Boethius and the Neoplatonic Good: Hebdomads and the Nature of God in the "Quomodo

Substantiae"
Author(s): Sarah Pessin
Source: Carmina Philosophiae , 2001, Vol. 10 (2001), pp. 57-71
Published by: International Boethius Society

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/44078528

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 Boethius and the Neoplatonic Good:
Hebdomads and the Nature of God in
the Quomodo Substantias
by Sarah Pessin

Boethius'
Boethius' treatise.2 treatise.2
(henceforth, (henceforth,
sItsIts main
Quomodo DH), mainisis topurpose
purpose DH),the question:
a Substantiae,
consider isveryashort,very short,
inis towhat
consider butthe thevery
but or, very difficult difficult metaphysical
De question: Hebdomadibus, metaphysical in what
way are things good? Are they good by participation the way things are
white by participation? Clearly not, for, surely the goodness which
characterizes all of God's creations characterizes these things more
fundamentally - or less accidentally - than something like "whiteness"
might characterize them. So, maybe, then, they are good substantially;
that is, maybe they are not good merely by participation, but are good by
their very nature. This, though, cannot be right either, for, as we learn in
the course of the treatise, only God is such that He is good by his very
nature. In effect, then, the DH sets out to ascertain what exactly is the
relationship between God's creations and their Goodness. Without going
into any detail on how Boethius arrives at a solution, suffice it to say
that, in the final analysis, the goodness of things is seen to derive from
their relation, as existing things, to God, the Pure Good and font of all
existence.
The first thing to note is that almost every word in the DH text
has been disputed in centuries' worth of attempts to understand what, in
the end, Boethius thinks the correct answer to this question regarding the
relation of things to their goodness is. While it is beyond the scope of the
current paper to detail all of the differences in interpretations across the
ages, we will be content to draw from these different interpretations three
main positions on the meaning of Esse in the treatise's 2nd axiom, and to
argue in support of the third of these positions, held historically, at least
in its essentials, by an unknown 9th-century commentator, by Thierry of
Chartres, and by Clarembald of Arras, as well, more contemporarily by
Pierre Hadot.3 * 4
In this paper, then, I will follow Hadot in suggesting historical
and philosophical reasons for why one might prima facie be inclined
towards the third reading. While Hadot has already provided us with

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 58 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE

some such reasons having to do with the in

Porphyry and Victorinus, I hope in what
demarcate Boethius's conception of Esse ce
leanings in particular. In effect, I will sugge
influence which Hadot discusses can only go so
account for certain commitments held by Boeth
elsewhere - regarding the direct relationship be
This direct relationship, then, will be explai
Neopythagorean notion of Limit, and as suc
influence will be shown to have a strong pre
alongside the Porphyrian ideas, which on th
Boethius an explanation of how all things are
relationship to God.
As should come as no surprise, no two com
are precisely alike. However, by demarcating
three major groupings, we can reveal some imp
Restricting our discussion to the single notion o
in the text, we note that, for Boethius,

6
Diver sum est esse et id quod est...,
esse and "that which is" are different...

Let us assume that "that which is" refers to an existing entity (ens).1 As
to the meaning of Esse, then, consider the following three broad
categories of suggestion:

1. Esse = the Essence of an ens ; e.g., in the case of Socrates, his

Humanity;8
2. Esse = the limited act of existence of an ens, (or the undetermined
actuality) which is limited by its form9
3. Esse = God, the forma essendi 10 and/or esse primum who is Pure
Being and Pure Good.

There are definitely some subtle distinctions which the above three
groupings conceal, but, for the sake of simplicity, let us take these groups
as at least representative of the various divergent philosophical positions
available in interpreting just a single phrase in the DH. Before moving on
to defend the prima facie likelihood of the third of these approaches, let
us consider, in at least a general way, the divergent philosophical

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 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE 59

implications which eventually follow from th

approach is what we may call an "essentialist
views Boethius's distinction between esse
nothing to do with "existence"; the distin
thing's being an entity (viz., in the case of
and its having an essence (viz., in the case of
As such, the axiom in question is, as Pi
reflective of early non-existential analyses,
with a view to his existence per se, but spea
individual entity in comparison with his occ
group of Humans. There is no sensitivity in
the presumably deeper question of how it is
THAT Socrates IS - taken either as an individual or as a member of a
larger group. In this respect, the 2nd and 3rd approaches may be seen as
"existentialist," for both of these approaches explain the distinction
between esse and id quod est in a way that demarcates esse as that which
directly addresses the deeper question of "how" it is that Socrates exists:
both treat esse as "existence" itself, or, that "by" which Socrates is,
thought each treatment proceeds quite differently. For, while both 2 and
3 treat esse as existence, hence pointing to the deeper issue of how
Socrates exists, the differences are significant: While the third approach
views Esse as referring to God, the Being above all beings, the second
approach views Esse as the particular existence of an individual entity -
not God, but the Existence of Socrates. One way to state this distinction,
then, between 2 and 3 is to take 2 as developing Esse as esse omnium,
and 3 as developing Esse as primum esse, where these two are taken to
be distinct.13
Let us proceed, then, to suggest why, prima facie, reading 3 is
the preferable reading of Boethius's distinction in the DH. Pierre Hadot
has, I think convincingly, suggested that the best way to approach the
Boethian text is with a philological and philosophical eye to the use of
terms and ideas in the late Hellenistic philosophical context in which he
was writing. As such, Hadot draws our attention to the development -
both in Porphyry and in Victorinus (where the actual Latin terminology
uses esse for to einai ) - of a distinction between esse (corresponding to
to einai ) and id quod est (corresponding to to on) as a known distinction
between the first and second Neoplatonic hypostases. As such, within his
philosophical context, there is support for prima facie viewing Boethius

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60 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE

as employing the term esse to refer to the tran

first hypostasis and Pure Being.
While I think that this is a powerful argum
third • approach, there is at least one problem t
account: The notion of the first hypostasis in t
developed in such a way that the First Esse eme
and infinitely unlimited activity above all form
though, it seems that that the First Esse - or G
treated as a Form - the Form of Being which is
existence for all things. For, on at least one pla
point of the DH is to claim that things are good
they take their existence from God, the first Be
fact, this relationship is described as a participa
participation, (as in the case of Socrates's partic
but an essential participation - a participation w
existence of the participant.15
That the nature of the relation is participat
from axiom 6:

Omne quod est participai eo quod est esse ut

Everything that is participates in that whic
it might exist...

If we take Esse as the First Being, then, in dem

"existential participation" as something distinct
participation, Boethius may be seen as answe
follows: existing things are good in virtue of th
Form of Being which is God, First Being an
Hadot' s development17 of the Porphyrian notio
we are to understand the conclusion of Boethius'
Porphyrian tradition, this First Being is not the
participated in; it is not a Form, but an unlimit
clear how exactly we should construe the
relationship between that First Being and any
world; for, as a purely transcendent hypostas
Being seems to bear no direct relationship to or
such, does not emerge in any obvious way as th
on the contrary, is drawn upon to explain the go
The Esse of the DH explains the goodness of all

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 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE 61

it is envisioned as the direct source - or Form - of their existence. It is

precisely the immanence of the First Esse , and not its capacity as a
Porphyrian transcendent variety of being, which does the philosophical
work in the DH, for it is precisely this conception of Esse as participated
in by all things which explains their goodness.18 The Porphyrian Esse as
a transcendent mode of being, then, does not seem at home within the
philosophical project of the DH, for such a transcendent mode of Esse is
not a 'participated in' Being, and as such, the relationship between things
and this transcendent Porphyrian Esse does not speak to the very core of
the DH thesis where it is precisely the participation of all things in
Esse - and not its transcendence - which explains why things are good.
For further support within Boethius for the idea that God, the
First Esse, is in fact participated in by lower beings, (again, in a way
which does not seem to characterize the transcendent Porphyrian Esse),
consider Consolation III19 where he is clearly comfortable (albeit in the
guise of Lady Philosophy) talking of existents participating in God:

For since men are made happy by the acquisition of happiness,

but happiness is itself divinity, it is obvious that they are made
happy by the acquisition of divinity. But as by the acquisition of
justice they become just, or by the acquisition of wisdom, wise,
so by the same argument they must, when they have acquired
divinity, become gods. Therefore, every happy man is a god,
though by nature God is one only: but nothing prevents there
being as many as you like by participation.

And, just to drive the point home, we find just a few pages later the
following exchange between Lady Philosophy and Boethius:

"But do you agree or not that everything which is

good is good by participation in the Good?"
"That is so."

Additionally, consider the De Trinitate ,20 in which work

Boethius overtly describes God as a "form without matter." This way of
describing God clearly supports the converse description of things as
related to God by participation - the "existential participation" which lies
at the very heart of Boethius's explanation in the DH of the goodness of
all existing things.

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62 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE

As such, it seems that there is at least a s

Boethius that does not actually treat the First
Esse "above" all forms but as, rather, the hig
ground this notion within Boethius that we t
sources.

First, there is some general support for Neop

influence on Boethius. We know, e.g., that Boethiu
mathematics (De lnstitutione Arithmetica) was "very close
the " Introduction to Arithmetic a decidedly neo-Pythago
Nicomachus of Gerasa (ca. 1st or 2nd c.22), and that hi
principles of music - a mathematical study of the nature o
their ratios - also reveals the direct influence of Nicomachean number
theory.23 In fact, Boethius's concern with all the members of the
quadrivium - as well as with the very notion of the quadrivium - is
Pythagorean in nature 24
Turning to the DH in particular, I argue at length elsewhere that
the esoteric reference to "hebdomads" in the work of Boethius that we
are currently speaking about is itself reflective of a Neopythagorean
theme. In effect, I argue that "hebdomads" are a reference in Boethius to
the Neopythagorean Nicomachus's doctrine recounted in the
Theologoumena Arithmeticae, in which the number "seven" (and,
accordingly, groups of sevens) is related to that aspect of God by which
He creates and sustains the world. While I will not here expand upon this
conception, suffice it to say that the conclusion I arrive at views
Boethius's reference to his "Hebdomads" in the opening lines of the
Quomodo Substantiae as drawing upon the theological and ontological
implications of the "Hebdomad," understood in the Nicomachean sense
as the creating and sustaining aspect of the Godhead.25
That Boethius was indebted to the Neopythagoreans, then, is
uncontroversially evident, regardless of whether one sees the reference to
Hebdomads as illustrative of this influence.
To see, then, the sense in which the Neopythagorean influence
may emerge as helpful in our attempt to understand the notion of Esse as
the Form of Being, (as opposed to Esse as unlimited activity above all
form), consider Nicomachus on the nature of the supreme monad. In his
writings, we find the description of the supreme Monad as Limit - not
the unlimited being of Porphyry and other texts. As Limit, the Monad is
seen as imposing limit on the unlimited flow of otherness, associated
with the indefinite dyad. As such, on this picture, it is clear that

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 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE 63

"unlimitedness" is not associated with the hig

being is pure Limit. This idea, then, lends sup
as a Form: the supreme Being emerges as a L
responsible, as any form is, of imposing ord
otherness.
Consider, in this regard, Nicomachus's rem
Theologoumena (or, The Theology of Arithme

Each thing in the world is one in accordan

systematizing monad in it, and again, ev
far as it partakes of the dyad, connect
matter; wherefore first their congre
multitude... For as rennet curdles flow
creative and active faculty, so the unify
advancing upon the dyad, source of easy m
down, infixed a bound and a form, tha
triad; for this is the beginning of actual n

This sort of claim by Nicomachus expresses g

Monad to rennet that curdles flowing mi
principle of Limit in this particular system; in
ordering - or unifying - of the disorder of l
flow of otherness) is described as fixing "f
precisely by introducing elements of Limit, S
boundlessness of otherness that the Monad, a
In the case of an entity, we might see this as
boundlessness of that entity's matter by bein
which the entity partakes - or participates. A
Being, as Unity itself, orders all things, inasm
unity.29
Turning to Boethius' own Introduction to Arithmetic, it is no
doubt considerations such as these that have led Professor Stephen Gersh
to describe that work as revealing "the doctrine that number is a
transcendent principle contained in God's mind and serving as the
archetype of the visible creation,"30 and concluding furthermore that
"...[Boethius] follows the [neo-Pythagorean] tradition's identification of
number and form with the divinity itself."31 This notion of God as Form,
then, is precisely what we have been hoping to find in an attempt to
make sense of the Esse of DH - not as an unlimited activity but as a

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64 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE

limiting form - Unity itself - in which al

participation which is undeniably evidenced
simply say, individuation) which characte
existence.
As Limit, God emerges in this picture as the highest of all
Forms - not as above all forms; and He likewise more clearly emerges as
the repository of the existence of all things, not simply as a transcendent
mode of Being. For, in the Neopythagorean picture, the supreme Monad
stands in a direct relation to all that follows it, in that it is the Form
which imposes Limit on the infinite flow of otherness, thus resulting in
discrete entities. As Form, we may say that things "participate" in Him,
and that He is directly the limit of every existing thing: It is by partaking
of the order of this first Limiting Existential Form that all things exist as
distinct, unified entities.32 It is by this notion of God as Limit and
Form - and not here His transcendent (or Porphyrian) aspect - which
best answers the question of the DH: How is it that things are Good? It is
in virtue of their partaking in the existence of that most supreme Form
which is the Good itself.

Department of Philosophy
The Ohio State University
350 University Hall
230 Oval Mall
Columbus, OH 43210-1365

Notes

1 Special thanks to Professors Peter King and Calvin Normore

whose 1997 "De Hebdomadibus" seminar at The Ohio State University
inspired my thinking about this treatise, and to Andrew Arlig for useful
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also
like to thank the International Boethius Society for allowing me the
opportunity to present this paper at the 34th International Medieval
Congress in Kalamazoo, May 1999.
The treatise was composed by Boethius in 521, towards the end
of his writing career.

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 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE 65

3 Of the extant medieval commentato

century gloss sometimes attributed to Eriug
of Arras (ca. 1 187) both share the sort of po
with Thierry. (Note, though, that the
distinguishes the meaning of esse from that o
describes esse in the way that Thierry and C
and ipsum esse). More contemporarily, Pierre
this view, as I will discuss, (see Pierre Hadot,
de l'étant dans le De Hebdomadibus de Boece," in Miscellanea
Mediaevalia, ed. P. Wilpert II (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1963): 147 -
153; and " Forma Essendi: interprétation philologique et interprétation
philosophique d'une formule de Boece" Les Etudes Classiques, 38,
1970: 143 - 156). For the medieval commentaries, see: the 9 -century
gloss of the DH (sometimes attributed to Eriugena), in E. K. Rand,
Quellen und Untershuchungen (München, 1906), vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 50-56;
Gilbert of Poitiers (1085/90-1154) in The Commentaries on Boethius by
Gilbert of Poitiers, N.M Häring, ed. (Toronto 1966); Thierry of Chartres,
(after 1 1 56) in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and his
School, N.M. Häring, ed. (Toronto 1971); Clarembald of Arras (ca.
1187) in Life and Works of Clarembald of Arras (Toronto 1965), pp.
187-221, (the commentary itself is ca. 1157-8); and, of course, the
commentary by Thomas Aquinas - cf. S. Thomas Aquinatis, Opuscula
Theologica, vol. 2, M. Calcaterra, O.P., ed. (Taurini, Marietti, 1954);
also, Peter O'Reilly, Sancii Thomae de Aquino Super Librum Boetii "De
Hebdomadibus," An edition and study, (Dissertation), (Toronto: PIMS,
1960). For a useful summary (and critical treatment) of Thomist views
on the DH, as well as a careful analysis of Aquinas's treatment of the
text, see Ralph Mclnerny, Boethius and Aquinas (Washington: CUA
Press, 1990), pp. 161 ff.
Note, each of these views differs in its details, but, as I hope to
show, may all be seen as sharing an understanding of the Ipsum Esse in
the 2nd axiom. Hadot's position, e.g., differs significantly from these
other positions with respect to his view of the forma essendi which
Hadot - looking to Porphyry - finds to refer to a variety of being below
Esse itself, while Thierry, e.g., equates Esse with the Forma Essendi. I
group these thinkers together, then, only with respect to their view on
Esse as the highest being of all.

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66 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE

5 At least in its occurrence in the early

second - or, the second and third - axiom
counts the axioms) in the DH text, most of
9th-century commentator as a notable excep
esse as referring to the same thing, viz., that
from id quod est.
Boethius, Theological Tractates, ed. and
Rand and S. J. Tester, Loeb Classical Libr
University Press, 1973), p. 40 (Latin).
7 Pierre Hadot, whose understanding o
understanding that I will here advance t
existing ens in the sense of an existing
demarcating the 2nd hypostasis, (and, perha
to anything - concrete or not - which is "oth
While I agree with Hadot' s more subtle treat
current purposes, though, I will simply trea
existing ens in order to most easily draw m
focus on esse as some aspect of existing thin
For Hadot's view, op. cit.
For proponents of variations on this ap
Poitiers and the 9 -century gloss, (op. cit.
Scott MacDonald, "Boethius's Claim that
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, Ba
Pierre Duhem, Le Système du Monde, Tom
Roland-Gosselin's chapter on Boethius in the
edition of Aquinas's De ente et essentia (P
critique of this "essentialist" position as part
reading of Boethius, (as well as summari
views) see Mclnerny [19901, 161-198, and 249
9 While this is not what Thomas says in
occurrence of the term esse in this early
calling the "2nd axiom" but which Thomas c
how Thomas views the notion of esse as it a
God thing. As such, this is Aquinas's unders
divide between esse and id quod est in the ca
God, (as well as Aquinas's own metaphysical
some - Hadot, e.g. - take Aquinas's view
comment on esse v. id quod est within the e

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 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE 67

dichotomy refers merely to the conceptual di

between the "existence" and the "essence" of
tells us, Boethius is here not yet intending to b
to either the particular case of God (in which
the esse and id quod est turn out to be one an
of non-God entities (in which, Boethius will
and id quod est are not one and the same). For
id quod est distinction in the early Boet
conceptual divide, and not - as is the
implications of that divide in the case of an in
What I have put in "2" above, then, is not T
occurs in the axiom we are looking at per se,
understand his view of esse in the text as it a
For the sake of comparison, then, I have inc
though this view is not put forth by Thomas
esse in the early axiom, it is a third way to th
compare the id quod est of an existing (non-Go
Fr. Lawrence Dewan who drew to my attentio
this is in fact not Thomas' position with re
axiom.
Furthermore, for a clearer sense of wh
position of Thomas's is in fact different fr
admittedly, there is a fine line here), see the l
paper.
10 Note, while Thierry and Clarembald de
as Forma Essendi, Hadot describes the First Be
and takes the Forma Essendi as instead refe
being" which is a variety of being which diff
See Hadot [1970], p. 153. In what follows, I wi
notion of the First Esse in the De Hebdomadib
speaking, best seen as the Forma Essendi its
Boethian corpus, we find support for treating
not as merely above all form (as is the case
Esse).
11 This view is attributed to Boethius by many Thomists who, as
Mclnerny describes the situation, seek to "reserve" "existentialist"
metaphysical views to Aquinas. Mclnerny, op cit.
Duhem, op. cit., esp., p. 289.

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68 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE

13 In support of my claim that Aquinas' s

developing Esse as esse omnium, (and not as P
reading of Aquinas favored by Hadot), see Mc
Hadot [1970], 151-52. As such, Hadot c
there are only two ways to best render forma
id quod est ( l'étant ) is when (1) "it receives t
when (2) it takes on its proper way of exerci
favors this second rendering.
15 Inasmuch as we take the DH not a
analysis, but as more of a logical analysis, th
"pre-existing its own participation in the sour
arise in any interesting way, it would seem.
16 Stewart, p. 42.
Note, even those who have questione
Porphyry called the first hypostasis to einai a
first hypostasis is "above to on," and is, a
transcendent One. This latter claim is really
here. For criticism of Hadot' s ascription of t
commentary (in which this association is
hypostasis and to einai as a higher mode of t
as for a general discussion of these issues
Smith, "HYPOSTASIS and HYPARXIS in Po
Taormina, eds., Hyparxis e Hypostasis nel
1994): 33-41.
18 This is not to deny that such a transcen
Being occurs as well; in the De Trinitate, e.
"supra-substantiality" seems to reveal this ver
Stewart, p. 281, (cf. also p. 333).
20 See, e.g., Loeb De Trinitate, p. 1 1: "...t
Form without matter..."; p. 19; "...He is Form
See John Marenbon, Early Medieval P
An Introduction. Second Edition. (London:
Others describe the close relationship b
Boethius's mathematical treatises as the latter
Latin of the former (see Kenneth S. Gu
Sourcebook and Library: An Anthology of
Relate to Pythagoras and Pythagorean Philoso
p. 41), or at least a "a very free transla

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 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE 69

Boethius's The Principles of Music, (1967), p

tracking of the correlation between chapters
Nicomachus's original, see Henry Chadwick, Boethius: The
Consolations of Music, Logic, Theology and Philosophy (Oxford
University Press, 1981), pp. 71-78. For a detailed account of the
differences between Boethius's and Nicomachus's text, see Martin
Luther D'Ooge, Nicomachus of Gerasa: Introduction to Arithmetic.
With Studies in Greek Arithmetic by Frank Egleston Robbins and Louis
Charles Karpiński. (University of Michigan Studies; Humanistic Series,
Volume XVI). (New York: The Macmillan Co., Ltd., 1926) pp. 1 33-
137.
22 Dating the life of Nicomachus is done indirectly, and is hence
not fully certain. We know from references in his works, for example,
that he lived during or after the reign of Tiberius, and we have good
reason to suppose that he lived before Ptolemy flourished. See John
Dillon, The Middle Platonists. (New York: Cornell, 1977) p. 352, and
D'Ooge, Nicomachus of Gerasa, Ch. V.
23 In addition to the influence of Nicomachus on Boethius'
musical writings through the former's mathematical work, Boethius
makes reference throughout his musical treatise to specifically musical
teachings of Nicomachus. As these musical references do not appear in
Nicomachus's Manual of Harmonics (his brief extant musical work), we
can infer that Boethius must have had access to a longer, more
substantial treatise on music by Nicomachus (which is no longer extant).
See Calvin Bower, Principles of Music, pp. 338 ff. For additional
discussion of the Pythagorean underpinnings to Boethius's Treatise on
Music, see Chadwick, Boethius, pp. 78-101, and Calvin Bower's
"Boethius and Nicomachus, an essay concerning the sources of De
Institutione Musica," Vivarium 16 (1978) 1-45.
24 See Chadwick, Boethius, Ch. 2. On the relation of the
Pythagorean quadrivium to Plato, see Philip Merlan, From Platonism to
Neoplatonism (The Hague, 1975) Ch. 4.
Furthermore, in a more general way, consider the DH
conception of God as a "first Good" who "flows" forth as a constant
source of all Being and Goodness. Substances are called good, Boethius
concludes, because "esse eorum a boni volúntate defluxiť (Rand,
Boethius, p. 46), that is, because their existence '' flowed down " from the
will of the good (viz., from the will of God, the first good). (Note, the

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70 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE

English is my own.) Rand translates (p. 47):

from the will of the good." While "derive
stem from the very notion of "flowin
r/vw5=stream), in the actual English use of t
implication of "flowing" or "streaming"
decision to not translate " defluxif as "fl
Boethius's choice of verb, which, as we w
philosophically relevant in this context).
We find similarly throughout the tre
occurrences of the verb "to flow" (fluere ) an
( defluere ), used to describe the activity of
Being and Goodness to all other existents. F
of verbs, this obvious notion of God as th
flows forth is extremely important, as it r
Neopythagorean influence in the work.
Parts of this work are extant in Ph
Byzantine patriarch (cf. Photius, Bibliot
anonymous compilation (usually attribut
Theologoumena Arithmeticae, which was fir
Friedrich Ast (Leipzig, 1817). The compilatio
excerpts, including whole sections of Nicom
For a discussion of why this anonymous com
to Iamblichus, see, e.g., Dominic J. O'M
Mathematics and Philosophy in Late Ant
Press, 1989) p. 15 note 24, and D'Ooge, Ni
(where additionally, arguments are offered f
excerpts within this anonymous - or Iambli
actually from Nicomachus' work of the sam
For an edition of the Greek text of this
than Ast's, see Victorius de Falco (ed.), [I
Arithmeticae, Bibliotheca Scriptorum
Teubneriana (Leipzig: Teubner, 1922). For th
Waterfield, The Theology of Arithmetic: On
and Cosmological Symbolism of the First
Iamblichus (Phanes Press, 1988).
Theologoumena Arithmeticae, p. 8 (Ast
Luther D'Ooge, Nicomachus of Gerasa: Intro
Studies in Greek Arithmetic by Frank E

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 CARMINA PHILOSOPHIAE 71

Charles Karpiński (University of Michigan

Volume XVI), (New York: The Macmillan C
italics.
This becomes clearer, when, e.g., we no
beginning of number - is seen as the first "li
"multitude" is the infinite limitlessness of t
the result of the monad's imposition of t
limitlessness. See D'Ooge, Nicomachus of G
description in Boethius, see Michael Masi,
Translation of the De Institutione Arithm
Antiquity - Volume 6), (Amsterdam: Rodo
the essentials of this idea come from Aristotle.
For further details on the Nicomachean (and more generally,
the Pythagorean) philosophical system, see D'Ooge, Nicomachus of
Gerasa: Introduction to Arithmetic, esp. F. E. Robbins's exposition, pp.
88-123.
30 Stephen Gersh, Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The
Latin Tradition, Vol. II (University of Notre Dame Press, 1986) p. 655.
31 Ibid., p. 667, fn. 76.
Consider, furthermore, the importance of this idea of Being as
Limit in bringing into even greater relief the distinction between
approaches 2 and 3 above. For Aquinas, (approach #2), the Being which
is God is unlimited act, whereas the source of limitation is seen as
stemming from the more mundane "forms" which essentially
characterize all non-God substances. On a Neopythagorean appreciation
of 3, though, we have the opposite dynamic at play: Limit is associated
with the Form of Being, God, Himself; Esse, then, does not merely refer
to the limited (or limiting of) existence of (or by) a particular ens, but,
refers to God, the Pure Esse which is the universal principle of Limit in
the case of every entity. If the limiting relationship between Being and
id quod est were - as in approach 2 - one in which the id quod est limits
Being, it would stand to reason that the Esse relevant to a given id quod
est would be its limited "slice" of Being. If, however, the limiting
relationship is rather one in which God, as Form of Being, imposes limit
on each and every id quod est - äs is the case in a Neopythagorean
understanding of 3 - then, the relevant Esse in the case of a given id
quod est is God Himself.

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