Chapter Title: SOCRATES’ ERROR IN THE PARMENIDES

Book Title: Essays on Plato’s Epistemology

Book Author(s): Franco Trabattoni
Published by: Leuven University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1b9x1mp.13

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  
’    

.   “” 

The part of the Parmenides that is regarded as marking a transition from the
author’s discussion of the doctrine of the ideas to his analysis of the eight (or
nine) hypotheses illustrated in the dialogue has chiefly been studied with the
aim of understanding the nature of the exercise which Parmenides presents the
young Socrates with, sometimes in order to evaluate to what degree the executive
part of this project matches the guidelines provided in these pages.¹ What has
not been studied as much – at least, judging from the articles and comments I
have examined – is the issue of what Socrates’ error precisely consist in. In this
paper, I aim to provide an answer to this question by examining some sentences
Parmenides addresses to Socrates, partly as a reproach.
Let us start from c–d. Parmenides blames Socrates for having prema-
turely set out to “mark off something beautiful, and just, and good, ad each of
the forms” (ὁρίζεσθαι … καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἓν ἕκατον τῶν εἰδῶν).
Parmenides had first noticed this when he had heard Socrates speaking with the
young Aristotle, not long before. On the other hand, the urge that leads Socrates
towards discourses (logoi: ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους) is presented as a divine, beautiful
thing.
One initial problem is to understand how the verb ὁρίζεσθαι (horizesthai)
at lines c– is to be translated. Under the entry ὁρίζειν/ὁρίζεσθαι, Des Places’
lexicon² gives four different meanings: ) séparer, ) distinguer,  déterminer,
) définir. Most of the authors I have taken into account translate the verb as
“define” or “definition” (see, among others, Acri,³ Zadro,⁴ Cambiano,⁵ Casertano,⁶
Diès,⁷ Cornford,⁸ Miller,⁹ and Migliori.¹⁰ Other scholars instead translate it as

¹ See Casertano (), esp. pp. – ff.

² Des Places ().
³ Acri ().
⁴ In Giannantoni (), vol. .
⁵ Cambiano (), vol. .
⁶ Casertano (), p. .
⁷ Diès ().
⁸ Cornford ().
⁹ Miller (), p. .
¹⁰ Migliori () .

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  

“mark off ”, including Sayre,¹¹ Gyll-Ryan,¹² Allen,¹³ and Brisson (who uses the
French verb séparer).¹⁴
In our attempt to solve the question, let us first of all note a couple of things:

a) Let us suppose that we were to translate the verb as “define”. At line c
there is a τί that certainly prevents us from translating the sentence as “define
the Beautiful, the Just, etc.” (as Migliori would have it). Rather, with Cambiano,
we would have to translate “define a beautiful and a just etc.”, or, with Zadro,
“the definition of a thing that is beauty, etc.”.
b) The verb ὁρίζεσθαι is used two more times in the dialogue, in both cases shortly
before the passage under consideration and with an accusative accompanied
by τί.

a–: εί … ὁριεῖται τις αὐτό τι ἕκαστον εἶδος (a person is to mark off each form
as ‘something itself ’).
b–: μηδέ [sc.τις] τι ὁριεῖται εἶδος ἑνὸς ἑκάστου (won’t [sc. someone] mark off
o fom form each one).

Now, what is the meaning of ὁρίζεσθαι in these sentences? As may be inferred

from the context, Parmenides is speaking of someone who assumes that the
ideas exist, that is to say: someone who posits a form for each single unity. If
by “define” and “definition”, then, we mean the act of describing the essence
of a thing through discourse (which is more or less how Aristotle speaks of
definition), translating the verb as “define” is incorrect.¹⁵ For it is not a matter
here of describing a thing through a discourse, but of determining its existence
through an act of separation that will make it independent from other things.
The verb ὁρίζεσθαι, therefore, must here be translated as “separate” or “mark off ”,
in the sense in which Aristotle – for instance – states that forms are separate,
since they have their own independent and specific determinateness.¹⁶
In my view, the same applies to ὁρίζεσθαι in c–. The affinity between the
two texts lies not just in their proximity, but in the presence of ἔν at line c. Here
Parmenides is speaking of the act by which a person determines the existence
of things such as the beautiful, the just and the good, understood as single,

¹¹ Sayre ().
¹² Gill-Ryan ().
¹³ Allen ().
¹⁴ Brisson ().
¹⁵ I add here further considerations to what I have already said in ch. , pp. –.
¹⁶ Metaph. , a–. See too Sayre (), p. , pp. –.

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 ’     

unitary objects. In other words, it is not a matter of stating what the ideas are,
but of acknowledging that they exist, i.e. that there is such a thing as the unity
of the multiple. This is further confirmed by other passages of the dialogue in
which Parmenides sums up Socrates’ thesis. He repeatedly speaks of the thesis
of someone positing the existence of the ideas/unities – not defining them or
claiming to know them. For example:

“I suppose [the speaker is Parmenides] you think that each form is one (ἓν
ἕκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι, which actually means “you think that each form
exists as one”) on the following ground: whenever some number of things
seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems to be some one character (μία τις
ἴσως δοκεῖ ἰδέα … εἶναι), the same as you look at them all, and from that you
conclude that the large is one”. (a–)

“Then do you see, Socrates”, he said [Parmenides] “how great the difficulty is
if one marks things off (διορίζηται) as forms, themselves by themselves?”
“Quite clearly”
“I assure you”, he said, “that you do not yet, if I may put it so, have an inkling
of how great the difficulty is if you are going to posit that each idea is one and
is something distinct from concrete things” (εἰ ἓν εἶδος ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων ἀεί
τι ἀφοριζόμενος θήσεις¹⁷). (a–b)

“Because I [Parmenides] think that you, Socrates, and anyone else who posits
that there is for each thing some being, itself by itself ” (αὐτήν τινα καθ’ αὑτὴν
ἑκάστου οὐσία τίθεται εἶναι) … (c–)

To these passage we may also add Resp. b–, which speaks of διορίζειν τῷ
λόγῳ (“to mark off by logos”) multiple things but not the ideas. Is it correct to
speak of “definition” in relation to individual entities? For in this case the logos
does not define anything but “separates” ideal unities from multiple things.
Furthermore, whereas in the case of mundane objects knowledge can also be
based on sense-perception, in the case of the ideas it can only rely on logos (cf.
Pol. a).
Besides, how could Parmenides blame Socrates for having set out to define
the beautiful, the just, and the good? Where in the Parmenides (or in any other
Platonic dialogue) does Socrates ever do so? Rather, Parmenides refers to aff.,
which is to say the moment in which, setting out to discuss the doctrine of the

¹⁷ I here follow Fowler's translation, as I believe that the Gill-Ryan one (in Cooper-
Hutchinson) is misleading.

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  

ideas suggested by Socrates as a solution to Zeno’s aporias, he had briefly summed

up its content. A clear indication of the agreement between the two passages is
the presence, in both, of a praise formulated in exactly the same way:

You are much to be admired for your impulse toward logoi (τῆς ὁρμῆς τῆς ἐπὶ
τοὺς λόγους) (a–b)

The impulse that urge you to logoi (ἡ ὁρμὴ ἣν ὁρμᾷς ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους) is beautiful
and divine (d–)¹⁸

.     ’  



The expression “impulse towards logoi” recalls Phaedo e–a, as Luc Brisson
has observed – among others.¹⁹ It is worth exploring this connection in greater
detail. The passage of the Phaedo in question is the one presenting the idea of a
second sailing, which is to say of a flight into logoi. At lines a– Socrates
describes the new approach he has adopted, and to do so employs the very verb
ὁρμᾶν (urge on) that is also used in the Parmenides. Socrates’ approach is an
impulse to posit as a hypothesis the discourse (logos) ones deems the strongest,
and to regard things – causes, as well as everything else – that are in accordance
with this discourse as true and things not in accordance with it as false.
What does logos mean in this passage of the Phaedo? It means, as we already
know,²⁰ that the attempt to find causes in sensible objects in a direct way, by
means of the senses, ends in failure. The flight into logoi is a flight towards
argumentation, towards the kind of inferential procedure that in order to solve a
given problem will posit the existence of something which cannot be seen. Logos,
in this case, stands in direct contrast to αἴσθησις (sens perception). As is all to
evident, the same is also the case in the Parmenides. The problems raised by Zeno
cannot be solved through an enquiry limited to the level of sense-perception.
The “impulse toward logoi” (ὁρμὴ ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους) represents the adoption of
an inferential plan that leads one to acknowledge the existence of things that
cannot be seen (and hence may only be approached through the logos), but

¹⁸ The analogy is erased in Gill-Ryan translation: “you are much to be admired for your
keenness for argument!” (a–b); “the impulse you bring to argument is noble and
divine” (d–).
¹⁹ Brisson (), p.  and n. .
²⁰ See for instance pp. –, , –.

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 ’     

which it is necessary to posit in order to solve the problem. In the passages of the
Parmenides we are discussing, therefore, ὁρίζειν has exactly the same meaning
(“positing”, “hypothesizing”) as ὑποτίθημι in the Phaedo (a).
Parmenides approves of the ὁρμὴ ἐπὶ τοὺς λόγους, something which finds full
confirmation in the Phaedo. This strikes me as proof of the fact that this ὁρμή
(impulse) represents an element of continuity which Plato in any case wishes to
preserve. What we have here is the impulse which leads one to posit invisible
unities that lie beyond the visible multiplicity of things and that bring these
things together into homogeneous groups. As Parmenides explains immediately
afterwards, this assumption is made necessary by the fact that the δύναμις τοῦ
διαλέγεσθαι (capacity of discussing) would otherwise be lost. Since there, as
a matter of fact, is such a thing as διαλέγεσθαι, i.e. since men, when sensibly
discussing things, clearly assign a fixed meaning to words, it is necessary to argue
that the contradictions Zeno points to no longer hold, and that they will not hold
only if one accepts the ideas as invariant unities of meaning (cf. b–c).
It is clear, however, that the operation performed by Socrates, as it is presented
in the Parmenides, is also flawed. What the flaw may be can be inferred from
a–b – namely, absolute separation. Parmenides sums up Socrates’ proposal as
follows (b–): “have you yourself distinguished, as you say, on the one side
(χωρίς) ideas in themselves, and on the other (χωρίς) the things which partake of
them?” The stress in this passage is precisely on the idea of separation: this is also
clear from the immediately following sentence, in which Parmenides correctly
hypothesises that, according to Socrates, there is such a thing as equality itself,
separate (χωρίς) from the one we experience.
This, then, is how Parmenides sums up the thoughts that Socrates had
expressed in e–a, where he had introduced the ideas in order to solve
Zeno’s paradoxes. What is particularly significant for the sake of my argument is
the sentence opening the explanation. Addressing Zeno, Socrates asks: “don’t
you acknowledge that there is a form, itself by itself, of likeness etc.” (οὐ νομίζεις
εἶναι αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ εἶδος τι ὁμοιότητος κτλ., e–a). This way of presenting
the problem perfectly corresponds to “to mark off something beautiful, and juste
and good” (ὁρίζεσθαι … καλόν τέ τι καὶ δίκαιον καὶ ἀγαθόν) in Parmenides’ line in
c–: it is not so much a matter of stating what the ideas are (or of describing
them through a definition), but of acknowledging the existence of something (τί)
such as ideas in themselves, of which multiple things partake.

.  . 

One important discrepancy may be noted, however, between Socrates’ argument

and Parmenides’ summaries. Socrates himself, at the beginning of his answer to

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  

Zeno, stresses the fact that the ideas exist χωρίς (d). The purpose of this claim
is to establish the existence of universal unities of which all the various things
partake, something which would be enough to explain Zeno’s paradoxes – not to
thematise separation as such. Socrates’ argument, therefore, chiefly focuses on
the relation of participation – and hence the connection – between the ideas
and things. Parmenides, on the contrary, stresses in particular the separation
between the ideas and things, which is to say the main reason for the criticism he
directs against the doctrine of the ideas in the first part of the dialogue.
We may therefore posit a scenario of the following sort. The impulse (ὁρμή)
towards logoi, i.e. towards argumentative inferences leading to determine/sep-
arate the unity of the multiple, is right and irrepressible: for there are events,
such as generation and corruption (Phaedo), or Zeno’s paradoxes and the δύναμις
τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι, which could not otherwise be explained. But this work must
be carried out very carefully, since there is a risk of distancing the explanatory
principle too much from its explicandum, thus creating something incompre-
hensible and useless that will acquire an absurd existence regardless of the reason
for which it was introduced. If ideal unities are introduced as prerequisites for
multiplicity, but at the same time are regarded as entities utterly separate from
things, then there is no longer any logos, any argumentative inference, capable of
accounting for why they ought to be posited. What Parmenides means to say, in
the speech he addresses to Socrates, is that while it is correct to posit an invisible
unity alongside visible multiplicity by means of logoi, one must also make sure
that this unity will continue to stand in relation to the multiple.
This is also the meaning of the exercise Parmenides presents Socrates with.
It is not enough to merely mark off the one (i.e. to acknowledge its existence
alongside things). It is also necessary to always preserve the relation between the
two, which is to say to always speak of the one and the many in their mutual
relation and examine what consequences the positing of the one entails for
the many, and vice versa. In other words, it is necessary to proceed through
hypotheses, and measure the consequences of these hypotheses: namely, to
evaluate to what degree a hypothesis helps solve the problems for which it was
“posited”.
This kind of procedure had already been described in the Phaedo. In a–
Socrates explains that his method consists in positing (ὑποτίθεσθαι) in each case
the discourse (logos) that strikes him as being the strongest, and in regarding
consequences that agree with it as true and consequences that do not as false.
The logos in question here is not an idea as such, but the discourse stating the
existence of the ideas. This is quite clear from what Socrates says immediately
afterwards (b–): Socrates assume “the existence of a Beautiful, itsel by itself,
of a Good and a Great and all the rest” (ὑποθέμενος εἶναι τι καλὸν αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ
καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ τἆλλα πάντα, b–). He then adds: if Cebes will grant

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 ’     

him this assumption (if, that is, he too will regard it as a logos ἐρρωμενέστατον, i.
e. “strongly compelling”, a), then it might be possible for him to prove that
the soul is immortal. In b– the “positing” of such a thing (τί) as the ideas is
affirmed exactly in the same way as in the sentences from the Parmenides we
have already examined. The αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ represents “separation” in the Platonic
sense, which is not absolute separation, but rather something hypothetical, given
it is only possible and reasonable to posit these things to the extent that they help
explain something else. But if we replace “hypothesis” (ὑπόθεσις) with “apart”
(χωρίς), the separation becomes absolute: for speaking of hypotheses means
speaking of principles functional to the explicandum.

. ’ 

I might agree, then, with the claim that Socrates, in the Parmenides, is expound-
ing a theory of the ideas analogous to the one expounded in the Phaedo (and
Republic). What I cannot accept is the notion that through Parmenides Plato is
seeking to criticise precisely that way of understanding the theory, possibly on
account of a development that took place between the Phaedo and the dialectical
dialogues. What Plato wishes to do, through Parmenides, is to show that the
theory of the ideas only faces insurmountable problems if we one-sidedly stress
separation instead of regarding it as functional to the identification of explicative
hypotheses. In the Parmenides Plato is ultimately seeking to defend his views
against those who interpret the positing of the ideas as the fanciful construction
of a realm utterly separate from the one in which man actually lives. He does so
by showing how separation must be understood: the ideas are separate if by this
we mean that they are universal unities with a distinct determinateness; they
are not separate if by this we mean that they have no relation to sensible reality.
Indeed, the chief objection raised by Parmenides against the theory of the ideas
is that absolute separateness would make them utterly unintelligible (b), and
hence utterly useless for philosophical enquiry.
The exercise proposed by Parmenides concerns the one and the many, since
in the previous section of the dialogue the ideas – which it is necessary to posit
in order to preserve the act of διαλέγεσθαι – were precisely regarded as unities
of the multiple.²¹ The experiment fails, however, because despite the fact that
the testing of given hypotheses takes also into consideration the things that are
‘others’ with respect to the subject of the hypothesis itself, the one and the many

²¹ This first of all emerges from the above-mentioned passages in which every idea is
described as as ἕν. See Sayre (), p. .

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  

are still treated separately.²² Rather one should start from the fact, defined in
Philebus c– as having “somehow … an amazing nature” (φύσει πως πεφυκότα
θαυμαστόν), whereby “the many are one ant the one many” (ἓν γὰρ δὴ τὰ πολλὰ
εἶναι καὶ τὸ ἓν πολλά). In other words: from a metaphysical perspective, the one is
beyond and separate from the many, but this dimension cannot be grasped by
discourse; from the point of view of discourse, which is to say of dialectics, it
is rather necessary to argue not that the one and the many exist, but that the
one is many and that the many are one – however incredible this may seem.
Metaphysics and dialectics, then, are in a way separate (and had already been
presented as such in the Republic, long before the dialectical dialogues). The
metaphysical background, the αὐτὸ καθ’αὑτὸ, is the precondition for the fact
that logos, when operating upon reality, speaks of invisible unities that are not
perceptible by the senses and are not subject to generation or corruption. These
unities, however, are not knowable or analysable separately, in themselves, for
while it is true that in the exercise of logos every multiplicity is a unity, it is equally
true that every unity is multiple.
In the light of what has just been argued, the position of the character of
Parmenides in the dialogue become strangely ambiguous. On the one hand, he
suggests the correct method of enquiry to Socrates: Socrates must not simply
posit the ideas as unities separate from the multiple, but must also evaluate
the effect which the positing of the one has on the many, and vice versa. On
the other hand, Parmenides’ attempt to apply this procedure himself ends in
failure. Alongside Socrates’ error, then, there is also one made by Parmenides.
It consists in wishing to claim that the one/many relation can be explained
by considering the one and the many in turn, and analysing them individu-
ally. This plan necessarily leads to some unsolvable contradictions, since the
one always proves to be at the same time multiple, and the multiple one. This
means that the investigation must start from a different assumption, namely
(as we have seen in the Philebus) that the one is the many, and vice versa. This
inevitable co-presence does not rule out the foundational priority of the one
(or of the ideas, which are its specification); however, it thwarts the plans of
the historical Parmenides to ground the knowledge of reality upon the analysis
of a principle preventively separated and marked off from every multiplicity.
The Parmenides of Plato’s dialogue, therefore, is a sophisticated product of the
author’s imagination which serves to illustrate both (in the first section) the
problems arousing from a wrong way to understand the “doctrine” of ideas
(as I am going to show in the next chapter), and (in the second part) the apo-
rias and contradictions one is bound to run up against those who sought to

²² Again, see Sayre (), p. .

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 ’     

solve these problems through Eleatic procedures (the actual existence of which
is illustrated not just by Plato, but also by Gorgias and the so-called Megar-
ics).
For Plato, then, distancing oneself from Eleatism means envisaging the sepa-
ration of universal unities in such a way that the latter may be used to explain
multiplicity. In other words, these unities must be envisaged in such a way as to
be able to neutralise the objections raised in the first section of the Parmenides,
and hence ensure that they will exercise the explanatory function which is the
only sufficient reason for positing their existence in the first place. If this does
not occur, it means that the operation has not been carried out correctly: for the
separation envisaged would not be the kind useful for Plato’s philosophy (and
the same applies to the kind of separation described in Aristotle’s ambiguous
representation).

.       

An additional observation may be made, by way of clarification, with regard to

the figure of Aristotle in the dialogue. May Plato have chosen this name as an
allusion to Aristotle the philosopher? Most scholars rule out this hypothesis.²³
From a chronological standpoint, it would not be utterly impossible. Scholars
generally agree that the Parmenides was written shortly after  (although
other dates are also plausible), and that Aristotle became a disciple of Plato
around ; so, it is not completely unplausible that Plato was still working
on the Parmenides when Aristotle was already his pupil. Certainly, Aristotle
must have been very young at that time. But it is hardly by chance that explicit
mention is made of the young age of the character Aristotle in a section of the
dialogue which suggests that he is even younger than Socrates (c).
There is one further element that must be taken into account. Supposing
that at the time of the fictional discussion Socrates was at least twenty years
old, the date for the setting of the dialogue would be around . Now, from
the Parmenides itself we know that the character of Aristotle joined the Thirty
Tyrants; and Xenophon informs us that he played an active role in the final stages
of the Peloponnesian War, accepting some risky responsibilities.²⁴ If in 
this Aristotle was capable of answering Parmenides’ questions, he could hardly
have been any younger than sixteen. Hence, as Allen suggests, this Aristotle must

²³ See Allen (), p. , Brisson ()., p. , F. Fronterotta (), p. . One
exception here is Migliori (), p. , n. .
²⁴ See Allen (), p. .

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  

have been engaging in dangerous military actions at the no longer green age of
sixty plus years (Allen also notes that Nicias, the fifty-five year-old commander
of the Sicilian Expedition, was regarded an exceptionally old general). All this
suggests that the presence of the young Aristotle at the meeting between Par-
menides, Zeno and Socrates in  is a historically rather implausible literary
artifice. Given that Plato was already struggling to make the largely incompatible
chronologies of Parmenides and Socrates fit together, one is led to wonder why
he chose to make things even more difficult for himself by introducing an even
younger Aristotle, when he might have chosen a character that would have raised
no chronological problems. Might it be that Plato was deliberately seeking to
introduce the name of Aristotle?
Moving on to the strictly philosophical level, one might reject the idea that
the character of Aristotle has anything to do with the Stagirite by pointing to
the fact that the dialogue attributes no personal point of view to the former.²⁵
Actually, this is not quite true, as may be inferred from the passage we have
just examined, in which Parmenides accuses the young Aristotle of the same
shortcoming as Socrates. Besides, if one accepts the suggestion I have made
that Parmenides is reproaching Socrates for one-sidedly stressing the separation
(χωρίς) of the ideas from things, one must acknowledge that this criticism could
very pertinently be addressed to the historical Aristotle. Finally, the invitation to
“get training” (γυμνάσαι, d) in dialectics seems perfectly fitting for a young
disciple, and matches quite well what we may reasonably believe to have been
the chief pursuit of the historical Aristotle after he joined the Academy, that is:
precisely the exercising of dialectics (and the related discipline of rhetoric) – in
particular through the investigation of predication, something soon destined to
lead Aristotle to develop his doctrine of categories.

²⁵ See, for instance, Brisson (), p.  and n. .

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