Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 33–38

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Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/csefa

Case study

Fault tree analysis of failure cause of crushing plant and

mixing bed hall at Khoy cement factory in Iran§
Ali Nouri.Gharahasanlou *, Ashkan Mokhtarei, Aliasqar Khodayarei,
Mohammad Ataei
Mining Engineering, Faculty of Mining, Petroleum & Geophysics, Shahrood University of Technology, Shahrood, Iran

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Article history: Evaluating and analyzing the risk in the mining industry is a new approach for improving
Received 31 August 2013 the machinery performance. Reliability, safety, and maintenance management based on
Received in revised form 12 October 2013 the risk analysis can enhance the overall availability and utilization of the mining
Accepted 5 December 2013 technological systems. This study investigates the failure occurrence probability of the
Available online 23 January 2014 crushing and mixing bed hall department at Azarabadegan Khoy cement plant by using
fault tree analysis (FTA) method. The results of the analysis in 200 h operating interval
Keywords: show that the probability of failure occurrence for crushing, conveyor systems, crushing
Fault tree analysis (FTA)
and mixing bed hall department is 73, 64, and 95 percent respectively and the conveyor
Crushing department
belt subsystem found as the most probable system for failure. Finally, maintenance as a
Mixing bed hall
Failure
method of control and prevent the occurrence of failure is proposed.
Mining industry ß 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC
Maintenance BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

1. Introduction

Completing planned activities in the mining industry is meant to provide complex demands of reliability and safety of
both parts of the system as well as the technological processes. This is of great importance for developing companies. In
addition, it will increase liability for such companies. Therefore, focusing on risk management to accurately identify the
problems and failures of complex technological mining systems is an urgent need [1].
Fault tree analysis is one of the many systematic safety analysis methods developed in the last 40 years to promote the
safety of complex technical systems. Bell Telephone Laboratories first used fault tree analysis in 1962 to study the safety of
the launch control system for Minuteman missiles [2]. Faisal I. Khan used quantitative approaches based on risk analysis
consisting of three major modules: risk estimation module, maintenance planning module and evaluation module for
scheduled maintenance and inspection. Furthermore, he tried to minimize the probability and consequences of failure in
relation to safety, economy, and environment [3]. Also M.J. Little, in the western wall of the PPRUST open pit mine analyzed
slope stability [4]. In 2010, different applications of this technique in analysis of coal spontaneous combustion, reliability
assessment of rock slope failure, and the prediction of the risk of potential coal and gas outburst were used [5–7]. In 2012 and
2013 this method was used in the analysis of failure rate and safety diagnosis on coal mine production systems, roof fall

§
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: ali_nouri@alumni.ut.ac.ir, Alinoorimine@gmail.com (A. Nouri.Gharahasanlou).

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csefa.2013.12.006
2213-2902/ß 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
34 A. Nouri.Gharahasanlou et al. / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 33–38

accidents in coal mines, main causes of accidents due to gas outburst in mines, safety of rail transport systems in coal mine,
effect of operating environment conditions on LHD, and radiation hazards in uranium mine [8–14]. In this study, fault tree
analysis (FTA) method was chosen from various risk assessment techniques (e.g. informal risk assessment, event tree
analysis, failure modes, effects and criticality analysis). After consideration of its applications in the mining industry over the
past two decades, a case study was conducted at Azarabadegan Khoy cement factory.

2. Fault tree analysis

Fault tree analysis is a systematic safety analysis tool that proceeds deductively from the occurrence of an undesired
event (accident) to the identification of the root causes of that event [15].
Fault tree analysis starts with a ‘‘top event’’ that generally display with rectangular and related events based on logical
relations with the top event that are drown below, branching downward as in a tree [16]. In most cases, the top event is
chosen based on its criticality. In addition, intermediate events based on the reasons for their occurrence are divided into the
following branches. The analysis continues at each level, until basic causes or the analysis boundary conditions are reached.
Branches of failure that require no further development are known as basic event, which are shown with a circle. If the failure
data is not available, they event is called an ‘‘undeveloped event’’ and a diamond symbol is used to represent it. These events
reflect the initial conditions, which are cause the main accident. Also a triangle symbol is used to show ‘‘transfer’’ in FTA
which indicates the tree is developed further at other trees [17].
Fault-tree diagrams use logical operators, principally the ‘‘OR’’ and ‘‘AND’’ gates. In AND gate the output event occurs if
any of the input events occur. This describes the intersection of the sets containing all input events to that gate. The output
from an OR gate occurs if one of the input events occurs. This describes the union of the sets containing all input events to the
gate [17]. Fig. 1 shows the logic symbols used in FTA.
Six basic steps used to develop a fault tree analysis [2]:

I. System configuration understanding

II. Logic model generation
III. Qualitative evaluation of the logic model
IV. Equipment failure analysis and obtain basic data
V. Quantitative evaluation of the logic model
VI. Recommended appropriate corrective actions

2.1. Probability of occurrence of the logic gates

In order to estimate the probability of occurrence of the top event, it is essential to estimate the probability of occurrence
of the logic gates’ output fault events. Thus, equations to estimate the probability of occurrence of ‘‘OR’’ and ‘‘AND’’ logic
gates’ output fault events are presented below [18]:

 OR gate
Y
m
PðX0 Þ ¼ 1  ð1  PðX j ÞÞ (1)
j¼1

where m is the number of input fault events, P(X0) is the probability of occurrence of OR gate’s output fault event Xo,
P(Xj) is the probability of occurrence of input fault event Xj, for j = 1, 2, 3, . . ., m.
[(Fig._1)TD$IG]
Output fault event

Input fault events

"OR" gate "AND" gate

Fig. 1. Logic symbols used in FTA [17].
 A. Nouri.Gharahasanlou et al. / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 33–38 35

 AND gate
Y
m
PðXa Þ ¼ PðX j Þ (2)
j¼1

where P(Xa) is the probability of occurrence of AND gate’s output fault event Xa.

3. Case study

This case study aimed at determining the probability of failure occurrence by using FTA in crushing and mixing bed hall
(consisting of stacking raw minerals in the longitudinal direction of the pile with stacker) departments at Azarabadegan
Khoy cement. The factory is located at Azerbaijan province, Iran. The main purpose of this study was to identify the main
causes of failure by using FTA. FTA is a graphical model to depict the combination of the failures that cause occurrence of the
top event. It should be noted that FTA focuses on the main reasons and too detailed is not in it. After a brief description,
analysis started with the assumption of ‘‘failure in factory’’ as the top event.
The factory can be divided to six branches: mine, crushing and mixing bed hall, raw mill, cement mill, burning
(clinkerization process), and packing house departments in the first step. This case study focused on crushing and mixing bed
hall department. Other departments are underdeveloped due to lack of relevant sufficient data.
Fig. 2 shows fault tree of crushing and mixing bed hall department that are divided into crusher system, mixing bed hall
system and conveyor belt system. In addition, at the next level, several subsystems are identified for each system. These
systems and subsystems are connected to top event with logic gate No. 1, 2 and 3. Finally, basic events are represented by
codifying in circle symbols at the last levels.
Fig. 2 can be enlarged by another level, e.g. the transfer symbol is considered for stacker subsystem and can be developed
it based on type of failure (Fig. 3). Therefore, at this level of fault tree analysis of the system the basic event will be based on
type of failure in each subsystem. In the case of excessive developments of FTA because of the sharp increase in the
calculations, excessive complexity of analysis, difficulties of data collection, and management’s attitude, there was no need
to get into the details. Consequently, in this paper, the system is assessed at the subsystem level by FTA.
Required data (TBF) for this case study were collected from two main sources including daily reports and mechanical
unit’s reports for period of 18 months. After performing statistical analysis on the collected data and fitting an appropriate
distribution function or process, probability of failure occurrence for each subsystem (basic event) was calculated and
[(Fig._2)TD$IG]
tabulated at 50-h intervals of the system operation in Table 1 and shown in Fig. 4.

Failure in crushing and mixing bed

hall department

Conveyor belt Mixing bed hall

Crusher system
system system

Stacker
subsystem

3 2
STMBS

Coneyor belt Coneyor belt Coneyor belt Screen Apron feeder Crusher
subsystem 1 subsystem 2 subsystem 3 subsystem subsystem subsystem

CBCBS 1 CBCBS 2 CBCBS 3 SCCS AFCS CRCS

Fig. 2. Fault tree of crushing and mixing bed hall department.

[(Fig._3)TD$IG]
36 A. Nouri.Gharahasanlou et al. / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 33–38

Stacker system

Material Conveyor belt Coneyor belt

was dameged Jib failures came out from Stacker
chute failure failures
axis

MC CD Ji CO St

[(Fig._4)TD$IG] Fig. 3. Fault tree of stacker subsystem.

60%
Probability of failure occurrence(%)

50%

CRCS
40%
SCCS
30% STMBS
CBCBS 1
20%
AFCS

10% CBCBS 2
CBCBS 3
0%
0 50 100 150 200
Time(hr)

Fig. 4. Probability of failure occurrence for basic events.

Table 1
Quantitative and qualitative results for basics events.

Basic Function or Probability of failure occurrence Consequences at the end of

event process (%) at the end of different time different time intervals (h)
intervals (h)

50 100 150 200 50 100 150 200

CRCS Power low 10.75 25.17 39.42 52.25 FA FA FA FA

SCCS Power low 2.82 7.58 13.28 19.5 SA FWM FA FA

STMBS 3P-Weibull 11.72 25.36 35.74 44.14 FA FA FA FA

CBCBS1 Power low 1.06 3.1 5.76 8.89 SA SA FEM FWM

CBCBS2 Lognormal 22.55 37.06 46.7 53.7 FA FA FA FA

CBCBS3 Power low 2.24 6.48 11.86 17.97 SA FWM FA FA

AFCS Lognormal 9.38 17.82 24.48 29.92 FWM FA FA FA

Safety Failure without maintenance Failure

 A. Nouri.Gharahasanlou et al. / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 33–38 37

Table 2
Quantitative and qualitative results for logic gates.

Logic Probability of failure occurrence Consequences at the end of

gate (%) at the end of different time different time intervals (h)
pintervals (h)

50 100 150 200 50 100 150 200

1 25.09 42.96 55.73 65.40 FA FA FA FA

2 21.41 43.17 60.33 73.06 FA FA FA FA

3 48.02 75.80 88.72 94.79 FA FA FA FA

Safety Failure without Failure

maintenance

[(Fig._5)TD$IG]
100%
Probability of failure occurrence(%)

90%
80%
70%
60%
50% Gate 1
40% Gate 2

30% Gate 3

20%
10%
0%
0 50 100 150 200
Time(Hr)

Fig. 5. Probability of failure occurrence for logic gates.

As mentioned above, after the quantitative analysis, the results should be analyzed qualitatively as well. Consequently,
qualitative outcomes were classified into three consequences groups: safety (SA): failure probability lowers than 5 percent,
failure without maintenance (FWM): failure probability between 5 and 10 percent, failure occurrence (FA): failure
probability upper than 10 percent, as shown in Tables 1 and 2.
As can be seen, the most and lowest probability of failure occurrence are in the CBCBS2 and SCCS respectively during
200 h time interval. At the end of this time interval probability of CRCS reached CBCBS2 and surpassed it.
The probability of failures occurrence in logic gates No. 1, 2 and 3 are calculated based on Eqs. (1) and (2). Quantitative and
qualitative results are tabulated in Table 2 and presented in Fig. 5.
Finally, probability in logic gate No. 1 presented failure occurrence in crushing and mixing bed hall department. It can be
observed that system and subsystem probability of failure increases as the mission time increases.

4. Conclusions

Comparative study of the scientific literature of the time 1995–2013 about FTA applications in the mining field showed
that the most frequent papers are in 2010 and 2012. The most attention was paid to safety problems and spontaneous
combustion issues. In this paper, a case study of Azarabadegan Khoy cement factory was conducted. In this regard, the
factory was decided to system and subsystem level based on department level and those basic levels were identified. Then
the required data were collected and the relevant statistical analysis was performed. This analysis indicated that critical
condition and the highest probability of failure for the basic event conveyor belt No. 2 subsystem during the time interval.
However, after this operation interval (200 h), crusher subsystem surpassed it. Therefore, maintenance activities are
recommended for crusher subsystem so that by implementing them, the probability of failure is reduced and as a
consequence one of the risk control elements (transition, handle, modification, and remove), that is modification, which is
divided into two reduce the intensity and reduce the probability branches is implemented and therefore the risk of failure in
the whole system is reduced.
38 A. Nouri.Gharahasanlou et al. / Case Studies in Engineering Failure Analysis 2 (2014) 33–38

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