay teachers. According to Mohammad Su-
booryar, deputy director of education in the province
of Ghor, teachers’ salaries have not been paid in more
than a year. The United Nations Development Program
(UNDP) is supposed to pay each teacher $40 a month,
but the money has “disappeared” somewhere in the
Byzantine Afghan banking system.
At the hyper-congested Ministry of Planning in
Kabul, Minister Mohamed Mohaqeq – a Hazara – is
desperate. Mohaqeq, a former military commander,
was one of the key leaders (along with Dostum) who
captured Mazar-I-Sharif from the Taliban last Novem-
ber. Today he denounces the fact that millions of dol-
lars in aid are being diverted out of the government’s
coffers by “well-connected people.” Because inter-gov-
ernmental dialogue is so fractious, Mohaqeq says that
the officials who should be in charge of aid distribution
have no voice, and the money disappears before getting
to the people in need. Afghanistan’s annual GDP per
capita remains $160. If you’re lucky enough to find a
job as a government employee, your salary will be $30
on average – or a maximum of $50. Mohaqeq says that
he knows people involved in reconstruction aid who
are getting their hands on as much as $15,000 a month.
He adds that there’s lavish spending in luxury goods
– like on those swinging underground “parties.” His
solution: all aid money should come through the
central government, most of all through his Ministry
of Planning. Well-positioned Afghan-Americans argue
that this would not do either as it reflects a Soviet-style
concept of central planning. They suggest that the
money should come directly to each concerned minis-
try – the whole process supervised by teams of West-
ern experts.
Meanwhile, the problems just accumulate. Donor
countries and a plethora of international organizations
have pledged $1.8 billion to Afghanistan in 2002 alone,
and a total of $4.5 billion over five years. The targets
this year are far from being met. On his recent visit to
Kabul, the UN special envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar
Brahimi, expressed what any average Afghan is now
beginning to understand: Brahimi would like to see a
fraction of the billions of dollars funding the Ameri-
can military machine spent on aid and development.
Afghan Education Minister Yunus Qanooni touched
on the same point, “If the international community
allocated only a small part of the budget it’s using to
fight terrorism and educated a new generation of Af-
ghans, that would be a great service.” Only 3 million of
the estimated 4.5 million Afghan children are now in
school. The shortage of teachers, buildings and teach-
ing materials is mind-boggling. At least 2,500 schools
need to be built. At least 3,500 schools need urgent
repair. According to the Education Ministry, the coun-
try needs only $874 million to rebuild its entire school
system until the end of 2003. But the money is still not
forthcoming.
The country more than ever depends on the good-
will of people such as Muhamad. He’s a Pashtun from
Kandahar married to a Hazara. He’s been 25 years out
of Afghanistan – first in Australia then in the US. Now
he describes himself as “a banker in Washington.” He’s
back to help – distributing school packets in the Haz-
arajat, or at the Lycee Malalai in Kabul. “You should
see the look in their eyes when they get their first pen,”
he says. Muhamad perfectly understands the menace
posed by powerful Afghan warlords as far as the coun-
try’s future is concerned, “They are always uneasy when
they have to deal with educated people. They only
understand military language. They are unfit to rule.”
Muhamad tells of very powerful Afghans working in
the background, close to King Zahir Shah’s family, who
have told him that they would leave Afghanistan again
if the situation did not change: namely, a new kind of
government strong enough to face the warlords.
The fact is the struggle between Afghans with a
modern view for the country like Muhamad and the
old mujahideen leaders is once again being won deci-
sively by the warlords – and these include, of course,
Northern Alliance warlord Mohamed Fahim, now the
powerful Defense Minister. It’s an open secret in Kabul
that Fahim is the man in charge, dwarfing the always
elegant but otherwise ineffective Hamid Karzai. Fa-
him, a Tajik from the Panjshir Valley, was an operative
of the political police during Najibullah’s communist
regime, and then directed the secret police of the
mujahideen governments from 1992 to 1996. He’s not
exactly a diplomat.
Afghans recently arrived from America or Europe
trying to help in the reconstruction of the country
say that they have the feeling of a clock turned back
to 10 years ago, to the mujahideen “governments”
that evolved into a civil war that practically destroyed
Kabul and created the conditions for the emergence
of the Taliban. The only argument of the warlords to
justify their preeminence is the usual “but we were the
ones who stayed here and fought the jihad” (against
the Soviets). Average Afghans, though, are tired of the
warlords’ grip on the country. Some of these warlords
even denounced Sima Samar, the minister for women’s
FOREVER WARS   117
affairs, as “Afghanistan’s Salman Rushdie.”
Hamid Karzai’s transitional government has so far
failed completely to enhance the power emanating
from Kabul and extend it to the provinces – for obvi-
ous reasons: Afghans everywhere outside of Kabul see
Karzai as “the man from America,” a weak president
who cannot go anywhere without his American body-
guards. Ismail Khan, the so-called “Emir of southwest
Afghanistan” who runs four provinces, and Abdul
Dostum, who runs crucial Mazar-i-Sharif in the north,
remain the lords of regional fiefdoms, and don’t give
a damn about Kabul. Pashtuns in the Pashtun belt are
secretly organizing their own counter-power. And
there’s absolutely nothing that the US can do about any
of this.
The US still refuses to allow peacekeeping forces out
of Kabul, so they could help Hamid Karzai to disarm
the warlords. The Pentagon says that an extension of
their role would compromise direct American mili-
tary operations. The West as a whole still does not tie
aid for regional government projects as conditional
on human rights progress – which would be a way to
reign in the warlords. And – worst of all – the West is
not even providing a fraction of the aid that it prom-
ised, with or without strings attached. Take the matter
of roads. Jalalabad-Kabul, a mere 150 kilometers,
is still a back-breaking five-hour journey around a
moonscape. The West – for all its claims of not aban-
doning Afghanistan this time – still is not committed
to help the road-building. Without a decent road
system, Afghanistan simply cannot even begin to reap
some benefits from its crucial location as a Central
Asia crossroads.
The World Food Program (WFP) estimates that over
half of all Afghan families are in need of emergency
aid. But the WFP has received only 57 percent of the
food that it needs from foreign donors.The United Na-
tions High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is also
in dire straits. The constant flood of Afghan refugees
pouring in from Pakistan has simply overwhelmed the
UN. Hundreds of thousands of these refugees lived in
Peshawar or Karachi – and not in refugee camps. A
118   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
lot of them complain that Pakistani police harassment “The US is giving only minimal economic and food On December 21, 2001, George W Bush said that
forced them to go back to Afghanistan. And when aid. They are only seeking their own interests.” A third 2002 would be “a year of war.” The new Iraqi war is
they come back they find that their homes have been one complains. “[King] Zahir Shah was denied being coming, while the new Afghan war is far from over.
destroyed and livestock killed. Even under so much named head of state by the US envoy, Khalilzad. The But the definitive historical judgement of the Ameri-
strain, the UNHCR had to cut food rations to the Northern Alliance was the chosen government by the can adventure in Afghanistan will depend on whether
returnees by two-thirds – and it is still warning that it US so that they could build their oil pipeline through the bombing-provoked fall of the Taliban is capable of
may have to end all food distribution if foreign govern- Afghanistan.” And a fourth one goes straight to the outweighing so many unbearable “collateral” costs.
ments do not come up with the money they promised. point: “If the Americans want to remain loved by the
Afghans they should finish al-Qaeda as soon as possi-
It’s crucial to remember today that “regime change”
ble and then go away.”
was never the main target of the US bombing of Af-
ghanistan. “Regime change” evolved into a doctrine
only when the Pentagon woke up to the reality that
it would be nearly impossible to capture Osama bin
Laden and eliminate the danger of any further al-Qae-
da attack.
But now “regime change” in Afghanistan is about
the only tangible success of the US after Washington’s
decision to answer to the September 11 challenge with
overwhelming military force.
In the process, the American bombing machine
killed what is estimated in Kabul nowadays as as many
as 8,000 innocent civilians – a “collateral damage”
(copyright Pentagon) two-and-a-half times the num-
ber of victims of September 11. And this total does
not include the incalculable number of those who
died of hunger during the disruption of aid supplies
last October – ordered by the US. The US also set the
extremely dangerous precedent of one nation’s right to
overthrow a foreign government – any foreign gov-
ernment – by bombing, and is now trying to sell world
opinion a replay in Iraq. Poor, hard-working Kabulis
in the bazaars are still happy: at least they can be en-
tertained by an Indian movie without being tortured
by the Taliban.
But some educated Afghan returnees are increas-
ingly desperate. A collection of opinions not usually
carried by the Western media says it all. One of these
returnees says that “the situation is a mess. The Amer-
icans came too early, without doing their homework,
bombing everything. One more month of pressure
and the Taliban would have collapsed, and we could
have decided our future by ourselves.” Another says.
FOREVER WARS   119
 Afghan war-
lord Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar prays
before giving a
speech to support-
ers in Jalalabad,
Afghanistan, on
April 30. Photo:
Reuters

Exit Osama, enter Hekmatyar

Follow all the mesmerizing plot twists in the badlands of eastern
Afghanistan: the big, brash American anti-terrorist show is in town.
Their new mission: ‘Get Hekmatyar’

By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 11, 2002

ASADABAD, eastern Afghanistan – It’s 7am in dirt-poor, semi-devas-

tated Martyr’s Square in this town in the heart of Kunar province. The sun
is already shining high and the big, brash American anti-terrorist show is
in town.
And what a show it is. Nine vehicles, ranging from Humvees to Toyota
HiLux vehicles customized with machine guns, carrying as many as six
soldiers each, all engineered to raise serious hell, take possession of the
square. The whole town is watching. A commando group climbs up the

120   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    121

rickety stairs to the balcony of the Istiqlal – the only
hotel in town and whose unbelievably filthy wash-
rooms are crammed with graffiti of the new jihad
against America – and engages in a search-and-destroy
operation against two “culprits,” as the local Pashtuns
put it: this Asia Times Online correspondent and his
companion, Pashto-speaking, Peshawar-based journal-
ist Majeed Baber.
The Special Forces are relatively polite – but firm.
Identity documents are checked and then digital still
photos and video footage is erased – under severe
vigilance. Next time, the cameras will be confiscated.
Although the whole process is totally illegal, all is justi-
fied in the name of the “tense” security situation. Scott,
one of the soldiers, is a little more affable than the
others, who share a uniform blank, psychopath-style
gaze. Scott confirms on the record – and he will be
the only one to do so – that the real mission is “to get
Hekmatyar,” the former Afghan premier and famed
mujahideen warlord, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, leader of
the Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan (Islamic Party).
Scott argues the footage and photos might fall into
the wrong hands. “They might see how many we are,
what we are doing.” As if “they” didn’t know already.
Some intelligence information is exchanged and the
show departs with a bang to look for the bad guys.
Later, the whole town will keep coming back to ask
in utter perplexity, “What were the Americans telling
you? Have you done anything wrong?”
Make no mistake. This is it. One year after September
11, this is the ultimate frontline, the last, crucial bat-
tle in the new Afghan war – as the best Pakistan-Af-
ghanistan insiders have been predicting for months.
Or maybe the battle is just beginning. The fact is that
now between 300 and 400 American Special Forces
– according to different estimations of local Pashtun
commanders – are now based in Kunar in hot pursuit
of the newly-promoted number one “dead or dead”
enemy in the war against terrorism in Afghanistan:
Hekmatyar, the Pashtun leader and the only premier in
history with the dubious distinction of shelling his own
capital, Kabul, in mid-1992, causing the death of as
122   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
many as 25,000 people, until his bases were destroyed
by the Taliban in early 1995.
Even though the war against terrorism costs rough-
ly US$1 billion a day, Osama bin Laden has not been
found. Ayman “The Surgeon” Ayman al-Zawahiri,
al-Qaeda’s number two, has not been found. Taliban
supremo Mullah Omar – who escaped from B-52
bombing last November on the back of a Honda 50cc
motorcycle – has not been found. So the new bogey-
man is Hekmatyar, who is gathering forces for his new
jihad to drive foreign troops out of Afghanistan.
Scores of international journalists are gathering at the
Tora Bora to “commemorate” September 11 – perhaps
hoping to shoot a bin Laden video in one of the myriad
caves in which he was reputed to have hidden before
escaping well before the advancing US troops arrived.
Asia Times Online, instead, is trying to confirm priv-
ileged information according to which Hekmatyar is
hiding somewhere in Kunar; former mujahideen lead-
er “Professor” Abdul Rassoul Sayyaf – renamed by his
Arab patrons Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf – has been
to Kunar; and bin Laden and al-Zawahiri may or may
not have recently been in Kunar.
The American Special Forces – housed in a huge
compound that used to be the local jail on the out-
skirts of Asadabad – have been camped since the end
of June; in the beginning they were less than a dozen,
now they’re hundreds, but still they haven’t found what
they are looking for. The search – for Hekmatyar, for
al-Qaeda, for supporters, for clues in the middle of
ever-shifting alliances, for escape routes – is a complex
puzzle. There’s only one way to go – and it is to criss-
cross information volunteered by all the major players.
What we find is a dizzying web of political, military,
tribal and religious friction.
In Hekmatyar America has a formidable foe, as the
Soviets found out to their cost in their Afghanistan
adventure in the 1980s. He issued an anti-American
fatwa in June, and last week he reconfirmed a jihad
against “American invaders” and the “persecution of
Pashtuns.” His Hezb-i-Islami Afghanistan now runs
the show and Hekmatyar can count on hundreds of
loyal and very experienced commanders – such as
Maulana Jalaluddin Haqqani, the former number one
military commander of the Taliban. Al-Qaeda is col-
laborating with Hezb-i-Islami, but only in a supporting
role.
The Hezb-i-Islami – 75 percent of it made up of Pash-
tuns – is the most revolutionary and disciplined of all
the Afghan Islamist parties. It’s nothing remotely sim-
ilar to a bunch of turbans roaming around in pick-up
trucks, as often the Taliban were. The Hezb is a mod-
ern organization. Recruitment and promotion is based
on skill and merit – and not on social roles or how well
one can recite the Koran. Hezb leaders have all been
educated in Afghanistan – not in Pakistani madrassas
(religious schools). Hekmatyar is a radical Islamist.
During the anti-Soviet jihad his party was the abso-
lute favorite of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, where
Islamabad helped the Hezb control 250 schools – from
which 43,500 students graduated. These students are
the core of the party’s new generation, and they make
up most of the soldiers of Hekmatyar’s conventional
military force, the Lashkar-i-Isar (Army of Sacrifice).
During the anti-Soviet jihad, Hekmatyar received
tens of millions of dollars from Libya and Iraq. And
prior to Saddam Hussein invading Kuwait in 1990, the
Saudi and Kuwaiti governments and private donors
had provided as much as a billion dollars to Hek-
matyar. The Hezb was also the darling of Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and the Islamic con-
servative wahhabis from Saudi Arabia. It was also the
favorite of moderate Pakistani generals and – the icing
on the cake – the operations wing of the US’s Central
Intelligence Agency.
This went on until late 1989, when Bush senior’s
administration realized that the USSR was collapsing
– and Afghanistan lost its strategic importance. When
the priority was to “kill Russians” – according to the
crude lingo of the times – the US gave free reign to
the ISI to distribute cash and weapons in Afghanistan,
with no American supervision. The lion’s share always
went straight to Hekmatyar and Sayyaf.
It is fair to say that practically every Pashtun tribe
or clan had or has a branch or faction with a link to
Hekmatyar. So it is no wonder that the man is now
skillfully playing the ethnic card. In his most recent
audiotaped address to people all over the Pashtun belt
to the east of the country he asks rhetorically why only
Pashtuns are being bombed, arrested or killed by the
Americans. Hekmatyar touches the right chord in any
tribal Pashtun heart when he says that Pashtuns have
been humiliated by Americans searching their houses
without any warning, confiscating their weapons and –
an unpardonable sin in Pashtunwali, the tribal code of
honor – physically searching their women.
Pashtuns in Kunar and Nangarhar are convinced
the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance was behind
the killing of Haji Abdul Qadir – the only Pashtun
vice-president in President Hamid Karzai’s govern-
ment in Kabul. Portraits of Qadir are ubiquitous in
Nangarhar while not a single Karzai portrait is to be
seen. Karzai, although a Pashtun, is widely despised
as an American puppet and a hostage of the powerful
Northern Alliance ministers, such as commander Mo-
hammed Fahim, the Afghan Defense Minister. Karzai’s
own security service is totally infiltrated by experi-
enced Hezb-i-Islami operatives, possibly why he now
relies on US bodyguards for his personal protection.
Haji Matheullah Khan Safi is the core commander
of Kunar. In theory, he is working with the Ameri-
cans. He says that he used to speak English – but adds,
emphatically, that “with this war I forgot everything.”
According to him, the Americans have been in Kunar
for at least two months. “When they got here, we had
problems with local commanders in different check-
posts. Now this is finished. The province is under a
single administration.”
Haji Matheullah is the first to tell what will be a
recurrent story of how a group of high-ranking Ar-
abs escaped from Jalalabad after the city fell to the
Northern Alliance on November 12. “There was a huge
compound full of Arabs. The most important escape
to Kunar.” The Arabs were helped by Hezb-i-Islami
people, by Haji Roohullah (a Kunar wahhabi rising
star, recently arrested and now in American custody at
FOREVER WARS   123
Bagram air base on the outskirts of Kabul) and Kash-
mir Khan (a high commander close to Hekmatyar
whom some define as a gangster). “There were only
nine Arabs at the time. But one of them was severely
injured, died, and was buried near Asadabad. The eight
that remained arrived in Daish and then the valleys
of Shigal. There were at least four important people
among them – maybe Abu Zubaida.” Zubaida, an
al-Qaeda strategist, was later arrested in Faisalabad,
Pakistan, in late March.
Haji Matheullah cannot or is not willing to confirm
a now famous meeting in the beginning of August
between Hekmatyar, Sayyaf and other key people that
took place in Kunar. “It is not easy for Sayyaf to get
into this area. But everyone knows their thinking is the
same.” He comments with a Pashtun proverb. “If you
don’t eat the onion, you don’t smell.” And then he adds,
“Some activities in this area might confirm that Hek-
matyar could be in the remote mountains northeast of
Asadabad.” A few minutes later, though, comes a new
twist: “If all the people are thinking that Hekmatyar is
in Kunar, he may well be in Kunar. And if Hekmatyar
is in Kunar, Osama and al-Zawahiri may be as well,
because they are all in contact.”
We talk about how Hekmatyar – by satellite tele-
phone, on the BBC Pashto service – announced that
he supported a new jihad against the Americans,
launched in Gardez and Khost, in Paktia province. “Are
you sure it was a sat-phone, or tape?” He then switches
to attack mode. “We did the jihad 20 years ago against
the Russians, for the stability of the country and for
the sake of Islam, and then we gave Kabul to these
people – Hekmatyar, [Rashid] Dostum, [Burhanuddin]
Rabbani, Sayyaf. What did they do to Kabul and the
country? They destroyed Kabul, they destroyed the
country and now they want it again.”
The situation in Kunar is increasingly tense. Two
weeks ago, two missiles hit the American compound in
Asadabad. Haji Matheullah finally fires on all cylinders
and admits fighters, numbering about 500, are proba-
bly hiding in the mountains. “It takes 48 hours to get
there, by walking. We heard they bought a lot of new
124   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
weapons, RPGs, rocket launchers.” The route they most
likely took is from Nawaqui, a village on the Pakistani
border. On the Pakistan side lies the region domi-
nated by the fierce black-turbaned Sufi Muhammad,
who sent thousands of madrassa students in a jihad
against the Americans last October. Most were killed
or captured and Sufi Muhammad is now languishing in
a Pakistani jail.
Haji Matheullah notes that the Americans in Kunar
don’t have helicopters. Anyway, that would not help:
“These people could stay in the mountains during the
whole winter. They collected food. They have a lot of
money. They have support from Pakistan, across the
border. The only way for the Americans is to go there
on foot, through the mountains and jungle.”
Kunar still holds a lot of sympathy to Wahhabism.
“Twenty years ago, the Arabs got here and started their
aid to widows, orphans, kids. There was a lot of money.
When people saw what we call ‘load, coat and boot’,
they converted to Wahhabism. The sheikhs, they want-
ed to spread Wahhabism all over Afghanistan, starting
from Kunar. For this reason, the region still has a lot of
relations with the Arabs.”
What Haji Matheullah is actually saying is that in the
community there’s still a lot of support for al-Qaeda.
That’s why people in Kunar are so incensed by the
arrest of Haji Roohullah. But at the same time he is
also saying that “the common people support Ameri-
cans, they think they are helpful.” The characteristically
Pashtun twists and turns of the conversation are spiced
up: “Afghans never liked foreign invaders.” And then
comes the punchline. “Afghanistan has problems with
Pakistan and China. The Americans want to finish the
influence of neighbors on Afghanistan. They [Amer-
icans] created a nightmare for us. When they create
light, they can go.”
Haji Amanullah is the man responsible for Asad-
abad’s security. But, significantly, he is still a military
Hezb-i-Islami commander. This flagrant contradiction
requires extreme diplomacy. His basic judgment of the
American presence is “if they want to stay long, for
security reasons, and if they do not disturb the peo-
ple, they are welcome. But if they continue to search
houses, scare people – the people’s temperament won’t
stand them for any more than three months.”
The security commander confirms that at the be-
ginning of July Hekmatyar visited Kunar, and then
went north into Nuristan. He was in touch with local
commanders, “But people in Kunar told him they
could not guarantee his safety. He might be in Xinji-
ang [western China].” But this is extremely unlikely as
Beijing – ultra-sensitive towards the Muslim Uighur
region in western China – would know it right away. In
once again a characteristically indirect Pashtun man-
ner, Haji Amanullah finally implies that Hekmatyar is
alive – and in the region.
In his view the Kunar Wahhabis “got a lot of aid from
the Arabs and Osama. They still have a lot of money.
But they are not more than 10,000 followers.” Haji
Roohullah, according to him, was and still is receiving
money from Pakistan’s ISI.
The story of the Arab escape from Jalalabad receives a
new, savoury twist in Haji Amanullah’s version. “I saw
nine Arabs at the time. Commander Saburlal arrested
them – and then he helped them to escape. They left
all their own vehicles and money.” Saburlal was also
arrested a few days ago, and is now under American
custody at Bagram air base.
Raiz Khan Mushwani is only 18. With his boyish
good looks and disarming smile he could be a heart-
throb in a boy band or a Hollywood television series.
But he is the son of Malik Zarin – the number-one
core commander of Kunar (so one assumes that Haji
Matheullah is in fact number two). Malik Zarin spends
most of his time in crucial meetings in Kabul. His son
stays in Asadabad . Raiz says that “more than 20 peo-
ple” are working closely with the Americans. And he,
at only 18, is their commander.
Raiz is happy as “the Americans are bringing peace.”
Americans, he says, “choose their own informers,”
“have one American Pashto-speaker, an air force
soldier named Kay” and are not paying directly for
information, “only for expenses.” The American mo-
rale, according to Raiz, is “fresh, there is no tension.”
Their commander is one “Captain Ryan, who came
from Bagram.” Raiz thinks that the Americans will stay
for long. They have “no helicopters or tanks, but there
is a helipad in the compound.” In fact, every night the
activity is feverish, for as long as three hours – with
surveillance by drones.
Raiz confirms that the mission is to get Hekmatyar.
Not surprisingly, he does not know where bin Laden
could be. “Sometimes, as a joke, the Americans ask me
if I know something.” Everybody in Asadabad talks
about how in a patrolling mission in ultra-sensitive
Pech Dara a month and a half ago, four men were shot
and killed by the Americans just because they were
carrying a Kalashnikov. Another lethal case of cultural
misunderstanding. Raiz insists that “the Americans
recognized the mistake.”
Gradually, in the Kunar puzzle, emerges the crucial
figure of another commander, Khan Jan. Khan Jan is
a distinguished Hezb-i-Islami commander, as well as
being the mayor of Asadabad. The Americans tried
to arrest him and they raided and, according to some,
even fired on his house. They think that he meets
regularly with Hekmatyar, Raiz admits. “Khan Jan has
popular support in the area.” As we talk to Raiz, we
finally learn that none other than Khan Jan himself is
in the same compound. He came to meet Malik Zarin
– or Raiz – to complain about heavy-handed Amer-
ican tactics. But Raiz does not want to meet him. He
belongs to the Mushwani tribe, while Khan Jan is from
the Salarzai tribe. Tribal enmity is deadly – especially
now that one of the tribes has been selected to work
closely with the Americans. Raiz admits, “It is clear
there is a movement among people to fight the Amer-
icans.” But the “jihad is over,” says the son of the most
powerful military commander in Kunar – at least for
the moment.
The plot thickens. Ahmadullah is a cousin of the
crucial character, the Wahhabi superstar Haji Roohu-
llah. He recognizes that Haji Matheullah and Malik
Zarin are “well-relationed with the Americans.” But
he quickly adds, “Zarin is creating problems because
FOREVER WARS   125
he targeted Haji Roohullah and his tribe.” He stresses
that “people from all over Kunar demand the release of
Haji Roohullah because he fought against the Taliban
and took over the area. Americans have to tell us what
charges they have against him.”
Last November, Ahmadullah was fighting against the
Taliban alongside Hazrat Ali – the American’s favorite
commander in Nangarhar province. After he came to
the area, Haji Roohullah called him: he needed peo-
ple to take over Asadabad. Ahmadullah confirms that
commanders Sabarlal and Najinuddin Khan, among
others, took over Asadabad “under the supervision
of Haji Roohullah” and had been ruling the area ever
since. But now both Haji Roohullah and Sabarlal are
under arrest by the Americans.
Ahmadullah was an eyewitness to the massive Taliban ing permanently raided by bullish American soldiers.
escape last November. “The Taliban crossed to Paki-
stan in Marawara” – the direction of Bajaur agency in
the Pakistani tribal areas. Hazrat Rahman was another attempt against Karzai in Kandahar are dismissed as
commander at the time in Marawara who supported
the Taliban. Ahmadullah saw 48 trucks coming, carry- nated, General Zia [ul-Haq of Pakistan] was killed.”
ing at least 12 men each, a mix of Arabs and Taliban:
“Hazrat Rahman took all their weapons and helped
them escape.” Then came another convoy of Pakistani
Taliban, who also profited from the services of Rah-
man.
Ahmadullah fiercely criticizes “those people who are
collaborating with the Americans” – meaning Haji
Matheullah and, most of all, Malik Zarin: he is im-
plying that the arrest of Roohullah is a power game
between commanders of different tribes. Ahmadullah
also stresses that “we are ideological enemies of the
Arabs because they killed our leader in ’92, Maulvi
Jamil Rahman Salafi.” The portrait of Salafi is displayed
at most of Asadabad’s businesses. One Abdullah, an
Egyptian, went to Bajaur agency and shot Salafi in a
mosque in 1992 because he was against Arab prosely-
tizing in the region.
Ahmadullah adds an extremely ironic twist to the
American presence in Kunar. He says that five British,
not American, special forces were the first to arrive in Asadabad.
Kunar a little more than two months ago. They came
126   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
escorted by none other than Roohullah, and his first The governor recognizes the mesmerizing cultural And then, in a slip, the crucial word “invasion” comes
cousin Haji Wali Ullah, the president of the World shock between America gung-ho culture and Pashtun up. “The Taliban, they were Afghans, but they always
Relief Committee, an Arab NGO very much active in culture. “I asked, why are you doing like this. They said made mistakes. Due to the Taliban we are now facing
the region. because we receive information in a hurry, we don’t invasion of these forces.” If even the ultra-diplomatic
want to waste time. But they are not checking any- governor commits a Freudian slip of this nature, in
Personally, Ahmadullah claims “not to know if Hek-
thing. I was in a jirga [meeting] and I told the people the dusty streets and tea houses of Asadabad there is
matyar is here.” But he assumes that Hekmatyar and
the Americans are coming to your villages because widespread talk about “invasion.”
Kashmir Khan are working together. Kashmir Khan
of your informers. And they are giving bad informa-
“disappeared” a month ago and remains one of Hek- Ghulam Ullah, the head of education in the province,
tion.” So how do the Americans gather intelligence?
matyar’s top commanders. warns in a soft voice, “We all think Americans came
“They ask us sometimes. But most of the time they
here with the support of the UN. We don’t look at
Presiding over the Kunar puzzle is the governor of the do it on their own. Some teenagers told them they
them as invaders. But we do not accept Americans as
province, Sayed Muhamad Yusuf. But he is not from had seen Hekmatyar in Dangan. The Americans went
rulers of this country.”
Kunar: he is from neighboring Laghman province. He there, stayed the whole night. They got into a house,
was appointed by Hamid Karzai’s central government they only saw women and kids.” He denies that the This sums up half of the popular perception in Kunar.
and spends most of his time asking villagers to support Americans armed eastern Afghanistan commanders, The other half is already involved – surreptitiously for
Kabul – an unenviable task, as Pashtun houses are be- although “they did arm commanders in Kandahar.” now – in an anti-American jihad.
He insists that “all the nation is behind the Karzai gov-
ernment.” The recent assassinations in Kabul and the
“the usual.” “President [John F.] Kennedy was assassi-
A long white beard disguises the steely character of
Yusuf, a former jihad commander in the 1980s. The
governor is playing a tremendously skillful diplomatic
game, trying to accommodate the anger of local popu-
lations against American methods, the demands of the
Americans themselves, and the conflicting interests of
powerful and sidelined commanders. He insists that
“all the people here are fed up with war. There is no
chance of a battle in Kunar.”
The governor thinks that the Americans came “un-
der the flag of the UN to create peace in the land of
the Afghans. Kunar is too sensitive, a border province,
the geographic situation is too important.” He does
not think that Hekmatyar, bin Laden or al-Qaeda are
in Kunar. He says “there’s only a 5 percent chance” of
Hekmatyar and some Arabs being in the province. He
hasn’t heard of any eyewitnesses: “The ideal place for
them would be Nuristan.” This is a huge mountainous
enclave between Laghman and Kunar, northwest of
FOREVER WARS   127
 Members of Amer-
ican Special forces
patrol the streets
of Kandahar, in
January of 2002,
as they continue to
raid suspected al
Qaeda and Taliban
hideouts with the
help of local Af-
ghan forces. Photo:
Banaras Khan / AFP

Special Forces, ordinary people

Meet the fabulous cast of characters who will decide the future of
Kunar – the last battle of the new Afghan war, and the first frontline of
the new anti-American jihad.

By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 12, 2002

SHIGAL, ASMAR and DANGAN, Kunar province – “Hekmatyar is not

here,” the smiling young men answer in chorus when questioned about
the whereabouts of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the famed mujahideen war-
lord busy gathering forces to kick foreign troops out of Afghanistan, a
man desperately wanted by the US.
It’s 7am in the tiny village of Aman Koot, in Shigal district, and the
convoy of the governor of Kunar, Sayed Muhamad Yusuf – packed with
dozens of uniformed Kunaris armed with Kalashnikovs – is parked by the

128   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    129

side of the dusty, rocky road.
The governor is inside a mud-walled compound,
addressing a shura (meeting), trying to calm down the
locals, all furious with the heavy-handed tactics used
by American soldiers in searching houses for “terrorist
suspects.” The landscape is breathtaking – like in most
of Kunar: green maize fields, the Kunar river and the
backdrop of stunning forested mountains. The moun-
tains are part of the Kashmund Range – but the locals
know them by at least five different names.
The American Special Forces are also on the spot –
this time in four customized Toyota Hi-Lux vehicles
equipped with machine guns – patrolling the road
and combing the surrounding fields, although they are
not with the governor. “We’re not with anybody. We’re
Americans,” says one of the soldiers. They don’t con-
firm or deny that they are protecting the governor this
morning – but they certainly prevent us from getting
into the compound to follow the shura, although we
have been invited by the governor’s people. All in the
name of the “tense” security situation. There’s an eerie
feeling that a missile could zoom in from behind the
mountains at any moment. We are less than three
hours trekking from the porous Pakistani border.
The young men crowded around us are eager to talk
because with the Americans there’s no dialogue. “It’s
not possible for us to support Hekmatyar in front of
the Americans, now that jihad is finished.” The smiling
crowd is “very hopeful” for the future: they list as their
only problem the absence of a cricket pitch – with all
those maize fields and mountains. And they insist that
they don’t have “any concern” about the Americans:
“We welcome them.”
They are not exactly welcomed back by the Amer-
icans, though, even if it is their own country. Kids
swarm the dusty road. Some soldiers pick up a stick
and start shooing them off. No chance for anybody to
get even close to one of the Mad Max Toyotas. Two sol-
diers combing the fields with their precision rifles held
high are surrounded by a mini-mob. Kids ask for pens.
A few minutes later a local comes with a tin plate full
of mutton slices – a characteristic sign of Pashtun hos-
130   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
pitality. The soldiers recoil in utter disgust. Some start
shouting “Back up!” to no avail. “Zai” – the Pashtun
equivalent, would produce a better effect.
We depart following the governor’s convoy and soon
stop at another dismal village where the four Ameri-
can vehicles are parked in a semi-circle, practically in
combat-ready mode. They see us, they radio messages
to each other – “Your Asia Times connection is here
again.” It’s all part of a cat-and-mouse game developed
over a few days. They know that we are here – and they
don’t like it. We know where they are and where they’re
going – and they don’t like it. Every night, when they
patrol Asadabad, Kunar’s capital, they point their night
vision goggles to the roof of the Istiqlal hotel where we
are staying to check whether we’re filming them. On
a visit to the American compound, in a former prison
on the outskirts of Asadabad, we are met at the gate
by two soldiers, one of them carrying a pistol in one
hand and X-ray goggles in another. The armed soldier
is very polite, but absolutely “no quotes,” not even a
“How’s the weather?” unless we are cleared by Bagram
air base on the outskirts of the capital Kabul.
After a quick stop in the village of Asmar, the crucial
part of the governor’s day is spent at a jirga (council)
meeting in the village of Dangan – reached by an abso-
lutely hair-raising, back-breaking rocky mountain trail.
It’s the first time ever that a Kunar governor has visited
this village – which is not even on the map: that is a
measure of the reigning tense situation. The convoy is
greeted by a long circuitous line of very young madras-
sa (religious school) students immaculately dressed
in blue. An armed sentry in a watchtower, next to the
black-green-red Afghan flag, commands a spectacular
view of the lush valley and the surrounding mountains
– a landscape that evokes the most pristine mountain
valleys in the Panjshir or in Kashmir. Before the jirga,
some of the students engage in a heart-warming ren-
dition of an Afghan national poem, whose lyrics say,
“We know how to grow flowers in this land, we don’t
need guns, we need pens.” Some elders weep. Then, in
a fairytale courtyard naturally protected by trees from
the scorching sun, the governor resumes his complex
diplomatic ballet, forcefully telling the locals not to
spread false information on Hekmatyar’s whereabouts.
The Hezb-i-Islami supremo is extremely popular in the
region.
On a more environmental mode, the governor in-
sists, “You have to protect your forests from Pakistani
loggers.” At the capital, Asadabad, the only business is
the timber business – all of it controlled by six or seven
powerful commanders, all of them with privileged
connections with Pakistani companies. In Dangan it-
self, people diversify, and practically everybody is now
back into cultivating poppy. The governor pleads with
them not to.
After the governor’s speech, the village elder, the
green-turbaned Sayed Mehbwob, takes the stage and
delivers a blistering performance. Fiery eyes, booming
voice and an expressive face straight out of tribal the-
ater, he details to the governor how the Americans are
disturbing the peace of his tribe.
Later, he spells out to us some of the grievances.
According to Mehbwob, two months ago, when the
Americans got to Dangan, someone fired an RPG at
them. The Americans didn’t say who they were looking
for. Three days later they came back and “struck the
house of Zhulam Khan with mortars for four hours.
There were people inside, but mercifully no one was
injured.” Then, a few days ago, says Mehbwob, the
Americans broke into another house at night: “They
broke a lot of boxes [Pashtuns keep a lot of their pos-
sessions in tin containers]. They checked the clothes
of the women. There were only women and children
inside the house. Now everybody in the area is afraid.
This is against Pashtun tradition.”
Mehbwob confirms that the Shinkai home of the
very popular Hezb-i-Islami commander and mayor of
Asadabad, Khan Jan, was also raided by the Americans
“because they thought he had information that would
lead to Hekmatyar.” Mehbwob is stinging: “We don’t
know who they are looking for. Sometimes they say it’s
Osama [bin Laden], sometimes al-Qaeda, sometimes
Hekmatyar, and now they say they are looking for ter-
rorists.” Another village elder cuts to the chase. “I think
the Americans are foolish. There is tension everywhere
in Afghanistan. What are they doing in this area.”
The head of education in Kunar, the affable Ghulam
Ullah, offers a more nuanced perspective. “Kunar is
part of a body that has 32 parts. We support the central
government. Kabul is recognized by all the world.” He
sees the war on terrorism being waged “by civilized na-
tions. America is part of a coalition. We see the peace-
keepers in Kabul and the American presence in this
area in the same way. We do not see them as invaders.
The Russians were invaders. We kicked them out. And
we are here to help Afghans.”
But the Americans may be making serious mistakes,
such as arresting the popular Wahhabi leader Haji
Roohullah. “Roohullah is a national religious leader.”
The motto at the office of Haji Roohullah is “Unity is
the best policy.” The educator, on the arrest of Roohu-
llah, says that “all the tribes have long enmities. One
of them is creating problems [he means the Mushwani
tribe]. Roohullah was the first to start loya jirga nego-
tiations in Kunar.” Ghulam Ullah is absolutely right
when he recalls that the Afghan jihad against the Rus-
sians in the 1980s “started in Kunar, through the family
of Roohullah.”
Ghulam Ullah is among the few in the region who
reject Hekmatyar’s ruthless methods: “We have a lot of
differences with Hezb-i-Islami. In 1990, we had a par-
liament in Kunar, a democratic election for the chief of
this area … Roohullah won. The Hezb-i-Islami started
fighting because they lost. They killed 12 of Roohullah’s
supporters. So we have no relationship with Hekmat-
yar, Hezb-i-Islami or al-Qaeda. Hekmatyar got Osama
to north Kabul and then they sent an Egyptian to kill
our religious leader, Maulvi Jamil Rahman Salafi. Hek-
matyar and Osama were our first enemies. So how can
we give them help.”
The real sensitive relationship, for Ghulam Ullah,
is between Americans and local collaborators: “I’m
not blaming Americans, because they don’t know our
traditions. I’m blaming those working with them. They
are kids [a reference to Raiz, the son of pro-American
Asadabad commander Malik Zarin, and his army of
teenagers]. They want to fill their pockets. And they
FOREVER WARS   131
want to obliterate Pashtun tradition.” Last week, Ghu-
lam Ullah met with Afghan President Hamid Karzai
and Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim in Kabul. He
is hopeful. “I’m sure Haji Roohullah will come back
soon. But these people who created problems for him
must get behind bars.” It’s unlikely that the Americans
will incarcerate their few local partners in Kunar.
Back to Asmar, at what the locals call the Capitol
building, the governor is reclined in his cushion,
surrounded by what amounts to an informal cabinet
meeting, with everyone seated on carpets sipping
green tea. Someone asks the governor point blank, “Are
you going to search these disinformers and put them
in jail?” There’s no clear answer. At 3pm the charis-
matic Khan Jan shows up – received with all-around
reverence. The governor and Khan Jan launch into an
elaborate conversation revolving around the relation-
ship between the commander and Hekmatyar.
The governor says, “We have two types of mujahi-
deen in Afghanistan. One of them was boiling tea
for the mujahideen who were in the front against the
Russians. The other was in fact in the frontline. The
Taliban were boiling tea, and then they started creating
problems. [Former president Burhanuddin] Rabbani
is now creating all kinds of problems for the govern-
ment. He had support in 1996, not anymore.” Khan Jan
tells the governor that two days ago he went to talk to
the Americans, and they told him that they had intel-
ligence in the area proving that he (Khan Jan) was the
problem.
The background for the terse exchange, inevitably,
is once again tribal enmity. The Americans are work-
ing with the Mushwani tribe – to which Malik Zarin,
the core commander of Asadabad and his son Raiz,
belong. Khan Jan is a member of the Alizai – a sub-
clan of the Salarzai tribe. Mushwanis and Salarzais are
“brothers” only in name: the atmosphere is more like
fraternal hatred. The Salarzai are accusing the Mush-
wanis of spreading false information to the Americans.
Malik Zarin fought against the Taliban. But the Taliban
at one time were supported by Malik Zarin’s cous-
in. It soon became a battle of cousin against cousin.
132   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Now Salarzais believe that Malik Zarin is exacting his
revenge.
The future of Kunar – the last battle of the new Af-
ghan war, and the first frontline of the new anti-Amer-
ican jihad – will be decided by this cast of characters.
Haji Matheullah – the number-two core commander
– and Malik Zarin – the number-one core command-
er – plus his 18-year-old son Raiz and his army of
teenagers, will keep working with the Americans. The
governor will keep his skillful diplomatic balancing
act. The local populations remain split between feel-
ings of silent anger or joining Hekmatyar’s appeal
for a jihad against the American invaders. Khan Jan,
mayor of Asadabad, may be working secretly with
Hekmatyar. There are no prospects of Haji Roohullah
being released from Bagram air base. Hekmatyar may
be hidden and plotting in the mountains, 48 hours on
foot to the northeast of Asadabad. And the Americans
are bound to keep treating the local populations with a
total lack of sensitivity.
The crucial fact is that the post-Taliban Pashtun
counterrevolution is already in full swing. And it’s
once again Pashtuns against Tajiks: the Pashtun belt
against a central government in Kabul dominated by
the Northern Alliance, where the Pashtun President
Hamid Karzai is derided as a mere American puppet.
Bacha Khan Zadran is a powerful warlord with a
strong military presence in three key Pashtun belt
provinces: Paktia, Paktika and Khost. He is openly
confronting Kabul, which nominated what the Pash-
tuns call “a kid,” Abdul Taniwal, as the governor of
Khost. Kabul is after Zadran. But Zadran’s tribe has
forcefully asked Karzai to fulfill an earlier pledge and
appoint him as head of the three provinces. A few days
ago in Gardez, the simple presence of Zadran inside
the American compound for four hours started a riot,
because the locals thought that he had been arrested.
In Kunar, Haji Roohullah’s arrest is not reaping any
benefits for the Americans. On the contrary. In Nan-
garhar the Americans have relied since the Tora Bora
campaign on the wily Hazrat Ali, a Pachai: the Pachais
are derided by the Pashtuns. Americans are only work-
ing with commanders recommended by the North-
ern Alliance. They are being fed bad intelligence, no
intelligence, and in the process are being drawn into
the tangled web of warlord tribal rivalry. Under these
circumstances, “peace” is impossible: US National
Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice’s recent claims that
the security situation in Afghanistan had improved in
the past year is nothing short of ridiculous.
Hamid Karzai’s security services are totally infiltrat-
ed by ultra-disciplined Hezb-i-Islami operatives. The
4,800 international peacekeeping soldiers in Kabul are
seemingly ineffective. Under their watch, two Afghan
ministers have been assassinated in broad daylight
and a car bomb exploded last week in Kabul, killing 30
people and wounding 167. An assassination attempt on
Karzai was only narrowly averted in Kandahar.
The US – as did the former USSR – has underestimat-
ed the indomitable Pashtuns, at its peril. Many empires
have already paid the price for this carelessness. The
American strategy in the Pashtun belt has been the
catalyst for re-starting the civil war in Afghanistan. On
the night of September 10, eyewitnesses claim to have
spotted Gulbuddin Hekmatyar himself not in Kunar,
but in the Teraha valley, in Khyber agency (in Paki-
stan) – on the other side of the Tora Bora. Hekmatyar
was deep in a conference with a group of influential
mullahs.
What the US is up against now is a formidable coali-
tion involved in a jihad to kick out what it sees as for-
eign invaders. The coalition groups Hekmatyar and the
Hezb-i-Islami’s “Professor” Sayyaf, with his wealth of
Arab connections and sponsorship; Ishmail Khan, the
“Emir of southwest Afghanistan,” who is very close to
Iran; Mullah Omar (still hiding in safety somewhere in
Kandahar province) and his formidable former Taliban
military commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani; plus vast
middle-level support from Pakistan’s Inter-Services
Intelligence.
At the end of a gruelling day, on the dusty As-
mar-Asadabad road, Azad (his name means “free”), a
Pashtun villager, definitely not a fundamentalist, stops
the car to show us his house perched on a hill. The
landscape around is breathtaking, as usual. The Amer-
ican Special Forces are only minutes away – we cross
their convoy on our way back. Azad gazes at the classic
Afghan panorama and murmurs, almost to himself,
“The Americans are here because the world commu-
nity has made a promise to the Afghan nation. But if
they have their own agenda, I’ll have to take care of
this. Because I am the owner of this land.”
FOREVER WARS   133
 Afghan men view
pictures of Ahmad
Shah Massoud at his
grave site on the 8th
anniversary of his
assassination in the
Panjshir Valley on
September 10, 2009.
Photo: Shah Marai
/ AFP

The Panjshir Lion lives

One year later, we revisit all the details of the assassination of Ahmad Shah
Masoud, 48, mujahideen hero, the Lion of the Panjshir, resistance leader for
the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and the closest to a nationalist
leader and hero Afghanistan has had in a long time. He now lies buried in
“The Chief of the Martyr’s Hill” - an unpretentious black marble grave, in the
middle of a chapel, marked with a green Islamic flag.

BY PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 12, 2002

PANJSHIR VALLEY, Northern Afghanistan – It’s a simple round white

chapel with a green dome. A sign beside the rocky trail points to “The
Chief of the Martyr’s Hill.” The monument, located in one of the defini-
tive Shangri La-like corners of the Panjshir, in a lush green valley bisected
by the Panjshir River, is dwarfed by imposing naked mountains.
Earlier this week, scores of men worked around the clock in scorching
sun and pitch darkness, wind and dust to add the finishing touches to the
134   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    135
chapel. Students took a whole day to bicycle from the
capital Kabul to pay their respects, dodging bombed
bridges and wrecks of tanks, carrying bouquets of
flowers and green banners with the inscription, “We
follow the way of Masoud.” Afghan President Hamid
Karzai paid his visit on Saturday – but not on the
highly significant September 9, a date that for a great
deal of fractured Afghanistan carries infinitely more
meaning than September 11 does for many people in
the West.
For September 9 was the day a year ago that Ahmad
Shah Masoud, 48, mujahideen hero, the Lion of the
Panjshir, former vice-president of the Islamic State of
Afghanistan, resistance leader for the Northern Alli-
ance against the Taliban and the closest to a nationalist
leader and hero Afghanistan has had in a long time,
was assassinated, and he now lies buried in “The Chief
of the Martyr’s Hill.” It’s an unpretentious black marble
grave, in the middle of the chapel, marked with a green
Islamic flag.
The circumstances surrounding news of Masoud’s
death are no longer a mystery. Everybody – not only
Panjshiris – knows that his death was kept secret for
days: even his faithful field commanders and his own
family didn’t know that his body was lying in a morgue
in southern Tajikistan when they were being told only
that he had had an accident, but was well. According to
the official Northern Alliance version, he had “suffered
an accident” with only “minor injuries.” Then, a few
days later, he was “in a coma” in a Tajik hospital. And
when he “officially” died, the world he had lived in had
been turned upside down by the events of September
11, and the demise of the Taliban regime in Afghani-
stan had been sealed.
But disturbing questions remain. Al-Qaeda may have
hit Masoud to finish off the last and only hurdle for the
Taliban to control all of Afghanistan – the Northern
Alliance controlled between 5 percent and 10 percent
of the country at the time. Masoud was a nemesis for
Osama bin Laden, whose regional master plan includ-
ed the integration of Afghanistan’s northern neighbors
in a radical Islamic axis.
136   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Masoud’s killing, too, may have been bin Laden’s
personal gift to Taliban leader Mullah Omar for the
shelter that the Taliban provided al-Qaeda in Afghani-
stan. The assassination, further, may have been the key
event that sent the signal for the September 11 opera-
tion in the US. Ironically, some people argue that the
only power to have profited from Masoud’s killing was
America itself: Washington would never have been al-
lowed to maintain its military presence in Afghanistan
if Masoud, a nationalist leader par excellence, had been
in charge of the Northern Alliance’s military.
The plot to kill Masoud was carried out by a Brus-
sels-based Tunisian terrorist cell. Masoud was assassi-
nated by two killers in their 30s posing as journalists
and carrying fake Moroccan passports. The “reporter”
called himself Karim Touzani – affable and relaxed.
The surly, burly “cameraman” – who carried explosives
in his battery pack – called himself Kacem Bakkali.
Their letters of introduction presented them as tele-
vision journalists from a certain Islamic Observation
Center, based in London and concerned with “human
rights issues for Muslims all over the world.”
Already in 1999 European intelligence had begun to
notice increased al-Qaeda recruiting activity among
Tunisians living in Europe. A key recruit was Abdul
Sattar Dahmane, a Tunisian resident of Belgium. He
had been trained in one of al-Qaeda’s Afghan military
camps, where he lived in a house nearby with his Mo-
roccan wife, Malika. In the spring of 2001 Dahmane
was selected for a crucial mission. As he had studied
journalism in Tunisia and Belgium, he would pose as
a television interviewer, alongside another Tunisian
posing as a cameraman – Rachid Bourawi, an illegal
immigrant to Belgium. According to European intelli-
gence, Dahmane was an operative in Brussels and Lon-
don for the Tunisian Fighting Group, an organization
with ties to al-Qaeda. The established European theory
for the Masoud hit is that the Tunisian Fighting Group
agreed to kill Masoud in exchange for its fighters train-
ing in al-Qaeda’s Afghan military camps.
Visiting Masoud in the Panjshir was an inescap-
able ritual for any journalist covering Afghanistan.
Asia Times Online was there in the first two weeks
of August 2001. Everybody had to go through the
same motions: kill time in Dushanbe while waiting
for a battered Russian MI-17 helicopter of the rick-
ety Northern Alliance air force to be transported to
the Panjshir. Like everybody else, the fake journalists
stayed in a guesthouse of the Northern Alliance, close
to the village of Bazarak. The guesthouse arrangement
was another graphic sign of the extreme politeness of
Panjshiris: journalists received a free room, three meals
a day, access to a translator at modest rates and the
requisite tour of the frontlines in the war against the
Taliban.
Masoud was always ready and willing to meet jour-
nalists – especially from all corners of the Muslim
world. He was particularly frustrated by the general
perception in the Middle East that his beloved mujahi-
deen were a tool of the Russians or other foreign pow-
ers, acting against the best interests of Muslims. When
he talked to Asia Times Online – his last interview in
the Panjshir before he moved to Khwaja Bahauddin,
his far-flung base near the Tajik border, Masoud re-
peatedly accused the Taliban of destroying Afghanistan
with the assistance of Arabs and Pakistanis.
The Northern Alliance was in deep trouble in the
spring and summer of 2001. At least 16,000 Taliban,
including a few thousand hardcore al-Qaeda warriors,
were ready to take all of Takhar province, north of
the Panjshir Valley. The Taliban were planning a final
offensive to wipe out any resistance, take control of
the whole of Afghanistan and increase their support of
hardcore Islamist movements in Central Asia, such as
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).
The key arrangement in the Masoud killing was the
way in which the fake Moroccan journalists managed
to get into the Panjshir. This happened through an
introduction by one Dr Hani, an Egyptian friend dat-
ing back from the anti-USSR jihad of the 1980s of the
notorious “Professor” Abdul Rasul Sayyaf – renamed
by his Arab patrons Abd al-Rabb al-Rasul Sayyaf. Dr
Hani apparently called Sayyaf from Bosnia-Herzegov-
ina, and Sayyaf agreed to endorse the “journalists” and
request permission for them to follow the usual tour of
the frontlines.
Repeated attempts recently by Asia Times Online
to reach Sayyaf proved unfruitful. Some people said
that he was incognito in Kabul. Some people said
that he had been to a secret meeting in eastern Kunar
province, along with fierce Pashtun warlord Gulbud-
din Hekmatyar, now promoted by the Pentagon to
the status of America’s number one “wanted dead or
dead” villain in Afghanistan. Some people said that
Sayyaf would never agree to talk to foreigners about his
controversial role in the Masoud killing. But a source
in Kabul confirmed that during the loya jirga (grand
council) last June, Sayyaf admitted that the two fake
journalists had spent two weeks with him and his peo-
ple – in Taliban-controlled territory – before crossing
to the Northern Alliance areas.
Sayyaf, a Kharruti Pashtun from Paghman, in Kabul
province, is the leader of the Ittihad-e-Islami (The Is-
lamic Union for the Freedom of Afghanistan), a party
that during the 1980s was basically a vehicle for Sayyaf
to receive loads of funds and weapons from wealthy
Arab donors. Sayyaf is still a big supporter of the strict
Wahhabi Islam and thanks to his solid Arab connec-
tions remains the most well-known mujahideen leader
in Saudi Arabia, heartland of Wahhabism. Unlike
Masoud, he is fiercely opposed to nationalism, and
supports a pan-Islamic ideal, and he is now definitely
plotting with Hekmatyar to undermine the already
fragile Hamid Karzai government in Kabul and to see
all foreign troops booted out of Afghanistan.
Sayyaf ’s relationship with Masoud was always ex-
tremely complex. Masoud had tremendous problems
dealing with fundamentalists like Sayyaf and Osama
bin Laden himself – who enjoyed unlimited Arab
support. Bin Laden and other future al-Qaeda nota-
bles were among the thousands of Arabs who fought
alongside Sayyaf in the 1980s jihad. During the chaotic
mujahideen “governments” of 1992-1996, Masoud was
defense minister to President Barhanuddin Rabbani,
and Sayyaf was a presidential adviser. These “govern-
ments” were such in name only: warlords at the time
FOREVER WARS   137
wreaked havoc in Afghanistan and created the condi-
tions for the emergence of the Taliban.
Bismillah Khan, a stocky, workaholic warlord who
had fought alongside Masoud for 22 years and was one
of his top generals, was the man who led the fake Mo-
roccan journalists on the required frontline tour after
Masoud himself approved their visit. He insisted on
demonstrating to the “Moroccans” that only Afghans
were members of the Northern Alliance. Bismillah
Khan remembers that these posers were different. They
didn’t ask for interviews and they filmed practically
nothing. Before they finally managed to kill him, there
were a few near-misses between them and Masoud.
One day, the Lion of the Panjshir himself showed up
at the guesthouse, but they were away. Another day
they were supposed to travel in his helicopter back to
Khwaja Bahauddin. But the helicopter was overloaded
– as usual – and they had to stay behind.
The fact that they didn’t ask many questions, like
other journalists, according to Bismillah Khan, caused
widespread suspicion. But they could not be chal-
lenged because they were Sayyaf ’s guests. And that’s
the key to the mystery. The mysterious phone call from
Bosnia-Herzegovina which convinced Sayyaf to invite
the two journalists to the Panjshir actually came from
Kandahar – in the heart of Taliban land. But nobody
among the Panjshiris took pains to investigate it at the
time.
Helicopter rides were one more inevitable fixture in
every visit to the Panjshir. Anybody had to wait some-
times days for the skies to clear: it’s suicidal to fly in
the Hindu Kush under a cloudy sky. And that’s why
the fake journalists had to wait a few extra days before
traveling to Khwaja Bahauddin – where they arrived
as “guests of Sayyaf.” Their interview was once again
delayed because the summer Taliban-al-Qaeda offen-
sive had begun – and Masoud was extremely busy. The
“Moroccans” had to kill their time in a room next door
to General Mohammed Arif, Masoud’s chief of internal
security.
Abdul Malik, commander of the military tank base
in Jalalabad, in eastern Afghanistan – now working
138   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
closely with American Special Forces – today tells a
substantially different version of Bismillah Khan’s sto-
ry. Malik says that “Arabs” forced Sayyaf to introduce
the fake journalists to Bismillah Khan, who in turn
got them to Masoud. Anyway one looks at it, though,
Sayyaf ’s role remains murky.
In the summer of 2001, Masoud was still trying to
recover from a devastating blow in 2000 when the
Taliban captured his former headquarters in Taloqan.
When he spoke to Asia Times Online he was not only
preparing a defense plan against the renewed Taliban
attack, but also a Northern Alliance plan to retake
Taloqan – and that was as far as his dreams were set.
During the first months of 2001 Masoud was involved
in a tireless effort to rally commanders, major regional
warlords and all kinds of tribal factions to fight against
the Taliban. Through skilful diplomacy, he managed
to get more money from Iran and more weapons from
Russia. By late spring, all major warlords – Uzbek
General Abdul Dostum, Hazara Karim Khalili and the
now-called “Emir of southwest Afghanistan” Ismail
Khan were back in the country from exile in Turkey
and Iran, and ready to fight the Taliban.
During the 1990s, and especially during the time of
the Taliban rule, which began in 1996, Washington
never knew exactly how to deal with Masoud. But after
the attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanza-
nia in 1998, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents
sought a meeting with Masoud in Dushanbe. The CIA
wanted information on how to get to bin Laden. Ma-
soud carefully considered all the angles, but ultimately
he could not but criticize American shortsightedness.
For the Bill Clinton administration, the ultimate aim
was to get bin Laden and destroy al-Qaeda. For Ma-
soud, the main point was to destroy the Taliban. He re-
peatedly stressed at the time that “without the Taliban,
Osama can’t do anything.”
Masoud, indeed, had agents and intelligence in the
heart of Taliban country. The best example is how his
Panjshiris planted a powerful truck bomb just out-
side Mullah Omar’s compound in central Kandahar,
in 1999. The explosion left a huge crater and killed 10
people, including three of Mullah Omar’s bodyguards.
Omar escaped, almost by a miracle, but if the North-
ern Alliance could get close to the Taliban, they could
not penetrate al-Qaeda’s ultra-hardcore security to try
to find and menace bin Laden. And as much as the
Northern Alliance could penetrate the Taliban, secu-
rity chief Arif – now head of intelligence of Hamid
Karzai’s government – says that “Osama was actively
trying to recruit spies inside the Panjshir Valley.” But
once again, no one investigated the “Moroccans.”
In his interview with Asia Times Online, the second-
to-last in his lifetime, Masoud repeatedly portrayed
al-Qaeda, the Taliban and Pakistan as a sort of “trian-
gle of evil.” He criticized the US for basically following
a Pakistani plan: try to “reform” the Taliban and con-
centrate on seducing Taliban “moderates” (a contradic-
tion in terms). There were never any moderates within
the Taliban. Mullah Omar was totally under the spell
of bin Laden. American diplomats with knowledge of
Central Asia were warning about the “Arabization” of
Afghanistan. But no one in Washington was listening.
The US only got the message after September 11 – and
after Masoud’s death.
In the first months of 2001, Masoud calculated that
he had to involve himself in a complex gamble: change
his image from warrior to statesman. He addressed the
European parliament in Strasbourg, France, in April
2001. This was his first official trip to the West. He
tried hard to attract Western support for the resistance
against the Taliban. But still no one was listening. In
Strasbourg, Masoud delivered a stunning message that
nobody took seriously at the time: “If President Bush
doesn’t help us, then these terrorists will damage the
United States and Europe very soon – and it will be too
late.”
The Afghan fundamentalist old guard – people such
as Rabbani and Sayyaf – obviously hated Masoud’s
new international status. The wife of one of Masoud’s
killers told European intelligence early this year that
Masoud’s comments were interpreted as a direct threat
to the Taliban and al-Qaeda. The plot to kill him may
have started immediately after his visit to Europe.
According to French intelligence sources, the amassed
evidence shows that the fake Moroccan passports were
prepared between April and May, as well as one of the
letters of introduction.
Panjshiris now in Kabul, all in government jobs, still
remember vividly the final hours of the Lion. On Sat-
urday evening, September 8, the Taliban finally threw
everything they had against the Northern Alliance.
General Bismillah Khan was desperate. He called Ma-
soud by satellite telephone for urgent strategic advice.
Masoud delivered – in style – and then spent the rest
of the night talking Persian poetry with the Northern
Alliance’s ambassador to India. At 4 am on Septem-
ber 9, while Masoud and his friend were still talking
against the backdrop of the legendary Amu Darya
river, his personal secretary came with the news that
Bismillah Khan’s mujahideen had stood their ground
against the Taliban. Masoud took his morning prayer,
slept for a little more than an hour and had his usual
breakfast of tea, nan bread, almonds and cream.
Masoud then called Bismillah Khan by radio at
the frontline in Jabal Saraj, south of the Panjshir. He
wanted bodies of dead Arabs transported by helicopter
as soon as possible so that he could show them to the
fake Moroccan journalists. The long-awaited interview
would be next door to his office, in the bungalow of
security chief Arif. Masoud was on the phone when the
journalists entered the room. They were accompanied
by another journalist, Fahim Dashty, a Panjshiri who
was shooting a documentary on Masoud. The visitors
showed their letters of introduction from the Islamic
Observation Center in London and from Arabic News
International. Masoud ordered green tea for all. Ma-
soud asked them about their trip in Taliban land. They
said that Mullah Omar had refused them an interview
because television is haram – forbidden under the Tal-
iban’s interpretation of Sharia (Islamic Law). Ahmad
Jamshid, Masoud’s personal secretary, says this was the
last time that he saw Masoud smiling.
The killer cameraman then adjusted his tripod at a
very low level, with the camera lens pointing to Ma-
soud’s chest, about two meters away. Masoud asked to
FOREVER WARS   139
see the list of questions, which were then translated
from English to Persian. Jamshid, the personal secre-
tary, went out of the room. Dashty, the Panjshiri doc-
umentary maker, was still adjusting his camera. Then
suddenly, as the Moroccan’s camera was switched on, a
“blue, thick fire” engulfed the room, which was totally
destroyed. There was a strong smell of gunpowder. A
bomb hidden in the battery pack of the camera cut the
body of the “cameraman” in two. But the “reporter”
was only slightly injured and he tried to escape, say-
ing that he didn’t know what happened. A bunch of
Panjshiris threw him into an empty room, and when
he tried to escape through a window he was instantly
killed.
Haji Mohammad Omar, Masoud’s bodyguard for the
past 12 years, ran into the devastated room and found
Masoud still seated in an armchair, drenched in blood.
With other Panjshiris they climbed into a Toyota Hi-
Lux, holding Masoud’s body, and rushed on a mad
drive to Khwaja Bahauddin airstrip. Masoud was still
breathing when they boarded the helicopter. But soon
it was over. “Amir Sahib had stopped breathing,” said
Haji Omar. Everybody fell silent. When the helicopter
arrived 10 minutes later at a clinic in southern Tajik-
istan, doctors found that Masoud’s heart had been
pierced by two pieces of shrapnel.
140   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
A few days after September 11, a green MI-17 Russian
helicopter showed up in Panjshir Valley. This time it
was carrying CIA officials, with an official proposal.
Since 1996, Masoud had tried to convince the US to
smash the Taliban first, and then get bin Laden. Now,
the US government was finally proposing the same
thing: we need your help to smash the Taliban, because
we think that this is the way to get to bin Laden. Since
1996, Masoud had fought the Taliban, asking – in vain
– for weapons, supplies and money from the US and
the European Union. Now, the US government was
promising weapons, supplies and a lot of money.
Masoud said a few days before his death that his
dream was to see peace in Afghanistan, and then work
to maintain peace until he died an old man. He died
relatively young, at 48, and Afghanistan is still not at
peace. Afghans still contemplate what they describe
as an ominous future. They wonder if the sacrifice of
a quintessential Afghan hero was still not enough to
placate the gods.
Meanwhile, the legend of the Panjshir Lion lives –
stronger than ever. French intellectuals are proposing
Masoud for a posthumous Nobel Peace Prize. The Lion
would have said not yet – not until peace reigns in the
land of the proud Afghans.
Afghan command-
er Jalaluddin
Haqqani (C) at his
Pakistani base in
Miram Shah with
Amin Wardak and
Abdul Haq, two top
guerilla command-
ers. Photo: Zubair
Mir / AFP
Enlightened warlordism
Everybody and his dog is on board the new jihad to ‘kick out the foreign invad-
ers’: infamous Pashtun warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; extra-well-connected
Arab protege ‘Professor’ Sayyaf; the ‘Emir of the Southwest’ Ismail Khan; Mul-
lah Omar (hidden in the depths of Kandahar province), the Taliban leadership
and their former military commander, the formidable Jalaluddin Haqqani; and
vast mid-level sectors of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 18, 2002
JALALABAD – While al-Qaeda may have fled Afghanistan – and is now
maintaining dormant cells in Pakistan and reorganizing itself in north-
ern Africa – the anti-American jihad in the Afghan Pashtun belt is in full
swing. As Asia Times Online has reported, this has been the inevitable
outcome of a series of American blunders in Afghanistan.
Everybody and his dog is on board the new jihad to “kick out the for-
eign invaders”: infamous Pashtun warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar; ex-
tra-well-connected Arab protege “Professor” Sayyaf; the “Emir of the
FOREVER WARS    141
Southwest” Ismail Khan; Mullah Omar (hidden in the
depths of Kandahar province), the Taliban leadership
and their former military commander, the formidable
Jalaluddin Haqqani; and vast mid-level sectors of the
Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
Afghanistan everywhere is warlord country. Uzbek
warlord General Dostum, currently vice-minister of
defense, ignores Kabul, runs the north like a personal
fiefdom, and is rumored to be very much interested
in the jihad (Dostum and Sayyaf were always very
close; Sayyaf was practically Dostum’s mentor). Ismail
Khan runs the southwest – and he has joined the jihad.
Khalil Khalili runs the center – but for the moment he
is mum. Gul Agha Sherzai – who barely escaped the
assassination attempt against Hamid Karzai in Kanda-
har recently – runs the south and remains cozy with
the Taliban leadership. And the opportunist but weak
Hazrat Ali – handsomely paid by the Americans – sort
of runs the east, after the killing of Haji Qadir in Kabul,
which the whole Pashtun belt is convinced was ordered
by the Northern Alliance. Bacha Khan Zadran was in
control of the southeast (Paktia, Paktika and Khost
provinces) until Kabul nominated another governor.
Zadran collaborated with the Americans, but he won’t
quit until he totally defeats Kabul.
Afghan returnees from the US and Europe complain
– in vain – in Kabul that warlords still command thou-
sands of soldiers, and deeply believe everybody needs
their leadership. Although at the beginning of 2002 in
Tokyo the international community promised US$4.5
billion in reconstruction aid, the Afghan population
– especially the almost 1.7 million refugees who came
back from Pakistan and Iran – see no tangible benefits,
apart from the road Iran is paving from Herat to the
Iranian border at Islam Qilla.
A crucial joint aid package from the US, Saudi Arabia
and Japan for road building was announced last week
to President Hamid Karzai in New York. The joint
project will rebuild the backbreaking road – or rather
moonscape – linking Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. The
US will contribute $80 million, and Saudi Arabia and
Japan $50 million each. (To meet costs, somebody has
142   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
to still come up with $70 million.) The road should be
finished by the end of 2005. The US Congress approved
$255 million for Afghanistan in 2001, but the White
House rejected part of that aid, and it has not made
any request for Afghan aid in 2003.
Corruption is rampant in Kabul: even Kabulis crit-
icize Karzai’s cabinet as a bunch of greedy American
puppets. In the vast countryside, kids still cannot go
to school – no schools have been built – and teachers
have not been paid in months. Returnee advisers with
top American diplomas are getting desperate: they ad-
mit that if the inefficient American-sanctioned Karzai
government breaks down, it would be like the end of a
ceasefire. All bets will be off,and the only ones to gain
will be well-armed and extremely resentful Pashtun
warlords.
All over the Pashtun belt there are three key recurrent
themes: people feel totally ignored by Kabul, are sick of
tired of the ubiquitous insecurity, and deeply resent the
American presence. The Taliban are making a kill-
ing, distributing pamphlets all over the Pashtun belt,
reminding people of the lack of security everywhere,
even inside the bazaars, and that TV, music and movies
are “forbidden by Islamic law.” UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan and Karzai both pleaded for a larger inter-
national force at a recent high-level meeting of donors
and neighboring states in New York. Karzai begged
for a few hundred extra troops in the main cities – like
Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif and Herat – as a means of
proving graphically to average Afghans that the inter-
national community was committed to Afghanistan’s
security. The Pentagon once again vetoed the idea.
Amid so much doom and gloom, there is at least a ray
of hope in Jalalabad. Nasirullah Baryani is the younger
brother of the slain Haji Qadir and the current Nan-
garhar governor, Din Muhamad. He is also the brother
of famous mujahideen commander Abdul Haq, cap-
tured and killed by the Taliban last November. They
are all members of the grand family of Nangarhar –
100 cousins in only one generation. But now only two
brothers remain alive: Baryani and Din Muhamad.
Baryani also fought the anti-USSR jihad in the 1980s.
Afterward he “put away the guns” and lived for years
in Germany (apart from Pashto and Urdu, he speaks
fluent German and English). In these past two years,
he lived in Peshawar, always talking about rebuilding
Afghanistan. He came back to Afghanistan last No-
vember, after the assassination of his brother Abdul
Haq and the fall of Jalalabad to the so-called Eastern
Alliance – allied to the Northern Alliance. The Eastern
Alliance supremo was none other than his older broth-
er Haji Qadir, whose portrait now adorns every shop
and 4X4 vehicle in Nangarhar.
Baryani was the only notable in eastern Afghanistan
who did not want to be associated with the Americans.
He now runs the Abdul Haq Foundation in Jalalabad,
“Only money from the family, no help or aid from
outside.” There are unconfirmed rumors in Kabul that
the family wealth was built on heroin trafficking – but
it does not matter. The main fact is that Baryani is not
a Dostum, or a Fahim, a Sayyaf or a Hekmatyar.
Baryani’s motto is “put out the guns, pick up the
pens.” This is scribbled on mud walls all over Nangar-
har, especially on the road from Jalalabad to Torkham,
on the Pakistani border. Baryani believes that the
traditional loya jirga (grand council) system is capable
of solving all of Afghanistan’s problems. He is obvious-
ly not talking about the jirga in Kabul in June which
put in power the new Hamid Karzai government: there
is a wide consensus in most Afghan provinces that
the meeting was hijacked by the American envoy, “oil
man” Zalmay Khalilzad.
Baryani is extremely critical of the Northern Alli-
ance’s incompetence and of American meddling. Like
any educated Pashtun, he views Kabul as controlled
from Washington. He is especially critical of the fact
there’s no Pashtun representation at the top. But at the
same time he abhors the Kalashnikov culture, so he
does not advocate a violent solution. Baryani is ex-
tremely suspicious of Hekmatyar’s motives – and does
not see the emergence in the near future of a genuine
Pashtun leader.
Baryani is involved in something absolutely un-
heard-of in post-Taliban Afghanistan: with the help of
a German businessman, he is devising a strategic busi-
ness plan to develop his province. Three key areas have
been identified for investment: transport and com-
merce; orange culture (during the communist govern-
ment in the late 1970s and early 1980s, orange culture
in Nangarhar was a very successful model of socialist
agriculture); and energy (the province has eight dams,
and it could sell plenty of solar and hydroelectric en-
ergy). And most crucially, Narngahar is also the only
province in Afghanistan with a network of functioning
schools and qualified teachers.
Baryani is not in it for the money – or the power. The
motto says it all, “Put out the guns, pick up the pens.”
He’s one of the few trying hard. A recent United Na-
tions report in Kabul, quoting figures from the Afghan
Ministry of Education, confirms the daunting task.
Only 3 million Afghan children – from a total of 4.5
million – are now enrolled in school. Afghanistan im-
mediately needs at least 2,500 more schools and 30,000
more teachers. The average salary of a teacher is now
170,000 afghanis, a mere $36 monthly. The moral high
ground of the international community will be mere
rhetoric rubble if there’s no urgent help for Afghans to
pick up their pens.
FOREVER WARS   143
 A US State Depart-
ment image shows
intercepted alu-
minum tubes that
were on their way
to Iraq for possible
use to enrich urani-
um for weapons of
mass destruction.
Photo: AFP / US
State Dept.

From Kabul to Baghdad

So the war is in fact well under way. As the Bush administration remains
obsessed about Iraq, Afghanistan once again has slipped to the status of
a mere sideshow. A real victory in Afghanistan is very hard to consolidate
– and not at all spectacular in media terms. To smash Saddam Hussein’s
crippled forces in prime time with high technology is a lot sexier

By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 7, 2002

The suspense is unbearable. Will it come in just a few paragraphs? Will it

come in hundreds, perhaps thousands of pages? In English? Or in Arabic?
Delivered where, and by whom? The fate of Saddam Hussein’s regime in
Iraq – as well as the future of the Middle East itself – depends on Iraq’s
full declaration of weapons of mass destruction, to be handed over this
Sunday at the United Nations compound in Baghdad. The declaration
then travels in the hands of a UN official to New York by plane, so the UN
Security Council will not have the original document before Monday. Un-
like previous declarations, all the contents of this one will be made pub-

144   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    145

lic, according to the current president of the Security
Council, Colombian ambassador Alfonso Valdivieso.
Iraq’s last declaration of biological weapons, in 1997,
had 600 pages. And the last declaration of missiles,
almost 3,000 pages. The main text was in English, the
notes in Arabic. In Saturday’s declaration, everything
has to be listed: substances, materials, every relevant
office and every relevant corner of any building, along
with their official purpose. Diplomatic sources com-
ment that it will take at least a few days to fully exam-
ine the document and draw the necessary conclusions.
The Bush administration is maintaining maximum
pressure on Iraq and will be looking for anything that
could be characterized as “material breach.” North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approval for an
attack against Iraq is practically assured, according to
Paul Wolfowitz, the Pentagon’s number two. European
diplomats are saying off the record that NATO’s role
might be justified “as an effort to defend Turkey, a
NATO ally.” But, says one diplomat, “this is nonsense,
because planes based in Turkey are attacking Iraq, and
not the other way round.”
Roughly one year ago, Osama bin Laden was escap-
ing from the B-52s pounding the mountains at Tora
Bora, in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province, while in
Petersberg, near Bonn, a wild bunch emerging from
Taliban-free Afghanistan was trying to find themselves
a leader. After a lot of hardcore resentment was ex-
pressed and a lot of US pressure was applied, the cho-
sen leader turned out to be a minor Pashtun notable,
Hamid Karzai, whom the US had rescued from certain
death in Kandahar province at the hands of the Taliban
only a few weeks before.
Hamid Karzai’s new government was supposed to
enjoy the fruits of massive international economic aid
to try to manage three complex tasks: revive a country
totally devastated by 23 years of uninterrupted war;
round up the thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda who
managed to escape US bombs; and start the painful
reconstruction of what one day would be a unified
Afghanistan. This week, representatives of all those
countries which promised well-publicized billions
146   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
of dollars to Karzai’s new government came back to
Bonn. But there was nothing spectacular to announce.
The billions of dollars are not flowing into Afghani-
stan. Only now, the first big project is being launched
– in road construction.
It will take a long time to build an Afghan national
army. The so-called coalition and stabilization forces
represent no more than a cantonment in Kabul, just
about the only place in the country where there is a
semblance of authority by the central government.
Warlords rule the provinces, where the favorite joke is
that Karzai is not capable of ruling even his own chair.
General Fahim, the powerful Minister of Defense,
actually decides everything that matters, to the benefit
of his close coterie of Panjshiris from the Northern
Alliance.
Afghan sources tell Asia Times Online practical-
ly every week about attacks against US forces in the
Pashtun belt. The attacks are part of the jihad to kick
out “foreign invaders,” formally launched in August
in southeastern Afghanistan. At the start of this week,
Radio Tehran, Pakistani Urdu newspapers and Islamic
news agencies widely reported that 50 International
Security Assistance Force soldiers, predominant-
ly Americans, travelling on the three-hour journey
between Logar province and Gardez, in Paktia, were
kidnapped by mujahideen. Their Afghan guides were
apparently involved in the kidnapping, all of them as-
sociated with the Northern Alliance, which means they
acted under the orders of General Fahim, who wants
the Americans out of his turf.
Meanwhile, in Bonn, the West once again demanded
from Karzai all kinds of efforts – political, economic,
institutional. But anyone who has been to Afghanistan
knows that what the country really needs is all kinds
of practical help, and not bags of promises that cannot
be kept. There’s no way the Afghan economy will pick
up speed without a lot of urgent investment in infra-
structure. Opium poppy cultivation will not disappear
if peasants are not offered other means of subsistence:
Karzai-era heroin sales are booming again in Antwerp
and Amsterdam.
The Taliban simply won’t go away: on the contrary,
they have blended in everywhere. US journalist Bob
Woodward has recently revealed how George W Bush
bought Afghan warlords to the tune of US$70 million,
so US forces would not need to stage a dangerous,
massive land invasion of Afghanistan. This saved
many US lives, but the practical results are in fact a
disaster.
There’s no peace to speak of in Afghanistan. George
W Bush wanted to “smoke out” Osama bin Laden and
capture him “dead or alive.” Osama is alive and kick-
ing, firing up his war through the global media, and
betting more than ever on a clash of civilizations. The
most tangible effect of the war against terrorism is the
ressurgence of Talibanization in Pakistan. In the latest
Pakistani elections, the Islamist front Muttahida Maj-
lis-e-Amal (MMA) – an alliance of six religious parties
– captured most of the seats in parliament and won a
majority in the ultra-sensitive provinces neighboring
Afghanistan – Baluchistan and the North West Fron-
tier Province (NWFP).
The MMA wants to prohibit further operations in the
search for al-Qaeda members in the NWFP, any op-
erations in which the CIA participates, and the use of
Pakistani air bases for “foreigners” to launch military
operations in Afghanistan.
In the NWFP, the mullahs are back in full force, en-
forcing the burqa, prohibiting mixed classes, and vow-
ing to apply a key tenet of the MMA program – “to fin-
ish off with vulgarity and obscenity” on TV. The elites
in urban Pakistan are terrified that sooner or later the
mullahs may also be applying an array of punishments
related to moral questions – cutting off hands, piercing
eyes, stoning adulteresses.
Meanwhile, in Iraq, it’s already raining bombs and
pamphlets – just like in Afghanistan a little more than
a year ago. US and British planes – many of them
based in Turkey – keep bombing Iraqi air defenses, the
last time on Wednesday, 25 kilometers northeast of
Mosul. In the exclusion zone north of the 36th parallel,
the US and Britain operate 45 combat planes, serviced
by 1400 men. In the exclusion zone south of the 33th
parallel, they operate 150 combat planes, serviced by
6,000 men.
This year, there have been 406 incidents, including
149 since September 16, the day Baghdad accepted
the return of inspectors from the UN and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. Since the voting of
UN Resolution 1441, there have been 7 incidents in
the north and 17 in the south, according to Gener-
al Richard Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs
of Staff. Last Sunday,13 coalition planes dropped 23
precision-guided bombs over Iraqi air defense installa-
tions, including an advanced vehicle-mounted detec-
tion radar, according to the US. According to the Iraqi
version, the bombed site was the headquarters of an
oil company .
In a measure of the decrepit state of Saddam’s army,
the Iraqis are now using Roland surface-to-air batter-
ies sold by France way back in the 1980s during the
Iran-Iraq War, as well as Russian SAM-3 missiles. The
US, along with its bombs, is also dropping containers,
each one with up to 60,000 sheets of paper of 18cm by
7.5cm. The pamphlets, in English and Arabic, target
the general population and most of all policemen, mili-
tiamen and the army. They “advise” Iraqi soldiers not
to repair the installations destroyed by the bombing,
and tell Kurds in the north and Shi’ites in the south
that these bombings are a means to protect them from
the Iraqi army.
So the war is in fact well under way. As the Bush ad-
ministration remains obsessed about Iraq, Afghanistan
once again has slipped to the status of a mere sideshow.
In the US administration’s global strategy, allies are
considered an annoying sideshow anyway, some of
them barely redeemed by their deep pockets. There’s
no real interest in even trying to help nation-building.
A real victory in Afghanistan is very hard to consol-
idate – and not at all spectacular in media terms. To
smash Saddam Hussein’s crippled forces in prime time
with high technology is a lot sexier. Bush senior had a
“vision thing.” His son’s vision as applied to Afghan-
istan may be a roadmap for what will be America’s
strategy in Iraq.
FOREVER WARS   147
 US nationals of the
Humanitarian Or-
ganization Voices
in the Wilderness
hold a candle vigil
at the entrance of
the United Nations
headquarters
in Baghdad on
New Years Eve in
2002. The group
urged the United
Nations not to bow
to pressure from
the United States
and other nations
who support a war
against Iraq. Photo:
AFP

Iraq first, then Southwest Asia

The logic of war for the moment seems to be favoring American political,
economic and strategic designs. Moscow’s interests seem to be threatened
– in terms of loss of influence – and so seem Beijing’s in the longer run – in
terms of access to energy sources. The potential for trouble is immense
By PEPE ESCOBAR
DECEMBER 25, 2002

PARIS – An Islamic scholar born in Egypt tells Asia Times Online that
as soon as US Secretary of State Colin Powell, a living portrait of mod-
eration, pronounced the deadly magic words “material breach,” the Arab
world had to swallow its bitter impotence and admit that war against Iraq
was practically inevitable.
The whole world knows Saddam Hussein is indefensible: he tortures and
kills opponents, has used chemical weapons against Iran and Iraqi Kurds,
has produced biological weapons and tried to obtain nuclear weapons
148   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    149
– even before the Gulf War, when the US and the UK
generously supplied him with armaments, radioactive
material and advanced military technology. But what
concerns the Arab world is less the fate of Saddam
than the exponential suffering of the Iraqi civilian pop-
ulation in case of war.
Destroy Saddam
The American strategy has been extremely efficient:
it relies on the fact the US cannot be criticized be-
cause it is following the UN. This is one more splen-
did paradox coming from an administration that has
boycotted the most consensual UN decisions – those
regarding the International Court of Justice, global
warming, children’s rights and the banning of nuclear
tests.
Cato in Imperial Rome used to conclude all his
speeches with the catch phrase “Carthago delenda est”
(Carthage must be destroyed). Practically harmless in
fact, Rome’s old enemy was blocking the construction
of the empire and was also an unwanted competitor
in the export of oil and grain. Then one day the Car-
thaginians violated their “exclusion zone” to pursue
a bunch of robbers. This was the pretext Rome was
waiting for, and it smashed Carthage into oblivion.
Carthage had to die for the Roman Empire to live.
Just like Cato, George W. Bush doesn’t mince words
as far as his new world order is concerned. Critics of
the war all agree that Bush may not know much about
the world outside Texas, but he knows something
about oil: his family has been in this business for two
generations. He also knows the war will mobilize more
than 100,000 troops, will cost between US$100 billion
and $200 billion, depending on the scenario, and after-
wards will require maintaining 50,000 troops in Iraq, at
a cost of $18 billion a year, perhaps for decades.
In exchange, the Bush administration may control
the production and pricing system of oil in the world
markets. Iraq, which was producing no more than 1.6
million barrels a day until a few months ago, and now
150   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
is barely producing 500,000, could produce 3 million,
5 million or even 10 million barrels a day. George W.
Bush has a vision of a world where the highest values
in his moral scale – open markets and cheap gas – are
explicitly guaranteed by the US Marines.
Nobody ever stresses that the Security Council
resolutions adopted after the Gulf War are the most
punitive collection of measures imposed on a country
in peacetime since the Versailles Treaty. The economies
of Germany and Japan were rebuilt after World War II,
and both countries soon came back to the concert of
nations. Iraq, on the other hand, has been devastated.
All these years, Security Council members have been
approving sanctions against Iraq so inhumane that
two highly respected UN officials, Denis Hallyday and
Hans von Sponeck, in charge of humanitarian aid to
Iraq, resigned because they did not want to be accom-
plices to a policy described by both of them as “geno-
cidal.”
Richard Falk, professor of international law at Princ-
eton University, is one of the few to draw the relevant
conclusions: “The West is ready to impose a punitive
peace on Third World countries, especially Muslim
countries. It is even capable of giving an appearance of
legitimacy to these hate measures by their vote at the
UN.”
Few outside the US are being fooled – as Europe,
Asia, the Middle East and Latin America know, Wash-
ington hawks have scant respect for the UN. It is wide-
ly recognized that the US, as a permanent member
of the UN Security Council, would never say a single
word about the state of Israel’s illegal colonization and
slow-burning ethnic cleansing policies in Palestine –
practices widely condemned by UN member states.
Frustrated UN diplomats have been reaffirming off
the record that Resolution 1441, the way it was voted
on November 8, is a blank check for war and nothing
but a convenient instrument of American policy. No
matter what it does, Iraq is condemned in advance.
The process has nothing to do with Iraq’s disarma-
ment and everything to do with “regime change” –
which specialists in international law like Falk define
as a direct interference in a country’s sovereignty and
its people’s right to self-determination.
Washington is actively sponsoring post-Saddam Iraq.
During the recent, highly-publicized Iraqi opposi-
tion meeting in London, says the respected Al Hayat
newspaper, the American delegate Zalmay Khalilzad
– the man who according to Afghans stole the Loya
Jirga from King Zahir Shah – actually threatened the
300 participants. He said “Washington could name a
military governor after the fall of Saddam Hussein if
the conference finished without an agreement.”
For the London-based Palestinian paper Al Quds
Al Arabi – one of the only pan-Arab papers to escape
Saudi control – the meeting was organized by the US
to fulfill its own interests: “They got what they wanted:
a political cover for their military objectives.” For Al
Quds Al Arabi, the main beneficiaries are “the pro-Ira-
nian Shi’ites and the Kurds. This assures the ‘Shi’ite-
Kurd coalition’ a big influence over the nomination
of members of the provisional [Iraqi] government,
scheduled for January 15.” Arab diplomats fear that
by playing up ethnic and religious components, the
US will be forcing post-Saddam Iraq to lose its Arab
character.
According to a recent Gallup poll, 91 percent of
Americans think the Iraqi weapons declaration is a lie,
but 66 percent think the administration should not
go to war before the lies are proved by the UN inspec-
tors. This is one of the reasons the US administration
may take its time until January 27, but another reason
is that the Pentagon military machine won’t be ready
until late January or early February.
The best Arab observers have no doubt that Saddam
Hussein will do everything in his power to make the
Americans pay a tremendous price for the invasion.
American military planners know the urban guerrilla
scenario is very much on the cards: a Fortress Baghdad
heavily protected by Saddam’s elite Special Republi-
can Guard plus the two regiments of the Republican
Guard, in a 21st century remake of the Siege of Stalin-
grad.
There’s a possibility Saddam may set fire to Iraq’s oil
fields – as he did in 1991 in Kuwait. He may also be
betting on collateral damage reaching an unbearable
level for Western public opinion, way beyond the esti-
mated 3,000-plus civilian victims of American bomb-
ing during the New Afghan War. If Saddam Hussein,
the ultimate survivor, resorts to employing his crude
chemical or biological weapons, the White House’s
assurances that it would go nuclear will not be much of
a consolation.
The bigger picture
American foreign policy is now dominated by three
vectors: the post-Cold War policy to prevent the re-
surgence of any rival power comparable to the USSR;
the global war against terrorism, encompassing states
that support terrorism, and states that have decided to
acquire weapons of mass destruction; and the echoes
and reverberations of the war against the Taliban in
Afghanistan.
These three vectors converge at an intersection of the
Chinese, Indian, Slavic and Arab worlds – what Amer-
ican strategists (but not yet tourist guidebooks) define
as Southwest Asia.
As if any confirmation were needed, General Tommy
Franks – who managed the war against the Taliban
and will manage the war against Iraq – has stressed
time and time again that American forces will stay in
Afghanistan for a long time. There are roughly 8,000
American troops in Afghanistan at the moment. They
remain practically all the time in cantonment mode,
because they have no access to valuable information to
guide them on the trail of Taliban and al-Qaeda oper-
atives.
To make matters worse, in the Pashtun belt, the
Americans are faced with a jihad against foreign
invaders launched last August, a jihad with a strong
rear-guard base in Pakistani territory. As Asia Times
Online has reported from the spot, Pashtuns on both
sides of the volatile and porous Pakistan-Afghanistan
FOREVER WARS   151
border are unanimously enraged by the US. Afghani-
stan remains totally insecure. Warlords rule the prov-
inces. Hamid Karzai’s government is dominated by
Uzbeks, Tajiks and, on a smaller scale, Hazaras. It is so
fragile that Karzai, according to local jokes, cannot rule
even over his own chair. And once again, predictably,
Afghanistan has disappeared from the media radar.
The “smoking out” of Taliban and al-Qaeda and the
capture of their chiefs and commanders has been a
failure. The New Afghan War became a Pakistani war.
President General Pervez Musharraf ’s decision to
totally align himself with the US was not much help to
Washington. The best illustration is what happened in
the Pakistani elections on October 10: the President’s
party – the Muslim League Quaid-e-Azam – won in
some places, but the religious parties united in the
Muttahidda Majlis-e-Aman (MMA) won a massive
victory in the ultra-sensitive Pashtun-dominated re-
gions, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and
Balochistan.
The vice-president of the MMA, Qazi Hussain
Ahmed, has said he wants to eliminate US air bases in
Pakistan and wants the country out of the coalition to
fight terrorism. The regions controlled by the MMA
are bound to be subjected to Sharia (Islamic law),
with no interference of Western culture. Militants in
most of the groups composing the MMA – especially
the young – are in fact basically the same people that
fought under a Taliban or an al-Qaeda banner last year
and are still engaging in anti-US jihad on both sides of
the border.
As the US war on terror translates into a massive-
ly powerful war machine, the US has extended the
battlefield way beyond Afghanistan and Pakistan. Now
there are more air and ground forces in Diego Garcia
– located in the heart of the Indian Ocean. There are
at least 200 US “advisors” in Yemen, where, not by an
accident, a precise hit from a drone smashed a vehicle
transporting six alleged al-Qaeda members. There are
US Special Forces in Djibouti, in the ultra-sensitive
horn of Africa – where soon there will be a full Amer-
ican headquarters. The agenda is only superficially re-
152   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
lated to the pursuit of terrorist groups in north Africa.
It is directly related to the replacement of American
bases in Saudi Arabia, as it is almost certain (though
not yet an irreversible decision) that the Saudis will not
authorize their use in the upcoming Iraqi invasion.
What the US is really interested in is Southwest Asia:
Iran and the former Soviet republics of Central Asia.
The Bush administration and the Putin government
are playing a very complex chess game. Putin is sac-
rificing positions now to gain a later advantage. The
Americans have already attacked Russian interests on
four sides. The US torpedoed the 1972 ABM treaty
which forbids space missile defense. NATO expanded
east to former Soviet satellites – and now incorporates
three former Soviet republics: Estonia, Latvia and Lith-
uania. A crucial pipeline carrying a substantial part of
the Caspian oil wealth runs from Baku in Azerbaijan to
Ceyhan in Turkey, south of the Caucasus, thus totally
bypassing Russia. And the US signed with Uzbekistan
and Kyrgyzstan – and is negotiating with Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan – agreements to create American
air bases in these former Soviet republics’ territories.
These developments form the basis of a long-term
American military presence in the heart of Southwest
Asia.
The Bush administration may start its new war
against Iraq – but the war in fact is against Iran. Iran is
an official member of the Axis of Evil. Washington has
conveniently forgotten that only one year ago, during
the New Afghan War, Iran was actually an ally of the
US as it helped, financed and armed the Hazaras, who
were part of the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance.
European diplomats suggest the heart of the matter
is how the regime in Tehran is perceived in Washing-
ton. There may exist an understanding of the Iranian
regime as a concert of multiple and clashing centers of
decision. But Washington hawks have only two preoc-
cupations. They know the regime is under the power
of Velayat-e-Faqih – Islamic jurisprudence. Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei directs the army, the
security services, the Guardians of the Revolution, the
paramilitary forces, the institutions of the judiciary, the
imams who recite the Friday prayers all over the coun- The parallels with Afghanistan are striking. The US
try, and also the media. So in the view of Washington intervention in Afghanistan completely destabilized
hawks, President Khatami simply cannot reform the Pakistan – and a few dangerous after-effects are al-
regime. ready noticeable. The US intervention in Iraq could
completely destabilize Iran. It’s absolutely certain
Strategically, Iran is important because – as Israeli in-
that Iran will not help mortal enemy Saddam Hus-
telligence has been alerting – Iran could have a nuclear
sein. But the fact is the US already has a substantial
bomb before 2005. Washington hawks figure that if the
military presence in the Gulf, Pakistan, Central Asia
Shah’s regime wanted to become a nuclear power, it
and Turkey. Add Iraq, and Iran will be encircled. The
need be no different for the Islamic regime. The ayatol-
Islamic regime may inevitably react by forcefully
lahs indeed fear total encirclement of Iran. They know
aiding the anti-US jihadis in Afghanistan as well as the
that Iraq was trying to become nuclear, that Israel and
anti-Musharraf parties in Pakistan. Iran could also try
Pakistan are nuclear powers, and that now the US is an
to seduce Iraq’s 60 percent of Shi’ites to prevent the
unwanted neighbor.
next Iraqi state from being a totally American con-
European diplomats speculate that Iran could have coction (as the Arab press is convinced it will be). It’s
three options: it could continue trying to acquire fissile fair to imagine that under these circumstances the war
material and missile launchers, while waiting for ex- against terrorism will acquire a totally new dimension.
ternal threats to justify the pursuit of a nuclear arsenal.
The logic of war for the moment seems to be favoring
It could engage in a secret program to build nuclear
American political, economic and strategic designs.
weapons – just like Israel did. Or it could explode a nu-
Moscow’s interests seem to be threatened – in terms of
clear device – just like India and Pakistan did. There’s
loss of influence – and so seem Beijing’s in the longer
one factor common to these three options: they are all
run – in terms of access to energy sources. The poten-
anathema for Washington. For the US, it’s out of the
tial for trouble is immense – but so is the potential for
question for Iran to become a very important regional
a peaceful Southwest Asia ruled by a new concert of
power, andnor does the US want to become engaged
powers: the US, China, Russia and India. This may not
in an automatic nuclear guarantee to the Gulf monar-
be an Axis of Good, as compared to the current Axis of
chies. So Iran risks sooner or later becoming a victim
Evil, but it could certainly be an Axis of the World.
of the American doctrine of preemptive action.
FOREVER WARS   153
 The London-based
Saudi daily Al-
Sharq Al-Awsat
(C), and other
Gulf newspapers,
show ‘America on
Fire’ on their front
pages after the
World Trade Center
attacks on Sept. 11,
2001. Photo: AFP

Clues from ancient Babylon

It’s unlikely Saddam Hussein has been using a phone, mobile or otherwise, these
days. Nobody on the planet can tell for sure how will he choose to exit from
History. When he delivered his speech for the 12th anniversary of the Gulf War
– known as ‘Mother of All Battles’ in Iraq – he compared the next Desert Storm
to the 1258 conquest of Baghdad by the Mongols. The Mongols destroyed the city
and killed Al-Mustasim, the last Abbasid caliph. The caliph died fighting.

By PEPE ESCOBAR
JANUARY 31, 2003

CAIRO – All the Arab capitals – as much as Washington – wish he

would just go away. He won’t. As an unusually exasperated diplomat
remarked in Geneva: “It’s not about Iraq. It’s not about inspections. It’s
not about oil. It’s about one man really. Why doesn’t he just … disappear?
Osama bin Laden – yesterday’s villain, untraceable, uncatchable – re-

154   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    155

mains in the shadows, like a specter. Saddam Hussein
– unlike Osama – is in your face, our face, everybody’s
faces, everyday on Iraqi TV, a creepy, stony remake of
a Babylonian emperor chairing meetings with army
officers and security agencies.
Osama bin Laden has not lost his gift for timing.
Even before George W. Bush, with religious exalta-
tion and crusader spirit, talked about the State of the
Union, Osama, with religious exaltation and crusader
spirit, was purportedly talking about the state of the
umma. He has sent a 26-page text with his “trade-
mark secret signature” to the Islamic Center for Stud-
ies and Research in Pakistan. The text was obtained by
the Saudi-owned newspaper Al-Sharq Al Awsat, and
the story was published on January 26. In the text,
Osama stresses that Muslims should “enter into the
blessed obligation of jihad by highlighting the impor-
tance of unity and eliminating differences of opinion.”
It’s not a coincidence that this call for unity happens
just as the war against Iraq seems inevitable. Millions
of angry and frustrated Muslims – especially in the
Middle East – are bound to echo Osama when he
asks: “When will Muslims wake up from their long
sleep, and when will they distinguish between their
friend and enemy? When will they direct their own
arrows that they use to fight each other to their ex-
ternal enemy that steals and loots its fortunes and its
resources?” Dictatorial Arab regimes tremble when
they hear these words. They know “regime change” is
not applicable to Osama, but they also know Osama
wants to apply his own version of “regime change” to
them.
As far as Washington is concerned, in the absence of
Osama, Saddam Hussein remains the next best option.
Colin Powell himself recognized after a meeting with
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister that Saddam’s exile – along
with his family and the leadership of the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) – plus immunity, would be
the ideal solution. Powell even hinted that if the UN ap-
proved it, the US might go for it. A few days before Pow-
ell, Donald Rumsfeld had already said that an arrange-
156   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
ment like this “would be a fair trade to avoid a war.”
Washington wants something that Baghdad will
never deliver. Egyptian politician Farouq Goweida says
why: “The US is probably aware that if Saddam dies
under American bombing, he will become a symbol of
resistance for the Arab world. So obviously they will
refuse him the privilege. That’s why his only way out is
to remain in Baghdad.” On January 17, Ali Hasan Al
Majid, aka “Chemical Ali” (he is the alleged master-
mind of the gassing of Iraqi Kurds in 1988 and one of
Saddam ‘s cousins), visited Syria. “Chemical Ali” is as
close to the leader as you can get: he manages Saddam’s
personal affairs. Obviously he dismissed all the specu-
lation about exile as “absurd.”
Mohsen Khalil, Iraq’s ambassador to Egypt, in an
analysis that could have been penned by Osama him-
self, also dismissed the rumors as “another example of
US propaganda and lies where they leak information
that is not true so that they can create a rift between
Arab leaders.” And in another echo of Osama’s call for
unity, the ambassador said that “Arab leaders refuse to
interfere in the internal political affairs of other na-
tions, because they know if it happens in Iraq, it will
happen to them next.”
Colin Powell certainly does not believe in the exile
option, and is now getting ready for the pitch of his life
next Wednesday at the Security Council, the new key
date set by Washington. President Bush is very clear:
the US will consult with the UN, but if Saddam does
not disarm, in the name of security and peace, the US
will lead a coalition and go to war.
George W. Bush has not declared war, not yet. But he
has announced it. He didn’t lay down an ultimatum.
But he formulated it. With one stroke, Bush smashed
the importance of the meeting this past Wednesday
where the inspectors’s report was discussed at the
Security Council; smashed the importance of the new
report to be presented on February 14 (a German
proposal); and imposed on the UN his own calendar
– faster, and with a very clear objective. The date that
matters now is February 5, when Powell presents the
alleged new evidence capable of convicting Saddam’s
regime. Very important: Bush never pronounced the
word “resolution.” This means that as far as Washing-
ton is concerned the war won’t depend on a UN vote in
a new resolution; the war depends on a clear choice by
Saddam Hussein, right here, right now.
In a secret document titled “What does disarma-
ment look like,” leaked in the beginning of this week,
the White House accuses Qusai, Saddam’s youngest
son and heir, of organizing the dissimulation of Iraqi
means of production and storage of weapons of mass
destruction. According to the document, the Iraqi
organization put in place to aid the inspectors works
as an “anti-inspector corps.” These “anti-inspectors”
are supposed to be scientists capable of protecting
sensitive installations from the UN operation. The
White House document says these scientists are much
larger in number than the inspectors, and they also get
help from “thousands of others, coming from all Iraqi
security agencies,” in a mission to “hide documents
and materials from the inspectors.” According to the
White House document, Qusai Hussein – the head
of the Special Security Organization (SSO) – controls
the whole operation. Normally, Qusai heads the Jihaz
Al-Amn Al-Khas (Special Security Service), created
in 1984 and listing some 5,000 officials charged with
protecting sensitive sites.
The White House document goes even further, saying
that a whole basket of security agencies is engaged in
preventing the UN from working properly. These in-
clude operatives from the military industry; the special
division in charge of the security of Baghdad; military
intelligence (with as much as 6,000 agents); the Repub-
lican Guard; and the Special Republican Guard (with
as many as 100,000 personnel). It’s practically certain
that Colin Powell will present this kind of evidence
to the UN next week, along with a battery of Ikonos
satellite images of movement of sensitive material, and
photos of recent mosques or hospitals built inside or
around military sites considered to be certified bomb-
ing targets.
As far as the al-Qaeda-Baghdad connection goes,
things are much more complicated. It’s fair to assume
Powell’s presentation will rely on confessions obtained
by US intelligence in Guantanamo, Cuba. European
intelligence agencies don’t believe in the veracity of the
information, but American intelligence says al-Qaeda
“enemy combatants” confessed having received chem-
ical products from Iraq for their training. Al-Qaeda
operatives may have been to Iraq for training (very
unlikely), and Iraqis may have been to Afghan training
camps (very likely, as Asia Times Online confirmed in
August 2001).
Saddam Hussein, as expected, remains defiant.
According to a source inside Iraq, Saddam said this
week on Iraqi TV that everybody should be inspired
by the suicide-bombing of “our Palestinian brothers.”
It appears that Qusai – now on TV every day – along
with army generals, has been charged by Saddam to
organize the key Iraqi defense around Baghdad.
Another US option would be to simply exterminate
Saddam: CIA and Special Forces operating in Iraqi
Kurdistan have authority to use lethal force. According
to a presidential order signed by Bush in 2002, it’s now
legal for Americans to assassinate foreign leaders or
civilians. Many within the Bush administration believe
assassinating Saddam is an unrivalled option in terms
of cost-benefit.
It’s unlikely the legal killer brigade has reached the
gates of Baghdad yet: At the moment they are sup-
posed to be training opposition Kurdish and Shia
leaders, and also scouting for potential landing strips
to be used in case of war. Nonetheless they can rely on
a massive armory of satellites monitoring the phone
calls and walkie-talkie transmissions of Saddam and
his generals. A converted Boeing 707, called a RC-135
Rivet Joint, flies up to 10 hours a day at 35,000 feet
over Iraq, intercepting all phone calls and identify-
ing callers’ locations with a minimal margin of error.
Two satellites are dedicated to tracking Saddam. The
Micron Spy satellite, stationed more than 33,000km
above the Middle East, picks up phone calls and sends
FOREVER WARS   157
them to a US listening base in Yorkshire, England. The
Trumpet satellite picks up cellphone calls and sends
them to a base in Colorado.
It’s unlikely Saddam Hussein has been using a phone,
mobile or otherwise, these days. Nobody on the planet
can tell for sure how will he choose to exit from His-
tory. When he delivered his speech for the 12th an-
niversary of the Gulf War – known as “Mother of All
Battles” in Iraq – he compared the next Desert Storm
to the 1258 conquest of Baghdad by the Mongols. The
Mongols destroyed the city and killed Al-Mustasim,
158   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
the last Abbasid caliph. The caliph died fighting. The The famous Khan
reference matches Saddam’s recent eulogy of Palestin- al-Khalili bazaar
in Cairo. Photo:
ian suicide bombers. Wikimedia
But only a few days before this speech, Saddam told
his army commanders that Gilgamesh – the legendary
king of Uruk – decided to abdicate from the throne
and wander the earth “in search of the secret of im-
mortality.” One thing is certain: Saddam is no Shah of
Iran. So how will he play it? As a martyr, like the last
Abbasid caliph? Or as a philosopher-king, like Gil-
gamesh?
All quiet on the Arab street
When Colin Powell started delivering the pitch of his life at the United
Nations Security Council this Wednesday, the cry of the muezzin at the
Hussein mosque calling for the sunset prayer was echoing throughout the
Khan al-Khalili. Walking around the huge market, in ahwas and shops,
the odd ‘Hey mister, want papyrus?’ barely interrupted the hypnotic drone
of Powell, a secular muezzin in suit and tie reading his indictment almost
like a prayer, cueing the carefully edited audio of what, for many in the
Arab nation, was nothing but accusations and allegations, and for some in
the West was indeed ‘unrefutable’ and ‘undeniable’ evidence.
By PEPE ESCOBAR
FEBRUARY 7, 2003
CAIRO – Call it romantic or realist, but in the hearts and minds of 280
million Arabs, their world is defined by a western wing in North Africa,
an eastern wing in the Levant – with a very strategic border ending in
Iraq – and the heart in Egypt. This representation is very much faithful to
the powerful geographic, strategic and political ties uniting all Arabs. It’s
not a mystery why Pan-Arabia is so worried today, with so many unfore-
FOREVER WARS    159
seen consequences of an Anglo-American-led war in
one of its strategic borders.
If Egypt is the heart of the Arab world, Islamic Cai-
ro is the heart of Egypt, and El Fishawy one of its key
arteries. El Fishawy itself is at the heart of the Khan
al-Khalili – a caravanserai originally built in the late
14th century and today a gargantuan labyrinth of mar-
kets and shops, one of the great bazaars of the whole
Middle East. El Fishawy has been the quintessential
ahwa (coffeehouse), packed day and night since the
beginning of the 20th century.
Sprawling to both sides of a cramped narrow alley,
proud of its mirrors hanging over divans and its old
photos hanging on the walls, it impeccably coexists
with a bazaar chaos of brass and copper, rows and rows
of Nefertiti, Anubis and Horus in clay or stone, plastic
transparent pyramids complete with showered golden
powder, real and fake amber jewelry, belly dancing
outfits, cheap camel design carpets, rubber obelisks
and the odd stray cat.
If downtown Cairo is a derelict early modern infer-
no of noise and pollution, in Islamic Cairo – with its
twisting alleyways smelling of cumin and petrol and
fabulous collection of medieval mosques – it’s not
impossible to time travel to the Cairo of the Thousand
and One Nights: after all, many a fabled episode took
place in the Cairo of the Mamluks.
Only five minutes away from El Fishawy is the
mosque of Al-Azhar, founded in the year 970. Al-
Azhar is also the oldest university in the world. For
centuries it was the Mecca of knowledge for scholars
from all over the Islamic world and Europe. Today they
don’t study in the atmospheric central courtyard of the
mosque, surrounded by minarets from the 15th and
16th centuries, but in different campuses around the
country. And as a sign of the times, political scientist
Mustapha El-Feki now worries that Al-Azhar does
not send its scholars abroad anymore: this would be
“the best way to show the world the true face of Islam,
which is based on tolerance.”
On jumma prayers on Friday at Al-Azhar, the imam
160   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
has been raging against what is largely perceived as
another war imposed on the whole umma – the com-
munity of the faithful. A request to watch one of these
sermons is politely turned down by attendants at the
mosque: “The police won’t let you come inside. And
many people may be angry, they may think you are
American.” Though aware of the currently extra-sen-
sitive situation, Cairenes remain unfailingly polite and
helpful. Numerous tortuous steps to arrange a possible
meeting with the Sheikh of Al-Azhar – the ultimate
theological master in Egypt – are softened with endless
cups of mint tea.
Two minutes away from El Fishawy is the mosque of
Sayyidna al-Hussein, arguably the most sacred Islamic
site in Egypt, with its shrine under which is buried the
head of Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammad,
brought to the mosque in a green silk bag in 1153 –
almost half a millennium after his death in Kerbala (in
Iraq) – at a time when the crusaders were desecrat-
ing Islamic holy places in Palestine. This interplay of
history is just another example of how the concept of
an Arab nation is impregnated in the collective un-
conscious. At the Mashi Ghet, the Al Azhar building
holding the mosque’s administrative offices, an official
says, “The Arab nation and Islam is one. So the suffer-
ing of Iraqis and Palestinians cannot but be shared by
any Egyptian.”
Maybe not around the Hussein mosque – which faces
the Khan al-Khalili and inescapable package-tour
hell – but behind the alleys of Al Azhar it is possible to
enter pure Naguib Mahfouz territory. The 91-year-old
1988 Nobel of Literature, the greatest living writer in
Arabic, has recently left hospital. He cannot write any
more: he dictates to a friend, playwright and journalist
Mohamed Salmawy. Every Thursday, the great writ-
er’s vocal haikus are printed as a short column in the
newspaper Al Ahram. Egyptians of all walks of life
read them as their secular version of a jumma prayer
– a helpful guide to the trials and tribulations of life.
Mahfouz now compares his life to the penultimate
train station on his annual train journey from Cairo
to Alexandria: he is getting ready to collect his luggage
anticipating the arrival at his destination.
Mahfouz was born in Gamaliyya, in the heart of
Islamic Cairo: his family moved to another neighbor-
hood before he became a teenager, but in his heart
he never left. He kept coming back to El Fishawy to
meet his friends – and Islamic Cairo is the privileged
universe of his modern Dickensian novels. In fact, in a
novel like Children of the Alley, the whole universe is
contained in a single alley and the people who live in
it: this is Mahfouz himself speaking as a boy growing
up in the beginning of the 20th century in an alley in
Islamic Cairo called Darb Qirmiz.
When Colin Powell started delivering the pitch of
his life at the United Nations Security Council this
Wednesday, the cry of the muezzin at the Hussein
mosque calling for the sunset prayer was echoing
throughout the Khan al-Khalili. Walking around the
huge market, in ahwas and shops, the odd “Hey mister,
want papyrus?” barely interrupted the hypnotic drone
of Powell, a secular muezzin in suit and tie reading his
indictment almost like a prayer, cueing the carefully
edited audio of what, for many in the Arab nation, was
nothing but accusations and allegations, and for some
in the West was indeed “unrefutable” and “undeniable”
evidence.
At El Fishawy, the inevitable horde of Japanese tour-
ists carrying an audiovideo Babel kept struggling with
their sheeshas – water pipes. And at an ahwa in a dark
cul-de-sac not far from El Fishawy, a cluster of men
were more interested in watching the rerun of a soccer
match on a cheap made in China TV set. All the con-
versation shuffled around the crucial match this Friday
when Egyptian favorites Zamalek face the Moroccans
from Wydad Casablanca for the African Supercup title.
Somebody says that Powell has made a connection
between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda. “He says
there are more than 20 al-Qaeda living in Baghdad.”
Somebody answers: “So what? You don’t go to war
for this.” And the conversation instantly shifts to war.
Any ahwa – cheap tin-plated-topped tables, rickety
wooden chairs, room filled with sawdust – is not just a
coffehouse: it is the quintessential Arab street, square
and living room all rolled into one. Some play towla
– backgammon – some smoke sheeshas, some drink
mint tea or, in winter, sahleb – a warm drink of semo-
lin powder, milk and chopped nuts. Some plunge into
deep silence for hours, some do everything at all once
and talk non-stop, occasionally glancing at also non-
stop Arabic movies on video and, of course, live or
rerun soccer matches.
The informal message of the Khan al-Khalili is “no
to war, yes to peace”. Everybody seems to agree with
the Syrian ambassador to the UN when he says on TV
that “war would be a failure of the international sys-
tem, which should depend on the UN charter”. And
some even clap when the ambassador says, “How can
we go to war against Iraq – which is not occupying any
country and is not menacing any of its neighbors –
when Israel is still occupying Palestinian, Lebanese and
Syrian territories in defiance of many UN resolutions?”
Somebody echoes the ambassador, “Nobody must have
bombs and missiles. Israel also, no.”
The street-square-living room is nothing but echo-
ing silkier corridors. Mohamed Sid-Ahmed, from the
Egyptian Council of Foreign Relations, recently back
from a meeting with members of the European Union
in Brussels, says, “America does not want Israel to dis-
mantle its nuclear arsenal. It is interested only in going
after suspected caches of weapons of mass destruction
held by countries that are Israel’s enemies. This double
standard is the main obstacle in the way of finding a
real solution to the problem of weapons of mass de-
struction.”
Mahfouz nowadays barely talks about politics. But
in one of his weekly newspaper pieces, in 1997, he
wrote, “No matter how powerful a culture may be
militarily and politically, it cannot impose itself upon
a people unless they are convinced of its superiority
to their own culture. If they are convinced, then the
new culture is more qualified than the one it replaced.”
Today this reads like a message from the Arab world to
America.
In Baghdad, General Amer Al Sa’adi, scientific ad-
viser to Saddam, is describing the Powell presentation
FOREVER WARS   161
as “a typical American show, with stunts and special
effects”. Ahmad laughs at the comparison. Ahmad is
a character straight from a Mahfouz novel. He is only
22, unemployed, left school to take care of his ailing
father. He spends mornings and nights at home, and
during the day hits the streets of Cairo trying to make
ends meet. In three months he’ll be going to military
service for three years, and he is very much afraid of
the future. Especially to what might happen to his
relationship with his 18-year-old girlfriend. They see
each other only once a week, sometimes only twice a
month. He says that he is shy, so that’s why she took
the initiative to kiss him for the first time. His most
pressing obligation is how to find US$15 to buy a
brand-new Lifestyle shirt for their next date. “She is
very chic. From a rich family. When we go out, she
always pays.” He wishes he would not have to serve the
obligatory three years so he could pursue his studies,
be with his girlfriend, and work on his dream of emi-
grating to London. Now he is afraid of a possible war.
“Bush is crazy. He wants to bomb everybody. What if
something happens to Egypt?”
At a jewelry shop in the Khan al-Khalili, Fatima gives
up on a silver necklace. The Powell theme is inescap-
able, “I was waiting for something more practical. He
showed a lot of photos. Why did they keep this so long
for themselves?” She’s not convinced about the al-Qae-
da ties, “Nobody knows. They can say these people are
in Egypt. Who can say no?”
In private, the Arab street talks a lot, but it is more
or less prohibited from shouting in public. Amina,
a professor of French literature at the University of
Cairo, says, “There are many people who share our
feelings but are afraid to come out and protest.” Mod-
erate Islamists, fierce nationalists, Nasser nostalgics,
human rights activists, politicians, university students
in fact have very specific demands. They want Egypt
to ban US and British warships from entering the Suez
canal. They are asking people to boycott US and British
products: McDonald’s and KFCs in Cairo are nearly
deserted these days. They demand the end of any form
of American military presence in the Arab world. And
most of all they want the end of Egypt’s draconian
162   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
emergency law – which prohibits demonstrations. Abu to channel the interest of the public to purely cultural next day.” In The Day the Leader Was Killed, a com-
Madi, a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood debates will calm their anger. If there is war, it will be plex mini-novel which is really about the merciless
and a “moderate Islamist” by his own definition, sort of difficult to imagine the reactions.” new materialism creeping into the Egypt of the early
agrees with regime change in Iraq: “We need to change 1980s, Mahfouz writes, “Life’s but a walking shadow
Powell’s speech has come and gone. Late at night, El
Saddam Hussein, but through democracy. If Iraqis on a summer’s day, seeking shelter under the shades
Fishawy still gets a drop of its ceaseless heavy dose of
want to get rid of Saddam Hussein, that is their right. of a tree for an hour or so and then is heard no more.”
tourists, but the shops are closing and the ahwas are
But no one has the right to do it in their place.” At the Khan al-Khalili, the call of the muezzin starts
more silent. A raiyis – waiter – says, “Who cares about
another day – and the Arab street goes back to the
Gamil Mattar, who directs the Arab Center for Futur- war? We have to worry about getting money for the
business of seeking shelter from the coming storm.
istic Studies, says so much speculation about the war
in Iraq affects everybody in the Arab world. “The US
has many plans for us. But do we know what they are?
And does the US, for that matter, know what they are?”
For months Mattar has been puzzled by the deafening
silence of the Arab street. He is convinced the silence
masks a lot of anger, which could explode anytime
with very worrying consequences: “The gap between
the Arab people and their regimes was widened to
such an unprecedented extent that one can’t imagine a
worse scenario than reality today. I’m quite pessimistic.
I think this gap has swallowed everything.”
The gap between the Arab street and the governments
in the region sometimes narrows, though. There have
been a few demonstrations in Cairo – the heart of the
Arab world – but with more police than demonstra-
tors. The regimes obviously prefer silence. At the 35th
Cairo International Book Fair, which ends this Friday,
for the first time since 1983 any debates about the
explosive situation in the Middle East were prohibit-
ed. Egypt created this fair in 1967 to show the world it
still had an important regional role to play in spite of
the military defeat by Israel. Book sellers confirm that
the fair was always a great forum to debate terrorism,
freedom of expression and the political role of religious
institutions.
For Mustapha Bakri, editor of an independent weekly
in Arabic, the fact that nobody is allowed this year to
discuss Iraq or Palestine shows how much the powers
that be fear those oceans of extremely angry Muslim
youth ready to explode: “The state is very much con-
scious of the gap between the government position and
public opinion.” Writer Mahmoud Al-Tohami says that
the fair has lost all its impact: “It is naive to think that
FOREVER WARS   163
 Iraqi Ambassador
to the Arab League
Moshen Khalil.

Looking askance at a
(very) likely war
In an exclusive interview, the Iraqi ambassador to the Arab League denies
any relationship between Baghdad and al-Qaeda

By PEPE ESCOBAR
FEBRUARY 14, 2003

CAIRO – In an exclusive interview to Asia Times Online, Moshen Khalil,

the Iraqi ambassador to the Arab League, admitted that war is practically
inevitable: “The prospects are very high, I would say 99.99 percent. But the
remaining 0.01 percent still has a chance.”
Khalil will be a key player at the extraordinary Arab League summit of
foreign ministers this Sunday in Cairo. He is not only one of Iraq’s top
diplomats but also a journalist, writing a weekly column for Babel, the
newspaper controlled by Saddam Hussein’s son Uday. The Iraqi embassy
in Cairo is in a splendid colonial house bought during the 1930s near the

164   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    165

banks of the Nile. Right across, also in a splendid colo-
nial house, is the Saudi Arabian embassy.
As far as the summit is concerned, where 21 belea-
guered members of the Arab League (Iraq is the 22nd)
will try to find some unity and hammer out a common
position for a last chance to peace, the Iraqi position,
says Khalil, is clear: “We will listen to the opinions of
all other Arab countries, but they should stick to what
has been decided in the Beirut summit [in March 2002]
and the ministerial meeting last November. The most
important thing is the obligation of all Arab countries to
reject aggression against Iraq, which would be consid-
ered an aggression against all Arab countries. The US is
clearly bent on aggression.”
Concerning the proposed Franco-German initiatives
at the UN asking for more inspectors and tougher in-
spections, with no time limit, Khalil repeats that “Iraq’s
position is to prevent an aggression. I’m waiting for my
government’s judgment before expressing my opinion
on what France and Germany propose. Any effort which
leads to prevent aggression is welcome.” Concerning an
Egyptian-Saudi proposal which would recommend that
Iraq to get rid of any weapons of mass destruction, and
offer amnesty to Iraqi military officers who would reveal
the whereabouts of such weapons, Khalil’s answer is
simple: “These weapons do not exist.”
Khalil is sure that “the only thing that would convince
the US not to go to war is that the international com-
munity makes a stand against aggression. Iraq has dealt
freely with the inspectors. The inspectors have said that
Iraq is complying and fully cooperating. The inspectors
have no information on the existence of prohibited
weapons. The inspectors are the ones who should judge.
The US insists on war for political reasons which have
no relation to the inspections. If the US administration
is left to force its will, it will be forcing it over the whole
international community. Iraq is cooperating with the
UN to demonstrate it is free from these weapons.”
Khalil confirms that the leadership in Baghdad seems
to be aware that the US is not bluffing. “The Iraqi lead-
ership is behaving as if the war is about to happen any
time. They have a very clear picture. They see the pre-
166   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
texts used by the US and they know the real objective all possible directions. According to bin Laden, under are in Baghdad or Aden.”
is not based on facts. America’s policy is to control oil, the current circumstances, “There will be no harm if the Khalil believes there’s only one way to prevent war: “If
occupy and reframe the region, and find a solution for interests of Muslims converge with the interests of the
there is a change in the beliefs of the American admin-
the Palestinian crisis based on the Israeli point of view.” socialists in the fight against the crusaders, despite our
istration. If they become convinced they are not sure to
belief in the infidelity of socialists. The jurisdiction of
The widely-rumored possibility of exile for Saddam achieve their objectives. And if the US public opinion is
the socialists and those rulers has fallen a long time ago.
Hussein is dismissed by a diplomat who knows the against them.”
Socialists are infidels wherever they are, whether they
Iraqi leader very well: “These are imaginative thoughts,
and illegal. Interference in domestic policy of other
states is forbidden by Article 2 of the UN charter. The
Iraqi people have a history of struggling against foreign
occupation and will never accept a foreigner force im-
posing their will over the country. People will be part
of the resistance.” But how? “Ask the American admin-
istration. When the Americans come to our country,
we will fight back and resist. We are taking everything
into consideration in case of war. We have good expe-
rience in this field. We have been facing aerial combat
for the past 12 years.”
The Anglo-American bombing, reaffirms Khalil, never
stopped: “US aircraft are bombing cities and civilians.
There are thousands of dead and injured in cities in
all governorates, including Baghdad. Since December
1998, there have been 9,400 military strikes, an average
of 20 to 40 strikes a day. But the international media
keeps quiet about this.” As a comparison, according to
UN data, from 1991 to 1999 there were more than 6,000
Anglo-American strikes, dropping 1,800 bombs and hit-
ting more than 450 targets. Khalil also says “1,730,000
people have died due to the sanctions, the embargo, or
effects of bombing by depleted uranium.” UN agencies
and a plethora of Western humanitarian organizations
estimate the number of victims from 500,000 to up to
1 million. Khalil maintains that “every day these [Iraqi]
figures are announced on newspapers and TV.”
Khalil denies any relationship between Iraq and
al-Qaeda. “There is a fundamental difference between
our modern and reasonable regime, which has no link
with fundamentalism and extremism, and al-Qaeda.
They will never prove anything in this respect. Iraq has
no relation to al-Qaeda and has never cooperated or
encouraged terrorist organizations.” Osama bin Lad-
en himself confirmed it in so many words in his latest
audio broadcast by Al Jazeera – which has been spun in
FOREVER WARS   167
 Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa (R) meets with six Arab foreign ministers, from R to L, Lebanon’s Mahmud Hammud, Iraqi Naji
Sabri, Omani Yussef bin Alawi, Libyan African Unity Minister Abdel Salam Triki, and Syrian Faruq al-Shara at Arab League headquarters in
Cairo 23 March 2003. Photo: AFP

At the gates of heaven – or hell

George W. Bush may have never read Dante Alighieri. But Bush’s three
ultimatums – to Iraq, to the United Nations and to the European Union
– seem to come straight from one of old Europe’s greatest creative art-
ists. ‘Abandon all hope ye who enter,’ says Dante in The Divine Comedy
at the gates of hell

By PEPE ESCOBAR
FEBRUARY 26, 2003

CAIRO – George W. Bush may have never read Dante Alighieri. But
Bush’s three ultimatums – to Iraq, to the United Nations and to the
European Union – seem to come straight from one of old Europe’s great-
est creative artists. “Abandon all hope ye who enter,” says Dante in The
Divine Comedy at the gates of hell. “Abandon all hope ye who engage in
irrelevant talk,” says Bush at the gates of heaven as he prepares for the first
installment in a long round of engagement in the Middle East.

168   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    169

 As we approach the final countdown at the Security
Council, it’s the United States and the United King-
dom, backed by Spain, against France and Germany,
backed by Russia and China: a one-page second reso-
lution stating that Iraq is in material breach against a
memorandum setting deadlines for Iraqi disarmament.
The Syrian ambassador to the United Nations has
dubbed the deceivingly bland semantics of the second
resolution “a declaration of war.”
The immediate reaction of the Arab League to total
war has been total panic. Secretary general Amr Mous-
sa said, “You can never belittle the consequences of
war, especially in a Middle East already frustrated with
the Israeli occupation and the bias towards Israel. So
adding insult to injury is too much for us.”
Insult has been added to injury long before the tabled
second resolution. As Asia Times Online has reported
(The great Arab face-saving theater, February 19), the
Arab League has no cohesive, independent, forcefully
argued position vis-a-vis the US: it has only man-
aged to attach most – but not all – of its camels to the
Franco-German-Russian “more time for the inspec-
tors” position. Half of Kuwait, a league member, has
been turned into a US boot camp. Qatar and Bahrain
will also help in the invasion of Iraq. The Arab League
is a sad exercise in schizophrenia – trying to appease
Washington and engage it in dialogue while at the
same time performing full-time contortionism to calm
its angry and restless populations.
While the world grapples with extraordinary events,
the Arab League couldn’t do more than settle for an
ordinary summit to be held in Cairo early next month.
Syria has been lobbying hard for a meaningful summit.
Syria knows very well that it is next on the list of the
Washington hawks. In fact, Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon – who is the top dog running US foreign policy
in the Middle East – just last week offered American
congressmen his own list of who’s next: Syria, Iran and
Libya.
Syria has been fighting hard at the UN to remind any-
one who will listen that peace in the Middle East will
only be achieved with a comprehensive solution of the
170   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Palestinian tragedy. At the UN, Syria – as a non-per-
manent member of the Security Council – is staunchly
aligned with the Franco-German-Russian front. At
the Arab League, Lebanon – according to diplomats
instigated by Syria – made sure to remind of the 2002
Beirut declaration, which establishes that an attack on
one individual Arab nation would be regarded as an
attack on the whole Arab nation. Kuwait was furious –
and that’s the main reason there cannot possibly be a
consensus in the Arab League.
Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah may be sincere in his
current efforts to introduce democratic reforms in the
kingdom, but Saudi Arabia is living in dreamland hop-
ing that Saddam Hussein will accept free elections un-
der the supervision of the UN. Egyptian political scien-
tist Wahid Abdel-Meguid laments that “the Americans
always impose discussions about post-Saddam [Iraq]
while Arab countries try to maximize the chances of a
peaceful solution.”
Walid Kazziha, professor of political science at the
American University in Cairo (AUC), tries to be more
optimistic: “The Arab and European stances are mu-
tually dependent. The Arabs will make a firmer stand
with the encouragement of Europe.” But he also warns
that “the Arabs are not in a position to risk everything
for someone like Saddam Hussein.” Professor Bah-
gat Korany from AUC agrees, and adds that with the
Saudis not exactly enjoying Washington’s good graces,
most other key Arab nations are resigned that “even
the Europeans can’t stop the American war machine.”
But the whole world keeps trying anyway. That is
the message coming from the Kuala Lumpur meeting
of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) – 116 coun-
tries representing more than 50 percent of the world
population, two-thirds of the UN, and including six
non-permanent members of the Security Council:
Syria, Pakistan, Chile, Angola, Guinea and Cameroon.
These last three African nations have already stated
their anti-war position at the Franco-African summit
in Paris last week. Even under serious carrot-and-stick
approaches in New York for these next few days, they
won’t be easily swayed to vote for a second resolution
that in fact will be a green light for war. For the abso-
lute majority of the 186 UN member states that are not
part of the Security Council P5 (as the five permanent
members are known), this second resolution now
tabled means nothing else than a UN authorization for
preemptive war.
At the NAM meeting, Malaysian Prime Minister Ma-
hathir Mohamad repeated what Prince Saud al Faisal,
the Saudi foreign minister, has been saying these past
few days in the Arab world: the war will inevitably be
perceived as anti-Muslim.
Hassan Nafaa, professor of political science at Cairo
University, agrees: “Washington’s actions suggest it has
targeted Islam and that it plans to reshape the region
in a manner that will obviate the emergence of an
Arab nationalist or Islamic ideology of unification or
resistance. Towards this end, it most likely intends to
redraw the map of the region on the basis of ethnic or
sectarian rivalries.” Nafaa paints an alarming picture:
“If what appears to be American designs see the light
of day, Arabs and Muslims realize that the only nation
to benefit will be Israel, and Washington will have
paved the way for it to become an unrivaled region-
al power virtually overnight.” A stroll through the
campus of the liberal American University in Cairo is
always instructive, and one hears fiercely anti-US and
anti-Israel comments.
There’s absolutely no love lost for Israel in Egypt. Dip-
lomats in Cairo comment that Israel, in partnership
with the US, is actively involved in the partition of Su-
dan, which Egypt considers its back yard. It is all about
water. Herodotus rightly pointed out that Egypt was a
gift from the Nile, but the possibility of the gift being
wrapped by Israeli control of the nascent waters of the
Nile makes for endless sleepless nights. It’s a situation
parallel to the future of the River Jordan – a key in the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict. With Israel controlling the
flow of the river, a Palestine state could be starved in a
few days.
The Egyptian economy is bound to suffer badly with
a war in Iraq. The figures are gloomy. There will be
heavy losses in many crucial fronts: tourism (the main
source of foreign-exchange revenue), exports, revenue
from the Suez Canal and the stock market. According
to official data, tourism employs 2.2 million people in
Egypt, directly and indirectly. Independent sources say
that there could be as many as 10 million.
According to a study by the Federation of Egyptian
Industries, Suez revenues are expected to fall by almost
half, to US$1 billion. Assuming a short war ending
within three months, tourism revenues will also fall by
half, to $1.7 billion. Egyptian expatriates’ remittances
will also be halved, to $2 billion. The import bill will
rise 30 percent. Exports will decrease by 5 percent, to
$5.9 billion. Foreign direct investment will be non-ex-
istent. According to economist Hamdi Abdel-Azzem,
at least 200,000 Egyptian workers could be forced to
return from Iraq: a social as well as an economic crisis.
About 4 million to 6 million Egyptians work in the
Persian Gulf region – and the absolute majority fear
that they could lose their jobs. And to top it all, trade
between Egyptian businesses and Iraq under the UN
oil-for-food program ($1.5 billion last year) will also
suffer: Egypt is one of the top five countries benefit-
ing from the program. The US has given signals that
it might be willing to “compensate” Egypt for some
of these tremendous troubles, but the mood in Cairo
couldn’t be more pessimistic.
Thus, appalled by the prospect of imminent war,
Egyptians keep searching for alternative solutions.
Mahmoud Abaza, vice president of the opposition
Wafd Party, advances that “the pressure could have
been more efficient and useful for all if it was geared
to force the Iraqi regime to organize free elections,
after a period of transition, under the surveillance of
the international community. This would have been
more acceptable for the Iraqi people, the Arab nation,
the immediate neighbors and the international com-
munity.” Abaza’s dream would be “a coalition to save
the Iraqi people instead of exterminating them.” He is
devastated by the fact that the Bush administration,
“the most reactionary in American history,” is using
the September 11 tragedy to “build an empire devoid
of all moral values that America has incarnated since
its independence.”
FOREVER WARS   171
 Gamil Mattar, director of the Arab Center for Devel-
opment and Futuristic Research, makes a point of re-
ferring to the secret 1916 Sykes-Picot agreement, when
the British and the French carved up the Middle East
for themselves after the Ottoman defeat in World War
I: “That map has continued largely unchanged, even
in the face of attempts by some – in the name of Arab
unity or the unity of greater Syria – to change it. The
map lasted because the Arabs have refused to change
it.” But Mattar has a very clear warning that could
only be directed to Washington: “Would-be reformers
will face many difficulties. The Middle Eastern state
is autocratic, leaving nothing out of its orbit of influ-
ence, and at the same time it is underdeveloped. While
nation-states have been established in the Middle East
and even institutionalized, they have not yet succeeded
in the process of nation-building. This will be a heavy
burden on anyone seeking to implement far-reaching
changes in political and social institutions.”
The Bush administration may be aware that Iraq is a
southeastern Syria, the Jordan region and northern President Saddam
Saudi Arabia. Hussein delivers a
televised speech to
mark Armed Forces
The majority of soldiers in the Iraqi regular army are
Day on January 6,
Shi’ite. As war breaks out, they will either flee, sur- 2003. Photo: AFP
render or, most likely, engage in widespread rebellion. / INA
Washington’s plans of a clean occupation of Iraq will
turn to dust. A preview of what might happen was
offered early this month. In a meeting in the Turkish
capital Ankara, US officials totally dismissed the Iraqi
opposition – the bulk of which is Shi’ite and Kurd-
ish. They said that post-Saddam Iraq will be under a
military government, and – insult to injury – run by
the same Sunni establishment put in place by Saddam
Hussein.
Shi’ites are silently furious. They will revolt. Insistent
rumors coming from Iraq about a massive Shi’ite revolt
immediately after war breaks out don’t mention any
kind of rallying organization – except for the Supreme
Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, backed by Iran.
The council has a small army of a maximum of 10,000

Inside Saddam’s mind

supreme prize – the crucial frontier separating Arabs,
Persians and Turks, the key bridge between the Med-
iterranean and Central Asia from a historic, religious,
ethnic and geographic perspective. But the invading
superpower may be less aware of the extreme com-
plexity of most political, religious and ethnic problems
lying ahead. For instance, Iraq – not Iran – is the coun-
try harboring the Shi’ite holy places: Kufa, Najaf and
Kerbala. Even though they are a majority in Iraq, the
Shi’ites have been consistently oppressed by successive
Sunni empires. Ethnically they are Arabs, but reli-
giously they are Shi’ites (see The Shi’ite factor, April 25,
2002). They are not only the most important commu-
nity in the Arab world, but also a very important link
with Shi’ite minorities living in the eastern Arabian
Peninsula and in Lebanon. Sunni Arabs in central and
eastern Iraq since the fall of the Ottoman empire have
constituted the political and military elite – but they
also have a common tribal origin with people from
men, based in Iran, although they say that many are
based in Iraq as well. There are no Shi’ite leaders inside
Iraq because Saddam has killed them all.
So it looks as if the United States will be confronted
by a replay inside a replay of the Gulf War of 1991. At
the end of that “Mother of All Battles,” Saddam lost
no fewer than 14 of Iraq’s 18 provinces to Shi’ites and
Kurds. Washington under Bush Senior at the time
already wanted regime change, but it did not want a
popular revolution. That’s why Saddam was de facto
authorized by Washington, even in defeat, to smash
both the Kurdish and Shi’ite revolts violently. There’s
every indication a Shi’ite revolution may happen this
time – along with a Kurdish revolution in the event
of Turkish troops taking over Kurdistan. But unlike
1991, Washington won’t be able to count on a Saddam
to smash them. The liberators will have to do it them-
selves.
A voyage in History: although he evoked Gilgamesh in a long speech
last January, it’s unlikely that Saddam Hussein will embark on such a
transcendental journey in search of wisdom. Which leaves us with the
fate of the last Abbasid caliph – very much alive in the minds of Iraq-
is, who are drawing many parallels between the Mongols in the 13th
century and the Americans, and worrying about what may happen to
them in the beginning of the 21st century
By PEPE ESCOBAR
MARCH 14, 2003
ALEXANDRIA, Egypt – One can’t help but wonder whether Saddam
Hussein, with 300,000 armed-to-the-teeth Dirty Harrys pointing their Mag-
nums – and Tomahawks – at his head at this very moment, is feeling lucky.
Even more than Clint Eastwood taking the law into his own hands,
Saddam’s favorite movie character is Marlon Brando in Francis Ford
Coppola’s The Godfather – the archetypal Mafia boss. Saddam watches a

172   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    173

lot of videos. He reads a lot of thrillers. And he watches
a lot of TV: not only Iraqi but especially CNN, BBC
and al-Jazeera. In his unbridled Babylonian narcis-
sism tinged with totalitarian gangsterism, he feels like
Emperor Nebuchadnezzar, but also like James Cagney
in White Heat – “Look Ma, top of the world.” Indeed,
much of the future direction of the whole world at
this moment hinges on the fate of this Godfather on
Ground Zero.
By formally inducting him into the axis of evil a year
ago, George W. Bush has managed to pluck Saddam
from relative obscurity and containment limbo and
throw the “brutal dictator” once again into the glob-
al limelight as the ultimate menace. As Bush moves
relentlessly towards war, guided by his definitive
foreign policy adviser, God, Saddam has once again
invoked the Holy Prophet Mohammed and appealed
to the Muslim world for a jihad. He said that Iraqis will
rather choose to die as martyrs so that they can reach
the “paradise” of “a new life” instead of submitting to
American armies.
But his and Bush’s religious fervor notwithstanding,
Saddam knows very well that this is not a religious
war. His envoys to recent summits in Cairo, Sharm
el-Sheikh and Doha let it be known that he seems to
know what he is up against. Contrary to the usual
“Western intelligence reports,” echoes from Iraq keep
suggesting that Saddam and the regime’s innermost
circle are ready for what he calls a “battle of destiny.”
He now appears nonstop on Iraqi TV clad in finely
tailored three-piece-suits and smoking US$100 ci-
gars: but the unbounded fear of those he addresses or
sermonizes is palpable even when filtered by a satellite
signal. One wonders to what extent they comprehend
the implications of Shock and Awe – the planned
3,000 bombs and missiles to be dropped on Iraq in the
first 48 hours of war. Saddam may in a strange way be
prepared for this: Saddam in Arabic means “violent
shock.”
On occasional nights when Saddam, clad in Arab
gear, leaves one of his 45 palaces or safe houses, some
times surrounded by bodyguards, some times all by
174   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
himself, and sets out to eliminate a handpicked enemy
of the regime. Why? “Because he cannot go to sleep
without killing somebody.”
This astonishing piece of information – which for
obvious reasons could not be independently verified
inside Iraq – was volunteered to this correspondent
last year in Baghdad by a member of the 1st platoon of
the 2nd battalion of the 1st brigade of Saddam’s Special
Republican Guards. He was one of the top of the tops
of the regime’s Praetorian guard: well dressed, well
fed, well paid and crucially, well armed. He didn’t say
so, but most certainly he came from Tikrit – Saddam’s
birthplace, maybe from the same sub-clan.
Theoretically, his loyalty to the regime was rock-solid.
But according to the contact who secured the meeting
after a Byzantine negotiation, he was tired. He had
had enough. He wanted to talk. It’s fair to assume that
many Iraqi scientists arms inspectors want to interview
would do the same if they had the chance.
No cameras, no tape recorders, no hidden micro-
phones, no witnesses – and no minders. The Special
Republican Guard stepped into our white-and-orange
GMC Suburban for a Baghdad-by-night ride, without
our driver, and then he let it rip – by official Iraqi stan-
dards anyway.
He told us how Saddam chose Qusay (the youngest
son) over mama’s favorite Uday, splitting the couple
into mutual hate; how the army hates Uday and sup-
ports Qusay; how Uday constantly imports foreign
girls to party for a week; how on every corner of every
street of every neighborhood people are paid to be in-
formants of the regime; how the Jerusalem Liberation
Army (officially with 7 million members) is just a pub-
licity stunt; how a combination of the regime plus the
UN sanctions have poisoned the whole of Iraqi society
from top to bottom; and how there are no weapons of
mass destruction, only conventional weapons, in bun-
kers located in underground mosques.
And then he disappeared into his barracks. The image
that remained of Saddam was not as he is painted in
an array of frescoes and murals scattered across Bagh-
dad: Saddam the Bedouin, Saddam the horseman with
scimitar, Saddam with flowers, Saddam comforting
old woman, Saddam the peasant, Saddam in a chariot,
and the most startling of them all, Saddam holding the
scales of justice. The image that remained was of Sadd-
am as a cold-blooded killer.
Like his historical icon Yussuf Saladin, who recap-
tured Jerusalem from the Crusaders in 1187, Saddam
was born in Tikrit. He was actually born in al-Awja, a
small village near Tikrit, which in 1937 was a misera-
ble place on the Tigris, 160 kilometers north of Bagh-
dad. Saddam still carries his clan tattoo, three dark
blue points aligned close to his fist, a symbol of his
very humble origins. True to pure Bedouin tradition,
Saddam is a real Tikriti: intelligent and cynical, and a
clan chief loyal only to his family. The family of course
became a mafia and took a whole nation as hostage.
Saddam’s dream is to be a modern Saladin. But Sal-
adin was a Kurd. And Saddam despises Kurds with a
vengeance. Saladin was a noble soul who united Arab
power under a single kingdom and the banner of a
true jihad – to liberate Jerusalem from the crusaders.
Poets in the Aleppo bazaar in Syria still tell us of a
fabulous speech in the 12th century in which Saladin
was eulogized by a poet as the “sultan” of Islam. Sal-
adin was a warrior and a gentleman. In his last Cru-
sade battle against Richard the Lionheart in July 1192,
Saladin saw that Richard was unhorsed and vulnerable.
He ordered his brother to take two Arabian horses as a
gift to Richard, “For a king as great as him should not
fight on foot.” In Jerusalem’s old city, an inscription
in a small room inside the very simple al-Khanagah
mosque where Saladin lived reads, “Allah! Moham-
med! Saladin!” The Godfather on Ground Zero would
like nothing better than to add a “Saddam!” to the
inscription. Saddam is a gambler who relishes testing
the enemy. He poses as the heir of Babylon, the sci-
on of Arab culture, and claims to be a descendant of
Fatima, the daughter of the Holy Prophet Mohammed.
But what will he really do when Shock and Awe brings
apocalypse to Mesopotamia?
Alexandria, a city of learning on the Mediterranean,
with her eyes on Europe, now proudly hosts the new
high-tech, Scandinavian-designed, US$200 million
version of the legendary Bibliotheca Alexandrina.
Saddam, of all people, is one of the original donors for
the new library project: he contributed $20 million.
The bibliography on Iraq is not yet extensive but it’s
improving – especially online. People in Alexandria are
keen to point out how the Americans are swaggering
their way to war without even considering the dizzy-
ing complexity of Iraq – a Tower of Babel of peoples,
languages and faiths. Shock and Awe may act as a
larger-than-life fragmentation bomb to push fractures
to unprecedented dangerous levels.
Americans will arrive with their gee-whiz slang at a
crucial front line between Indo-European languages
– including Kurdish – and Semitic languages – which
include Arabic and Aramaic (the language spoken by
Jesus). This language border has also been a religious
border since antiquity – when Babylonians (Semitic
and Polytheist), were opposed to Persians (Indo-Euro-
peans and Zoroastrians). The linguistic-religious bor-
der remained when Shi’ite Iran separated itself from
the Sunni Arab world. This absolutely crucial schism of
Islam happened nowhere else than at the heart of Iraq,
culminating at the battle of Kerbala in 680 AD. When
this correspondent visited the sacred Shi’ite cities of
Kufa and Najaf, religious officials, pilgrims and the
imam of Najaf himself reminded that here – between
the Tigris and the Euphrates – the partisans of the
caliph and the partisans of Ali had shed their blood in
the name of the Sunni and Shi’ite branches of Islam.
The Shi’ite faith’s most sacred sites – Kerbala and Najaf
– are not in Iran, but in Iraq: a war that so much as
touches these sacred sites will fuel the anger of Irani-
an, Afghan, Pakistani and Gulf Shi’ites to incalculable
levels.
George W. Bush may find comfort in the fact that
Christendom is alive and well in northern Iraq. There’s
a Christian community in every street of Mosul. There
are Nestorian Assyrians – dissidents of the Council of
Ephesus: for them, Mary is the mother of Jesus and not
the Mother of God. There are Jacobites: for them, Jesus
is really God but not totally man. There are Chaldeans
FOREVER WARS   175
(Nestorians united to Rome). There are Orthodox Byz-
antines. There are Armenians. There are Protestants
evangelized by American preachers.
After the repression of the Ottoman empire, many of
these Christians believed European powers would pro-
tect them. In 1920, the Treaty of Sevres had promised
heaven on earth to Assyrio-Chaldeans in a future au-
tonomous Kurdistan. It never happened. Today these
northern Iraqis are trying to balance their Christian
identity with their Arab patriotism. Most couldn’t take
it any more and went into exile. The women in north-
ern Iraq wear colored dresses and no veils – some-
thing startling when one learns that 1,700 years before
the Holy Prophet Mohammed the veil was already
compulsory in these lands, thanks to a series of laws
attributed to Assyrian King Teglat-Phalazar the First.
Now, the new American war is offering these people a
stark alternative: exile or the graveyard.
The Yazidis – the so-called “devil worshippers” – are
in a complex predicament. The only way out for these
Kurds is to emigrate to Europe, because their faith is
simply forbidden: they worship a king who placated
the flames of hell with the tears of his repentance.
Meanwhile, in southern Iraq, the Mandeans of Basra
will try to emigrate to America or Australia. For the
Mandeans, St John the Baptist is the real messiah. They
must be re-baptized every day in water – but Saddam’s
armies have dried their marshlands.
Iraq is the land of prophet Abraham, a Chaldean. To
the peoples of the Book, Iraq gave its myths – like the
deluge – and also its laws: the Torah borrows heavily
from Mesopotamian codes. The area also gave the To-
rah its wars – such as the deportation of Jews to Baby-
lon. History is now coming full circle: American Chris-
tian fundamentalism, allied to Zionism, is reopening
very old wounds. From psalms to spirituals, from
ancient tradition to American black consciousness,
prophecies echo a new apocalypse in Babylon. Every-
one fears that the Garden of Eden – which tradition
places between the Tigris and the Euphrates – will be
paradise turned into hell. Five millennia ago the story
was slightly different. Uruk – the cradle of Iraq, and
176   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
the superpower of the times – was opposed to Aratta.
In the end there was no war, thanks to the advice of
Nidaba, the Goddess of Wisdom. It’s unlikely that the
UN’s Kofi Annan will replay this role. Not today, when
Saddam behaves like he’s Emperor Nebuchadnezzar,
and George W. Bush prays his way to war like a Cru-
sader.
It won’t be easy for American Special Forces to get
close to Saddam. There’s the 1st and 2nd battalions of
the 1st brigade, and then the top operatives of the Amn
al-Khas – the Special Security Service. These “rings of
fire” not only offer close-to-the-bone protection, but
meticulously infiltrate every state ministry and spy on
every military and intelligence operative who might
entertain the idea of staging a coup against Saddam.
Saddam is physically protected by these concentric lay-
ers, as much as Baghdad is supposed to be defended by
concentric layers of special and not-so-special Repub-
lican Guards: three armored divisions, one mechanized
and one infantry. It’s history’s pull, once again: walls as
an instrument of deterrence were invented in Iraq – in
ancient Uruk, the superpower of the times. In Iraqi
exile communities around the Middle East, all sorts
of rumors abound. The bulk of Baghdad’s population
will remain hostage to the security forces – with the
added trauma of a severely-enforced curfew, and the
certainty of power being cut off by bombing: oil lamps,
lanterns and emergency cookers are the biggest-selling
items in the bazaars. The Ba’ath Party has distributed
rifles in most neighborhoods. Most Baghdadis fear a
devastating civil war. But some are talking of guerrilla
resistance against the Americans.
Jordan has closed its borders to Iraqis. Everybody in
the ruling bureaucratic elite is trying to come up with
an exit strategy – buying $500 exit visas to Turkey
on the black market, sending money abroad – while
others are hanging on a much more precarious bal-
ance. These people are trying to anticipate the exact
moment when the regime will start to crumble. They
can’t afford to leave now because they would be caught
by the still-intact terror apparatus. But they dread to be
left behind as Tommy Franks, the new MacArthur (or
the new Mongol, Hulagu, according to Ba’ath officials)
slouches towards Baghdad as the new conqueror. soon find that he has his aching back totally against the
wall. That’s when he may engineer a totally unpredict-
According to echoes from Baghdad, there has been a
able reaction. He wants a bloody replay of the siege of
wave of arrests of government bureaucrats, high-rank-
Stalingrad. He wants to turn Baghdad into a Grozny,
ing military and Republican Guards in these past few
Chechnya’s battered capital. For that, he may have to go
days, all pinpointed as likely candidates for desertion.
underground. He does move around, but not as often
This is business as usual: as the Special Republican
as one imagines, hitting his 45 palaces and safehouses
Guard told us, Saddam’s paranoia ensures that there is
all ready to greet him at the drop of a hat – or a bullet.
a pogrom of some sort practically on a daily basis. For
When war breaks out he may likely use nondescript
all practical purposes, it appears now as if Saddam is
homes of Ba’ath Party officials as a refuge: it has been
still playing a game. Every drop of concession further
done before. He is fond of seafood and fresh steaks,
shakes up the Security Council’s bottle. He has just
and drinks good wine and cognac – everything im-
unveiled Iraq’s drone – which looks like an old Revell
ported from the Gulf twice a week and duly tasted to
model kit. He is clearly relishing how the Turks – the
prevent poisoning. But life during wartime may not
former oppressors, via the Ottoman Empire – are now
be so sweet. Some Westerners might be tempted to
defending the Arabs, through the Turkish parliament
portray him as Macbeth. Wrong. Saddam’s psychology
vote that blocked the deployment of American forc-
is not of a Western tragic hero. So will he choose to be
es (but the vote could be taken again as early as next
Gilgamesh? Will he choose to be the last caliph? Will
week). Saddam is also relishing how French Presi-
he choose to be Samson – bringing the whole temple
dent Jacques Chirac – a heir to a medieval enemy, the
down on him and anyone who may be around?
Franks – is now being hailed in so many capitals as the
new Arab caliph. Twenty-six centuries before Jesus Christ, and five
generations after the deluge, King Gilgamesh ruled
But Saddam could be misinterpreting the stance of
over the city of Uruk – the superpower of the times.
the current Franco-German-Russian axis of peace. He
The “Gilgamesh” is the first epic drama in the history
might think that they are behaving this way because
of humanity. Bush might be interested to know that
all three have made a lot of business – including arms
the oldest book in the world, written around 2300 or
business – with his regime. But Saddam might not
2200 BC, was widely imitated and thoroughly pillaged,
understand that their opposition to war is a matter of
especially by the copywriters of the Bible, as well as
principle. They are against the fact that Washington
Greek authors. The Gilgamesh epic is the foundation
decided on a preemptive war a long time ago, and
of all Western imagination – it already contains the
treats legitimation by the UN as a mere formality. The
adventures of Jason, Ulysses and Celtic legends. The
Franco-German-Russian axis of peace is denouncing
wandering king battles giants, falls in love with the
that having unilaterally declared itself in a state of
goddess Ishtar (thus our word “star”), kills a heavenly
permanent self-defense, Washington feels that it can
bull, invokes the wrath of the gods, goes on a quest
designate any enemy and wage any war at will.
to find the essence of immortality, visits the realm of
The “game” at the UN will soon turn into an end- the dead. He meets a Sumerian Noah who tells him
game – as early as this Friday. If there aren’t nine votes how he built an ark, embarks a couple of each animal
in favor of a second UN resolution, war could start as species and escapes the destruction of the world (this
early as next week. Saddam won’t capitulate in Arabic is probably a reference to a catastrophic flood of the
on Iraqi TV – as the British would like it. As a UN Euphrates in the 4th millennium BC.) The Sumerian
ambassador remarked this week, “I think the British Noah reveals to the king of Uruk the secret of immor-
want Saddam to go on television and swallow a liter of tality: a plant that must be found at the bottom of the
anthrax to prove he is getting rid of it.” Saddam may sea. Gilgamesh finds the plant, but it is later stolen by
FOREVER WARS   177
a serpent. Gilgamesh finally grasps the meaning of
life and understands that the real hero is the one who
accepts the human condition.
Although he evoked Gilgamesh in a long speech last
January, it’s unlikely that Saddam will embark on such
a transcendental journey in search of wisdom. Which
leaves us with the fate of the last Abbasid caliph – very
much alive in the minds of Iraqis, who are drawing
many parallels between the Mongols and the Ameri-
cans and worrying about what may happen to them in
the beginning of the 21st century.
In the mid-13th century, the Abbasid empire was be-
ing menaced by the devastating Mongol hordes, which
had already conquered Central Asia, northern China,
Russia, Poland, Silesia and Hungary. Hulagu, Genghis
Khan’s grandson, raises hell in Anatolia and Persia.
In January 1258, Hulagu’s armies arrived at the gates
of Baghdad. The city falls after a furious battle lasting
two weeks (contemporary American military planners
may consider it too long). Caliph Muztasim is assassi-
nated by the Mongols. The Mongols – either Buddhist
or Nestorian – commit a real holocaust in the politi-
cal capital of Islam. Buildings are destroyed, libraries
are burned, corpses of Baghdadis are thrown into the
Tigris. Horrified – and hyperbolic – Arab historians
wrote that Hulagu ordered the building of a pyramid of
800,000 skulls. This horror show was not only the end
of the Abbasid empire – which spread from Andalucia
in Spain to the Indus – but the end of Baghdad as the
supreme metropolis of the Muslim world. It was the
end of a long process not totally dissimilar to the fall of
the Roman empire.
Gilgamesh or Abbasid caliph, Saddam still may refuse
to think about his demise because in his psychopath-
ic vanity he is still too busy immersed in his folly of
grandeur- as an heir to the great Babylonian Emperor
Nebuchadnezzar or as a heir to the great liberator of
Jerusalem, Saladin.
In the streets of Moscow one can buy matrioshkas –
Russian nesting dolls – of Russian supremos old and
new. The larger doll is Vladimir Putin, enclosing Boris
Yeltsin, Mikhael Gorbachev, Leonid Brezhnev, Nikita
178   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Krushchev, Josef Stalin, Tzar Nicholas and finally a mediately started his fulminating career as an insider restore their flourishing past. Saddam pushed it into
mini-Peter the Great. A Saddam matrioshka would in the Ba’ath Party on the road to total power. Saddam’s the abyss.”
consist only of Saddams. Iraqi TV still broadcasts intellectual master is Syrian Michel Aflak, a Greek
It may not be the end of the abyss. There’s a remote
back-to-back poems and chants to his glory: “You are Orthodox Christian professor who in 1940 co-founded
possibility that he might survive the American in-
the salt of the earth, the fountain of life, the sword the Ba’ath Party as a nationalist, socialist and pan-Arab
vasion. Taking a cue from Osama bin Laden – who
of death.” He is compared to the sun and the moon, party. Saddam would later betray the egalitarian ideol-
despises him as an infidel – Saddam might become a
and to the water of the two rivers – the Tigris and the ogy of the Ba’ath. Aflak thought that “an idea does not
ghost, a specter sending periodical tapes to al-Jazeera.
Euphrates. One brick in 10 at the restored temple of exist by itself: it is incarnated in the physical person
Nebuchadnezzar in Babylon – ordered by Saddam – is who must be physically eliminated so the idea will also In the end, we come back full circle to Saddam’s
engraved with Saddam’s name. Narcissus drowns in disappear.” innermost circle. Last act. Final scene. Baghdad in
ecstasy in his totalitarian pool. flames. A bunker in a palace. Enter a Special Republi-
In this context, the American war plan might have
can Guard. In his hand he carries a poisoned dagger,
He has told his official Iraqi biographer that he been conceived by Aflak: to eliminate Saddam is to
the light dancing off its sharpened edge. Then there’s
dreams of nothing short of imprinting his image in the eliminate the Ba’ath system. Egyptian historian Abdel
blood on the floor. The final curtain drops.
coming centuries. He wants to be Saladin reborn. He Aziz Ramadan laments that Saddam’s wars and to-
wants to be enshrined forever in Arab mythology – talitarian system “turned a country with a promising Saddam Hussein might become a tragic hero after all
even in death, surrounded by the bodies of his ene- future back some 80 years, when Iraqis were trying to – in spite of himself.
mies. So it’s unlikely that he would engineer a human-
itarian disaster of apocalyptic proportions, directed
against the Iraqis themselves, because he would not be
remembered as a hero. No replay of the 1988 gassing of
the Kurds in Halabja.
It’s also out of the question that he will go into exile.
He’s done that before, in his younger days. In 1959, as
a 22-year-old uneducated radical with a poor peasant
background, injured in an attempt by the Ba’ath Party
to kill Iraqi revolutionary leader Abdel Karim Kas-
sem, Saddam fled to Syria. Syria at the time was joined
to the Egypt of nationalist hero Gamal Abdel Nasser
in the short-lived United Arab Republic. From Syria
Saddam went to Egypt. He enrolled in the Qasr al-Nil
high school in Cairo. He became a law student in Cairo
University, but then he dropped out – to breathe and
think politics.
In The Long Days, his official biography, which can
be bought in Baghdad’s book souk for $5, Saddam says
that he “emulated Nasser by playing chess and was not
distracted by social life.” Said Aburish, a Palestinian
writer, says that Saddam basically spent his time with
his bawab – the doorman of his building; reading his
favorite book, a biography of Stalin; and even meeting
with an intelligence man at the American embassy in
Cairo. Saddam left Cairo for Baghdad in 1963 and im-
FOREVER WARS   179
 US Secretary of
Defense Donald
Rumsfeld speaks
during a press
conference on
January 15, 2003,
at the Pentagon in
Washington, DC.
Photo: AFP

This war is brought to you by …

During the Clinton years, they were an obscure bunch – almost a sect. Then
they were all elevated to power – again: most had worked for Ronald Reagan
and Bush senior. Now they have pushed America – and the world – to war
because they want it. Period. An Asia Times Online investigation reveals this
is no conspiracy theory: it’s all about the implementation of a project

By PEPE ESCOBAR
MARCH 20, 2003

ALEXANDRIA, Egypt – They’ve won. They got their war against Af-
ghanistan (planned before September 11). They’re getting their war
against Iraq (planned slightly after September 11). After Iraq, they plan to
get their wars against Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Saudi Arabia. Last Sunday,
one of them, Vice President Dick Cheney, said that President George W.
Bush would have to make “a very difficult decision” on Iraq. Not really.
The decision had already been taken for him in the autumn of 2001.

180   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    181

 As far as their “showdown Iraq” is concerned, it’s not
about weapons of mass destruction, nor United Na-
tions inspections, nor non-compliance, nor a virtual
connection between Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda,
nor the liberation of the Iraqi people, nor a Middle
East living in “democracy and liberty.”
The American corporate media are not inclined to
spell it out, and the absolute majority of American
public opinion is anesthetized non-stop by a barrage of
technical, bureaucratic and totally peripheral aspects
of the war against Iraq. For all the president’s (sales)
men, the whole game is about global preeminence, if
not unilateral world domination – military, economic,
political and cultural. This may be an early 21st centu-
ry replay of the “white man’s burden.” Or this may be
just megalomania. Either way, enshrined in a goal of
the Bush administration, it cannot but frighten prac-
tically the whole world, from Asia to Africa, from “old
Europe” to the conservative establishment within the
US itself.
During the Clinton years, they were an obscure
bunch – almost a sect. Then they were all elevated to
power – again: most had worked for Ronald Reagan
and Bush senior. Now they have pushed America –
and the world – to war because they want it. Period.
An Asia Times Online investigation reveals this is no
conspiracy theory: it’s all about the implementation of
a project.
The lexicon of the Bush doctrine of unilateral world
domination is laid out in detail by the Project for a
New American Century (PNAC), founded in Washing-
ton in 1997. The ideological, political, economic and
military fundamentals of American foreign policy –
and uncontested world hegemony – for the 21st centu-
ry are there for all to see.
PNAC’s credo is officially to muster “the resolve to
shape a new century favorable to American principles
and interests”. PNAC states that the US must be sure of
“deterring any potential competitors from even aspir-
ing to a larger regional or global role” – without ever
mentioning these competitors, the European Union,
Russia or China, by name. The UN is predictably
182   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
dismissed as “a forum for leftists, anti-Zionists and an-
ti-imperialists”. The UN is only as good as it supports
American policy.
The PNAC mixes a peculiar brand of messianic
internationalism with realpolitik founded over a stark
analysis of American oil interests. Its key document,
dated June 1997, reads like a manifesto. Horrified by
the “debased” Bill Clinton, PNAC exponents lavishly
praise “the essential elements of the Reagan admin-
istration’s success: a military that is strong and ready
to meet both present and future challenges; a foreign
policy that boldly and purposefully promotes Amer-
ican principles abroad; and national leadership that
accepts the United States’ global responsibilities”. These
exponents include Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
Wolfowitz, Richard Perle, chairman of the Defense
Policy Board, an advisory panel to the Pentagon made
up of leading figures in national security and defense,
Florida Governor Jeb Bush and Reagan-era White
House adviser Elliott Abrahms.
Already in 1997, the PNAC wanted to “increase
defense spending significantly” to “challenge regimes
hostile to our interests and values” and “to accept
responsibility for America’s unique role in preserv-
ing and extending an international order friendly to
our security, our prosperity, and our principles”. The
deceptively bland language admitted “such a Reaganite
policy of military strength and moral clarity may not
be fashionable today. But it is necessary if the United
States is to build on the successes of this past century
and to ensure our security and our greatness in the
next.”
The signatories of this 1997 document read like a
who’s who of Washington power today: among them,
in addition to those mentioned above, Eliot Cohen,
Steve Forbes, Francis Fukuyama, Frank Gaffney, Wil-
liam Bennett, Donald Kagan, Zalmay Khalilzad, Lewis
Libby, Norman Podhoretz and Dan Quayle.
The PNAC, now actively exercising power, is about to
fulfill its dream of invading Iraq. In the PNAC’s vision
of Iraq, the only vector that matters is US strategic
interest. Nobody really cares about Saddam Hussein’s
“brutal dictatorship,” nor his extensive catalogue of
human rights violations, nor “the suffering of the Iraqi
people,” nor his US-supplied weapons of mass destruc-
tion, nor his alleged connection to terrorism.
Iraq counts only as the first strike in a high-tech
replay of the domino theory: the next dominoes will
be Syria, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The idea is to carve up
Syria; let Turkey invade northern Iraq; overthrow the
Saudi royal family; restore the Hashemites to the Hijaz
in Arabia. And dismember Iraq altogether and annex
it to Jordan as a vassal kingdom to the US: after all,
Jordan’s King Abdullah is a cousin of former Iraqi King
Faisal, deposed in 1958. This would be one solution for
the nagging question of who would have any legitima-
cy to be in power in Baghdad after Saddam.
Rumsfeld loves NATO, but he abhors the European
Union. All PNAC members and most Pentagon ci-
vilians – but not the State Department – do: after all,
they control NATO, not the EU. These things usually
are not admitted in public. But Rumsfeld, the blunt
midwesterner, former fighter pilot and former servant
of presidents Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan, prefers
John Wayne to Bismarck: even Spanish Prime Minister
Jose Maria Aznar, a staunch ally of Bush, complained
out loud that diplomacy for Rumsfeld is an alien
concept. Rumsfeld even has his own wacky axis of
evil: Cuba, Libya and … Germany. If Rumsfeld barely
manages to disguise his aversion for dovish Secretary
of State Colin Powell’s views, one imagines to what cir-
cle of hell he dispatches the pacifist couple of Jacques
Chirac and Gerhard Schroeder.
Strange, no journalist has stood up and ask Rumsfeld,
in one of those cosy Pentagon spinning sessions, how
was his 90-minute session with Saddam in Baghdad
in December 20, 1983. The fuzzy photo of Rumsfeld
shaking hands with Saddam, observed by Iraqi vice
premier Tarik Aziz, is now a collector’s item. Rumsfeld
was sent by Reagan to mend relations between the US
and Iraq only one month after Reagan had adopted a
secret directive – still partly classified – to help Sadd-
am fight Iran’s Islamic Revolution that had begun in
1979. This close cooperation led to nothing else than
Washington selling loads of military equipment and
also chemical precursors, insecticides, aluminum
tubes, missile components and anthrax to Saddam,
who in turn used the lot to gas Iranian soldiers and
then civilian Kurds in Halabja, northern Iraq, in 1988.
The selling of these chemical weapons was organized
by Rumsfeld.
Washington was perfectly aware at the time that
Saddam was using chemical weapons. After the Halab-
ja massacre, the Pentagon engaged in a massive disin-
formation campaign, spinning that the massacre was
caused by Iran. Cheney, as Pentagon chief from March
1989 onwards, continued to cooperate very closely
with Saddam. The military aid – secretly organized by
Rumsfeld – also enabled Saddam to invade Kuwait on
August 2, 1990. Between 1991 and 1998, UN weapons
inspectors conclusively established that the US – as
well as British, German and French firms – had sold
missile parts and chemical and bacteriological material
to Iraq. So much for the moral high ground defended
by America and Britain in the Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction controversy.
September 2002’s National Security Strategy (NSS)
document simply delighted the members of the PNAC.
No wonder: it reproduced almost verbatim a Septem-
ber 2000 report by the PNAC, which in turn was based
on the now famous 1992 draft Defense Policy Guid-
ance (DPG), written under the supervision of Wol-
fowitz for then secretary of defense Cheney. Already
in 1992, the three key DPG objectives were to prevent
any “hostile power’ from dominating regions whose
resources would allow it to become a great power; to
dissuade any industrialized country from any attempt
to defy US leadership; and to prevent the future emer-
gence of any global competitor. That’s the thrust of the
NSS document, which calls for a unipolar world in
which Washington’s military power is unrivalled.
In this context, the invasion and occupation of Iraq
is just the first installment in an extended practical
demonstration of what will happen to “rogue” states
alleged to have or not have weapons of mass destruc-
FOREVER WARS   183
tion, alleged to have or not have links to terrorism, and
alleged connections to anyone or anything that might
challenge US supremacy. The European Union, China
and Russia beware: the Shock and Awe demonstration
that is about to be unleashed on Iraq is pure theatrical
militarism, a concept already analyzed by Asia Times
Online.
It’s no surprise that Bush, on February 26, chose to
unveil his vision of a new Middle Eastern order at the
American Enterprise Institute (AEI), a right-wing
Washington think tank. The PNAC’s office is nowhere
else than on the 5th floor of the AEI building on 17th
St, in downtown Washington. The AEI is the key
node of a collection of neoconservative foreign policy
experts and scholars, the most influential of whom are
members of the PNAC.
The AEI is intimately connected to the Likud Party
in Israel – which for all practical purposes has a deep
impact on American foreign policy in the Middle
East, thanks to the AEI’s influence. In this mutual-
ly-beneficial environment, AEI stalwarts are known as
Likudniks. It’s no surprise, then, how unparalleled is
the AEI’s intellectual Islamophobia. Loathing and con-
tempt for Islam as a religion and as a way of life leads
to members of the AEI routinely bashing Saudi Ara-
bia and Pakistan. They also oppose any negotiations
with North Korea – another policy wholly adopted
by the Bush administration. For the AEI, China is the
ultimate enemy: not a peer competitor, but a mon-
ster strategic threat. The AEI is viscerally anti-State
Department (read Colin Powell). Recently, it has also
displayed its innate Francophobia. And to try to dispel
the idea that it is just another bunch of grumpy dull
men, the AEI has been deploying to the BBC and CNN
talk shows its own female weapon of mass regurgita-
tion, one Danielle Pletka. Lynn Cheney, vice president
Dick’s wife, a historian and essayist, is also an AEI
senior fellow.
The AEI’s former executive vice president is John
Bolton, one of the Bush administration’s key operatives
as undersecretary of state for arms control and inter-
national security. Largely thanks to Bolton, the US uni-
184   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
laterally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) treaty. Bolton has also opposed the establish-
ment of the new International Criminal Court (ICC),
recently inaugurated in The Hague. The AEI only
treasures raw power as established under the terms of
neoliberal globalization: the International Monetary
Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organiza-
tion. Its nemesis is everything really multilateral: the
ABM treaty, the ICC, the Kyoto protocol, the treaty on
anti-personal mines, the protocol on biological weap-
ons, the treaty on the total ban of nuclear weapons,
and most spectacularly, in these past few days, the UN
Security Council.
The AEI’s foreign policy agenda is presided over by
none other than Richard Perle. As Perle is a longtime
friend and advisor to Rumsfeld, he was rewarded with
the post of chairman of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy
Board: its 30-odd very influential members include
former national security advisers, secretaries of defense
and heads of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Perle is also a very close friend of Pentagon number
two Wolfowitz, since they were students at the Univer-
sity of Chicago in the late 1960s. Perle now reports to
Wolfowitz.
On September 20, 2001, Perle went on overdrive, fully
mobilizing the Defense Policy Board to forge a link be-
tween Saddam and al-Qaeda. The PNAC sent an open
letter to Bush detailing how a war on terrorism should
be conducted. The letter says that Saddam has to go
“even if evidence does not link him to the attack”. The
letter lists other policies that later were implemented –
like the gigantic increase of the defense budget and the
total isolation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), as well
as others that may soon follow, like striking Hezbollah
in Lebanon and yet-to-be-formulated attacks against
Iran and especially Syria if they do not stop support for
Hezbollah.
The Bush administration strategy in the past few
months of totally isolating the PA’s Yasser Arafat and
allowing Israeli premier Ariel Sharon to refuse as much
as a handshake, was formulated by the PNAC. Anoth-
er PNAC letter states that “Israel’s fight is our fight …
for reasons both moral and strategic, we need to stand
with Israel in its fight against terrorism”. The PNAC de-
tested the Camp David accords between Israel and the
Palestinians. For the PNAC, a simmering, undeclared
state of war against Palestine, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and
Iran is a matter of policy.
Perle, a former assistant secretary of defense for
international security affairs under Reagan, is also a
member of the board of the Jerusalem Post. He wrote
a chapter – “Iraq: Saddam Unbound” – in Present
Dangers, a PNAC book. He is very close to ultra-hawk
Douglas Feith, who was his special counsel under
Reagan and is now assistant secretary of defense for
policy (one of the Pentagon’s four most senior posts)
and also a partner in a small Washington law firm that
represents Israeli suppliers of munitions seeking deals
with American weapons manufacturers. It was thanks
to Perle – who personally defended his candidate to
Rumsfeld – that Feith got his current job. He was one
of the key people responsible for strategic planning in
the war against the Taliban and is also heavily involved
in planning the war against Iraq.
David Wurmser, former head of Middle Eastern
projects at the AEI, is now special assistant to PNAC
founder John Bolton, the undersecretary of State for
arms control and a fierce enemy of multilateralism.
Wurmser wrote Tyranny’s Ally: America’s failure to
defeat Saddam Hussein, a book published by the AEI.
The foreword is by none other than Perle. Meyrav
Wurmser, David’s wife, is a co-founder of the Middle
East Media Research Institute.
In July 1996, Perle, Feith and the Wurmser couple
wrote the notorious paper for an Israeli think tank
charting a roadmap for Likud superhawk and then-in-
coming Israeli prime minister Benjamin “Bibi” Ne-
tanyahu. The paper is called “A Clean Break: A New
Strategy for Securing the Realm”. Perle, Feith and the
Wurmsers tell Bibi that Israel must shelve the Oslo
Accords, the so-called peace process, the concept of
“land for peace,” go for it and permanently annex the
entire West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The paper also
recommends that Israel must insist on the elimina-
tion of Saddam, and the restoration of the Hashemite
monarchy in Baghdad. This would be the first domino
to fall, and then regime change would follow in Syria,
Lebanon, Iran and Saudi Arabia. This 1996 blueprint
is nothing else than Ariel Sharon’s current agenda in
action. In November last year, Sharon took the liberty
to slightly modify the domino sequence by growling
on the record that Iran should be next after Iraq.
Bush’s speech on February 26 at the AEI claimed
that the real reason for a war against Iraq is “to bring
democracy”. Cheney has endlessly repeated that Iraqis
– like Germany and Japan in 1945 – will welcome
American soldiers with wine and roses. For Bush, Iraq
is begging to be educated in the principles of democ-
racy: “It’s presumptuous and insulting to suggest that a
whole region of the world, or the one-fifth of humanity
that is Muslim, is somehow untouched by the most
basic aspirations of life.” But this very presumption is
seemingly central to the intellectual Islamophobia of
both the AEI and PNAC.
The AEI and the PNAC shaped the now official
Bush policy of introducing democracy – by bombing
Iraq – and then “successfully transforming the lives
of millions of people throughout the Middle East,” in
the words of AEI scholar Michael Ledeen. At his AEI
speech, Bush did nothing else but parrot the idea.
Many a voice couldn’t resist to point out the splendid
American record of encouraging native democracy
around the world by supporting great freedom fight-
ers such as the Shah of Iran, Sese Seko Mobutu in the
Congo, Augusto Pinochet in Chile, Suharto in Indone-
sia, the Somozas in Nicaragua, Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan
and an array of 1960s and 1970s Latin American dic-
tators. Among newfound American allies, Turkmen-
istan is nothing less than totalitarian and Uzbekistan
is ultra-authoritarian, and among “old” allies, Egypt
and Saudi Arabia have absolutely nothing to do with
democracy.
Chalmers Johnson is president of the Japan Policy
Research Institute, based in California, and author of
Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American
Empire. A war veteran turned scholar, he could never
FOREVER WARS   185
be accused of anti-Americanism. His new book about
American militarism, The Sorrows of Empire: How the
Americans lost their Country, will be published in late
2003. Some of its insights are informative in confirm-
ing the role of the PNAC in setting American foreign
policy.
Johnson is just one among many who suspect that “af-
ter being out of power with Clinton and back to power
with Bush … the neocons were waiting for a ‘cata-
strophic and catalyzing’ event – like a new Pearl Har-
bor” that would mobilize the public and allow them to
put their theories and plans into practice. September
11 was, of course, precisely what they needed. National
Security Advi Condoleezza Rice called together mem- five-star hawk, is a great friend of Wolfowitz. Woolsey
bers of the National Security Council and asked them
“to think about how do you capitalize on these oppor-
tunities to fundamentally change American doctrine,
and the shape of the world, in the wake of September
11th”. She said, “I really think this period is analogous
to 1945 to 1947 when fear and paranoia led the US into
its Cold War with the USSR”.
Johnson continues: “The Bush administration could
not just go to war with Iraq without tying it in some
way to the September 11 attacks. So it first launched
an easy war against Afghanistan. There was at least a
visible connection between Osama bin Laden and the
Taliban regime, even though the United States contrib-
uted more to Osama’s development as a terrorist than
Afghanistan ever did. Meanwhile, the White House
launched one of the most extraordinary propaganda
campaigns of modern times to convince the American
public that an attack on Saddam Hussein should be a
part of America’s ‘war on terrorism’. This attempt to
whip up war fever, in turn, elicited an outpouring of
speculation around the world on what were the true
motives that lay behind President Bush’s obsession
with Iraq.”
The Iraq war is above all Paul Wolfowitz’s war. It’s
his holy mission. His cue was September 11. Slightly
after Rumsfeld, on September 15, 2001 at Camp Da-
vid, Wolfowitz was already advocating an attack on
Iraq. There are at least three versions of what hap-
186   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
pened that day. As a reporter, the Washington Post’s
Bob Woodward (remember Watergate) used to bring
down presidents; now he’s a mere presidential public
relations officer. In his book Bush at War he writes that
Bush told Wolfowitz to shut up and let the number 1
(Rumsfeld) talk. The second version, defended by the
New York Times, says that Bush listened attentively to
Wolfowitz. But a third version relayed by diplomats
holds that in Bush’s executive order on September 17
authorizing war on Afghanistan, there’s already a para-
graph giving free reign to the Pentagon to draw plans
for a war against Iraq.
Former CIA director James Woolsey, a certified
is also the author of what could be dubbed “the high
noon” theory that defines nothing less than Bush’s vi-
sion of the world. According to the theory, Bush is not
a six-shooter: he is the leader of a posse.
That’s how Bush described himself in a conversa-
tion last year with then Czech president Vaclav Havel.
As film fans well remember, Gary Cooper in High
Noon plays a village marshal who tries by all means
to convince his friends to assemble a posse to face the
Saddam of the times (a lean and mean Lee Marvin)
who is supposed to arrive in the noon train. In the end,
Cooper has to face “Saddam” Marvin all by himself.
It’s fair to argue that the Bush administration today is
enacting a larger-than-life replay of a high noon. The
posse is the “coalition of the willing.” The logic of the
posse is crystal clear. The US first defines a strategic
objective (for example, regime change in Iraq). They
propagate their steely determination to achieve this
objective (an awesome worldwide propaganda and
disinformation campaign combined with a major mil-
itary deployment). And finally they assemble a posse
to help them: the coalition of the willing, or “coalition
of the bribed and bludgeoned,” as it was dubbed by
democrats in Europe and the US itself. A devastating
report by the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington
has detailed a “coalition of the coerced”. Whatever its
name, those who do not join the coalition (the absolute
majority of UN member-states, as well as world public
opinion) remain, as Bush says, “irrelevant.”
With missionary fervor, Wolfowitz has been pursuing
his Iraqi dream step by step. In late 2001, James Wool-
sey roamed all over Europe trying to find a connec-
tion between Saddam and al-Qaeda. He couldn’t find
anything. But then in January 2002, Iraq was formally
inducted in the “axis of evil along with Iran and North
Korea. Rumsfeld went on overdrive: he said that Sadd-
am supported “terrorists” (in fact suicide martyrs in
Palestine, who have nothing to do with al-Qaeda). He
said that Saddam promised US$25,000 to each of their
families. The neocons embarked on a media blitzkrieg,
and Wolfowitz’s mission finally hit center stage.
During the Cold War in the 1970s, Wolfowitz learned
the ropes laboring on nuclear treaties, the endless talks
with the Soviets on nuclear armament limitations. At
the time he also started a career for one of his better
students, Lewis Libby – who today is Cheney’s chief of
staff. For three decades Wolfowitz has been involved
in strategic thinking, military organization and politi-
cal and diplomatic moves. Even former Jimmy Carter
national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, the
author of The Grand Chessboard – or the roadmap for
US domination over Eurasia – allegedly allows Wol-
fowitz to figure alongside Henry Kissinger, McGeorge
Bundy or Zbig himself: that select elite of academics
who managed to cross over to high office and radiate
intellectual authority and almost unlimited power by
osmosis because of close contact with an American
president.
Wolfowitz routinely talks about “freedom and de-
mocracy” – with no contextualization. His renditions
always sound like a romantic ideal. But there’s nothing
romantic about him. During the First Gulf War, Wol-
fowitz was an undersecretary at the Pentagon formu-
lating policy. Cheney was the Pentagon chief. It was
Wolfowitz who prepared Desert Storm – and also got
the money. The bill was roughly $90 billion, 80 percent
of it paid by the allies: a cool deal. It was Wolfowitz
who convinced Israel not to enter the war even after the
country was hit by Iraqi Scuds, so the key Arab part-
ners of the 33-nation coalition would not run away.
But Saddam always remained his nemesis. When
Bush senior lost his re-election, Wolfowitz became
dean of the School of Advanced International Stud-
ies at Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore. Later,
he was fully convinced that Iraq was behind the first
attack against the World Trade Center, in 1993.
Wolfowitz and Perle, though close, are not the same
thing. Perle is virtually indistinguishable from the
hardcore policies of the Likud in Israel. Perle thinks
that the only possible way out for the US – not the
West, because he despises Europe as a political player
– is a multi-faceted, long-term, vicious confrontation
against the Arab and Muslim world. Wolfowitz is more
sophisticated: he has already served as American am-
bassador to Indonesia. He definitely does not subscribe
to the fallacious Samuel Huntington theory of a clash
of civilizations. Wolfowitz even believes in an inde-
pendent Palestine – something that for Perle is beyond
anathema.
Wolfowitz, born in 1943 in New York, is the son of a
Polish mathematician whose whole family died in Nazi
concentration camps. It was Allan Bloom, the brilliant
author of The Closing of the American Mind and pro-
fessor at the University of Chicago, deceased in 1992,
who steered Wolfowitz towards political science. Wol-
fowitz had the honor of being cloned by Saul Bellow in
the novel Ravelstein: the Wolfowitz character shows up
under a fictional name in the same role he occupied in
1991 at the Pentagon. Messianic, and a big fan of Abra-
ham Lincoln, Wolfowitz is a walking contradiction: his
fierce unilateralism is based on his faith in the univer-
sality of American values.
Wolfowitz and his proteges’s are hardcore “Strauss-
ians” – after Leo Strauss, a Jewish intellectual who
managed to escape the Nazis, died in 1999 as a
100-year-old and was totally anti-modern: for him,
modernity was responsible for Nazism and Stalinism.
Strauss was a lover of the classics – most of all Plato
and Aristotle. His most notorious disciples were Chi-
cago’s Allan Bloom and also Harvey Mansfield – who
translated both Machiavelli and Tocqueville and was
the father of all things politically correct in Harvard.
FOREVER WARS   187
 Strauss believed in natural right and in an immutable
measure of what is just and what is unjust. Thus the
Wolfowitz credo that a vague “democracy and free-
dom” is a one-size-fits-all panacea to be served every-
where, even by force. Plenty of neo-hawks followed
Bloom’s courses at the University of Chicago: Wol-
fowitz of course, but also Francis Fukuyama of “end of
history” fame, and John Podhoretz, who reigns over
the editorial pages of the ultra-reactionary Rupert
Murdoch-owned tabloid the New York Post. As to
Mansfield, his most notorious student was probably
William Kristol, the editor of the also Rupert Mur-
doch-financed magazine Weekly Standard. In Kristol’s
own formulation, all these Straussians are morally con-
servative, religiously inclined, anti-Utopian, anti-mod-
ern and skeptical towards the left but also towards the
reactionary right.
Ronald Reagan, because of his “moral clarity” and
his “virtue,” is their supreme icon – not the devious
realpolitik couple of Richard Nixon and Kissinger.
This conceptual choice is absolutely essential to un-
derstand where the neocons are coming from. Take
the crucial expression “regime change”: there’s nothing
casual about it. Strauss used to say that “classic politi-
cal philosophy was guided by the question of the best
regime”. Here Strauss was talking specifically about
Aristotle and his notion of politeia. The “regime” – or
politeia – designates not only government, but also
institutions, education, morals, and “the spirit of law”.
In the mind of these Straussians, to topple Saddam is
a mere footnote. “Regime change” in Iraq means to
implant a Western Utopia in the heart of the Middle
East: a Western-built politeia. Many would argue this
is no more than a replay of Rudyard Kipling’s “white
man’s burden”.
Perle, also a New Yorker, is much, much rougher than
Wolfowitz. No Aristotle for him. A dull man with a
psychopath gaze, he recently accused New Yorker re-
porter Seymour Hersh of being “a terrorist” – because
Hersh, in a splendid piece, unveiled how Perle set up
a company that will profit immensely from war in
the Middle East. Perle has repeatedly declared on the
record that the US is prepared to attack Syria, Lebanon
188   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
and Iran – all “enemies of Israel”. One of his most noto-
rious recent stunts was when he invited an obscure
French scholar to the Defense Policy Board to bash the
Saudi royal family. He casually noted that if the inva-
sion of Iraq brings down another couple of “friendly”
Arab regimes, it’s no big deal. At a recent seminar
organized by a New York-based public relations firm
and attended by Iraqi exiles and American Middle East
and security officials, Perle proclaimed that France
was no longer an ally of the US; and that NATO “must
develop a strategy to contain our erstwhile ally or we
will not be talking about a NATO alliance”. This hawk,
though, is no fool, and loves la vie en rose: Richard
Perle spends his holidays in his own house in the south
of France.
If you are a Pentagon senior civilian adviser, saying
all those things out loud, they pack a tremendous
punch in Washington: it’s practically official. As offi-
cial as Perle musing out loud whether the US should
“subordinate vital national interests to a show of hands
by nations who do not share our interests” by seeking
the endorsement of the UN Security Council on a
major issue of policy (that’s exactly what happened on
Monday). Perle has been saying all along that “Iraq is
going to be liberated, by the United States and whoever
wants to join us, whether we get the approbation of the
UN or any other institution”. And Bush repeated these
words almost verbatim. As for the tremendous unpop-
ularity of the US, “it’s a real problem and it undoubted-
ly diminishes our ability to do the things that we think
are important. I think that’s bad for the world because
if the United States, as the leader it has always been,
has its authority and standing diminished, that can’t be
good for the Swiss or the Italians or the Germans. But I
don’t know how you deal with that problem …”
Perle and Wolfowitz may shape policy, but that would
not enhance their mundane status among the polit-
ical chattering classes if they didn’t have a bulldog
to disseminate their clout in the media. That’s where
William Kristol, the chairman of the Project for a New
American Century and the director of the magazine
Weekly Standard comes in. Kristol’s co-chairman at the
PNAC is Robert Kagan, former deputy for policy in
the State Department in the bureau for Inter-American
affairs. Kagan is the author of Of Paradise and Power:
America vs Europe in the New World Order – where,
according to a fallacious formula, Europeans living
in a kind of peaceful, Utopian paradise will be forced
to stomach unbridled American power. Robert is the
son of Donald Kagan, ultra-conservative Yale profes-
sor and eminent historian. Kagan junior is a major
apostle of nation building, as in “the reconstruction of
the Japanese politics and society to America’s image”.
He cheerleads the fact that 60 years later there are still
American troops in Japan. The same, according to him,
should happen in Iraq. Any strategist would remind
Kagan that in Japan in 1945 the emperor himself
ordered the population to obey the Americans and in
Germany the war devastation was so complete that the
Germans had no other alternative.
William is the son of Irving Kristol and Gertrud
Himmelfarb, classic New York Jewish intellectuals
and ironically former Trotskyite who then made a
sharp turn to the extreme right. Former Trotskyites
have a tendency to believe that history will vindicate
them in the end. Irving, at 82 a former neo-Marxist,
neo-Trotskyite, neo-socialist and neo-liberal, today is
officially a neoconservative and one of the AEI’s stal-
warts.
Kristol junior reportedly likes philosophy, opera,
thrillers and is fond of – who else – Aristotle and Ma-
chiavelli, who not by accident were eminences behind
the prince. Instead of rebelling against his parents, he
sulked in his bedroom rebelling against his own gen-
eration – the anti-war, peace-and-love, Bob Dylan-ad-
dicted 1960s baby boomers. Although admitting that
Vietnam was a big mistake, William did not volunteer
to go to war, a fact that qualifies him as the archetypal
“chicken hawk” – armchair warmongers who know
nothing about the horrors of war. William wants to
erect conservatism to the level of an ideology of gov-
ernment. His great heroes include Reagan – for, what
else, his “candor” and “moral clarity”. A naked imperi-
alist? No, he’s not as crass as Rumsfeld: he prefers to be
characterized as a partisan of “liberal imperialism”.
As media hawk-in-chief, William is just following up
daddy’s work: Irving Kristol was the ultimate porta-
ble think tank of Reaganism. Today, Kristol junior is
convinced that the Middle East is an irredeemable
source of anti-Americanism, terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction and an assorted basket of evils.
Kristol of course is a very good friend of Wolfowitz,
Kagan and former ex-CIA chief James Woolsey, who
not by accident heaps lavish praise on The War over
Iraq: Saddam’s tyranny and America’s mission, a book
by Lawrence Kaplan and … William Kristol. Woolsey
loves how the book goes against the “narrow realists”
around Bush senior and the “wishful liberals” around
Bill Clinton.
Under Bush senior, William Kristol was Dan Quayle’s
chief of staff. Under Clinton, he was in the wilderness
until he finally managed to launch the Weekly Stan-
dard. Who financed it? None other than Rupert Mur-
doch, whose tabloidish Fox News is widely known as
Bush TV. The Weekly Standard loses money in direct
proportion to the expansion of its influence. It remains
invaluable as the voice of “Hawk Central.”
Hawks, or at least some neoconservatives, seem to
understand the importance of a lighter touch as a key
public relations strategy. That’s where David Brooks
comes in. Brooks, former University of Chicago,
former Wall Street Journal and now a big fish at the
Weekly Standard, was the one who came up with the
concept of “bobos” – bourgeois bohemians, or “caviar
left” as they are known in Latin countries. “Bobos,”
accuse the neocons, do absolutely nothing to change
a social order that they seem to fight but from which
they profit. Bobo-bashing is one of the neocon’s ideo-
logical strategies to dismiss their critics out of hand.
In his conference at the World Social Forum in Porto
Alegre, Brazil, in January, Noam Chomsky demistified
the mechanism through which these people, “most
of them recycled from the Reagan administration,”
are implementing their agenda: “They are replaying a
familiar script: drive the country into deficit so as to be
able to undermine social programs, declare a ‘war on
terror’ (as they did in 1981) and conjure up one devil
FOREVER WARS   189
after another to frighten the population into obedi- people to Netanyahu in 1996 and to Bush since 2001 on Palestine was equal to war against terrorism. But ratization – overwhelming military force, unilateral
ence. In the 1980s it was Libyan hit men prowling the has been the same: international law is against our he went one step beyond: he convinced Bush that the preemption, overthrow of governments, seizure of oil
streets of Washington to assassinate our leader, then interests; we fix our own objectives; we go for it and Palestinian Intifada, al-Qaeda and Saddam are all cats fields, recolonization, protectorates – is being roundly
the Nicaraguan army only two days march from Texas, the rest will follow – or not. Even Zbig Brzezinski has in the same bag, plotting a concerted three-pronged condemned by the same educated Arab elites which
a threat to survival so severe that Reagan had to de- recognized the American corporate press – unlike the offensive to destroy Judeo-Christian civilization. Thus would be the natural leaders of a push for democrati-
clare a national emergency. Or an airfield in Grenada European press – has not uttered a single word about the subsequent, overwhelming Bush administra- zation. Many question not Washington’s objective, but
that the Russians were going to use to bomb us (if they the total similarity of the agendas. But concerned tion campaign to try to convince public opinion that the method: they simply cannot stomach the “imperial
could find it on a map); Arab terrorists seeking to kill Americans have already realized the superpower has Saddam is an ally of bin Laden. Few fell into the trap. liberalism” version marketed by the hawks. The current
Americans everywhere while Gaddafi plans to ‘expel no attention span, no patience, no tact – and many But European strategists got the drift: they are already absolute mess in Afghanistan is further demonstration
America from the world’, so Reagan wailed. Or His- would say no historical credibility – to engage in na- working with the hypothesis that the geopolitical axis that “democratization” via an American proconsul
panic narco-traffickers seeking to destroy our youth; tion-building in the Middle East. in the Middle East is about to switch from Cairo-Ri- is doomed to failure. Moreover, 16 eminent British
and on, and on.” yadh-Tehran to Tel Aviv-Ankara-Baghdad (post-Sadd- academic lawyers have certified the Bush doctrine of
There’s not much democracy on the cards either. Iraq-
am). preemptive self-defense is illegal under international
For both the AEI and the PNAC, the Middle East is a is and the whole Arab nation view as an unredeemable
law.
land without people, and oil without land – and this is insult and injury the official American plan to enforce In a recent hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations
something anyone will confirm in the streets or power a de facto military occupation. Iraq is already carved Committee, undersecretary of state for political affairs Even a tragically surreal, zombie regime like North
corridors in Cairo, Amman, Beirut, Ramallah, Damas- up on paper into three sections (just like the British Mark Grossman and undersecretary of defense for Korea’s has retained one essential lesson from this
cus or Baghdad. The image fits the AEI and PNAC’s did in the 1920s). Two retired generals – including policy Douglas Feith talked for four hours and through whole crisis : if you don’t want regime change, you’d
acute and indiscriminate loathing and contempt Arabic-speaking, Lebanese-origin John Abizaid – and 86 pages, apparently detailing how the US will rebuild better maximize your silence, speed and cunning to
for Arabs. The implementation of the AEI’s and the a former ambassador to Yemen – will control the Iraq after liberation through massive bombing. Feith build your own arsenal of WMDs. Muslims for their
PNAC’s policies has led to the transformation of Ariel three interim “civil” administrations. Abizaid studied has been on record saying that this war of course “is part have understood that the unlikely Franco-Ger-
Sharon into a “man of peace” – Bush’s own words at the the history of the Middle East at Harvard – and this not about oil,” while stating a few sentences later that man-Russian axis of peace was and still is trying to
White House – and the semi-fascist Likud Party be- is as far as his democratic credentials go. Everything “the US will be the new OPEC.” A source confirms that prevent what both al-Qaeda and American fundamen-
coming the undisputed number one ally of American in Iraq will be under overseer supremo Jay Garner, a it was clear at the Senate hearing both Feith and Gross- talists want: a war of civilizations and a war of religion.
civilization. The occupied Palestinian territories – see retired general very close to Ariel Sharon and until a man had absolutely no idea what the Arab world is all And the world public opinion’s insight is that Wash-
never-complied, forever-spurned UN resolution 242 few months ago the CEO of a weapons firm special- about. Senators asked how much the war would cost ington may win the war without the UN – but it will
plus dozens of others – became “the so-called occupied ized in missile guidance systems. Iraqis, Palestinians (Yale economist William Nordhaus said the occupation lose peace by shooting the UN down. As a diplomat in
territories” (in Rumsfeld’s own words). Jewish moder- and Arabs as a whole are stunned: not only has the US may cost between $17 billion and $45 billion a year): Brussels put it, “The world has voted in unison: it does
ates, inside and outside Israel, are extremely alarmed. flaunted international legitimacy in its push to war, it nobody had an answer. Feith and Grossman said it was not want to be reordered by a posse in Washington.”
will also install an Israeli proxy as governor of Iraq and “unknowable.” Rumsfeld is also a major exponent of
One of the key excuses for the Iraq war sold by Wash- The men in the AEI and the PNAC galaxy may be ac-
will keep pretending to finally be committed to respect the “not knowable” school. The cost of war for Amer-
ington was the elimination of the roots of terrorism by cused of intolerance, arrogance of power, undisguised
the never-complied dozens of UN resolutions concern- ican taxpayers – some estimates go as high as $200
striking terrorists and the “axis of evil” that supports fascist tendencies, ignorance of history and cultural
ing Palestine. billion – is “not knowable.” The size of the occupation
them. This is a total flaw. The excuse is undermined parochialism – in various degrees. This is all open to
force – some estimates range as high as 400,000 troops
by the US themselves. Not even Washington believes As much as Israel is widely regarded by most 1.3 debate. They may be “chicken hawks” like Kristol ju-
– is “not knowable.” The duration of the occupation –
war is the way to fight terrorism, otherwise the Bush billion Muslims as the de facto 51st American state, nior or attack dogs like Rumsfeld. But most of all what
former NATO supreme commander Wesley Clark has
administration would not have adopted the AEI and many responsible Americans denounce the Iraq war baffles educated publics across the world – especially
mentioned no less than eight years – is “not knowable.”
PNAC agenda of promoting “democracy and liberty” as Sharon’s war. Washington’s Likudniks – the AEI and the overwhelming majority of public opinion in Ger-
in the Arab world. But neither the Arabs nor anyone PNAC people – allied with evangelical Christians – are Arabs, Asians, Europeans – and a few Americans – many, France, the UK, Italy and Spain – is the current
else is convinced that the US is committed to real running US foreign policy in the Middle East. Since warn of blowback: the whole Middle East may explode non-separation of Church and State in the US.
democracy or to the “territorial integrity of Iraq” when Autumn 2002, they have managed to convince Bush to in a violent, vicious anti-imperialist struggle. As this
George W Bush is not ideologically a neoconserva-
key members of the administration, like Perle, signed increase the tempo – with no consultation to Congress correspondent has been hearing for months from Pa-
tive. But he is certainly a man with a notorious lack
“Clean Break” in 1996 advising Benjamin Netanyahu or to American public opinion – betting on a point-of- kistan to Egypt and from Indonesia to the Gulf, “doz-
of intellectual curiosity. Backed by his core American
that Iraq and any other country which tried to defy no-return scenario in Iraq. Meanwhile, Sharon, in a re- ens of bin Ladens” are bound to emerge. The strategy
constituency of 60 to 70 million Bible-believing Chris-
Israel should be smashed. The message by the PNAC lentless campaign, managed to convince Bush that war advocated by the evangelic apostles of armed democ-

190   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS   191

tians, born-again Bush is setting out to do God’s will
on a crusade to Babylon to “fight evil” – personified
by Saddam. Martin Amis, Britain’s top contemporary
novelist, argues that Bush, being intellectually null,
had no other option than to adopt God as his foreign
policy mentor. Amis wrote in the Observer that “Bush
is more religious than Saddam: of the two presidents,
he is, in this respect, the more psychologically primi-
tive. We hear about the successful ‘Texanization’ of the
Republican party. And doesn’t Texas seem to resemble
a country like Saudi Arabia, with its great heat, its oil
wealth, its brimming houses of worship, and its weekly
executions.” For former weapons inspector Scott Ritter,
Bush is “a fundamentalist who does not respect inter-
national law. The United States is becoming a crusader
state.” For the absolute majority of 1.3 billion Muslims,
a sinister crusader it is.
The endgame will reveal itself to be a cheap family
farce: the Bush family delivers an ultimatum to the
Hussein family. What Gore Vidal describes as “the
Bush-Cheney junta” has won: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Wol-
fowitz, Perle, the AEI and PNAC stalwarts. Paul Wol-
fowitz, above all, has won his own personal crusade.
Colin Powell has lost it all. It does not matter that the
State Department’s classified report, “Iraq, the Middle
East and change: no dominoes” was unveiled by the
Los Angeles Times. Wolfowitz and Perle will play with
their dominoes. By predictable mechanisms of power
as old as mankind itself (and incidentally very com-
192   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
mon in the former USSR) it was Powell – the adversary Iraqis drive pass
of the new doctrine of preemption – who was charged wrecked cars on
the al-Jumhouriya
to defend it in the face of the world. Sources in New bridge on April
York confirm he was told to get in line: his discourse, 15, 2003. Photo:
his body language, his whole demeanor changed. Patrick Baz / AFP
Seasoned American diplomats are appalled by the
devastating political and diplomatic failure of the Bush
administration. They know that by deciding to go to
war unilaterally – and leaving the international system
in shambles – the US has squandered its biggest cap-
ital: its international legitimacy. And to make matters
worse there was absolutely no debate – in the Senate,
or in the public opinion arena – about it.
Americans still have to wake up to the fact of how
startlingly isolated they are in the world. The world,
for its part, will keep deploying its weapons of mass
democracy. There can be no “international commu-
nity” as long as the popular perception lingers in so
many parts of the world of a clash between the West
and Islam. Always ready to recognize and love the best
America has to offer, hundreds of millions of people
would rather try to save it from the fatal unilateral-
ism distilled by the American fundamentalists of the
A (mis)guided tour of Baghdad
PNAC and the AEI. Everyone in Baghdad, the former Driving around Baghdad beats any Hollywood version of urban wasteland.
great capital of Islam at its apex, is fond of saying how
it has survived the Mongols, the barbarians at the gate. Apart from the sequence of charred tanks, anti-aircraft artillery and pickup
The evangelic apostles of armed democratization can- trucks, there’s a gallery of Soviet 155mm guns under flyovers. Smoke still
not even imagine the fury a new breed of barbarians billows from the odd ministry. The Oil Ministry is still on fire. The main
may unleash at the gate of the new American century.
HQ for weapons – whose director, General Amer Saadi, surrendered last
Saturday – has been bombed. The sprawling Mukhabarat complex, home of
the Iraqi secret police, with dozens of buildings, has been thoroughly bombed
– and is still being looted, although some satellite dishes are still available
By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 18, 2003
BAGHDAD – The Godfather’s black box with the three-part Francis
Ford Coppola saga lies under the sun in front of former deputy prime
minister Tariq Aziz’s house facing the Tigris River, not far from the
discarded cover of Bob Marley and the Wailers’ Uprising. The (Shi’ite)
uprising didn’t happen in Baghdad, but the (Iraqi) Godfather is gone.
FOREVER WARS    193
 Much of the world media have focused on the anar-
chy that took place in the days after the first US sol-
diers entered Baghdad, and with some justification, al-
though people such as US Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld would prefer to concentrate on the liberation
angle. Should Rumsfeld visit the capital, though, he
would not be able to visit Tariq, with whom he met
on December 20, 1983, when he was Ronald Reagan’s
special envoy for the Middle East.
Aziz’s house has been thoroughly looted. Where is
Tariq? “He’s here in my pocket,” says one of his neigh-
bors in this affluent part of riverside Baghdad. Sifting
through the rubble, under the smell of cauliflowers
rotting in the kitchen, stepping over torn group pho-
tos of the Ba’ath Party leadership, one learns, among
other things, that Aziz was a great fan of former US
secretary of state Henry Kissinger and of Italian operas
on Russian vinyl and was fond of swimming in his
own private pool. But now, in the immortal words of
Mohamed al-Douri, Iraq’s ambassador to the United
Nations, “the game is over.”
No one can possibly argue with a Daisy Cutter, a
J-DAM, a MOAB, an Abrams tank or an Apache heli-
copter. The most vivid evidence of overwhelming US
firepower, and probably the highlight of any tour of
the shattered city, is the main presidential palace, hit
in the early stages of the “shock and awe” campaign.
The marines are now camped inside the presidential
grounds, in a building identified as “employees’ re-
stroom.” The entrance to the complex is guarded by an
Abrams – the marines’ pet dark-brown camel which,
according to a connoisseur, is “a very rare breed” and
could fetch as much as US$1 million in the weapons
markets of the Middle East. The destruction inside – a
sequence of mini-September 11s – is a graphic mes-
sage addressed to any so-called rogue government
that falls foul of the US. Saddam indeed lived in the
lap of luxury: 18th-century French furniture, crystal
chandeliers, gold fittings in the bathrooms, and even
a 300-seat cinema – now a roomful of distorted metal.
This is where he used to watch his favorite movie over
and over again, the first part of The Godfather trilogy,
starring Marlon Brando.
194   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
The Americans have been in town for just over a
week now. They face an extremely ambiguous popular
reaction – totally dissimilar to the nervous excitement
displayed in Shi’ite Saddam City when the tanks occu-
pied the National Parade Ground. Baghdad itself may
be the only place in the Arab world where people don’t
ask themselves in disbelief why Baghdad fell in only
two days. And as they contemplate their newfound
wasteland, Baghdadis are now asking themselves how
they are going to survive.
The Palestine Hotel – home to many journalists –
poses in Baghdad as a safe area. In a sprawling, scarred
city torn by anarchy, strife and much bitterness and
desperation, the Palestine is an island protected by
Abrams tanks, Bradley vehicles and barbed wire – a
Manhattan in the middle of a giant Liberia. Its concen-
tration of high-tech audio video equipment is worth
more than the gross national product of whole Iraqi
provinces.
This not-so-splendid isolation only fuels the resent-
ment of Baghdadis – inevitably subjected to endless
searches and checks. For them, the Palestine could as
well be in off-limits Israel. Samir is a mechanical engi-
neer who had to walk for five hours to get to the hotel.
He would like to find a job repairing damaged plants,
but he doesn’t know whom to address. An elderly
Shi’ite woman is worried that a weapons cache was left
in her garden: she sobs and complains that she doesn’t
know whom to talk to. Democracy is taking root in
Baghdad: there are daily demonstrations in Ferdows
Square, near the Palestine. People scream: “We want
Iraqi leaders!” and hold banners decrying the lack of
stores, universities and hospitals.
For the Americans, security has become something
of a nightmare. On Monday, the Ministry of Education
building was on fire. A geologist, visibly desperate, told
us to warn the Americans that the ministry was very
close to a giant gasoline depot, and the consequences
of the fire spreading could be devastating. Back at the
Palestine, the marines kind of manning the public in-
formation office were asking “What city is that?” It was
just a 10-minute drive away.
Any visitor will need transportation for a tour of ern slum populated by at least 2 million Shi’ites. Nader
Baghdad. One could of course drive around in a says its “full of thieves, very dangerous.” Last week in
Humvee or a Bradley – but that’s not a good way to Saddam City, pent-up anger mixed with deep religious
make Iraqi friends. Or one could go for the least unsafe fervor provided the world media with those cherished
option. He could choose between GMC Suburbans images of liberation. Today, a Bedouin in Saddam City
and Japanese vans with huge black lettering splashed is emphatic: “The old regime was bad. The new one
on all sides, or a plain, simple red-and-orange 1970s will be bad. We, the poor, we always lose.”
made-in-Brazil Volkswagen Passat Baghdad taxi. Na-
Visitors will soon run out of sightseeing, because
der’s Chevrolet Celebrity would be even better. Nader
there’s not much left to see. The Olympic Hospital –
drives like he’s about to finish the final lap at a Grand
former property of Uday Hussein, Saddam’s son – has
Prix, and he knows Baghdad by heart. He used to trade
been looted. The Aluya Pediatric Hospital is barely
dates in the United Arab Emirates. A big fan of all of
functional. The Oil Ministry is still on fire. The main
Brazil’s world-champion soccer squads, he is also will-
HQ for weapons – whose director, General Amer
ing to do anything for a visa, especially if it is Danish,
Saadi, surrendered last Saturday – has been bombed.
so that he can visit his brother, who apparently works
Saddam Tower miraculously still stands, beside the
for IBM.
bombed-out telephone exchange that qualifies as
There are no-go areas aplenty in the capital. Although Baghdad’s conceptual contribution for the Venice Bi-
the first white Iraqi police cars took to the streets on ennale exhibition of contemporary art.
Monday, escorted by Humvees, and are already in hot
But a certified highlight of a city tour would be the
pursuit of bank looters armed with AK-47s, most of
remains of what everyone refers to as “the CIA of Iraq.”
Baghdad still resembles Kabul or Mogadishu. Abu Ra-
The sprawling Mukhabarat complex, home of the
gheb, in the western limits of Baghdad, is definitely a
Iraqi secret police, with dozens of buildings, has been
no-go area. That’s where we were stopped by a nervous,
thoroughly bombed – and is still being looted, al-
sweaty Fedayeen clutching a rocket launcher. He asked
though some satellite dishes are still available. We took
for our passports. The driver engaged him in conver-
a mesmerized Bassan, a chemical engineer, for a drive
sation and after some hesitation he waved us on. An
inside the walls that for all Iraqis meant only one thing,
Abu Dhabi TV crew was not so lucky: when stopped
forever and ever: Terror. “I am dreaming,” Bassan kept
by the Fedayeen they had their tape, camera and press
repeating, glued to his seat. “I am dreaming.”
credentials confiscated.
Then there is the “desolation row” tour. There are
Driving around Baghdad beats any Hollywood ver-
85 people, from ages 10-35, at the al-Hanan home for
sion of urban wasteland. Apart from the sequence of
the disabled – but there are no doctors: either they are
charred tanks, anti-aircraft artillery and pickup trucks,
afraid to leave their homes or they can’t find transpor-
there’s a gallery of Soviet 155mm guns under flyovers.
tation. Visitors from the nearby Buratha Mosque bring
Smoke still billows from the odd ministry. Legendary
some food and water for these poor souls. Disabled
Sharia al-Rashid, old Baghdad’s main street with its
children in wheelchairs perform as de facto human
charming colonnades, seems to have reverted to Sierra
shields at the entrance, discouraging looters. Their
Leone status. On the other hand, civilians now step
stony faces don’t appear to reflect pain or sadness. They
out of their cars and become instant traffic controllers.
want security. But most of all, they say, they just need a
Only a few buses, red double-deckers that sound like
water pump.
cranking metal, are back into service.
Saeed Muhamad Salman’s sister died at the bombing
Casual visitors wouldn’t find a single taxi driver will-
of the al-Sa’a restaurant in the Mansur district. She was
ing to take them to Saddam City, the huge northeast-
one of the 14 fatalities among two Christian family
FOREVER WARS   195
houses destroyed by four misguided 900-kilogram
laser-guided bombs – only two houses away from the
Libyan ambassador’s residence. The crater behind
the al-Sa’a is big enough to engulf Tariq Aziz’s house.
Salman says “the Americans missed their target. He
[Saddam] was here three hours before, smoking and
drinking coffee.”
An over-excited Muhamad, 18, who lives around
the block, insists: “No one respects us like American
soldiers. They kiss us! The Arab socialist Ba’ath Party,
they kicked our asses.” He guides the visitor around
the rubble to the table inside a relatively intact house
nearby, where he says a disheveled Saddam wearing
reading glasses recorded his speech in the morning
after the “decapitation strike” at the start of the war. At
the bottom of the crater behind the al-Sa’a, Muhamad
displayed a single red rose: “There are no flowers in
Iraq. Saddam Hussein cut them all.”
Any visitor is regaled with such stories of a Saddam
sighting. In the Zayuna neighborhood, residents swear
Saddam was in a house for 30 minutes on Wednesday
morning, April 9, fall-of-Baghdad day. The house,
protected by a high wall, belongs to Mudar Khairal-
lah, a member of Saddam’s family. This information is
certainly more credible than insults now commonly
hurled in a typical Baghdad day, such as “Saddam was
a Jewish agent,” “Saddam was gay” or “Saddam is in
America.”
In the al-Qadissiya neighborhood, middle-class fami-
lies are terrified. Gaida Yousef spent 12 years in France.
She lives practically next door to Yarmouk Hospital
with two daughters and a cat – and she confirms that
a US missile landed on the hospital. “The war, it was
over there,” she says, pointing to the farther end of the
street. She still cannot sleep: “We need psychologists,
for us and for our children.” Her neighbor, an elderly
Kurdish woman with a white scarf and beatific smile,
still afraid of having to survive alone in her house,
says, “Saddam was a dog.” Another neighbor says that
Iraqi soldiers have left everything they had – clothes,
weapons – in her son’s house: the same worry is repro-
duced by the dozen in front of the Palestine to marines
196   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
and their blank stares. Gaida Yousef still expresses the
feelings of many Baghdadis, that Saddam remained an
American Frankenstein to the end: “Saddam and the
Americans, it was already designed, for the oil. Every
time the Americans attack, he escapes before.”
In the Adhamiya neighborhood, Quarter 308, resi-
dents say that the Americans came through the main
road, the Corniche al-Adhamiya, guns blazing. On the
other side of the avenue lies another one of the pres-
idential palaces, bombed on the 10th day of the war.
Adel Hussein, head of a family of 10, and Dr Salman, a
PhD in economics, tell the visitor that on April 9, the
day of the fall of Baghdad, four Abrams tanks, from
4:30am to 11am, struck more than 20 houses. They
point to a carpet of spent cartridges in the main road
and then take the visitor around, showing any possi-
ble configuration of bullet holes in an array of houses
in all sorts of angles, and a white Volga splattered in
blood: “The whole family died inside,” says Dr Salman.
“You see the houses. This is real evidence.” A neigh-
borhood crowd congregates to deliver a “message” for
the Americans, who are less than half an hour away:
“Please, we need water and electricity.”
Chardagh Street in Adhamiya was the scene of a
fierce battle that started in the square facing the Abu
Hanifa Mosque. The whole Abu Hanifa square has
been converted into a ghastly wasteland: civilian
homes, banks, pharmacies, bakeries have been hit,
shelled, burned. A woman in front of the only func-
tioning bakery in Chardagh says, “George Bush is
the enemy of God. He killed the Iraqi people. What I
say? You see around for yourself.” For Muhamad, 19,
a college student, “The [Saddam] government is not
good and it’s not bad. We have a lot of oil. Some people
in Iraq have a lot of money. But you see people wearing
no shoes. Why?” He knows that American troops will
stay “for one year only, and to protect the Iraqi people.”
He’s sure that Iraqis will be better off because of it. But
an American government? “Absolutely not.”
Ayad Tarik Helal was driving back home at 11am
on Thursday of last week in Mansur when his car was
hit by a tank shell. He survived, pulled out of the car
through one of the windows, but his wife and two
sisters were killed. “All the cars on the road were hit
and burned,” he barely whispers. A relative quietly slips
a piece of paper with a London number: “Please tell
them that the family is OK. But don’t tell them he is in
the hospital.”
An elderly Shi’ite woman all in black wants to tell the
story of what happened to her son. At midnight on
April 9, fall-of-Baghdad day, Munib Abid Hassawi was
at home near the Balkis school in the Ashab neigh-
borhood, asleep with his wife and son, when a stray
missile hit his house. He looks the visitor in the eye,
his face contorted with pain, his torso sprayed with
shrapnel, his legs two reddish lumps of flesh: “Every
day I die a little,” his mother whispers. “The house is
destroyed, we have no place to go.” Munib needs six in-
jections a day: he’s getting only two. The hospital badly
needs medicine, needles, oxygen, and is running out
of anesthetics and painkillers. Munib’s mother stoically
murmurs, “The doctors are lying. There is no medicine
left in this hospital.”
There will come a time in their tour when the visi-
tors will be hungry. Apart from the Palestine, the only
other realistic option for a daily fix of kebab is at the
al-Lathicia restaurant – if one is prepared to wait two
hours for a mixed grill. One can always steal from the
kitchen – a favorite pastime of certain Italian free-
lance lensmen. American soldiers occasionally patrol
the street – which is one the safest in Baghdad. They
wouldn’t be exactly welcomed inside the Syrian-owned
al-Lathicia, though. Inevitably visitors will be ap-
proached by dozens of families clutching small pieces
of paper with written Arabic numbers. These numbers
– most in London and the United Arab Emirates – are
the only, elusive lifeline to their relatives abroad, if the
foreigners take the trouble to make the calls in their
satphones.
A visitor may want to check out a mall. But there
are no options left. The Mustansariya shopping center
has been thoroughly looted – and some sections were
burned. For simpler pleasures, what used to be another
one of Uday Hussein’s monopolies – cigarette smug-
gling – is now flourishing at the Palestine entrance.
A carton of Miamis sells for about US$20. Marines
kill for it. For booze, it is imperative to be acquainted
with one of the security middlemen, who will be most
obliged to find a bottle of Black and White for $50.
Visitors will have problems if they want some culture
– and this in the land that invented writing. There are
no functioning cinemas. No theaters – such as the of-
ficial theater in the TV building in front of the former
five-star al-Mansur hotel (still being looted), where
it was possible to attend classical-music concerts.
Al-Mustansariya University – the oldest in the world,
founded before the Sorbonne in 1234 – has been
looted. Students soon might have to resort to “benzin”
selling: looters do their business near the university
grounds, at 2,000 dinars a liter (less than $1).
Looting of extreme seriousness took place on April 10
at the Iraqi Museum, built by a German architect and
inaugurated in 1966. Dr Doni George, director of gen-
eral research and studies at the State Board of Antiq-
uities, asked the Americans to protect the museum: he
says a marine lieutenant-colonel named Zarcone even
gave him a pass. And then nothing. Dr. George says,
“The whole administrative compound was completely
destroyed and looted. The first point is that there were
people who knew what they wanted. They’ve taken the
precious vase of Uruk, an Akkadian bronze statue from
3200 BC, Abbasid wooden doors. Before they started
looting, there were American armored cars outside,
and people inside. They asked for the American troops
to intervene, but they did not. On Sunday, the chair-
man of the State Board of Antiquities went to the
American HQ and explained the situation. But they
sent no help.”
The book souk (market) at Moutanabi Street is totally
deserted these days – after all, the whole area is now
a charred wasteland. According to Arab legend, ev-
ery 100 years a man – not a hero, not a martyr, but
a sort of secular prophet, a wise man full of lucidity
and justice – arises to wake up a people in a dreamlike
state, anesthetized by a cruel fatality breeding fear and
passivity. For educated Baghdadis, there’s nothing irra-
FOREVER WARS   197
tional about this – either from a religious or national-
istic point of view. They wonder who that man will be,
but they know it will not be the new proconsul, retired
General Jay Garner.
Baghdadis know that Iraq – since Assyria and Meso-
potamia – needs a charismatic and authoritarian father
figure. Former Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser
was such a figure for the Arab world, as well as Mua-
mmar Gaddafi of Libya and Saddam Hussein – who
was more dangerous, clever and cynical than Gaddafi.
Ali, a civil engineer who may or may not have not been
a member of the ruling elite, coldly analyzes Saddam
as the product of the political brutality that took over
Iraq after the monarchy was deposed in 1958. He also
points out that Saddam’s model was really his worst
enemy: Hafez Assad, the clever Syrian strategist.
At the Abu Hanifa Mosque a tank shell has blown an
enormous hole in the clock tower, built in 1937. Actu-
ally, says a man named Khudaier, this was due to two
missiles shot from an A-10 tankbuster. In the grounds
of the mosque, 12 Iraqi Fedayeen and 20 mujahideen
from Syria and Algeria are buried, for “defending
Islam,” as a resident put it, on Wednesday morning,
April 9.
Khudaier says that he saw them destroy four US
198   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Abrams tanks with twin rocket-propelled grenades The leader of the
stuck together with nylon. Other locals take the vis- Iraqi National
Congress, Ahmad
itor inside the mosque and point to a pock-marked Chalabi, meets with
wall very close to the tomb of Abu Hanifa himself, an Iraqi tribal leaders
important Sunni imam. “This missile hit could have in Baghdad on
April 18, 2003. Pho-
destroyed a tank. But Allah has blessed this place.” to: Odd Andersen
Shrapnel hit the silver embroidery around the tomb, / AFP
and the shelling destroyed the delicate 100-year-old
wood-framed windows. But the real surprise is in
the mosque’s back yard. That’s where 11 fighters from
Syria and Algeria are discreetly buried, with a single
palm leaf over their graves. A small Iraqi flag identifies
another tomb. It’s perhaps the only peaceful place in
Baghdad at the moment, away from the mayhem, birds
singing in the background.
Most of Baghdad’s mosques remain closed – as the
majority of the population is still very much afraid to
leave their houses. After so many betrayals and hu-
miliations, such everlasting despair, millions of Iraqis
cannot but take refuge in religious faith – even in a
cosmopolitan Baghdad reduced to appalling economic
underdevelopment and intellectual regression.
The true test of US greatness is now. The American
soldiers have come, and they will be gone. Baghdad,
Direct democracy in action
with its broken heart, will stay.
How a former officer in the Iraqi Air Force is now the de facto mayor of
Hilla, a poor sprawling city of 2 million, 80 kilometers south of Bagh-
dad, chosen through consensus by the local population. This is Iraqi
democracy in action, the post-Saddam Hussein version
By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 19, 2003
HILLA – Mr. Iskander, a lawyer and former officer in the Iraqi air force,
married with four sons and five daughters, sits behind his desk in a
nondescript building formerly used for religious meetings for Sunni and
Shi’ite alike, now guarded by five Marines. He receives a non-stop string
of visitors, juggling between as many as four conversations simultaneous-
ly. Iskander is now the de facto mayor of Hilla, a poor sprawling city of 2
million, 80 kilometers south of Baghdad, chosen through consensus by
the local population. This is Iraqi democracy in action, the post-Saddam
Hussein version.
FOREVER WARS    199
 Hilla is now largely peaceful. People are still intrigued
by the meaning of the letters “TV” spelled out in black
tape all over our car. Kids play soccer oblivious to a
passing sandstorm and next to a miraculously non-de-
faced mural of Saddam, where he is pictured between
al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and Ishtar Gate in Bab-
ylon. Splendid, elegant (in a dusty way) Shi’ite couples
carry green flags with the inscriptions “Ali” and “Hus-
sein.” Police officers now patrol the streets and locals
swear that there has been no looting in Hilla. Food
distribution has started – from a local food warehouse,
and organized by the same managers who once worked
for the Saddam government (“But now they are free,”
said a grinning official at the new mayor’s office).
Iskander is in the middle of the process of forming a
new government. He lists his priorities as oxygen for
hospitals, equipment for water purification and the
reconstruction of the gas pipeline between Basra and
Hilla. Security, according to him, is “very good” as
proven by police officers coming back to their old jobs.
He expects the Americans to provide “new uniforms
and the new weapons to be used.” He is “very glad”
with the American presence: “It was very good to re-
move Saddam Hussein. No force could do it except the
US and the British.” More than 100 American soldiers
are now stationed in Hilla, according to Iskander.
The people’s priority, and the main subject of talks
with his visitors is, of course, security: “35 years of
Saddam was too bad,” he said, his cue to show the vis-
itor some gruesome pictures from 1998 of his brother
Jaffar, a victim of torture, under no specific accusation,
by Saddam’s regime. He also shows Jaffar’s death certif-
icate: “Dead under inquiry.”
Sheikh Salim Saed, an imposing figure in robe and
keffiah (head scarf) contrasting with his sparkling blue
eyes, is also in the room. He is the supreme sheikh
of the tribes of Shurfa (which means “honesty” in
Arabic). The sheikh’s father was hanged by Saddam’s
henchmen in 1991, after the failed Shi’ite uprising
following the Gulf War. The son of an accompanying
sheikh was also hanged in 1991, as well as the broth-
er of a lawyer also in the room. A few minutes later
200   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
comes Abbas, who had many family members killed We are firmly discouraged by the new mayor’s top capital, and the site of a ferocious battle only a few days
by Saddam’s regime from 1981 to 1991. He is now officials to travel further south to the holy Shi’ite sites ago. Amid rows of destroyed and burned businesses,
searching for five still “disappeared” family members. of Najaf and Karbala: “Every foreigner is being shot and charred tanks in alleyways laden with unexplod-
Iskander said that “we’ll give him any chance available on the road and inside the cities. There are Americans ed bombs, locals remain extremely angry. There’s no
to find work.” there, but they don’t care about the situation.” water, no electricity – and no police in the streets. They
want answers – and fast. One is almost tempted to sug-
The sheikh is clutching a stack of black and white On the way back to Baghdad we stop at the dirt-poor
gest a quick trip to the brave new world of Hilla.
copies of a photo of Ahmed Chalabi, the Iraqi Nation- village of Mahmudiya, 30 kilometers south of the
al Congress (INC) leader and self-styled new regime
strongman who stormed into Baghdad on Wednes-
day. For Iskander, Chalabi “is known for his history
of working with people against Saddam Hussein. And
he has a very strong character.” The sheikh’s opinion
is tinged with slightly more subtlety: “As far as I’m
concerned, I don’t know anything about Chalabi, but I
consider a suitable person who will govern Iraq must
provide freedom in order to deserve this position.” The
sheikh’s ideal ruler would be “anyone that is not Sadd-
am Hussein.”
Iskander has his views on what took place in a far-
away neighborhood of Hilla called Nader in the be-
ginning of April. According to him, “Syrian Fedayeen
came to this place, people tried to kick them out, and
then the Americans bombed it.” He said that there
were a maximum of three civilian dead and 20 wound-
ed. This contrasts with figures from the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), according to
which at least 61 people were killed and more than
460 seriously injured – mostly by cluster bombing – in
what has become known as the Hilla massacre.
The new Iskander government is practically in place:
it lists 14 members, including Sunni, Shi’ites and
Kurds. But where will the money come from? Their
only source of finance is “managers of Iraqi banks,”
who have already had a meeting with the Americans.
The new government will start collecting taxes, but not
now: “Our intention is to lower taxes,” Iskander swore.
“Our banks were not looted. There are some thieves
who are returning money to mosques.” He said that
“for the last 35 years there was no money here, Saddam
took it all. But there are 4 million Iraqis living outside
the country. We are very rich. They should absolutely
come back to rebuild their country.”
FOREVER WARS   201
 Iraqi Shiites
carry the coffin
of Mohammed
al-Garaawi, a
prominent aide of
radical Shiite cleric
Moqtada al-Sadr,
during his funeral
in Najaf, 160 km
south of Baghdad
on September 8,
2007. Photo: AFP

Shi’ites on the march

to Karbala
The Shi’ite armies are on the move. They have no tanks, no stealth bombers,
no night vision devices. Their sole weapon of mass persuasion is the pow-
er of the word. But the political weight that they are about to display this
Tuesday in Karbala is something unheard and unseen in centuries of histo-
ry of ‘the land between the rivers’

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 22, 2003

NAJAF and KARBALA – The Shi’ite armies are on the move. They have
no tanks, no stealth bombers, no night vision devices. Their sole weap-
on of mass persuasion is the power of the word – deep religious fervor
inscribed in green, black and red flags waved under the sandy winds of
Mesopotamia. But the political weight that they are about to display this
Tuesday in Karbala is something unheard and unseen in centuries of

202   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    203

history of “the land between the rivers.”
Every year, a pilgrimage celebrates the 40th day of
the death by decapitation of Imam Hussein, the son of
the first Imam Ali (the Prophet Mohammed’s brother-
in-law), at the battle of Karbala, in the year 680 AD,
which is the founding event of Shi’ism.
But the pilgrimage this year is unlike any other. At
the office of the late Great Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr
al-Sadr in central Najaf, top cleric Abbas Elroubaei,
who is also a painter, confides with a smile, “It took
only three words.” These – pronounced by the all-pow-
erful al-Hawza council of 15 to 20 supreme Shi’ite
religious authorities in Iraq – were simple: “Go to
Karbala.”
As early as Saturday morning, hundreds of thousands
were already on the road, literally walking to their
destination in central Iraq and converging on Imam
Hussein’s shrine, with its cupola and minarets covered
with gold. Elroubaei expects no less than 7 million
people in Karbala: “And this with just one phrase. Can
you imagine the power of 7 million?”
Karbala (an Aramaic name) is the second Shi’ite holy
place after Najaf (Najaf is Islam’s fourth holiest city,
after Mecca, Medina and Jerusalem). Karbala is so holy
that many pilgrims carry soil from it to pray in their
cities, be they in Iran or Pakistan. Many others sleep
with little round tablets under their pillows (sold for
less than 50 US cents) made from the earth of Karba-
la. A pilgrimage to Karbala can be more important to
many Shi’ites than the hajj to Mecca and Medina. This
is the ultimate Holy Land, sanctified by the blood of
martyrs. The color combination of flags waved by the
pilgrims also carries deep religious meaning. The red
flag symbolizes Abbas, Hussein’s half-brother (vener-
ated because he fought alongside Hussein in Karbala),
and also the blood of Hussein. The black flag symboliz-
es Hussein, and also sadness. The green flag symbolizes
Imam Ali, and is also the color of Islam.
“Prince” (as he is affectionately referred to) Hussein’s
mosque in Karbala is encircled by a vast courtyard
and an ornate wall with exquisite blue mosaics with
204   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
verses of the Holy Koran. Hussein’s tomb is inside a
silver-embroidered rectangle. Three hundred meters
away from Hussein’s shrine, on the other side of a huge
square, is also the golden-domed shrine of Abbas.
Since Saturday, the square has been turned into an
immense religious bazaar – a congregation of silent
widows, street orphans, raucous families, opportunists
selling battered cassettes of Koranic texts, impromptu
preachers, and the odd coffin paraded over heads and
shoulders. The pilgrims on the move – on the Bagh-
dad-Najaf expressway or on the dusty two-lane road
between Najaf and Karbala – are an extraordinary
sight, mingling with the rumbling serpent of Ameri-
can convoys, past charred T-72 tanks and “desecrated”
Saddam Hussein murals that would have pleased Andy
Warhol. Elderly Shi’ite women all in black carry plastic
vases on their heads. Most men just carry a flag, chant-
ing all the time, a keffiah (scarf) around the waist.
Some, at the sight of a foreigner, immediately shout
“No Saddam, no Amrika.” Huge photos of Hussein,
looking like a dashing medieval warrior-prince, deco-
rate the entrances of tents set up in the desert offering
tea, a few cushions and the latest tribal gossip.
Anybody thinking that a giant political rally – in a
Western sense – will take place in Karbala is bound to
be disappointed. The political statement is the gather-
ing itself of Shi’ites in such staggering numbers. The
pilgrims tell us how it is through their banners – like
“I’m the one that Allah loves” – or through their words:
“Everyone in Karbala would wish to be a martyr in
Paradise with Ali and Hussein.” What will happen,
according to top clerics, is a giant concert of wailing,
some flagellation and even some voluntary ampu-
tations – prohibited during the whole Saddam era:
these are instruments for the Shi’ites to repent for not
helping Hussein in his battle against the Ummayad
Caliphate almost 14 centuries ago. There’s nothing
specifically programmed regarding the war, said a top
cleric: “People, rather, are interested in how to work
with God: have a good life, help people, have children,
money and follow the right way.”
For Shi’ites, Islam should have been led by the Holy
Prophet Mohammed’s descendants through Ali’s lin-
eage, and not by the Caliphs. The battle of Karbala was
a larger-than-life event that not only defined the Sun-
ni-Shi’ite split inside Islam, but also defined the Shi’ite
view of the world as a blend of protest and martyrdom:
a radical activism. That’s why the battle of Karbala is
as vivid in the Shi’ite imagination today as if it had just
taken place.
It’s startling to compare Sunni and Shi’ite attitudes
in the highly-charged atmosphere of post-Saddam
Iraq. Sunnis – apart from the giant street protest after
jumma (Friday) prayers at the Abu Hanifah mosque in
Baghdad on Friday – have faded into the background,
while Shi’ite clerics have demonstrated an extraor-
dinary capacity for unity. They seem to be united on
at least one rallying cry, heard at the Abu Hanifah
demonstration and also on the road to Karbala: >I>La
Suniya, La Shieya, Wahda Wahda Islamiya (No Sunni
or Shi’ite, only one Islam). But another battle cry – also
vocally imprinted by Sunni and Shi’ite alike, is in-
finitely more problematic: La ilaha ila Allah, America
Aduallah (There is no God but Allah, and America is
His enemy).
Right now, Najaf is all but deserted: everybody went
or is on the road to Karbala. An April 13 proclamation
by the powerful al-Hawza – which could be defined as
the high office of Shi’ite religious authorities – affixed
on the meticulously decorated tiles of the Imam Ali
shrine – gives detailed instructions to Najaf ’s citizens.
Some crucial points: there is no difference between
Sunni and Shi’ite; everyone should go to the mosque;
al-Hawza will take care of managing health problems.
Al-Hawza has made numerous recommendations:
“Don’t listen to anyone outside Iraqi or from the
occupying force.” “Keep your eyes open,” “Save your
possessions from looting,” “Help people with food and
medicine,” “Don’t do anything against anybody like
during the Saddam Hussein government,” “Everyone
must respect any religion” and “Everybody should go
back to work.”
In the streets, a huge crowd immediately congregates
around any foreign visitor: “Tell the world we have no
water, no electricity, no gas, very little food, no mon-
ey, no medicine.” Very few shops are open in the souk
(market) corridor that leads to the Imam Ali shrine.
And there’s the matter of the assassination of a very
prominent figure to be solved.
Last year, the imam of Najaf, Dr. Haider Alkelydar,
granted a long interview to this correspondent, talking
about Sunni-Shi’ite unity and revealing among other
things that the city was a training camp for the Pales-
tine Liberation Army. On April 12, with the Americans
already in town, Haider was killed. According to Zaki
Elnouthfar, a prominent Najafi, “The imam was killed
by the Mukhabarat” [the Iraq secret service], by peo-
ple “who were not from Najaf, who knifed his body
100 times.” Elnouthfar, whose story is corroborated by
many Najafis, swears “everybody here loved Dr. Haid-
er.”
According to the Najaf street version, the killing fit
the Mukhabarat style. Residents say that Haider left the
Imam Ali shrine and was walking in Thausat al-Ashrin
street with two bodyguards when he was attacked.
Residents say that Haider had enough time to “try to
call the Americans on his satphone,” apparently with
no success.
This version of events is totally contradicted by Abbas
Elroubaei of the Ayatollah al-Sadr’s office: “There was a
relationship between Haider and Saddam Hussein and
his sons.” He thinks that the assassins were from Najaf.
If they are, this would confirm Elroubaei’s assertion
that “there are a lot of people in the streets who have
no responsibilities.”
Who is the top Shi’ite authority in Iraq at the mo-
ment? In Najaf, the al-Hawza says that 68-year-old
Grand Ayatollah Sistani is a crucial reference in these
troubled times. Others point to Kazem al-Haari, who
left for Iran 25 years ago. As far as Elroubaei is con-
cerned, the Shi’ite political parties based in Iran “have
no popular base in Iraq. Most Iraqi people want to
hear the opinions of al-Hawza.” He insists though that
“al-Hawza will not play a political role. But it will sup-
port any government who will serve the Iraqi people.”
He also says, significantly, “there’s no political role for
Ayatollah Sistani.” There are indeed subtle distinctions
FOREVER WARS   205
between the top Shi’ite names. For the office of Ayatol-
lah al-Sadr, al-Haari is the most popular. For Najafis,
Sistani is the most popular.
There are photos of the Great Ayatollah al-Sadr –
who along with his sister was slaughtered on Saddam’s
orders in April 1980 – on sale all over Najaf; but it
takes a real pilgrimage to find a photo of Sistani. This
may have to do with the fact that al-Sadr was killed by
Saddam, and Sistani is still alive: for Shi’ites, martyrs
hold the ultimate power.
In the 1991 Shi’ite uprising following the Gulf War,
the anti-Saddam rebels briefly took control of Najaf
and Karbala, before Saddam’s forces wiped them out
with brute force. This political disaster taught them
many lessons. It’s wrong to think along Elroubaei’s
lines that the political parties based in Iran have no
base inside Iraq.
The Da’wa Party claims to be very well connected in-
side Iraq. Their spiritual leader is none other than Aya-
tollah al-Sadr. His martyrdom is one of the foundation
stones of the party. According to a privileged Iranian
source, in the beginning of the war the Da’wa Party did
not exactly disagree with the Anglo-American inva-
sion. Anybody was welcomed to remove Saddam. But
Da’wa is vigorously against a military protectorate. It
insists a maximum of two months are enough to orga-
nize an election. It’s not thinking in terms of a general
election for a parliament in the initial stage, but local
elections for municipal officials. These officials would
organize a constitutional assembly and then general
elections. Da’wa is absolutely against the two-year or
more transition period preferred by the Pentagon. If it
happens, it will be colonization, and Da’wa will engage
in armed struggle against the foreign invaders. Da’wa
are more “moderate,” in a sense, than the Supreme
Assemble for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI).
They know that America will remain in Iraq – for
some period of time. But they are adamant: Iraq’s fu-
ture should be determined by Iraqis themselves. Da’wa
officials spent a long time in exile, and some imbibed a
lot of Western culture; they are certainly not hardcore
Islamists. For instance, their take on the application
206   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
of one form or another of Sharia (Islamic law) is that
it should be a parliamentarian decision. And cru-
cially, they reject the concept of velayat-al-faqih – or
government by specialists of Islamic jurisprudence.
The SAIRI, and its leader Ayatollah Hakim, is totally
aligned on this matter with Iranian supremo Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei.
Ayatollah Sistani’s position is much more complex
than the position of political parties based in Iran –
although not dissimilar. The ayatollah never left Najaf.
Saddam tried to assassinate him at least four times.
And he is not pro-Iranian. He was in the eye of the
storm only a while ago, concerning his alleged fatwa
in favor of neutrality during the war – something that
was welcomed at the American Central Command in
Qatar.
His official website had to post a window in Arabic
denying “anything said by the Western press agen-
cies” attributing a fatwa to him. And in London, the
al-Khoei Foundation of Abdul Majid al-Khoei (who is
the son of the late Abul Qasem al-Khoei from the first
Gulf War, who tried in vain to meet General Norman
Schwartzkopf in the desert to prevent a repression of
the Shi’ites by Saddam) denied the existence of the
fatwa.
Abdul Majid al-Khoei went to Najaf courtesy of the
American army. He arranged for the safety of Sistani
and three others who were captives in Najaf of Sadd-
am’s Fedayeen when Ba’ath militia were occupying
Imam Ali’s shrine. Sistani was finally liberated. He is
in good health, but he is not talking to anyone for the
moment.
According to the al-Khoei foundation, neither the
supposed Sistani pronouncement on neutrality nor
another so-called fatwa from September 2002 nailed
on the doors of Baghdad’s mosques could be qualified
as fatwas. A fatwa is a religious edict that results from
a learned analysis of a point of Islamic jurisprudence.
Sistani, some say, just made a statement. Ayatollahs in
his position are usually asked questions regarding all
sorts of current issues. The answers are usually circum-
stantial, and don’t carry the same doctrinal weight as
a fatwa. This means that in September 2002, and again
in March 2003, Sistani reinforced the notion that in
all the history of Islam, the protection of the umma
(the community of the faithful) means that no infidel
troops should occupy Muslim territory. So if Iraq is
caught in the crossfire between a Western army and
Saddam’s troops, what is the solution? Sistani (who
still is not talking to the media) might have answered,
or not answered: “do nothing.” This certainly wasn’t a
fatwa.
It’s enlightening to note that Sistani’s position perfect-
ly matches Ayatollah Hakim’s, the leader of SAIRI in
Tehran. A few weeks ago, Hakim said, “I urge all Iraqis
not to get involved in the fighting. They should not
side, either with Saddam’s forces, or with the US-led
forces.”
Hakim belongs to one of the most notable Shi’ite fam-
ilies in Iraq. His father is Muhsin Hakim al-Tabatabai,
a senior ayatollah from Najaf who sharply criticized
the Ba’ath repression against the Shi’ites in the 1950s
and 1960s. Hakim wants the SAIRI to be fully repre-
sentative of all Iraqi Muslims – Sunni and Shi’ite alike.
The SAIRI’s power base is basically in Basra, Na-
jaf and Karbala. It has refused American funding,
has tried to distance itself from any connection with
America and is of course opposed to an American
government in Iraq. The SAIRI’s paramilitary wing, the
40,000-strong Badr Brigades – mostly based in Iraqi
Kurdistan – were prevented by Hakim from engaging
in any military operations inside Iraq: this could be
interpreted as support for the Anglo-American inva-
sion. But Hakim said many times that the brigades
were positioned inside Iraq and ready to speed up the
fall of Saddam’s regime. Hakim said two weeks ago in
Tehran that “if Americans are planning to stay in Iraq
as an occupation force after Saddam, we have repeat-
edly stated that they will be faced by fierce armed
resistance.” On his vision of a future Iraqi government,
he said, “We don’t believe in a system that is based on
sectarian or racial division. I think what the majority
of Iraqi factions have come to recognize as the best
political course for Iraq is the parliamentarian system
on the basis of one-man one-vote, without applying
any sectarian agenda. I also strongly believe that any
future government should uphold the religious values
of the Iraqi people, which are rooted in Islam. It has to
be emphasized that Islam is the official religion of the
state and that Sharia is the main source of legislation.
That said, all the rights of the religious minorities will
be respected. The cultural sensitivities and religious
values of the Iraqi people have to be taken into account
in any future Iraqi government,”
What is being said in Tehran is in effect reinforcing
what is taking place in Najaf and Karbala. Elroubaei
scoffs at the fact that there is “an unknown Iraqi”
leading the Najaf provincial government. In his own
personal opinion, “Iraqis reject any kind of foreign
occupation. They will resist. When we believe they will
not leave and are behaving as an occupation force, we
will move.” He insists, “Our rallying cry is that there
are no differences between Kurds, Sunnis and Shi’ites.
The Americans said that after the collapse of Saddam’s
government and the search for weapons of mass de-
struction they will go. If they don’t go, we will take our
measures.”
Shi’ites seem to know exactly what they want. And
most of all what they don’t want. After so much op-
pression, the march to Karbala may be, on the surface,
apolitical. But it may turn out to be the most profound
political affirmation of direct democracy in the history
of Mesopotamia.
FOREVER WARS   207
 Mohymeed Aswad,
manager of Bagh-
dad’s al-Qarah cem-
etery, stands near
a plot with almost
1,000 unmarked
graves, most of
them corpses
brought in from the
nearby Abu Ghraib
prison during the
regime of Saddam
Hussein. Photo: Cris
Bouroncle / AFP

The Mukhabarat’s shopping list

A document found by Asia Times Online, among other files, in a
nondescript, abandoned Mukhabarat safe house in the Qadissiya
district of the capital reveals how Saddam Hussein’s deeply feared
secret service lived in its own Thousand and One Nights bubble

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 24, 2003

BAGHDAD – While the buildup to the war on Iraq was convulsing

world capitals, world opinion and the United Nations, the Mukhabarat –
the feared Saddam Hussein secret service machine – was still living in its
own Thousand and One Nights bubble.
This is what revealed by a document found by Asia Times Online,
among other files, in a nondescript, abandoned Mukhabarat safe house
in the Qadissiya district of the capital. Iraqis who read it and translated it

208   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    209

had no reason to doubt its authenticity. The handwrit-
ten document details a series of meetings between June
2002 and March 2003 (even when war was already rag-
ing in Iraq), probably in the same safe house, involving
Mukhabarat agents and representatives of firms from
many Arab countries but also from France, Russia
and the Netherlands. The document should constitute
additional proof that the secret services indeed oper-
ated as a parallel state in Iraq – way beyond the reach
of United Nations sanctions and trade embargo. All
negotiations were secret. And everything was paid in
US dollars, cash.
All manner of other secrets and not-such-secrets
are to be found in what remains of Baghdad. Detailed
personal files by Internal Security in Mukhabarat
abandoned safe houses in Karada. Compromising files
at the torched and looted Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Secret graves in the al-Qarah cemetery of nearly 1,000
political prisoners tortured and mostly hanged at
Abu Ghraib prison. And in the basement of another
Mukhabarat safe house in Wahda, after a poor torch
job, an astonishing room brimming with the latest
high-tech surveillance equipment is still practically
intact. Possibly much of the equipment was purchased
following the meetings detailed at the document found
in Qadissiya.
From the Alwaeth firm in Syria, the Mukhabarat
negotiated to buy machines to conceal fax numbers.
They could be delivered in three days. From an un-
named Egyptian firm, it wanted wireless communica-
tion systems for buildings, at US$55,000, and a more
sophisticated system for $100,000. It also wanted
wireless systems from the Iraqi firm, al-Azhal. From an
unnamed corporation in Abu Dhabi, the Mukhabarat
wanted an array of goods: wireless systems; wireless
pinhole cameras with a maximum range of 100 meters
(delivery in one month); four-channel AV receivers;
pen cameras with a maximum range of 100 meters,
connected to video, recording audio and operating on
12V batteries; cameras with a range of 1 kilometers,
and upgraded with an outer antenna for 3 kilometers;
and night vision goggles with a 1 kilometer range. The
goggles could be the most explosive item in the shop-
210   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
ping list as Washington had all but accused Syria of foreign – the Mukhabarat wanted to buy three dif- The Mukhabarat was actively comparing prices
selling them to Iraq. According to the document, the ferent computer systems for $199,000 each (with a between Iraqi and Syrian firms. It was negotiating to
negotiations were actually conducted with this un- discount, it could come to $130,000 each). The sys- buy Toyota Camrys at $20,500 apiece and Mercedes
named Abu Dhabi corporation. tems are called Spread Spectrum (operating between sedans for $55,000 apiece from the Aldahi dealership
1,5 and 5 gigahertz). There was an explicit condition in Baghdad, imported from a firm in the United Arab
From the Dutch firm Haiman, and also from an
for the purchase: the manager of the firm had to send Emirates. From the al-Azar firm, also in Baghdad, it
unnamed Lebanese firm, the Mukhabarat wanted
Mukhabarat agents for training out of Iraq – with wanted Mercedes vans. From the Jawrah and Hensi
spray to detect fingerprints on paper and wood, and
specialists from Lebanon. And all spare parts should corporation in Syria, it received an assurance that the
to detect separate fingerprints from different people.
be free. On this particular negotiation, the Mukhabarat cars could be delivered in two months. And it could
Mukhabarat agents questioned Haiman for any new
was dealing with Muhamad Halewi, a doctor and also buy on request air-conditioners, Hyundai eleva-
technology and also wanted to know the prices for
manager of the Fica firm in Baghdad. And it was also tors, copy machines, Panasonic videos and TVs and
card-operated security systems.
comparing prices with the Abu Dhabi office of a firm paper shredders.
From the French firm APX, the Mukhabarat wanted called Teltec. The Mukhabarat complains that the pric-
One thing is certain: not all Mukhabarat papers were
to buy listening devices, portable satellites and pri- es quoted by the Reeger company – country of origin
shredded as the Americans arrived at the gates of
vate security systems. The document states that the non-specified – are very high. The document states
Baghdad.
Mukhabarat had “direct contacts with a minister in that if they buy anything from Reeger, training will
France” who could help the negotiations. The docu- have to be conducted in Malaysia.
ment also states the Mukhabarat desire of trying to
improve the security systems of Iraqi embassies around
the world. Thus the quest for sophisticated listening
devices; small microphones; telephone bugs; transmit-
ter pens; laser systems to check camera performance;
listening devices to monitor what happens inside a
building from the outside; hidden espionage cameras;
night cameras to identify people from a distance of
150 meters; and the smallest color cameras available
on the market. From the Alsalam company – country
of origin non-identified – the Mukhabarat was trying
to buy video cameras inside pens and made-in-Russia
long-distance cameras, with a range of 2 to 3 kilome-
ters.
In another meeting with an unidentified French firm,
the Mukhabarat wanted to purchase equipment to
recognize fingertips on glass and wood; machine guns
disguised as suitcases; and voice identifying systems
that can be matched with databases. It also wanted a
spray to identify fingerprints; laser tools to identify
fingerprints; a system to identify food poisoning (a key
Saddam Hussein obsession); tools to identify explo-
sive materials and give the exact distance between
the target and the explosives; and a robot to remove
explosives.
From the al-Asriya firm – not identified as Iraqi or
FOREVER WARS   211
 Mohammed A.
al-Douri, perma-
nent representa-
tive of Iraq to the
United Nations, ad-
dresses the media
on March 21, 2003
at UN Headquar-
ters in New York.
Photo: AFP

The Baghdad deal

An Asia Times Online investigation in Baghdad, Tikrit and Najaf has
yielded a clear certainty among Iraqis, both Sunni and Shi’ite: the
Pentagon and the Ba’ath Party leadership made a safqua (‘secret deal’
in Arabic) for the (almost) bloodless fall of Baghdad.

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 25, 2003

BAGHDAD – Much of the world was surprised. After the spirited resis-
tance in the south of Iraq, how could Baghdad possibly have fallen in only
two days?
An Asia Times Online investigation in Baghdad, Tikrit and Najaf has
yielded a clear certainty among Iraqis, both Sunni and Shi’ite, as to the
answer: The Pentagon and the Ba’ath Party leadership made a safqua (“se-
cret deal” in Arabic) for the (almost) bloodless fall of Baghdad. Crucially,
this safqua may have included a package of American green cards for top

212   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    213

Republican and Special Republican Guard command-
ers and their families.
“Shaku maku”? (“What’s new”?). “Makushi”? (No
news). In the answer to this popular exchange in Bagh-
dad slang, makushi has been replaced by safqua.
Mohammed al-Douri, the Iraqi ambassador to the
United Nations, was the one who pronounced the
famous last words “the game is over” – referring to the
end of Saddam Hussein’s regime. And a game it might
well have been. (Al-Douri, according to al-Jazeera
television, has enjoyed safe passage to Syria, and might
even end up the UN ambassador of the new Iraqi gov-
ernment).
At the beginning of last week, a congregation of
sheiks clad in dazzling black linen robes was camped
in the lobby of the Palestine Hotel in Baghdad. They
were once again seeking an appointment with Moham-
med Mohsen al-Zubaidi, the self-anointed governor of
Baghdad (now demoted by the Americans).
The sheiks wanted to talk about their main priority:
security. They wanted cooperation with the US Ma-
rines, but most of all they needed medicine for their
hospitals and all the help they could get to “rebuild our
country.” Sheik Altai was among the participants. An
affable and subtle man, he was a political prisoner of
Saddam’s regime from 1995 to 2002 in a Baghdad jail.
He commands the allegiance of about 70,000 people.
And as an important tribal leader, he ultimately ended
up being courted by Saddam himself.
From a long conversation with the sheik, observa-
tions from a Ba’ath Party official who calls himself Ali
and now lives in discreet civilian garb in a nondescript
house in the Karada district, former Ba’ath Party offi-
cials laying low in Tikrit and top Shi’ite clerics in Najaf,
it’s possible to reconstitute how the “fall” of Baghdad
was staged.
No one will know what really happened in this war
until a number of crucial questions are answered. And
Iraqis are not expecting these answers to be spelled out
by the Americans.
214   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
• How did American forces manage to storm into
and take over Baghdad with practically no resis-
tance? In Basra, which is much smaller and which
was relatively lightly defended, there was no
pro-Anglo-American uprising, and the city took
three weeks to be subdued.
• What happened to the 20,000-strong, well-
equipped Special Republican Guards, charged
with the defense of Baghdad? Where did they
melt away to?
• How come there was no coordination between
the Ba’ath Party-Republican Guard defense of
Baghdad and the jihadis who poured in from
Syria, Algeria, Yemen and Egypt to help?
• How come the Republican and Special Repub-
lican Guards did not destroy a single bridge in
Baghdad – an effective tactic to delay the Ameri-
can invasion?
• How did the entire Iraqi cabinet manage to
escape? This includes Saddam and his sons, Vice
President Taha Yassin Ramadan, Deputy Prime
Minister Tariq Aziz, Dr. A K Hashimi (Sadd-
am’s personal adviser), the ministers of defense,
economy, trade and health and the unforgettable,
insult-laden Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf of the
information ministry.
• Similarly, how did the vast majority of the Ba’ath
Party leadership and the Republican Guard evade
capture or surrender?
• What happened to the infrastructure of the re-
gime – the bulk of the estimated 500,000 elite?
• What has happened to Saddam? Is he still in Iraq,
in Taramiya, not far from Tikrit, or in Mecca, as
per wild speculation in the Arab world?
• Why were the oil fields in northern and south-
ern Iraq not set on fire – a tactic already used by
Saddam in Kuwait in 1991?
• Where are Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruc-
tion – the official reason for the war?
Iraqi sheiks confirm that Saudi Crown Prince Ab-
dullah – who enjoys excellent relations with the Bush
family – had been working tirelessly for months for
a political solution to the Iraqi crisis. If Saddam is in
Mecca, the architect would surely have been Prince
Abdullah. His rationale always was to prevent by any
means a long, bloody guerrilla war in Iraq which
would turn the whole Middle East into a volcano. The
Bush administration rationale was to grab a chance to
engineer an allegedly quick post-Saddam stabilization
process and so create a shortcut to the much-talked-
about but yet-unpublicized roadmap supposed to solve
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
At the beginning of the war, US Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld in his Pentagon briefings highlighted
the constant flow of “communications” between the
Americans and Republican Guard commanders. But
Iraqis are now saying that the most important set of
secret channels was between Republican Guard com-
manders and commanders of the Fedayeen of Saddam.
This channel completely bypassed Saddam and his
son Qusay – the de facto commander of the defense of
Baghdad.
The whole issue was about survival, considering that
the regime’s demise, confronted by overwhelming
American power, was inevitable. At least two Repub-
lican Guard divisions plus the well-trained, well-fed,
well-armed Special Republican Guard could have
raised hell against the Americans in the defense of
Baghdad. The Palestinization of Iraq, coupled with
a jihad fought like a guerrilla war, could have lasted
months, if not years. So as the Americans approached
Baghdad they came up with an offer selected Iraqis
could not refuse.
So the story goes that a reward package for the
“peaceful” handover of Baghdad was offered to Repub-
lican Guard commanders and, later on, the Fedayeen
of Saddam. Republican Guard commanders received
a lot of cash, a “secure” relocation outside of Iraq, and
crucially for those not considered war criminals, the
promise of a new job in post-Saddam Iraq. After all,
the new American government will need cadres to
run the remains of the devastated state apparatus. Top
commanders were offered the option of residency in
the US, for themselves and their families, and most of
all the chance to play a relatively prominent role linked
to some factions of the Iraqi opposition – basically the
Iraqi National Congress (INC) led by the Pentagon’s
pet Iraqi, Ahmad Chalabi.
The story also goes that although there were less than
50 human shields in Baghdad when the war started,
many had been coming and going since February. The
role played by some was not that of a completely inno-
cent bystander: they were Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) agents. These agents, equipped with sophisti-
cated micro-communication devices, were in fact the
only American “human intelligence” on the ground in
Baghdad. They worked as a kind of carrier pigeon in
meetings with key Republican Guard commanders.
Saddam and his son Qusay seem to have been totally
out of this loop. It’s certainly difficult to conceive that
Ba’ath Party officials could not or did not do enough
to detect the spies among the human shields placed in
factories and water and power plants. In most of these
installations, there were underground bunkers with a
dizzying array of weapons – enough to fuel a guerrilla
war for years. It’s an open secret in Baghdad that these
weapons were later duly discovered by the Marines as
they took control of the capital.
The CIA human shields updated and guided the
American forces to the bombing of key regime instal-
lations, and to selected places where Saddam and the
Ba’ath Party leadership would meet: thus the origin of
the information that led to the “decapitation strike”
with four 900 kilogram bombs in the Mansur district
on April 8, the first night of the war. Saddam survived.
But 14 civilians were killed – members of two Chris-
tian families, mostly women and children. Asia Times
Online has been to the site twice: for Baghdadis, it’s an
unofficial shrine to the horrors of this war.
As the Americans bribed the resistance, the order not
to resist started streaming from the top commanders
down. Republican Guard commanders told the rank-
and-file that the resistance would be secret and long-
FOREVER WARS   215
term, according to Saddam and Qusay’s long-elabo-
rated scenario of a guerrilla war. The “fall” of Saddam
International Airport was the first part of the deal.
Another open secret in Baghdad were the famous tun-
nels linking the main Republican palace of Saddam to
the airport. Republican Guard commanders tipped off
the Marines, and the tunnels were immediately seized.
Proof that Saddam and top Ba’ath Party officials were
out of the handover loop was the promise by Moham-
med Saeed al-Sahaf, in one of his briefings, that the
media should expect an “unusual” Iraqi counter-attack
to retake the airport. Many thought about chemical
and biological warfare, when in fact the plan was to
send Special Republican Guards through the tunnels to
take the Americans by surprise. The surprise went the
other way.
When the American Abrams tanks arrived close to the
Palestine Hotel – Baghdad’s international media head-
quarters – the “game” was practically over. The Repub-
lican Guard commanders were about to be airlifted out
of Iraq, and their soldiers had orders to demobilize and
melt into the civilian population. Independent media
had to be intimidated, silenced or corralled – and that’s
why the al-Jazeera office and the Abu Dhabi TV office
were hit, as well as the Palestine Hotel itself. The delib-
erate communications and power black out of Baghdad
fit into the pattern: the Pentagon and the Republican
Guard had to be dancing together in the dark.
The commander of the Fedayeen of Saddam had
heard about the American offer to the Republican
Guard elite officers. He realized that his own best
interests were to get his own piece of the action. He got
it. The Fedayeen were instantly beheaded, and were left
to roam helplessly around Baghdad and finally dissolve
into the civilian population. Game over.
Baghdad now can watch satellite TV in the streets.
The communication blackout is slowly being lift-
ed. Away from the American media spin, the same
theme is being replayed over and over again in Iraq,
from Sunni neo-entrepreneurs to Shi’ite clerics, from
last week’s unprecedented street demonstration after
jumma (Friday) prayers at the Abu Hanifa mosque to
216   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
the emotional convulsion of the Shi’ite celebrations in US soldiers keep
Karbala: the Americans want Iraq’s oil, and the guerril- watch on one of
Saddam Hussein’s
la war will start sooner or later. palaces in Babylon
April 19, 2003.
George W Bush solemnly promised that war crimi- Photo: Karim Sahib
nals would be brought to trial in Iraq. There are around / AFP
60 secret police headquarters in Baghdad. They are
all empty. The giant Mukhabarat complex – the secret
services’ pleasure dome, thoroughly bombed by the
Americans – is empty. When one goes to these places,
still loaded with shredded, burned or partially read-
able documents, only reporters are to be found: not a
single American forensic specialist. War criminals of
lower rank – Saddam’s invisible professional torturers,
the so-called “B” list of the Ba’ath Party – are not being
pursued. Iraqis openly say that most of these people
are now seeking to work for the new occupying pow-
er: all smiles in their newfound, nondescript, civilian
clothes, they were to be found starting from 9am every
day outside the Palestine Hotel, trying to get a job with
The lions of Babylon
the Marines’ Civil Affairs Unit. In an effort to disclose
names and responsibilities in a giant, totalitarian police
state, every bit of information is helpful. The Ameri-
cans are not even trying to make an effort. Nothing could be more enlightening than to roam around Babylon
So all these unanswered questions keep resurfacing in guided by one of its caretakers. Babylon’s museum was pillaged
Baghdad. Like the mysterious “fires” in dozens of min-
istries, in fact all of them except the Ministry of Oil and
and torched. What happened in Babylon is only a fraction of what
the Ministry of Interior. The top floor of the Ministry happened in Baghdad – where a siege turned into pillage. Iraqis and
of Information – a mine of information, in fact – was concerned foreigners consider it as a crime against humanity, a crime
on fire in the middle of last week. Marines on site were
patrolling the streets. The Ministry of Education was
against civilization and a crime against Islam
on fire by the end of last week: Marines in the Palestine
Hotel asked this correspondent, “What city is that?” By PEPE ESCOBAR
Few in Baghdad believe these recurrent fires were APRIL 26, 2003
provoked by the “remnants of Saddam’s regime” – as
goes the official Washington line. They don’t know BABYLON – Hussein Sahab, a frail, gentle man in his late 50s, married,
for sure for whom the arsonists are working. But they two sons and two daughters, has had the same job for the past 27 years.
His salary: 24,000 Iraqi dinars a month (less than US$8). Sahab is one of
are asking themselves three questions. Who profits
the caretakers of Babylon, the mythical Bab Ilou (God’s gate), founded in
from the destruction of the whole infrastructure of the
the 24th century BC by the Amorite king Sumu-Abum.
Iraqi state? Who profits from the destruction of Iraq’s
invaluable cultural wealth? And why are Americans Nothing could be more enlightening than to roam around Babylon
soldiers just blank-stared, gum-chewing spectators of guided by this quintessential Mesopotamian. He talks about how Babylon
all this pyromania? started to make history after the fall of Ur in 2003 BC. He talks about the
FOREVER WARS    217
great king Hammurabi, a skilled diplomat who turned
Babylon into the center of an empire settled in a terri-
tory comparable to contemporary Iraq. He shows the
visitor around the Babylon of king Nebuchadnezzar
in the 6th century BC – as reconstructed by Saddam
Hussein. At the time of Nebuchadnezzar, the prophet
Jeremiah described Babylon as “a cup of gold in the
hands of the Lord which inebriates the whole of the
earth.”
Hussein Sahab takes the visitor to some of the visible
ruins of Hammurabi’s Babylon (most are 40 meters
underground). He shows the exact corner where Al-
exander the Great died of malaria in June 323 BC. He
talks about sexy Semiramis – the legendary founding
queen of Babylon – who chose her lovers among her
most handsome soldiers and executed them once she
was satiated.
According to legend, Babylon was built in 365 days
by 2 million workers. At the outset of the 1980-1988
Iran-Iraq war, Saddam set out to rebuild Babylon. The
summer palace, the temples of Ishtar, Nabu and Nin-
mah, the ramparts, the Greek amphitheater, were all
restored. If one uses one’s imagination, one can hear
the chanting of pilgrims echoing around the “House
of the Foundation of Heaven and Earth” – the ziggurat
(temple tower) the whole world knows under the bib-
lical name of the Tower of Babel. “It’s over there,” says
Hussein Sahab, pointing to the top of a hill less than
800 meters away from Nebuchadnezzar’s palace walls.
In a commemorative plaque placed at the square
of the throne, Saddam Hussein says that he rebuilt
Babylon “to restore to the Iraqi people the pride of its
glorious past.” Saddam is now gone: Hussein Sahab fig-
ured it out when he noticed the surrealist Minister of
Information Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf did not show
up on Iraqi TV on April 9. Hussein Sahab says, “We
are not satisfied with the Americans, but we are sat-
isfied because they destroyed Saddam’s family.” What
Hussein Sahab did not expect was the destruction that
take place afterwards – and from which Babylon was
not spared.
Babylon’s museum was pillaged and torched. Al-
218   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
though most of what has been discovered on site since
the end of the 19th century is in European museums, it
held some priceless objects recently excavated by Iraqi
archeologists. Hussein Sahab says that most were saved
by the site’s staff of 60. The vandals, he says, were “not
people living in the area.” The tribune in the Greek
amphitheater where Saddam’s family used to watch
concerts was also vandalized. The restored, sprawling
Nebuchadnezzar’s palace at least was not bulldozed:
originally it had more than 200 rooms and courtyards
linked by corridors, with royal apartments, adminis-
trative buildings, courtesan quarters and shops whose
ruins were long mistaken for vestiges of the famous
Hanging Gardens.
What happened in Babylon is only a fraction of what
happened in Baghdad. The transformation of the siege
of Baghdad into the pillage of Baghdad is considered
by many Iraqis and concerned foreigners as a crime
against humanity, a crime against civilization and
a crime against Islam. In Mesopotamia, the “Land
between the Rivers,” the home of the Garden of Eden
(which is located 74 kilometers north of Basra in the
direction of Baghdad, where the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers meet), the human race invented agriculture, al-
phabets, codes of law, mathematics, astronomy, poetry,
epic literature and organized religion. Without Meso-
potamia, the human race might have lived a lot longer
in darkness and ignorance.
The Iraqi Museum in Baghdad, housing more than
170,000 priceless sculptures, bass reliefs, ceramics and
ancient texts, chronicling Stone Age settlements of half
a million years ago, the rise and fall of the great civili-
zations of Uruk, Sumeria, Babylon, Assyria and Persia,
and the spread of Islam, has been thoroughly looted.
Among the irreparable losses are the tablets containing
Hammurabi’s Code – the first code of law in history –
and the 4,600-year-old Ram in the Thicket statue from
Ur. The 4,300-year-old bust of an Akkadian king was
smashed.
Asia Times Online went to the Iraqi Museum one
day after the looting, which took place on April 10. Dr
Doni George, director of general research and stud-
ies at the State Board of Antiquities, said at the time, they opened the locks, no Iraqi could do it.”
“The whole administrative compound was completely
Specialists at the UN Educational, Scientific and
destroyed and looted. The first point is that there were
Cultural Organization in their headquarters in Par-
people who knew what they wanted. They’ve taken the
is are convinced that this was a concerted operation
precious vase of Uruk, an Akkadian bronze statue from
organized outside of Iraq. Not all the oil in the world –
3,200 BC, Abbassid wooden doors. Before they start-
which as a matter of fact will not benefit Iraqis anyway,
ed looting, there were American armored cars out-
but will serve to pay foreigners for the Iraqi war –
side, and people inside. They asked for the American
would be enough to compensate the Iraqi population,
troops to intervene, but they did not. On Sunday, the
the whole Arab nation, and the whole civilized world
chairman of the State Board of Antiquities went to the
for what has been lost in the looting.
American HQ and explained the situation. But they
sent no help. This shows they wanted the Iraqi Muse- Meanwhile, in a deserted Babylon tormented by
um to be destroyed.” sandy winds, Hussein Sahab wants to keep his job. He
shows the visitor that the Lion of Babylon is still stand-
At the time, the curators were too traumatized to
ing: it has not been stolen or vandalized. The Lion of
discuss what was lost, and how. In the following days,
Babylon – supposedly a trophy from Hitite times, mid-
they started collecting extremely disturbing evidence
dle of the 2nd millennium BC – is an enigmatic basalt
that this was a very well organized operation. Archae-
statue representing a man who is about to be killed by
ological files and computer disks simply disappeared.
a lion. But in fact the man is resisting: with one hand
Glass-cutting tools were found on the museum’s floor.
he tries to shove the lion’s mouth away, and with the
Replicas that the curators had switched with the gen-
other he fights one of the lion’s menacing paws. Legend
uine article were still there, but the genuine artworks
rules that as long as the statue is there, Babylon will
were stolen. The museum’s vaults had been opened
never be conquered. As to Hussein Sahab, he could
with special keys: an armed guard at the museum told
have stolen anything from Babylon, and sold the loot
Asia Times Online that American soldiers had not
for millions. He did not. Long live the lions of Babylon.
taken anything, but that they had opened the doors
for “people from other nationalities” to loot. “The way
FOREVER WARS   219
 The twin towers
of the World Trade
Center billow
smoke after
hijacked airliners
crashed into them
early September
11, 2001. Photo:
Henny Ray Abrams
/ AFP

The Twin Towers and the

Tower of Babel
After consistently blaming “remnants of Saddam’s regime” for all of
the troubles in Iraq, Washington has been forced to recruit hundreds of
the worst of these remnants - the feared Mukhabarat - to try to at least
identify the more than 40 different groups that compose the resistance.
Roving Eye Pepe Escobar reports in the first article of a two-part series
By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 10, 2003

PARIS - Two years after September 11, 2001, the Washington neo-con-
servative dream of a rainbow of democracy shining from Israel to Af-
ghanistan and traversing Iraq has vanished into thin air. From Kabul to
Baghdad, the vision is being wiped out by the truth of hard facts. 1) The
American army does not have the resources to play by itself the role of

220   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    221

global sheriff. 2) America is not prepared for or inter-
ested in nation-building. 3) Military “victories”, like
Afghanistan and Iraq, mean nothing when they are not
complemented by moral and political legitimacy. The
lack of legitimacy creates a political void, immediately
exploited by radical Islam.
Tribal Afghanistan is a Taliban-infested ungovernable
chaos trespassed by an anti-American jihad. Iraq is an
ungovernable chaos bordering on civil war and tres-
passed by an anti-American jihad. The Israeli-Palestin-
ian roadmap has been ripped apart. Al-Qaeda, a mu-
tant virus, continues to strike from east Africa to the
Middle East and Southeast Asia. Osama bin Laden and
his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri remain on the loose in
the Pakistan-Afghan tribal areas. Taliban leader Mul-
lah Omar leads the Afghan jihad from his hideout in
the mountains north of Kandahar. And Saddam Hus-
sein, after losing yet another war, has exploded a time
bomb in the face of the Pentagon by financing a great
deal of the Iraqi resistance - a magnet now attracting
people from all over the Arab world.
Al-Qaeda is “celebrating” September 11 in its own
sinister way, via a new audiotape broadcast on al-Ara-
biyya satellite television on September 3. A spokesman
who identified himself as Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Najdi
announced, “There will be new attacks inside and out-
side [the US] which would make America forget the
attacks of September 11.” But the spokesman denied
that al-Qaeda was involved in the car bombing that
killed Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim and an-
other 125 people in front of Imam Ali’s Shrine in Najaf
in Iraq last month.
According to the al-Qaeda version, the US and Israel
orchestrated the bombing because they feared the
ayatollah’s connections with Iran, and also to pro-
voke trouble between Sunnis and Shi’ites and turn the
Shi’ites against Wahhabi-dominated al-Qaeda. Al-Qae-
da’s objective, according to the spokesman, remains “to
fight the Americans and kill them everywhere on earth
and drive them out of Palestine, the Arabian peninsula
and Iraq”. Of course, the tape has not failed to remind
everyone that bin Laden and Mullah Omar are alive
222   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
and in jihad mode in Afghanistan.
The latest developments have proved once again that
American conservatives’ pocket futurology is dead and
buried. There has been no “end of history”. There has
been no “death of ideology”. Instead of these pre-Gal-
ilean platitudes to which all would have been forced
to submit, now it’s Medievalism all over again - with
clashing sectarian apocalyptic visions (born-again
Christian fundamentalists against radical Islamists),
Inquisition tribunals (Guantanamo) and the horrors of
war (Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine).
It’s Medievalism - but mixed with the epitome of
modernity. As John Gray, a professor of European
Thought at the London School of Economics argues
in his latest book (Al-Qaeda and what it means to
be modern, London, Faber & Faber), al-Qaeda is
a by-product of globalization: “Its most distinctive
feature - projecting a privatized form of organized
violence worldwide - was impossible in the past.”
Gray goes to great lengths to stress that on September
11, al-Qaeda “destroyed the West’s ruling myth”. And
he sharply demonstrates how “like communism and
Nazism, radical Islam is modern. Though it claims
to be anti-Western, it is shaped as much by Western
ideology as by Islamic traditions. Like Marxists and
neo-liberals, radical Islamists see history as a prelude
to a new world. All are convinced they can remake the
human condition. If there is a uniquely modern myth,
this is it.”
Just as the US re-invented and financed jihad in the
early 1980s to combat the “evil” Soviet empire in Af-
ghanistan - and so contributed to the emergence of this
modern myth - by invading Iraq the US has opened
up a new Pandora’s box, facilitating the alliance of
Wahhabi, Afghan-Arab jihadis with secular, Ba’athist
operatives: “the deadliest of combinations” according
to European intelligence experts. The White House
and the Pentagon won’t admit that Iraq is not tribal
Afghanistan - and that the rule of anarchy everywhere
around Kabul cannot prevail in a country that George
W Bush wants to portray as the window of his democ-
racy export program to the Middle East. If the Iraqi
adventure fails, it’s the end of the American pretense of
fashioning the new world order, and it’s the death knell
for the unilateralist neo-conservatives who have held
the world hostage since September 11.
As Asia Times Online has argued (Why the lessons of
Vietnam do matter - Aug 20), Iraq is already a Viet-
nam in the sense that the most powerful army in the
world is again facing a popular war of national liber-
ation - with no exit strategy. It’s a popular war in the
sense that the resistance is multi-faceted, composed by
dozens of groups - left, center, religious, non-religious,
Shi’ite, Sunni, Kurd. It’s a simultaneously nationalist,
Ba’athist and Islamist resistance. And like in Palestine,
the resistance exists as a direct consequence of the oc-
cupation - and not, as Israeli and American spin would
have it, because of “Islamic terrorists”. To top it all, the
absolute key question in Iraq is not the fact that the
Sunni triangle (Baghdad-Ramadi-Tikrit) is engaged in
a guerrilla war. If the Shi’ites also go for it in the next
few weeks, then one will be witnessing the end of the
neo-conservatives’ fantasy.
Outside Iraq - not only in the Arab world but also in
Europe, Asia and Latin America - there’s a pervasive
cynical perception according to which the Islamist
scarecrow is an enemy made by US intelligence: invis-
ible and virtual, thus eternal. And very convenient as
well, compared to the old Soviet “evil empire”. Fran-
co-Palestinian writer and former peace negotiator
Ilan Halevi, in his book Face a la Guerre - Lettre from
Ramallah (Paris, Actes Sud) argues that one must
distinguish Islamism in general from “the international
network created by the American secret services more
than two decades ago, essentially with anti-Soviet
purposes, and which we are now told it has staged a
mutiny”. The real tragedy is that hidden by the Isla-
mist scarecrow, one finds as hostages no less than the
hundreds of millions of people living in the Arab and
Muslim world.
Two years after September 11 - and after the neo-con-
servatives have squandered all the capital of sympathy
that poured towards America from all corners of the
globe - cynicism towards the American “official” ver-
sion of events is also pervasive. From Rio to Rome and
from Sydney to Saigon, many started viewing “Islamic
terror” as too convenient a scarecrow, so pliable to the
image Washington neo-conservatives want to project.
This led to the widespread suspicion that the boys at
spy headquarters in Langley have let it live and prosper
during the 1990s to better illustrate the necessity of a
new never-ending war. It’s important to remember that
in the beginning of the Bush administration the top
candidate for enemy number 1 in a new Cold War was
China - until the Islamic terrorism scarecrow came,
literally, out of the sky.
Another impregnable perception is widely shared all
over the world: the American adventure in Iraq was
not about weapons of mass destruction (which simply
have refused to show up); but, as British analyst Tariq
Ali, author of The Clash of Fundamentalisms puts it,
“capturing an oil-producing country with a regime
that was very hostile to Israel, which was giving money
to the Palestinians”. It was also a display of “theatri-
cal militarism”, a concept coined by French historian
Emmanuel Todd and already analyzed by Asia Times
Online (Theatrical militarism - Dec 4, 2002).
In the eyes of most of the Iraqi population, as well
as most of the Arab and Muslim world, the Bush
adventure has not “liberated” Iraq, but replaced a
cruel dictatorship - which successive US governments
encouraged and supported until it went out of line -
with a neocolonial regime headed by a proconsul with
absolute powers.
European intelligence experts have noted how Bush’s
recent messages have been in fact designed to address
the “liberated” Iraqi people, with the same tone “you
are either with us or against us”. This means “accept
our occupation on our terms, or else”. But as the Iraqi
resistance stiffens - and the secular “remnants of Sadd-
am’s regime” and radical Islam have finally found a
common goal - Washington has been forced to con-
cede that it must change its tactics. The alliance of what
Iraqis are calling “the Saddam network” with radical
Islam is betting on a “Lebanonization” of Iraq.
The Bush administration for its part is now saying
FOREVER WARS   223
that it will leave the country - or considerably reduce
its military deployment - after the first democratic
elections, promised by proconsul L Paul Bremer for
Spring 2004. The deadly message seems to have hit
home: the latest attacks have smashed any channel of
communication that might benefit American plans and
simultaneously demonstrated the powerlessness of the
occupying force. But as far as the American-appointed
governing council is concerned, for the moment the
verdict is still open. It may be the first step towards
really representative government - although all major
decisions are ultimately taken by Bremer. Or it may
represent the beginning of communal fragmentation -
opening the doors for a civil war.
Whatever the spin, George W Bush’s decision of ask-
ing the United Nations to issue a mandate for a multi-
national stabilizing force in Iraq is viewed in the corri-
dors of the European Union as concrete proof that the
arrogance and incompetence of the neo-conservatives
led them to a quagmire. Diplomats warn that Bush, as
he appeals for help, will try simultaneously to dictate
his conditions to the UN. So “old Europe” - France and
Germany, plus Russia - is caught in a dilemma: how
to help this American adventure that has been con-
demned from the beginning? An EU diplomat sums it
all up, “We cannot allow Iraq to sink into horror and
abjection just because we want to punish George W
Bush. But at the same time we cannot just bow our
heads and march into this mess the Americans them-
selves created, and now want to get rid of.”
The EU, meeting in Riva del Garda, Italy, this past
weekend, remains deeply divided. Great Britain and
Spain support Washington’s proposal to the UN,
France, Germany and the Scandinavians are against it.
As Anna Lindh, the Swedish foreign minister puts it,
“You cannot have a situation where the US remains in
control over what happens in Iraq and at the same time
others have to move in and take care of security and
reconstruction.”
UN blue helmets - which in fact are little else than
mercenaries - may eventually be offered the honor of
trying to clean up the mess. So in the corridors of the
224   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
European Union inevitably there’s great sadness about
what is ultimately the UN’s irrelevancy and lack of
independence: “The fact is the UN simply cannot do
anything against the will of the US. The maximum the
UN can aspire to is to clean up the empire’s mess,” says
another diplomat. Most Iraqis - who, let’s not forget,
are among the most well-educated people in the Arab
world after the Palestinians - share exactly the same
view.
As Tariq Ali stresses, “For the US, the main thing in
Iraq is to push through the privatization of Iraq’s oil, to
achieve the liberalization of the Iraqi economy and to
get the big US corporations in there. They are not too
concerned as to how the country will be run. We are
witnessing imperialism in the epoch of neo-liberal eco-
nomics and the ‘Washington consensus’. Why rebuild
hospitals and recreate the state health service in Iraq
when you are dismantling it in your own countries?”
It’s all there in Executive Order 13315, signed by Bush
on August 28 and conceived to “expand the scope of
the national emergency declared in Executive Order
13303 of May 22”. By “blocking property of the former
Iraqi regime, its senior officials and their family mem-
bers, and taking certain other actions”, the Executive
Order in fact places Iraq’s state assets under total con-
trol of the US Treasury. It is by all means the institu-
tionalization of the looting of Iraq, under the banner of
“Iraqi reconstruction”. Without any Iraqi being con-
sulted, the Executive Order implies that what benefits
the Iraqi people benefits the US. With this Executive
Order duly signed, the Bush administration shouldn’t
have any problems if it is forced to hand over a little
control of Iraq to the UN.
If somebody should take the fall for most of the cur-
rent, ghastly chaos in Iraq, one has to look no further
than American proconsul L Paul Bremer. On May 23,
as Bush issued his first Executive Order seizing control
of Iraq’s assets, Bremer for his part signed a decree
which simply dismantled the huge Iraqi army - with
more than 400,000 officers and soldiers. Furious with
this decision, a great deal of them subsequently fell or
are falling right in the lap of the Iraqi resistance move-
ment. The decision was of course made in Washing-
ton, possibly by Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
himself. The official spin was that it should signal the
end of the former government. Instead, it bolstered the
resistance. European intelligence analysts comment
that this may have been perversely what the Pentagon
had in mind: to force the elusive nexus between the
“remnants of Saddam’s regime” and Islamists related to
al-Qaeda.
As Asia Times Online has described (The plot thick-
ens - Aug 23) , the Iraqi resistance works as myriad
cells operated by former soldiers of Saddam’s army,
each of them responding to a higher official with good
military training. All obey to a Central Command, a
sort of clandestine joint chiefs of staff. Crossing Iraqi
information with European intelligence information,
it’s possible to determine that the bulk of this “invisi-
ble” army is composed by at least three different groups
- all of them autonomous in military as well in finan-
cial terms:
The Iraqi mujahideen. Composed of non-members of
the Ba’ath Party, plus jihadis who have combat expe-
rience in Afghanistan and Chechnya and who come
from different Muslim countries. Practically everybody
has guerrilla training. This group may have up to 7,000
fighters.
Al-Ansar (the Partisans). These are the famous
“remnants of the Ba’ath Party” the Pentagon is so fond
of talking about . All the leaders have been personally
chosen by Saddam. They are spread out all over Iraq.
No manuscript messages, no radio, no satphone: the
cells communicate only through oral messages.
Al-Muhajirun (the Emigrants) . These are a few
members of the Iraqi elite, plus Ba’ath Party officials,
especially military strategists. They are the hard core of
the new Iraqi regime Saddam dreams of - if and when
the Americans leave.
Ali Hasan al-Majid, the notorious Chemical Ali,
recently arrested, was in theory the general director of
the Saddam resistance, or what the Iraqis themselves
are calling the “Saddam network”. Former vice pres-
ident Taha Yassin Ramadan, captured in Mosul on
August 19, was the head of al-Ansar. But Izzat Ibrahim,
the former commander-in-chief of the Iraqi armed
forcers, and leader of the mujahideen, is still on the
loose. Ibrahim was the main enforcer of the Islam-
ization of Iraqi society for these past 10 years. He is
the absolute key connection between the regime and
prominent Islamists in the wider Arab world. If he is
arrested, this would be the closest that the Pentagon
will get to finding a link between Saddam’s regime and
al-Qaeda.
At least 100,000 former members of the Iraqi security
services, especially the Mukhabarat, all of them unem-
ployed, are roaming the Sunni triangle. Mohammed
Khtair al-Dulami, head of the branch specialized on
explosives, poisoning and other special operations, has
not been arrested yet. Former Mukhabarat agents are
acting as go-betweens for resistance fighters interested
in buying loads of weapons from all sorts of dealers
operating in the black market.
In a startling development, Washington was forced
to swallow its own propaganda and start recruiting
hundreds of real “remnants of Saddam’s regime” - the
feared Mukhabarat - to try to at least to identify the
more than 40 different groups that compose the resis-
tance. Members of the American-appointed interim
governing council could not be but furious. This is not
only a sensational case of sleeping with the enemy, but
it also painfully highlights how the Americans simply
have no access to ground intelligence.
The Mukhabarat was one of the four branches - the
best organized and the most feared - of Saddam’s se-
curity services. It was specialized in foreign relations.
The Pentagon is particularly interested in working with
agents familiar with Syria and Iran - also as an addi-
tional way to continue to demonize both countries.
The Mukhabarat was officially dissolved by Bremer
in early summer, as well as the ministries of informa-
tion and defense. They are back - paid in dollars, and
chasing Iraqis again. When Iraqis knew about it, is was
one more nail in the coffin of the discredited American
democratic “vision”.
FOREVER WARS   225
 US Deputy Defense
Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz (R)
watches trainees
from the Iraqi Civil
Defense Corps at
a US base in the
northeastern Iraqi
town of Tikrit in
October of 2003.
Photo: AFP

The Twin Towers and the

Tower of Babel
The past two years of the “war on terror horribly “ have offered up
myriad lessons for mankind, with Afghanistan and Iraq sad examples
of how things can go wrong, and will continue to do so if the lessons
remain unheeded, writes Roving EyePepe Escobar in the concluding
article of a two-part series

By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 11, 2003

PARIS - “I wonder whether there can be a future for the UN in Iraq,”

asks a European diplomat. Some Iraqis recognize that the United Nations’
humanitarian aid, in the shape of the oil for food program, may have
saved lives during the embargo. But many hate the UN exactly because of
the embargo: for them, the UN just enforces what Washington decides.

226   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    227

The undisputable fact is that the UN supervised the
harsh sanctions that, according to the United Nations
Children’s Fund, were directly responsible for the
deaths of half a million Iraqi children and an explosion
in the mortality rate. Denis Halliday and Hans von
Sponeck, two senior, respected UN officials, resigned
in disgust against the way in which the oil for food
worked (or not) - for them, the UN had betrayed the
people of Iraq.
Meanwhile, the US and Britain - with the UN’s tacit
approval - have bombed Iraq since 1992, as well as
launching thousands of missiles, to the point that in
1999 American officials were saying that they had
run out of targets. Educated Iraqis keep these painful
memories very much alive. And to add more insult to
injury, the UN Security Council has recently ratified -
in retrospect - the American invasion and occupation,
in a clear, direct breach of the UN Charter. It is now
impossible to overstate the anger in many parts of Iraq
towards the UN.
After years of Byzantine UN weapons inspections,
Washington’s dirty little secret was finally revealed:
intelligence and scientific inspectors proved almost
beyond reasonable doubt that Iraq did not possess any
weapons of mass destruction. This raised the ques-
tion of which of the Bush neo-conservatives came up
with the false evidence to support the war, which Paul
Wolfowitz, the Pentagon number 2, cynically claimed
on the record was to “secure a consensus for the war
policy”. European intelligence confirms that a group of
“unofficial” political advisers appointed and controlled
by Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith and Donald Rumsfeld in
the Office of Special Planning (OSP) were the source of
the false claims.
Wolfowitz and Feith, the Pentagon number 3, were
responsible for setting up the OSP. Its director was
Abraham Shulsky. The OSP included other neo-cons
with no professional qualification whatsoever in in-
telligence and military affairs. It came as no surprise
that Shulsky is a protege of the “Prince of Darkness”
Richard Perle - who resigned as chairman of the
Defense Policy Board before the war (a job he got via
228   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Wolfowitz). The OSP also included Elliot Abrams (who
supported the Guatemalan genocide of the 1980s), a
senior director for Middle East affairs for the National
Security Council. These neo-cons intimately connect-
ed with the Zionist lobby, even issued reports on Iraq
totally contradicting those from the Israeli Mossad,
which did not believe that Iraq represented any threat,
either to the US or to Israel.
The OSP is just one more arm of the neo-cons - espe-
cially Wolfowitz and Feith - in a central strategy of sup-
porting Ariel Sharon’s hardcore policy against the Pal-
estinians. Sharon was never interested in the success of
the Middle East roadmap to peace - which would imply
painful concessions from Israel towards the Palestin-
ians. It’s no surprise that Perle, Feith and Wolfowitz are
now targeting Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Saudi Arabia
with a vengeance - with the same barrage of fake “in-
telligence reports” accusing Arab countries of funding,
protecting and promoting terrorism, and now sending
terrorists to Iraq. All the fake intelligence is provided by
OSP operatives and their elaborate networks.
European intelligence reads the death of the roadmap
in the Middle East as a coup deliberately orchestrat-
ed by the Israeli military, with Ariel Sharon and his
Defense Minister Shaoul Mofaz as commanders (and
following Wolfowitz’s advice). That’s the same view
of Israeli writer and peace activist Uri Avnery, “The
military was upset when it saw the new hope that took
hold of the Israeli public, the bullish mood of the stock
exchange, the rise in value of the shekel, the return of
the masses to the entertainment centers, the signs of
optimism on both sides. In effect, it was a spontaneous
popular vote against the military policy.”
Sharon’s strategy was first to isolate and discredit
Palestinian prime minister Abu Mazen; then not even
trying to fulfill roadmap commitments (remove set-
tlements, stop the construction of the “Wall of Shame”
separating Israel and Palestine, withdraw the army
from the whole West Bank). Finally, with the end of
the hudna (truce), Sharon has given Israeli army tanks
and helicopters the chance to wreak havoc in Palestine
all over again.
As Sharon is very close with George W Bush - and
also managed to convince him that virtually all Pal-
estinians are terrorists - his plan, says Avnery, just
explored “the simplistic world of Bush with its good
guys and bad guys. The bad guys are the terrorists.
Therefore, it was advisable to kill Hamas and Islam-
ic jihad militants. That would not upset Bush. In the
eyes of the president, to kill terrorists is a good thing.
And as a result, the Palestinians would be compelled
to break the hudna.” That’s exactly what happened.
Avnery’s summary is totally shared by European intel-
ligence analysts: Sharon killed the roadmap because he
was against it from the beginning. Bush saw it only as a
photo opportunity and former premier Abu Mazen did
not get from Israel and the US anything he could show
to the Palestinians, who treated him as a “traitor” and
a “puppet” of the US and Israel. So it’s back to all-out
bloody confrontation.
European diplomats are keen to point out that if there Shi’ites in Najaf. He said that “the occupation force is
is a choice in the Middle East, it is not a choice be-
tween secular dictatorship and secular democracy - but in holy Najaf ... this force is primarily responsible for
between secular dictatorship and Islamic democracy.
The difference between what people living in the Mid- every day. Iraq must not remain occupied and the
dle East want and what the Bush administration says
they want is abysmal. A solution will come only when
America - and regional autocratic regimes - allow
those people to decide by themselves. Obviously, this
will only happen when Middle Eastern oil runs out.
Washington neo-cons fear that if left to their own
devices, Iraqis would probably choose a Shi’ite-led,
perhaps moderate, Islamic republic.This would be
intolerable for the neo-cons and the oil lobby’s “mas-
ters of the universe”. Washington is already finding out against those same “remnants” have been so scarce.
why Saddam Hussein was such a ghastly dictator. Iraq
is a mirage in the desert, a colonial, artificial creation
put together by the British from three former Ottoman
provinces. As Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds have very little
in common, this surrealist construction could only be
sustained by brute force. That’s exactly how Saddam
behaved.
Slightly before his assassination in front of the Imam
Ali Shrine in Najaf on August 29, Grand Ayatollah
Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim, the moderate spiritual
chief of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolu-
tion in Iraq (SCIRI) warned that “some groups wanted
to create conflict among Shi’ites, and others want to
create conflict among Arabs”. The majority of Shi’ites
(62 percent of Iraq’s population) want a democratic
transition: by the logic of the ballot box, they should
get most of the power. But they are already in conflict.
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani - the top Shi’ite religious
authority - refuses to get bogged down in politics, and
still adopts a “wait and see” attitude towards the Amer-
icans. The downtrodden and dispossessed prefer to
listen to the young firebrand Muqtada al-Sadr, who is
calling for a jihad against the invaders.
The turning point, as far as the Shi’ites are concerned,
may have been expressed by the funeral oration of
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, brother of slain Grand Ayatollah
al-Hakim, in front of a crowd of half a million grieving
primarily responsible for the pure blood that was spilt
all this blood and the blood that is shed all over Iraq
occupation must leave so that we can build Iraq as God
wants us to do.” This means that unlike the situation
from April to August, the Shi’ites’ “window of opportu-
nity” for the Americans to do any good, has expired.
What makes it even more complicated is that every-
where in Iraq, religion, tribe and ethnicity are inter-
twined. Inside the same tribe one may find Shi’ite and
Sunnis, “remnants” and victims of Saddam’s regime.
This goes a long way to explain why acts of revenge
Washington may now be confronted with a nation
of warring factions. It faces the same problem Sadd-
am faced. And it may even apply Saddam’s methods.
It’s important to remember that the neo-cons’ initial
plan was just to replace the two most senior officials in
each of Saddam’s ministries, and leave the rest of the
infrastructure of government intact. The alternative is
what we are seeing right now: Iraq falling apart. So it
comes as no surprise that the Pentagon is now recruit-
FOREVER WARS   229
ing Mukhabarat agents. Iraqis have repeatedly told
this correspondent that without the Ba’ath Party, the
country is ungovernable. Saddam, whose psychological
warfare tactics are much more sophisticated than those
of the Americans, knew it all along.
UN special representative Sergio Vieira de Mello,
who died in the bombing of the UN headquarters in
Baghdad last month, correctly assessed that the issue
in Iraq is sovereignty, not security. For him, the at-
tack on Uday and Qusay Hussein (Saddam’s sons) was
“overkill” - it would have been better to put them on
trial. He initially described US proconsul in Iraq L Paul
Bremer as a “true neo-con who does not care about
getting international legitimacy” - but later he thought
Bremer was starting to see the big picture. He knew
that whether Saddam was captured or not, that would
make no difference in the number of attacks against
Americans - be they by former security agents, Isla-
mists or even people seeking revenge for the killing of
innocents by trigger-happy GIs. The problem was the
occupation itself: Vieira de Mello tirelessly warned that
“security can only get worse. Iraqis’ impatience and
exasperation with such a massive foreign force is likely
to increase and is psychologically understandable.”
Vieira de Mello wrote a plan - which UN Secretary
general Kofi Annan took to the Security Council on
June 17 - according to which the UN could develop a
total strategy to support the political transition, the hu-
manitarian assistance and the economic development
of Iraq. Iraqis in the interim government welcomed
the plan. But this is exactly what Wahhabi Islamists
and the “Saddam network” did not want: a surefire way
to legitimize the American occupation. That may be
the main reason why Vieira de Mello was the target of
the UN bombing operation on August 19. Plans like
these were floating since early February, when a panel
of experts produced a preliminary report on postwar
reconstruction, according to Stephane Dujarric, a
spokesman in the office of Kofi Annan. The report was
edited by a Pakistani UN official, Rafeeuddin Ahmed,
and the postwar project was being overseen by Louise
Frechette, the number 2 at the UN.
230   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
It’s also important to remember that at the time - Feb-
ruary to March - the Bush administration didn’t want
to be perceived as a colonial power, and was ready
to give power back to Iraqis as soon as the country
recovered an acceptable degree of stability. But already
at the time the model was Afghanistan - where the UN
has just a support role, focused on nation-building
and humanitarian operations, with no administration
involved. It was also at the time that Great Britain was
telling France and Germany that they would “reap a
whirlwind” if they refused to sign up to a new An-
glo-American UN resolution authorizing a war. Histo-
ry may still dictate that Tony Blair and George W Bush
will “reap a whirlwind” for engaging in such a war.
The Afghan model is a total failure. Warlords keep
helping the Americans to go after the Taliban - to the
tune of suitcases full of dollars. Obviously the warlords
have no interest to finish off this extraordinary source
of income. By using the warlords - and getting a lot
of disinformation for its dollars - the Pentagon fur-
ther sabotages the already flimsy authority of Hamid
Karzai’s government in Kabul. The Taliban, for their
part, pose as the only credible alternative to warlords
and gangs which terrorize residents, extort money,
deal heavily in opium and heroin and run ultra-prof-
itable smuggling routes. With strong tribal support in
the Pashtun belt, and protected by some of the higher
ranks of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, the
Taliban are back with a vengeance. Allied with infa-
mous Afghan Pashtun stalwart Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
in the anti-American jihad, they are determined to
keep the country mired in perpetual chaos.
Trying to fight its paralysis - both over Afghani-
stan and Iraq - the UN keeps doing what it does best:
talking. Before the next General Assembly, on Sep-
tember 22, around 20 heads of state and government
- including Jacques Chirac (France), Jose Maria Az-
nar (Spain), Pervez Musharraf (Pakistan) and Hamid
Karzai (Afghanistan) will discuss in a conference how
to “fight terrorism for humanity’s sake”. To help the
leaders determine “the various roots of terrorism”, the
organizers of the conference had assembled, last June,
in Oslo, a panel of 30 international experts. Among
their most important findings: there’s a direct link
between poverty and terrorism, but terrorists do not
necessarily come from disinherited classes. Their edu-
cation is usually above average, and they usually come
from countries with no freedom of expression.
For some experts, the correlation between poverty
and terrorism is even weaker than between terrorism
and absence of a rule of law. Terrorism finds a favor-
able terrain in societies under rapid mutation, like the
Arab world, where thanks to oil the tribal structure has
given place to high-tech in less than a generation. Con-
trary to American spin, experts sustain that rogue state
support is not a precondition of terrorism. Terrorist
groups prefer to maintain relations with many states at
the same time.
Terrorists are not mad or mentally afflicted: they
follow their own rationality, but they are not irratio-
nal. On suicide bombers, the experts have found no
evidence of the psychopathology of suicidal individ-
uals. Religion generally is not a determinant factor.
And there’s no correlation with a particular desire for
vengeance. Experts also recommend not to think of
terrorism in terms of “they bomb us because they are
Muslim fundamentalists”. And they stress that war
crimes - of which terrorism is a manifestation - cannot
be studied without taking into account the causes of
each particular war.
Professor Gilles Kepel, a leading European expert on
radical Islam, has been stressing for some time that the
long march of Islamism in Egypt and Algeria, which
sought to conquer political power by mass mobiliza-
tion, has failed, as well as the short march of extreme
violence privileging the historic confrontation between
an aggressed, humiliated Islam and Jews and Chris-
tians. Kepel, at the time of his classic Jihad (Gallimard,
2000), thought that radical Islam was “a fatal trap”
for the Islamist movement. Today, he thinks that “the
Islamist movement has never been so divided. On one
side, there are the advocates of better relations with
nationalist and democratic forces, and on the other
side the proponents of jihad. But between American
evangelical fundamentalism, which progresses in the
Christian sphere, and Islamic fundamentalism, two
visions also clash, founded on schematic discourse,
savage exegesis and perverted sacred scriptures. And
if the religious dimension of this war of course is not
yet so visible, or the most decisive, tomorrow it could
bring unpredictable consequences.”
Palestine is inextricably linked with Iraq - as Pales-
tinians and Iraqis know so well. The US - like Israel
- is finally beginning to discover that occupation is a
bloody and, ultimately, unsustainable business, not
least because the heavy American armed response to
bombing and snipers has totally alienated the people,
especially Shi’ites, who were initially grateful for being
liberated from Saddam. From conversations with many
diplomats and high officials, it’s possible to determine
a perception in Brussels that neo-con arrogance is
leading indeed to an alternative Middle East, with the
change starting in Iraq: “But the alternative project
went mad: it is leading to fiery hatred between Arabs
and Muslims on one side, and the US and the West
on another,” says a diplomat. Radical Islamists con-
ceive Iraq as a gigantic volcano whose lava will bury
any American presence in the region - and destabilize
many other Arab regimes close to Washington in its
path.
As far as the Arab world is concerned, the US is
running the risk of transforming Saddam from cru-
el, hated tyrant into the romantic, mythological hero
of Arab and Muslim resistance, the Salah al-Din of
Saddam’s youthful dreams. Saddam counts on being
seen as the man who did to the US what the Afghan
mujahideen did to the former Soviet Union: lure the
superpower so deep into an absolutely unwinnable war
that both the American economy and popular support
collapse. Saddam - a consummate survivor - should
not be underestimated: he dreams that he may still
have the key to seduce not only Iraqis, but the whole
Muslim umma.
The US, by a series of blunders, has already managed
to engineer the fantastic chimera it has repeatedly
claimed to be chasing: the alliance of Saddam’s well-
armed secular brutality and al-Qaeda’s global insur-
FOREVER WARS   231
rection. Some well-traveled European diplomats agree
that more than Saddam, it is the fighting spirit of the
Iraqi people which is progressively inspiring a revolt
throughout the Muslim world, against the Americans,
the British and, of course, Israel.
The stage is now set for a merciless confrontation
between the American occupation force - with its
unrivalled firepower - and the myriad forms of resis-
tance, with the Iraqi population as hostage. European
intelligence is paying serious attention to conspiracy
theories roaming the Arab and Islamic world - accord-
ing to which the neo-cons have deliberately provoked
this escalation of violence, especially after the Najaf
bombing that killed al-Hakim. From Egyptian news-
papers to Iranian clerics, a chorus of voices is accusing
US intelligence and Mossad of applying the well-worn
imperial tactic of “divide and rule”, creating conflict
among Shi’ites and between Sunnis and Shi’ites. This
development is so serious that it even led to Saddam
releasing another audiotape denying any involvement
in the bombing. Saddam would have nothing to gain
from pitting Sunnis against Shi’ites: he is betting on
a unified movement of national resistance, with the
Sunni triangle (Baghdad-Tikrit-Ramadi) linked to the
Shi’ite south.
Two years after September 11, the neo-cons’ mix
232   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
of geopolitical calculation and messianic fervor has President Saddam
dragged the world into a bloody mess from which Hussein meets with
his army command-
we might not emerge for years to come. John Gray ers in Baghdad.
of the London School of Economics points out that Photo: AFP
“Americans see their country as embodying universal
values. Other countries see the American way of life as
one among many; they do not believe it ever will - or
should - be universal ... They resist the division of the
world into ‘good’ and ‘evil’ regimes ... in any realistic
scenario, the US will have to learn to live with states
that have no wish to share its values. After all, they
include nearly all the states in the world. Strategically
allied in the Cold War and - already less convincingly -
during the post-Cold War period, Europe and America
are reverting to being the alien civilizations they were
before the First World War. In Asia, the claim that the
US embodies the only sustainable model of human de-
velopment is viewed with incredulity, if not contempt.”
The current “war on terror” may last longer than
the Cold War. This implies a bleak future for all of us.
(Just) alive and kicking
Gray’s prediction is as good as any, “Once al-Qaeda has
disappeared, other types of terror - very likely not an-
imated by radical Islam, possibly not overtly religious
- will surely follow. The advance of knowledge does not
portend any age of reason. It merely adds another twist
to human folly.”
in Baghdad
The word in some intelligence quarters, and also on the streets in Bagh-
dad, where Pepe Escobar does some footwork, is that Saddam “Elvis”
Hussein is secreted in the capital, albeit a devastated city that he would
not recognize from the days when he ruled with an iron fist
By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 19, 2003
BAGHDAD – “Saddam is in Baghdad.” The former University of Baghdad
student, recently graduated, is adamant. “Here he is very well connected,
and as he has so much money, he can bribe anybody,” adds another.
This exchange takes place as the satellite network al-Arabiya receives the
latest (purported) Saddam Hussein audio tape at its office in Baghdad.
Saddam tells the Americans, “Your withdrawal from our country is inev-
itable, whether it happens today or tomorrow, and tomorrow will come
FOREVER WARS    233
soon.” He urges more attacks, and “jihad by all means
possible, financial and otherwise.” He even addresses
the United Nations: “Iraq and its leaders will refuse any
solution that is made while the country is under the
shadow of occupation.”
Baghdadis once again listen to that ghostly voice from
the past with cool detachment. But what the former
students are saying basically mirrors what a Jordanian
intelligence source with extensive contacts in Iraq told
Asia Times Online in Amman. Colonel Joe Anderson,
commander of the 101st Airborne’s 2nd Brigade in
Mosul, is searching the wrong place, in the Kurdish
north of the country. “Elvis” – as the GIs call him – has
not left the building. Elvis-Saddam continues to oper-
ate in the bowels of the Iraqi capital itself.
The future elite of Iraq is all dressed up with diplo-
mas – with nowhere to go. With the exception of one
graduate who, helped by family connections, received
a US$1,500-a-month job in Dubai in the United Arab
Emirates – a dream salary in Iraq – the vast majority
are unemployed. And all would jump at the oppor-
tunity to leave. But those without a passport are even
barred from entering neighboring Jordan, which now
only admits Iraqis if they have Jordanian resident
cards. A passport on the Baghdad black market costs a
fortune: 400,000 dinars ($200 at today’s rate).
The students are all Sunnis, the minority that domi-
nated Iraq at the expense of Shi’ites for many decades.
They are not part – yet – of the armed resistance,
although they know people who are. They definitely
don’t, and never did, support Saddam. One says that
“one Sunni equals 10 Shi’ites” in terms of fighting
spirit, “and that’s why the Americans will be defeat-
ed.” Another says, “An armed group kidnapped three
American women soldiers, two of them black. They
kept the black ones for their own fun, but sold the
white one for another group for 3 million dinars.” This
is not the kind of story that one would find in US-ap-
proved newspapers such as Iraq Today. Especially
because the euphemistically named Coalition Provi-
sional Authority (CPA) never admits that its soldiers
are being kidnapped.
234   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
A student suggests a visit to the city morgue. “The
Americans are killing people like flies. In Ramadi they
have footage of American helicopters throwing dead
bodies in the desert.” The CPA has in fact censored
journalists’ visits to Iraqi hospitals. Special permission
is now required – and the wait can be eternal. As such,
these outlandish claims (including the kidnapping
one) can in no way be substantiated, although they do
reflect a certain mood on the street.
In its de-Ba’athification drive, the CPA fired 436 pro-
fessors who were members of the former ruling Ba’ath
Party, and terminated an academic system skewed to
benefit student party members. But then it discov-
ered that many of the 436 fired professors were in
fact coerced to join the Ba’ath, otherwise their careers
would be over. At al-Mustansariyah University they all
got their jobs back – of course after filling out forms
denouncing the Ba’ath Party.
Among the students, the popularity of Ahmad Chal-
abi – founder of the Iraqi National Congress, a Penta-
gon protege and now chairman of the US-hand-picked
25-member Governing Council – is virtually zero.
“Who is he? Nobody knows him here,” comments one
student in reference to the long-exiled Chalabi.
It was Chalabi who told the neo-conservatives in
Washington, who told the CPA, to arrest brothers,
sons, nephews and cousins of Ba’ath Party members in-
discriminately, as well as any males between the ages of
15 and 50 if weapons were found in their homes. “He’s
never been in Iraq. He doesn’t know how the country
works, how people had to deal with the Ba’ath Party,
how we must have weapons to defend ourselves from
anarchy,” says another student.
Indeed, some students envisage a future very different
from Chalabi’s and Washington’s dreams: “Iraq is the
pole of convergence, political and military, of the Arab
world. If the US mission fails here, then the way will be
finally open for a Great Arab nation, united and free
from all these corrupted governments.”
The convergence of views between Baghdad students
and the Jordanian intelligence official is remarkable
– and is widely shared by the popular voice of the
bazaars. The perception is that “the Americans” engi-
neered both the UN bombing that killed special envoy
Sergio Vieira de Mello, and the Najaf bombing that
killed Grand Ayatollah Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim
(the Jordanian insists the Israeli Mossad was responsi-
ble for the Hakim bombing, which benefits the Ameri-
cans by splitting the Shi’ites and pitting Sunnis against
Shi’ites). All agree on what the US agenda is: to main-
tain a perpetual state of chaos, enforce the control of
the fabulous Iraqi sources of energy, and use this new,
sprawling military base in the heart of the Middle East
to harass Syria, Lebanon, Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Moreover, few in Baghdad appear able to understand
how US high-tech marvel is not capable of finding
Elvis-Saddam. All kinds of theories float on why the
Americans killed his sons Uday and Qusay in a fire-
fight instead of arresting them and bringing them to
justice. All are convinced that Nawaf Alzaidan, the
owner of the house in Mosul in which the brothers
were killed, was the one who tipped the Americans
and bagged the $30 million reward (not yet: the State
Department has not paid him in full, citing “security
problems”). The family of Salah Alzaidan, Nawaf ’s
brother, was killed by Iraqis in revenge. But Nawaf and
his family escaped and are now in the United States.
The resistance will get much stronger – and this has
nothing to do with Saddam’s flurry of cassettes. There
seems to be an overall consensus in Baghdad that
most Sunnis are on “wait and see” mode for two more
months before they switch overwhelmingly to guerrilla
struggle. And the Shi’ites will also be waiting for an-
other two months. This seems to be the final window
of opportunity for the CPA and the Governing Council
to alleviate the daily hell faced by the Iraqi population.
Young American officers paying for their spaghetti at
the brasserie of the Palestine Hotel with crispy $20 bills
at least get a glimpse of paradise, post-Saddam style.
In a city reduced to Fourth World status, the Pales-
tine-Sheraton complex remains a fortress, protected
by tanks, barbed wire, checkpoints and body searches
– totally remote from real life, which barely tends to
intrude via a procession of protesters. Like a ragged
group from the village of al-Kafel, near Babylon. They
have come a long way to ask for US help in getting rid
of their local government – which they say comprises
Saddam’s people, terrorizing and stealing from their
families. But most of all they want jobs. Dejected, they
are directed to the major fortress in town, Saddam’s
former presidential palace, which is the headquarters
of proconsul L Paul Bremer’s CPA.
The Iraqi border with Jordan – once a nest of bak-
sheesh-demanding spies – is now a World Trade
Organization wet dream. Customs officers just say “Go
Baghdad OK.” The CPA extinguished all tariffs and
duties on imports until the end of the year. A deluge of
merchandise – except, of course, weapons of the non-
mass destruction kind – flow through at practically
zero cost. Second-hand German Opel Vectras landed
in the Jordanian port of Aqaba join the army of rusty
1970s Volkswagen Passats in the intractable Baghdad
traffic, where gas – not in the black market – remains
cheap: a full tank costs less than a dollar. A great deal
of the loot ends up in shops or spilling on the pave-
ments of Karrada In and Karrada Out, the notorious
Baghdad twin sister roads.
As with any new order following the collapse of a
totalitarian regime, the usual suspects have surfaced:
satellite dishes, the Internet, exchange counters and
pornography. The clerk at a cinema in Saadoun Street
extols the merits of “Film sex Itali! Business very
good!” More than five months after the fall of Bagh-
dad, still there’s no banking system, no checks, no
credit cards. The dollar is king – or rather a bundle of
“Saddams” or “papers” (250-dinar banknotes) held in
black plastic bags that can be stolen at any moment by
the roaming hordes of Ali Babas, themselves immune
to the roaming of Humvees filled with GIs. Policemen
in brand-new Toyota patrol cars can be seen in select-
ed neighborhoods – but “dozens are being killed every
day”, according to a resident of Mansur district: “They
get a salary of $100 a month, but the family gets no
benefits from the Americans if they die.”
The Bab Alsharjee souk is popularly regarded as a
FOREVER WARS   235
looters’ paradise. Under the roar of military helicopters
and close to passing Humvees with GIs pointing their
machine-guns to the sidewalk, the audiovisual choice
is immense: from Britney Spears to the incendiary
speeches of firebrand Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr,
from the Women of Wrestling to torture sessions su-
pervised by Chemical Ali. Last April, some of these Ali
Babas now converted into souk merchants ransacked
everything in half of Baghdad, and left a great deal of
the population literally in the middle of the street, with
no possessions, or even with no homes to go back to.
There’s not a single working industrial plant left in the
city, according to a businessman now selling satellite
dishes. To wander around some parts of the city on
foot – a practice that can be quite a gamble – is to be
surrounded by rubble uncollected in five months, a
collection of instant ruins, piles of rubbish and vermin,
and the occasional clouds of fire with which Baghdadis
try to protect themselves against this filthy avalanche.
Baghdad mirrors Kabul in its squalor and its lust for
life, in its lacerated, bombed urban landscape and its
barely contained rage that so much, yet so little, has
changed for the better.
Practically none of the public services work. There are
very few operating police stations. All the ministries
remain closed – or totally destroyed. There is no postal
service – although an extreme minority can now use
DHL of Fedex. Telephones in some neighborhoods do
work – and once again the extreme minority can buy
a Thuraya satphone on the spot, plus refill cards. Any
brand-new BMW is assumed to be driven by a looter.
The Americans stay on another planet – in bunkers.
Humvees venturing out on patrol are subject to all
number of attacks in broad daylight. Like this Wednes-
day, when a still sweating resident of Zayouna tells
how he saw, through his rear-view mirror, a Humvee
being hit by a roadside bomb and another backing up
to collect two dead American soldiers and speed away.
He can hardly believe that his car was not hit. Locals
inevitably tell a foreigner: “Don’t be near any Humvees
or jeeps, even walking in the street. The American sol-
diers are so frightened they start shooting at random
236   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
every time they hear an explosion.” reopen. It may take very long, as it holds a huge US – the Iraqi arm of the Washington neo-cons – wants in
military base, plus a sprawling prison with at least fact what neo-con Daniel Pipes described as “a demo-
Even if in theory there’s total freedom of the press in
3,000 inmates. It is attacked practically every night by cratically minded strongman who has real authority”,
Iraq for the first time since the 1960s, and there are
the resistance with grenades and mortars – and there who would be “politically moderate” but “operationally
now more than 50 newspapers in the Baghdad market
are plenty of surface-to-air missiles expecting to greet tough.” In plain English: another Saddam, but pliable
alone, a lot of people don’t bother to read them. “They
incoming aircraft. “What kind of liberation is this?” to US interests.
are censored by the Americans – they can’t say what’s
asks an 83-year-old retired army officer trained “in
really happening, and they just print rumors about As much as the occupiers remain in their Baghdad
Tunbridge Wells, in England.” He used to hate Saddam
Saddam and the Ba’ath Party,” says a former army offi- bunkers, impervious to the ghastly real life around
and the Ba’ath Party silently; now he vocally hates the
cer, now unemployed. Bremer officially said that “in- them and with no idea whatsoever as to how they are
US occupation.
citement to violence” is in fact an excuse to close down perceived by average Iraqis, the irreversible US failure
any newspaper or TV station the CPA doesn’t like. Al-Sharif Ali, leader of the Constitutional Monarchy still has to be fully understood by the West. Another
Any newspaper critical of the occupation is inevitably Movement, has stressed in a conference attended by graduate of Baghdad University goes straight to the
“visited” by American soldiers. no fewer than 80 political parties, 43 religious leaders, point: “The Americans now want help from the UN.
43 military commanders, 33 ministers and diplomats And they want an Iraqi army working for them. Even if
A whole neighborhood of army officers, Baladeiat,
and 109 tribal sheikhs that the Iraqi population simply they managed to have both, this is just talk. They want
is unemployed since the United States decided in late
does not trust the Governing Council. The conference our oil and they want to stay here forever.”
May to dissolve the Iraqi army. They stay at home
decided that restoration of national sovereignty and
because there are no jobs, except turning your car Meanwhile, “Saddam is in Baghdad.” “Elvis” has not
independence must be the common objective for all. In
into a taxi, and there are too many taxis already. They left the building, and in each passing day the distress of
other words, real democracy. This is not exactly what
live close to the dreaded building of General Security, the unemployed, the doomed and the damned grows,
the CPA has in mind. Whatever the spin during Secre-
which the Americans, with no sense of irony, turned and for many of them it’s much worse than under
tary of State Colin Powell’s visit to Baghdad, the CPA
into a prison, “attacked every night with bombs and Saddam.
mortars,” according to a resident.
The now-unemployed army officers tell endless tales
of “disappeared” in Saddam’s presidential palace – with
the Americans re-enacting the antics of the US-trained
Latin American dictatorships of the late 1960s and
1970s. Some of the “disappeared” are released only
months later. They are never told why they were ar-
rested in the first place: inevitably they are assumed to
have been Ba’ath Party members, but the Americans
don’t seem to make the distinction that everybody who
wanted to do something in Saddam’s Iraq had to be a
party member. Most “disappeared” are interrogated
only once or twice, and then transferred to the make-
shift prison at Saddam International Airport, or to the
infamous Abu Graeb prison in the outskirts of Bagh-
dad. They are prevented from any contact with the
outside world. And since there is no judicial system,
nobody can check what the Americans are up to.
The CPA says there is no timetable for putting the
judiciary system in place. The CPA also doesn’t know
when the former Saddam International Airport will
FOREVER WARS   237
 US soldiers strap
arrested Iraqi men
into the back of
a military vehicle
after they were ar-
rested in Baghdad
in July of 2003 for
allegedly looting or
possessing illegal
weapons. Photo:
Ahmad Al-Rubaye
/ AFP

The mean streets of Baghdad

With the risk of assassinations, car bombings, muggings and incurring the
deadly wrath of extremely nervous US soldiers, Baghdad’s streets are not
the place for the faint-hearted, or the innocent, as Pepe Escobar finds out

By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 23, 2003

BAGHDAD – Ahmad, a 23-year-old Jordanian student, stepped out of

his apartment in Haifa Street this past Saturday morning to hail a taxi,
but he was confronted by a US checkpoint. “Move your ass from here,” a
GI ordered him. “Don’t talk to me like that. I’m not your slave,” answered
Ahmad. “Aren’t you? taunted the GI. Ahmad rose to the bait and an-
swered back, so the outcome was inevitable. He was arrested.
Ahmad was kept in a Hummer for two hours, and then taken to the
main building at Baghdad (former Saddam) International Airport. A

238   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    239

translator said to him, “Are you crazy? Never talk to
these people, whatever they say to you.” Ahmad finally
managed to show the translator his Jordanian identity
card. The Americans were not convinced. “What are
you doing in Iraq? Are you a fedayeen [paramilitary]?”
Ahmad replied that he was a student, and showed his
university papers. The Americans said these might be
fake.
Ahmad was then taken to a big hall inside the airport
crammed with about 400 people. “They look like kill-
ers, or probably looters,” Ahmad thought to himself.
The “killers” then began talking behind his back: “He
looks like a fedayeen. There’s no future for him.” Ah-
mad remembered that many foreign fedayeen – espe-
cially in Basra and Najaf – had been killed by Iraqis.
Then a soldier arrived in the hall and read a list of
10 names: these people were taken away. After a few
hours, an Iraqi soldier came to talk to Ahmad. “You’re
lucky they [other detainees] didn’t hurt you. Because
they don’t care. You’re Jordanian, you have no family
here. If they kill you, who cares about you?” Ahmad
argued that he was not carrying his passport because
there’s no security in the city, and muggings are rife.
The Iraqi soldier went out to plead Ahmad’s case to
the US commander. He came back half an hour later:
“You can go. But don’t do this again. And if you see an
American tank or vehicle driving in the street, don’t go
near them.”
Ahmad’s experience is positively mild compared
with what happens daily to others in Baghdad – and
he managed to get away just because he is a foreigner.
A curfew in the capital starts every night at 11. But in
many places everything has stopped by as early as 2 in
the afternoon because there’s no security in the city.
Last month, Nudir, a young engineer, was arrest-
ed with two friends in a BMW because GIs found a
revolver in the glove compartment: practically every
Iraqi carries a gun for self-defense. Nudir says he was
beaten up by the soldiers and then spent 16 days in
Camp Cropper, the prison inside the airport grounds
that Ahmad was lucky not to see.
240   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
US repression is relentless. Red Cross officials con-
firm that more than 20,000 people have been arrested
in Baghdad in the past few months. Most come and
go – but there’s no way to keep tabs on all the cases:
there are no functioning courts and judges. Amnesty
International has already denounced cases of “tor-
ture,” and an unknown number of Iraqi civilians have
been gunned down by US search patrols. The bun-
kered-down Coalition Provisional Authority simply
refuses to mention how many Iraqi civilians are being
shot or killed every day – either victims of crime or
victims of US repression. Like the Iraqi interpreter
killed by an American soldier in the front seat of a
car occupied by Pietro Cordone, the Italian diplomat
who is the official adviser to the new Iraqi Ministry
of Culture. Baghdadis take for granted that American
soldiers are now free to shoot civilians in any Iraqi
civilian vehicle if they look even remotely suspicious.
Iraqi police now man several checkpoints in Bagh-
dad – but they don’t seem to have been trained well
enough. On Saturday, two “Ali Babas” – thieves – stole
a battered Toyota and managed to cross a checkpoint
close to the Palestine-Sheraton hotel complex, slalom-
ing through a hail of bullets from the agitated guards.
They were only stopped near the hotel entrance. Cynics
speculate that this was a trial run for a car bombing, as
the Palestine remains a key target for the Iraqi resis-
tance.
But while ordinary Iraqis may be treated like cat-
tle, VIP Iraqis – for propaganda purposes – receive
red-carpet treatment, even if they are included in the
US 55-most-wanted pack of cards. That’s the case of
General Sultan Hashim Ahmed, the former minister of
defense, who surrendered to Major-General David Pe-
traeus. This US general in charge of northern Iraq has
written a letter to Hashim describing him as “a man of
honor and integrity.”
That’s not the word in Baghdad. It’s an open secret
that Hashim was instrumental in Saddam Hussein’s
bloody repression of Shi’ites and Kurds immediately
after the 1991 Gulf War – a repression that the Amer-
icans did nothing to prevent. And many know that
Hashim was the northern coordinator of the so-called years, but in the next few months. That’s exactly what
“Saddam network” – the Saddam-sponsored faction of the Iraqi Governing Council itself demanded last week
the resistance that includes “remnants of the regime” in Baghdad.
and disgruntled, unemployed former army officers.
France wants a key role for the UN Security Council
The Iraqi perception is that by treating Hashim with
(the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom
velvet gloves, the Americans may expect to defuse at
and France). And it wants a constitutional conven-
least this faction of the resistance. “They are desperate.
tion for Iraq, as soon as possible, followed by general
Now they are doing deals with anybody,” says a retired
elections in the spring of 2004. If the plan is approved
army officer.
by the UN, the European Union, as well as Muslim
The more exalted factions of the resistance are far countries such as Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia,
from being appeased. And they proved it by their would certainly participate in a UN-mandated, per-
assassination attempt on Akila al-Hashemi, a woman, a haps US-led peacekeeping force. Baghdadis tend to
Shi’ite, a diplomat and one of the only members of the consider this a rational, sensible plan – although they
25-member Iraqi Governing Council actually enjoy- would prefer the UN totally in charge.
ing the respect of the general population. The council
But the hardcore faction of the Iraqi resistance has
is called “the imported government” by practically
once again made clear that it will not compromise.
everybody in the bazaars and kebab shops of Baghdad.
That’s the message of the car-bombing on Monday
Hashemi, shot in the abdomen, is in critical condition
against the already badly damaged UN headquarters
in a US Army hospital. She would have been one of the
in Baghdad, which killed two and injured eight. Prac-
members of the Iraqi delegation attending the United
tically everybody in Baghdad heard the blast – which
Nations General Assembly that opened in New York
is nothing but a metaphorical warning to both Bush
on Monday.
and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, who insists on
The only possible way out for the Iraqi quagmire lies security guarantees for UN staff in the event of a more
at the United Nations. The US draft resolution to be substantial role in Iraq.
presented to the UN in essence means that President
The car-bombing proves once again that the Amer-
George W Bush needs money and blue helmets – but is
icans cannot guarantee anyone’s security. A solution
unwilling to surrender any US control of Iraq. France,
for the Iraqi situation might be around the corner, this
on the other hand – followed by Germany, and in a
week in New York. But many in Baghdad see the future
certain measure by China and Russia, and arguably by
as nothing but bleak, even in the unlikely event of Bush
most of the UN – wants a swift transfer of sovereignty
and the Pentagon seeing the light.
to an Iraqi provisional government: not in the next few
FOREVER WARS   241
 Iraqis chant
anti-US slogans
as they stand on
a destroyed US
military vehicle in
Fallujah, a Sunni
Muslim bastion
50 km west of
Baghdad. Photo:
Karim Sahib / AFP

Fallujah: A multilayered
picture emerges
At the heart of the Sunni triangle, where most anti-American resistance
takes place in Iraq, lies the city of Fallujah. Its people have stories to tell,
from the mayor to a powerful sheikh to the ordinary citizens, and they all
paint a different picture from the one that the US prefers to present

By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 26, 2003

FALLUJAH – This is the heart of the Iraqi resistance. Fallujah, with a

population of almost 500,000 people, traditionally “the city of mosques,”
is now called “the city of heroes” as it is at the core of the Sunni triangle
(Baghdad-Ramadi-Tikrit) where most of the resistance to the US occupa-
tion is taking place.
President George W. Bush told the United Nations on Tuesday that he

242   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    243

is not willing to give back full sovereignty to Iraq any
time soon. US Proconsul L Paul Bremer said last week
that Iraqis are not yet capable of ruling themselves. The
citizens of Fallujah have other ideas.
The highway from the capital to Fallujah – 43 miles
(69 kilometers) west of Baghdad and the scene of one
of the fiercest tank battles of the war in April – passes
past Abu Ghraeb prison, one of the symbols of Saddam
Hussein’s repression which is now the American occu-
pation’s largest prison.
Practically every day in Fallujah there are attacks
against the Americans. And the repression is also fierce
– all around Fallujah. This Tuesday, for example, the
82nd Airborne intervened with full force in al-Sajr, a
village 15 kilometers north of Fallujah, leaving two big
craters in the courtyards of two houses.
At the Fallujah hospital, Abed Rashid, a 50-year-old
retired civil servant, said that he was sleeping with his
family on the roof of his house when he heard Kalash-
nikov fire. As he ran downstairs, American helicopters
started firing what he believed were rockets. Rashid,
wounded in the chest and left foot, says, “This is geno-
cide. This is not about overthrowing a government or
regime change.” Two boys, Hussein, 11, and his broth-
er Tahseen, nine, were also severely wounded. Their
father, Ali Khalaf Mohammed, 45, was killed.
The mayor
The mayor of Fallujah, Taha Bdaiwi, officiates in the
Qaem Maqameiah – a building that not without irony
was the former general security headquarters of the
Ba’ath Party. The ante-chamber of his office is a true court
of miracles, where an endless stream of citizens wait
patiently to express all sorts of grievances. Says a local
sheikh, “When the Americans are attacked on the high-
way, they always come to the nearest villages. And they
take many prisoners, without any evidence. There was
an attack near a factory: they took all the families living
around it, including the women. They are using families
as human shields. Some of the arrested are older than 50.”
244   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Many people in Fallujah repeat the same story: when
American soldiers search houses for guns and find
nothing, they take all the cash and gold. Fallujah’s
erratic supply of “national electricity”, as the locals put
it – two hours on, two hours off – is due to resistance
attacks: “Last week there was no electricity because
of resistance attacks. Electricity depends on loyalty to
Americans.” A pipeline was bombed twice in one week
“because people believe this oil is not benefiting Iraq.”
But a local branch of Rafidain Bank was never attacked
– even if there are always two American soldiers in-
side: “People know they are protecting their money.”
Taha Bdaiwi’s office walls are conspicuously adorened
by two military maps of Fallujah, from Fort Stewart,
Georgia, one of them a satellite photo, as well as two
diplomas offered by the American military for his
collaboration. The new chief of police keeps coming
in and out. The mayor cannot give any orders without
first negotiating with an American military official
sitting in the same building. Bdaiwi, already involved
in civil administration beforehand, says, “This area is
bigger than Tikrit. People complain services are very
poor.” He spends most of his time in meetings with
teams in charge of rebuilding and reconstruction. The
money will come from the city’s budget, but mostly
from the Americans, who from April to September
spent US$1.9 million. The city gets a paltry monthly
360 million dinars (US$1 = roughly 2,200 dinars) from
the Ministry of Finance to pay for salaries and services.
Anything else has to come from the Americans.
“There are many projects in the pipeline – a water
project, a bridge, a hospital, civilian complexes – but
no new projects,” says the mayor. He is trying to bring
energy from Baghdad and Ramadi. “I demanded
two big generators, but they have not arrived yet.” He
bought two generators for water plants, but at present
the Americans deliver water for some areas every day.
He lists the key popular demands: water, electricity,
security and health. The mayor admits indirectly that
the real story about the pipelines is that the Americans
want Iraqi police to protect them because they don’t
want more American casualties. But the mayor is a
realist, “We need the Americans to pay. We do every-
thing we can. We can’t do anything without money. We
need them.”
The sheikh
Sheikh Khaled Saleh, a Sunni cleric in his early 50s,
says that “although unorganized and without leader-
ship, the Iraqi resistance is a ball of fire in America’s
face that will bring its end in Iraq.” His sermons at Fri-
day prayers draw thousands every week to Badawi, one
of the main mosques in the “city of mosques.” Sheikh
Saleh is sure that thousands of young men in Fallu-
jah were and still are influenced by Osama bin Laden
and his positioning as an heroic Arab mujahideen.
The sheikh is also sure “we have made the Americans
dizzy.”
Fallujah is littered with graffiti. Some is pro-Saddam.
None is pro-bin Laden. All encourage local citizens to
harass and kill American soldiers. Posters plastered
across the city warn everyone to stay very far from US
convoys to avoid being hit. In the kebab shops, people
say, “The Americans are cowards. They are now afraid
of any gunshot coming from anywhere.”
A group of prominent citizens of Fallujah got togeth-
er and agreed to talk to Asia Times Online to explain
“the real situation”, as they put it. Considering the fact
that for the Governing Council in Baghdad and for
Bremer, anybody telling the truth about the occupation
can be accused of “incitement to violence”, their identi-
ties should be protected.
This week, the Governing Council’s spokesman, Inte-
fadh Qanbar – a protege of Pentagon protege Ahmad
Chalabi – told the media that the offices of television
networks al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya in Iraq would be
closed. Within two hours, this decision by the coun-
cil turned into “no cooperation from the council” for
two weeks – which for all practical purposes means
nothing considering that the council sits in a bunker in
Baghdad and is extremely uncooperative anyway.
Bremer’s legal advisers have in fact established press
censorship in Iraq. And al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya are
prime targets as they remain fierce critics of the occu-
pation. Under the current press censorship laws, even
to report about the killing of Iraqi civilians near Fal-
lujah by missiles from American helicopters could fall
into “incitement to violence.”
For starters, the citizens of Fallujah don’t agree with
the usual statistics according to which the Shi’ites
make 62 percent of the Iraqi population. After a careful
tabulation of the population in the main Iraqi cities,
they insist more realistic figures would be 6 million
Kurds, 8 million Shi’ites and 8.7 million Sunnis: this
would prove their point that Sunnis are woefully un-
der-represented in the Governing Council.
For Fallujah citizens, “The mayor is an honest man.
He was one of the most wanted by Saddam’s regime.
His family is one of the top five families in the city.
Most of the population trust him and chose him.” They
insist that “people here are as religious as the Shi’ites in
Najaf. So the population did not agree with the way the
Americans came to Iraq.” Unlike Baghdad, no shops in
Fallujah sell alcohol or CDs. At least half of the popu-
lation was satisfied with the fall of Saddam: “We didn’t
want Saddam. But after the invasion, with the bad be-
havior of the Americans, people are saying it was better
under Saddam.” The citizens are keen to stress that in
the first two months after the fall of Baghdad, there
was absolutely no resistance.
The resistance officially began on June 28. “A peace-
ful gathering went to the mayor’s building. There were
troops inside. Then it went to a school: there was a
military base inside. People were shouting: ‘We want
democracy, electricity, water’. The Americans opened
fire, at first into the air. Then against people. An old
woman in her house beside the base was hit, along
with her three sons: one was dead, one lost his leg, an-
other lost his kidney. Many people went to the hospital
to donate blood. There were 73 wounded. They had to
wait for more than two hours to be sent to hospital. No
car could carry more than one wounded – and one car
only every 30 minutes. The next day people went to
the cemetery. As is our custom, they opened fire in the
air to celebrate the dead. Many American helicopters
FOREVER WARS   245
and convoys then came and opened fire. That’s how it
started. There were 21 dead in two days.”
The citizens of Fallujah add, “The Americans have
no right to invade houses, search our women and also
steal gold and money. The Americans played a double
game with the Iraqis. They said they would give us
democracy. People only understood what they meant
when they came. Outside Iraq, they treat dogs better
than Iraqis.”
The United Nations “is controlled by America. It will
never help Iraq. It’s not independent. If the UN comes,
it will be attacked. Any foreign forces – Turkish or
Pakistani, even Arabs. These forces will do what the
Americans want, in an indirect way. No Arab countries
will send soldiers, because they support the resistance.”
The citizens of Fallujah say that there are no Amer-
ican patrols in the city any more: only convoys com-
ing from and going to Baghdad: “If there are three
convoys, at least two will be attacked. Every convoy
crossing Fallujah is covered by air support. If there is a
patrol, the American soldiers attract children living in
the area and use them as human shields. Is that free-
dom?”
The 25-member, American-appointed Governing
Council is considered by everybody in Fallujah “an
imported government.” With two glaring exceptions:
Dr. Hashimi, a Shi’ite and a diplomat, who barely
escaped an assassination attempt last Saturday (widely
condemned in Fallujah); and Mohsen Abdul Hameed,
from the Iraqi Islamic Party, actually the Muslim
Brotherhood. During the Saddam era, Hameed lived
underground building the clandestine Brotherhood
base. Ahmad Chalabi, who is the rotating chairman of
the council until the end of this month, is regarded as
an “Ali Baba” – thief – and the butt of many jokes. It
is widely assumed that at least 85 percent of the Iraqi
population does not trust the Governing Council.
For the citizens of Fallujah, the Najaf bombing in
which Ayatollah Baqr al-Hakim was killed was the
work of the Americans, “to split Shi’ites and Sunnis.”
They are totally convinced that the Americans engi-
246   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
neered the bombings of the Jordanian embassy, the UN cer in the Iraqi army, wounded in the Iran-Iraq war of against Americans are conducted by very small groups
headquarters and in Najaf so that they could “go ask the 1980s. The sheikh does not mince his accusations armed with roadside bombs, rocket launchers and
help for from the UN to get rid of their problems.” against Jalal Talabani, the leader of the Patriotic Union Strella anti-aircraft guns. Most are former army offi-
of Kurdistan (PUK) and member of the Governing cers, with the operations financed by local business-
Council: he says that he witnessed many episodes of men ready to donate thousands of dollars. The regi-
The resistance cruelty against villagers in the mid-1980s and accus- mental force is always the tribal chief.
es Talabani of complicity in the Halabja massacre of
The citizens of Fallujah are adamant: the resistance Convincing tools for the young and the restless are
Kurds in 1988.
is composed of members of families angry with or multiple: defense of tribal values, defense of the moth-
victims of violent American behavior, as well as former The Sheikh concurs that “the biggest problem for the erland, and most of all defense against the “bad behav-
army soldiers and officers. They swear that they have Americans is when they dissolved the army. “They ior” of the Americans. The mujahideen can count on
not seen any Arab fedayeen (fighters) – and definitely were trying to damage Iraqi society. So everybody im- total popular complicity. When al-Jazeera and al-Ara-
no al-Qaeda. And there are no Ba’ath Party members mediately joined the resistance.” The sheikh says, “The biya – the nemesis of the Governing Council – show
in this indigenous resistance: “They are bad people. Americans now demand UN forces because they are images of American casualties, not only in Fallujah but
They have money. If you had money, would you risk in a circle of resistance and they cannot get out. When also in Baghdad, people stop talking and their faces
your life resisting?” They insist that “the main reason they started the war, they had no rights from the UN. lighten up. The running commentary is inevitable: “We
for resisting is loyalty to your own country.” So they have to leave this country, even by force. This is thanked them for our freedom, but they should have
not just my opinion, our God ordered us to resist them left long ago.” At least in Fallujah, as far as the Ameri-
Dr. Kamal Aldien Alkisim, born in the ancient city of as invasion forces.” can occupation is concerned, the battle for hearts and
Heet on the Euphrates, tortured by Saddam’s regime minds is irretrievably lost.
and general secretary of a new political party – the These citizens of Fallujah are not part of the armed
Iraqi National Fraction, which “emphasizes Iraq’s struggle. They only admit that the stream of attacks
unity and independence on all its land” – supports
the struggle in Fallujah. “The resistance here does not
have any relation with any groups. It is led by families.
The main reason is the bad behavior of the Ameri-
cans. There is no relationship with Saddam or Islamic
groups. These groups are using the name of Fallujah.”
The locals are adamant that they have never seen
anybody from self-described resistance organizations
like Owda (Return), led by one Mohammed al-Samidai
from Mosul, or Afaa (“Snake”), which sprang up from
the Ba’ath Party in Kirkuk, or even an alliance of the
Ba’ath with tribal elders coordinated by one Abu Hasan
from Hajiwa. The citizens of Fallujah don’t care about
Saddam’s cassettes routinely broadcast by Arab satellite
networks: “Saddam is a spy. He sold Iraq. When CDs
of Saddam calling for a jihad were distributed, peo-
ple in Fallujah stopped the resistance for a few days.”
They insist on a big mistake made by the West is “to
think that Saddam is the resistance just because he is a
Sunni.”
After a lavish lunch, enter Sheikh Abu Bashir, one of
the most prominent sheikhs in the region, a high offi-
FOREVER WARS   247
 US tanks roll down
a road in the town
of Ramadi in July of
2003. Photo: AFP

Fear and anger in the

Sunni triangle
Across the Sunni triangle, businessmen sheikhs are angry, religious
sheikhs are angry, and the people are angry as well as afraid, not only
of local thieves who stalk the highways, but also of what is happening
to their country

By PEPE ESCOBAR
SEPTEMBER 30, 2003

RAMADI – Sheikh Khaled from the al-Halabsa family, established in

the outskirts of Fallujah on the road to Ramadi, is one of the most pow-
erful men in the Sunni triangle (Baghdad-Ramadi-Tikrit). Relaxed in his
dishdash robe, drinking tea on the porch of his house, facing an immacu-
late garden and his own black Mercedes in the garage, he is nonetheless a
very pessimistic man: “We don’t believe in American promises. They have
lied before the war ‘promising democracy.’ If Americans believe in free-
dom and independence, why don’t they let the people vote for the Gov-

248   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    249

erning Council?” The sheikh adds that “even if I had a
family member in the Governing Council I would not
trust them because they were elected by tanks.”
The sheikh echoes a popular sentiment all over the
Sunni triangle that the Americans themselves encour-
aged the widespread looting that so traumatized Iraqis
after the end of the war in April, “So they must have
an extra reason not to leave.” The Americans negotiat-
ed with regional sheikhs before entering Ambar – the
province that includes Ramadi and Fallujah and which
is considered one of the richest in per capita terms in
Iraq. Most of the well-off in Ambar are contractors or
are in the transportation business. All mosques are
private. According to the sheikh “when the Americans
occupied the land, they encouraged looters to come
here. I caught some of them myself.”
The Americans were victims of a serious case of
cultural misunderstanding – according to the sheikh:
“The Americans confiscated all weapons. They en-
couraged looters to attack industrial complexes, steal
generators … I told the American commander that we
as sheikhs cannot face our families because we have no
weapons. If you can’t protect us, why did you take our
weapons? The American commander then said there
would be military patrols. But there are no patrols –
the Americans are afraid. In al-Haswa there is one of
the biggest storages in the Middle East, it is central for
the whole of Iraq. It has food, cars, electrical applianc-
es, spare parts … looters attacked it armed with RPGs.
We were unarmed. The Americans didn’t do anything.”
As a result, now there is no dialogue between the
sheikhs and the occupation forces.
While the businessmen sheikhs in the Fallujah-Rama-
di axis have lost their patience, but stop short of admit-
ting that they are financing the resistance, the religious
sheikhs are facing another kind of problem. In Ramadi
itself we are told that sheikhs who criticized the Amer-
ican occupation in their Friday prayers were arrested.
Sheikh Salah and his brother, from Ramadi, say in fact
that there was only one high-profile case: a cleric who
rhetorically bombed the occupation forces was ar-
rested for two months. So now clerics are much more
250   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
subtle. In last Friday’s prayers, in a mosque contiguous
to the Ramadi bazaar, the basic resistance message was
“we hope the Governing Council is not who we think
they are, so they have to listen to our demands to be
trusted.” But at the end of his sermon, the sheikh could
not help but “ask God to destroy America and release
Iraqis from the occupation as soon as possible.”
The Americans definitely need some public relations.
Sheikh Salah and his brother – prominent business-
men in Ramadi – are adamant that “in the begin-
ning most people in the city were against Saddam
[Hussein]. With the occupation, now most want him
back.” The sheikh’s brother owns the best hotel in the
city, closed four days before the war and not yet re-
opened. The reason: no security. The Americans have
no military base in Ramadi: they are lodged in one of
Saddam’s former palaces. Every day there are Amer-
ican patrols. According to Sheikh Salah, “Inside the
city there are few attacks. But they are always attacked
in the highway [to the Jordanian border] and in the
outskirts.”
People in Ramadi say that the Americans are attacked
at least six times every day: the Americans never admit
more than one or two attacks a day. Unlike the road
from Baghdad to Samarra and Tikrit, the road to Ra-
madi has no American checkpoints. Thieves holed up
in the desert, equipped with BMWs and Kalashnikovs,
continue to attack travelers on the Amman-Baghdad
highway near Ramadi; but according to locals “the
Americans have not done anything to catch them.” The
American checkpoint on the highway is in the wrong
place – at least 100 kilometers away from Ramadi.
Ramadi has an American-installed mayor, Abdul
Karim Barjes. Sheikh Salah says “he never left his
building” and unlike the mayor of Fallujah, is not re-
spected by the local population. People in Ramadi – as
well as in Fallujah – say that they saw Arab fedayeen
(para-military) only in the beginning of the war.
Most of all, people in Ramadi are angry because
“the Americans have done nothing for the city in five
months,” says Sheikh Salah. The streets of Ramadi echo
the same accusations heard in Fallujah: American sol-
diers in their raids are taking gold, money and pistols
from people’s houses. People are also very much aware
of Ali Babas (common thieves) turned Mukhabarat
agents paid by the Americans.
The Governing Council is as unpopular and untrust-
ed as anywhere in the Sunni belt. Ahmad Chalabi, the
current chairman, is perceived “as an American agent.
And he has American nationality. We would never vote
for him if there was an independent election.” As far as
a larger United Nations role is concerned, Sheikh Salah
expresses the local consensus: “Whatever the UN does
it is better than the occupation, as a halfway solution.
But we don’t agree with any foreigners occupying Iraq.”
A striking refrain is heard across the Sunni triangle,
from Baghdad to Samarra, from Fallujah to Baqouba.
As Sheikh Salah puts it, “If Saddam came back again,
he would rebuild Iraq in one month. After the [1991]
Gulf War, he rebuilt Iraq in 45 days.” The people who
are saying this never in their lives were Ba’ath Party
members.
The mood in the heart of the Sunni triangle all the
way to Ramadi is replicated in the very poor, work-
ing-class neighborhood called Fourth Police, almost in
the outskirts of Baghdad. Most people in this area did
support Saddam’s regime and were Ba’ath Party mem-
bers – and many abandoned their weapons and did
not fight during the last war. They swear the resistance
is composed of ordinary Iraqis. Practically everybody
is armed. “Islam tells us we have to resist occupation.
We will get rid of the Americans,” says a local carpen-
ter. Nobody has detected any suspicious behavior by
potential Arab fedayeen.
The anger in the Sunni triangle is pervasive. Workers
are angry because 400,000 civil servants were sacked,
and because there are only unknown exiles – 1,500 of
them, mostly from the US and the UK – working in
the Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council. Sun-
nis are angry because for the Americans the Kurdish
region is the priority. Businessmen are angry because
there will be no role for companies from Arab coun-
tries in the reconstruction process. Poor people are
angry because the UN scaled down its foreign staff to
only 42 in Baghdad, while relying on roughly 4,000
Iraqis for humanitarian work. Law-abiding citizens are
angry because former defense minister Sultan Hashim
Ahmad was granted immunity and was duly removed
from the American “pack of cards” listing 55 wanted
people (he was number 27). Everybody is angry be-
cause the US military cleared its troops in the recent
“friendly fire” incident in Fallujah which killed eight
Iraqi policemen.
The only people with nothing to complain about
are those in the booming roadblock business – as the
Americans bunker themselves out of sight. After the
surreal slalom by two Ali Babas in a stolen battered
Toyota on September 20, which cynics widely con-
sidered a trial run for a car bombing, there’s a new
roadblock arrangement in front of the Palestine-Sher-
aton hotel complex in Baghdad – which houses large
numbers of foreign journalists and American business-
men – the Aike hotel – where some American media
are staying – was attacked last week. A trip through
the Sunni triangle yields signs that no roadblock will
prevent the same from happening to the Palestine.
FOREVER WARS   251
 Baghdad’s Abu
Hanifa mosque in
September of 2003.
Photo: Thomas
Coex / AFP

The American Saddam

It was easy enough for the United States to break Iraq, now the problem
is to fix it, and fix it in such a way that it does not become just a US ver-
sion of Saddam Hussein’s regime

By PEPE ESCOBAR
OCTOBER 4, 2003

BAGHDAD – The Iraqi resistance against the US occupation – in the

form of the first, free popular demonstration in the country since the
1960s – was born on April 18 in front of the Abu Hanifa mosque in the
middle-class district of Aadhamiya, the site of a fierce battle on April 7,
two days before the fall of Baghdad.
Mahmoud Wasfi is now the president of the nine-member municipal
council in Aadhamiya, which includes two women, a suggestion from
this former wrestler who started his new job more than three months
ago – with no salary. After he was spontaneously chosen by the locals –

252   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    253

“everybody in the neighborhood voted, we had free
elections” – the Americans asked him if he had been
a Ba’ath Party member. He said “of course, like every-
body else. I had to feed my family.” He signed a form in
English repudiating the party, and he was in business.
Wasfi says that according to the only reliable statistics
– provided by Iraqi food agencies – there are roughly
42,000 families in Aadhamiya, divided in four areas.
The council meets every Monday. Wasfi has to deal
with one “Captain Mike” – responsible for Aadhami-
ya’s security and purse strings. Any financial decision
comes from “Captain Mike.” Basically, people now
have just about enough to eat, but services are slowly
being restored, electricity supply is still patchy – three
hours on, three hours off – and thieves roam the area.
Wasfi is adamant: “Our demands are not being satis-
fied.”
Wasfi says his post is equivalent to a manager in the
Ministry of Finance. But he has to help people with
cash from his own pocket. Everybody asks him the
ubiquitous question: “Why can’t we find jobs?” He
answers that there’s nothing he can do about it. “The
Americans put us in a very difficult position towards
the local people. But the people understand it.” He
believes a stronger United Nations presence would be
better. But if the situation doesn’t improve soon, he
will quit the council this month in protest. Wasfi notes
that municipal councils in Shi’ite parts of the country,
related to the powerful al-Hawza – the Shi’ite “Vatican”
housed in the city of Najaf – are more forceful. “At the
time of Saddam, everybody had a salary. Now every-
body says the situation under Saddam was better.”
Families in Aadhamiya want a soccer field for their
youngsters. Iraqi contractors came to examine a pro-
posed site, “but the Americans have not given their
okay.” Wasfi says Aadhamiya is getting help from IRD,
a Jordanian non-government organization (NGO) that
works closely with the Americans, as well as from the
United Nations Development Program (UNDP). But
he warns that “if you are an NGO Bechtel does not
help you. You have to know an American, otherwise
you don’t have a chance.”
254   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Bechtel of course is making a killing in Iraq, courtesy
of the US Agency for International Development (US-
AID) – the supervising body in charge of commission-
ing and awarding contracts. The San Francisco-based
giant has already won projects worth more than US$ 1
billion. Bechtel is under contract with USAID to repair
and upgrade Iraq’s power grid, and its potable-water
and sewage-treating systems; the main roads, bridges,
railways and public buildings; and building and recon-
struction of schools and clinics. The sectors considered
a priority are ports, buildings, surface transportation
and waste water. What Iraqis simply can’t understand
– because the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
didn’t bother to explain – is why the Americans con-
trol everything, why so many Iraqi contractors remain
empty-handed, and why everything takes so long.
Bechtel program directors say the company has hired
69 Iraqi subcontractors and employs more than 27,000
people. But subcontracts to Iraqi firms were only
worth $47 million by late September – out of a total of
more than $1 billion. US companies divide practically
the whole cake. Creative Associates International will
revitalize Iraqi primary and secondary schools. The
Research Triangle Institute will be in charge of local
governance development (Wasfi had no idea about it).
The public health system will be restored by Abt Asso-
ciates. Airport administration in Baghdad, Mosul and
Basra will go to Skylink Air and Logistics Support.
Bechtel is responsible for rebuilding 1,200 primary
and secondary schools in Iraq (600 in Baghdad alone).
Most should have been ready this week – the begin-
ning of the school year. In the case of Baghdad, only 43
out of 600 were ready. Ma’monia, a secondary school
in Aadhamiya originally built in 1922, was one of the
lucky ones. Ra’ad al-Juburi, the Iraqi subcontractor,
said he was able to rebuild the school with materials
still found in Iraqi markets.
Bradley vehicles and Humvees patrol Aadhamiya
every day. A teacher comments that in six months no
soldier ever talked to him “except to give me an order.”
Another teacher says everybody expected to be treated
as partners in the municipal councils, “and cultivated
people could find themselves a role after 35 years of
humiliation. Instead we are treated like cattle.”
Life for the municipal councils spread across the 50
Baghdad neighborhoods is not exactly the same. It’s
fair to argue that wealthier neighborhoods, with En-
glish-speaking council members, get better treatment.
For example, in upper-middle-class Sumer the coun-
cil president, Addel Rahim Khalaf, is a former officer
who proudly exhibits the signs of a close collaboration
with the Americans: a cellular phone, a badge and a
license to carry a gun. Sumer has a monthly budget of
$40,000. Sumer already obtained, among other things,
the renovation of three schools, two roads, and two
new soccer fields. In al-Saadoun Street, one of Bagh-
dad’s main roads, the president of another municipal
council, a businessman involved in import-export,
scoffs when he mentions that the CPA has even edited
a guide to teach the presidents of municipal councils
how to behave in a meeting: “This shows us the image
that the Americans have of ourselves – of a backward
people. They don’t know that the first municipal coun-
cils here started in 1868.”
A Baghdad trader now in the dumps says that “for
the Americans, their soldiers are more important than
us. I heard this from them myself. Under Saddam, we
knew we had to be a high official in the Ba’ath Party to
do something with our lives. What about now? Even if
we wanted to, we can do nothing. Every Iraqi is con-
sidered guilty.”
This tragic cultural misunderstanding is not enough
to make Wasfi support an armed resistance: “There are
many more important things to do – we have to try
to rebuild the country. We will wait. We trust Allah.”
He is in favor of jihad in principle, but not now. “If
the Americans gave us a chance, we could have done
better. But they didn’t give us a chance.” Wasfi has stark
advice for the Americans – echoed by a huge majority
in the Sunni triangle: “Get your military base and give
our cities back to us, and our chance to rebuild our
country.”
Whatever the benefits of the US program for rebuild-
ing Iraq, they are being lost on the absolute majority
of the Sunni population. In middle-class Aadhami-
ya, all former employees of Iraqi ministries are now
unemployed. Another refrain heard all over the Sunni
triangle is inevitable: Saddam rebuilt Iraq in 45 days af-
ter the end of the 1991 Gulf War. “The Americans have
not kept their promises. We thought we would become
the guiding light of the Arab world, but we find our-
selves in a toilet in the back yard,” says a former public
employee.
The fatal, irredeemable mistake of proconsul L Paul
Bremer and his CPA was to fire hundreds of thousands
of possibly innocent public employees. What these
residents of Baghdad are saying is that there is simply
no Iraqi face to hold and secure the country. It’s im-
possible to rehabilitate Iraq’s institutions and restore
basic services for the population without the managers
and employees of Iraq’s public sector. So no wonder
the talk in the streets of Baghdad is, “We had an Arabic
Saddam. Now we have an American Saddam.”
FOREVER WARS   255
 Iraqi President
Saddam Hussein’s
son-in-law General
Hussein Kamel
Hassan (L) speaks
with Nayef Mawal,
the secretary gen-
eral of the Jorda-
nian information
ministry during his
press conference at
the royal palace in
Amman on August
12, 2003. Gener-
al Hussein, who
fled Iraq with his
family, said that he
initiated contacts
to topple the Iraqi
regime. Photo: AFP

Selective reading and

choice friends
Elements in the Bush administration refuse to believe that Iraq de-
stroyed its weapons of mass destruction after the Gulf War of 1991, de-
spite the evidence, which Asia Times Online has also seen. It should not
be a surprise, then, that these same elements continue to put their trust
in Ahmad Chalabi, founder of the Iraqi National Congress

By PEPE ESCOBAR
OCTOBER 7, 2003

BAGHDAD and AMMAN – Chief United Nations weapons inspec-

tor Hans Blix knew it. Former weapons inspector Scott Ritter knew it.
French, German and Russian intelligence knew it. Sultan Hashim Ahmad
– Iraq’s former minister of defense, now safe after a cosy deal with the
Americans – knew it. In 1995, Hussein Kamel, married to one of Saddam
Hussein’s daughters and the man in charge of it all, knew it. The Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Langley and the MI6 in London knew it.
256   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    257
Saddam’s regime was not lying when it claimed that it
had destroyed all its WMD after the 1991 Gulf War.
Whatever the spin, the fact of the matter is that now
there’s conclusive proof that both US President George
W. Bush and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair lied about
the reason for invading Iraq.
As it was widely reported at the time, on the night
of August 7, 1995, General Hussein Kamel, former
director of Iraq’s Military Industrialization Corp – the
organism in charge of Iraq’s weapons program – de-
fected to Jordan, along with his brother, Colonel Sadd-
am Kamel. Hussein Kamel managed to smuggle tons of
documents with him with priceless information about
different Iraqi weapons programs. A few days later,
Saddam’s regime went on the offensive, presenting
another set of documents showing that Iraq had con-
ducted an aborted crash program to develop a nuclear
bomb. A few months later, Hussein and Saddam Kamel
made the biggest mistake of their lives. Following
family pleas and giving credence to assurances from
Baghdad, they returned to Iraq in early 1996, and were
inevitably killed by Saddam’s secret services.
On August 22, 1995, Hussein Kamel was interviewed
in Amman by three top Western officials: Rolf Ekeus,
executive chairman of UNSCOM from 1991 to 1997;
Professor Maurizio Zifferero, deputy director of the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and head of
the inspections team in Iraq; and Nikita Smidovich, a
Russian diplomat who led UNSCOM’s ballistic missile
team, and Deputy Director for Operations of UN-
SCOM. Major Izz al-Din al-Majid, a cousin of Sadd-
am Hussein’s who defected with the Kamel brothers,
was also present. Unlike the brothers, he remained in
Jordan and exiled himself in Europe in an undisclosed
location.
The key document – shown to Asia Times Online
by a Jordanian intelligence source – is in the form
of an internal UNSCOM/IAEA report classified as
“sensitive.” On page 13 of what is the transcript of the
UNSCOM/IAEA interview with Hussein Kamel, he
categorically says, “I ordered the destruction of all
chemical weapons. All weapons – biological, chemical,
258   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
missile, nuclear were destroyed.” He also says that “not
a single missile was left, but they had blueprints and
molds for production. All missiles were destroyed.”
Kamel discloses that anthrax was “the main focus”
of the Iraqi biological program (pages 7-8). He con-
firms all weapons and agents were destroyed: “Nothing
remained after visits of inspection teams.” Kamel also
says, “They put VX [nerve gas] in bombs during the
last days of the Iran-Iraq war [of the 1980s]. They were
not used and the program was terminated.” On page
13, Rolf Ekeus asks Kamel if Iraq had restarted VX
production after the Iran-Iraq war. Kamel says, “We
changed the factory into pesticide production. Part of
the establishment started to produce medicine […] we
gave instructions not to produce chemical weapons.”
On page 8, Kamel insists that “I made the decision to
disclose everything so that Iraq could return to nor-
mal.”
In August 1995, both the Bill Clinton administration
in the US and the John Major government in the UK
took Kamel’s assertion that Iraq had destroyed its en-
tire stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and
banned missiles – as Saddam’s regime claimed – very
seriously. But this “sensitive” interview was kept secret
for more than seven years. It was only leaked in early
2003. Kamel’s interview was then endlessly spun by
Bush and Blair. But the key point remains undisputa-
ble: Saddam’s regime destroyed all its WMD after the
1991 Gulf War.
This was not the soundbite that the Pentagon
neo-conservatives wanted. So they listened instead to
their lone “humint” (human intelligence) on Iraq –
which entirely consists in the person of Ahmad Chal-
abi, founder of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) – an
organization basically created by the US – a convicted
fraudster in Jordan, and rotating chairman during the
month of September of the 25-member, American-ap-
pointed Iraqi Governing Council.
Chalabi, a 54-year-old banker, heir of a rich Shi’ite
family, was living in early 2003 in a lavish mansion
in Tehran paid by the State Department, plotting his
triumphant return to Iraq after more than two de-
cades. He never had any political support inside Iraq.
After his conviction – 22 years – in Jordan in the early
1980s for bank fraud, nobody knows what he made of
lavish funds dispensed to the INC by the CIA in the
mid-1990s. And in late 2002, nobody also knew what
happened to half of the US$4.3 million once again
dispensed to the INC.
Chalabi is an extremely persuasive character. It was
himself who proposed to Washington a mutual collab-
oration against Saddam. Ultra-conservative American
senators Trent Lott and Jesse Helms loved it, as well as
the “Prince of Darkness” Richard Perle, the CIA and
the Jewish lobby. In their 1999 book Out of the Ash-
es, Andrew and Patrick Cockburn paint a devastating
portrait of CIA agent Chalabi’s wheelings and dealings
since 1991. But the fact is Washington would never
trust the INC to depose Saddam: the emphasis – or
wishful thinking – relied on a coup orchestrated by the
army. Chalabi was progressively relegated to oblivion.
In desperation, he launched a plan in 1996 for Kurds to
attack Iraqi army units stationed in Mosul and Kirkuk.
The operation failed miserably. Chalabi was totally
discredited in the CIA’s eyes, and they turned to anoth-
er potential and more trustworthy agent: Ayad Allaoui,
chief of the Iraqi National Accord (INA).
With the neo-cons in power, the tireless Chalabi
managed to get back into the limelight via the Penta-
gon – even though the CIA and the State Department
now openly despised him. The go-between was none
other than Richard Perle. Once again, this correspon-
dent in the past few weeks has been able to reconfirm
that Chalabi’s street credibility in Iraq is less than zero.
The most flattering compliment he gets is that he may
be the new “American Saddam.”
In his new self-attributed role of respected statesman,
Chalabi was part of the Iraqi delegation to the recent
UN General Assembly. In the first address by an Iraqi
to the 191-member body since the fall of Saddam’s
regime, Chalabi could do no better than scold France,
Germany, Russia, Syria and in fact most of the planet
for opposing the American invasion. He said absolute-
ly nothing about a UN role in Iraq – now desperately
wanted by the Bush administration. He said absolutely
nothing about how and when Iraqis will get back their
sovereignty – a key UN demand. But true to form,
Chalabi promoted his own personal political causes:
he called for the “eradication” of Ba’ath Party members
“once and for all.”
The Pentagon still buys his take that the Iraqi resis-
tance is conducted by “remnants of Saddam’s regime.”
In fact, the Pentagon still parrots everything Chala-
bi says. But on a more serious note, Chalabi can be
accused of promoting a sectarian war in Iraq. Weeks
before coming to the UN, he recommended the ar-
rest of brothers, sons, nephews and cousins of Ba’ath
Party members and former Iraqi army officials, as well
as male Iraqis between the ages of 15 and 50 if illegal
weapons were found in their homes. If this “recom-
mendation” was to be taken seriously, it would mean
no less than an horrendous civil war.
Chief US weapons inspector David Kay’s interim
report on WMD has already proved that the Bush
administration was chasing a ghost. In fact, Kay should
save the extra 600 million demanded by Bush for
the investigation to continue and ask the Pentagon’s
“humint” Chalabi where the weapons are. With friends
like Chalabi, “liberated” Iraqi certainly doesn’t need
enemies.
FOREVER WARS   259
 The marja and the proconsul
Senior American administrator L Paul Bremer has his views on how
elections in Iraq should be conducted, as does Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, religious leader of the country’s 15 million Shi’ites. For
Washington, this means one of two outcomes: jihad or civil war

By PEPE ESCOBAR
JANUARY 30, 2004

An extremely discreet and reclusive man, rarely

seen in public, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, born in
Iran’s holy city of Mashhad, is the primus inter pares
of four great marjas who lead the roughly 150 million
Shi’ites spread around the world - including Iraq,
Iran, India, Pakistan, the Saudi peninsula and Europe
- through the Hawza, the so-called “Shi’ite Vatican” in
Najaf, Iraq. A great marja - deemed to be infallible - is
the equivalent to a pope: a “source of imitation” - not
only as an interpreter of sacred words, but because
of his intelligence and his knowledge, ranging from
philosophy to the exact sciences.
Sistani rarely travels and spends most of his time
reading, studying and receiving endless religious
delegations in his small, Spartan study in central
Najaf. His organization controls millions of dollars in
donations, but the marja himself lives like an ascetic.
He controls no army. He leads no political party and
he harbors no political ambitions. Unlike other spiri-
tual leaders, he never gives major speeches. He never
holds press conferences and he never meets journal-
ists - as Asia Times Online has found out in Najaf on
many occasions. But any serious observer knows that
all it takes is one word from Sistani for the Shi’ites to
embark on a jihad against the Americans and forever
bury the United States Deputy Secretary of Defense Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Photo: AFP

260   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    261

Paul Wolfowitz-concocted scenario of a new era of
American supremacy in the Middle East.
Like Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini - the now-de-
ceased leader of the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979
- Sistani spent many years studying in Qom, as crucial
in Iran as a holy city as Najaf is in Iraq. The Sistani
seminary in Qom is still one of the most important in
the Shi’ite world. According to insiders in Najaf, when
Sistani speaks in Arabic, he still retains “a vague Per-
sian accent”. Khomeini spent 13 years exiled in Najaf
and held a status similar to that of Sistani. But Kho-
meini never became a marja - because no living marja
at the time appointed him as such. Another striking
difference is that Khomeini was heavily supportive of
Velayat-e-Faqih - or the primacy of religion over every-
thing, including politics. Sistani flavors total separation
between mosque and state - because he fears politics
may pollute spiritual matters.
This leads to the crucial point: Sistani is not in fa-
vor of an Islamic republic in Iraq, a development that
although an anathema in Washington, at the same time
would immensely please the ayatollahs in Tehran. What
Sistani wants is an Iraqi constitution written with no
foreign interference, with no articles contrary to Islam.
And he wants a secular government, but composed of
good Muslims who respect Islamic principles. French
expert on Shi’ism, Pierre-Jean Luizard, explains that
Sistani essentially wants religion to be protected from
politics. But in an occupied Iraq subjected to such
extreme volatility, he cannot but express a political
position - because his is the supreme word.
It may be pure malice to juxtapose a sayyed (descen-
dant of Prophet Mohammed) like Sistani with a blunt,
unsophisticated, alleged former counter-terrorism
expert like L Paul Bremer, the US administrator in Iraq.
But whatever the marja says in his small Najaf studio
invariably drives the proconsul - working in a luxurious
Baghdad palace formerly occupied by Saddam Hussein
- crazy. Sistani’s fatwas (religious edicts) are implacable:
short and straight to the point. The marja has qualified
the American “democratization” plans that Bremer
seeks to impose as “not democratic enough”, or worse
262   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
still, “fundamentally unacceptable”. in southern Iraq, clarified that “we don’t want any introducing democracy to the Middle East.
violence. But if there is obstruction, the people will take
Sistani had no reason to support Saddam - who for The UN mission - “driving under the [Washington]
its responsibilities”. Asia Times Online has had credible
three decades systematically persecuted and killed Iraqi influence” - may estimate that direct elections are
information since late 2003 that Shi’ites of all factions
Shi’ites. During the war in 2003, Washington inter- impossible before the American-imposed deadline of
are building a “secret army” to engage the Americans in
preted Sistani’s call for the Shi’ites not to oppose the July 1. US President George W Bush will then be left
case their democratic aspirations are not met.
American army as an endorsement. But since April 9, with two extremely unsavory options. The caucuses will
2003 another story has emerged: what most of Iraq’s 15 Even with all its military might, the US has never proceed in Iraq’s 18 provinces, and 15 million Shi’ites
million Shi’ites see is the military occupation of holy looked so fragile and discredited in Iraq. An occupy- will smash - by any means necessary - the legitimacy of
Islamic lands by an army of infidels. Sistani’s fatwas are ing power which refuses democratic elections using any government that might emerge. Or the Americans
the succinct expression of their outrage. all manners of excuses is being judged by the Islamic may hold direct elections - and in this case Sunnis, not
world - and the international community - for what it only in the Sunni triangle - will upgrade their already
Sistani may have been crucial in forcing the Amer-
is: a neo-colonial power. It has now been proved there ferocious guerrilla war to code red, because they will
icans to get United Nations Secretary General Kofi
were never any weapons of mass destruction in Iraq - never accept losing power to Shi’ites. Jihad or civil war:
Annan back in the game. However, Annan did not
much less the means to deliver them. It is now being these are the options ahead.
react as the marja expected. Annan started by basically
proved the invasion of Iraq had nothing to do with
repeating the usual American excuses: there had been
no census in Iraq in the past 45 years and all electoral
lists disappeared during the war. Sistani stood his way,
and Annan was forced to send in an UN exploratory
mission to Baghdad. But Annan’s priority remains the
end of the occupation - and organizing “free, just and
credible” elections only when security allows.
Last week at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland, Iranian President Mohammed Khatami
expressed what hundreds of millions of Muslims are
feeling all over the world: “The American administra-
tion invaded Afghanistan to find [Osama] bin Laden,
where is bin Laden? The Americans occupied Iraq
under the pretext of installing democracy and finding
weapons of mass destruction. Where are these weapons
and where is democracy?” Khatami also revealed how
Iran is closely monitoring the confrontation between
the proconsul and the marja: “Ayatollah Sistani de-
manded direct democracy, and the Americans refuse
it. That’s what we have always proposed, one man, one
vote.” Also in Davos, John Ruggie, professor of interna-
tional affairs at Harvard and an adviser to Annan, has
been far from enthusiastic: “The Bush administration
has not changed. The Americans’ attitude does not
incite anybody to cooperate with them.”
One of Sistani’s sons has already recognized that “the
marja cannot resist the anti-American popular pressure
forever”. Ali Hakim al-Safi, one of Sistani’s spokesmen
FOREVER WARS   263
 Iraqis watch a
statue of Iraqi
President Saddam
Hussein topple
in Baghdad’s
al-Fardous square
on April 9, 2003.
Photo: Patrick Baz
/ AFP

One year on:

From liberation to jihad
Shi’ite leader Muqtada al-Sadr finds echo in Iraq when he compares US pro-
consul L Paul Bremer to Saddam Hussein. He also finds resonance in the Arab
world when he aligns himself with Hamas - predominantly Sunni - and Hez-
bollah - predominantly Shi’ite. And in the mosques, the calls are for jihad

By PEPE ESCOBAR
APRIL 9, 2004

On April 9, 2002, Saddam Hussein’s statue in Firdaus Square in Baghdad

was still enveloped, like a Christo installation, waiting to be unveiled in
an official ceremony. On April 9, 2003, the statue was toppled by the US
Army, and later replaced by a faceless figure symbolizing “liberation”. On
April 9, 2004, the faceless statue is plastered with photographs of “outlaw”
Shi’ite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr.

264   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES FOREVER WARS    265

 One year after the “fall” of Baghdad, the old colonial
maxim “divide and rule” does not apply anymore. For
the occupiers, this is the ultimate nightmare: Sunni
and Shi’ite, united (almost) as one. From Kirkuk in the
north to Karbala in the south, from Fallujah to Nasiri-
yah, from Ramadi to Baghdad, Iraq is in turmoil - and
this is not the work of “Saddam Fedayeen”, “remnants
of the Ba’ath Party” or “foreign terrorists”. This is the
beginning of the end: the serious possibility that the
Shi’ites - 60 percent or so of the invaded and “liberat-
ed” Iraqi population - will be tempted actively to lead
the multifaceted Iraqi resistance.
It’s ironic that it took one year after its supposed
US-sponsored liberation for the resistance to qualify
Fallujah as liberated - before the city of almost 500,000
came under siege by the marines this past Monday.
There’s no food or water coming in. By blocking the
highway connecting Baghdad, Amman and Damascus,
the Americans have strangulated practically all trade
between Iraq and its neighbors Jordan and Syria. The
city is totally sealed off from the rest of the world. Al-
Jazeera has the only media crew in town. Reporter Ah-
mad Mansur says: “Everybody walking in the streets
is now becoming an [American] target.” Mosques are
broadcasting calls to jihad.
An Apache helicopter fired three missiles into a com-
pound housing the Abdul Aziz al-Samarrai mosque in
Fallujah during afternoon prayers. The mosque itself
was not hit - but dozens of people were. Homes are
being turned into makeshift hospitals. Whatever the
spin from the Pentagon, this is the word of mouth in
the Iraqi street, soon to spread like wildfire all over
the Muslim world: the Americans now are bombing
mosques. Fallujah is the new Gaza. Fallujah residents
are to be subjected to ferocious Israeli-style search-
and-destroy raids for the men with rocket-propelled
grenades who first attacked the four American mer-
cenaries from Blackwater Security Consulting, whose
corpses were later mutilated and hanged by an angry
mob. Iraqis in the Sunni triangle believe that the
Americans received their “rules of engagement” from
Ariel Sharon’s army in Israel.
266   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Meanwhile, in the Shi’ite belt, the holy city of Kufa,
the power base of the clerical al-Sadr family, in whose
mosque “outlaw” Muqtada al-Sadr took refuge, became
the first Iraqi city to spin completely out of US control.
Asia Times Online has confirmed that Muqtada is now
in the holy city of Najaf, in his office in an alley near
the Imam Ali shrine, protected by hundreds of armed
members of his Mahdi Army. The Iraqi police have
totally vanished. The Spanish garrison outside of town
describes the situation as “high tension”. The Mah-
di Army now in effect controls the shrine, as well as
central Najaf. A constant stream of Muqtada’s followers
comes from Baghdad. In his most recent statement,
he says: “I’m prepared to have my own blood shed for
what is holy to me,” and calls on Sunnis and Shi’ites
alike to fight the Americans.
Proconsul L Paul Bremer’s Coalition Provisional Au-
thority (CPA) has already amplified Muqtada’s cult-hero
status, and may soon create a martyr by having a war-
rant for his arrest issued. Muqtada’s black-clad Mahdi
Army may have only several thousand members, but he
commands support of at least 30 percent of an estimat-
ed 15 million Iraqi Shi’ites: some serious Arab analysts
even talk of 50 percent. And just as his father, Grand
Ayatollah Mohammed al-Sadr, became a martyr to
Saddam in 1999, Muqtada well appreciates the benefits
of becoming a martyr to the US occupation.
Cross-confessional intifada
For all purposes, an intifada is now going on. Local
sources tell Asia Times Online there are pro-Muqtada
posters all over Anbar - the richest, predominantly
Sunni, Iraqi province. Ramadi - where marines have
been under fierce attack - is in Anbar. Only a war of
national liberation is the motive capable of explaining
these posters. The concept - penned by the Pentagon -
of a Shi’ite Mahdi Army fighting the marines in Sunni
Anbar is positively ludicrous. This regional resistance
is conducted by former officers of the Iraqi army, as
tribal sheikhs in the Sunni triangle told this correspon-
dent last year.
Sunnis and Shi’ites are united in Baghdad, under
the same nationalist impulse. Sheikh Raed al-Kazami,
Muqtada’s man in the Shi’ite-majority Kazimiya neigh-
borhood, is not very far from the truth when he says:
“All of Iraq is behind Muqtada al-Sadr; we are but one
body, one people.” On the other side of the Tigris, Sun-
ni-majority Adhamiya is now aligned with Kazimiya,
as well as Fallujah, Ramadi and even Mosul, against the
“American invaders”. The popular justification is always
the same: this is now a jihad, regardless of whether one
is Sunni or Shi’ite. People will fight in their neighbor-
hoods, even if they don’t join the Mahdi Army.
Asia Times Online has learned that in an unprece-
dented move, 150 powerful Sunni tribal leaders and
emissaries personally delivered a support message
to Muqtada’s key aides in the 2-million-plus slum of
Sadr City, the former Saddam City: “We are all behind
Muqtada al-Sadr, we are by his side because he awak-
ened the Iraqi people to liberate the country from the
infidel invaders.” The message also said: “We are but
one Muslim nation - no one can separate us, be it in
Iraq or Palestine.”
Washington was busy predicting a civil war among
Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds. The White House, the
Pentagon and the CPA even had the perfectly man-
ufactured culprit: Jordanian Mussab al-Zarqawi, the
new Osama bin Laden. What they bought themselves
instead is the ultimate occupier nightmare: Sunni
and Shi’ite united. Muqtada may be a cross between
two-thirds Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran and
one-third Che Guevara (without the romantic cha-
risma). But he finds enormous echo in Iraq when he
compares Bremer to Saddam (in Sadr City, US-trained
Iraqi soldiers first fired on peaceful demonstrators,
followed by the US Army with tanks, Apaches and jets
firing at random on homes, shops and even ambulanc-
es; according to local hospitals, dozens of civilians were
killed and many more were injured). Muqtada also
finds enormous echo in the Arab world when he aligns
himself with Hamas - predominantly Sunni - and Hez-
bollah - predominantly Shi’ite.
US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld swears
Washington has nothing to do with the arrest war-
rant against Muqtada: this is “Iraqi justice” in action.
Wrong. The Iraqi Jurists Association published a
statement on Wednesday saying that the arrest warrant
is “illegal and based on a lie ... The arrest warrant is il-
legal and incorrect, as the occupation forces issued it in
disregard for sovereignty of Iraq’s justice system.” The
Iraqi minister of justice, Abdel-Rahim Al-Shibly, also
says he had not been aware of the arrest warrant.
The Bremer-Muqtada-Sistani triangle
The CPA will never persuade Iraqis - Sunni or Shi’ite
- that the violent repression against Muqtada and the
Mahdi Army is capable of safeguarding the “handover
of sovereignty” on June 30. Apart from Humvees, tanks
and Apaches, Bremer sent the new Iraqi army - using
ski masks, so they would not be recognized later by
the neighbors - to fire on the urban poor of Sadr City,
the same Saddam City “liberated” by the marines a
year ago. After this performance, the CPA’s credibility,
already low, is now less than zero: the average Iraqi
portrays it as a dictatorship exactly like Saddam’s - in-
tolerant of a critical press and fully repressing peaceful
protests.
Former counter-terrorism expert Bremer may have
been foolish to use such tactics. Or he may have been
very clever - employing a typical Sharon move: a prov-
ocation leading to anger and protests, which cries for
a crackdown to restore “order”. He may have wanted
to trigger a move to cripple the growing influence of
the army of Sadrists. Muqtada and his followers would
have every chance of getting a great number of seats
if elections for a Iraqi parliament are really held next
January.
Muqtada is indeed a radical upstart compared with
the religious Shi’ite first among equals, Grand Aya-
tollah Ali al-Sistani. But Sistani prefers to carefully
mold the United Nations to his wishes, rather than
confronting the CPA - which he loathes in silence and
seclusion. But as many Shi’ite religious leaders have
told this correspondent, Sistani just has to say the word
FOREVER WARS   267
(or issue a fatwa). If he says the word, the occupation is
finished.
One thing is absolutely certain: there is no possible
US military solution to smash the resistance. Harith
al-Dari, secretary general of the Iraqi Islamic Scholars
Association - one of the country’s highest religious
authorities - goes straight to the point: “They insist on
enforcing a military solution as if they are facing an
enemy in a battleground, not isolated civilians.”
If Bremer behaved like a fool, he only has one card
left to play. He badly needs Sistani’s help to reign in
Muqtada. But Sistani does not even admit receiving a
deferential visit from Bremer in person. Supposing this
would happen, there would be a heavy political price
to pay: plenty of US concessions and a total review of
the US-imposed Iraqi constitution. For the moment,
Sistani has voiced “solidarity” with Muqtada, and is
still preaching “negotiations”, while Dawa - the oldest
Shi’ite political party - has distanced itself from the
Muqtada uprising.
Hell and Blackwater
The four Americans killed in Fallujah were not simply
“civilians”. Three were Navy Seals (sea, air, land special
forces) and one was Delta Force, working on contract
for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and employ-
ees of Blackwater Security Consulting - one among
dozens of so-called “private” companies performing
shady operations in Iraq and other parts of the world
Washington prefers be attributed to “civilians”: a
US$100-billion-a-year market. There may be as many
as 10,000 “civilian” security contractors in Iraq at the
moment. Blackwater is a paramilitary operation: it
trains soldiers in counter-terrorism and urban com-
bat, and profits from rent-a-soldier schemes (using
former Green Berets, Army Rangers and Navy Seals).
Blackwater’s corporate leaders are proud to manage
the largest and most professional private army in the
world, with around 400 armed commandos in Iraq
alone. Some of them compose the Praetorian Guard of
Bremer himself.
268   THE PEPE ESCOBAR ARCHIVES
Additionally, there may be up to 3,000 CIA agents
in Iraq at the moment. As far as the Iraqi resistance is
concerned, “security” contractors, Seals, Delta Force
or CIA are not civilians but legitimate military-related
targets.
Anybody who has traveled in the Sunni triangle
knows how the US occupation is universally loathed.
Fallujah residents told this correspondent last year that
the Americans themselves triggered the birth of the re-
sistance only two weeks after the fall of Baghdad, when
their troops entrenched in a Fallujah school opened
indiscriminate fire against an angry crowd, killing at
least 17 people, including women and children.
The Pentagon and the White House could not possi-
bly admit there’s a war of national resistance going on
- but that’s what it is: the spirit of the resistance is a mix
of Iraqi nationalism and Arab pride, and has absolutely
nothing to do with Saddam. Even before the crack-
down on Fallujah and against Muqtada’s followers,
different groups had united under an official denomi-
nation: the Patriotic Front for the Liberation of Iraq.
The US response in Fallujah - “deliberate, precise and
overwhelming”, according to General Mark Kimmitt -
won’t deter the resistance. In Fallujah, they call them-
selves the Resistance Brigades of Fallujah, and have
even issued a communique taking credit for the killing
of the American contractors. The Brigades include the
Brigades of the Martyr Ahmad Yasin, the Brigades of
Ali ibn Abi Talib the Lion of God and Conqueror, and
the Brigades of the 1920 Revolution.
‘Free Iraq’
Bremer has declared war on local populations: this is
an enormous mistake. The Bush administration’s “war
on terror” has led to thousands more civilian victims
in Afghanistan and Iraq than in the United States on
September 11, 2001. This is never debated in the US
mainstream media - where as a rule an American life is
deemed to be superior to any other. On every front, the
“war on terror” is not leading to an end of terrorism,
but to a never-ending war.
The administration of President George W Bush is
busy selling the concept of a June 30 handover of “sov-
ereignty” to an Iraqi administration. Even before the
current Operation Bloodshed, Iraqis - avid consum-
ers of political intrigue - knew full well what’s behind
it. They know the CPA has confirmed that after June
30, the $18.4 billion of reconstruction funds will be
administered by the US Embassy in Iraq - the largest
in the world, capable of housing 3,000 people. These
funds - supposed to last for five years - will be spent on
Iraq’s crucial infrastructure: oil, water, electricity, com-
munications, police and the judiciary. What Bremer’s
CPA is in fact saying is that any Iraqi government
simply won’t be able to decide how the country will be
rebuilt.
Iraqis also know that 14 US military bases are already
under construction, enough to accommodate the (for
the moment) 110,000 American soldiers who will stay
in Iraq until at least 2007. No sovereign Iraqi govern-
ment has approved the construction of these bases.
Kimmitt - the No 2 Pentagon man in Iraq, and the one
who launched total war on Fallujah - said the bases are
“a blueprint for how we could operate in the Middle
East”. A ring of US military bases throughout what the
Pentagon calls the Greater Middle East is a key element
of the neo-conservative-driven strategy to control
world energy resources as the way to control the desti-
ny of America’s economic rivals - the European Union
and Northeast Asia.
Iraqis also know about another Bremer executive
order - according to which even with an interim Iraqi
government the Iraqi army will be controlled by top
US commander Lieutenant-General Ricardo Sanchez.
And they know they will also have to live with an Iraqi
version of Condoleezza Rice - a Bremer-appointed
national security adviser with a five-year mandate.
Muqtada may be an Islamic fundamentalist. But his
intifada is popular because the base consists of legions
of Iraq’s urban poor and unemployed - roughly 70
percent of the total working-age population. And the
motive is plain and simple: this is part of a national
resistance against a colonial enterprise. No institution
created by the US invasion - especially the CPA - has
any political legitimacy, any moral legitimacy, or any
kind of popular support. Juan Cole, professor of histo-
ry at the University of Michigan and one of the leading
American experts on Iraq, is adamant: “The United
States has managed to create a failed state, similar to
Somalia and Haiti, in Iraq.”
So this is the Bush administration-sponsored “free
Iraq” people identify not only in the Sunni triangle but
in the Shi’ite south: an occupying power maybe not
formally occupying the country any more, but installed
in 14 military bases and able to exercise full control on
security, the economy and the whole infrastructure. In
plain English: a US colony. This is the reason the mob
in Fallujah rejoiced in the burning of those American
bodies. This is the reason Sunnis and Shi’ites have for
now united in anger. And this is the reason the “libera-
tion” has finally turned into a jihad.
FOREVER WARS   269
 Two of the United States’ top “strategic threats” are
getting more and more real within the scope of the
New Silk Roads, the leading 21st-century project of
economic integration across Eurasia. America’s Deep
State will not be amused.
A sensationalist report, which did not add anything
that was not already known about the strategic part-
nership, nevertheless gained attention when it predict-
ably dog-whistled a major red alert about the military
alliance.
Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Abbas Mousavi
to a great extent was referring to that report when he
blasted as “lies” a series of rumors about the “transpar-
ent roadmap” that’s built into the evolving Iran-China
strategic partnership.
President Rouhani’s chief of staff, Mahmoud Vezi,
added that “a destructive line of propaganda has been
initiated and directed from outside Iran against the
expansion of Iran’s relations with neighbors and espe-
cially [with] China and Russia.”
Vezi said, “This roadmap in which a path is defined
for expansion of relations between governments and
the private sectors is signed and will continue to be
signed between many countries.”
The Iran-China strategic partnership was officially
established in 2016, when President Xi visited Tehran.
These are the guidelines. Two articles among the 20
listed in the agreement are particularly relevant.
Item 7 defines the scope of the partnership within
the New Silk Roads vision of Eurasia integration: “The
Iranian side welcomes ‘the Silk Road Economic Belt
and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road’ initiative
introduced by China.
“Relying on their respective strengths and advantag-
es as well as the opportunities provided through the
signing of documents such as the ‘MOU on Jointly
Promoting the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road’ and ‘MOU on Reinforce-
ment of Industrial and Mineral Capacities and Invest-
ment,’ both sides shall expand cooperation and mutual
investments in various areas including transportation,
railway, ports, energy, industry, commerce and ser-
vices.”
Item 10 praises Iran’s membership in the AIIB: “The
Chinese side appreciates Iran’s participation as a
founding member of the Asia Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank. Both sides are willing to strengthen their
cooperation in the relevant areas and join their efforts
towards the progress and prosperity of Asia.”
The core of the Iran-China strategic partnership – no
secret whatsoever since at least last year – revolves
around a $400 billion Chinese investment in Iran’s
energy and infrastructure for the next 25 years.
It’s all about securing a matter of supreme Chinese
national interest: a steady supply of oil and gas that
bypasses the dangerous bottleneck of the Straits of Ma-
lacca, secured with a median 18% discount and paid
in yuan or in a basket of currencies other than the US
dollar.
Beijing will also invest roughly $228 billion in Iranian
infrastructure – that’s where the AIIB comes in – over
25 years, but especially up to 2025. That ranges from
building factories to badly needed energy industry
renovation, all the way to the already-in-progress con-
struction of the 900-km-long electric rail from Tehran
to Mashhad.
Tehran, Qom and Isfahan will also be linked by high-
speed rail – and there will be an extension to Tabriz,
an important oil, gas and petrochemical node and the
starting point of the Tabriz-Ankara gas pipeline.
All of the above makes total sense in New Silk Road
terms, as Iran is a key Eurasian crossroads.
High-speed rail traversing Iran will connect Urumqi
in Xinjiang to Tehran, via four of the Central Asian
“stans” (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan), all the way to West Asia, across Iraq and
Turkey and farther on to Europe.
This will be a techno revival of the Ancient Silk
Roads, where the main language of trade between East