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L5 – GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY
22,8%
43,3%
6,7% High
11,1%
dependency
10,5%
from Russia
1,4%
1,6%
➢ In Ukraine "orange revolution" and victory in presidential elections (26-12-2004) of Viktor Juščenko,
not appreciated by the Kremlin
➢ Ukraine moves more and more towards the European Union, reducing the weight of Russian
influence
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➢ Ukraine, however, is in the orbit of Moscow and from an energy point of view depends on Russia for
energy. The majority of Ukrainian gas, in fact, comes from Gazprom, and is sold at a subsidized
price of 50 $/ 1000 m3
➢ Meanwhile, Ukraine obtains from EU the status of market economy → Gazprom begins to apply
market tariffs (at first 160 $/1000 m3 and then, after Ukrainian refU.S.l, 230 $/1000 m3) → attempt to
bind Ukraine to Russia
➢ Ukraine threatens to make withdrawals on gas destined to Europe as payment for transit fees (15%
of the total)
➢ Moscow points out that transit rights are already paid by Gazprom and, following rumors of a
possible rent increase for Russian ships stationed in Crimea, also questions the territorial
agreements with Ukraine
➢ Risks of the crisis:
o For Russia,FAREpossibleCLIC PERofMODIFICARE
alienation LO the
the sympathies of even STILE DEL TITOLO
Russian-speaking part of Ukraine
and stiffening of relations with the EU
o For Gazprom, possible blocking of the entry of European investors into the company's
shareholder base
o For Ukraine, possible significant crisis in the entire industrial sector, with serious repercussions
on the economy
➢ On December 30, 2005 the Russian President Putin proposed a compromise to Ukraine, with the
application of market prices only from April 1, 2006
➢ Juščenko asks for prices to be fixed in advance, but Moscow interprets the request as an attempt to
gain time and gives the green light to Gazprom to cut natural gas supplies to Ukraine
➢ On January 1, 2006 Juščenko states that the price of 230 $/1000 m3 is unacceptable. Gazprom then
announces the closure of the taps for the Ukraine, specifying that there would be no repercussions
for the supply of natural gas to the EU
➢ Despite the announcement, gas supplies to Europe immediately undergo a sharp drop, pushing
some importingFARE CLIC
countries to usePER MODIFICARE LO STILE DEL TITOLO
oil reserves
➢ On the same day, various European countries formally request Ukraine to ensure the gas flow
➢ On January 2, 2006 Gazprom accuses Ukraine of having illegally withdrawn 100 million cubic
meters of gas destined for the European market; the Ukrainian government replies specifying that
supplies come from underground deposits and from Turkmenistan, but reiterating that it has no
problems about intervening directly on supplies to the EU
➢ The crisis extends to Moldova, which has not accepted the 100% price increase proposed by
Moscow, suffering the stop of supplies as of January 1
January 2, 2006:
➢ Italy: 24% drop in imports;
➢ France: decrease of 25÷30%;
➢ Germany: unquantified drop;
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➢ Croatia: drop of more than 30%;
➢ Slovenia: 25% decrease; risk due to high dependence of gas imports on Russia (55% of the total);
➢ Hungary: 25% drop, returning to normal in the evening;
➢ Austria: 30% drop; availability of reserves;
➢ Romania: 30% drop;
➢ Slovakia: 30% drop; availability of reserves;
➢ Poland: 38% drop.
➢ On January 4, 2006 Naftogaz (Ukrainian company) and Gazprom announce they have reached an
agreement: Ukraine will purchase Russian gas for the next 5 years at the price of 230 $/1000 m3, but
will also be able to purchase gas from other countries (such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan) at a
lower price (equal to 95 $/1000 m3), through a Swiss company with Russian and Ukrainian
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participation (RosUkrEnergo)
➢ The fear of an energy crisis ends for Europe, with the price of oil reaching again the pre-crisis levels
➢ However, the problem of high energy dependence and problems deriving from possible geopolitical
crises is highlighted
➢ In Italy, in particular, the nuclear option is relaunched for the generation of electricity, which,
however, will be definitively stopped following the referendum of 2011, proposed downstream of the
accident at Fukushima
➢ The new crisis arises when - in 2008 - Gazprom refuses to sign the new supply contract with Ukraine
for 2009 until Naftogaz pays its past debts
➢ Gazprom proposed to raise the price to 250 $/1000 m3 from 179.5 $/1000 m3. Ukraine said it was
prepared to pay 201 $/1000 m3 and wanted to raise gas transit fees. Gazprom then raised the price
FARE
again to 458 $/1000 m3,CLIC PER MODIFICARE
unacceptable for Ukraine LO STILE DEL TITOLO
➢ Following the failure of negotiations, on January 1, 2009 the supply to Ukraine was stopped
➢ Russia accused Ukraine of stealing gas in transit towards Europe, and on January 7, 2009 Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin ordered a stop: gas supplies through Ukraine were completely
interrupted for 13 days, totally blocking supplies to South-Eastern European countries and partially
blocking supplies to other European countries
➢ On January 12 Gazprom announces its intention to allow a transit of small quantities of gas to
South-East Europe through the Sudzha station, but Ukraine refuses the proposal citing technical
reasons and suggesting as an alternative the Valuyki and Pisarevka stations
➢ Kiev motivated its refU.S.l to let Russian gas enter from Sudzha with the fact that in this case four
eastern regions of the country would remain without supplies. The Ukrainian proposal is rejected by
Gazprom
E. F.Bompard – E-Transition, Sustainability and Economics- 13
RUSSIA-UKRAINE 2009 CRISIS – 2
Source: ENTSO-G
➢ On January 18, 2009 the Prime Ministers of Russia and Ukraine - Vladimir Putin and Yulia
Tymoshenko - stipulate a new ten-year supply contract (whose signature will cause Tymoshenko to
be sentenced to prison for abuse of office in 2011)
➢ On January 20, 2009 the supply of gas to Europe was restored and it returned to full capacity within
2 days FARE CLIC PER MODIFICARE LO STILE DEL TITOLO
➢ Negative impacts of the crisis:
o Drawbacks for Russia are related to Gazprom losses equal to 1.5 billion $ due to lack of gas
selling; furthermore, Russia suffered an image damage, starting to be considered an unreliable
supplier
o Drawbacks for Ukraine were the 100 millions $ losses due to the lack of gas transit fees;
considerable effects also on the productive sector and the country’s economy in general;
moreover, a loss of reputation, like for Russia
o Also for other European countries there were negative impacts, since they suffered significant and
social consequences; for instance, Bulgaria was forced to interrupt the production in some of its
important industrial sites, while Slovakia declared a state of emergency
Representation of European countries involved in the reduction of gas supply during the Russia-
Ukraine crisis in 2009 (red: high impact; yellow: limited impact)
Source: Wikipedia
➢ From the legislative point of view, the EU discussed whether it needs to go beyond current
legislation in order to be prepared for new crises
" ...After the gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009, which caused an
unprecedented interruption in the supply of gas reaching the Community through Ukraine, the
European Council and the European Parliament called for an early review of the current
Directive. Another major interruption of gas supply cannot be excluded and may even occur
before long. The Community must therefore be prepared for the possibility of further gas
supply disruptions. ..."
REGULATION (EU) NO. 994/2010 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
FARE CLIC PER MODIFICARE of 20 October 2010LO STILE DEL TITOLO
concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply and repealing Council Directive
2004/67/EC
(http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/IT/ALL/?uri=CELEX:32010R0994)
➢ It introduces the N-1 formula, which describes the ability to meet total gas demand in the
considered area in the event of a major gas infrastructure failure relative to a day with
exceptionally high gas demand observed statistically once every twenty years
➢ The natural gas transmission network (including interconnectors), production facilities, liquefied
natural gas regasification terminals, and storage facilities are considered
➢ The remaining available capacity in case of failure of the main gas infrastructure must be at least
FARE
equal to the total dailyCLIC PER of
gas demand MODIFICARE
the considered areaLOrelative
STILEto aDEL TITOLO
day with exceptionally
high demand statistically observed once every twenty years (i.e. under worst case conditions)
➢ The value of N - 1, expressed in %, shall be ≥ 100 %
𝐸𝑃𝑚 + 𝑃𝑚 + 𝑆𝑚 + 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝑚 − 𝐼𝑚
𝑁−1 % = ∙ 100
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑓
Demand to be satisfied
𝐸𝑃𝑚 + 𝑃𝑚 + 𝑆𝑚 + 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝑚 − 𝐼𝑚
𝑁−1 % = ∙ 100
𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑓
➢ Political crisis leading to the separation of the Crimean peninsula (with an ethnic Russian
majority) from the rest of Ukraine after local riots and the Russian military intervention, as a
reaction to the removal (in February 2014) of President Janukovyč and the government by the
Ukrainian parliament, as a consequence of the Euromaidan events1
FARE CLIC
➢ The local government PER
of Crimea MODIFICARE
refuses to recognize theLO
newSTILE
UkrainianDEL TITOLO
government and
president Poroshenko (recognized as legitimate by most countries, except Russia and some
others) declares the will to separate from Ukraine and annexation to Russia, calling a referendum
(March 16, 2014) among the population of Crimea
➢ The outcome of the referendum (97% in favor of autonomy) is not recognized by the EU, the U.S.
and 71 other UN member countries, which consider it a violation of the international law and the
Constitution of Ukraine; this outcome is instead considered valid by Russia
1Aseries of demonstrations started in Ukraine on November 21, 2013) following the suspension - by the
Ukrainian government - of an association agreement called DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area) between Ukraine and the EU
E. F.Bompard – E-Transition, Sustainability and Economics- 23
RUSSIA-UKRAINE 2014 CRISIS – 3
➢ The EU then decides to apply economic sanctions (limiting access to EU capital markets by
Russia's five largest state-owned financial institutions and their subsidiaries, as well as three
major Russian energy and three defense companies; banning arms imports/exports; limiting
access to technologies that can be used for oil production) and related to economic cooperation
FARE
(with suspension CLIC
of some PERand
bilateral MODIFICARE
regional cooperationLOprograms)
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➢ In response to the sanctions, on December 1, 2014, Putin declared the South Stream project
aborted, taking advantage of the European Commission’s indication that the project did not
comply with the Third Energy Package, which provides for the separation of commodity producer
and transmission system operator (Gazprom, specifically, would have played both roles)
➢ The South Stream would be replaced by the Turkish Stream (or TurkStream), a pipeline of equal
capacity (63 billion cubic meters: 16 for Turkey, 47 for the EU) directed from Russia to Turkey
through the Black Sea
➢ On November 24, 2015, Turkish F-16s shoot down a Russian Sukhoi 24 fighter jet flying near the
Turkish-Syrian border, which allegedly trespassed, violating Turkey's airspace
➢ Russian’s response was to impose several sanctions on Turkey, including suspension of visas for
Turkish citizens, restrictions on Turkish companies investing in Russia, and import restrictions on
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Turkish products
➢ Another consequence is Russia's decision to halt the Turkish Stream project
➢ Over the course of 2016, there has been a thaw between the parties
➢ On October 10, 2016, Russia and Turkey signed the agreement to resume the Turkish Stream
construction project
➢ Gazprom started to deliver natural gas via TurkStream, including to Bulgaria and North
Macedonia, on January 1, 2020, replacing supplies via the Trans-Balkan pipeline through Ukraine
and Romania
➢ An expansion project (also called “Balkan Stream”) foresees the development of the Balkan lines
across Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary, up to Austria, in order to supply central and Western Europe
with gas passing through the TurkStream
➢ The period after the Crimea crisis was characterized by further tensions related to the Donbass
war
➢ One month after the Crimea independency, separatists in the regions of Donetsk, Luhansk and
Kharkiv, close to the Russia-Ukraine border claimed for independency, and the two self-
FAREand
proclaimed Donetsk CLIC PERPeople's
Luhansk MODIFICARE LOdeclared
Republics were STILE on DEL
AprilTITOLO
6, 2014
➢ This lead to an armed conflict between the central Ukrainian government and the separatists
(indirectly supported by Russia)
➢ A ceasefire agreement between Ukraine, Russia, the two self-proclaimed Republics, the Minsk
Protocol, was signed September 5, 2014
➢ Violations of this ceasefire on both sides were however continuous, and led to the need of a new
agreement (Minks II) on 12 February 2015
➢ After this agreement, the conflict was formally frozen, even if several violations and military
actions continued in the area even in the following years
March 3, 2019
• Length: 1230 km
• Capacity: 55 bcm/y
• Expected start: 2022
May 2, 2018
➢ On February 21, 2022 Russia formally recognized the separatists Donetsk and Luhansk People's
Republics
➢ On February 24, 2022 Russia military invaded the Ukrainian territory, and the war currently ongoing
started
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Three main consequences from the energy point of view:
➢ Stop to the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, already completed in September 2021
and waiting for the operational approval
➢ Strong increase of the natural gas and oil prices, reflecting the uncertainties
caused by the conflict
➢ Decision of European countries of relevantly accelerating for reducing and – as
soon as possible – eliminating the energy import dependency from Russia
Source: http://www.offshore-technology.com/projects/brent-field-decommissioning-north-sea/brent-field-decommissioning-north-sea3.html
➢ Brent and WTI are benchmarks: each oil is quoted against the benchmark, adding a positive or
negative difference (premium), a function of quality:
o Lighter oil and lower sulfur content than the benchmark: positive premium
o Heavier oils with higher sulfur content than the benchmark: negative premium
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➢ Brent is used to price oil produced in Europe (including Russia), Africa and the Middle East and
represents the benchmark for over 60% of transactions
➢ WTI is mainly used to price oil produced in North and South America
➢ Brent historical minimum: December 10, 1998, 9.55 $ /barrel
➢ Brent historical maximum: July 11, 2008, 147.25 $ /barrel
➢ Since then, values of around $40/barrel in 2009, over $90/barrel in 2011, sharp decline starting in
the second half of 2014, low of around 28 $ /barrel in January 2016
Source :BP
➢ The need for Western European countries to introduce measures to reduce oil consumption and
avoid wastage
Austerity