RTC: Issued an Order dismissing the case because
2. VILLA GOMEZ v. PEOPLE ACP Paggao had no authority to prosecute the case
Lack of prior written authority or approval on the
face of the Information by the prosecuting officers
authorized to approve and sign the same has
nothing to do with a trial court's acquisition of
jurisdiction in a criminal case.
FACTS:
- In 2010, petitioner Gina Villa Gomez (Villa
Gomez) was arrested by the police from the
Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task
Group of Makati
- A Complaint was then filed against Villa
Gomez charging her with corruption of
public officials under Article 212 of the
Revised Penal Code because she allegedly
offered P10,000.00 to PO2s Ronnie and
Renie Aseboque in exchange for the release
of her companion named “Anoy”
- The Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of
Makati then received the Complaint for
inquest
OCP RESOLUTION:
• found probable cause
• The very resolution contained a statement
saying: “The attached Information is
recommended to be approved for filing in court.
No bail.”
• It was also signed by following persons:
o Assistant City Prosecutor Rainald
Paggao (ACP Paggao)
o Senior Assistant City Prosecutor
Imelda Portes-Saulog
o City Prosecutor Feliciano Aspi
- Eventually, an INFORMATION for the said
charge was filed with the RTC
- It contained a statement which says:
“I further certify that the Information is
being filed with the prior authority
of the City Prosecutor”
- However, it was merely signed by
ACP Paggao
- At the trial, both parties submitted their
evidence. They did not file any motion
whatsoever.
since the Information did not bear the signature of
the City Prosecutor - a jurisdictional defect which
cannot be cured.
- The Prosecution then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) for the sudden
summary dismissal by the RTC despite the
fact that no motion has been filed, and the
case has been running for more than 2 years
with the detention of Villa Gomez
- It argued that the Resolution contained an
approval for the filing of the Information and
the signature of the City Prosecutor
RTC: denied the MR.
• The said Resolution merely authorized the
handling prosecutor, ACP Paggao, to file the
Information
• The Resolution did not authorize him to sign the
Information
- Thereafter, the Prosecution through the OSG
filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
with the CA seeking for the annulment of the
RTC Orders.
CA: granted the petition.
• It ruled that indeed, the Resolution was signed
by the City Prosecutor
• RTC cannot quash an Information after the
arraignment without a motion filed by the
accused.
• Ordered the reinstatement of the criminal case
and the issuance of a new warrant of arrest
against Villa Gomez
- Villa Gomez then filed an MR and argued
that courts may motu proprio dismiss a case
based on jurisdictional infirmities at any
stage of the proceedings
CA: denied the MR.
- Villa Gomez then filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari for the CA’s pronouncements
against her
Arguments
PETITIONER VILLA GOMEZ
» ACP Paggao was not authorized to file the
Information
» The ground of want of jurisdiction may be
assailed at any stage of the proceedings
» A criminal Information which is void for lack
of authority cannot be cured by an
amendment for such authority is a mandatory
jurisdictional requirement
PROSECUTION
» the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the criminal case
» The Resolution recommending for the
attached Information "to be approved for
filing" bore the signature of City Prosecutor
Aspi
» an Information cannot be quashed by the
court or judge motu proprio, especially if the
case had already gone to trial and the parties
had already completed the presentation of
their evidence
ISSUE:
Whether a trial court in a criminal case is divested of
its jurisdiction over the person of the accused and
over the offense charged if the Information filed by
the investigating prosecutor does not bear the
imprimatur because of the absence on its face of
both the word "approved" and the signature of the
authorized officer such as the provincial, city or chief
state prosecutor
RULING:
- NO. The handling prosecutor's authority,
particularly as it does not appear on the face
of the Information, has no connection to the
trial court's power to hear and decide a case.
- Sec. 3 (d), Rule 117, requiring a handling
prosecutor to secure a prior written authority
or approval from the provincial, city or chief
state prosecutor before filing an Information
with the courts, may be waived by the
accused through silence, acquiescence, or
failure to raise such ground during
arraignment or before entering a plea.
Secs. 3 and 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court
read:
Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move
to quash the complaint or information on any of
the following grounds:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute
an offense
(b) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the offense charged
(c) That the court trying the case has no
jurisdiction over the person of the accused
(d) That the officer who filed the
information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to
the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged
except when a single punishment for various
offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has
been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true,
would constitute a legal excuse or
justification;
(i) That the accused has been previously
convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege
any ground therefor. — The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to
quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in
said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any
objections except those based on the grounds
provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i)
of section 3 of this Rule.
Here, Sec. 9 is clear that an accused must
move for the quashal of the Information
before entering his or her plea during the
arraignment. Failure to file a motion to quash
the Information before pleading in an
arraignment shall be deemed a waiver on the
 part of the accused to raise the grounds in Sec. RULING: NO. The trial court’s acquittal was tainted
3. Nevertheless, failure to move for a quashal with grave abuse of discretion. A judgment of
of the Information before entering his or her plea acquittal or order of dismissal amounting to an
on the grounds based on paragraphs (a), (b ), (g) acquittal which is tainted with grave abuse of
and (i) of Sec. 3; i.e., (1) that the facts charged discretion becomes void and cannot amount to a
do not constitute an offense; (2) that the court first jeopardy.
trying the case has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (3) that the criminal action or
liability has been extinguished; and (4) that the
accused has been previously convicted or
acquitted of the offense charged, or the case
against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, will not
be considered as a waiver for the accused and
the latter may still file such motion based on
these grounds even after arraignment. S

Correlatively, the prevailing jurisprudence (Villa

v. Ibanez, Turingan v. Garfin, Tolentino v.
Paqueo, Jr., Quisay v. People and Maximo v.
Villapando, Jr.) is of the view that paragraph (d)
of Sec. 3, that the officer who filed the
Information had no authority to do so, also
cannot be waived by the accused like those in
paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i). Even if such
ground is not listed in Sec. 9 as among those
which cannot be waived, it may still be asserted
or raised by the accused even after arraignment
for purposes of quashing an Information and,
consequently, having the criminal case
dismissed.

- All previous doctrines laid down by the

Court holding that the lack of signature and
approval of the provincial, city or chief state
prosecutor on the face off the information
shall divest the court of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused and the subject matter
in a criminal action are hereby
ABANDONED.
- It is sufficient for the validity of the
Information or Complaint, as the case may
be, that the Resolution of the investigation
prosecutor recommending for the filing of the
same in court bears the imprimatur of the
provincial, city or chief state prosecutor.

SIDE ISSUE: But Gomez was already acquitted by

the trial court due to the finding that the Information
was defective, if the acquittal is overturned, will it not
violate Gomez’ right against double jeopardy
considering that an acquittal is immediately final and
executory?

4. Lacson v. Executive Secretary
“The factor that characterizes the charge is the actual
recital of the facts." The real nature of the criminal charge
is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
informations nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions
of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information. It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information and not by the result of evidence after trial.
FACTS:
- In the early morning of May 18, 1995, 11 persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong
Baleleng gang, reportedly an organized crime
syndicate which had been involved in a spate of
bank robberies in Metro Manila, where slain
along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG)
- The ABRITG was composed of petitioner Chief
Superintendent Lacson as head of Task Force
Habagat and other petitioner-intervenors Chief
Superintendent Acop and Zubia, Jr which were
heads of Criminal Investigation Command and
Traffic Management Command, respectively.
- Acting on a media exposé of a member of the
CIC, what actually transpired at dawn of May 18,
1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out)
and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong
Baleleng gang members and the ABRITG,
- Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel of
investigators to investigate the incident. This
panel later absolved from any criminal liability
all the PNP officers and personal allegedly
involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding
that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation.
- However, a review board led by Overall Deputy
Ombudsman Villa modified the panel's finding
and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six (26) respondents,
including herein petitioner and intervenors.
- Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo
Lacson was among those charged as principal
in eleven (11) information for murder before the
Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
intervenors Acop and Zubia, Jr. were among
those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.
- Upon motion by all the accused in the 11
information, the Sandiganbayan allowed them to
file a motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman's action.
- After conducting a reinvestigation, the
Ombudsman filed (11) amended informations
before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner
was charged only as an accessory, together
with Acop and Zubia, Jr. and other.
- All the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the
amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 2a
and 2c of Republic Act No. 7975. They contend
that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of
the "principal accused" are government officials
with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP
officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. The highest ranking principal accused in
the amended informations has the rank of only a
Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of
at least SG 27.
SANDIGANBAYAN: admitted the amended
information and ordered the cases transferred to
the QC RTC which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal
accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher.
- Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was
opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
- While these motions for reconsideration
were pending resolution, and even before the
issue of jurisdiction cropped up with the filing of
the amended informations, a House bill and a
Senate bill were introduced in Congress,
defining expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills
sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word
"principal" from the phrase "principal
accused" in Section 2a and 2c of R.A. No.
7975.
- These bills were consolidated and later
approved into law as R.A. No. 8249.
- Subsequently, Sandiganbayan promulgated a
Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor,
- On the same day the Sandiganbayan issued and
ADDENDUM to its Resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads: Considering the pertinent
provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and
Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they
are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's
motion for reconsideration.
- Petitioner Lacson and petitioner-intervenors
Acop and Zubia, Jr. files a petition for
prohibition and mandamus assailing the
constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No.
8249, including Section 7 thereof which
provides that the said law "shall apply to all
cases pending in any court over which trial has
not begun as to the approval hereof."
- They also seek to prevent the Sandiganbayan
from proceeding with the trial of the criminal
cases for multiple murder filed against them on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 4 and Section 7 of RA 8249
is unconstitutional – NO
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the subject criminal cases – NO, RTC has
jurisdiction
RULING:
1.
- The established rule is that every law has in its
favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to
justify its nullification there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a
doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those
who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say,
was not convincingly discharged in the present
case.
- Considering that herein petitioner and
intervenors are being charged with murder which
is a felony punishable under the RPC, the
governing on the jurisdictional offense is not
paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A.
8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation
to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of
murder, provided it was committed in relation to
the accused's officials functions.
- The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249
failed to rebut the presumption of
constitutionality and reasonable of the
questioned provisions. The classification
between those pending cases involving the
concerned public officials whose trial has not yet
commence and whose cases could have been
affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as
against those cases where trial had already
started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real
differences.
- Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the
Kuratong Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post
facto law. This contention is erroneous.
- Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits
retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not
penal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction
which is not penal in character.
2. RTC has jurisdiction since the prosecution
failed to show in the amended informations that the
charge of murder was intimately connected with the
discharge of official functions of the accused PNP
officers. The offense charged in the subject criminal
cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, not the Sandiganbayan.
- "The factor that characterizes the charge is the
actual recital of the facts." The real nature of the
criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the informations nor from
the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, they being conclusions of
law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. It is an elementary rule
that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
in the complaint or information and not by the
result of evidence after trial.
- While there is the allegation in the amended
information that the said accessories committed
the offense "in relation to office as officers and
members of the (PNP)," the Court do not see the
intimate connection between the offense
charged and the accused's official functions,
which is an essential element in determining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
- The informations merely allege that the accused
abducted, kidnapped and detained the two
victims for the purpose of extracting or extorting
the sum of P353,000.00. In determining
jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall
control, and not the evidence presented by the
prosecution at the trial. It was not indicated that
the accused arrested and investigated the
victims and then killed the latter in the course of
the investigation.
- The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 is sustained and the Sandiganbayan was
directed to transfer the subject criminal cases
for multiple murder to the RTC of QC which has
exclusive jurisdiction over the said cases.

5. PEOPLE vs. PAGAL
[Plea of Guilty to a Capital Offense]
FACTS:
- This is an appeal from the Decision
promulgated by CA.
• Which annulled and set aside the
Order of the RTC that found Brendo
Pagal guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder solely based on his
plea of guilty.
- Brendo Pagal (accused-appellant) was
indicted under an Information charging him of
the crime of murder.
- During his arraignment, he pleaded guilty to
the crime charged.
- RTC found the plea to be voluntary and with
full understanding of its consequences.
Thus, it directed the prosecution to present
evidence to prove the guilt of Pagal and to
determine the exact degree of his culpability
in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
- On February 24, 2010, RTC issued a
subpoena to Angelito Pagal, Cesar Jarden
and Emelita Calupas to appear and testify
RTC:
before the RTC on May 5, 2010.
- On November 22, 2010, RTC issued another
subpoena directed to Angelito Pagal to
appear before it on February 22, 2011.
- On March 4, 2011, RTC ordered a repeat
subpoena be issued to Angelito Pagal, Cesar
Jarden and Jaimelito Calupas for May 11,
2011 hearing.
• In its May 11, 2011 Order, RTC noted
that "the prosecution is serious
enough to prove the degree of
culpability of the accused Brendo
Pagal who pleaded guilty to the crime
charged of murder but for several
times there were absences made by
the prosecution witness despite
proper service of subpoena or
notices.
CA:
- The prosecution on this situation requested
for a resetting and in the event no
prosecution witness would appear and
testify, this case is submitted to the x x x
discretion of this court inviting the degree of
culpability."
- RTC then set the trial and presentation of
witnesses on July 20, 2011
• In its July 20, 2011 Order, the RTC
stated that "[t]he prosecution after
having exerted its effort to present
any prosecution witness in
determining the degree of culpability
of the accused who pleaded guilty to
the crime charged, has no one to be
presented. On this matter, the
prosecution now submitted the case
for decision and as joined by the
defense who has also no witness to
be presented."
- As detailed above, none of the prosecution
witnesses appeared and testified on the
scheduled hearing dates of November 17,
2010; February 22, 2011; May 11, 2011;
and July 20, 2011 for the presentation of the
prosecution's evidence despite repeat
subpoenas duly issued and received by
them.
- The defense chose not to present any
evidence in view of the prosecution's non-
presentation. Both the prosecution and the
defense moved for the submission ofthe
case for decision.
- The RTC found accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt based solely on his
plea of guilty. It stated that accused-appellant
maintained his plea despite being apprised
that he will be sentenced and imprisoned on
the basis thereof.
- Pagal appealed the RTC Order to the CA and
raised this singular error:
• The trial court erred in convicting the
accused-appellant of the crime
charged solely on the basis of the
latter's plea of guilt and despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
- Annulled and set aside the October 5, 2011
Order of the RTC and remanded the case for
further proceedings in accordance with the
guidelines to be observed in the proper
 conduct of a searching inquiry as required by
Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules.
- The CA held that the RTC failed to comply
with the requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116
regarding the treatment of a plea of guilty to
a capital offense, particularly the conduct of
a searching inquiry into Pagal’s
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea.
- Also, the CA observed that the prosecution's
evidence was insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction independent of the
plea of guilty. In fact, the CA noted that the
prosecution did not present any evidence;
thus, it remanded the case to the RTC with a
directive that it follow the mandate of Sec. 3,
Rule 116.
Allegation before the SC
NAME OF APPELLANT (BRENDO PAGAL)
» Pagal maintains that the RTC erred in
convicting him on the sole basis of his guilty
plea despite the failure of the prosecution to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
» He points to the fact that the prosecution was
given numerous opportunities to present its
evidence yet still failed to do so.
» He emphasizes that there is no evidence in
support of his conviction except for his guilty
plea. Considering that the prosecution failed
to prove his guilt, the RTC should have
dismissed motu proprio the action on the
basis of insufficiency of evidence.
» He cites the case of People v. Janjalani
(Janjalani), where the Court stated that
"[c]onvictions based on an improvident plea
of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the
sole basis of the judgment."
» He concludes that since his conviction was
based solely on his improvident plea of guilt,
the RTC should have acquitted him.
» Lastly, he also invokes the equipoise rule:
since neither the prosecution nor the defense
presented any evidence, the law should be
tilted in his favor.
ISSUES:
1. Did the RTC err in convicting Brendo Pagal
on the sole basis of his guilty plea despite the
failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt? (YES)
2. Is it correct for the case to be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings so that
the trial court may comply with the
requirements of Sec. 3, Rule 116? (NO)
RULING (SHORT VERSION):
1. YES. It must be noted that murder remains a
capital offense despite the proscription
against the imposition of death as a
punishment. Thus, when Brendo pleaded
guilty during his arraignment, he pleaded to
a capital offense. For this, Sec. 3, Rule 116
of the 2000 Revised Rules is relevant since
it provides that when the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall
conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and shall require
the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability.
The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient
points of the 1985 amendment. Hence, at
present, the three (3)-fold duty of the trial
court in instances where the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense is as follows:
(a) conduct a searching inquiry;
(b) require the prosecution to prove the
accused's guilt and precise degree of
culpability;
(c) allow the accused to present evidence on
his behalf.
The present rules formalized the requirement
of the conduct of a searching inquiry as to the
accused's voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his
plea. Further, it made mandatory the
reception of evidence in cases where the
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense.
Most importantly, the present rules require
that the prosecution prove beyond
reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.
Evidently, starting with the 1985 Rules, the
accused may no longer be convicted for a
capital offense on the sole basis of his plea
of guilty.
The duty of conducting a searching inquiry
means more than informing cursorily the
accused that he faces a jail term but also, the
exact length of imprisonment under the law
and the certainty that he will serve time at the
national penitentiary or a penal colony. The
searching inquiry of the trial court must be
focused on:
(a) the voluntariness of the plea, and
(b) the full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea.
It likewise compels the judge to content
himself reasonably that the accused has not
been coerced or placed under a state of
duress - and that his guilty plea has not
therefore been given improvidently - either by
actual threats of physical harm from
malevolent quarters or simply because of his,
the judge's, intimidating robes.
Further, a searching inquiry must also
expound on the events that actually took
place during the arraignment, the words
spoken and the warnings given, with special
attention to the age of the accused, his
educational attainment and socioeconomic
status as well as the manner of his arrest and
detention, the provision of counsel in his
behalf during the custodial and preliminary
investigations, and the opportunity of his
defense counsel to confer with him.
Lastly, the trial court must explain the
essential elements of the crime he was
charged with and its respective penalties and
civil liabilities, and also direct a series of
questions to defense counsel to determine
whether he has conferred with the accused
and has completely explained to him the
meaning of a plea of guilty. This formula is
mandatory and absent any showing that it
was followed, a searching inquiry cannot be
said to have been undertaken.
Corollary to this duty, a plea of guilty to a
capital offense without the benefit of a
searching inquiry or an ineffectual inquiry, as
required by Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised Rules, results to an improvident plea
of guilty. It has been held that failure to
comply with the said formula constitutes a
violation of the accused's fundamental right
to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation against him and a denial of his
right to due process.
The duty to require the prosecution to still
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability is that the plea of
guilt alone can never be sufficient to produce
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It must be
remembered that a plea of guilty is only a
supporting evidence or secondary basis for a
finding of culpability, the main proof being the
evidence presented by the prosecution to
prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Once an accused charged with a
capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a
regular trial shall be conducted just the same
as if no such plea was entered. The court
cannot, and should not, relieve the
prosecution of its duty to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his
culpability by the requisite quantum of
evidence.
The duty of giving the accused a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence is to allow
the accused to present exculpatory or
mitigating evidence on his behalf in order to
properly calibrate the correct imposable
penalty. This duty, however, does not mean
that the trial court can compel the accused to
present evidence. Of course, the court
cannot force the accused to present
evidence when there is none. The accused is
free to waive his right to present evidence if
he so desires.
Applying the foregoing principles in this case,
it is evident that the trial court failed
miserably to comply with the duties imposed
by the 2000 Revised Rules. As regards the
first duty, the trial court failed to conduct a
searching inquiry to determine the
voluntariness and full comprehension by
Brendo of his plea of guilty. The Court
scanned the records of the case to see
compliance with the said duty. The search,
however, was in vain. The records are barren
of any proceeding where the trial court
gauged the mindset of Brendo when he
pleaded guilty. There is no transcript of
stenographic notes which would reveal what
actually took place, what words were spoken,
what warnings were given, if a translation
was made and the manner by which it was
made, and whether or not the guidelines for
 a searching inquiry were duly observed.
Brendo’s plea of guilt is therefore
improvident.
What compounded the RTC's strenuous
oversight is the fact that the trial court
penalized Brendo of the crime charged
despite failure of the prosecution to present
evidence of his guilt. This is in direct
contravention of the mandate of the second
duty stated in Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised Rules. In this regard, the Court
agrees with the CA that Brendo’s guilt for the
crime of murder was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. It is beyond cavil that the
prosecution did not present any witness,
despite being given four (4) separate hearing
dates to do so. Thus, the RTC's conviction of
Brendo relied solely on his improvident plea
of guilty.
Lastly, as regard the third requisite, the
October 5, 2011 Order of the RTC stated that
Brendo, despite the non-reception of
prosecution's evidence, opted not to present
any evidence in his behalf." It would appear
that Brendo waived his right to present
evidence under Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000
Revised Rules. However, the same Order
and the records of the case are bereft of any
showing that the trial court complied with the
guidelines promulgated by the Court in
People v. Bodoso. Such cavalier attitude of
the trial court to the Rules of Court and
existing jurisprudence leaves much to be
desired.
2. NO. The conviction of the accused simply
depends on whether the plea of guilty to a
capital offense was improvident or not. An
indubitable admission of guilt automatically
results to a conviction. Otherwise, a
conviction on the basis of an improvident
plea of guilt, on appeal, would be set aside
and the case would be remanded for
presentation of evidence. An exception to
this is when, despite the existence of an
improvident plea, a conviction will not be
disturbed when the prosecution presented
sufficient evidence during trial to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The existing rules, however, shifted
the focus from the nature of the plea to
whether evidence was presented during the
trial to prove the guilt of the accused.
The plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand in
place of the evidence that must be presented
and is called for by Sec. 3 of Rule 116. Trial
courts should no longer assume that a plea of
guilty includes an admission of the attending
circumstances alleged in the information as they
are now required to demand that the prosecution
prove the exact liability of the accused. The
requirements of Sec. 3 would become idle and
fruitless if we were to allow conclusions of
criminal liability and aggravating circumstances
on the dubious strength of a presumptive rule. As
it stands, the conviction of the accused shall be
based principally on the evidence presented by
the prosecution. The improvident plea of guilty
by the accused becomes secondary.
Accordingly, convictions involving improvident
pleas are affirmed if the same are supported by
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the
conviction is set aside and the case remanded
for further proceedings when the conviction is
predicated solely on the basis of the improvident
plea of guilt, meaning that the prosecution was
unable to prove the accused's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. “Further proceedings" usually
entail re-arraignment and reception of evidence
from both the prosecution and the defense in
compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 116. Jurisprudence
has developed in such a way that cases are
remanded back to the trial court for re-
arraignment and re-trial when undue prejudice
was brought about by the improvident plea of
guilty.
In this case, the Court cannot sustain the
conviction as there is nothing in the records that
would show Brendo’s guilt. Neither is it just to
remand the case. This is not a situation where
the prosecution was wholly deprived of the
opportunity to perform its duties under the 2000
Revised Rules to warrant a remand. In this case,
the prosecution was already given a reasonable
opportunity to prove its case against Brendo.
Regrettably, the State squandered its chances to
the detriment of Brendo. If anything, the State,
given its vast resources and awesome powers,
cannot be allowed to vex an accused with
criminal prosecution more than once. The State
should, first and foremost, exercise fairness.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, the
Court adopts the following guidelines concerning
pleas of guilty to capital offenses:
1. AT THE TRIAL STAGE. When the accused
makes a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the
trial court must strictly abide by the provisions of
Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. In particular, it must afford
the prosecution an opportunity to present
evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability. Failure to
comply with these mandates constitute grave
abuse of discretion.
(a) In case the plea of guilty to a capital offense
is supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt,
the trial court shall enter a judgment of
conviction.
(b) In case the prosecution presents evidence
but fails to prove the accused's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the trial court shall enter a
judgment of acquittal in favor of the accused.
(c) In case the prosecution fails to present any
evidence despite opportunity to do so, the trial
court shall enter a judgment of acquittal in favor
of the accused.
(d) In the above instance, the trial court shall
require the prosecution to explain in writing
within ten (10) days from receipt its failure to
present evidence. Any instance of collusion
between the prosecution and the accused shall
be dealt with to the full extent of the law.
2. AT THE APPEAL STAGE:
(a) When the accused is convicted of a capital
offense on the basis of his plea of guilty, whether
improvident or not, and proof beyond reasonable
doubt was established, the judgment of
conviction shall be sustained.
(b) When the accused is convicted of a capital
offense solelyon the basis of his plea of guilty,
whether improvident or not, without proof beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution was
not given an opportunity to present its evidence,
or was given the opportunity to present evidence
but the improvident plea of guilt resulted to an
undue prejudice to either the prosecution or the
accused, the judgment of conviction shall be set
aside and the case remanded for re-arraignment
and for reception of evidence pursuant to Sec. 3,
Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
(c) When the accused is ·convicted of a capital
offense solely on the basis of a plea of guilty,
whether improvident or not, without proof beyond
reasonable doubt because the prosecution failed
to prove the accused's guilt despite opportunity
to do so, the judgment of conviction shall be set
aside and the accused acquitted.
Said guidelines shall be applied prospectively.
RULING (LONG VERSION):
The evolution of the duty of trial courts in
instances where the accused pleaded guilty to a
capital offense
Accused-appellant was charged with murder,
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Murder is punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death, making said crime a
capital offense.
It must be noted that murder remains a capital
offense despite the proscription against the
imposition of death as a punishment. In People v.
Albert, the Court ruled that "in case death was found
to be the imposable penalty, the same would only
have to be reduced to reclusion perpetua in view of
the prohibition against-the imposition of the capital
punishment, but the nature ofthe offense ofmurder
as a capital crime, and for that matter, of all crimes
properly characterized as capital offenses under the
Revised Penal Code, was never tempered to that of
a non-capital offense."
Thus, when accused-appellant pleaded guilty during
his arraignment, he pleaded to a capital offense.
Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules is
relevant.
As early as 1903, in US. v. Patala, the Court
cautioned against the acceptance of pleas of guilty
and opined that the trial judge should freely exercise
his discretion in allowing pleas of guilty to be
withdrawn if the accused does not fully realize the
probable effects of his admission.
Again, in the 1917 case of US. v. Jamad (Jamad),
this Court noted that "[n]otwithstanding the plea of
'guilty,' several witnesses were examined, under the
well-settled practice in this jurisdiction which
contemplates the taking of additional evidence in
cases wherein pleas of 'guilty' are entered to
complaints or information charging grave crimes,
and more especially crimes for which the prescribed
penalty is death." Hence, the following guidelines
were adopted:
(1) The essence of the plea of guilty in a criminal
trial is that the accused, on arraignment,
admits his guilt freely, voluntarily, and with
full knowledge of the consequences and
meaning of his act, and with a clear
understanding of the precise nature of the
crime or crimes charged in the complaint or
information.
(2) Such a plea of guilty, when formally entered
on arraignment, is sufficient to sustain a
conviction of any offense charged in the
information, even a capital offense, without
the introduction of further evidence, the
defendant having himself supplied the
necessary proof.
(3) There is nothing in the law in this jurisdiction
which forbids the introduction of evidence as
to the guilt of the accused, and the
circumstances attendant upon the
commission of the crime, after the entry of a
plea of "guilty."
(4) Having in mind the danger of the entry of
improvident pleas of "guilty" in criminal
cases, the prudent and advisable course,
especially in cases wherein grave crimes are
charged, is to take additional evidence as to
the guilt of the accused and the
circumstances attendant upon the
commission of the crime.
(5) The better practice would indicate that, when
practicable, such additional evidence should
be sufficient to sustain a judgment of
conviction independently of the plea of guilty,
or at least to leave no room for reasonable
doubt in the mind of either the trial or the
appellate court as to the possibility of a
misunderstanding on the part of the accused
as to the precise nature of the charges-to
which he pleaded guilty.
(6) Notwithstanding what has been said, it lies in
the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge
whether he will take evidence or not in any
case wherein he is satisfied that a plea of
"guilty" has been entered by the accused,
with full knowledge of the meaning and
consequences of his act.
(7) But in the event that no evidence is taken,
this court, if called upon to review the
proceedings had in the court below, may
reverse and send back for a new trial, if, on
the whole record, a reasonable doubt arises
as to whether the accused did in fact enter
the plea of "guilty" with full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of the act.
From the foregoing, it is evident that this jurisdiction
places a premium on ensuring that an accused
pleading guilty to a grave crime understands his plea
and the possible consequences thereof.
The Jamad guidelines became the standard for trial
courts when confronted with similar circumstances.
It must be noted, however, that the reception of
evidence in cases where the accused pleads guilty
remained discretionary on the part of the trial court.
In fact, convictions solely on the basis of a plea of
guilty were upheld by this Court.
Some jurisprudential trends before are the following:
• US v. Burlado (1921) - The Court explained that "a
plea of guilty, when formally entered on arraignment,
is sufficient to sustain a conviction of any offense
charged in the information without the introduction of
further evidence, the defendant himself having
supplied the necessary proof by his plea of guilty.
The defendant having admitted his guilt of the facts
charged in the complaint, the only question left for
decision is the penalty."
• People v. Ng Pek (1948) - That plea necessarily
foreclosed the right of the accused to defend himself
and left the court with no other alternative than to
impose the penalty prescribed by law."
• People v. Santa Rosa (1951) - It stated that "the
general rule is that 'a plea of guilty when formally
entered on arraignment is sufficient to sustain a
conviction of any offense charged in the information
without the introduction of further evidence, the
defendant himself having supplied the necessary
proof by his plea of guilty. "
• People v. Acosta (1956) – xxx that while it may be
prudent and advisable in some cases, especially
where grave crimes are charged, to take additional
evidence as to the guilt of the accused and the
circumstances attendant upon the commission of the
crime nevertheless it lies in the sound discretion of
the court whether to take evidence or not in any case
where it is satisfied that the plea of guilty has been
entered by the accused with full knowledge of the
meaning and consequences of his act.
Provisions of the Rules of Court before are the
following:
The 1940 Rules of Court, the earliest progenitor of
the 2000 Revised Rules, extended the same level of
protection. Sec. 5, Rule 114 of the 1940 Rules of
Court reads:
SECTION 5. Plea of Guilty - Determination of
Punishment. - Where the defendant pleads guilty to
a complaint or information, if the court accepts the
plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the
offense, it may hear witnesses to determine what
punishment shall be imposed.
The 1964 version of the Rules of Court reproduced
this section verbatim. Thus, when an accused
pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court may hear
witnesses for purposes of determining the
punishment to be imposed; the guilt of the accused
was a forgone conclusion. The rule seemed to
institutionalize Jamad as shown by the discretionary
nature of the hearing.
Clearly, to this point, the reception of evidence when
an accused pleads guilty depended on the sound
discretion of the trial court.
However, the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
(1985 Rules) introduced a paradigm shift to the
formerly discretionary role of trial courts when an
accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The 1985
version of the rule, as amended, reads:
SECTION 3. Plea of Guilty to Capital Offense;
Reception of Evidence. - When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea and
require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the
precise degree of culpability. The accused may also
present evidence in his behalf.
The 2000 Revised Rules retained the salient points
of the 1985 amendment. Hence, at present, the
three (3)-fold duty of the trial court in instances
where the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense
is as follows:
(1) conduct a searching inquiry,
(2) require the prosecution to prove the accused's
guilt and precise degree of culpability, and
(3) allow the accused to present evidence on his
behalf.
Evidently, starting with the 1985 Rules, the accused
may no longer be convicted for a capital offense on
the sole basis of his plea of guilty.
It is equally important to note that the 1985 Rules
retained the directive that the reception of evidence
in cases where the accused pleads guilty to a non-
capital offense is discretionary on the part of the trial
court.
The essence of the requirement of the conduct of a
searching inquiry is the ascertainment of the
accused's voluntariness and full comprehension of
the consequences of his plea
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to
how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry,"
we have held that the following guidelines should be
observed:
1. Ascertain from the accused himself
a. how he was brought into the custody of the
law;
b. whether he had the assistance of a
competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and
c. under what conditions he was detained
and interrogated during the investigations.
This is intended to rule out the possibility that
the accused has been coerced or placed
under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from
malevolent quarters or simply because of the
judge's intimidating robes.
2. Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as
to whether he had conferred with, and completely
explained to, the accused the meaning and
consequences of a plea of guilty.
3. Elicit information about the personality profile of
the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which may
serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a
free and informed plea of guilty.
4. Inform the accused the exact length of
imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the law
and the certainty that he will serve such sentence.
For not infrequently, an accused pleads guilty in the
hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or
because of promises of the authorities or parties of
a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express
remorse.
5. Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which
he is charged and fully explain to him the elements
of the crime which is the basis of his indictment.
6. All questions posed to the accused should be in a
language known and understood by the latter.
7. The trial judge must satisfy himself that the
accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or
reenact the crime or furnish its missing details.
The plea of guilt made by the accused does not
relieve the prosecution of the duty to prove the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt
The reason behind this requirement is that the plea
of guilt alone can never be sufficient to produce guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. It must be remembered
that a plea of guilty is only a supporting evidence or
secondary basis for a finding of culpability, the main
proof being the evidence presented by the
prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Once an accused charged with a
capital offense enters a plea of guilty, a regular trial
shall be conducted just the same as if no such plea
was entered.
Thus, as it stands, the conviction of the accused no
longer depends solely on his plea of guilty but rather
on the strength of the prosecution's evidence.
The accused must be given a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence
The third duty imposed on the trial court by the 2000
Revised Rules is to allow the accused to present
exculpatory or mitigating evidence on his behalf in
order to properly calibrate the correct imposable
penalty. This duty, however, does not mean that the
trial court can compel the accused to present
evidence. Of course, the court cannot force the
accused to present evidence when there is none.
The accused is free to waive his right to present
evidence if he so desires.
Application in the case at bar:
1. The RTC failed to comply with the mandate of
Sec. 3, Rule 116 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure
As regards the first duty, the trial court failed to
conduct a searching inquiry to determine the
voluntariness and full comprehension by accused-
appellant of his plea of guilty. The Court scanned the
records of the case to see compliance with the said
duty. The search, however, was in vain.
What compounded the RTC's strenuous oversight is
the fact that the trial court penalized accused-
appellant of the crime charged despite failure of the
prosecution to present evidence of his guilty.
In this regard, the Court agrees with the CA that
accused-appellant's guilt for the crime of murder was
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. It is beyond
cavil that the prosecution did not present any
witness, despite being given four (4) separate
hearing dates to do so. Thus, the RTC's conviction
of accused-appellant relied solely on his improvident
plea of guilty.
2. Jurisprudence dictates that the correct course
of action depends on whether the prosecution
has presented evidence to establish the guilt of
the accused.
The State insists that the case must be remanded to
the trial court for further proceedings so that the trial
court may comply with the requirement of Sec. 3,
Rule 116. While the accused-appellant insists that
he should be acquitted.
As stated above, the conviction of the accused
simply depends on whether the plea of guilty to a
capital offense was improvident or not. An
indubitable admission of guilt automatically results to
a conviction. Otherwise, a conviction on the basis of
an improvident plea of guilt, on appeal, would be set
aside and the case would be remanded for
presentation of evidence. An exception to this is
when, despite the existence of an improvident plea,
a conviction will not be disturbed when the
prosecution presented sufficient evidence during
trial to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
In People vs. Camay with this explanation:
Under the new formulation, three (3) things
are enjoined of the trial court after a plea of
guilty to a capital offense has been entered
by the accused: 1. The court must conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and
full comprehension of the consequences of
his plea; 2. The court must require the
prosecution to present evidence to prove the
guilt of the accused and the precise degree
of his culpability; and 3. The court must ask
the accused if he desires to present evidence
in his behalf and allow him to do so if he
desires.
The presentation of evidence is required in order to
preclude any room for reasonable doubt in the mind
of the trial court, or the Supreme Court on review, as
to the possibility that there might have been some
misunderstanding on the part of the accused as to
the nature of the charge to which he pleaded guilty,
and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the
commission of the crime which justify or require the
exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in
the imposition of the prescribed penalty.
To emphasize its importance this Court held in
People vs. Dayot that the rule in Section 3, Rule 116
is mandatory, and issued the warning that any judge
who fails to observe its command commits a grave
abuse of discretion.
given reasonable opportunity to present evidence to
establish the guilt of the accused but failed to do so,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal, if only to give
rise to the constitutionally guaranteed right to due
process and the presumption of innocence.

Thus, the plea of guilty of an accused cannot stand
in place of the evidence that must be presented and
is called for by Sec. 3 of Rule 116.
The conviction of the accused shall be based
principally on the evidence presented by the
prosecution. The improvident plea of guilty by the
accused becomes secondary.
Convictions involving improvident pleas are
affirmed if the same are supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the
conviction is set aside and the case remanded for re-
trial when the conviction is predicated solely on the
basis of the improvident plea of guilt, meaning that
the prosecution was unable to prove the accused's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Thus:
As in the case of an improvident plea of
guilty, an invalid waiver of the right to
present evidence and be heard per se does
not work to vacate a finding of guilt in the
criminal case and enforce an automatic
remand thereof to the trial court.
Accordingly, this Court has sustained convictions
involving improvident pleas of guilt because the
sentence of conviction is supported by proof
beyond reasonable doubt independent of the
accused's plea of guilty. However, where the
conviction is predicated solely on the basis of an
improvident plea of guilty, this Court has consistently
chosen to set aside said conviction and, instead,
remand the case to the lower court for further
proceedings. "Further proceedings" usually entails
re-arraignment and reception of evidence from both
the prosecution and the defense in compliance with
Sec. 3, Rule 116.
Since the prosecution was given four ( 4)
separate hearing dates to present evidence
against accused-appellant and, despite these
chances, the prosecution was unable to prove his
guilt, the Court acquits accused-appellant for failure
of the prosecution to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of murder.
DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the appeal;
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the May 8, 2018
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-HC
No. 01521; ACQUITS accused-appellant Brendo P.
Pagal a.k.a. "Dindo" of the crime of Murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, for failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and ORDERS his IMMEDIATE
RELEASE from detention unless he is confined for
another lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Penal
Superintendent, Leyte Penal Colony for immediate
implementation and he is ORDERED to report the
action he has taken to this Court within five (5) days
from receipt of this Decision. SO ORDERED.

In this case, the Court cannot sustain the

conviction as there is nothing in the records that
would show the guilt of accused-appellant.
Neither is it just to remand the case. In this case,
the prosecution was already given reasonable
opportunity to prove its case against accused-
appellant. Regrettably, the State squandered its
chances to the detriment of accused-appellant.

Therefore, in instances where an improvident plea

of guilt has been entered and the prosecution was

Salvador Estipona, Jr. V. Hon. Lobrigo
& People
15 August 2017
The power to promulgate rules of pleading,
practice and procedure is now under the
exclusive domain of the Supreme Court and no
longer shared with the Executive and
Legislative departments.
» Opposes and moved for the denial of the Motion
FACTS:
- Petitioner Estipona is the accused in the case for
violation of RA 9165 or the Possession of
Dangerous Drugs
- That on 21 March 2016, the accused have in his
possession one transparent plastic sachet
containing 0.084 gram of white crystalline
substance or shabu.
- On 15 June 2016, Petitioner Estipona filed a
Motion to Allow the Accused to enter into a Plea-
Bargaining Agreement, and to enter a plea of
guilty of violation of RA 9165 with a penalty of
rehabilitation since he is a first-time offender
and the quantity of the drugs seized is minimal.
- the Prosecution opposes the Motion filed by the
Accused and submitted a Comment.
Section 23 of RA 9165:
“Prohibits a person charged under RA 9165 to
avail of plea bargaining.”
Allegations
PETITIONER ESTIPONA
He argued that section 23 of RA 9165 violates
the:
1. Rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court
under the Constitution and the;
2. Principle of Separation of Powers among the
three (3) equal branch of the government.
The Accused argued that Sec. 23 of RA 9165
passed by the Congress encroaches the exclusive
power of the SC to promulgate rules. Hence,
unconstitutional.
PROSECUTION
to allow the Accused to enter into a Plea-Bargaining
Agreement for being contrary to section 23 of RA
9165.
RTC: Issued an Order denying the Motion to
Allow the Accused to enter into a plea-bargaining
agreement filed by the Accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sec. 23 of RA 9165, which
prohibits plea-bargaining in drug related cases,
is unconstitutional as it encroached the sole and
exclusive power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules?
RULING:
• YES, Section 23 of RA 9165 is
unconstitutional for being violative of the
rulemaking authority of the Supreme Court
to promulgate rules of pleadings or
procedure, it is no longer shared with the
Legislative or Executive Branch.
The power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice
and procedure is now under the exclusive domain of
the Supreme Court and no longer shared with the
Executive and Legislative departments.
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure:
Plea bargaining is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval.
The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to issue,
amend, or repeal procedural rules is limited to
the preservation of substantive rights, the
former should not diminish, increase or modify
the latter.
No basic rights are infringed by trying him
rather than accepting a plea of guilty; the
prosecutor need not do so if he prefers to go to
trial. Under the present Rules, the acceptance of
an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable
right but depends on the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, which is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a
lesser offense that is necessarily included in the
offense charged
Plea bargaining is a rule of procedure:
» Plea bargaining is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the
case subject to court approval.
o There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining.
o The essence of the agreement is
that both finality — can benefit the
accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.
» The Supreme Court’s sole prerogative to
issue, amend, or repeal procedural rules
is limited to the preservation of
substantive rights, i.e., the former should
not diminish, increase or modify the
latter.
o “Substantive law is that part of the
law which creates, defines and
regulates rights, or which
regulates the right and duties
which give rise to a cause of
action;
» In determining whether a rule prescribed
by the Supreme Court, abridges,
enlarges, or modifies any substantive
right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for
justly administering remedy and redress
for a disregard or infraction of them.
» If the rule takes away a vested right, it is
not procedural. If the rule creates a right
such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
NOTE: Considering the presence of mutuality
of advantage, the rules on plea bargaining
neither create a right nor take away a vested
right. Instead, it operates as a means to
implement an existing right by regulating the
judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them.
(additional notes lang):

» Under the present Rules, the acceptance

of an offer to plead guilty is not a demandable
right but depends on the consent of the
offended party and the prosecutor, which is a
condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a
lesser offense that is necessarily included in the
offense charged. The reason for this is that the
prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute
the proper offense, not any lesser or graver one,
based on what the evidence on hand can
sustain.

» The only basis on which the prosecutor

and the court could rightfully act in allowing
change in the former plea of not guilty could be
nothing more and nothing less than the
evidence on record. As soon as the prosecutor
has submitted a comment whether for or
against said motion, it behooves the trial court
to assiduously study the prosecution’s evidence
as well as all the circumstances upon which the
accused made his change of plea to the end that
the interests of justice and of the public will be
served.

» The ruling on the motion must disclose

the strength or weakness of the prosecution’s
evidence. Absent any finding on the weight of
the evidence on hand, the judge’s acceptance of
the defendant’s change of plea is improper and
irregular.

10. PEOPLE v TEEHANKEE
FACTS:
- Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman
to her home in Dasmarinas Village, Makati.
Roland John Chapman went with them. Leino &
Hultman walk a block from her home as she did
not want her parents to know that she was going
home late. Leino offered to walk with her while
Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the
radio.
- While Leino and Hultman were walking, a
Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car came up from
behind them and stopped on the middle of the
road. Accused Tehankee alighted from his car,
approached them, and asked about their
identities. Leino handed his I.D., the accused did
not bother looking at it as he just grabbed his
wallet and pocketed it
. exemplary damages.
- Chapman upon seeing the incident came to
them and asked, “Why are you bothering us?”
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt,
pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman
crumpled on the sidewalk.
- Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but
accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. Hultman came to her senses
and became hysterical and started screaming for
help. The accused made Hultman and Leino sat
on the sidewalk, turned his back from the two
and then faced them again and shot Leino
who was hit on the upper jaw. Leino heard
another shot and saw Hultman fall beside him.
He lifted his head to see what was happening
and saw accused return to his car and drive
away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted
for help. He noticed at least 3 people who saw
the incident.
- Hultman was hospitalized but died 97 days after.
- It was found out that the person was Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. and was charged of Murder of
Hultman and Chapman, and a charge of
frustrated murder on Leino.
- Accused denied he was not the person as he
was in his house in Pasig. While he admitted to
owning a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer, he
however claimed that the car ceased to be in
good condition, although admitted that it could
still be used.
RTC:
The trial court convicted Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for
the murder of Roland Chapman and Maureen
Hultman and for the frustrated murder of Olavi Leino.
The RTC appreciated the aggravating circumstance
of treachery but ruled out evident premeditation.
Moreover, Teehankee was ordered to pay the heirs:
• Of Champan:
1. P50,000 – actual damages
2. P500,000 – moderate or temperate and
exemplary damages.
• Of Hultman:
1. P50,000 – actual damages
2. P13,000,000 – loss of earning capacity of the
deceased
3. P1,000,000 – moral, moderate, and
And to pay Leino:
1. P30,000, P118,369.84, and $55,600 – actual
damages
2. $40,000 – loss of earning capacity
3. P1,000,000 – moral, moderate, and
exemplary damages.
In all three cases, Teehankee was ordered to pay
the offended parties, costs and P3,000,000 for
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.
The new counsel of Teehankee filed for a Motion for
New Trial on the ground that the trial court erred in
considering the petition for bail and the case on the
merits as submitted. He claimed that Teehankee’s
right to adduce further evidence was violated.
However, the RTC denied the motion. Hence, this
present appeal.
Allegation before the SC
- Teehankee assails the credibility of his out-of-
court identification by the witnesses trying to
discredit the eyeball account of Leino contending
that his identification of Teehankee was highly
irregular, and that he only saw his pictures on
television and newspapers, that the hospital
interview of Leino was not put in writing, the
cartographic sketch of Teehankee was
 suppressed by the NBI, and that the shooting
only lasted for 5 minutes which is highly
improbable for the witness to remember as his
senses were dull due to the 5 bottles of beer he
imbibed that night.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the out-of-court identification is valid.
Assignment of errors by the appellant:
i. That there was an error in identification of
the accused by Leino, Cadena, and
Mangubatas.
ii. That the prosecution failed to establish
the guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
iii. That the publicity given against the
accused was massive and prejudicial to
the right of the accused to impartial trial.
iv. That the lower court erred in finding that
the killing of chapman and Hultman and
the shooting of Leino was attended by
treachery.
v. That the lower court erred in awarding an
attorney’s fees of P3M.
vi. That the lower court erred in rendering
judgment on the merits and on the
petition for bail at the same time without
giving the accused the opportunity to
present additional evidence in his
defense the merits of the case and
denying the accused’s motion for new
trial. He claims he was denied due
process when the trial court considered
all the cases submitted for decision after
the defense waived its right to present its
surrebuttal evidence.
RULING:
I. Error in finding that the accused had been
positively identified by Leino, Cadenas and
Mangubat as the one who shot him, Roland
Chapman and Maureen Navarro Hultman.
The court ruled that the Leino and the witnesses
positively identified Teehankee as the shooter and
that the irregularities cited by the latter did not result
in the identification nor was he denied due process.
Identification testimony has at least three
components. First, witnessing a crime, whether as a
victim or a bystander, involves perception of an
event actually occurring. Second, the witness must
memorize details of the event. Third, the witness
must be able to recall and communicate accurately.
Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony
arise at each of these three stages, for whenever
people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve
information accurately, they are limited by normal
human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police
in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where the
suspect alone is brought face to face with the
witness for identification, thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the
suspect or thru line-ups where a witness identifies
the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose.
The totality of circumstances test:
1. the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime;
2. the witness' degree of attention at that time;
3. the accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness;
4. the level of certainty demonstrated by the
witness at the identification;
5. (5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification;
6. (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure.
Using this test, court held the alleged irregularities
cited by appellant did not result in his
misidentification nor was he denied due process.
II. Failure to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt.
Assignment of errors
1st his involvement in previous shooting incidents for
this contravenes the rule that evidence that one did
or omitted to do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the
same or similar thing at another time.
- The reference by the trial judge to reports about
the troublesome character of appellant is a
harmless error. It is not the linchpin of the
inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial
judge in convicting appellant. The appellant was
convicted mainly because of his identification by
three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
2nd NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare
the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of the
crime with the bullets recovered from the body of
Chapman.
- The omission cannot exculpate appellant. The
omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary
value of the positive identification of appellant
3rd The prosecution eyewitnesses described the
gunman's car as white, but the trial court found it to
be silver mettalic gray.
- Court ruled that considering the speed and
shocking nature of the incident which happened
before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not
make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of
credence.
4th Appellant could not have been the gunman for
Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said
that he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead
to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me and
don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy."
- The evidence on record, however, demonstrates
that Anders Hultman could not have been the
gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen
could not have uttered said statement for two (2)
reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and
she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not
"Daddy."
5th The NBI towed accused's car from Dasmariñas
Village to the NBI office which proved that the same
was not in good running condition
- Thesaid car was towed because the NBI could
not get its ignition key which was then in the
possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was
towed not because it was not in running
condition. Even appellant's evidence show that
said car could run.
6th The paraffin test showing he was negative of
nitrates.
- NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified
and confirmed that excessive perspiration or
washing of hands with the use of warm water or
vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on
the skin.
- The conduct of the paraffin test after more than
seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the
shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by
such time, the nitrates could have already been
removed by washing or perspiration. In the
Report on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon
noted that when appellant was tested for the
presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has
already lapsed from the time of the alleged
shooting.
III. The SC denied the position of Teehankee that
he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity.
It rules that pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the
case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high
profile and high stake criminal trials.
However, the press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police,
prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive
public scrutiny and criticism.
Moreover, judges are learned in the law and trained
to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere
exposure to publications and publicity stunts does
not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
In the case at bar, the records do not show that the
trial judge developed actual bias against Teehankee
as a consequence of the extensive media coverage
of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of
circumstances of the case does not prove that the
trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of
prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change
even by evidence presented during the trial.
Teehankee has the burden to prove this actual bias
and he has not discharged the burden.
Lastly, the court stated transcripts of the
proceedings and they do not disclose that the trial
judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival.
Nor did he consent to or condone any manifestation
of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the
courtroom during the trial of the case at bar.
It was likewise noted that the trial judge voluntarily
inhibited himself from further hearing the case at bar
to assuage Teehankee’s suspicion of bias and
partiality. However, upon elevation the SC, it
directed the judge to proceed with the trial as it found
nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any
suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
IV. The SC ruled that the aggravating circumstance
of evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by
the trial court for, admittedly, the shooting incident
was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting
on the street since the victims were unknown to
appellant and vice-versa It, however, appreciated
the presence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.
However, it found that the prosecution failed to prove
treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution
witness Leino established the sequence of events
leading to the shooting. He testified that for no
apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from
his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who
were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant
questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D.
After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared
from behind Leino and asked what was going on.
Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and
inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and
then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from
inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was
unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all
Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried
out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend
himself. Also, there is no evidence on record to
prove that appellant consciously and deliberately
adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to
himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the
spur of the moment. Their meeting was by chance.
The time between the initial encounter and the
shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of
Chapman was thus the result of a rash and
impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather
than a deliberate act of will.
The SC ruled that mere suddenness of the attack
on the victim would not, by itself, constitute
treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying
circumstance, Teehankee should only be held liable
for Homicide for the shooting and killing of
Chapman.
As to Leino and Haltman, the SC held that treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The
evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold
blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the
pavement. Maureen became hysterical and
wandered to the side of appellant's car. When
Teehankee went after her, Maureen moved around
his car and tried to put some distance between them.
After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and
ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement.
While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the
two were gunned down by appellant.
Clearly, Teehankee purposely placed his two victims
in a completely defenseless position before shooting
them. There was an appreciable lapse of time
between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of
Leino and Hultman — a period which Teehankee
used to prepare for a mode of attack which ensured
the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the
trial court against Teehankee insofar as the
killing of Hultman and the wounding of Leino are
concerned.
V. The Court did not err in awarding the
attorney’s fees.
he three (3) private complainants were represented
by the ACCRA law firm, with Atty. Rogelio Vinluan
as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of
One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos each as
attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three
criminal cases were consolidated. A continuous trial
was conducted, with some hearings having both
morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for
almost one and a half years. More than forty (40)
witnesses testified during the hearings. Several
pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-
eight (68) documentary exhibits were presented by
the prosecution. Incidents related to the trial of the
cases came up to this Court for review at least twice
during the pendency of the trial. Given these
circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the
private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial
court's award of a total of Three Million
(P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses appears just and reasonable.
Given these circumstances and the evident effort
exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the
trial, the trial court's award of a total of Three Million
(P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and
litigation expenses appears just and reasonable
VI. The appellant was afforded with his right to
present evidence.
This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of
the cases on August 9, 1991. The incident then
pending was appellant's petition for bail for the
murder of Chapman. It will be remembered that,
initially, there was only one murder charge against
appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to
death during the course of the proceedings on
October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the
incident for resolution was appellant's petition for
bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving
victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3) charges
to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three
(3) charges involved one continuing incident.
Appellant, through counsel, objected to the
testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2) frustrated
murder charges (with respect to the wounding of
Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He argued that
since the pending incident was the petition for bail
with respect to the killing of Chapman, any testimony
relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail
were recommended was irrelevant.

After arguments, the defense suggested that if the

prosecution would present Leino to testify on all
three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's
arraingment on August 14, 1991. The prosecution
agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on
the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the
petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed.

All these clearly show that the merits of the

cases and the petition for bail were heard
simultaneously and appellant acquiesced
thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present
additional evidence was not abridged by the trial
court. On the contrary, the records disclose that
the trial court afforded the defense fair
opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the
defense almost one and a half years to submit its
evidence. The defense presented more than
twenty (20) witnesses and several documentary
evidence.
 NURULLAJE SAYRE Y MALAMPAD @ "INOL",
VS. HON. DAX GONZAGA XENOS, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PANABO CITY,
DAVAO DEL NORTE, HON. MENARDO I.
GUEVARRA, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE; AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
[The DOJ Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to
acceptable plea bargain for Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 did
not violate the rule-making authority of the Court. DOJ
Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for
prosecutors to observe before they may give their
consent to proposed plea bargains. While A.M. No. 18-
03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established pursuant to
the rulea plea bargain still requires mutual agreement of
the parties and remains subject to the approval of the
court]
FACTS:
• Sayre was charged with violation of Sections 5,
11, and 12, Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.)
9165,6 in three separate Information.
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 416-2017
➢ traded, delivered and sold zero point one zero
two nine (0.1029) grams of Methylamphetamine
Hydrochloride (Shabu)
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 417-2017
➢ knowingly had in his possession, control and
custody of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride
(Shabu) contained in four (4) separate heat
sealed transparent [sic] cellophane
CRIMINAL CASE NO. CRC 418-2017
➢ knowingly had in his possession, control and
custody, (1) tooter, an equipment, instrument,
apparatus and paraphernalia fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting or introducing dangerous drugs into
the body.
• On November 9, 2017, Sayre filed a Proposal for
Plea Bargaining11 and manifested as follows:
- He wanted to plea bargain Section 5 and 11
to a lesser offense under Section 12, which
carries with it a penalty of imprisonment of
six (6) months and 1 day to four (4) years.
Moreover, for Section 12, penalty of
compulsory 6-month rehabilitation.
• Sayre filed a Motion for Approval of Plea-
Bargaining Proposal with Modification.
- (Pursuant to Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) Circular No. 90-2018,
adopting the Court En Banc Resolution dated
April 10, 2018 in Administrative Matter
(A.M.) No. 18-03-16-SC (Adoption of the
Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases),
• He proposed to plea bargain the charge of Illegal
Sale of Dangerous Drugs to the lower offense of
Possession of Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs
under Section 12 in accordance with the
guidelines provided by the Supreme Court in
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) Circular
No. 90-2018.
• Sayre proposed that he be allowed to file an
Application for Probation for the penalty of 6
months and 1 day to 4 years considering that the
maximum penalty therein is less than 6 years and
that he be released from the custody of the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology City
Jail upon its approval
• City Prosecutor Namoc-Yasol filed a Comment
and Counter-Proposal in accordance with
Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 27
dated June 26, 2018, otherwise known as the
"Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for
Republic Act No. 9165
1. City Prosecutor Namoc-Yasol recommended that for
the charge under Section 5 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous
Drugs), the plea bargain prescribed in DOJ Circular No. 27
is the offense under Section 11, paragraph 3 (Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs) with an indeterminate
penalty of twelve (12) years to fourteen (14) years and
eight (8) months and a fine of P300,00.00.
2. For the charge under Section 11 (Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs), the City Prosecutor recommended
the plea of guilty to the offense under Section 12 (Illegal
Possession of Drug Paraphernalia with an indeterminate
penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years
and a fine of P25,000.00, as prescribed in DOJ Circular
No. 27.
3. As to the charge under Section 12 (Illegal Possession of
Drug Paraphernalia), the City Prosecutor recommended
that Sayre plead guilty to the crime as charged with an
indeterminate penalty ranging from six (6) months and
one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine of P25,000.00.
• Since the parties failed to reach a consensus
insofar as Criminal Case for violation of Section 5
of R.A. 9165 (Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs),
the RTC deferred the pre-trial to afford Sayre
 another opportunity to convince the prosecution
to accept his proposal.
• Sayre reiterated his proposal to plea bargain the
charge of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs to the
lower offense of Possession of Paraphernalia for
Dangerous Drugs under Section 12 in
accordance with the guidelines provided by the
Court in OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
• On the other hand, the City Prosecutor argued
that they are bound by DOJ Circular No. 27,
rejecting Sayre's plea bargain from Illegal Sale of
dangerous Drugs to Possession of Drug
Paraphernalia, and insisting that "any plea
bargaining outside the DOJ circular is not
acceptable.
• In an Order, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied
Sayre's Motion to Plea Bargain and set the case
for Pre-Trial.
• Sayre filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration27 arguing that the RTC should
abide by and follow OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
• His Motion for Reconsideration having been
denied, Sayre filed the present petition for
Certiorari and prohibition.
• Sayre seeks to declare DOJ Circular No. 27
unconstitutional for being in contravention with
the provisions of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
Allegation in the Complaint
Sayre
» Citing the case of Estipona v. Judge Lobrigo,
Sayre argues that OCA Circular No. 90-2018 is a
rule of procedure adopted by the Supreme Court
under its constitutional mandate to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts. Therefore, OCA Circular
No. 90-2018 is deemed incorporated in the Rules
of Court.
» Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
when he disregarded the provisions of under
OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
» that the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27
pertaining to plea bargaining under Section 5 to
Section 11 of R.A. 9165, penalized with
imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years
and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine
ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00, is
unconstitutional as it repealed, altered, or
modified the more favorable plea bargaining
provision under OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
OSG
» In justifying the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 27,
the OSG argues that:
1. it is an administrative issuance which enjoys
the presumption of validity
2. the DOJ has the authority to issue and
implement it
3. it did not repeal, alter, or modify OCA Circular
No. 90- 2018 and they can be harmonized.
**Case was directly elevated to SC**
» Serious and compelling reasons justify the direct
resort to the Court.
» Considering that what is invoked here is the
constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 27 that
continues to be implemented in the prosecution
of cases involving dangerous drugs, Sayre is
justified in seeking the immediate action of the
Court.
ISSUE:
1. Short Version: Is the provision in DOJ Circular No. 27
unconstitutional for contravening OCA Circular No. 90-
2018, a procedural rule issued pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s rule-making power?
Long Version: Whether the provision in DOJ
Circular No. 27 pertaining to plea-bargaining
under Section 5 to Section 11 of R.A. 9165,
penalized with imprisonment ranging from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20)
years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to
P400,000.00, is unconstitutional as it repealed,
altered, or modified the more favorable plea
bargaining provision under OCA Circular No. 90-
2018, a procedural rule promulgated by the
Supreme Court En Banc, in violation of the rule-
making power of the Court under Section 5(5),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
2. Whether Presiding Judge Xenos acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he
disregarded the provisions of OCA Circular No. 90- 2018.
RULING:
• NO. In Estipona v. Lobrigo:
xxx plea bargaining has been defined as "a
process whereby the accused and the
prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory
 disposition of the case subject to court
approval." There is give-and-take negotiation
common in plea bargaining. Properly
administered, plea bargaining is to be
encouraged because the chief virtues of the
system - speed, economy, and finality - can
benefit the accused, the offended party, the
prosecution, and the court.”
• We adopt the view of Justice Marvic Mario Victor
F. Leonen in his Separate Opinion in Estipona v.
Lobrigo that the aim is to rehabilitate, not
punish, drug offenders.
• The provision in DOJ Circular No. 27 pertaining to
plea-bargaining under Section 5 to Section 11 of
R.A. 9165, penalized with imprisonment ranging
from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00
to P400,000.00, did not contravene the Plea
Bargaining Framework found in A.M. No. 18-03-
16- SC.
• In this petition, A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of
procedure established pursuant to the rule-
making power of the Supreme Court that serves
as a framework and guide to the trial courts in
plea bargaining violations of R.A. 9165.
• Nonetheless, a plea bargain still requires mutual
agreement of the parties and remains subject to
the approval of the court. The acceptance of an
offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not
demandable by the accused as a matter of right
but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound
discretion of the trial court.
Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court expressly
states:
Sec 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At
arraignment, the accused, with the consent of
the offended party and the prosecutor, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in
the offense charged. After arraignment but
before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after
withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is
necessary
• The use of the word "may" signifies that the trial
court has discretion whether to allow the
accused to make a plea of guilty to a lesser
offense. Moreover, plea bargaining requires the
consent of the accused, offended party, and the
prosecutor. It is also essential that the lesser
offense is necessarily included in the offense
charged.
• Taking into consideration the requirements in
pleading guilty to a lesser offense, We find it
proper to treat the refusal of the prosecution to
adopt the acceptable plea bargain for the charge
of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs provided in
A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC as a continuing objection
that should be resolved by the RTC. This
harmonizes the constitutional provision' on the
rule making power of the Court under the
Constitution and the nature of plea bargaining in
Dangerous Drugs cases. DOJ Circular No. 27 did
not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea Bargaining
Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC
• Therefore, the DOJ Circular No. 27 provision
pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for Section
5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making
authority of the Court. DOJ Circular No. 27
merely serves as an internal guideline for
prosecutors to observe before they may give
their consent to proposed plea bargains.
• Presiding Judge Xenos did not act without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when he disregarded the provisions
of OCA Circular No. 90-2018.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is:
(1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence; or
(2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

12. PEOPLE v. JERRY SAPLA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. JERRY SAPLA a.k.a. ERIC SALIBAD, accused-
appellant. June 16, 2020. CAGUIOA, J.
FACTS:
- In the morning of 10 January 2014, an officer
on duty at the Regional Public Safety
Battalion (RPSB) in Tabuk, Kalinga received
a phone call from a concerned citizen,
who informed the said office that a certain
male individual would be transporting
marijuana from Kalinga and into Isabela.
- PO1 Mabiasan relayed the said information
to their deputy commander, PSI Ngoslab.
Thereafter, as a standard operating
procedure in drug operations, they also
coordinated with the PDEA.
- About 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the
same day, a follow up information via text
message was received by the RPSB this
time detailing the description of the drug
courier, to wit: male, wearing collared white
shirt with green stripes, red ball cap, and
carrying a blue sack; he will be boarding a
passenger jeepney bearing plate number
AYA 270 bound for Roxas, Isabela.
- Based on this information, a checkpoint was
organized by the PNP.
- At around 1:20 pm in the afternoon, the
jeepney arrived. The police officers stopped
the jeepney and inside they saw the person
described in the text message they received.
They approached said person and asked him
if the blue sack in front of him was his. The
person answered in the affirmative.
- The police officers then requested the person
to open the blue sack. The content of the blue
sack was four bricks of dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in newspaper and old
calendar. The person was later identified as
Jerry Sapla.
- PO3 Labbutan subsequently arrested Sapla
and informed him of the cause of his arrest
and his constitutional rights in Ilocano dialect.
- PO2 Mabiasan further searched Sapla and
found one LG cellular phone unit. Thereafter,
PO2 Mabiasan seized the four bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves and
brought them to their office for proper
markings.
- Also, further investigation revealed that
[accused-appellant Sapla] tried to conceal
his true identity by using a fictitious name
- Eric Mallari Salibad. However, investigators
were able to contact [accused-appellant
Sapla's] sister, who duly informed the said
investigators that [accused appellant
Sapla's] real name is Jerry Guerrero Sapla.
Allegation in the Complaint
ACCUSED: SAPLA
» Sapla denied the allegations and offered a
different version of the incident. He claimed
that he went to Tabuk City to visit a certain
relative named Tony Sibal.
» Thereafter, police officers flagged down the
jeepney that he boarded in order to check its
passengers’ baggage.
» From the three passengers therein, the said
police officers identified him as the owner of
the marijuana found inside the sack.
» The accused denied ownership of the
marijuana and asserted that he did not have
any baggage at that time.
RTC:
- RTC rendered a decision convicting
accused-appellant Sapla for violating R.A.
9165.
- RTC found that the prosecution was able to
sufficiently establish the corpus delicti of the
crime. The accused Sapla filed an appeal
before the CA.
CA:
- CA denied the appeal and affirmed the
conviction.
- The CA found that although the search and
seizure conducted on accused-appellant
Sapla was without a search warrant, the
same was lawful as it was a valid
warrantless search of a moving vehicle.
The CA held that the essential requisite of
probable cause was present, justifying the
warrantless search and seizure.
ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and arising out of circumstances known to the seizing
seizure conducted by the police officers. The answer officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains
to this critical question determines whether there is an item, article or object which by law is subject to
enough evidence to sustain accused-appellant seizure and destruction."
Sapla's conviction under Section 5 of R.A. 9165.
The recent case of People v. Comprado is
controlling as the facts of the said case are virtually
RULING: identical to the instate case. In Comprado, the Court
held that the search conducted "could not be
• NO. The glaring absence of probable
classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In this
cause that justifies an intrusive
particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and
warrantless search, considering that the
not a specific person. In search of a moving vehicle,
police officers failed to rely on their
the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to
personal knowledge and depended
transport illegal items.
solely on an unverified and anonymous
tip, the warrantless search conducted on
In this case, the target of the search conducted was
Sapla was an invalid and unlawful
not the passenger jeepney boarded by Sapla nor the
search of a moving vehicle.
cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of
the search was the person who matched the
The Constitutional Right against Unreasonable
description given by the person who called the
Searches and Seizures
RPSB Hotline. Therefore, the search conducted in
As a rule, a search and seizure operation is
the instant case cannot be characterized as a search
reasonable only when a court issues a search
of a moving vehicle.
warrant after it has determined the existence of
probable cause through the personal examination
Probable Cause as an Indispensable
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
Requirement for an Extensive and Intrusive
witnesses presented before the court, with the place
Warrantless Search of a Moving Vehicle
to be searched and the persons or things to be
Even if the search conducted can be characterized
seized particularly described.
as a search of a moving vehicle, the operation
undertaken by the authorities in the instant case
There are, however, instances wherein searches are
cannot be deemed a valid warrantless search of a
reasonable even in the absence of a search warrant:
moving vehicle.
1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; 2)
seizure of evidence in plain view; 3) search of a
In order for the search of vehicles in a checkpoint to
moving vehicle; 4) consented warrantless search; 5)
be non--violative of an individual's right against
customs search; 6) stop and frisk; and 7) exigent and
unreasonable searches, the search must be limited
emergency circumstances.
to the following: a) where the officer merely draws
aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
Search of a Moving Vehicle and its Non--
on the public fair grounds; b) where the officer simply
Applicability in the Instant Case
looks into a vehicle; c) where the officer flashes a
CA erred in holding that the search conducted in the
light therein without opening the car's doors; d)
instant case is a search of a moving vehicle. The
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical
situation presented in the instant case cannot be
or body search; e) where the inspection of the
considered as a search of a moving vehicle.
vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and f) where the routine check is
A warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles
conducted in a fixed area.
are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of
Routine inspections do not give the authorities carte
securing a warrant under said circumstances as the
blanche discretion to conduct intrusive warrantless
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or
searches in the absence of probable cause. When a
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought.
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive
However, these are limited to routine checks where
search, as opposed to a mere routine inspection,
the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual
"such a warrantless search has been held to be valid
inspection.
only as long as the officers conducting the search
have reasonable or probable cause to believe before
On the other hand, an extensive search is
the search that they will find the instrumentality or
permissible, but only when "the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be
searched."
Sheer Unverified Information from an
Anonymous Informant does not engender
Probable Cause on the part of the Authorities
that warrants an Extensive and Intrusive Search
of a Moving Vehicle
Law enforcers cannot act solely on the basis of
confidential or tipped information. A tip is still
hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause in the
absence of any other circumstance that will arouse
suspicion."
As early as 1988, the Court had ruled that an
extensive warrantless search and seizure conducted
on the sole basis of a confidential tip is tainted with
illegality. In Cogaed, the Court stressed that in
engendering probable cause that justifies a valid
warrantless search, “it is the police officer who
should observe facts that would lead to a reasonable
degree of suspicion of a person. The police officer
should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.
Anything less than this would be an infringement
upon one's basic right to security of one's person
and effects.
There should be the "presence of more than one
seemingly innocent activity from which, taken
together, warranted a reasonable inference of
criminal activity. Exclusive reliance on information
tipped by informants goes against the very nature of
probable cause. A single hint hardly amounts to "the
existence of such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed and
that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place to be searched."
In the instant case, the accused was just a
passenger carrying his bag. "There is nothing
suspicious much less criminal in said act. Moreover,
such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the
arresting officers to believe that Sapla was in
possession of marijuana.
What further militates against the finding that there
was sufficient probable cause is the fact that the
information regarding the description of the person
was relayed merely through a text message from a
completely anonymous person. The police did not
inquire how this stranger gathered the information.
The authorities did not ascertain in any manner
whether the information was credible. After receiving
this anonymous text message, without giving any
second thought, the police accepted the unverified
information as gospel truth and immediately
proceeded in establishing the checkpoint. The
information coming from a complete and
anonymous stranger, without the police officers
undertaking even a semblance of verification, on
their own, cannot reasonably produce probable
cause that warrants the conduct of an intrusive
search.
In fact, as borne from the cross-examination, the
authorities did not even personally receive and
examine the text message. The contents of the text
message were only relayed to them by a duty guard,
whose identity the police could not even recall.
Simply stated, the information received through
text message was not only hearsay evidence; it
is double hearsay.
Moreover, as testified by PO3 Mabiasan himself,
tipped information received by the authorities
through the duty guard was unwritten and
unrecorded, violating the Standard Operating
Procedure that any information received by a police
station that shall be duly considered by the
authorities should be properly written in a log book
or police blotter.
Further, the mobile phone which received the text
message was not an official government -issued
phone. It is unclear as to who owned or possessed
the said phone used as the supposed official hotline
of the RPSB Office. Furthermore,
A probable cause justifying an intrusive warrantless
search and seizure cannot possibly arise from
double hearsay evidence and from an irregularly
received tipped information. A reasonably discreet
and prudent man will surely not believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item
sought in connection with said offense are in the
place to be searched based solely on the say-so of
an unknown duty guard that a random, unverified
text message was sent to an unofficial mobile phone
by a complete stranger.
NOTE:
Court clarifies that there is indeed a line of
jurisprudence holding that information received by
the police provides a valid basis for conducting a
warrantless search.
In Tangliben, the authorities' decision to conduct the
warrantless search did not rest solely on the tipped
information supplied by the informants. The
authorities, using their own personal observation,
saw that the accused was acting suspiciously.
Similar to Tangliben, in the great majority of cases
upholding the validity of a warrantless search and
seizure on the basis of a confidential tip, the police
did not rely exclusively on information sourced from
the informant. There were overt acts and other
circumstances personally observed by the police
that engendered great suspicion. Hence, the holding
that an inclusive warrantless search can be
conducted on the solitary basis of tipped information
is far from being an established and inflexible
doctrine.
Hence, the Court now holds that the cases
adhering to the doctrine that exclusive reliance
on an unverified, anonymous tip cannot
engender probable cause that permits a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle that goes
beyond a visual search should be the prevailing
and controlling line of jurisprudence.
Other Discussions:
Neither are the other instances of reasonable
warrantless searches and seizures applicable in the
instant case.
The search conducted on Sapla was not incidental
to a lawful arrest. Such requires a lawful arrest that
precedes the search, which is not the case here.
Further, the prosecution has not alleged and proven
that there was a seizure of evidence in plain view,
that it was a customs search, and that there were
exigent and emergency circumstances that
warranted a warrantless search. Neither can the
search be considered a valid stop and frisk search.
the allowable scope of a 'stop and frisk' search is
limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for
weapons." The search conducted by the authorities
on Sapla went beyond a protective search of outer
clothing for weapons or contraband
not unequivocal, specific, intelligently given, and
unattended by duress or coercion. It cannot be
seriously denied that Sapla was subjected to a
coercive environment, considering that he was
confronted by several armed police officers in a
checkpoint. At most, Sapla's alleged act of opening
the blue sack was mere passive conformity to a
warrantless search conducted in a coercive and
intimidating environment. Hence, the Court cannot
consider the search conducted as a valid consented
search.
The Exclusionary Rule or Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree Doctrine
Known as the exclusionary rule, "evidence obtained
and confiscated on the occasion of such
unreasonable searches and seizures is deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In other words,
evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any
purpose in any proceeding."
Therefore, with the inadmissibility of the confiscated
marijuana bricks, there is no more need for the Court
to discuss the other issues surrounding the
apprehension of Sapla. The prosecution is left with
no evidence left to support the conviction of Sapla.
Consequently, Sapla is acquitted of the crime
charged.

It is not also as a valid consented search. The

consent to a warrantless search and seizure must be
unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and
unattended by duress or coercion. Mere passive
conformity to the warrantless search is only an
implied acquiescence which does not amount to
consent and that the presence of a coercive
environment negates the claim that the accused
consented to the warrantless search.

In the instant case, the totality of the evidence

presented convinces the Court that Sapla's apparent
consent to the search conducted by the police was

13. PEOPLE v. RACHO
[VALIDITY OF ARREST AND SEARCH]
Background:
This is an appeal on the CA's decision affirming the
RTC in finding appellant, Jack Racho, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of section 5, article 2,
of RA 9165 (Dangerous Drugs Act)
FACTS:
• A confidential agent of the police transacted
with appellant Racho through a cellphone for
the purchase of shabu.
• The agent reported said transaction to the
police immediately after, together with
appellant’s name, physical description, and
the assurance that the latter would arrive in
Baler, Aurora the next day. A team
composed of PDEA, intelligence group of the
Philippine Army and local police was formed
to arrest Racho.
• The following day, appellant called the agent
and told him that he was on board a Genesis
bus; that he was arriving in Baler at anytime
of the day; that he was wearing red and white
striped shirt. The team then positioned
themselves along the highway in Baler.
• At 3pm that day, a Genesis bus arrived, and
when Racho alighted from the bus, the agent
pointed to him. As Racho was about to board
a tricycle, the team approached him and
invited him to the police station on suspicion
that he was carrying shabu.
• Racho immediately denied it; but as he
pulled out his hands from the pocket of his
pants, a white envelope slipped, which when
opened, yielded a small sachet containing
the suspected drug. He was brought to the
police station for investigation.
o The confiscated specimen was
turned over to Police Inspector De
Vera for marking with his initials and
Racho’s name.
o The lab tests showed that the
specimen was methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
• Racho was charged in 2 separate
informations:
o One, for violation of section 5, RA
9165: transporting or delivering
dangerous drugs
o Second, for violation of section 11,
RA 9165: for possessing dangerous
drugs
• During arraignment, Racho pleaded not
guilty to both charges.
• During trial, appellant denied liability.
o RACHO’S CONTENTIONS:
§ He claimed that he went to Baler
just to visit his brother and inform
him about their sick father
§ That the charges against him
were false and no shabu was
taken from him
§ With regard to his arrest, the
police blocked the tricycle
using their van and forced him
to alight; they brought him to
Sea Breeze Lodge and
stripped his clothes and
underwear, then brought him
to the police station for
investigation.
§ Racho attacks the credibility of
the witnesses for the
prosecution. He likewise avers
that the prosecution failed to
establish the identity of the
confiscated drug because of the
team’s failure to mark the
specimen immediately after
seizure. In his supplemental
brief, appellant assails, for the
first time, the legality of his arrest
and the validity of the subsequent
warrantless search. He
questions the admissibility of the
confiscated sachet on the ground
that it was the fruit of the
poisonous tree.
• RTC:
o CONVICTED Racho of violation of
section 5 (transporting or delivering);
o But ACQUITTED him of the charge of
violation of section 11 (possession of
dangerous drugs)
• CA: AFFIRMED RTC
ISSUE:
WON the arrest was valid as well as the subsequent
warrantless search. (Consequently, the admissibility
of the sachet in evidence)
RULING:
SC: Arrest cannot be questioned anymore; Shabu
seized is inadmissible in evidence.
• After a thorough review of the records of the
case and for reasons that will be discussed
below, we find that appellant can no longer
question the validity of his arrest, but the
sachet of shabu seized from him during the
warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him.
• The records show that appellant never
objected to the irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment. In fact, this is the
first time that he raises the issue.
Considering this lapse, coupled with his
active participation in the trial of the case, we
must abide with jurisprudence which dictates
that appellant, having voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, is deemed to have waived his right
to question the validity of his arrest, thus
curing whatever defect may have
attended his arrest. The legality of the
arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over his person. Appellant’s warrantless
arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the
basis of his acquittal.
• As to the admissibility of the seized drug
in evidence, it is necessary for us to
ascertain whether or not the search which
yielded the alleged contraband was
lawful.
o The 1987 Constitution states that a
search and consequent seizure must
be carried out with a judicial warrant;
otherwise, it becomes unreasonable
and any evidence obtained therefrom
shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding. Said proscription,
however, admits of exceptions,
namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a
lawful arrest;
2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"
3. Search of a moving vehicle;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency
circumstances.
o What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable warrantless search or
seizure is purely a judicial question,
determinable from the uniqueness of
the circumstances involved, including
the purpose of the search or seizure,
the presence or absence of probable
cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the
place or thing searched, and the
character of the articles procured.
o Recent jurisprudence holds that in
searches incident to a lawful arrest,
the arrest must precede the search;
generally, the process cannot be
reversed. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with
an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make
the arrest at the outset of the
search. Thus, given the factual milieu
of the case, we have to determine
whether the police officers had
probable cause to arrest appellant.
Although probable cause eludes
exact and concrete definition, it
ordinarily signifies a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious
man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with
which he is charged.
o From the facts, clearly, what
prompted the police to apprehend
appellant, even without a warrant,
was the tip given by the informant that
appellant would arrive in Baler,
Aurora carrying shabu. This
circumstance gives rise to another
question: whether that information,
by itself, is sufficient probable cause
to effect a valid warrantless arrest.
§ The long standing rule in
this jurisdiction is that
"reliable information" alone
is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule
requires, in addition, that
the accused perform some
overt act that would
indicate that he has
committed, is actually
committing, or is
attempting to commit an
offense. We find no cogent
reason to depart from this
well-established doctrine.
 accused. A waiver of an illegal,
• Appellant herein was not committing a warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
crime in the presence of the police waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
officers. Neither did the arresting officers seized during an illegal warrantless
have personal knowledge of facts arrest.
indicating that the person to be arrested
had committed, was committing, or about • Appellant Jack Raquero Racho was
to commit an offense. At the time of the ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.
arrest, appellant had just alighted from
the Genesis bus and was waiting for a
tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any
suspicious manner that would engender
a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that he
was committing or intending to commit a
crime. Were it not for the information
given by the informant, appellant would
not have been apprehended and no
search would have been made, and
consequently, the sachet of shabu would
not have been confiscated.

• Neither were the arresting officers impelled

by any urgency that would allow them to do
away with the requisite warrant. As testified
to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a
member of the arresting team, their office
received the "tipped information" on May 19,
2003. They likewise learned from the
informant not only the appellant’s physical
description but also his name. Although it
was not certain that appellant would arrive on
the same day (May 19), there was an
assurance that he would be there the
following day (May 20). Clearly, the police
had ample opportunity to apply for a
warrant.

• Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of

the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the
confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence
consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the
1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in
violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding."

• Without the confiscated shabu, appellant’s

conviction cannot be sustained based on the
remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of
his right to question the illegality of his arrest
by entering a plea and his active participation
in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned,
the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the

14. ENRILE v. SANDIGANBAYAN
[Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.]
FACTS:
- In 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Enrile and several others with
plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis
of their purported involvement in the
diversion and misuse of appropriations under
the Priority Development Assistance Fund
(PDAF).
- Thereafter, Enrile respectively filed his
Omnibus Motion and Supplemental
Opposition, praying, among others, that he
be allowed to post bail should probable
cause be found against him.
- The motions were heard by the
Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution filed its
Consolidated Opposition.
SANDIGANBAYAN: denied Enrile’s motion,
particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its
prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then
voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the
custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the arrest of Enrile.
- On the same day that the warrant for his
arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Magalong of the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(CIDG) in Camp Crame and was later on
confined at the PNP General Hospital
following his medical examination.
- Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for
Detention at the PNP General Hospital and
his Motion to Fix Bail which were heard by
the Sandiganbayan. In support of the
motions, Enrile argued that he should be
allowed to post bail because:
a. the Prosecution had not yet
established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong;
b. although he was charged with
plunder, the penalty as to him would
only be reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua because of
mitigating circumstances:
§ he is over 70 years old; and
§ he voluntarily surrendered
c. he was not a flight risk, and his age
and physical condition must further
be seriously considered.
SANDIGANBAYAN: denied Enrile’s Motion to Fix
Bail
• It is only after the prosecution shall have
presented its evidence and the Court shall
have made a determination that the evidence
of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile
can he demand bail as a matter of right. In
this case, no such determination has been
made by the Court. In fact, accused Enrile
has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even
commence. It is thus exceedingly premature
for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix his
bail.
• For purposes of bail, the presence of
mitigating circumstance/s is not taken into
consideration. These circumstances will only
be appreciated in the imposition of the proper
penalty after trial should the accused be
found guilty of the offense charged.
• Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical
condition and his being a flight risk are
among the factors that are considered in
fixing a reasonable amount of bail. However,
as explained above, it is premature for the
Court to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt
against accused Enrile is not strong.
- The Sandiganbayan likewise denied Enrile’s
motion for reconsideration.
- Hence, this petition for certiorari.
Allegation before the SC
ENRILE
» before judgment of conviction, an accused is
entitled to bail as matter of right;
» it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution
to show clearly and conclusively that Enrile
comes under the exception and cannot be
excluded from enjoying the right to bail;
» the Prosecution has failed to establish that
Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua considering the
 presence of two mitigating circumstances –
his age and his voluntary surrender;
» the Prosecution has not come forward with
proof showing that his guilt for the crime of
plunder is strong; and
» he should not be considered a flight risk
taking into account that he is already over the
age of 90, his medical condition, and his
social standing.
SANDIGANBAYAN
» In its Comment , the Ombudsman contends
that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he
is charged with a capital offense;
» to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail
hearing be conducted to determine whether
there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the
lack of it; and
» the entitlement to bail considers the
imposable penalty, regardless of the
attendant circumstances.
ISSUE:
Whether Enrile is entitled to bail.
RULING:
• YES. The fragile state of Enrile’s health
presented a compelling justification for his
admission to bail.
• Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the
charge, provided his continued incarceration
is clearly shown to be injurious to his health
or to endanger his life.
The general rule is that any person, before
being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of
his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is
placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by
the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of
his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he
retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a
capital offense, or with an offense punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no
right to bail shall be recognized.
As a result, all criminal cases within the
competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter
of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to
try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise,
bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life
imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an
offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or
life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not
strong.
On the other hand, the granting of bail is
discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed
a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years,
provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present,
as follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or
habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of
reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from
legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while
under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case
indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may
commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
Moreover, for purposes of admission to bail,
the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt
is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses,
or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial
court. However, such discretion may be exercised
only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree
of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provisional liberty. It is
axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed
when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of
the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.
Nonetheless, in granting Enrile’s petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the principal
purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever
so required by the court. The Court is further mindful
of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international
community arising from the national commitment
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as
value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of
our Constitution which provides: "The State values
the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights." This national
commitment has authorized the grant of bail not only
to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extradites upon a clear and convincing showing: (1 )
that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2 ) that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
Hence, Enrile’s social and political standing
and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate
that the risk of his flight or escape from this
jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition
from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal
or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. The Court does
not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with rebellion with
murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for
the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a
flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public
and his private lives, his long years of public service,
and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he
should be granted bail.
Moreover, the fragile state of Enrile’s health
presents another compelling justification for his
admission to bail. Dr. Gonzales, the Director of the
Philippine General Hospital (PGH), attested that the
medical condition of Enrile could pose significant
risks to his life, to wit: (1) uncontrolled hypertension;
(2) arrhythmia; (3) coronary calcifications associated
with coronary artery disease; and (4) exacerbations
of ACOS.
Based on foregoing, there is no question at
all that Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required
special medical attention.
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided
his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be
injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life
would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
The granting of provisional liberty to Enrile
will enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by
competent physicians in the hospitals of his choice.
This will not only aid in his adequate preparation of
his defense but, more importantly , will guarantee his
appearance in court for the trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to
wait for the trial to finish before a meaningful
consideration of the application for bail can be had
is to defeat the objective of bail, which is to entitle
the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of
bail – whose existence is either admitted by the
Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial
notice – that the courts can already consider in
resolving the application for bail without awaiting the
trial to finish. The Court thus balances the scales of
justice by protecting the interest of the People
through ensuring his personal appearance at the
trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan arbitrarily
ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the
fragile health and advanced age of Enrile. As such,
the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
denying Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Hence, Enrile’s
petition for certiorari was granted and he was
provisionally released upon posting a cash bond
amounting to ₱1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan.

15. PADERANGA v. CA
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that
he had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before
he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He
may, however, be considered as being constructively
and legally under custody. Thus, in the likewise peculiar
circumstances which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing
thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily
submitted his person to the custody of the law and,
necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which
thereafter granted bail as prayed for.
FACTS:
- An Information was filed with the RTC Gingoog
City, indicting for multiple murder, eight (8)
accused suspects, namely: Felipe Galarion, and
others as the alleged conspirators in the
indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo
and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr.
- In an unexpected turn of events, a man named
Ely Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an
amended information, Roxas was charged as
co-accused therein. In the course of his
preliminary investigation, Roxas implicated
Miguel Paderanga as the supposed mastermind
behind the massacre of the Bucag family.
- Petitioner Miguel Paderanga was belatedly
charged in a second amended Information as a
co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder
before the RTC Cagayan de Oro City, for the
killing of members of the Bucag family in
Gingoog City, of which petitioner was the mayor
at the time.
- Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-
accused all the way to the SC in Paderanga v.
Frankling Drilon et. al, an en banc decision
promulgated in 1991 where the Court sustained
the filing of the second amended information
against him.
- A warrant of arrest for petitioner's apprehension
was then issued, but before it could be served on
the petitioner, he filed a motion for admission to
bail with the trial court, which was set for hearing.
The trial court proceeded to hear the application
for bail.
- As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan
Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that
they were submitting custody over the person of
their client to the local chapter president of the
IBP and that, for purposes of said hearing on his
bail application, he be considered as being in the
custody of the law.
- Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed
the trial court that in accordance with the
directive of the chief of their office, Regional
State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the
prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing
the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of
the trial judge.
RTC: admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00. The following day, petitioner,
apparently still weak but well enough to travel by
then, managed to personally appear before the clerk
of court of the trial court and posted bail in the
amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and,
in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared
and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the
case. The motion for reconsideration filed by
Prosecutor Gingoyon was denied by the trial court.
- More than 6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon
elevated the matter to the CA through a special
civil action for certiorari (Rule 65).
CA: The resolution and the order of the trial court
granting bail to petitioner was annulled. The CA
observed that at the time of petitioner's application
for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law,"
apparently because he filed his motion for admission
to bail before he was actually arrested or had
voluntarily surrendered. Lastly, the prosecution,
according to the CA, was not afforded an opportunity
to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary to
the requirements of due process.
- Hence, petitioner Paderanga filed an appeal
by certiorari through a petition (Rule 45) which
raises issues centering mainly on said
petitioner's right to be admitted to bail.
Allegation before the SC
MIGUEL PADERANGA (PETITIONER)
» Petitioner argues that his filing of the
aforesaid application for bail with the trial
court effectively conferred jurisdiction over
his person. In short, for all intents and
 purposes, he was in the custody of the law.
In petitioner's words, the "invocation by the
accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a
pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court
with jurisdiction over the person of the
accused and bring him within the custody of
the law."
ISSUE:
Whether the grant of bail was proper. (YES)
RULING:
• Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail
as the security given for the release of a person
in custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing
before any court as required under the
conditions specified in said Rule. Its main
purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the
rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and
yet secure his appearance at the trial. As bail is
intended to obtain or secure one's provisional
liberty, the same cannot be posted before
custody over him has been acquired by the
judicial authorities, either by his lawful arrest or
voluntary surrender. As this Court has put it in a
case, "it would be incongruous to grant bail to
one who is free."
• As a paramount requisite then, only those
persons who have either been arrested,
detained, or otherwise deprived of their freedom
will ever have occasion to seek the protective
mantle extended by the right to bail. The person
seeking his provisional release under the
auspices of bail need not even wait for a formal
complaint or information to be filed against him
as it is available to "all persons" where the
offense is bailable. This rule is, of course, subject
to the condition or limitation that the applicant is
in the custody of the law.
• On the other hand, a person is considered to be
in the custody of the law (a) when he is arrested
either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued
pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in
relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has
voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court by surrendering to the proper
authorities.
• In the case of herein petitioner, it may be
conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and
physically placed under arrest. He may,
however, at that point and in the factual
ambience thereof, be considered as being
constructively and legally under custody.
Thus, in the likewise peculiar circumstances
which attended the filing of his bail
application with the trial court, for purposes
of the hearing thereof he should be deemed
to have voluntarily submitted his person to
the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the
jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter
granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is
made either by an actual restraint of the arrestee
or merely by his submission to the custody of the
person making the arrest.
• The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by
then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the
prosecutors agreed on that point since they
never attempted to have him physically
restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly
submitted to physical and legal control over his
person, firstly, by filing the application for bail
with the trial court; secondly, by furnishing true
information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the
jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his
arrest had been issued, petitioner never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the
clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day
he was charged in court, up to the submission of
his application for bail, and until the day of the
hearing thereof.
• As to the contention that the prosecution was not
given the opportunity to present its evidence
within a reasonable period of time, the Court
rules in the negative. The records indicate that
the Regional State Prosecutor's Office duly
received its copy of the application for bail on the
very same day that it was filed with the trial court.
Counted from said date up to the day of the
hearing, the prosecution had more than one (1)
week to muster such evidence as it would have
wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to
the motion. Certainly, under the circumstances,
that period was more than reasonable

16. Cortes vs Catral
[The judge is mandated to conduct a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise in the discretion of
the court, not only to take into account the
guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court, but primarily to determine the
existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it,
against the accused]
FACTS:
Allegation in the Complaint
A sworn letter complaint was filed by Flaviano
Cortes charging Judge Segundo B. Catral of the
RTC of Aparri, Cagayan with Gross Ignorance of
the Law. He alleges that
- Judge Catral granted bail in murder cases without
hearing: People v. Duerme for murder and People v.
Rodrigo Bumanglag for murder
- On May 3, 1995, Barangay Captain Rodolfo
Castanedas for Illegal Possession of Firearm was r
granted a bailbond of P180,000.00 but it was
reduced for only P30,000.00. The worst part of it no
hearing has been made from 1995 to the present
because according to his clerks, he is holding it in
abeyance.
- Another Barangay Captain Nilo de Rivera with a
homicide case was granted with a bailbond of
P14,800.00 by Judge Segundo Catral.
Judge Catral’s Contention (Respondent)
- With regard to the first charge, in the case of
duerme, respondent stresses that the provincial
prosecutor recommended P 200,000.00 as
bailbond for each of the accused. The court,
mindful of the fact that the prosecution is banking
on weak circumstantial evidence and guided by the
factors prescribed in Section 9 of Administrative
Circular 12-944 issued an order for reduction of the
bailbond from P200,000.00 to P50,000.00.
- In the case of Bumanglag, the inquest judge
issued a warrant of arrest for the accused with no
bail recommended. When the case was elevated to
the Regional Trial Court upon information filed by
the provincial prosecutor, the information made no
mention of a bailbond. In the hearing of the petition
to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong, the fiscal opted not to introduce evidence
and recommended bail in the sum of P200,000.00
instead.
- In the case against Castaneda, concerning the
illegal possession of firearm, the bailbond
recommended by the prosecutor was P180,000.00.
Accused, through counsel Atty. Bulseco, filed a
motion for reduction of the bailbond to P30,000.00.
The motion for reduction of bailbond was submitted
without serious opposition and the prosecutor
mindful perhaps that there is no corpus of the crime
as no firearm was caught or taken from the
possession of the accused merely submitted the
same to the discretion of the court.
- In the homicide case of de rivera, respondent
judge says that the bailbond of P14,800.00 was
recommended by the acting Officer-In-Charge .
Respondent judge then acting on the
recommendation of the OIC provincial prosecutor
and mindful of the guidelines in fixing a reasonable
amount of bailbond coupled by the fact that the
evidence on record is merely circumstantial and
there was no eyewitness to the commission of
crime granted bailbond in the sum of P14,800.00.
- Respondent judge stresses that, as can be
gleaned from the penultimate paragraph of said
order, the accused, despite reduction of their
bailbonds, remained detention prisoners because
of their failure to post bond.
Ruling of the Court Administrator
- The Office of the Court Administrator
recommended the dismissal of the complaint
saying that there is nothing in the allegations of the
complainant that would warrant the imposition of
administrative sanction against respondent judge.
- the Office of the Court Administrator noted,
that complainant failed to show any indication that
bad faith motivated the actuation of the respondent
in granting and reducing the amount of bail.
- it is crystal clear that the increase or
reduction of bail rests in the sound discretion of the
court depending upon the particular circumstances
of the case.
- Moreover, the actions taken by the
respondent were in the exercise of judicial
discretion that may not be assailed in an
administrative proceedings
ISSUE:
 Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of
gross ignorance of law for his acts of granting
bail on the abovementioned criminal cases.
RULING:
 YES. The judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, not only to take into
account the guidelines set forth in Section 9,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, but primarily to
determine the existence of strong evidence of
guilt or lack of it, against the accused.
- Bail is the security required by the court and given
by the accused to ensure that the accused appears
before the proper court at the scheduled time and
place to answer the charges brought against him or
her.
- Therefore, whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is required
to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal or at least he
must be asked for his recommendation because in
fixing the amount of bail, the judge is required to
take into account a number of factors such as the
applicants character and reputation, forfeiture of
other bonds or whether he is a fugitive from justice.
- When a person is charged with an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion.
- when the accused is charged with an offense
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, the judge is mandated to conduct a
hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, primarily to determine the
existence of strong evidence of guilt or lack of it,
against the accused.
-A summary hearing means such brief and speedy
method of receiving and considering the evidence
of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the
purpose of hearing which is merely to determine
the weight of evidence for purposes of bail.
- In this case, Respondent judge, in two instances,
granted bail to an accused charged with murder,
without having conducted any hearing
- In the case of Duerme, records do not reveal
whether a hearing was actually conducted on the
application for bail although respondent judge
implies that there was one. Respondent judge, in
his comment, disclosed that the prosecution was
banking on weak circumstantial evidence since
there was no eyewitness to the commission of the
offense as borne out from the affidavits and sworn
statements of the prosecution witnesses. The order
granting the reduced bailbond, however, did not
contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution.
- In the case of Bumanglag, the fiscal opted not to
introduce evidence and recommended the sum of
P200,000.00 instead.Unable to post the said bond,
accused through counsel filed a motion to reduce
bai in which the judge granted. Once again, the
order granting the bail of P200,000.00, as well as
the reduced bail bond of P50,000.00, did not
contain a summary of the evidence presented by
the prosecution.
- In the case of Basco ve Rapatalo, the judge is
mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases
where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application of bail to the
sound discretion of the court. A hearing is likewise
required if the prosecution refuses to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant
and fix bail.
- The reason for this is plain. Inasmuch as the
determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion, It may rightly be exercised only
after the evidence is submitted to the court at the
hearing.
- Even if the case of Duerme was dismissed by a
lower court, Judge Catral does not completely
exculpate him in determining whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
-Well settled in a number of cases is the rule that
the courts order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution, otherwise the order granting or
denying bail may be invalidated because the
summary of evidence may be considered as an
aspect of procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense.
- In the case of Castaneda, the the Office of the
Court Administrator is correct that the complainant
failed to show that bad faith motivated the actuation
of respondent judge in reducing the amount of bail
as there was no corpus of the crime as no firearm
was taken from the possession of the accused
- In the case of de Rivera, as long as in fixing the
amount of bail, the court is guided by the purpose
for which bail is required, that is, to secure the
appearance of the accused to answer charges
brought against him, the decision of the court to
grant bail in the sum it deems appropriate will not
be interfered with.

Summary of duties of the trial judge in case an

application for bail is filed:

1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of

discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8,
supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong,
discharge the accused upon the approval of the
bailbond (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition
should be denied.

- In sum, we find respondent Judge Segundo B.

Catral guilty of gross ignorance of the law for
having granted bail without having conducted the
requisite hearing.

18. PEOPLE vs. CAPARAS
[RULE 114 – Forfeiture of Bail]
Upon the assumption of the obligation4 of bail, the
sureties become in law the jailers of their principal.
Their custody of the prisoner is the continuance of
the original imprisonment and though they cannot
actually confine him they are subrogated to all the
rights and means which the government possesses
to make their control effective.
In a long line of decisions, it has been held that it is
the bonding company's responsibility to produce
the accused before the court whenever required.
Failure to so produce is undisputably a complete
breach of guaranty.
FACTS:
- This is a petition to review the Order of CFI.
- Mariquita Caparas was charged with the
crime of estafa and was out on a bail bond in
the amount of P18,000.00 posted by the
appellant, Mabini Insurance and Fidelity Co.,
Inc.
- The trial of the case having been scheduled
for January 19. 1968 at 9 o’clock a.m., Mabini
Insurance and Fidelity Co. on December 14,
1967, personally notified the accused of the
hearing.
- On January 12, 1968, Mabini Insurance and
Fidelity Co. filed a manifestation and motion
for postponement of trial on the ground that
‘it lost effective control on the person of the
accused’.
• Mariquita Caparas is presently
confined at the City Jail of the Crown
Colony of Hongkong serving
sentence for 3 years imprisonment
after she was convicted of smuggling
into Hongkong of nearly $200,000 in
forged US Travellers Check.
- Without acting on the said motion for
postponement, CFI, on Jan. 19, 1968,
ordered the confiscation of the bond and
gave the bondsmen 30 days within which to
show cause why judgment should not be
rendered against them due to the non-
appearance of the accused at the scheduled
date of hearing.
- Mabini Insurance and Fidelity Co. filed a
motion to lift the order of confiscation of said
bond and the cancellation of the same.
• To this motion, it attached a
statement from the secretary of
Foreign Affairs certifying that
Mariquita Caparas was indeed
confined in jail in Hongkong.
- The said motion was however, denied on
March 11,1968 for lack of merit.
- On March 28, 1968, Mabini Insurance and
Fidelity Co. filed a motion for reconsideration
followed by an amended motion for
reconsideration on the same date reiterating
its appeal that the order dated March
11,1968 be reconsidered and the bail bond
for the provisional liberty of the accused be
ordered cancelled, and the Mabini Insurance
and Fidelity Co. discharged and exonerated
on the ground that the nonproduction of
Mariquita Caparas is 'without the knowledge,
consent and/or negligence of the bondsmen'
adding this time that the government made it
impossible for Mabini Insurance and Fidelity
Co. to produce the accused since it
authorized Mariquita Caparas to travel to
Hongkong as in fact she had been issued a
clearance certifying that she had no pending
case in the Philippines.
CFI:
- These clearances were obtained through
deceit and misinterpretation by the accused,
Mariquita Caparas, and therefore it cannot
be said that the government had consented
to the departure of the accused.
- Moreover, a certification that the accused
had no pending case in the Philippines
cannot be construed as a consent on the part
of the State for the accused to leave the
jurisdiction of the Philippines. Neither this
Court nor any government authority had
given its consent to the departure of the
accused from the jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
- By virtue of the filing of the bail bond by
the Mabini Insurance and Fidelity Co.,
technically and legally it assumed
custody of the accused, Mariquita
Caparas, and is under obligation to
produce the body of the accused
whenever the Court so requires. Failure to
do so is a violation of a condition of the
bond. That the accused is now confined
in jail in Hongkong does not excuse the
 bondsmen from its obligation as the legal
and technical custodian of the accused.
- Mabini Insurance and Fidelity Co. appealed to the
CA.
RULING:
CA:
- The CA certified the appeal to the SC on the
ground that it involves pure questions of law.
- Hence, this present petition.
Allegation before the SC
NAME OF PETITIONER (MABINI INSURANCE
AND FIDELITY CO.)
» Petitioner contends that their act of notifying
the CFI of the impossibility of the appearance
of the accused before the date scheduled for
trial in that the accused was able to leave the
country surreptitiously without their
knowledge and consent should be
considered a substantial compliance of their
duty as bondsmen and hence they should be
exonerated from liability.
» The petitioner stresses that with the
clearance issued by the government agency
concerned in favor of the accused enabling
the latter to leave the Philippines, the
government has consented to her departure,
hence petitioner should not be held liable. Or,
otherwise, it was the principal, Mariquita
Caparas who defrauded the government
without petitioner's knowledge and
participation thus, their, exoneration from
liability is proper.
ISSUES:
1. Whether CFI erred in ordering confiscation of
the bond, having already been previously
notified by Mabini Insurance and Fidelity Co.
of the fact that the accused was able to leave
the Philippines and was detained at
Hongkong for smuggling.
2. Whether CFI erred in not completely
exonerating Mabini Insurance and Fidelity
Co. from liability in view of the fact that
appearance of Mariquita Caparas at the trial
was precisely rendered physically impossible
by the Government in issuing clearances to
her to leave the country notwithstanding the
pendency of the criminal case against
Mariquita Caparas.
1. NO.
- Rule for forfeiture of bail:
• When the appearance of the
defendant is required by the court, his
sureties shall be notified to produce
him before the court on a given date.
If the defendant fails to appear as
required, the bond is declared
forfeited and the bondsmen are given
thirty (30) days within which to
produce their principal and to show
cause why a judgment should not be
rendered against them for the amount
of their bond. Within the said period
of thirty (30) days, the bondsmen, (a)
must produce the body of their
principal or give the reason for its
non-production; and (b) must explain
satisfactorily why the defendant did
not appear before the court when first
required to do so. Failing in these two
requisites, a judgment shall be
rendered against the bondsmen.
- Under this cited provision, it is very clear that
if after the notice to produce the accused is
served upon the surety, the principal fails to
appear at the time required by the court, the
bail shall be declared forfeited. However, the
bondsmen are given thirty (30) days within
which to produce the defendant and show
cause why a judgment should not be
rendered against them to the extent of their
liability under the bond.
- In this case, Mabini Insurance and Fidelity
Co. contends that their act of notifying CFI of
the impossibility of the appearance of
Mariquita Caparas before the date of trial in
that the accused was able to leave the
country surreptitiously without their
knowledge and consent should be
considered a substantial compliance of their
duty as bondsmen and hence they should be
exonerated from liability.
- The SC held that the question whether the
explanation is satisfactory lies within the
discretion of the court. In the forfeiture of bail
bonds, courts are liberal in accepting the
 explanation of the bondsmen provided the
body of the accused is produced. Production
of the body of the accused should be made
within the period of 30 days required by the
court. If so produced, forfeiture may be
discharged if a satisfactory explanation is
given why he neglected or failed to appear
when first required to do so. To justify
exemption from liability on a bail bond or a
reduction thereof, the accused must be
surrendered to the court and his non-
appearance when first required by the court
must be satisfactorily explained.

- Thus, Mabini Insurance and Fidelity Co. was

of the erroneous impression that as long as
an explanation was given and provided it was
made timely a bondsman could be readily
relieved of liability.

2. NO.
- Mabini Insurance and Fidelity Co. itself noted
that the act of the accused Mariquita
Caparas, was done surreptitiously. Mabini
Insurance and Fidelity Co.'s allegation that
the performance of its obligation was
rendered impossible by the act of the obligee
is untenable.
- It could have taken steps to prevent the
departure of Caparas. The error of the
government agency concerned in allowing
Caparas to leave must be because of her
misrepresentation that there was no pending
case against her. Petitioner cannot be
relieved of liability on the ground that it had
not participated nor consented to the escape
of the principal. As the jailer or custodian
of the accused its obligation is to produce
the body of the accused whenever so
required. Failure to do so is a violation of
the condition of the bond. Failing in this
respect, forfeiture of the bail bond is
proper.
- It is clear from the foregoing that the surety
had not shown sufficient cause to justify its
exoneration. The principal having escaped
and is now beyond the jurisdiction of the
court, petitioner breached its obligation to the
government. Hence, it is liable under the
bond.
 June 2, 2000, requiring Rosalie to file her
17. Magsucang vs. Balgos counter-affidavit in Criminal Case Nos. 1608 to
1613 since he failed to consider that Rosalie was,
[ The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times. at the time, locked in jail and incapable of
Excessive bail shall not be required. Where the right to defending in court.
bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by » Lastly, complainant states that respondent judge
requiring a sum that is excessive. ] violated applicable rules and regulation when
he required excessive bail.
FACTS:
Allegation in the Complaint NAME OF DEFENDANT
NAME OF PLAINTIFF » Judge Rolando Balgos (Presiding Judge, MTC,
Hinigaran, Negros Occidental)
» Modesto Magsucang
» On January 25, 2001, then Court Administrator
» In a letter-complaint dated November 18, 2000
Alfredo L. Benipayo required respondent judge to
and addressed to the Secretary of the Department
file his comment.
of Interior and Local Government, complainant
» In his comment, respondent maintained that the
Modesto Magsucang charged Judge Rolando
rules of procedure were followed in the filing of
Balgos, , of bias and partiality, grave abuse of
the criminal complaints against Rosalie
discretion, requiring excessive bail, and
Magsucang.
violation of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
» He added that Rosalie virtually disappeared after
posting bail in Criminal Case No. 1593; she was
» Based on records, on May 10, 2000, a certain
only arrested after an intensive police effort to
Pepito Lim, owner of the Ace Fishing
find her
Corporation, filed a criminal complaint for
» Respondent further declared that, excluding
qualified theft against complainant’s
Criminal Cases Nos. 1634 and 1635, which were
daughter, Rosalie Magsucang, allegedly for
dismissed, he found probable cause to hold
misappropriating cash amounting to P11,200,
Rosalie Magsucang liable for eight (8) counts
with grave abuse of confidence. (Criminal Case
of qualified theft.
No. 1593.)
» Subsequently, respondent judge, before whom
the preliminary investigation was conducted,
Office of the Court Administrator:
issued a warrant of arrest. Bail was set at
The incumbent Court Administrator, Justice Presbitero
P30,000
Velasco, found respondent judge innocent of the
» Rosalie was arrested on May 11, 2000
charges contained in the letter-complaint, except the
» Complainant posted bail for his daughter from the
charge related to excessive bail. Justice Velasco
proceeds of the sale of his banca and with money
recommended that the case be re-docketed as a regular
borrowed from friends.
administrative matter and that the respondent judge be
» more cases for qualified theft were filed by Mr.
fined in the amount of P2,000.
Lim against Rosalie. (docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1634,
The parties were asked to manifest whether they agree to
and 1635. )
submit the case for decision on the basis of the pleadings
» In Criminal Case No. 1635, bail was set at
on record. Respondent agreed. Complainant did not
P24,000. Neither Modesto nor Rosalie had
respond and is deemed to have no objection.
money to pay for bail so Rosalie remained
incarcerated.
SC:
Allegations of the complainant ISSUES:
» Complainant faults respondent judge for 1. as to the charge that respondent judge acted with bias
allegedly committing irregularities in the and partiality (NO)
conduct of the preliminary investigation when 2. As to the charge of grave abuse of discretion in issuing
respondent judge administered the oath to Pepito six (6) subpoenas on June 2, 2000 (NO)
Lim and for having sent Rosalie to prison without 3. W/N judge required excessive bail (YES)
the benefit of a hearing.
» Magsucang also contends that the Judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when RULING:
respondent judge issued several subpoenas on 1. NO.
The court find that complainant failed to substantiate his
claim. Other than the letter-complaint, no evidence
was introduced.
In Araos vs. Luna-Pison, we held that the absence of any
evidence showing that the respondent judge acted in bad
faith, ill-will, or malice reduces the charges against him
into a mere indictment. Charges based on mere
suspicion and speculation cannot be given credence.
As investigating officer the respondent judge is given the
latitude to determine if there exists probable cause that
would warrant either the filing of the corresponding
information or the outright dismissal of the case.
Section 3 (a) 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
provides that it is the duty of the prosecutor or other
government official to certify that he personally examined
the affiants and he is satisfied that they voluntarily
executed and understood their affidavits. It is clear that
respondent judge has performed his duty pursuant to
existing rules.
A judge enjoys the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his function no less than any other
public officer. The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption,
however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.
2. The court find the charge bereft of merit.
There is nothing in the rules prohibiting respondent judge
from issuing subpoenas to Rosalie requiring her to file her
counter-affidavits to the complaints filed against her. In
fact the respondent judge is bound to do so in the course
of processing the complaints. The six (6) subpoenas
correspond to the number of complaints filed against her.
3. The court agree with the OCA. Respondent judge
required excessive bail in this case.
Section 9 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that
in fixing the amount of bail in criminal cases, judges shall
primarily consider the following factors: (a) financial
ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and
circumstances of the offense; (c) penalty for the offense
charged; (d) character and reputation of the accused; (e)
age and health of the accused; (f) weight of the evidence
against the accused; (g) probability of the accused
appearing at the trial; (h) forfeiture of other bail; (i) the
fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and (j) pendency of other cases where the
accused is on bail.
The amount of bail should be reasonable at all times.
Excessive bail shall not be required. In implementing this
mandate, regard should be taken of the prisoner’s
pecuniary circumstances. That which is reasonable bail to
a man of wealth may be unreasonable to a poor man
charged with a like offense. Where the right to bail exists,
it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. The amount should be high enough to assure
the presence of defendant when required but no higher
than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
In this case, the respondent judge failed to consider that
Rosalie Magsucang is illiterate, the daughter of a poor
fisherman. She had very limited financial ability to
post bail.
In Criminal Case No. 1635, Rosalie Magsucang was
accused of stealing only P4,300. In fixing the
unreasonably excessive amount of bail at P24,000 in the
last cited case, it is clear that the respondent judge
disregarded the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
In the same breath that Rosalie was told she could be
bailed out, she was practically denied the means to do so.
The excessive amount required could only mean that
her provisional liberty would be beyond her reach.
This is ironic, like categorically telling her that she could
not avail of the right to bail. It appears respondent did not
pay heed to the admonition that the court should not
permit any act or omission which undermines public faith
and confidence in the judiciary
Coming now to the recommended penalty by the OCA,
the amount of P2,000 does not appear to be commensurate
with respondent’s infraction. Setting excessive bail
evinces disregard of pertinent rules and regulations.
Considering that bail involves a basic right of the accused,
this Court finds that a higher penalty should be imposed.
Thus, the fine should be set at P5,000 13 as more
appropriate in view of the violation proved.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, respondent Presiding Judge Rolando
Balgos, MTC, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental is found
liable for requiring excessive bail and is hereby
FINED the amount of P5,000.00, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same or similar act would be
dealt with more severely.
Let this decision be made a part of the personnel record of
the respondent judge. SO ORDERED.