Hylomorphism and Substantial Gradualism

Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia
Hylomorphism and Substantial Gradualism

Author(s): GABRIELE DE ANNA
Source: Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, T. 71, Fasc. 4, Metafísica: Problemas
Contemporâneos / Metaphysics: Contemporary Issues (2015), pp. 855-872
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Revista Portuguesa de Filosofía, 2015, Vol. 71 (4), p. 855-872
© 2015 by Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia. All rights reserved.
DOI 10.1 7990/RPF/20 1 5_7 1_4_0855
Hylomorphism and Substantial Gradualism

GABRIELE DE ANNA*
Resumo
Recentemente o hilemorfismo - a visão tradicional, segundo a quai, as subst

constituídas pela composição de forma e matéria - tem sido alvo de renovado
Este artigo centra-se na substancia material, sugerindo que, neste caso, a co
hilemórfica requer uma nova concepção de forma que deve ser entendida tam
energia, ou o exercício de uma força. Posteriormente argumenta-se em favor do
substancial: quando a forma é assim entendida, a substancialidade aparece em "
é, as coisas podem ser substâncias em maior ou menor grau. O gradualismo subst
trazer uma nova luz sobre os actuais debates sobre a identificação das partes das s
e sobre a compatibilidade entre o hilemorfismo e o categorialismo.
Palavras-chave : forma, gradualismo substancial, hilemorfismo, matéria, substân
Abstract
Hylomorphism, the old traditional view according to which substances are constituted by the
combination of form and matter, has recently undergone a renaissance. This essay focuses
on material substance, and suggests that in this case the hylomorphic constitution calls
for a notion of form which should be understood also as energy, or the exercise of a force.
It further argues for substantial gradualism: when form is thus understood, substantiality
comes in degrees, i.e. things can be substances to a greater or lesser degree. Substantial
gradualism sheds new light on current discussions concerning the identification of the parts
of substances and the compatibility between hylomorphism and sortalism.
Keywords : form, hylomorphism, matter, substance, substantial gradualism
1. Introduction
Hylomorphism
Hylomorphism by can can
the bebecombination by
traced isatbackleast
traced back tothe
the view combination
at of form
Aristotle leastbutaccording and of
Aristotleform
it hastorecently matter. toand
come which butmatter. Thehas isview
The objects it view are recentlyisveryvery
constitutedold, andand
old, come
back into fashion in the analytic tradition. This is seen particularly in
discussions in philosophy of mind1 and mereology.2 In philosophy of mind,
* Universität Bamberg, Germany, and Università di Udine, Italy.

E-mail : gabriele.de-anna@uni-bamberg.de
1. Cf., Haldane, John - "A Return to Form in the Philosophy of Mind". Ratio, 11, 1998,
pp. 253-276.
2. Cf., Fine, Kit -"Things and Their Parts". Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23, 1999,
pp. 61-74; Johnston, Mark- "Hylomorphism". Journal of Philosophy, 103, 2006, pp. 652-698.
I 855-872
856 Gabriele De Anna
the revival of metaphysics has m

cognitive ties that connect ment
has been accounted for by some
about wholes and their parts, hy
problems that traditional mer
object together. In recent yea
become common, with many i
It seems fair to say that deba
direction to more traditional d
theory of substances, within th
I have defined hylomorphism
are constituted by the combin
leaves the door open to several
objects, but also abstract objec
could, at least prima facie, apply
claimed that the premises are
conceive the argument as an a
be interpreted in many ways:
material object, or to any physi
A sound can also be seen as a combination of form of matter: a chord is a
certain structure of constituting sounds.
In this essay I will deal only with every day, middle-sized material
objects, that are traditionally called substances. My main claim will be
that in the case of material substances, the hylomorphic constitution calls
for a notion of form which should be understood also as energy, as the
exercise of a force (section two). I will also contend that, when form is
thus understood, substantiality comes in degrees, i.e. things can be more
or less substances (section three). I call this thesis substantial gradualism.
In section four, I will discuss how substantial gradualism may have a
bearing on some contemporary discussions concerning the identification
of the parts of substances and the compatibility between hylomorphism
and sortalism. I will conclude with some remarks about some metaphysical
consequences of substantial gradualism. Metaphysics has to cut reality at
the joints, but there are different kinds of joints and we can follow different
threads to separate parts depending on what our interests, preoccupations
or necessities are. Substantial gradualism allows us to account for this
variety.
Vol. 71
Fase 4 (J RPF 2015
Hylomorphism and Substantial Gradualism 857
2. Hylomorphism and material substances
According to Mark Johnstons comprehensive analy

morphic constitution of an object in general (i.e. not neces
object) concerns the bonding of the genuine parts of an
which are not just fiat parts, but which capture real su
object)3 by a principle of unit. This is a canonical form of th
such genuine parts and principle of unity:
[PPU] What it is for... (the item is specified here)... t

(some parts are specified here) ...to have the propert
in the relation ... (the principle of unity is specified
It can be observed that a principle of unity, then, ma

("for the item to be is..."). This means that to be, for an item
a unity obtained by a joining together of proper parts, ca
principle of unity.
Different versions of contemporary hylomorphism di
the form (the principle of unity) carries out its functio
some, the form is not one of the parts.5 Others claim th
one of the parts, although not one of the proper parts of th
would be more ways of slicing up an object in significant
distinguish proper parts; another one is to distinguish m
proper parts) and form (the principle of unity).6 Still oth
form must be one of the proper parts of the object.7
The latter possibility is ruled out by an argument tha
Aristotle but that is still employed by contemporary philoso
were one of the parts of an item, it could not explain how it
is joined together to the other parts of the item, and a furt
unity would thereby be required. This would lead to an i
3. The fiat parts of an objects are those which are disclosed by an "a
of divisions of that item" (Johnston - "Hylomorphism", cit., p. 656), wh
is disclosed by "a principle of division" for that item which is associate
non-arbitrary function characteristic of a principle of unity for that item
4. Johnston - "Hylomorphism", cit., p. 658.
5. Ibidem, p. 674.
6. Fine - "Things and Their Parts", cit., p. 64.
7. Koslicki, K. - "Aristotle's Mereology and the Status of Form"
Philosophy, 103, 2006, pp. 715-736; cf., p. 733.
8. Johnston - "Hylomorphism", cit., p. 674; Marmodoro, Anna - "Ar
phism without Reconditioning". Philosophical Inquiry, 36, 2013, pp. 5-22
Vol. 71 -Jķ,
Fase 4 ff ŘPF 2015
Deciding between the other

different intuitions lead us in d
of a mosaic. The mosaic is ju
certain way, i.e. having a part
unity is the spatial disposition
individual, i.e. a trope, must be
This example presses us to emb
of a mereological sum made of
of my friend Luke and a certa
bonded into an object by my (or
sum. Nothing in that object se
and this suggests that the first
not one of the parts.
The fact that different exam
suggests that we should consider
unity, and define that concept i
different intuitions. In order to
unity are, what they do, and ho
on one kind of object. Given the
scheme, I will consider everyda
Johnston suggests that a theo
and so it should not focus on o
illegitimately apply results obta
of reality. By contrast, I think t
composition is always the same
which applies to all possible
differences among different t
for diverse articulations of ou
hylomorphism in a familiar ty
conclusions we reach can be ex
sufficiently similar to the typ
only partially, when the new ty
are different in relevant ways
results could be extended differ
these different in different rele
justify my way of proceeding, a
extensions of my results to othe
Let us consider material su
material objects. These entit
meaning that they do not inhe
(e.g. properties) inhere in them
Vol. 71
Fase. 4 Q RPF 2015
that their existence is in some relevant sense independent f

existing things. Material substances are the basic particular
identify and re-identify, and through which identify and re-ide
particulars-9
The most familiar examples of material substances - an
chair - have a certain compactness. Their parts are bond
and they to some degree resist attempts to rip them apart. T
resistance to attempts to penetrate them, i.e. to occupy the
fill. The strength of bonds keeping the parts together can ha
degrees, depending on the kind of substance it is and on othe
features. The principle of unity of a material thing is the g
forces bonding the parts of the thing together. By the ground of
I mean whatever implies the existence of that pattern of for
this might or might not be identified with (a part of) the thing
Someone might wonder whether the identity of the form
and the forces keeping the parts of that thing together is re
possibility. Indeed, we might be reminded that Johnston ha
what keeps the parts of a thing together can be the form of th
were so, what keeps the parts together would become one of the
we would end up in the problem of the regress of forms mentio
For example, a model airplane: the glue keeping the pieces o
together is another part of the airplane, and cannot be its form
the pressure of this argument convince me to deny that fo
identified with the forces keeping together the parts of things?
I think that this objection does not affect my position.
argument concerns things that can be considered parts of th
the glue in the airplane. My claim concerns forces, i.e. the
power that parts of the object have. So, in his example, I wou
that the glue could be (a part of) the form, but that the forces
exercises when it sticks to other parts and keeps the airplane to
be such. I would agree that the glue is just another part.
Usually forms are generally identified as the structures of th
arrangements of their parts: why do we need to bring in forces?
that the mere structure or arrangement of the parts of a materia
not seem sufficient to account for the compactness and imp
of a thing, which I have mentioned above. Let us consider t
of the model airplane again. Let us imagine that we someho
9. Strawson, Peter F. -Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphy

Methuen, 1959; cf., Ch. 3.
Vol. 71
Fase 4 Q RPF 2015
the sticking power of the glue, w

the parts, including the glue, sti
before the deactivation process, an
arrangement of its parts are still t
unity: if we try to lift it by holding
The view that forces must b
constituents of a material thing
among either the matter (parts)
thing. I need to justify why I thin
Certainly, forces are in the things
they must be their parts. However
included among the proper parts i
which have to be included in a de
does. Forces are not parts in this s
Furthermore, not all forces whic
are entailed by the principle of un
proper parts together are relevant
in two parts by cutting it with
cut in two parts and lose their fun
and the two parts in which many
proper parts of the watch. The for
(e.g. the bonds keeping together
of the watch are made) were no
watch, and so do not figure in the
they were keeping together the pa
figured in the principles of unity o
A further distinction needs to b
sorts of proper parts. Some prop
exist, others are not. Take a human
no legs, but she cannot survive wi
heart (or a transplanted heart, or
of her heart). Legs or arms seem t
fiat parts: they can be disclosed
a natural, non-arbitrary function
human beings. However, PPU claims
its proper parts unified by a prin
object without some of its proper
hands would not exist, and this i
call for a rejection of PPU, but onl
far as we mention parts which a
that we should distinguish amon
VoL 71 ^ -
Fase 4 ¿T RPF 2015
which are needed for a thing to be, and accidental those

needed for a thing to exist. We should then rephrase
[PPUE] What it is for... (the item is specified here)...
(the essential parts are specified here) ... to have th
or stand in the relation ... (an essential principle
specified here)
Accidental proper parts, however, are also proper p
suggests that a statement of their relation to a thing m
We can note that by having an essential proper part (tog
other essential proper parts and with the relevant princ
a thing is. By having an accidental proper part (or a cer
them) tied to the whole by a relevant principle of unity, a c
is acquired. E.g.by having a heart functioning in a proper
manner with the rest of the vital organs, a human being live
hand, properly functioning in a coordinated manner with
body, a certain man has the property of having a hand. T
example: in virtue of having an engine my car exists, but in
the body covered with layers of red paint, my car is re
the following statement of the relation among a thing a
accidental proper parts:
[PPU A] What it is for. . . (the item is specified here). . . to hav

F is for... (some relevant accidental parts are spe
... to have the property or stand in the relation ... (a
principle of unity of the parts among themselve
item is specified here).
This suggests that a material substance has an essent

several accidental forms, since many of its properties w
some accidental proper part of it to have a certain prop
certain relation with it, and with other parts of it.
3. Substantial gradualism
The refinement of PPU that we have arrived at above accounts for
some of the features of material substances that I have pointed to, but
it is not yet quite enough. Let us remember that I started from the need
to account for the compactness and solidity of material substances
The refinement so far suggested allows us to distinguish accidental from
essential parts. But a dimension of the complexity of material substances
and their categorization is still untouched. Proper parts, accidental and
VoL 71
Fase 4 ff RPF 2015
essential, can also be made of

be made of parts, and so on. A
parts which are molecules, and
Atoms have also parts: electrons
made of subatomic particles. How
research and for philosophica
there are layers of substance-pa
a substance at one layer can be a
I would like now to suggest tha
sized objects which we call mat
principles of unity at different
make my point I will take as e
One must take care with this e
not properly substance-terms, h
the sort of relation between ma
one is careful about the ambig
imagine a piece of diamond, a
conglomerate rock, all with the s
we identify and re-identify in o
manner. However, their unities a
The diamond is an allotrope o
are tied together by strong cova
cubic crystal structure. This m
keeping the piece of diamond to
act on the atoms, at their level.
relation in the case of the diamond should be this:
[PPUdiamoJ What it is for the piece of diamond d to be is for (a sufficient

subset of) the carbon atoms filling in the region of space
occupied by d to stand in a relation of covalent bonding
generating a face-centered cubic crystal structure .
The pure piece of limestone is made of molecules of calcium carbonate

(CaC03), which take a certain crystalline structure (let us say that our
example is pure calcite). What keeps the piece of limestone together are
the bonds among molecules of calcium carbonate, and hence this is the
statement of its parts-principle of unity relation:
[PPUlimestone] What it is for the piece of limestone 1 to be is for (a sufficient

subset of) the calcium carbonate molecules filling in the
region of space occupied by 1 to stand in a relation of
bonding generating a calcite crystal structure.
Vol. 71
Fase 4 ff 2015
The case of the piece of conglomerate rock is still differe

fragments of minerals, crystals, various rocks, pieces o
detritus of different kinds were cemented together by pres
the piece together is the weak chemical bonds generated a
pieces composing the rock during the formation proces
the mechanical adhesion of the pieces one to the other, d
Each piece of crystal is kept together by its own, and the
whole is the resultant of the combination of all the weak for
small pieces together. The statement of the parts-principle o
in the case of the piece of conglomerate will be thus the foll
[PPUconglom] What it is for the piece of conglomerate c

sufficient subset of) the pieces of debris filling in
of space occupied by c to be bonded together by
of weak chemical or mechanical bonds which giv
a compact unity .
In each case, the principle of unity plays a role quite d

that played in the other cases. In the case of the limeston
of unity entails a pattern of forces at the level of atomic bo
of the limestone, it involves bonds at the level of molecul
the conglomerate it concerns ties among pieces of stones a
One could be tempted to claim that the compactness and
of a material substance depends on the level at which its prin
structures its matter: in the example, the diamond is h
limestone, and the limestone is harder than the conglom
things are not so straightforward, although there is cert
between compactness and depth at which a principle of
That the relation is not a simple, binary, relation can be illu
example of water. Water seems to have a principle of unity w
at the level of the principle of unity of [PPUiimestonJ- ®ut w
and more penetrable than conglomerates. The problem s
the bonds keeping the molecules of water together (at least a
in which it is liquid) are weaker that the bonds keeping
together. This means that principles of unity operating a
may give rise to different degrees of compactness: comp
function of the level at which a principle of unity operates.
At the same time, however, it seems that the level at wh
of unity operates is relevant in determining the degree of co
material substance. Let us consider some examples which i
in this direction. The example of diamond suggests that t
v°l. 71
Fase. 4 Q RPF 2015
compactness of the diamond d

bonds that keep atoms togethe
of the compactness of the diam
compactness of the limestone
the level at which the principle
can be stronger than the stron
be stronger than the strongest b
the example of a custard crea
ingredients are melted together
the molecules of the parts are
or at least broken in very sma
other particles of different kin
other hand, it is the mere dispo
other which keeps them togethe
But there is more. So far,
material substance in a purely
which tie parts together. Howev
substance depends also on the un
In this sense, custard cream an
conglomerate stone. Or a watch
its pieces cannot be taken apar
conglomerate stone can be reduc
The property of compactness,
that there are different degr
But unity is the property of b
independent from other thing
both the above intuitions abou
theses, the thesis of degrees o
degrees of unification (DU):
(DS) A substance can be such

degrees, depending on the d
(DU) A principle of unity c

different degrees, dependin
entails operate on the parts
(DS) accounts for our intuiti

things and it states that the mo
the parts of a thing are bonded
hence is in itself and by itself
links among the parts of a thing
Vol. 71
Fase. 4 ¿T RPF 2015
the forces implied by it operate the process of unification

"controls" matter at the level of subatomic particles give
the thing of which it is a form than a form which controls
level. This suggests that substantiality comes in degrees
of the parts-principle of unity relation should take into
substantial gradualism :
[PPUEsg] What it is for... (the item is specified h

substance at degree d (with 0<d<l) is for... (th
parts are specified here) ...to have the property
the relation... (an essential principle of unity i
here), depending the degree d on the level at w
forces implied by the principle of unity constrain
of the substance.
[PPUdiamoJ> [PPUlimestoJ aïld [PPUco„g.o„J COuld be rephrased

accordingly, specifying different degrees at which unification and
substantiality is achieved. [PPUdiamond] will purport the highest degree of
substantiality among the three. Even in absolute terms, that is among the
highest degrees of substantiality that we can experience, at least given our
cognitive capacities. [PPUconglom ] will rank at a lower level of the scale of
substantiality. Lower positions in the scale will be occupied by substances
such us heaps, and even lower levels by mere mereological sums.
So far I have considered material substances as timeless objects, i.e.
objects the essential parts of which belong to them regardless of the time
in which they exist. The examples I used were employed in a way which
avoided problems of time. However, some material substances are such
that their essential parts belong to them throughout their whole existence,
whereas others change their parts as they go through time. This is
Fines distinction between rigid and variable embodiment.10 Substance
gradualism is compatible with this distinction and [PPUEsg] can be
rephrased accordingly:
[PPUEsgt] What it is for... (the item is specified here)... to be at t a

substance at degree d (with Ośdśl) is for... (the parts which
are essential at t are specified here) ...to have the property
or stand in the relation... (an essential principle of unity is
specified here), depending on the degree d on the level at
which the forces implied by the principle of unity constrain
the parts of the substance.
10. Fine - "Things and Their Parts", cit., p. 65-72.
VoL 71
Fase 4 Q RPF 2015
The difference between ri

played here by the relation whic
Some principles of unity purport
throughout the whole existence
of unity purport that parts are
organism is an example of th
environment throughout its ent
it at each time is determined by
the expression of its principle of
4. Identity of parts and
Substantial gradualism highl

substances depends on the str
on the hylomorphic structure
one hand, categorizing things
of our conceptual abilities, s
spatio-temporal framework. T
substance", for things which h
since each of them is kept toget
might be different form that
kinds. At one extreme, principle
other extreme, there are things
which are unified only by our
(e.g., mereological sums). On t
that in some cases our identifi
which are deeply rooted in reali
The upshot of this remark
terms of substances: after all, th
seems to be constitutive of ou
substances can be such to diff
talk about substances with the
very diverse. We talk about s
that we can identify and re-id
conceptual framework, but -
not all exist in the same way or
In this way, substantial gr
difficulties which have been r
11. Strawson - Individuals , ed. cit., C
Vol. 71 -
Fase 4 ¿T ŘPF 2015
the context of discussions on hylomorphism. Before getting int

of this, however, I will lay down some preliminary remarks, by
the relevance of substantial gradualism for some recent issue
hylomorphism. This will clarify certain issues which will be
what follows.
Anna Marmodoro has complained that recent interpretations of
Aristotle's hylomorphism grant him the view that matter and form are
mereological constituents of things.12 When form is a taken to be a part,
however, one has the problem of explaining what keeps the parts together
- as we have seen above - and this problem leads the above interpreters
to "recondition" Aristotle's hylomorphism.13 Marmodoro rightly stresses
that in Aristotle's view form is not a mereological part of a substance.
According to Aristotle's position matter and form constitute a new thing,
the substance, which is not just the sum of its parts:
being unified into a whole re-identifies the parts in a way they cannot
be when apart from the whole. The parts are re-identified according to
the unifying principle of the whole, the substantial form. If they were
severed from the whole, they would lose their functional identity, which
is conferred to them by the form, on the basis of their role in the whole
substance. Thus, if severed, the parts would lose their form and become
like (originative) matter is to the substance it can constitute.14
(The word 're-identification' is not used here in the same sense in

which it was used above. Above it referred to the identification of a thing
as the same thing as one previously perceived. Here it refers to a change in
the identity of a thing).
An illustration of the point is made through the example of the parts of
living animals. Marmodoro concludes that - contrary to the contemporary
interpretations she discusses - a principle of unity is not any item which
stands among the parts and "collects them somehow together into a
whole", but rather "the substantial form is an operation on the elements
of a substance, stripping them of their distinctness, rather than being an
item in the ontology".15
12. Koslicki - "Aristotle's Mereology and the Status of Form", cit., pp. 715-736; Lowe,
Jonathan -"A neo-Aristotelian Substance Ontology: neither Relational nor Constituent."
In: Thako, Thomas - Contemporary Aristotelian Metaphysics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2012, pp. 229-247. Rea, Michael - "Hylomorphism Reconditioned".
Philosophical Perspectives, 25, 201 1, pp. 341-58.
13. Marmodoro - "Aristotles hylomorphism without Reconditioning", cit., p. 6.
14. Ibidem, p. 15.
15. Ibidem, p. 17.
VoL 71 -
Fase 4 Q RPF 2015
Besides the exegetical point t

argument is strong: form canno
and it must then be seen as an o
parts) into a unity (the substanc
the parts involved. The exampl
supports this claim.
The view, however, can be ch
examples of substances do not se
parts: the gears of a watch rem
the watch also after being mou
a principle of unity does, not w
distinctness - i.e. in order to op
exercise a power. Marmodoro re
example of a syllable: the position
that case, to re-identity the let
case of the parts of a living, an
seems to be needed if an operat
of the parts.
Both problems indicate that the choice of examples may lead
intuitions in different directions. I think that the main virtue of substantial
gradualism is that can host divergent intuition in a consistent framework.
Concerning the first problem (the re-identification of the parts of
a substance), substance gradualism makes room for the possibility that
principles of unity lead to different degrees of re-identification of parts,
depending on the degrees of strength to which they unify things. A principle
of unity which acts at the level of atoms changes radically the natures of
the parts of the thing which it unifies. A diamond is not just a bulk of
atoms of carbon. The atoms and molecules of matter which my living
activities make into my body undergo a similar radical change. However,
the gears of a watch remain pretty much unaltered, being constrained
only in some possibilities of their spatial motion by their being mounted
in the mechanism. In mereological sums, an extreme case of looseness
of parts, parts are completely unaffected by being bonded together in the
sum. In sum, in some cases the substantial form reaches all the way down
to the atomic level and affects the very nature of the parts it unifies, in
other cases the substantial form acts at higher levels and affects only the
behavior of the component parts. In further other cases it does not affect
parts at all (as in mereological sums).
The second problem, i.e., the nature of principles of units, can also
find a solution in substantial gradualism. [PPUEsgt] is formal, in the sense
that the principle of unity' in it can be substituted by expressions referring
Vol- 71 ~sŁ^~
Fase. 4 Q RPF 2015
to many different sorts of things. In some cases, the princip

field of forces which keeps the atoms of a substance together
it is a field of forces which keeps the gears of a mechanism t
cases again it is just a process of thinking or a formalism
sums). This opens the possibility that sometimes the pri
is in things themselves, e.g. a field of forces, some other tim
the unified things at all (i.e. in mereological sums). When
however, it is not a proper part of it. This suggests that
ways of slicing things in parts: we can divide them in pro
hylomorphic components.
Let us now go back to the problems of talk about sub
context of hylomorphism. The issue concerns David Wigg
substances which is based on his analysis of sortal concepts.1
his arguments, we can identify substances since there are
which they fall, concepts which are true of substances
are of certain kinds. A substance cannot be such without bei
sort. Although some sortal concepts apply only in a certa
life of a substance (phase-sortal, e.g. child) others apply
which that thing exist (substance-sortal, e.g. human).
In his paper mentioned above, Kit Fine argued that h
suggests that sortalism must be wrong. Indeed, hyl
compatible with the possibility that different objects mig
that they might have all their parts in common. Indeed
can be seen as being unified by different principles of un
same time. This implies that in some cases, however, obje
coincide: e.g. the wood of a tree and the tree itself have diff
of unity and thus coincide, but they coincide of necessity. H
the possibility of necessary coincidence has, in its turn, i

implications for the notion of sort. It is often supposed tha
determined by the associated persistence conditions, that i
conditions for the identification of an object of that sort at a
and by the conditions for its re-identification at different tim
different possible circumstances. But objects that necessari
will satisfy the same persistence conditions and so cannot,
view, be of different sorts. Since the tree and its wood are of
sorts, the view must therefore be mistaken.17
16. Cf., Wiggins, David - Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell

David - Sameness and Substance Renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer
17. Fine - "Things and Their Parts", ed. cit., p. 74.
VoL 71
Fase. 4 S RPF 2015
It seems to me that if we ta
this problem for sortalism can
its wood is disputable apart from
take 'wood' to refer to a living p
from the tree? Its principle of
are also the principle of unity o
a sort of material, why cannot i
leave these issues aside). If ther
degrees of strength at which so
thus be a tree in a strict sense and wood in a looser sense. Which sense
is stricter? That associated to the principle of unity which operates at a
deeper level of reality. This suggests that sortal concepts come in degrees:
they describe unities at different levels of composition. When two objects
falling under different sortais necessarily coincide this happens because
the sortal describing an object at the higher level of composition depends
on the persistence of the conditions realizing the composition described
by the other sortal, and the higher level of composition is a necessary
consequence of the lower level of composition. This suggests two things
first, that the view that two necessarily coinciding objects are two different
objects stresses the notion of substance beyond a canonical employment
of the term: the parasitism of the principle of unity of the one on that of
the other makes one suspect that they are really one complex principle of
unity; second, that sortal concepts do not always capture what we take to
be substances: maybe the wood is not really a different substance, even if
the concept wood fulfils the requirements for qualifying as a sortal.
Gradualism suggests that when there are coinciding objects, one object
is more entitled to be considered a substance than the other competitors.
This is the object unified by the principle of unity that operates at the
lowest level. Hence, for example, the concept statue is a sortal concept and
a certain statue can be considered a substance in some sense. But that
piece of marble - let us assume it is a marble statue - can also be seen
as an object. Substance gradualism highlights the fact that these two
coinciding objects have different entitlements for substantiality. For th
statue to be is just for a piece of marble to be shaped as human body, f
example. For the marble to be is for its tiny bits of minerals, stones an
debris to be pressed together into forming a stone. The principle of unity
of the marble functions at a deeper level than the principle of unity of th
statue. In fact, the principle of unity of the statue takes the existence of th
marble and its principle of unity for granted, without re-identifying it (in
Marmodoro s sense). For this reason, even if we can speak of the statue in
sortal terms, and describe the relation between its parts and its princip
Vol. 71
Fase. 4 Q RPF 20
of unity according to [PPUEsgt], we can speak of the statu

of a piece of marble with a certain accidental form, accor
A move in the other direction is not possible, however.
The upshot is that substances in stricter senses are re
whereas substances whose principles of unity act at higher le
are thought of by us being as substances of certain kinds
something else : they have principles of unity organizing the
matter, but the sortal concepts which we apply to them d
those principles of unity They depend on principles of un
about accidental features, according to [PPUA]. We consi
as such like as substance and apply sortal concepts accordi
really a piece of marble with an accidental statue-shape. T
that shape for us probably explains why we apply sortal conc
similar vein, a watch is a collection of pieces of metal, wh
in a certain manner. That shape is in a sense accidental,
devised for its usefulness, and its relevance for our life mak
so we apply sortais to it. Hence, substantial gradualism sho
Johnston,18 there are more or less fundamental sorts of thin
are not fundamental.
5. Conclusion
Substantial gradualism is a view that recognizes an irreduc

subjective and epistemic element in our thinking about what the
we can make things through our technical capacities but also thr
our ways of thinking about what there is. Our interests, intentio
preoccupations play a crucial role in this process. At the same
however, gradualism recognizes that some things exist independ
of us and constrain our freedom to make, rearrange or rename
Living things occupy a central position in this respect: although th
structured and have functional parts at our level, still they have prin
of unity which act at the most fundamental levels of reality.
Someone could complain that even what I have called "real"
substances have principles of unity which probably do not operate at
the lowest possible levels of reality. After all, there are levels beyond the
atomic level, and we do not even know how far levels can go. I think this
can be granted: substantial gradualism does not imply that there must be
a highest or a lowest degree of substantiality, nor that we must have access
18. Johnston- "Hylomorphism", cit., pp. 665-667.
Vol- 71
Fasc.4 0 RPF 2015
to them, in case they exist. The

exclusive, and we might be ab
make these and not others acce
and we should record them. M
structure of reality, but the am
The language of substances, fo
tool to express the degree of str
19. I am grateful to Sarah Pawlett Jac
Vol. 71 -
Fase. 4 S 2015

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Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia

Hylomorphism and Substantial Gradualism

Hylomorphism and Substantial Gradualism

Recentemente o hilemorfismo - a visão tradicional, segundo a quai, as subst

Palavras-chave : forma, gradualismo substancial, hilemorfismo, matéria, substân

Keywords : form, hylomorphism, matter, substance, substantial gradualism

* Universität Bamberg, Germany, and Università di Udine, Italy.

the revival of metaphysics has m

Fase 4 (J RPF 2015

2. Hylomorphism and material substances

According to Mark Johnstons comprehensive analy

[PPU] What it is for... (the item is specified here)... t

It can be observed that a principle of unity, then, ma

Deciding between the other

Fase. 4 Q RPF 2015

that their existence is in some relevant sense independent f

9. Strawson, Peter F. -Individuals. An Essay in Descriptive Metaphy

Fase 4 Q RPF 2015

the sticking power of the glue, w

which are needed for a thing to be, and accidental those

[PPU A] What it is for. . . (the item is specified here). . . to hav

This suggests that a material substance has an essent

Fase 4 ff RPF 2015

essential, can also be made of

[PPUdiamoJ What it is for the piece of diamond d to be is for (a sufficient

The pure piece of limestone is made of molecules of calcium carbonate

[PPUlimestone] What it is for the piece of limestone 1 to be is for (a sufficient

The case of the piece of conglomerate rock is still differe

[PPUconglom] What it is for the piece of conglomerate c

In each case, the principle of unity plays a role quite d

Fase. 4 Q RPF 2015

compactness of the diamond d

(DS) A substance can be such

(DU) A principle of unity c

(DS) accounts for our intuiti

Fase. 4 ¿T RPF 2015

the forces implied by it operate the process of unification

[PPUEsg] What it is for... (the item is specified h

[PPUdiamoJ> [PPUlimestoJ aïld [PPUco„g.o„J COuld be rephrased

[PPUEsgt] What it is for... (the item is specified here)... to be at t a

10. Fine - "Things and Their Parts", cit., p. 65-72.

Fase 4 Q RPF 2015

The difference between ri

4. Identity of parts and

Substantial gradualism highl

11. Strawson - Individuals , ed. cit., C

Fase 4 ¿T ŘPF 2015

the context of discussions on hylomorphism. Before getting int

(The word 're-identification' is not used here in the same sense in

Fase 4 Q RPF 2015

Besides the exegetical point t

to many different sorts of things. In some cases, the princip

the possibility of necessary coincidence has, in its turn, i

16. Cf., Wiggins, David - Sameness and Substance. Oxford: Blackwell

Fase. 4 S RPF 2015

of unity according to [PPUEsgt], we can speak of the statu

Substantial gradualism is a view that recognizes an irreduc

18. Johnston- "Hylomorphism", cit., pp. 665-667.

Fasc.4 0 RPF 2015

to them, in case they exist. The

19. I am grateful to Sarah Pawlett Jac

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