Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

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Global Environmental Change

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/gloenvcha

Fairness critically conditions the carbon budget allocation across countries

Keith Williges a, c, *, Lukas H. Meyer c, *, Karl W. Steininger a, b, Gottfried Kirchengast a, d
a
Wegener Center for Climate and Global Change, University of Graz, Brandhofgasse 5, Graz A-8010, Austria
b
Department of Economics, University of Graz, Universitaetsstrasse 15, Graz A-8010, Austria
c
Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Attemsgasse 25, Graz A-8010, Austria
d
Institute of Physics, University of Graz, Universitaetsplatz 5, Graz A-8010, Austria

A R T I C L E I N F O A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Countries’ nationally determined contributions to mitigate global warming translate to claims of country specific
Greenhouse gas mitigation shares of the remaining carbon budget. The remaining global budget is limited by the aim of staying well below
Fairness 2 ◦ C, however. Here we show how fairness concerns quantitatively condition the allocation of this global carbon
Climate justice
budget across countries. Minimal fairness requirements include securing basic needs, attributing historical re­
Basic needs
Historical emissions
sponsibility for past emissions, accounting for benefits from past emissions, and not exceeding countries’ soci­
Legitimate grandfathering etally feasible emission reduction rate. The argument in favor of taking into account these fairness concerns
reflects a critique of both simple equality- and sovereignty-principled reduction approaches, the former modelled
here as the equal-per-capita distribution from now on, the latter as prolonging the inequality of the status-quo
levels of emissions into the transformation period (considered a form of “grandfathering”). We find the option
most in line with fairness concerns to be a four-fold qualified version of the equal-per-capita approach that in­
corporates a limited form of grandfathering.

1. Introduction
The global effort to restrict global warming in accord with the 1.5–2
◦
C goal of the Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) requires severely
limiting future global greenhouse gas emissions (Rockström et al., 2017;
Rogelj et al., 2019; Rogelj et al., 2018; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017) and
has motivated a wide field of literature focused on how countries can
define transformation pathways to achieve low-carbon goals by mid-
century. Over time, a multitude of allocation mechanisms have been
proposed, ranging from those which prolong the status quo, such as
grandfathering rules, constant emissions ratios, etc. to mechanisms
based on equality, ability to mitigate, or responsibility for past emissions
(Pan et al., 2015). While these have predominately focused on defining
country emission pathways or targets, more recently, greater emphasis
has been placed on distributions of a global carbon budget (GCB),
allowing for flexibility at the country level to determine the pathways
which fit within a given budget (van den Berg et al., 2020).
As the literature on methods to distribute the remaining carbon
budget to reach Paris goals has evolved, the number and complexity of
approaches has risen. Effort- (or burden-) sharing mechanisms devel­
oped in the literature initially to create scenarios of pathway allocation
and more recently GCB distribution have been categorized based on
three equity principles (responsibility, capability, and equality) and
their various combinations (Clarke et al., 2014). However, there exist
numerous approaches to each principle, and in some cases they are
classified in such a way that belies their normative implications.
Recent work by (Dooley et al., 2021) brings the normative di­
mensions related to effort-sharing studies to the fore and emphasizes
that studies are currently lacking in a number of areas. The authors
highlight a lack of clarity in definition of ethical principles behind
allocation mechanisms and conflicting or erroneous categorization of
mechanisms as major issues in current work. An example of such an
error can be found in the varying classifications of two simple mecha­
nisms; namely per capita convergence (PCC) – analogous to “temporary
grandfathering” as described by Schuessler (2017, p. 158) or “contrac­
tion and convergence” by Posner and Weisbach (2010) – and equal-per-
capita (EPC) (Jamieson et al., 2001; Singer, 2004). EPC in its simplest
form distributes a remaining carbon budget from the current point in
time until an end point (e.g. 2050) by allocating equal emissions to all
persons living in this period. By doing so it reflects an egalitarian un­
derstanding of justice. PCC on the other hand derives an allocation of the
remaining budget based on today’s unequal level of emissions (thus

* Corresponding authors at: Wegener Center for Climate and Global Change, University of Graz, Brandhofgasse 5, Graz A-8010, Austria (K. Williges); Department of
Philosophy, University of Graz, Attemsgasse 25, Graz A-8010, Austria (L.H. Meyer).
E-mail addresses: keith.williges@uni-graz.at (K. Williges), lukas.meyer@uni-graz.at (L.H. Meyer).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102481
Received 18 December 2020; Received in revised form 19 January 2022; Accepted 28 January 2022
Available online 16 March 2022
0959-3780/© 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Table 1 Beginning with an analysis of the shortcomings of both simple

Effort-sharing approach categorization and description of allocation approaches mechanisms in terms of addressing equity principles, based on the
used in this study (based on (Höhne et al., 2014)). fairness literature, we identify three key aspects in which both ap­
IPCC Category Description Analogue in this work proaches are lacking, and suggest qualifications to address these issues.
Responsibility Use of historical emissions to Historical emissions
We propose a new metric for addressing a need-based equity component
derive future reduction goals qualification (Historical) by introducing an allocation based on fulfilling basic needs, emphasizing
Capability Disregarding causal and Basic needs qualification (N- those most vulnerable to climate change. Furthermore, we attempt to
moral responsibility, qualified) reconcile a possible justification for a limited form of grandfathering and
approaches relating
introduce a qualification which attempts to incorporate the one positive
mitigation goals to capability
(or capacity) to pay for – or aspect of such an approach, in line with the third guideline.
most efficiently to contribute Finally, we operationalize the theoretical discussion of both the
to – emissions reduction or simple forms of PCC and EPC and their fairness as well as feasibility
approaches aiming at qualifications. For that we argue for and rely on proxies. We do so by
securing people’s capability
of leading a sufficiently good
first quantifying the limit defined by the Paris Agreement by placing a
(decent) life. global constraint on the cumulative total anthropogenic carbon dioxide
Equality Allocation based on equal Equal per capita approach (CO2) emission budget from fossil fuels and industry over 2017 to 2050
emissions per person, (EPC simple) (34 years), our GCB. We adopt three GCB options which target the 1.5–2
applying current and/or ◦
C goal at different levels of ambition consistent with recent literature
future population projections
Responsibility, Includes approaches placing Basic needs, historical (Rockström et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2019; Rogelj et al., 2018; Xu and
capability, and emphasis on historical emissions, and benefits Ramanathan, 2017); all options assume that a limited budget of only
need responsibility, balanced with qualifications (NHB- about 100 GtCO2 remains for beyond 2050, i.e., humanity reaches net
capability and need for qualified); for EPC also zero emissions near mid-century so that sustainable anthropogenic so­
sustainable development reasonable burden limit
lutions for atmospheric CO2 removal (Griscom et al., 2017; Rogelj et al.,
qualification (NHBC-
qualified) 2019; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017) are not overstressed thereafter.
Equal cumulative Combines equality with Historical emissions and The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses budget allo­
per capita responsibility (cumulative benefits qualifications (HB- cation mechanisms from a perspective of fairness, beginning with dis­
accounting for historical qualified)
cussion of simple forms of PCC and EPC, identifying objections to these,
emissions)
Staged approaches Differentiated commitments, Per capita convergence and suggesting possible remedies in the form of qualifications. Section 3
various stages, sectoral approach (PCC simple) outlines the methods by which we calculate the GCB and operationalize
approaches, or the mechanisms and qualifications from Section 2. Section 4 presents the
grandfathering approaches results and provides a sensitivity analysis of results to different param­
eterization, as well as isolates the magnitude of effects on countries of
favoring mainly wealthy, high-emitting countries) and population differing development, and Section 5 provides discussion and
shares, with convergence to an equal per capita distribution by the end conclusions.
of the budget period. While PCC (or as it is alternatively titled
‘contraction and convergence (CAC), particularly in pathway-based 2. Equity-based budget allocation to countries
allocation literature) is defined by some authors (e.g. (Pan et al.,
2015, 2014)) as being based on the status quo, others (such as Robiou du As introduced above, PCC simple means that we accept countries’
Pont et al. (2017) and Robiou du Pont and Meinshausen (2018)) classify current and very different levels of emissions together with population
such convergence towards EPC as addressing the equality principle. shares as the starting points for budget allocation, with convergence to
While the previous examples are drawn from pathway allocation liter­ an equal per capita distribution by the end of the budget period in 2050.
ature, they serve to demonstrate that neglecting to define the normative EPC simple means that while we also accept countries’ current levels of
reasoning behind an allocation mechanism and/or mislabeling it can emissions, we do not factor it in in our allocation but distribute the
lead to erroneous contributions misguiding or even obstructing progress remaining permissible emissions according to the EPC principle over
in further discourse. And as described in van den Berg et al. (2020) the 2017–2050.
pathway-based CAC and EPC mechanisms have analogous approaches When applying EPC to the distribution of the GBC among states, the
for determining emissions budget; which are defined with the same question arises: Should the populations of a specific (current or past)
equity principle in mind. year be used, i.e. assumed that for the purpose of the calculation the
Three main guidelines for future work on climate equity and dis­ population is fixed (option 1) or should the expected population
cussions on defining carbon budgets or emission pathways have been development in the period of transformation be relied on (option 2).
suggested by Dooley et al. (2021). The first is to make explicit the Normatively, the second option seems in line with the rationale of the
normative assumptions and positions taken in analysis. The second is to EPC, namely that every individual existing person should count equally
emphasize and acknowledge the need of those most vulnerable to the when it comes to allocation of the remaining permissible GBC. Against
effects of climate change, with the third being the emphasis on work the second option one could argue that expected population develop­
which “will clarify differences in interest or ethical positions, identify ment should not be relevant as states can (and should) change their
key issues of divergence, [and] suggest points of convergence.” (Dooley population policies and by doing so reduce their population. However,
et al., 2021). for the relevant period until 2050 states have close to no influence on the
With this work, we ground the derivation of allocation mechanisms development of the size of their population or at least not when they rely
for national carbon budgets firmly in the literature on fairness, with the on ethically acceptable policies (Bradshaw and Brook, 2014; Budolfson
aim of addressing the key issues highlighted by Dooley et al. (2021), and Spears, 2021). Against the first option, one could object that picking
with a focus particularly on the third. We accomplish this by deriving a any year might be unfair. If the EPC is given in terms of a current (or
set of allocation mechanisms for a remaining global carbon budget past) year, countries will effectively be disadvantaged depending on the
(GCB), making clear the equity principles underlying each stage of our current mix of ages of their populations (Singer, 2002). Based on these
approach. We first define two simple allocation mechanisms, namely considerations we find that option 2, namely the use of projections of
PCC and EPC as discussed above. population development for the period of transformation, is therefore
preferable for our analysis. To be sure, if the projection turns out to be

2
K. Williges et al.
false (e.g. owing to a global catastrophe) countries which end up having
a lower population than the initial projection are benefitted (since they
have fewer people for the same emissions) and those with larger than
expected populations lose out. Thus, if the projection changes, this
should lead to a changed allocation of the GCB among countries.
We follow a similar approach to Meinshausen et al. (2015) and
generalize allocation to a basic choice between PCC and EPC simple.
Given this binary starting point, we address fairness concerns raised by
each allocation method and introduce qualifications corresponding to
the stated equity principles and categories, as described in Table 1. This
table also indicates how we integrate the principles available in the
literature in our approach, thus enabling a consistent quantification of
their respective implications.
In qualified versions of both approaches, we consider two concerns,
securing the basic needs of all people and recognizing different historical
responsibilities for past emissions and their consequences. These con­
cerns are arguably central to fairness. Both can be understood as mini­
mal requirements of fairness (Kolstad et al., 2014; Miller et al., 2020;
White, 2021, sec. 2). For qualifying both the PCC and EPC approach, we
consider meeting these two concerns as fairness conditions for achieving
the goal of net zero emissions. The Paris Agreement can be interpreted to
reflect such a conditional understanding in Articles 2(2) and 4(1)
(reflecting the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities
and as being based on equity and in the context of efforts to eradicate
poverty, respectively).
We limit ourselves to these anthropocentric fairness concerns and do
not specifically address the moral claims of non-human animals and eco-
systems. Emission reductions and reduced overall climate change effects
are likely to be beneficial to non-human life forms also. However, if one
were to take into account the claims of non-human animals and eco-
systems, this might well require further and more drastic emission re­
ductions and measures aimed at protecting these claims (Pörtner et al.,
2021).
According to some interpretations the remaining IPCC category of
capability is not directly related to fairness concerns. However, we
develop an understanding of capability that identifies a minimal fairness
constraint for budget allocations relevant for both PCC and EPC. We will
finally propose a qualified version of EPC that additionally takes into
account a burden limit on the countries’ emission reduction rate per
year, reflecting feasibility constraints. In developing this understanding,
we assume that an allocation of the remaining GCB that can be under­
stood to be fair is to be preferred over one that is subject to basic
normative criticisms, all other considerations being equal.
2.1. Shortcomings of simple mechanisms
Using a PCC simple approach in determining national budgets can be
understood to be problematic for the following reasons:
We can characterize PCC simple as being a form of grandfathering.
First, it attributes legitimacy to the status quo of the highly unequal
attained levels of emissions. Second, it justifies fair shares relative to
today’s highly unequal levels (for discussion see, e.g., Caney (2009, p.
127) and Jamieson (2005, p. 230). For the period of the transformation
process PCC simple will imply highly unequal amounts of emissions per
capita and per country. Highly industrialized countries will have far
more emission rights in the transition period, thus they will very likely
realize many more benefits from emission-generating activities. No
justification is provided for prolonging this inequality beyond the fact
that countries happen to have reached highly unequal levels.
While grandfathering (prolonging the inequality of the status-quo
levels of emissions by allocating future allowances based on current
emission shares) is not explicitly supported by countries, we observe
that countries’ stated future emission levels (via Nationally Determined
Contributions (NDCs)) – reflecting their implicit budget claims – are
closely correlated with current levels of emissions, in comparison to
their expected contributions if they followed an EPC approach (see
3
Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481
Appendix B for a discussion of the increasing variation between ex­
pected and committed NDCs, and Fig. B.1. therein). As a result, the
implicit budgets of high-emitting countries far more closely resemble an
approach with grandfathering being given some weight rather than
what would be expected had countries taken an EPC-based approach to
determining contributions.
EPC simple does not attribute normative force to the current levels of
emissions with respect to how the benefits and costs of transformation to
low-carbon society ought to be distributed. For that reason, EPC simple is
not open to the grandfathering objection in the way PCC is. However,
there is a different rationale for grandfathering relevant for qualifying
EPC which is discussed further in Section 2.3. Note that both PCC simple
and EPC simple take the status quo of highly unequal past levels of
emissions for granted.
Both approaches are open to criticism in terms of two central
normative dimensions of distributing the benefits and costs of the
transformation process. We suppose, first, that the process would be
unfair if it did not help to secure the basic well-being of all people (Barry,
1995, pp. 61–67; Pogge, 2002, pp. 196–204). We further suppose, sec­
ond, that the distribution would be unfair if it did not reflect a minimal
understanding of the differentiated historical responsibilities of the
agents—who we consider countries or states (Friman and Strandberg,
2014; Meyer, 2013; Meyer and Sanklecha, 2017; Rajamani, 2000; Shue,
20152015). These two dimensions lead to three specific objections to
both burden-sharing approaches, which we distinguish below.
a. Because PCC simple implies a highly unequal per capita share of
emission rights for the period of transformation, it very likely imposes
high risks of frustrating the basic needs of very many people in devel­
oping and newly industrializing countries. This is also the likely impli­
cation of EPC simple: For countries with historically very low emissions,
an equal-per-capita share of the remaining global emissions might not
suffice to generate conditions conducive to securing citizens’ basic
needs. We assume the existence of a link between increased ability to
fulfill basic needs (using the Human Development Index (HDI) as a
proxy) and emissions, at least in the past. For the transformation to a low
carbon society to be successful, the world will need to decouple the link
between meeting basic needs (and more generally, welfare) and carbon
emissions. Fig. C.3 in Appendix C illustrates the correlation between
rising levels of HDI and emissions in the recent past.
b. We have strong reasons to consider actors liable to know about the
harmful consequences of anthropogenic climate change since (at least)
1995 when the IPCC confirmed that anthropogenic emissions affect the
climate, with the IPCC 2nd Assessment Report being published in 1995,
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) entering
into force in 1994, and the Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 (for dis­
cussion see e.g. (Gardiner, 2011; Kenehan et al., 2017; Sher, 2009).
Neither PCC simple nor EPC simple address responsibility for having
caused emissions since 1995, but rather, view all emission-generating
activities up to now as non-objectionable, and in the case of PCC sim­
ple, grants higher shares of the remaining permissible emission rights to
those countries that today emit most. Arguably, this is highly objec­
tionable especially for countries that already in 1995 had very high
levels of emissions and have not substantively reduced – or have even
increased – their per capita emissions as a share of global emissions
(applying a production-based accounting approach of the 36 OECD
countries, 10 had increasing emissions from 1995 to 2015, while using a
consumption-based approach 14 nations had such). According to PCC
simple countries that knowingly – and thus, arguably wrongfully (for
discussion see, e.g., Butt et al. (2017) and Heyd et al. (2017)) – used
more than their fair share will be allocated an even greater share of the
budget. This objection rests on the notion that it is impermissible for
states to exceed their fair share of the remaining global permissible
emissions since they were liable to know that limiting global emissions is
necessary for avoiding “dangerous climate change”.
c. From the perspective of securing or maximizing human well-being,
what matters are not emissions as such, but the benefits that people
K. Williges et al.
realize by engaging in activities that have emissions as their uninten­
tional by-product (for discussion see, e.g., Meyer and Roser (2010) and
Heyd (2017, pp. 34–40)). Importantly, many emission-generating ac­
tivities have long-term beneficial consequences: they benefit those who
carry them out but also future people. Accordingly, we suppose that
distributing the GCB aims at distributing (chances of realizing) benefits
from emission-generating activities fairly among both currently living
and future people (Meyer, 2013). By distributing shares of the GCB
relative to today’s levels of emissions, neither PCC simple nor EPC simple
reflect why we care about emissions, nor do they take into account the
received benefits from past emissions. As these benefits differ dramati­
cally, one can criticize both approaches as unfair for failing to account
for this dimension of the normative significance of past emission-
generating activities. This objection rests on the notion that from the
perspective of (distributive) justice the well-being impacts of emission-
generating activities matter, not emissions themselves. Emission-
generating activities have well-being impacts regardless of whether
those carrying out these activities were liable to know about their effects
and regardless of whether in carrying out these activities they stayed
within the limits of their fair share of the remaining permissible emis­
sions or not.
Next, we show how one can respond to the objections common to
both PCC and EPC simple by introducing three qualifications.
2.2. Qualifying simple approaches to address fairness concerns
a. Introducing a sufficiency threshold on the basis of HDI. This
responds to objection a. by introducing and operationalizing the idea
that all people have a priority claim to reach a sufficient threshold level
of well-being (for discussion see, e.g., Frankfurt (1997), Meyer et al.
(2009), Shields (2016)). In placing the threshold of sufficiency, we aim
at an approximation of what fulfilling basic needs requires (see Copp
(1998) and Gough (2015)). That something is a basic need by itself
entails that it ought to be met, and that doing so matters more than
meeting non-basic needs or mere preferences (Braybrooke, 2014;
Gough, 2015; Thomson, 2005). According to Copp (1998, p. 124), “[m]
atters of basic needs are things anyone would require in some quantity
and in some form in order to avoid a blighted or harmed life” (see also
(Doyal and Gough, 1991; Thomson, 2005; Wiggins and Dermen, 1987).
Such an understanding implies material needs but is not necessarily
restricted to them (Anscombe, 1958; Kowarsch and Gösele, 2012).
The priority claim made above can be understood as an interpreta­
tion of the relevance of capability (or capacity). It focuses on people’s
capacity to lead a sufficiently good or decent life. Minimally this re­
quires persons securely being able to satisfy their basic needs. When a
person’s basic needs are not or not securely satisfied the person is
necessarily severely harmed: he or she is not able to autonomously
choose among valuable options open to her or him and to pursue them
with a chance of being successful in them (Meyer and Pölzler, 2022). We
suppose that avoiding this can be understood as a requirement for
leading a minimally good life. If this is the case, the allocation of the
remaining global carbon budget can count as fair only if all people have
a chance to lead a minimally good life.
Accordingly, we suppose that a fair allocation aims to distribute the
remaining permissible emissions among states in a way that all people
are likely to reach the basic-needs based sufficiency threshold. Only then
may the still-remaining permissible emissions be distributed. Budget
levels are adjusted in two ways: First, we secure for all countries
currently below the threshold level the budget required for all in­
habitants having the chance of reaching the threshold of well-being.
Second, we correspondingly reduce the unadjusted budgets of those
countries with emission levels higher than required for reaching that
level. While our approach is not the first to address distribution of
emissions based on needs, and various approaches have been suggested
– particularly in literature relating to defining emissions pathways –
such as (den Elzen et al., 2006) which defines multi-stage approaches to
4
Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481
allow for increased emissions by those states in greatest need, such
implementation is more commonly found in literature on emission
pathway allocation. While it would be possible to delineate partial
country budgets for different consecutive phases of the period of
transformation to climate neutrality, we focus here on budget alloca­
tions among countries for the whole period, leaving it to the countries
themselves how to use their budgets in the transformation period and
refraining from prescribing pathways to climate neutrality.
As a proxy to indicate levels of well-being relevant for setting the
sufficiency threshold (indicated in results as N-qualified for basic needs
qualification), we use the Human Development Index (HDI), a com­
posite index of life expectancy, education, and per capita income, as
reported in an annual time series by the UN. This composite index is a
proxy only. As (Doyal and Gough, 1991) point out composite indices
such as this do not account for the fact that basic needs are non-
substitutable (e.g., having a long life without education and signifi­
cant income does not get a person above the sufficiency threshold).
Instead they propose specific social indicators for each of their pur­
ported needs. At this point we do not see a possibility of operationalizing
such an extensive and multifaceted measurement instrument.
The resulting per capita emissions for 2015 relating to this HDI
threshold are taken as the per capita allocation for all countries with a
2015 HDI at or below the threshold level as their initial emission
allowance, based on current population, for the first year of budget
allocation. Countries below the threshold are allocated an initial CO2
budget that suffices to cover emissions starting from this level.
After having reduced the overall global budget until 2050 by the
total required emissions allocated in this way, only for the remaining
global budget allocation – across all countries, including those with an
initial “below-HDI-allocation” – do we proceed ‘as normal’ (e.g., equal
per capita or contraction and convergence). In a contraction and
convergence allocation the “initially-below-HDI” countries are assigned
a CO2 budget that could cover emissions starting from the basic needs
threshold level in linear reduction to a global per capita equal emission
by 2050.
Low-emitting countries may actually find it preferable to immedi­
ately build up a low carbon infrastructure and thus not utilize all of the
emission budget they would be allocated, but instead sell some of their
would-be share of the budget to finance the build-up of this
infrastructure.
As shown in Table 1 this interpretation of the relevance of capability
(capacity) differs from other interpretations discussed in the literature.
This study rests on neither the understanding that the greater an agent’s
capability to pay the greater the proportion of the costs they should bear
(Moellendorf, 2014) (often referred to as the “ability-to-pay principle”)
nor on the understanding that the greater an agent’s capability to effi­
ciently implement measures the greater the proportion of the efforts that
the agent should bear (which could be dubbed “ability-to-contribute“
principle). While the (repeated) application of an ability-to-pay-
principle is likely to lead to a reduction (and in the longer run elimi­
nation) of the inequalities between states in terms of their ability to pay
for solving the problem, this is not the case for ability-to-contribute. Its
distributional implications are open. They depend on how the efficiency
gains are shared among all states. However, the ability-to-contribute
understanding says nothing about how the gains ought to be shared. It
aims at maximizing aggregative benefits from the remaining global
carbon budget during the transformation to net-zero. Thus, neither the
ability-to-pay nor the ability-to-contribute understandings by them­
selves account for the priority of generating conditions under which all
countries are able to secure the basic needs of their peoples. On this
ground they are open to the objection of not meeting the minimal fair­
ness condition reflecting securing basic needs of people.
Introducing a sufficiency threshold on the basis of HDI reflects an
understanding of the relevance of capability that aims at securing peo­
ple’s capability of leading a sufficiently good (decent) life.
b. Moving the point of accounting back. In response to objection
K. Williges et al.
b., moving the point of contraction back to 1995 (indicated as a historical
emissions qualification, in results indicated by H-qualified) (Friman and
Strandberg, 2014; Gardiner, 2011; Gosseries, 2004) makes countries
accountable for the emissions they caused since 1995, that is, since they
were liable to know that limiting global emissions is necessary for
avoiding ”dangerous climate change” and that it is impermissible for
states to exceed their fair share of the remaining global permissible
emissions. Then countries effectively used up the emissions they caused
since 1995 from their share of the remaining global permissible emis­
sions. Such an approach of moving the point of accounting to a historical
year is widely-used in both budget and pathway allocation approaches
(e.g. (Lucas et al., 2020; van den Berg et al., 2020)) although the starting
year of accounting can vary widely, from 1850 and the start of the in­
dustrial revolution to the time of publication of the first IPCC report
(Gosseries, 2014). Also, ascribing a single point in time at which all
countries were similarly knowledgeable or culpable for emissions is
problematic as noted in Gardiner et al. (2016). In fact there has been an
increasing awareness over time (as documented in e.g. subsequent IPCC
Assessment Reports) and access to information has not been uniform for
political agents. At this point we do not see a possibility of operation­
alizing the complexity of the issue. Instead we rely on the simple
assumption that at least since 1995 all countries were knowledgeable of
the consequences of emissions and liable for future impacts due to such,
as discussed previously. Further, as shown in Fig. C.2 and discussed in
the Results section, changing the reference year for historical emissions
has little effect on the results for years between 1995 and 2005.
c. Taking into account received benefits from past emissions.
Some of the emissions caused even before 1995 can be taken into ac­
count on the basis of the benefits that currently living people have and
future people will have (designated as B-qualified i.e. benefits qualifica­
tion), owing to the long-term consequences of the activities that had
these emissions as their side-effect. We consider emissions embodied in
infrastructure available in 1995. This is to respond to objection c.
From the perspective of distributive justice what counts are the well-
being impacts of emission-generating activities for currently living and
future people. For these people to realize the benefits caused by
emission-generating activities it does not matter whether those carrying
out the activities were liable to know about these impacts or whether
they caused them by exceeding their fair share or not. We propose to
deduct the amount of pre-1995 emissions that were caused in generating
the received benefits among currently living and future people from the
beneficiaries’ shares of the remaining permissible emissions (for dis­
cussion see, e.g., (Meyer and Roser (2010, pp. 233–240); Page (2012);
Heyd (2017, pp. 34–43)). In that way we account for the unequal con­
sequences of what can be considered wrongless past emissions (that
agents caused while being non-culpably ignorant about their adverse
consequences) on the basis of the distributive principle of equal benefits
from emission-generating activities for currently living and future peo­
ple (see for further discussion on the distributive significance of conse­
quences of wrongless historical actions Meyer (2013)).
As proxy to indicate benefits current generations receive due to
previous activities connected to emissions, we use the capital stock
present in each country (covering the stock of buildings, infrastructure,
production facilities etc.) obtained from the Penn World Tables (Feen­
stra et al., 2015). As proxy for a lower bound on past emissions related to
this capital stock we use the average capital stock carbon footprint of
investments. This is calculated on the basis of Müller et al. (2013), who
estimated the carbon emissions embodied in global accumulated capital
stock for the year 2008.
This proxy warrants discussion in three dimensions.
First, the argument could be made that instead of compensating
directly for emissions embodied in capital stock, we should instead
allocate the amount of emissions necessary today to provide the benefits
of capital stock produced before 1995, e.g. as the emission intensity of
industrial processes to produce such capital may likely have been
reduced in the intervening time period. Additionally, some portion of
5
Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481
the capital stock may no longer be in operation or may have been
depreciated. To address this, a fractional proportion of capital stock
could be calculated based on an adjustment factor, the determination of
which would necessarily be based on speculation. Due to such indeter­
minacy, we do not consider an adjustment factor in our calculation of
the benefits received from past capital stock formation.
Second, benefits that current generations receive due to previous
activities connected to emissions will not be restricted to those gener­
ated due to available infrastructure. The emission-based rise in past
(economic) activities most often will also have raised aspects in other
dimensions relevant to current benefit, such as the institutional capac­
ity, education level, and knowledge (human capital) beyond what they
had otherwise been. Again, these aspects would be significantly more
difficult to quantify, and involve a substantial portion of speculation.
However, as many of these aspects have a much larger likelihood and
speed to spill-over to other countries and regions than they were initially
generated in (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Romer, 1990), the benefits
which arise tend to be available in a more equally dispersed way,
reducing at least somewhat their relevance to base a divergent carbon
budget on. In contrast, the available infrastructure is not only a major
production factor in economic output, but is also clearly location spe­
cific. We thus consider (only) the infrastructure stock, yet acknowledge
both that doing so simplifies a complex issue and that doing so is likely
to represent a lower bound for the divergency to be considered based on
perceived benefits.
Finally, using such a proxy relies on the adoption of what has been
dubbed “isolationism”. Isolationists (such as by Jamieson et al. (2005),
Ott (2012), Singer et al. (2010), and Torpman (2021, 2019), among
others) hold that we should consider the fair distribution of one good in
isolation from other goods and then, one after the other, qualify the
distributions in light of what a fair distribution of other relevant goods
requires, with the aim of determining an overall fair distribution. When
it comes to the unequal shares of received benefits from pre-1995
emission-generating activities, isolationists hold that we should
address the fair distribution of this good in isolation from other histor­
ically caused inequalities. Isolationists disregard these other issues for
the time being. Integrationists (e.g. Caney (2012), Margalioth and
Rudich (2013), Posner and Weisbach (2010), and Roser and Seidel
(2016)), in contrast, argue that in distributing a good, we should
consider all other goods relevant for an overall just distribution of
benefits and burdens; so they might argue that in addressing historically
caused inequalities one should address all of them together.
Arguments against full integrationism reflect epistemic and
pragmatic-political concerns.
Distributing a good in isolation from other goods is said to be more
tractable than the alternative in which we consider all the connections of
this good with the unjust distributions of other goods (see, e.g. Meyer &
Roser (2006, p. 239)). In addition, the integrationist approach arguably
fails to address the real-world conditions under which historically
caused inequalities are being negotiated. As Torpman (2019, p. 760)
writes, “[t]he political community will, plausibly, have an easier time
agreeing on one thing at a time, than agreeing on all of them at once.”
2.3. Accounting for a reasonable burden limit
While EPC simple does not imply grandfathering in the sense of
justifying unequal shares of the GCB relative to today’s highly unequal
levels, it misses two points which arguably speak in favor of some
limited version of grandfathering. The first is the argument that
reducing emissions from a high to very low level in a short period of time
is more costly, owing to the frustration of “legitimate expectations” of
high emitters as such drastic reductions are likely to come with high
costs of both adaptation and the substitution of or giving up of certain
goals; fairness requires taking into account these special costs (Meyer
and Sanklecha, 2014; Meyer and Truccone, 2022). Secondly, emission
reductions may be infeasible if they require a too high rate of reduction,
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Fig. 1. Three options for the global carbon budget 2017–2050 (GCB). Derived from five estimated ranges aiming for below 2 ◦ C at different levels of risk (orange
bars), based on a diversity of recently published estimates (Refs. left): (LB2C) a ‘likely below 2 ◦ C range’ in line with IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report Synthesis Report
as cited in (Rogelj et al., 2016); (T1.5C) a ‘target 1.5 ◦ C range’ in line with IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 ◦ C cited as (Rogelj et al., 2018); (WB2C) a
‘well below 2 ◦ C range’ after (Rockström et al., 2017); (T1.5Cext) a ‘target 1.5 ◦ C extended range’ according to (Millar et al., 2017); (1.5-2C) a ‘1.5-to-2 ◦ C range’
following (Xu and Ramanathan, 2017). They informed our choice of the three GCB options used in this study (bottom), among which we chose the WB2C option with
a GCB of 700 GtCO2 as primary (boldfaced, red circle), since it was found to be the most plausible across all estimates (see text for explanations). (For interpretation
of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)

with feasibility concerning the economic, technological, institutional,
socio-cultural, ecological and/or geophysical dimensions (de Coninck
et al., 2018).
The first argument pertaining to legitimate expectations is ques­
tionable at the very least, and we reject it for the following reasons. For
an estimation for the levels of frustration of legitimate expectations one
would need to take into account the consequences of overall burdens
and benefits of transforming to a very low level of emissions. They
include mitigation, but also adaptation costs and losses & damages.
Reducing to the same very low level in a short period of time might
prove to be less costly overall for high emitters, compared to low
emitters owing to lower adaptation costs and losses & damages (e.g.
owing to a smaller percentage of welfare realized in sectors like agri­
culture that tend to have above-average vulnerability to climate
change). Further, even if higher costs for high emitters owing to the
frustration of their “legitimate expectations” can be established, argu­
ably this is not a factor in the international distribution of the global
carbon budget. Instead, if we suppose that being causally responsible for
harm is a condition for standing under duties to provide compensation
then states that played a constitutive role in forming these expectations
can be understood to stand under such duties (Meyer, 2021). On the
basis of the historical emissions qualification states have been responsible
for pursuing a strategy of transformation to low-carbon society at least
since 1995. Arguably, such a strategy aims, among other things, at
changing the expectations of their citizens with regard to permissible
levels of their emissions.
However, the second issue of infeasibility justifies an argument for
limiting the burden faced by individual countries in terms of reduction
rates to remain within feasible ranges. While there is no evident
threshold for a prohibitive reduction rate, the literature assumes some
reasonable ranges. E.g. Stocker (2013) in his feasibility analysis of sta­
bilizing GHG concentration to meet the 1.5 and 2◦ targets builds upon
den Elzen et al. (2007). He concludes that “economic models estimate
that feasible maximum rates of emissions reduction may not exceed
about 5% per year” (their Fig. 3).
Rockström et al. (2017) in defining the “carbon law” conclude on a

6
K. Williges et al.
global emission reduction rate of halving emissions every decade to
2050, which they deem feasible – translating to a 6.7% reduction per
year. To avoid overly-burdensome yearly emission reductions (placing a
constraint on maximal yearly reductions, or C-qualified) in the equal per
capita case, we use the latter rate (rounded to 7%) as one example for
such a limit, and apply it at the country level, from 2016 emissions
onwards, assuming that on average, countries have similar opportunity
costs in terms of the transformation. We calculate the minimum possible
cumulative budget a country could reach given this limitation. This
minimum is then compared to the budget allocation under an EPC simple
approach, and if EPC simple is found too demanding, countries are pre-
allocated the budget difference. For the 7% rate suggested above, the
resulting budget reductions would be less than 20 t CO2 per person for
countries below the burden threshold, while states over it see rises in
their budgets from e.g. − 300 to around 25 t CO2 per person.
By initially allocating all countries a budget compatible with this
burden constraint we take into account an interpretation of grand­
fathering in a strongly limited but justified way. The resulting EPC
approach with all qualifications including such a burden constraint
(indicated as NHBC-qualified) appropriately remedies the shortcomings
of both simple approaches: First, it does not take for granted and beyond
criticism today’s highly unequal levels of emissions. Second, it takes into
account the three minimal fairness considerations we distinguished.
Third, it respects reasonable socio-economic limits of emission reduction
burdens.
While emissions trading can address this issue (and we discuss this
possibility in the Discussion and Conclusions section) we introduce the
idea of adjusting the national budgets according to the burden constraint
to approximate the relevant size of the effect of a normatively-justified
way of taking into account highly unequal current levels of emissions
in line with the rationale of PCC, rather than assuming tradeable emis­
sion rights will assuage the problem fully. Fig. C.1 in Appendix C pre­
sents a sensitivity analysis indicating that while the very imposition of a
burden constraint has a significant effect on carbon budgets of higher-
HDI countries, the choice of the rate has little effect on per person
emission budgets, for rates between 5% and 7%.
3. Methods
3.1. Determining the remaining global carbon budget
We first quantify the limit defined by the Paris Agreement by placing
a global constraint on the cumulative total anthropogenic carbon diox­
ide (CO2) emission budget from fossil fuels and industry over 2017 to
2050 (34 years), termed global carbon budget (GCB). We adopt three
GCB options which target the 1.5–2 ◦ C goal at different levels of ambi­
tion consistent with recent literature (Rockström et al., 2017; Rogelj
et al., 2019; Rogelj et al., 2018; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017): (i) a
baseline option aiming at well below 2 ◦ C (WB2C) with a GCB allocation
of 700 GtCO2 used as primary option, (ii) a drastic option targeting 1.5
◦
C (T1.5C) with a GCB limited to 500 GtCO2, and (iii) a marginal and
hence risky option to stay below 2 ◦ C (RB2C) with a GCB of 1100 GtCO2.
These options correspond to comprehensive emission scenarios incor­
porating non-CO2 greenhouse gases. All options assume that a limited
budget of only about 100 GtCO2 remains for beyond 2050, i.e., humanity
reaches net zero emissions near mid-century so that sustainable
anthropogenic solutions for atmospheric CO2 removal (Griscom et al.,
2017; Rogelj et al., 2019; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017) are not over­
stressed thereafter.
Fig. 1 illustrates the three global carbon budget (GCB) options for
this study in the context of relevant recent estimates considered most
reliable, showing them to reasonably reflect the GCB range. In our main
results, we focus on our baseline WB2C scenario which is used as the
primary option, reflecting ambitious anthropogenic CO2 emission re­
ductions combined with substantial anthropogenic CO2 removal
(Rockström et al., 2017; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017) that we consider to
7
Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481
correspond to about median (50%) probability for reaching 1.5 ◦ C by
2100 (~75% probability for below 2 ◦ C) (Rockström et al., 2017). For
the two additional scenarios introduced, the more stringent T1.5C
budget targeting 1.5 ◦ C and the more risky RB2C budget towards 2 ◦ C,
respectively, we illustrate the implications of their use in Appendices C
and D. The T1.5C option, with its smallest budget representing more safe
estimates (Rogelj et al., 2018; Rogelj et al., 2016; Xu and Ramanathan,
2017) to reach 1.5 ◦ C given that the global warming committed by 2016
is estimated to amount to ~1.2–1.3 ◦ C already (Mauritsen and Pincus,
2017), reflects a highly demanding CO2 emission reduction combined
with very challenging CO2 removal requirements (Friedlingstein et al.,
2014; Rogelj et al., 2018; Xu and Ramanathan, 2017). The RB2C option,
marginally compatible in most estimates with likely reaching the 2 ◦ C
limit (Griscom et al., 2017) and hence risky, reflects substantial CO2
emission reduction possibly feasible without or with limited CO2
removal (Griscom et al., 2017; Rogelj et al., 2016). For a full overview of
how the reference GCB ranges are obtained, see Appendix A.
3.2. Calculating country budgets with various distribution criteria
All budgets are calculated via use of either PCC or EPC mechanisms,
standalone or with the qualifications described in Section 2.2. In EPC
scenarios, countries are immediately (from the starting year of the sce­
nario) allocated emissions based on an equal per capita principle, based
on current and future population levels. In PCC scenarios, countries are
assigned budgets based on their current emission level and population
share as well as on emissions converging at a global equal per capita
emissions level at a future point in time (we choose 2050).
The following sections describe the calculations for fully-qualified
EPC and PCC approaches. These NHB-qualified scenarios contain all
three considerations qualifying the EPC simple and PCC simple ap­
proaches (i.e., consideration of basic needs, historical emissions, and
benefits from earlier emissions). The computation of the budgets for the
specific qualifications (N-, H-, and B-qualified) becomes clear inter alia in
this way. The final specification used in this work, NHBC-qualified, is
described in a separate step, as it only applies to EPC distributions.
4. EPC – all qualifications
4.1. Step 1: Calculating emissions to be allocated to countries which
require yearly reductions beyond the reasonable burden limit (NHBC-
qualified)
To implement a reasonable burden limit, we pre-allocate countries
additional emissions if they would otherwise experience reduction rates
through an EPC distribution which exceeds the specified limit (7%). We
first calculate the minimum budget required by a country, assuming a
constant 7% rate of reduction. Based on the start emissions estart (in year
t start = 2016) we begin by calculating the end emissions eend (in year tend
= 2050) for each country via
( )
eend = estart * (1 − δ)(t − t ) ,
end start
where the annual reduction rate (indicated above as δ) is assigned 0.07,
and calculate the country minimum budget using the equation specified
in step 2 below for the global budget, yet here for every country indi­
vidually.
We then calculate the difference between the budget from an EPC
simple approach and the above-calculated country minimum budget, and
when the EPC simple approach results in a smaller budget than the
country minimum budget, we earmark the difference to the respective
country, termed bburdenComp below. We then follow the subsequent steps
i
as normal but incorporate the burden-compensated budget allocation
bburdenComp
i during the final step 3.
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

4.2. Step 2: Calculating emissions earmarked for countries below an HDI
threshold (basic needs)
Initially, countries currently below a given HDI threshold are allo­
cated additional emissions via a PCC approach. To identify the level of
per capita emissions currently corresponding to a specific HDI threshold,
we carried out a panel regression of the log of emissions per capita on
inequality-adjusted HDI and country population from the World Bank’s
Open Data portal (World Bank, 2018) using yearly fixed effects, for years
2010 to 2015. Model specification can be found in Appendix C and
Table C.1.
In the main scenarios discussed, we use an HDI threshold level of
0.55, corresponding to the minimum HDI needed to be classified as a
country with medium human development. Based on empirical current
emissions this threshold implies an annual per capita emission allow­
ance of ~1.6 tCO2. For the sensitivity analysis in Fig. 4 (panels C and D)
thresholds of 0.65 and 0.75 correspond to annual per person emissions
of ~3.1 and ~6.2 tCO2, respectively. Countries below the threshold are
allocated an initial CO2 budget that suffices to cover emissions starting
from this level.
All countries below the HDI threshold are initially allocated the
threshold emissions, and a simple PCC approach is used, allowing for
emissions that are starting from that level, and linearly reduced emis­
sions to reach a level of “goal emissions per capita” by the target year.
Only countries currently below the HDI threshold are assigned such an
additional emissions budget. Countries are assigned an equivalent
aggregate basic-needs carbon budget as they would need to cover the
current threshold emission level (start) and their linear reduction in
emissions from start to end points in time, thus allowing for simple
calculation of the (globally uniform) emissions per capita at the end
point, epcend .
The global budget formulation, as a basis for obtaining epcend , then is
∑ ∑ end
(tend − tstart )( estart − ei ) ( end start ) ∑ end
B= i
+ t − t * ei ,
2
where B equals the remaining global budget (e.g., for the WB2C option,
700 GtCO2), t represents either start or end year (2016 and 2050,
respectively, for our remaining budget period 2017–2050), estart
i or eend
i
represent emissions of country i at the indicated time, and are summed
across the country index i (for 177 countries) to calculate global emis­
sions. This budget equation translates to the bracketed portion of the
following equation, which solves for the unknown emissions per capita
at the end point in time (2050),

Fig. 2. Mitigation burden of differing budget allocation approaches for the GCB option WB2C. Coloration indicates the years remaining until budget exhaustion, if
countries maintain their 2016 level of emissions. Blue shades indicate budget exhaustion at some point in the future, and orange shades indicate countries which
already exhausted their budget under such an allocation. The left and right columns represent forms of equal per capita and per capita convergence distribution
approaches. A simple approach (panels A and B) and a distribution using EPC or PCC with qualifications of addressing basic Needs, inclusion of Historical emissions
and Benefits received from previous emissions are shown (panels C and D, NHB-qualified). Panel E represents an EPC allocation with the previous considerations, plus
a Constraint on a reasonable burden limit in terms of maximum reduction rate (here indicated as NHBC-qualified). Budget allocations for the alternative GCB options,
T1.5C and RB2C, can be found in Appendix C (Figs. C.4 and C.5). (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web
version of this article.)

8
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Fig. 3. Carbon budgets per person for selected countries for the GCB option WB2C. The global carbon budget is distributed following EPC simple or qualified and
PCC simple or qualified allocation approaches, including qualifications for addressing basic needs (N-qualified), counting historical emissions (H-qualified), benefits of
previous emissions (B-qualified), and a combination of all three previous considerations (NHB-qualified). For EPC, including the additional qualification by a
reasonable burden constraint results in an EPC approach with all qualifications (NHBC-qualified). Rows indicate levels of country development, as indicated: first row:
developing countries, second row: BASIC countries, third row: G8 countries.

{ ∑ }
2B− (tend − tstart ) estart
i
of country i in the starting year.
tend − tstart
end
epc = ∑ ,
pend
4.3. Step 3: Calculating remaining emissions for all countries based on an
i

where pend is the population of country i at the end point in time (For the EPC approach
i
2050 target year we use the population forecast scenario of the IIASA
Shared Socio-economic Pathways data base, following population pro­ Next is the calculation of distributing the remaining – after step 2 –
jections for SSP2, a middle of the road scenario with moderate mitiga­ budget, i.e., remaining beyond the basic needs considerations, via an
tion and adaptation challenges) (Kc and Lutz, 2017). EPC approach. This remaining budget is allocated to all countries, i.e.,
With epcend , we can now calculate the additional budget allocated to both those at or below the HDI threshold and those above, on a cumu­
lative equal per capita basis. Thus, we take into account future popu­
individual countries below the HDI threshold, bHDI i . This is comprised of
lation change, using population projections from the SSP2 pathway for
two components, one granting budget to continuously allow (over the
2050 to calculate the total proportion of emissions to be allocated to a
34-year period tend − tstart of 2050 – 2016) the emissions per capita
given country based on population at the start (either 2016 or 1995) and
feasible for the end year, and one to additionally allow for emissions per
end (2050) points in time.
capita starting from those related to the adopted minimum HDI
When including all qualifications to the EPC approach, we also
threshold (epcHDI ) and leveling off to the target emission level per capita consider emissions from 1995 to 2016 (both cumulative and country-
by 2050 (epcend ), specific, via data from the World Bank’s Open data portal) as well as
{
1 ( end )[( ) ( )] the emissions embodied in the capital stock that was present in 1995.
bHDI
i = γ HDI
i * t − tstart epcHDI *pstart
i − epcend *pend
i Both these cumulative global emissions are added to the remaining
2
( ) ( )
} global budget of 2017–2050, while the total budget already allocated to
+ tend − tstart * epcend *pend
i . countries at or below the HDI threshold is subtracted from the global
budget. Only for the EPC NHBC-qualification (as introduced in Step 1
The variable γ HDI
i is a binary-valued activation factor set equal to 0 if above), do we also include a burden compensation term.
country i is above the HDI threshold, and 1 if it is at or below, thus only The final equation to determine individual country budgets under a
allocating emissions to the relevant countries, and pstart
i is the population fully-qualified EPC approach is:

9
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Fig. 4. Sensitivity of country carbon budgets (2017-2050) for the GCB option WB2C. Effect of various carbon budget allocation approaches (panels A and B) and
HDI thresholds (panels C and D) for countries sorted by HDI level. A and B illustrate the change in budget distribution for EPC and PCC approaches, respectively,
when adding considerations of basic needs (N-qualified), combined with historic emissions (NH-qualified), and the benefits of prior emissions (NHB-qualified). For
EPC, an approach with all qualifications (NHBC-qualified) is illustrated as well. C and D illustrate the sensitivity of the budget distribution to increasing HDI threshold
levels for what is considered a basic need and the corresponding emissions to fulfil that need.

∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ pstart + pend 5. PCC – all qualifications

bEPC
i = [B − bHDI
i + EiHist + (ψ * ki ) − bburden
i ]∑ i
∑i
pstart
i + pend i
+ bHDI − EiHist − (ψ *ki ) + bburden 5.1. Step 1: Calculating emissions earmarked for countries below an HDI
threshold (basic needs)
i i

where B is again the remaining global budget 2017–2050, bHDI i is the

fundamental basic needs allocation to below-threshold countries from The calculation of the budget allocated to countries below the HDI
threshold to address basic needs concerns is identical for both PCC and
above, EHist
i is the sum of historical emissions from 1995 to 2016 for
EPC, so calculation steps will not be repeated here. See Step 2 in the
country i, ψ is the average embodied emissions in one unit of capital in
previous section for calculation.
the capital stock, ki is the total capital stock of country i in the starting
year, bburden
i is the allocation to avoid overly burdensome emissions re­
5.2. Step 2: Calculating remaining emissions for all countries based on a
ductions (only relevant for EPC), and pstart
i and pend
i is the population of
PCC approach
country i in the starting/ending year. The starting year is 1995 in this
case.
In contrast to Step 2 in the previous calculation, here we calculate the
The equation can be broken into three parts; the first [bracketed]
required emissions per capita, which the world will converge to in 2050,
portion calculates the total global budget to be divided, from the base­
based on the global budget minus those emissions earmarked to address
line e.g. 700 Gt remaining budget plus additions for HDI, historic
basic needs concerns. The calculation of emissions per capita in 2050 is
emissions etc. The second portion determines the country share of this
hence as follows,
total budget, given national and global population at start and end pe­
{ ∑ start }
riods. Following this, country-specific amounts of already-used budget 2(B−
∑ HDI
bi )− (tend − tstart ) ei
(e.g. for historic emissions) or additions due to basic needs consider­ (tend − tstart )

ations, are taken into account. epcend = ∑ ,

pend
i

where t start and tend are starting and end years, respectively, B is the

10
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

remaining global budget (e.g., WB2C option 700 GtCO2 over since 1995 and/or those embodied in infrastructure available in 1995)
2017–2050), bHDI i is the budget allocated to address basic needs for into account, these emissions turn out to be so high that they account for
country i, estart
i is the emission of country i in the starting year (2016), practically the remaining difference between PCC and EPC simple for the
and pend the population in the final year (2050). below-HDI-threshold countries and most of the difference for the his­
i
torical high emitting countries. These results are robust to a change in
This emission per capita for countries to converge towards, epcend , is
the historic reference year, at least between the period 1995 to 2005.
then used as basis to calculate national budgets. Cumulative historical
Under a PCC distribution, moving the reference year to later would
emissions and the emissions embodied in capital stock are once again
result in only Oman seeing budget effects larger than an order of
included for the PCC approach with all qualifications,
{ magnitude. Under an EPC approach a larger number of countries would
1 ( end )[ ( )] see such effects (13 of 173); the change predominately affects highly-
bPCC = bHDI + t − tstart estart − epcend *pend
i i
2 i i
developed countries and particularly countries which rapidly
}
( )( ) expanded their emissions from 1995 to 2005 (e.g. South Africa) with a
+ tend − tstart epcend *pend − EHist − (ψ *ki ).
i i
strongly increasing budget allocation, or conversely, saw their emissions
decline (e.g. Czechia or Finland).
The bracketed portion of the equation calculates the cumulative
Our empirical findings show that qualifying both PCC and EPC in the
emissions throughout the period in question, equivalent to allow for a
ways described makes a big difference in terms of the distribution of the
linear decrease from starting emissions to the per capita emissions in the
GCB among countries (see Table 2 and Fig. 3 for selected countries and
end year, as calculated previously. This amount is added to any basic
the supplementary data file for all countries).
needs budget allocation (if non-zero) and a country’s cumulative his­
As shown in Fig. 3, we find that it is the consideration of historic
toric emissions from 1995 to 2016 and benefits-generating emissions
emissions that changes remaining country budgets most drastically for
embodied in capital stock are both removed from the budget. The
most of the countries, even for countries below the HDI sufficiency
resulting budget then is the PCC country budget bPCC
i remaining for 2017 threshold chosen (Ethiopia, Madagascar) more so than adjusting for the
to 2050. ability to reach the HDI threshold. Conversely, consideration of historic
emissions has a smaller impact for those countries that successfully
6. Results reduced emissions (of those shown in Fig. 3: Germany under a PCC
approach). For these latter countries - if emission reduction concen­
We observe that an NHB-qualified PCC has implications that are trated on the last two decades, but was not emerging earlier - the
similar to the implications of EPC simple (Fig. 3, 4 panels A and B). This consideration of benefits embodied in capital stocks more sharply re­
we can explain in the following ways: first, when we qualify PCC by duces the remaining budget. Finally, fairness modifications under an
giving priority to bringing all countries up to the HDI threshold, these EPC approach generally affects budgets to a smaller degree than under
countries are in fact granted a budget almost similar to the EPC simple PCC, with the exception of G8 countries.
budget. Second, when we qualify by taking past emissions (emissions Under a PCC approach, varying what is considered the minimum

Table 2
Selected country total and per person carbon budgets from 2017 to 2050 for three GCB options and different burden sharing approaches.
Target 1.5 degrees (T1.5C) Well below 2 degrees (WB2C) Risky below 2 degrees (RB2C)

Country EPC EPC NHBC- PCC PCC NHBC- EPC EPC NHBC- PCC PCC NHBC- EPC EPC NHBC- PCC PCC NHBC-
Simple qualified Simple qualified Simple qualified Simple qualified Simple qualified Simple qualified

Country total carbon budgets (Gt CO2)

Ethiopia 8.1 12.7 − 2.2 10.4 11.4 18.7 1.3 15.5 17.8 30.4 8.3 25.8
Madagascar 2.2 3.3 − 0.6 2.8 3.0 5.0 0.4 4.3 4.7 8.2 2.3 7.2
Philippines 7.7 10.2 − 0.3 8.7 10.8 12.8 3.0 10.3 16.9 17.6 9.6 13.4
India 92.8 129.5 16.1 106.7 129.9 199.2 54.1 163.0 204.2 333.9 130.2 275.6
China 79.7 108.7 175.4 23.7 111.5 105.8 203.1 37.0 175.2 95.8 258.5 63.6
Brazil 13.3 10.7 6.5 9.8 18.6 15.3 11.6 12.3 29.2 23.9 21.8 17.2
Germany 4.9 − 3.9 12.4 6.9 6.8 − 4.0 14.1 7.7 10.7 − 4.4 17.6 9.4
Russia 8.4 1.6 30.2 15.0 11.8 1.6 33.2 16.4 18.5 1.1 39.2 19.3
USA 21.9 − 18.6 93.2 32.2 30.6 − 19.4 102.0 36.5 48.1 − 22.4 119.7 45.0

Country per person carbon budgets (t CO2)

Ethiopia 72.4 113.3 − 19.5 92.5 101.3 167.0 11.6 138.5 159.2 271.2 73.8 230.6
Madagascar 80.0 122.8 − 23.1 104.7 112.0 185.0 13.6 159.1 176.0 305.7 87.0 267.7
Philippines 71.2 94.5 − 2.4 80.7 99.7 118.3 27.9 95.3 156.6 162.4 88.4 124.3
India 67.9 94.8 11.8 78.1 95.1 145.8 39.6 119.3 149.4 244.4 95.3 201.7
China 57.0 77.8 125.5 16.9 79.8 75.7 145.3 26.5 125.4 68.6 185.0 45.5
Brazil 62.8 50.6 30.8 46.5 87.9 72.5 54.9 58.1 138.2 113.2 103.1 81.3
Germany 58.4 − 47.3 149.3 82.7 81.7 − 47.9 170.1 92.7 128.4 − 52.6 211.8 112.7
Russia 58.3 11.1 208.9 103.8 81.6 11.0 229.7 113.8 128.2 7.4 271.2 133.7
USA 66.6 − 56.5 284.0 98.2 93.3 − 59.2 310.9 111.1 146.6 − 68.2 364.7 137.0

Table note: Units are total country emissions budgets (Gt CO2) (upper portion) and per person emissions budgets (t CO2 per person) (bottom), for the period
2017–2050.

11
K. Williges et al.
basic needs threshold significantly affects the allocation for all HDI
country groups (see Fig. 4 panel C), with raising the threshold markedly
increasing the budgets of low-HDI countries and reducing those of high-
HDI ones. Under an EPC approach, raising the minimum threshold also
clearly reduces the budgets for high-HDI countries, but only moderately
increases the budget for the other countries, as their allocated global
budget – in aggregate only slightly larger – is distributed on an equal-
per-capita basis anyway. In both cases, setting a moderate threshold
(e.g. 0.55 or 0.65, where a majority of countries are above the threshold)
results in a shift of emissions towards low-HDI countries, but the overall
trend of the emissions allocation remains similar. Increasing the
threshold to a high level such as 0.75 results in a drastic shift, with a PCC
N-qualified approach resembling an EPC simple allocation, as the ma­
jority of countries now are found below the threshold, and threshold-
level emissions increase markedly.
7. Discussion and conclusions
As noted in the introduction, Dooley et al. (2021) highlight a need for
literature on effort-sharing to make more explicit the normative posi­
tions taken, emphasize the needs of those most vulnerable to climate
impacts, and focus on approaches which suggest convergence points
between different ethical positions. We have tried to address all three of
these issues to a varying degree. In terms of the first issue, we explicate
the normative assumptions taken up in our analysis, in a clear and
consistent manner. Indirectly, we have also attempted to address the
needs of the most vulnerable populations with an explicit sufficientarian
allocation qualification. However, this attempt is imperfect, as those
covered by our basic needs approach do not fully overlap with those
most vulnerable to climate change impacts, but there most certainly
exists a strong correlation. Our highlighting of the issues of historical
responsibility, addressing feasible reduction rates as an interpretation of
limited grandfathering, and derivation of an allocation approach that
takes into account all of the previous concerns can be seen as our ful­
filling the third guideline proposed by Dooley et al.
We have investigated the allocation of national budgets if all coun­
tries would limit their budget to their fair shares, in other words, under
conditions of strict (or full) compliance, and have shown that it is
possible to quantitatively determine the fair budget shares of countries
(or of smaller units, which the approach also allows (Steininger et al.,
2020)). Under conditions of partial compliance – when some or many
countries (continue to) exceed their fair share – different views have
emerged as to the budgets of those committed to limiting their emis­
sions, with some arguing they should stay the same (Miller, 2016; Miller
et al., 2011; Murphy, 2000) while others defend notions that emissions
should either decrease or, if the compliers are able to do so, increase
(Singer, 2002; Stemplowska, 2019; Stemplowska, 2016). However, we
do not investigate issues of partial compliance in this paper.
An EPC approach with all qualifications (NHBC-qualified) will
distribute the GCB in a way that would impose on some countries
reduction rates that come with higher burdens than those we argue to be
bearable. We can mitigate this problem by assuming globally tradable
emission rights. Then, one can expect highly developed and high-
emitting countries to be able to buy the additional emission permits
from countries whose shares of the global carbon budget are greater
than what they require to reach the reduction convergence point within
the limits of a bearable reduction rate (i.e. the latter countries might
choose to not fully make use of emission rights allowed to them,
enabling cheaper achievement of emission reduction for the former
group). With respect to actual instruments in the context of voluntary
12
Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481
cooperation between countries in their implementation of nationally
determined contributions (NDCs) to achieve the Paris Agreement (i.e. in
activities under the Agreement’s article 6), we see that beyond the pure
permit market a rich set of possible approaches to more diversified green
industrial policy has become available and is discussed, including
deployment subsidies and regulation (Meckling and Allan, 2020). With
the Paris Agreement the differentiation of specific subsets of countries
(for example Least Developed Countries) for certain substantive issues
(e.g., climate finance) also supplies a more diversified basis for such
voluntary cooperation, beyond the earlier rigid distinction between
industrialized and developing countries. However, for the fields of
cooperation here relevant, in particular climate finance and technology
transfer, the self-differentiation of countries indicated by their NDC
formulation is often inconsistent with that of the Paris Agreement (Pauw
et al., 2019), which may render cooperation case-specific, and more
difficult to transfer and generalize to other settings within the context of
the Paris Agreement.
A second premise and further qualification concerns the fairness of
assuming the same maximum reduction rate. This would be unfair to
countries that have made serious efforts to reduce emission intensity in
the years before 2016 and still will need to drastically reduce their
emissions to reach the convergence point. For these countries, the “low
hanging fruit” have gone and they now face a more difficult task of
reducing emissions to the required level. Thus, we cannot expect them to
reduce up to the same maximum level. There is evidence that some
countries did make such serious efforts, though this is difficult to
establish; it seems to be the case for very few highly developed countries
(e.g. possibly Denmark). For such countries we would need to reduce the
maximum level of reduction imposed accordingly.
We conclude that simple so-called equality and equal percentage
reduction approaches are open to similar criticisms. Responding to these
criticisms requires taking into account major and minimal fairness re­
quirements. A critical interpretation of these fairness concerns allows us
to identify a four-fold qualified EPC approach. Arguably, this approach
allows to specify a fair allocation of the GCB across countries for the
period of transformation to a low-carbon economy and society. By tak­
ing into account the legitimate reasons for grandfathering the thus-
qualified EPC can be understood to reflect what is defensible in the
rationale of PCC. We submit that the EPC approach with all four qual­
ifications (NHBC-qualified) reflects widely shared minimal fairness
concerns in a systematic and open way. The implications of operation­
alizing this approach for the allocation of the remaining GCB in a
transparent manner which invites critical engagement with its norma­
tive underpinnings can guide countries in reviewing and adjusting their
NDCs.
CRediT authorship contribution statement
Keith Williges: Conceptualization, Investigation, Writing – original
draft, Writing – review & editing. Lukas Meyer: Conceptualization,
Methodology, Writing – original draft, Writing – review & editing. Karl
W. Steininger: Conceptualization, Methodology, Writing – original
draft, Writing – review & editing. Gottfried Kirchengast: Methodology,
Software, Investigation, Data curation, Visualization, Writing – review
& editing.
Declaration of Competing Interest
The authors declare that they have no known competing financial
interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence
K. Williges et al.
the work reported in this paper.
Acknowledgements
We thank Pranay Sanklecha for valuable discussion and contributing
to an initial design of an earlier version of the manuscript, Stefan Borsky
for discussion and Thomas Pölzler for his comments and suggestions. We
also thank participants in the seminar “Responding to Climate Change:
Intergenerational and Transitional Justice” for their discussion of the
draft manuscript. The work of K.W. and K.W.S. was funded by the
Austrian Climate and Energy Fund (ACRP project SHIFT). The work of G.
K. was performed as part of the Carbon Management project of the
University of Graz (www.carbmanage.earth).
Appendix A Determination of global carbon budgets
Describing the five reference GCB 2017-2050 ranges shown in Fig. 1
more specifically, these were obtained as follows.
The estimated ‘likely below 2 ◦ C range’ (LB2C) of 420 to 1070 GtCO2,
dubbed IPCC AR5 SYR in Rogelj et al. (2016), used the budget “IPCC
AR5 SYR, TAB (threshold avoidance budget), Value from 2015: 590 to
1240 GtCO2” from Table 2 of Rogelj et al. (2016) as basis, specified
therein as “To limit warming to below 2 ◦ C since 1861-1880 with 66-
100% probability, accounting for the non-CO2 forcing as spanned by the
subset of stringent mitigation scenarios in the IPCC AR5 Scenario
Database (10-90% range)”. Subtracting a rounded amount of 70 GtCO2
for starting from 2017 instead of from 2015 and a 100 GtCO2 allowance
for residual emissions beyond 2050, we arrived at the LB2C 420 to 1070
GtCO2 range shown.
The estimated ‘target 1.5 ◦ C range’ (T1.5C) of 370 to 740 GtCO2,
dubbed IPCC SR1.5 (Rogelj et al., 2018), used the budget “Remaining
carbon budget from 2018, 50th percentile (median) of TCRE (transient
climate response to cumulative emissions) to reach ~1.5◦ C, additional
warming since 2006-2015 of 0.5 to 0.7◦ C” from Table 2.2 of Rogelj et al.
(2018) as basis, corresponding therein to 530 to 900 GtCO2. Adding a
rounded amount of 40 GtCO2 for starting from 2017 instead of from
2018, subtracting an amount of 100 GtCO2 suggested therein as allow­
ance until 2100 for “additional Earth-system feedbacks (such as CO2
released by permafrost thawing or methane released by wetlands)”, and
subtracting another 100 GtCO2 allowance for residual emissions beyond
2050, we arrived at the T1.5C 370 to 740 GtCO2 range.
The estimated ‘well below 2 ◦ C range’ (WB2C) of 600 to 730 GtCO2,
dubbed Rockström et al. (Rockström et al., 2017), used the scenario
illustrated in the Figure “Decarbonization pathway consistent with the
Paris agreement” of Rockström et al. (2017) as basis, providing for a
GCB from 2017 of about 700 to 830 GtCO2 and quoted as “broadly
consistent with a 75% probability of limiting warming to below 2 ◦ C; a
median temperature increase of 1.5 ◦ C by 2100; estimated peak median
temperature increase of 1.7◦ C; a 50% probability of limiting warming to
below 1.5 ◦ C by 2100.” Subtracting for beyond 2050 a safety margin of
100 GtCO2 (as argued for in Rockström et al. (2017)), we arrived at the
WB2C 600 to 730 GtCO2 range.
The estimated ‘target 1.5 ◦ C extended range’ (T1.5Cext) of 630 to
1300 GtCO2, dubbed Millar et al. (Millar et al., 2017), used an estimate
contained in Fig. 3 of Millar et al. (2017) as basis, providing for a GCB
from 2015 of about 220 to 400 GtC (800 to 1470 GtCO2), quoted at end
of the section “Adaptive mitigation and carbon budgets” therein as
“Using a TCR [transient climate response] likely range of 1.3–2.5 ◦ C and
an ECS [equilibrium climate sensitivity] likely range of 2.0–4.5 ◦ C, the
remaining budget for a 1.5 ◦ C warming would be unlikely greater than
400 GtC and unlikely less than 200 GtC (see Supplementary Fig. 18).”
13
Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481
Subtracting 70 GtCO2 for starting from 2017 instead of from 2015, and
discounting for beyond 2050 a safety margin of 100 GtCO2 as for
Rockström et al. (2017), we arrived at the T1.5Cext 630 to 1300 GtCO2
range. Note that despite addressing T1.5C compatibility, these estimates
appear the most risky in comparison. The main reason for the high es­
timates is the construction method as visible from Fig. 1b in Millar et al.
(2017): the distinct decrease in the slope of the Observed-to-RCP2.6
temperature change trajectory as function of cumulative CO2 emis­
sions around the new “zero” reference time, from readjustment to 2010-
2019, leads to markedly higher future carbon budget availability for
given warming limits. However, such a sudden weakening of tempera­
ture sensitivity to cumulative emissions at current cumulated CO2
amounts appears physically implausible. We hence doubt the T1.5C
compliancy at least of the T1.5Cext range beyond 800 GtCO2, not least
given that the global warming committed by 2016 is estimated to
amount to ~1.2–1.3 ◦ C already (Mauritsen and Pincus, 2017) and since
this is also more in line with the above T1.5C upper estimate of 740
GtCO2.
The estimated ‘1.5-to-2 ◦ C range’ (1.5-2C) of 320 to 1020 GtCO2,
dubbed Xu-Ramanathan (Xu and Ramanathan, 2017), used the “Target-
1.5C option” and “Target-2C option” of Xu and Ramanathan (2017) as
basis for the lower and upper bound estimates, respectively, providing
for a GCB from pre-industrial of about 2500 to 3200 GtCO2, quoted in
the section “Mitigation: A Three-Level Strategy” therein as “the cumu­
lative emissions from preindustrial to 2100 must be less than 2.5 trillion
tons of CO2” (Target-1.5C option) and “will limit the cumulative CO2
emissions (since preindustrial) to 3.2 trillion tons” (Target-2C option).
Subtracting 2080 GtCO2 (estimated historic emissions up to 2016
(Friedlingstein et al., 2014; Rogelj et al., 2016) for starting from 2017
instead of from pre-industrial, and discounting for beyond 2050 a safety
margin of 100 GtCO2 (Xu and Ramanathan (2017) suggests particular
caution), we arrived at the 1.5-2C 320 to 1020 GtCO2 range.
Appendix B Empirical evidence of “grandfathering” from NDC
pledges
Evidence of grandfathering was derived from country Nationally
Determined Contributions pledges (Fenhann, 2018), for the commit­
ment period 2015 to 2030, with 99 countries for which adequate pledge
data was available.
Total commitments submitted to the UNEP imply a total global
budget of 671.3 Gt CO2 to 2030, with yearly global targets of 44 and 42
Gt for 2020 and 2030 respectively. The total budget is seen as the cu­
mulative allowance to 2030, and distributed using an EPC simple
approach based on 2015 population, arrives at a per person cumulative
allowance of just over 36 t. We assume linear changes between pledge
years in the UNEP database and calculate country cumulative pledge
emissions to 2030. Dividing by national population in 2015 arrives at
per person pledged emissions. This pledged per person allowance is then
compared to the expected EPC simple value using the total budget of
671.3 Gt CO2 to find the difference between expected and committed
budgets in percent, as shown in Fig. B.1. As can be seen, with increasing
initial (2015) emissions per person the difference between expected and
pledged emissions rises rapidly, implying an increasing use of grand­
fathering approaches for countries with higher initial emissions per
person. Additionally, Table B.1 shows regression results indicating the
strength of 2015 emissions per person in corresponding to the eventual
difference in needed (“expected”) versus pledged emissions per capita.
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Fig B.1. Increasing variation between expected and committed NDCs with increasing emission intensity. Countries with higher initial (2015) emissions per person
are pledging NDCs with resulting total emissions per person (over the period 2015 to 2030) much higher than the expected value that would apply if one assumes
them to follow an equal per capita approach. This discrepancy increases with increasing initial emissions.

Table B.1
OLS regression results of the (%) difference between goal (“expected”) and actual NDC
pledges given initial emissions per capita, total budget from 2015 to 2030, and 2015
population.
Dependent variable
% difference in goal vs pledged emissions per capita

2015 emissions per capita 43.572*** (3.011)

Cumulative emissions 2015 to 2030 0.001 (0.001)
2015 population -0.000 (0.000)
Constant 73.085*** (20.192)

Observations 93
R2 0.725
Adjusted R2 0.716
Residual Std. Error 124.763 (df = 89)
F statistic 78.362*** (df = 3; 89)

Note*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

14
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Appendix C Sensitivity analysis and further results

Fig. C.1. Sensitivity analysis of varying the maximum annual rate of reduction adopted as reasonable burden limit. For the EPC NHBC-qualified allocation approach,
a range of adopted reasonable burden limits were compared to a scenario with no rate restriction, here shown for the results with HDI threshold level set to 0.55.
Choosing a maximum rate between 0.05 (5 %) to 0.07 (7 %), versus using no rate restriction at all, has a much larger effect on average budget allocation than the
choice between different plausible rates. For countries with low HDI, generally not expected to be required to reduce emissions at rates higher than the reasonable
burden limit, the average allocation is reduced slightly, while for states above the threshold, budget allocations can increase dramatically, avoiding burdening
countries with large negative emissions requirements. This typically increases the cumulative budgets 2017-2050 of these countries, in some cases by more than 200 t
CO2 per person.

15
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Table C.1
Identification of model to estimate required per capita emissions for a given level of Human
Development Index (HDI), applied to determine per capita emissions levels for minimum HDI
threshold level.
Dependent variable
log(emissions per capita)

Inequality-adjusted HDI 6.938*** (0.131)

Population (billions) 0.922*** (0.181)
Year 2011 -0.050 (0.089)
Year 2012 -0.051 (0.089)
Year 2013 -0.076 (0.087)
Year 2014 -0.088 (0.086)
Year 2015 -0.093 (0.086)
Constant -3.285*** (0.094)

Observations 831
R2 0.774
Adjusted R2 0.772
Residual Std. Error 0.726 (df = 823)
F statistic 403.555*** (df = 7; 823)

Note:*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

The model controls for yearly fixed effects and country population data sources and use of results can be found in the Methods section of the
(as per capita emissions are higher in more populated countries, and main text.
population is a parameter of our allocation mechanism). Discussion on

Fig. C.2. Effects of changing the historic year on resulting budget distribution. The figure illustrates the percentage change in resulting country budget when
changing the year when historical consideration of emissions begins (in the main text given as 1995) to the years indicated. The left panel shows changes to PCC H-
qualified budgets, the right panel EPC H-qualified. As seen, changing the historic year has a larger effect on developed countries using an EPC approach, but there are
lesser effects on less developed countries compared to PCC. For the majority of countries, effects would be minor, although the reference year would have outsized
impacts (either positive or negative) on a small number of outliers as seen.
16
K. Williges et al. Global Environmental Change 74 (2022) 102481

Fig. C.3. Correlation between inequality-adjusted HDI and emissions

Fig. C.4. As in Fig. 2 of the main text but using a target 1.5 degrees Celsius (T1.5C)
17 option, resulting in a global carbon budget over 2017 to 2050 of 500 GtCO2.
K. Williges et al.
Fig. C.5. As in Fig. 2 of the main text, but using a risky below 2 degrees (RB2C) option, resulting in a global carbon budget over 2017 to 2050 of 1100 GtCO2
Appendix D. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2022.102481.
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