7. PEOPLE vs.
REAFOR
Rule 116, Section 2 – Plea of guilty to a lesser
offense
Under the present Rules, the acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty is not a demandable right but
depends on the consent of the offended party
and the prosecutor, which is a condition
precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense that is necessarily included in the
offense charged.
FACTS:
- Assailed in this petition for review on
certiorari are the Resolutions dated
December 17, 2018 and May 24, 2019 of the
CA, which dismissed the petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rule 65
Petition) filed before it due to several
procedural infirmities.
RESPONDENT: EDWIN REAFOR y COMPRADO
» Jan 21, 2017: respondent was charged
before RTC of Naga of the crime of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs, defined and
penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA
9165, for allegedly selling two (2) heat-
sealed transparent sachets containing a total
of 0.149 gram of shabu.
» July 26, 2018: During the presentation of the
prosecution's evidence, respondent filed a
Motion to Plea Bargain dated, contending
» that as per A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, he may
be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense
of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA
9165, which is punishable only by
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months
and one (1) day to four (4) years, and a fine
ranging from Pl0,000.00 to P50,000.00.
PROSECUTION
» Opposed the motion, invoking DOJ Circular
No. 27, which provides, inter alia, that for the
crime charged against respondent, the
acceptable plea bargain is for violation of
Section 11 (3), Article II of RA 9165,
punishable by imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years, and a fine ranging from
P300,000.00 to P400,000.00
RTC:
- Aug 24, 2018: In an Order, the RTC granted
respondent's motion over the opposition
of the prosecution.
- “It is only the SC that has the power to
promulgate rules of procedure, A.M. No. 18-
03-16-SC, which now forms part of the
procedure in all courts, must prevail over the
said DOJ Circular 27."
- Thereafter, respondent was re-arraigned
and pled guilty to violation of Section 12,
Article II of RA 9165 over the objection of the
prosecution and was subsequently convicted
therefor through a Judgment dated Sept 6,
2018.
PETITIONER PEOPLE OF THE PHIL
» Nov 26, 2018: petitioner through the OSG
filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the CA, assailing:
(a) the RTC Order dated Aug 24, 2018
granting respondent's Motion to Plea
Bargain;
(b) the RTC Order dated Aug 29, 2018
allowing respondent to plead guilty to
violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165;
and
(c) the RTC Judgment dated Sep 6, 2018
convicting respondent of the aforesaid crime.
» The OSG argues that the RTC gravely
abused its discretion in allowing
respondent to undergo plea bargaining
without the consent of the prosecution.
» Thus, it prayed that a TRO be issued
enjoining the implementation of the assailed
Judgment, and that the case be remanded to
the RTC for continuation of proceedings
CA:
- Dec 17, 2018: In a Resolution by the CA
dismissed the petition on purely
procedural grounds.
- It held that while the OSG admitted that the
last day to file the petition was on Oct 28,
2018, it failed to provide sufficient justification
as to why it took them nearly one (1) month
to file the same.
- Moreover, it found that the OSG failed to
offer any explanation as to why no motion
for reconsideration (MR) was filed before
 the RTC prior to the filing of the said
petition, which is a condition precedent
before filing a Rule 65 Petition.
PETITIONER
» moved for reconsideration, which was
denied in a Resolution dated May 24, 2019;
hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it.
RULING:
• YES. The assailed Orders and
Judgment of the RTC - all involving
respondent's plea bargain to a lesser
offense of violation of Section 12,
Article II of RA 9165 - are void; hence,
they can never be final and executory
and may be assailed at any time.
• Plea bargaining to a lesser offense is
governed by Section 2, Rule 116 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reads:
Section 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser
offense. ~ The accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the
fiscal, may be allowed by the trial
court to plead guilty to a lesser
offense, regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the crime
charged, or is cognizable by a court
of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the
complaint or information is
necessary.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process
whereby the accused and the prosecution work out
a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case
subject to court approval. It usually involves the
defendant pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to
only one or some of the counts of a multi-count
indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that
for the graver charge."
Essentially, it is a give-and-take negotiation wherein
both the prosecution and the defense make
concessions in order to avoid potential losses. The
rules on plea bargaining neither creates nor takes
away a right; rather, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized
by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of
them.
Nonetheless, it is well to clarify that "a defendant has
no constitutional right to plea bargain. No basic
rights are infringed by trying him rather than
accepting a plea of guilty; the prosecutor need not
do so if he prefers to go to trial. Under the present
Rules, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty
is not a demandable right but depends on the
consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, which is a condition precedent to a
valid plea of guilty to a lesser offense that is
necessarily included in the offense charged. The
reason for this is that the prosecutor has full control
of the prosecution of criminal actions; his duty is to
always prosecute the proper offense, not any lesser
or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand
can sustain.
Requisites of plea bargaining
1. consent of the offended party;
2. consent of the prosecutor;
3. plea of guilty to a lesser offense which is
necessarily included in the offense charged;
and
4. approval of the court.
Ruling of the SC regarding plea bargaining in
drug cases:
1. Estipona, Jr. v. Lobrigo
- which declared the provision in RA 9165
expressly disallowing plea bargaining in
drugs cases, i.e., Section 23,24 Article II
thereof, unconstitutional, for contravening
the rule-making authority of the SC.
Following this pronouncement, the Court
issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC providing for a
plea bargaining framework in drugs cases,
which was required to be adopted by all trial
courts handling drugs cases. In response to
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, the Secretary of
Justice issued DOJ Circular No. 27 as a
guideline to be observed by the trial
prosecutors nationwide in entertaining plea
bargaining offers in drug cases.
- while both A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and DOJ
Circular No. 2·1 enumerate in table format
several violations of RA 9165 which could be
subject to plea bargaining, they differ in the
acceptable plea bargain, i.e., the lesser
offense to which the accused may plead
guilty. Naturally, these differences would
result in plea bargaining deadlocks,
 especially in light of DOJ Circular No. 27's
explicit mandate that "if the proposed plea
bargain is not allowed or goes beyond
what is allowed under these guidelines,
the trial prosecutor shall reject the
proposed plea bargain outright and
continue with the proceedings."
2. Sayre v. Xenos
- the Court ruled in favor of the validity of DOJ
SC:
Circular No. 21, holding that the same does
not contravene the rule-making authority of
the Court, viz. :
Nonetheless, a plea bargain still
requires mutual agreement of the
parties and remains subject to the
approval of the court. The acceptance
of an offer to plead guilty to a lesser
offense is not demandable by the
accused as a matter of right but is a
matter addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
- The use of the word "may" signifies that the
trial court has discretion whether to allow the
accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense. Moreover, plea bargaining
requires the consent of the accused,
offended party, and the prosecutor. It is
also essential that the lesser offense is
necessarily included in the offense charged.
- Taking into consideration the requirements in
pleading guilty to a lesser offense, the SC
find it proper to treat the refusal of the
prosecution to adopt the acceptable plea
bargain for the charge of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs provided in AM. No. 18-03-
16-SC as a continuing objection that
should be resolved by the RTC. This
harmonizes the constitutional provision on
the rule-making power of the Court under the
Constitution and the nature of plea
bargaining in Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ
Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter or modify
the Plea Bargaining Framework in A.M. No.
18-03-16-SC.
- Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27
provision pertaining to acceptable plea
bargain for Section 5 of RA 9165 did not
violate the rule- making authority of the
Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves
as an internal guideline for prosecutors to
observe before they may give their
consent to proposed plea bargains.
- The Court concluded that the continuing
objection on the part ofthe prose cution
based on DOJ Circular No. 27 will
necessarily result in the parties' failure to
arrive at a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case that may be submitted for the trial
court's approval. In light of the absence of
a mutual agreement to plea bargain, the
proper course of action would be the
continuation of the proceedings.
- In this case, the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in granting respondent's
motion to plea bargain notwithstanding the
prosecution's opposition to the same which
is grounded on DOJ Circular No. 27.
- Effectively, respondent's plea of guilty to a
lesser offense (to which he was convicted
of) was made without the consent of the
prosecution. Since respondent's plea of
guilt and subsequent conviction for a lesser
offense clearly lack one of the requisites of a
valid plea bargain, the plea bargaining is
void. Resultantly, the judgment rendered
by the RTC which was based on a void
plea bargaining is also void ab initio and
cannot be considered to have attained
finality for the simple reason that a void
judgment has no legality from its
inception.
- Thus, since the judgment of conviction
rendered against respondent is void, it is only
proper to resume with the trial of Criminal
Case No. 2017-0053 - which prior to
respondent's filing of his motion to plea
bargain, was at the stage of the prosecution's
presentation of evidence - without violating
respondent's right against double jeopardy.

25. CAGANG v. SANDIGANBAYAN
[Inordinate delay; right to speedy disposition of
cases]
FACTS:
• On February 10, 2003, the Office of the
Ombudsman (OMB) received an anonymous
complaint alleging graft and corruption by
diverting the public funds using barangay
officials and using cooperatives as
“dummies” against Amelia Constantino
Mary Ann Gadian, and Joy Tangan of the
Vice Governor Office of Saranggani
Province.
• It was referred to the Commission on Audit
(COA) for audit investigation. Eventually,
COA reported that the said government
officials appeared to have embezzled
millions of public funds.
• Thus, the OMB concurred with COA’s
recommendation of the filing of the criminal
case for Malversation of Public Funds
through Falsification of Public Documents
under RA3019. There were around 180
accused involved. The Ombudsman had to
identify first those who appeared to be most
responsible.
• On November 17, 2011 (7 years after), the
OMB filed Informations for Violation of
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and
Malversation of Public Funds through
Falsification of Public Documents to the
Sandiganbayan against Cagang, Camanay,
Zoleta, Macagcalat, and Mangalen.
• Petitioner Cesar Matas Cagang (Cagang)
filed a Motion to Quah/Dismiss with Prayer
to Void and Set Aside the Order of Arrest.
He argued that:
• There was an inordinate delay of
seven (7) years in the filing of the
Information.
• Citing Tatad v. Sandiganbayan and
Roque v. Ombudsman, he argued
that the delay violated his
constitutional rights to due process
and to speedy disposition of case.
• The OMB filed a Comment arguing that there
was no showing that delay in the filing was
intentional, capricious, whimsical, or
motivated by personal reasons.
• The SANDIGANBAYAN denied the motion
stating that there was no inordinate delay in
the issuance of the information, considering
that 40 different individuals were involved
with direct participation in more or less 81
different transactions.
• The Motion for Reconsideration by
Cagang was also denied by the
Sandiganbayan.
Allegation before the SC
PETITIONER: CESAR MATAS CAGANG
» Filed a Petition for Certiorari with urgent
prayer for the issuance of TRO and/or writ
of preliminary of injunction to restrain the
implantation of the Order of Arrest.
» Cagang argued that there was grave abuse
of discretion when the Motion to Quash the
Information was dismissed as there was
violation of his right to due process and
speedy disposition of case.
» He argued that the inordinate delay of
seven (7) years in the filing of the
Information was not because it was politically
motivated, as in the case of Tatad, but
because it violates Article III, Section 16 of
the Constitution and Rule 112, Section
3(f) of the Rules of Court.
» Asserted that the said allegations was
already investigated by the COA; hence,
OMB should not have taken more than
seven years to study the evidence to
establish probable cause.
» Lastly, he argued that the pendency of the
petition for certiorari before the SC will
prevent the Sandiganbayan from preceding
the trial.
RESPONDENT: OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR
» Parameters necessary to determine whether
there was inordinate delay have been
repeatedly explained by the Sandiganbayan
in the assailed Resolutions.
» Petitioner should have invoked his right
to speedy disposition of cases when the
case was still pending before the Office of
the Ombudsman, not when the Information
was already filed with the Sandiganbayan.
» Sandiganbayan already made a judicial
determination of the existence of probable
cause pursuant to its duty under Rule 112,
Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
» Petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy
to question the denial of a motion to quash
and that the appropriate remedy should be to
proceed to trial.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the pendency of a petition for certiorari
with the Supreme Court suspends the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan.
2. Whether the denial of a motion to quash may be
the subject of a petition for certiorari.
3. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner Cesar
Matas Cagang’s Motion to Quash/ Dismiss with
Prayer to Void and Set Aside Order of Arrest and
Urgent Motion to Quash Order of Arrest on the
ground of inordinate delay.
RULING:
1.
• NO. The pendency of a petition for
certiorari before this Court will not
prevent the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding to trial absent the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction.
• Under Rule 65, Section 7 of the Rules of
Court:
Section 7. Expediting proceedings; injunctive
relief.—The court in which the petition is filed
may issue orders expediting the
proceedings, and it may also grant a
temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction for the preservation of
the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings. The petition shall not
interrupt the course of the principal case,
unless a temporary restraining order or a
writ of preliminary injunction has been
issued, enjoining the public respondent
from further proceeding with the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the
principal case within ten (10) days from the
filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher
court or tribunal, absent a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public
respondent.
Since this Court did not issue injunctive relief when
the Petition in G.R. Nos. 206438 and 206458 was
filed, the Sandiganbayan cannot be faulted from
proceeding with trial. It was only upon the filing of the
Petition in G.R. Nos. 210141-42 that this Court
issued a Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan.
2.
• As a general rule, the denial of a motion
to quash is not appealable as it is merely
interlocutory. Likewise, it cannot be the
subject of a petition for certiorari. The
denial of the motion to quash can still be
raised in the appeal of a judgment of
conviction. The adequate, plain, and
speedy remedy is to proceed to trial and
to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
A party may, however, question the denial in a
petition for certiorari if the party can establish that
the denial was tainted with grave abuse of discretion:
[A] direct resort to a special civil action for certiorari
is an exception rather than the general rule, and is a
recourse that must be firmly grounded on compelling
reasons.
In grave abuse of discretion cases, certiorari is
appropriate if the petitioner can establish that the
lower court issued the judgment or order without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief. The
petitioner carries the burden of showing that the
attendant facts and circumstances fall within any of
the cited instances.
3.
• NO. The Court held that there is no showing
that this case was attended by malice and
that there was no evidence that it was
politically motivated.
• It was only after six years after the
recommendation to file informations against
petitioner Cagang was approved, when the
Assistant Special Prosecutor II submitted the
informations for the review of Ombudsman
Carpio-Morales.
• The Court held that six (6) years is beyond
the reasonable fact-finding of ninety (90)
days and that the burden to prove the
justification of the delay is on the prosecution
(respondent of this case).
This Court finds, however, that despite the pendency
of the case since 2003, petitioner only invoked his
right to speedy disposition of cases when the
informations were filed on November 17, 2011. The
petitioner has not shown that he asserted his rights
during such period and instead waited until the
information was filed against him with the
Sandiganbayan.
The dismissal of the complaints, while favorable to
petitioner, would undoubtedly be prejudicial to
the State.
“[T]he State should not be prejudiced and
deprived of its right to prosecute the criminal
cases simply because of the ineptitude or
nonchalance of the Office of the
Ombudsman.”
The Supreme Court further cited the case of People
vs. Leviste which held that the State is entitled to due
process as much as the accused.
“[I]t must be emphasized that the state, like
any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court,
and to a reasonable opportunity to present its
case.”
This Court finds that there is no violation of the
accused’s right to speedy disposition of cases
considering that there was a waiver of the delay of
a complex case.
The granting of the present Petitions and finding
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Sandiganbayan will only prejudice the due
process rights of the State.
• February 10, 2003 – criminal complaint
was filed against petitioner
• August 11, 2004 – the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a resolution finding
probable cause against pet
• October 18, 2004 – resolution which
modified the previous resolution which
ordered the conduct of further fact-finding
investigation
• April 12, 2005 – fact-finding was
resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman
• August 8, 2011 – information were
submitted for Ombudsman Carpio-
Morales’ review
Supreme Court clarified in this case the mode of
analysis in situations where the right to speedy
disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial is
invoked.
1. Right to speedy trial - May only be invoked in
criminal prosecutions against courts of law.
Right to speedy disposition of case - May be
invoked before any tribunal, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial. What is important is that the accused
may already be prejudiced by the proceeding for the
right to speedy disposition of cases to be invoked.
2. Case is deemed initiated upon the filing of a formal
complaint prior to a PI. Ombudsman should set
reasonable periods for PI, with due regard to the
complexities and nuances of each case. Delays
beyond this period will be taken against the
prosecution. The period taken for fact-finding
investigations prior to the filing of the formal
complaint shall not be included in the determination
of whether there has been inordinate delay.
3. Determine first which party carries the burden
of proof.
A. If the right is invoked within the given time
periods, the defense has the burden of proving
that the right was justifiably invoked. \
B. If the delay occurs beyond the given time and
the right is invoked, the prosecution has the
burden of justifying the delay.

If the defense has the burden of proof, it must

prove:
a. Whether the case is motivated by malice or clearly
only politically motivated and attended by utter lack
of evidence, and
b. Defense did not contribute to the delay.

Once the burden of proof shifts to the prosecution,

the prosecution must prove:
A. It followed the prescribed procedure in PI and in
the prosecution of the case;
B. that the complexity of the issues and the volume
of evidence made the delay inevitable;
C. No prejudice was suffered by the accused as a
result of the delay.

4. GR: Determination of the length of delay is never

mechanical. Courts must consider the entire context
of the case, from the amount of evidence to be
weighed to the simplicity or complexity of the issues
raised.

XPN:
A. If there is an allegation that the prosecution of the
case was solely motivated by malice. Malicious
intent may be gauged from the behavior of the
prosecution throughout the proceedings. If malicious
prosecution is properly alleged and substantially
proven, the case would automatically be dismissed
without need of further analysis of the delay.

B. Waiver of the accused to the right to speedy

disposition of cases or the right to speedy trial. If it
can be proven that the accused acquiesced to the
delay, the constitutional right can no longer be
invoked.

5. The right to speedy disposition of cases or the

right to speedy trial must be timely raised.
Otherwise, they are deemed to have waived their
right to speedy disposition of cases.

26. SAYSON v. SANDIGANBAYAN
[STATE WITNESS]
Background:
There were 2 consolidated cases decided jointly.
Both cases sought review of the decision of the
Sandiganbayan finding petitioner Sayson guilty of
violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3 (e) or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, in each of the cases.
The Supreme Court REVERSED the decision of
Sandiganbayan, ACQUITTED petitioner Sayson
(budget examiner of the Ministry of Public Highways,
Region 7, Cebu City,) and ruled that Preagido was
not a credible state witness.
FACTS:
• It started when Ruth Paredes, the
supervising auditor of Commission on Audit
(COA) received an office memo directing her
and another to conduct an investigation on a
“fake” letter of advice allotments (LAA) in the
4 highway engineering districts of Cebu, and
to submit their report on it.
• Paredes and her team studied the flow of
funds from the Ministry of Budget down to the
district level.
• In the course of the investigation, Paredes’
team discovered the issuance of the fake
allotments.
o They identified the vouchers, which
were charged against fake allotments
for the years 1977 and 1978.
o They examined the Sub Advice
Allotments (SAAs) and Advice of
Cash Disbursement Ceilings
(ACDCs) coming from the Ministry of
Public Highways Central office and
prepared by its budget office for the
different regions.
§ NOTE: The SAAs were
issued on request for
allotment submitted by the
District Engineer to the
Regional Director in
accordance with a program of
work. Upon receipt of the
SAA, the chief accountant of
the central office would draw
a journal voucher for each
region, a copy of which is sent
to the region concerned.
o They also checked the LAAs
released to the different offices in
Region VII; the logbook or subsidiary
ledgers; the report of checks issued
by the deputy disbursing officer; the
vouchers; and other documents
relative to the transactions of the
Ministry.
• The President, thereafter, created a special
cabinet committee to investigate the alleged
irregularities in the disbursement of funds of
the public highways.
o The committee confirmed that the
released ACDCs were bogus
because they do not appear on the
logbook of the Ministry, they did not
bear the releasing stamp mark on the
top portion, the numbers were not in
sequence, there was no sub advice of
allotment number from which they
could have been taken, and there
was no legal basis for taking them
from appropriations.
• Meanwhile, Delia Preagido, an accountant
assigned to the Ministry of Public Highways,
Region VII office, was one of the accused
charged in an information but was later on
discharged from said information to be
utilized as a State witness.
o She handled the journal of collections
and deposits, as well as the general
journal.
o In the last week of January 1977,
accused Mangubat told her to stay
after office hours and handed her the
sum of P500.00, saying that her
salary was too small and that he
would need her someday.
o Sometime February 1977, accused
Mangubat again told her to stay after
office hours because they would go to
a conference.
o It was agreed upon that on Saturdays
accused Delia Preagido, Cruz and
Petitioner Sayson, who was a
 budget examiner of the Ministry of
Public Highways, Region 7, Cebu
City, would prepare and sell the
simulated LAAs at 26% of the
gross amount.
o Accused Cruz and Sayson were
the ones negotiating the fake LAAs
to contractors, district engineers
and accountants of different cities.
o Out of the 26% proceeds:
§ 6% would go to the
signatories of the fake LAAs;
§ ¾ of 20% to the regional
office;
§ and ¼ of 20% to the central
office people.
o The signatories on the fake LAAs
were accused Rolando Mangubat,
who was the chief accountant of the
Ministry of Public Highways, Region
7; one Fernandez and a certain
Faelnar.
• In the simulated LAAs, accused Mangubat
certified the availability of funds but the
SACDs were irregular because they did not
bear the stamp mark of the releasing and
budget section and they did not coincide with
the regular CDCs.
• Accused Preagido identified the
signatures on the fake LAAs as those of
accused Rolando Mangubat,
Fernandez and Faelnar.
• MANGUBAT’S DEFENSE:
o that the LAAs he signed were
properly funded by the savings of
the region, to wit:
§ 42% of the equipment rental;
5% for the discretionary fund
of the director and 2% for
administrative expenses. The
region saved and retained
between 65% to 70% of the
allotted fund because 25 to
30% of this was paid out for
equipment rental and their
projects were undertaken
through contracts with private
individuals.
o He insisted that the LAAs were
genuine because they were
properly funded and he was
authorized to sign them.
o The LAAs were spent for the intended
projects. He said that the
performance audit team did not find
any misuse or misappropriation of
funds allotted to the region or any
irregularity in the LAAs and CDCs he
issued.
o He denied meeting accused Cruz,
Sayson and Preagido in the
restaurant to discuss the issuance
of fake LAAs and the distribution
of the proceeds thereof to different
persons.
o He did not deny his signatures on
the LAAs.
• Later on, Mangubat pleaded guilty to all
the informations filed against him, for
which the Sandiganbayan convicted him.
• On the other hand, Petitioner Sayson was
charged by the prosecutor in a set 64
related criminal cases and another set of
143 related criminal cases for acting in
conspiracy with several other public officers
in Ministry of Public Highways causing undue
injury to the government by causing,
allowing, approving and receiving the illegal,
irregular and unauthorized disbursement and
expenditure of public funds, out of the
National Treasury through the issuance of
General Vouchers and Treasury Checks.
• SAYSON’S DEFENSE:
o He pre-audited disbursement of
salaries and supplies of the Regional
Office in amounts not exceeding
P6,000.00. Disbursements in excess
of P6,000.00 were forwarded to the
COA resident auditor for pre-audit.
His duty did not include allocation of
amounts to different districts but only
to disbursements within the regional
office.
o He had no hand in the preparation
of LAAs and CDCs, a task
 relegated to the accounting and
budget section of the ministry
where he was not connected. His
immediate superior was Angelina
Escaño, head of the Accounting
and Finance Division.
o He denied meeting accused
Mangubat, Preagido and Cruz at a
conference or receiving any
money in connection with the
anomalies.
o He said that accused Preagido had
been convicted in the other
highway cases and simply wanted
to implicate him and his co-
accused to the anomalies.
• When he was arraigned on 2 separate
dates, Sayson pleaded not guilty to all
charges.
• SANDIGANBAYAN’S DECISIONS:
o In GR No. 110547-50: (Lapu-Lapu City
Highway Engineering District Cases, First
Petition)
§ Sayson was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in violation of Section
3e of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
o In GR No. 114526-667: (Danao City
Engineering Office Cases, Second
Petition)
§ Sayson was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in violation of Section
3e of RA 3019.
§ The Sandiganbayan came up with this
decision because it found that since
October 1977 chief accountant
Rolando Mangubat no longer had
authority to approve the LAAs because
he was assigned on detail to the MPH
central office. In 1977 and 1978, the
fake allotments released to MPH
Regional Office VII reached the total
amount of P60,354,728.21.
§ The Sandiganbayan was convinced
to the point of moral certainty that
petitioner Jose Sayson y a co-accused from the information in order to
Delarmente took part in the
conspiracy due to the positive
testimony of accused Delia
Preagido and the admission of guilt
made by accused Mangubat.
• Hence, these petitions.
ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner Sayson’s guilt of the charges
against him has been established based on the lone
testimony of the accused turned State witness,
Preagido. (NO)
RULING:
No. After carefully reviewing the facts of the cases
herein involved, the Court was convinced that
petitioner had no part in the simulation and
negotiation of fake LAAs. The only evidence
linking him to a conspiracy to defraud the
government was the testimony of Delia
Preagido, a previously convicted co-accused,
who was discharged from the informations and
utilized as State witness.
The Supreme Court found Delia Preagido, the
accused turned State witness not credible. She
was convicted of several cases of estafa through
falsification of public documents and of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Her
discharge as an accused to be utilized as State
witness was improper. She was one of the most
guilty. In fact, she was given conditional pardon
to induce her to testify against her co-accused.
The Sandiganbayan itself found her testimony
against the other accused to be incredible.
According to the Supreme Court, “How come
that she was credible as against the petitioner?”
The Sandiganbayan erred in giving credence to
her testimony against petitioner.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayan grievously erred in
discharging her as an accused and allowing the
prosecution to utilize her as a State witness. Rule
119, Section 9 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, requires that in allowing
an accused to be discharged to be a witness for
the State, the court must be satisfied that the
accused does not appear to be the most guilty
and that he has not at any time been convicted
of an offense involving moral turpitude.
As a general rule, the discharge or exclusion of
utilize him as a prosecution witness rests on the
sound discretion of the trial court. This
discretion shall be exercised strictly on the basis
of the conditions set forth in Rule 119, Section 9
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. The
court’s discretion is not absolute or arbitrary. Sound
judicial discretion must be exercised with due regard
to the proper administration of justice. We consider
it unthinkable that the Sandiganbayan can so grossly
violate the strict conditions set out in this Rule.

In the discharge of a co-accused, the trial court may

be reasonably expected to err. Where such error is
committed, however, the error in discharging such
accused cannot affect the legal consequences of his
discharge. Neither may such error affect the quality
of his testimony, if otherwise credible.

However, as heretofore stated, we find Delia

Preagido not a credible witness. She implicated
petitioner to give a semblance of truth to her
testimony. The Sandiganbayan found her
testimony incredible as against the other
accused. There is no rhyme or reason to
consider the same incredible testimony credible
against petitioner Sayson.

Accused Mangubat, the mastermind of the

fraudulent scheme pleaded guilty to all the charges
against him. The Sandiganbayan convicted him on
October 20, 1989 and November 17, 1989. His
admission is binding only on him.

In light of the foregoing, the Sandiganbayan erred in

finding petitioner Sayson guilty of violation of
Republic Act 3019, Section 3(e). The elements of the
offense are: (1) that the accused are public
officers or private persons charged in conspiracy
with them; (2) that said public officers commit the
prohibited acts during the performance of their
official duties or in relation to their public positions;
(3) that they cause undue injury to any party,
whether the Government or a private party; (4) that
such injury is caused by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference to such
parties; and (5) that the public officers have acted
with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. The last two elements were
not established in the cases at bar.

27. PEOPLE v. SISON
[The discharge of an accused as a state witness
because he does not appear to be the most guilty is
highly factual in nature–the discretionary judgment
of the trial court on this factual issue is seldom
interfered with by appellate courts except in case of
grave abuse of discretion.]
FACTS:
- The case is an appeal by Renante Sison
alias Dante from the Decision of the RTC in
Dagupan City convicting him of the crime of
murder.
- An information was filed against Dante Sison
and Jessie Sison – his nephew.
- Both the accused were arraigned on Sept.
10, 1993. Dante pled not guilty. However,
Jessie was not arraigned because the judge
found him mentally unfit. He was ordered to
be treated first so his trial was suspended.
- Upon his recovery, the judge directed him to
return to jail for the trial.
- In June 1994, the prosecution moved to
discharge him as a state witness which
was granted.
- Jessie testified that Dante – his uncle –
together with Alfredo Cerventes went their
house at midnight of May 21, 1993. Dante
woke him up saying that he killed someone,
and he has to come with them to bury the
body. He saw that Dante was armed with
bayonet and his clothes were full of blood.
Initially he refused to go with them but
because of fear that Dante might strike him,
he went with them to Sinucalan river where
they dug the ground and bury the cadaver. It
was later that day that he learned that the
person they buried was Edwin Abrigo.
- Aurora Sison, Jessie’s mother, corroborated
the testimony of her son that at about 12mn
of May 21, 1993, she was awaked by Dante
and Alfredo. She noticed that Dante was
holding a bayonet and that his white t-shirt
was strained with blood.
- Because she was suspicious, she followed
them until the riverbank where she saw the
cadaver. She got frightened and left
immediately.
- Jonathan Abrigo, brother of Edwin, testified
on May 11, 1993, Jessie and others were
drinking when he heard Dante say that he will
kill Edwin Abrigo if he sees him. The last time
Jonathan saw Edwin was on May 20 when
he informed him about the threat.
- A child named Bangkay gave to them
Edwin’s wallet which he found near the river.
When they went to the place, they saw a
newly dug grave near the river and the grave
contained the corpse of Edwin which they
were able to identify because of his gold ring
and the short pants he was wearing.
DANTE SISON’S DEFENSE
- Dante testified that about 7pm of May 21, he
left his house to work as a carpenter. He
return to his house to eat his lunch and then
went back to work. At 12:30 midnight, he
went to the house of the barangay captain
Brgy. Matic-Matic to borrow an icebag
because his son has a fever. On his way
back, he saw Alfredo Cervantes.
- Alfredo asked him to inform Jessie that
Edwin Abrigo is missing, and he is the
suspect. So, they went to the house of Jessie
after applying the icebag to his son. They
woke Jessie up and told him that
disappearance of Edwin Abrigo.
- Dante also declared that he had a
misunderstanding with Jessie which was
allegedly brough about by Jessie’s use of
marijuana and his daughter’s report that
Jessie was fooling her.
- On May 22, Alfredo informed him about the
death of Edwin Abrigo.
- He denied that the testimonies of Jonathan
Abrigo and Aurora Sison claiming that he
was wearing a black shirt and blue pants
when he went out to borrow the icebag on the
evening of May 21.
- He also admitted that he has been charged
previously with the crime of robbery with
rape.
- Dante’s wife corroborated the testimony of
her husband that he went to the house of
Barangay captain to borrow and icebag for
their sick son. HOWEVER, she said that
Alfredo went to their house after the arrival of
her husband from the house of the barangay
captain.
RTC: The trial court convicted Dante of the crime of against the competence of one Obdulio as a state
murder and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua witness, we held that “x x x it is almost a universal
and to indemnify the heirs of Abrigo. rule x x x that aside from matters jurisdictional, which
can only be raised for the first time on appeal, and
The statement of the Dante to Jessie Sison saying
aside from a few other exceptions which need not be
that “I killed someone, come with me and we will bury
noticed, questions not raised in the trial court will not
him” is part of the res gestae as it was made under
be considered on appeal.
the stress of an exciting event. Hence, it is
admissible against the accused. Further, when
Dante woke Jessie up, Dante’s clothes were full of
blood, and he was armed with a bayonet. These are
incriminating pieces of circumstantial evidence that
point to Dante as the perpetrator of the offense.
- As regards the qualifying circumstance of
evident premeditation was proved through
the testimony of Jonathan Abrigo that he
heard Dante say that he will surely kill him.
There was sufficient lapse of time between
the determination and execution of the killing.

- Abuse of superior strength was not proved.

- The aggravating circumstance of nighttime

facilitated the commission of the crime.

ISSUE:
Whether the lower court gravely erred in granting the
motion to discharge Jessie in the Information and in
allowing him to become a state witness despite the
fact that jessie is the most guilty person

RULING:
• NO. The discharge of Jessie as a state
witness because he does not appear to
be the most guilty is highly factual in
nature. The discretionary judgment of
the trial court on this factual issue is
seldom interfered with by the appellate
courts, except in case of grave abuse of
discretion. There is no compelling
reason to fault the discharge of Sison as
a state witness in light of the trial court’s
assessment of the totality of evidence
adduced by the parties. Based on the
evidence, there is no competent
evidence establishing Jessie as the most
guilty party.
• Records show that it is only on appeal
that Dante Sison assailed the discharge
of Jessie as a state witness.

In the early case of US v. Inductivo, where it was only

on appeal that counsel for the accused first argued

28. JIMENEZ JR. v. PEOPLE
(BARRAMEDA CASE)
Motion to discharge accused as a state witness
under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure
FACTS:
- This case involves two (2) consolidated
petitions for review on Certiorari (Rule 45)
before the Supreme Court, assailing the
amended decisions of the CA.
- The CA found no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC when the latter issued
an order granting the People of the
Philippines’ motion to discharge Manuel
Montero (Montero) as a state witness.
- Montero is a former employee of petitioner
Manuel Jimenez Jr (petitioner Jimenez) in his
BSJ Company
- In 2009, Montero executed sworn
statements where he:
• Confessed his participation in the
killing of Ruby Rose Barrameda
(Ruby Rose).
• Named petitioner Jimenez, Lope
(petitioner’s younger brother),
Lennard, Robert, and Eric as his co-
conspirators.
• Provided details on where the alleged
steel casing containing the body of
Ruby Rose was dumped, leading to
the recovery of a cadaver encased in
a drum and steel casing
- The People, through the state prosecutors,
filed an Information before the RTC,
charging petitioner Jimenez, Lope, Lennard,
Robert, Eric, and Montero of murder for the
killing of Ruby Rose.
- Thereafter, Montero filed a Motion for the
Discharge of the Witness as Accused
Pursuant to the Witness Protection
Program under Republic Act No. 6981.
- The People also filed a motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness for the
prosecution.
- Petitioner Jimenez opposed both motions.
RTC: Acting Presiding Judge Almeyda denied the
motion to discharge Montero as a state witness
because the prosecution:
• Failed to comply with Section 17, Rule 119
• Failed to clearly show that Montero was not the
most guilty
• Failed to present evidence to sustain the
possibility of conviction against Jimenez; and
• Montero’s statements were not corroborated by
the other evidence on record
- Montero and the People filed separate
motions for reconsideration
RTC: The newly appointed Judge Docena issued
the following orders:
July 2010 Order
• Reconsidered and reversed Judge Almeyda’s
order.
• Ruled that the prosecution was able to comply
with the requisites of Sec. 17 Rule 119.
• The crime would have remained undiscovered
and unsolved had it not been for Montero’s
extrajudicial confession
• Montero does not appear to be the most guilty
although he is a principal by direct participation.
• The principals by inducement are more guilty
because without their orders, the crime would
not have been committed.
• Montero has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude.
- Petitioner Jimenez filed a motion for
reconsideration
- While the MR is pending, he also filed a
motion for inhibition against Judge Docena
because of bias and prejudice
December 2010 Order - Denied the motion for
inhibition
June 2011 Order
• Denied MR of the July 2010 Order
• Denied MR of December 2010 Order
- Because of the Judge’s orders, petitioner
Jimenez then filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the CA for the
annulment of the orders, and the issuance of
a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
CA: granted Jimenez’s petitions.
- The people then filed an MR
CA: reversed and issued the assailed Amended
Decision where it found:
• No grave abuse of discretion
• Absolute necessity of Montero’s testimony as no
other direct evidence was available.
• Montero is not the most guilty because the
principals by inducement are more guilty than
the principals by direct participation.
• The case should still be raffled to another sala
for trial to avoid any claim of bias and prejudice
- The People moved for partial
reconsideration of the CA’s order but these
motions were all denied
- Hence, two (2) consolidated petitions for
review on Certiorari (Rule 45) before the
Supreme Court, assail the amended decision
of the CA
Allegations before the SC
PETITION 1: PETITIONER JIMENEZ’S PETITION
» There is no necessity to discharge Montero
as a state witness because his voluntary
sworn extrajudicial confessions are all in the
possession of the prosecution which they
could readily present in court and there was
unjust favoritism of Montero because all the
other conspirators are equally
knowledgeable of the crime.
» The judge, and not the prosecution, has the
ultimate discretion in ensuring that the
requirements under Section 17, Rule 119 are
complied with.
» Montero’s testimony cannot be substantially
corroborated in its material points as the
prosecution’s own evidence contradicts his
declarations:
o Montero’s statement that a “busal”
was placed inside the mouth of Ruby
Rose is belied by the other
prosecution witness
o He never mentioned the presence of
a packaging tape wrapped around
the head and neck of the recovered
cadaver
o His sinumpaang salaysay stated that
Ruby Rose was killed by
strangulation using a “lubid” but the
death certificate stated asphyxia by
suffocation
o The identification of the cadaver is
questionable as there are differences
in the height, dental and
odontological reports
» Montero appears to be the most guilty. He
designed and actively participated in all
phases of the alleged crime
» The Revised Penal Code imputes on the
principal by direct participation the heavier
guilt; without the latter’s execution of the
crime, the principal by inducement cannot be
made liable.
» Judge Docena failed to conduct a prior
hearing
» Montero already executed a notice of
withdrawal of consent and testimony which
was submitted to the CA
PETITION 2: THE PEOPLE’S PETITION
(not really related, but see ruling below)
» Argues that the CA’s order to re-raffle the
case to another sala is not supported by
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,
either under mandatory or voluntary
inhibition also include the rebut/answer of the
defendant.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in ruling that Judge
Docena did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
granting the motion to discharge Montero as a state
witness
RULING:
• NO. The CA was correct. There was no
grave abuse of discretion when Judge
Docena granted the motion to discharge
Montero as a state witness.
• All the requirements in Rule 119 in order
to discharge an accused as a state
witness were sufficiently complied with.
In the discharge of an accused in order that he may
be a state witness, the following conditions must be
present:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged
with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the
prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present
evidence and the sworn statement of
 each proposed state witness at a hearing
in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a
state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the
testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material
points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be
the most guilty; and
e) Said accused has not at any time
been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
The parties dispute the compliance with conditions
(3) and 5(a) to (d).
There was absolute necessity of the testimony
of Montero
Absolute necessity exists when he or she alone has
knowledge of the crime. In more concrete terms,
necessity is not there when the testimony would
simply corroborate or otherwise strengthen the
prosecution’s evidence.
In the present case, not one of the accused-
conspirators, except Montero, was willing to
testify on the alleged murder of Ruby Rose and their
participation in her killing.
The CA was correct in ruling that Judge Docena
acted properly and in accordance with
jurisprudence. Montero alone is available to provide
direct evidence of the crime.
That the prosecution could use the voluntary
statements of Montero without his discharge as a
state witness is not an important and relevant
consideration. To the prosecution belongs the
control of its case and this Court cannot dictate on
its choice in the discharge of a state witness, save
only when the legal requirements have not been
complied with. The prosecution’s right to prosecute
gives it “a wide range of discretion of whether, what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends
on factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors.” Under Section 17, Rule 119 the court
is given the power to discharge a state witness only
after it has already acquired jurisdiction over the
crime and the accused.
Montero’s testimony can be substantially
corroborated
As the trial court properly found, the evidence
consisting of: the steel casing where the cadaver
was found; the drum containing the cadaver which
the prosecution successfully identified (and which
even the acting Judge Almeyda believed) to be Ruby
Rose; the spot in the sea that Montero pointed to
(where the cadaver was retrieved); the apparel worn
by the victim when she was killed as well as her
burned personal effects, all partly corroborate
some of the material points in the sworn
statements of Montero.
These corroborated statements are far more
material than the inconsistencies pointed out by
Jimenez, at least for purposes of the motion to
discharge. The alleged discrepancies in the physical
evidence, particularly on the height and dental
records of Ruby Rose, are matters that should
properly be dealt with during the trial proper.
To resolve a motion to discharge under Section 17,
Rule 119, the Rules only require that that the
testimony of the accused sought to be discharged be
substantially corroborated in its material points,
not on all points.
Montero is not the most guilty
“most guilty” refers to the highest degree of
culpability in terms of participation in the commission
of the offense and does not necessarily mean the
severity of the penalty imposed. While all the
accused may be given the same penalty by reason
of conspiracy, yet one may be considered to have
lesser or the least guilt taking into account his
degree of participation in the commission of the
offense.
What the rule avoids is the possibility that the
most guilty would be set free while his co-
accused who are less guilty in terms of
participation would be penalized.
As a rule, for purposes of resolving a motion to
discharge an accused as a state witness, what are
controlling are the specific acts of the accused in
relation to the crime committed.
It appears that while Montero was part of the
planning, preparation, and execution stage as
most of his co-accused had been, he had no
direct participation in the actual killing of Ruby
Rose.
While Lope allegedly assigned to him the execution
of the killing, the records do not indicate that he had
active participation in hatching the plan to kill Ruby
Rose, which allegedly came from accused Lope and
Jimenez, and in the actual killing of Ruby Rose
which was executed by accused Lennard.
Montero’s participation was limited to providing
the steel box where the drum containing the victim’s
body was placed, welding the steel box to seal the
cadaver inside, operating the skip or tug boat, and,
together with his co-accused, dropping the steel box
containing the cadaver into the sea.
The discharge of Montero as a state witness
was procedurally sound
Jimenez is estopped from raising the issue of lack of
hearing prior to the discharge of Montero. Jimenez
did not raise this issue when Acting Judge Almeyda
denied the motion to discharge.
Jimenez actively participated in the proceedings of
the motion to discharge such as his filing of a 20-
page opposition to the motion; filing a reply to the
People’s comment; submitting his memorandum of
authorities on the qualification of Montero as state
witness; and filing a consolidated opposition on the
People’s and Montero’s motion for reconsideration
of Judge Almeyda’s order.
In People v.CA and Pring, the Court ruled that the
lack of actual hearing is not sufficiently fatal to
undermine the court’s ability to determine whether
the conditions prescribed for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness have been satisfied.
Montero’s Notice of Withdrawal of Consent is
not material in the resolution of the present
case
The present case involves an appellate review of the
CA’s decision which found no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Docena in granting
the motion to discharge.
Interplay between the judge and prosecutor in
the motion to discharge an accused to become
a state witness
The CA cited Quarto v. Marcelo in ruling that the trial
court must rely in large part upon the suggestions
and the information furnished by the prosecuting
officer. We deem it important to place this ruling in
its proper context lest we create the wrong
impression that the trial court is a mere “rubber
stamp” of the prosecution, in the manner that
Jimenez now argues.
It is still the trial court that determines whether
the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the
accused-witness’ qualifications to be a state
witness satisfies the procedural norms.
This relationship is in reality a symbiotic one as the
trial court, by the very nature of its role in the
administration of justice, largely exercises its
prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and
evaluation.
--------------------------------------------------------------------
OTHER ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in
ordering the re-raffle of Criminal Case No. 39225-
MN to another RTC branch for trial on the merits.
YES. the CA did not provide factual or legal support
when it ordered the inhibition of Judge Docena. The
mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough
ground for their inhibition, especially when the
charge is without basis.
In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to
prove the charge of bias and prejudice, a judge’s
ruling not to inhibit oneself should be allowed to
stand.
Jimenez must prove that the judge acted or
conducted himself in a manner clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice so as to defeat the
attributes of the cold neutrality that an impartial judge
must possess. Unjustified assumptions and mere
misgivings that the judge acted with prejudice,
passion, pride and pettiness in the performance of
his functions cannot overcome the presumption that
a judge shall decide on the merits of a case with an
unclouded vision of its facts.