1St Mnlu, Nagpur National Moot Court Competition, 2022: Team Code: 30

1st MNLU, NAGPUR NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 Team Code 30P
Before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica

Writ Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of Indica
M/s. Johri Cine Films Limited and Inflix

(Petitioners)
v.
Union of Indica and Ors
(Respondents)
Clubbed With
Inflix and Inzon
(Petitioners)
v.
Union of Indica and Ors
(Respondents)
Clubbed With
M/s. Blockbuster Films and Mr. Amit Dewan
(Petitioners)
v.
State of Awadh & Ors
(Respondents)
Clubbed With
Association of Film Producers
(Petitioners)
v.
Union of Indica & Hind Swaraj
(Respondents)
Written Submissions for the Petitioner
Memorial on behalf of the Petitioners

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1st MNLU, NAGPUR NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...III
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …IV
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION …VI
STATEMENT OF FACTS …VII
STATEMENT OF ISSUES …IX
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS …X
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
1. Whether the petitions are maintainable in the Supreme court of …XI
Indica?
2. Whether M/s. Johri Cine Films Limited and Inflix required to …XII
obtain certification from CBFC for the release of web series,
‘Indica Games’?
3. Whether the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and …XVII
Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2022 (‘Rules’), are valid on the
grounds that they have been promulgated without any jurisdiction
by the Ministry of Information Technology and are ultra vires the
Constitution of Indica?
4. Whether the FIR registered against the petitioners Blockbuster ..XXVI
Films and Mr. Amit Dewan under section 153, 505 (1)(b) of the
IPC is groundless, malicious and abuse of the process of law and
hence liable to be quashed?
5. Whether the Hind Swaraj should be allowed to join as an ..XXXIII
intervener in the instant petition?
PRAYER ..XXXVII
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
AIR All India Reporter
Cl. Clause
Anr Another
Commr. Commissioner
Comp. L.L International Journal of Comparative Law
CriLJ/CrLJ Criminal Law Journal
CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure
Del Delhi High Court
Ed. Edition
FIR First Information Report
IPC Indian Penal Code
LEd United States Supreme Court Reports

(Lawyers Edition)
Ker. Kerala High Court
Mad Madras High Court
No. Number
Ors. Others
Rev. Reverend
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
Sec./S. Section
UOI Union of India
u/s Under section
v./vs. Versus
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Statutes:
1. The Cinematograph Act, 1952 (37 of 1952)
2. The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983.
3. Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000(21 of 2000)
4. Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021.
5. The Constitution Of India 1949
6. The Indian Penal Code(Act XLV of 1860).
7. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)
8. Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules,1961
Books:
1. Sundaravel, E. and Elangovan, N. (2020), Emergence and Future of Over-The-Top (OTT) video
services in India: An Analytical Research
2. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: The Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st ed

3. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed
Cases:
1. Mr Padmanabh Shankar vs Union Of India LNINDORD 2019 KANT 8654)
2. Abdul Waheed Farooqui v. Union Of India & ors. LNINDORD 2019 LUCK 100
3. Peggy Fen v/s Central Board of Film Certification, IIS, Regional Officer, Thiruvananthapuram &
Others1 WP(C). No. 28288 of 2021
4. Video Master, Bombay v Union of India Video Master, Bombay v Union of India(1986) 88 Bom LR
525 [LNIND 1986 BOM 265]
5. Justice for Rights Foundation Vs. Union of India WPC no. 11164/2018
6. State of Tamil Nadu and Others v. K. Shyam Sunder (2011) 8 SCC 737
7. Institution Of Mechanical Engineers (India) Through Its Chairman Versus State Of Punjab And Others
8. State of Karnataka and anr v. Ganesh Kamath & Ors(1983 SCR (2) 665);
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9. Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P. (2000) 3 SCC 40

10. Wipro Ltd. v. Assistant Collector Of Customs & Others 2018 ACR 121
11. Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v Union of India(1984) 3 SCC 127.
12. Mohan Medical College and Hospital & anr. v. Union of India & anr., 1 (2017) 15 SCC 719
13. Prof. C.S. Gautam And Another Versus Union Territory Of Chandigarh And Others LNIND 2019 PNH
1732
14. Live Law Media (P) Ltd. v. Union of India WP(C) No.6272 of 2021
15. Shreya Singhal v. Union of India 2013 12 SCC 73
16. Romesh Thappar1 (1950) AIR 124
17. Justice K.S Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
18. Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala Writ Petition (Civil) 135 of 1970
19. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Shri Raj Narain & Anr. (1975).
20. Daryao and others v. The State of U.P. and others (1962) 1 SCR
21. Vinod Dua Versus Union Of India & Others LNIND 2021 SC 177
22. Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of U.P. that13 (2004) 4 SCC 666
23. TK Kanungo v State of Bihar.1988 (3) Crimes 419 , 421 (Pat)
24. Mir Chittan v Emperor. AIR 1937 All 13, p 14: 38 Cr LJ 202
25. State of Orissa v RC Chowla, AIR 1966 Ori 192
26. Vijiaraghavachariar v Queen, 26 ILR Mad 554 (FB).
27. State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Jai Lal and others Appeal (crl.) 530 of 1997
28. Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. CIT, (1999) 237 ITR 1, 5 (SC)
29. St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat , AIR 1974 SC 1389
30. Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam , AIR 1964 SC 925
31. Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India , AIR 1974 SC 960
32. P.D. Amman v. State of Karnataka , AIR 1985 SC 621
33. Jasbhai Motibhai v Roshan Kumar AIR 1999 SC 1647.
34. State of Tamil Nadu v. Board of Trustees of the Port of Madras AIR 1976 SC 578
35. State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SC 604
36. SK Kothari v State of Rajasthan, 2004 (1) Crimes 440 (443, 444) (Raj).
37. Naveen Varshneya v State, AIR 1991 SC 1632
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
THE PETITIONERS HAVE APPROACHED THIS HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

UNDER ARTICLE 32(2)1 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA, READ WITH ORDER LV RULE 5 2 OF
THE SUPREME COURT RULES, 2013.
1 32(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred
by this Part.
2 5.Where there are two or more appeals arising out of the same matter, the Court may at any time either on its own motion or on the
application of any party, order that the appeals be consolidated. Unless otherwise ordered by this Court the liability of the parties to
pay separate Court-fees shall not be affected by by order for consolidation.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Background
Indica is socialist, sovereign, secular, democratic & republic country situated in South-Asian region. It is
considered to be culturally, ethnically and linguistically diverse country with various religions seeking shelter
in it. The people of Indica opted for a common law system and a constitution which is strictly followed by the
authorities under every circumstance. Post-independence, Republic of Indica showed a lot of progress in
various sectors of the economy including the film industry. In 1952, the Parliament enacted the Cinematograph
Act which made certification compulsory for the films before they could be exhibited.Around 2014 after noting
the immense growth of the Indican Film industry, the ministry of telecommunications announced the launch of
spectrum to enable 4G which led to increase in digital outreach in Indica which led to introduction to OTT
platforms such as Inflix, Inzon etc. Simultaneously the subscription fee was also reduced which led to increase
in the use of such OTT platforms. Notably, the content released on the OTT platforms did not obtain any
certification from the Central Board of Film Certification.
Regarding Indica Games
M/s. Johri Cine Films Limited [“JCFL”], a renowned film production company, announced a 30 million deal
with Inflix while expressing its intention to foray into production / development of web series / feature films, as
may be agreed between them, solely and exclusively for inflix platform. Pursuant to which JCFL produced a
web series called Indica Games. While it was scheduled for release on 5th May, 2022, on 1st May the Central
Board of Film Certification issued a notice to JCFL and Inflix directing them to cease and desist from releasing
Indica Games unless a certificate has been issued by the Central Board.
Regardless, JCFL and Inflix released the web series which received a great audience and appreciation.
However, the Central Board issued a notice imposing a penalty under section 7 of the Cinematograph Act for
exhibiting a cinematograph film without film certification. Aggrieved by the actions of the central board which
in turn led to defamation, JCFL and Inflix on May 15, 2022, filed a Writ Petition under article 226 of the
constitution of Indica before the High court of Bambil inter alia seeking for the quashing of the notice issued by
the Central Board of Film Certification.
Regarding Political Heist
Blockbuster films, another prominent Indican film production company, released a feature film titled Political
Heist on Inzon which shed light on the rise of MHP, the current political dispensation of the country. Since it
was a film based on a political theme the difference of opinion among the public led to a huge uproar against its
release and many protests rose against the Blockbuster films. Soon enough the protests turned violent resulting
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in damage to public property and injuries to a large number of protesters, ensuing in chaos. Mr. Supriyo
Gaikwad, a Member of Parliament belonging to MHP, lodged an FIR against Blockbuster Films and Mr. Amit
Dewan, its managing director, for causing public unrest and hurting the sentiments of the people at large.
Meanwhile, on May 16, 2022, Inzon issued a press release declaring that it had received approximately 1,000
complaints and grievances from various individuals and each complaint had been examined and assessed vis-à-
vis Political Heist by an independent committee. The said committee reached to the conclusion that no part of
Political Heist is violating any religious sentiment and therefore, the Political Heist shall neither be blocked nor
censored. Seeking justice for the unjust commotion against them, Blockbuster Films and Mr. Amit Dewan filed
a Petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before the Awadh High Court.
Result
Based on the public outrage and uproar against Political Heist, on June 1, 2022, the Government of Indica
issued the Information Technology Rules, 2022 under the Information Technology Act, 2000. The Rules
provided a code of conduct for hosting of information on social and digital media and directly affected the
manner in which the content was and is being hosted on the OTT platforms.
Though the rules were the result of the public reaction, they were still met with staunch opposition by various
sections of the society. Various social media influencers and pages which hosted content were now within the
purview of the said Rules. Similarly, various content hosted/streamed on the OTT platforms was also subjected
to scrutiny.
Regarding Information Technology Rules 2022
The Association of Film Producers, an organization of filmmakers and producers across the country, also
protested against the said Rules primarily on the premise that the said Rules violated the freedom of speech and
expression of the filmmakers and producers.
On the other hand, Hind Swaraj, an NGO working for the preservation and conservation of Hindu culture
supported the said Rules. As per Hind Swaraj, the OTT platforms are corrupting the Indican culture by
spreading westernisation. Accordingly, there is a need for regulating the content which is displayed, released
and/or exhibited in society.
Accordingly, on June 03, 2022, the Association of Film Producers filed a separate writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of Indica before the High Court of Deli challenging the constitutional validity of the
said Rules. Simultaneously, Hind Swaraj filed an Intervention Application supporting the constitutional validity
of the said Rules.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES
ISSUE I
WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA?
ISSUE II
WHETHER M/S. JOHRI CINE FILMS LIMITED AND INFLIX REQUIRED TO OBTAIN
CERTIFICATION FROM CBFC FOR THE RELEASE OF WEB SERIES, ‘INDICA GAMES’?
ISSUE III
WHETHER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES AND DIGITAL

MEDIA ETHICS CODE) RULES, 2022 (‘RULES’), ARE VALID ON THE GROUNDS THAT THEY HAVE
BEEN PROMULGATED WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION BY THE MINISTRY OF INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY AND ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA?
ISSUE IV
WHETHER THE FIR REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER’S BLOCKBUSTER FILMS AND MR.
AMIT DEWAN UNDER SECTION 153, 505 (1)(B) OF THE IPC IS GROUNDLESS, MALICIOUS AND
ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF LAW AND HENCE LIABLE TO BE QUASHED?
ISSUE V
WHETHER THE HIND SWARAJ SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO JOIN AS AN INTERVENER IN THE

INSTANT PETITION?
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

INDICA?
The petitioners humbly contents before this hon’ble the court that the petitioners approach this hon’ble court
under Art. 32 of the constitution of Indica and the petitions are maintainable under the same.
ISSUE II: WHETHER M/S. JOHRI CINE FILMS LIMITED AND INFLIX REQUIRED TO OBTAIN
CERTIFICATION FROM CBFC FOR THE RELEASE OF WEB SERIES, ‘INDICA GAMES’?
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that, the petitioners did not need to obtain certification from
the Central Board of Film Certification, as ‘Indica Games’ being in the nature of a digital media web series,
falls outside the realm of application of the Cinematograph Act 1952 and thus, the notices have been issued by
CBFC ultra vires its powers.
ISSUE III WHETHER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES

AND DIGITAL MEDIA ETHICS CODE) RULES, 2022 (‘RULES’), ARE VALID ON THE GROUNDS
THAT THEY HAVE BEEN PROMULGATED WITHOUT ANY JURISDICTION BY THE MINISTRY
OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ARE ULTRA VIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDICA?
The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2022 is violative
of Article 14, 19(1)(a) and 21 as the rules are vague, provides for restriction of such emergence where content
could we taken down which is not provided as an exception in Art.19(2) and provides for tracing of the original
uploaded which is a violation of Art.21.
ISSUE IV WHETHER THE FIR REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER’S BLOCKBUSTER
FILMS AND MR. AMIT DEWAN UNDER SECTION 153, 505 (1)(B) OF THE IPC IS GROUNDLESS,
MALICIOUS AND ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF LAW AND HENCE LIABLE TO BE QUASHED?
The FIR registered against the accused persons is liable to be quashed as there is no prima facie case, as the
ingredients of the section which the accused persons are charged with are not fulfilled. Further the Inzon
constituted an independent company to examine and assess complaints which concluded that the film didn’t
hurt any religious feelings. Lastly the FIR was registered with a malicious intent.
ISSUEV: WHETHER THE HIND SWARAJ SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO JOIN AS AN
INTERVENER IN THE INSTANT PETITION?
The petition humbly content that the hon’ble court showed not let the intervention application by Hind Swaraj
as the application is groundless and is not backed by any law. The application merely states that the rules are
supported by them as the OTT platforms are corrupting the Hindu culture, as the spread westernization, such
allegations are vague and are not supported by any law.
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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED
ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

INDICA?
The petitioners humbly contents before this hon’ble the court that the petitioners approach this hon’ble court
under Art. 32 of the constitution of Indica and the petitions are maintainable under the same.
32.3 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature
of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for
the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
In the case of JCFL and Inflix vs Union of Indica and others, there has been a violation of petitioners right
under Art. 14 and 19(1)(g) as the petitioners did not need to obtain certification from the Central Board of Film
Certification, as ‘Indica Games’ being in the nature of a digital media web series, falls outside the realm of
application of the Cinematograph Act 1952, and thus, the notices have been issued by CBFC ultra vires its
powers. Such action is arbitrary and hence violates Art.14 and affects the petitioners right to carry out trade
freely.
In the case of Inflix and Inzon vs Union of Indica and others, the state has acted ultra vises without jurisdiction
and hence acting arbitrary hence there is a violation of Article 14 and 19 of the constitution.
In the case of M/s. Blockbuster Films and Mr. Amit Dewan vs state of Awadh, the petitioners humble state that
the FIR are groundless, doesn’t make a prima facie case and is maliciously instituted against the petitioners.
Hence under art 32 we pray to this court to quash the FIR registered against the petitioners.
In the case of Association of Film Producers vs Union of Indica and Hind Swaraj and others, the petitioners
challenge the constitutional validity of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media
Ethics Code) Rules, 2022 as the said rule violate Art. 14, 19(1)(a) and 21 of the constitution of Indica.
3 Article 32 in The Constitution Of Indica 1949
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ISSUE II: WHETHER M/S. JOHRI CINE FILMS LIMITED AND INFLIX REQUIRED TO
OBTAIN CERTIFICATION FROM CBFC FOR THE RELEASE OF WEB SERIES, ‘INDICA
GAMES’?
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that, the petitioners did not need to obtain certification from
the Central Board of Film Certification, as ‘Indica Games’ being in the nature of a digital media web series,
falls outside the realm of application of the Cinematograph Act 1952, and thus, the notices have been issued by
CBFC ultra vires its powers.
A. CONTENT STREAMED ON OTT PLATFORMS OUT OF PURVIEW OF

‘CINEMATOGRAPHS.’
The preamble of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 reads as: ‘An Act to make provision for the certification of
cinematograph films for exhibition and for regulating exhibitions by means of cinematographs.’
According to Section 2 (c) of the Act, ‘Cinematograph includes any apparatus for the representation of moving
pictures or series of pictures.’
Further, ‘film’, as per Section. 2 (dd) of the Act, ‘means a cinematograph film.’
A cinematograph has been explained to be ‘an equipment which includes a camera which creates a film and the
machine which exhibits or displays a film. A video is recording of moving images and their recording is made
digitally or in the form of digital files. Therefore, a video film or a video compact disc is included in Clause (c)
of Section 2 of the said Act of 1952’.4
The counsel humbly contends that, as it follows as a consequence of the above, the said Act only applies to
certification of cinematograph films, and hence, a web series in the nature of digital media, not falling within
the meaning of either of the two definitions above, is excluded from the ambit of the Cinematograph Act, 1952.
The same was held in Mr Padmanabh Shankar vs Union Of India5, that ‘internet can be an said to be an
interconnected network which connects the computers across the globe. It can be said to be an interconnected
network of all the web-servers worldwide. When we come to web-server, it is essentially a program that uses
Hyper Text Transfer of Protocol [http] to serve the files that form web pages to the users which are provided in
4Mr Padmanabh Shankar v. Union Of India (LNINDORD 2019 KANT 8654)
5 LNINDORD 2019 KANT 865
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response to their requests which are forwarded by http client on their computers. There may be various films
or serials transmitted via internet. If we take into consideration the concept of internet and how the internet
operates, it is impossible to accept the submission that the films or serials which are transmitted or
exhibited through internet will constitute films within the meaning of Clause (dd) of Section 2 of the
said Act of 1952.
In Abdul Waheed Farooqui v. Union Of India & ors.6 it was held that, trailers and promos published
on Youtube, is regulated by the Information Technology Act and is not under the Cinematography Act, 1952.
The same can be contended so as to apply to Content on OTT Platforms as well.7
B. IS NOT ‘PUBLIC EXHIBITION’ WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE 1952 ACT AND THE
CINEMATOGRAPH (CERTIFICATION) RULES, 1983.
Section 3(1) of The Act empowers the Central Government to constitute a Board to be called the Board of Film
Certification, for the purpose of sanctioning films for public exhibition.
Further, Section 10 states that ‘Save as otherwise provided in this Part, No person will give an exhibition by
means of a cinematograph elsewhere than in a place licensed under the provisions of the Cinematograph Act
1952 or otherwise than in compliance with any conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence.’
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that, the meaning of ‘public exhibition’ as envisioned by the
provisions of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 read in consonance with The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules,
1983, can only be interpreted within the meaning of places having obtained license from appropriate authority
for giving such public exhibition 8; theatrical release and through Video Tape or Compact Video Disc, as seen
from the various provisions9 of The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983 and its Second Schedule10.
6 LNINDORD 2019 LUCK 100
7 Content on OTT Platforms are regulated by the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code)
Rules, 2022, under the Information Technology Act, 2000.
8 Section 10
9 Section 10 read with Rule 37-Power of entry of specified officers, Chairman, or any member of the Board/advisory panel after being
authorised in writing by the appropriate authority, may enter any place licensed under the law in force relating to cinemas, in the
discharge of his duties under the Act or these rules.
10 Schedule II of the Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983- dealt with in part C of this issue.
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In fact, if we consider the concept of internet, it is very difficult to accept the contention that through the
internet there is an exhibition of films or serials. The internet contemplates transfer of files in response to the
requests made by the users. 11
It was also confirmed that the Central Board of Film Certification has no control over online content but solely
certifies movies for theatrical release.12
In Peggy Fen v/s Central Board of Film Certification, IIS, Regional Officer, Thiruvananthapuram &
Others13, The Court observed that because it was broadcasted on an OTT platform, there is no issue of captive
audience in the case. ‘The film “Churuli” is exhibiting in OTT platform. Those who want to watch it, they can
pay and watch it. There is no compelled viewing of this movie. The OTT platform cannot be treated as captive
audience who are forced to watch the movie.’14
In Video Master, Bombay v Union of India Video Master, Bombay v Union of India 15, it was held that
examination and certification of film is necessary only if film is meant for public exhibition and not otherwise.
In light of the above, the counsel for the petitioners humbly submits that, the streaming of web series through
internet is not ‘public exhibition’ within the meaning of the Act. Hence CBFC is not empowered under the Act
to sanction or regulate the same, and the notices on the petitioners directing cease and desist of the release and
imposing penalty under Section 7, have been issued ultra vires of its jurisdiction.
C. ABSENCE OF ANY REGULATORY PROVISION FOR CERTIFICATION OF DIGITAL

MEDIA CONTENT ON OTT PLATFORMS.
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contend that there is no provision for certification of digital media
content on OTT platforms under any of the existing regulations, namely the Cinematograph Act, 1952 16, The
Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983, The Guidelines For Certification Of Films For Public Exhibition,
11 LNINDORD 2019 KANT 8654
12 RTI application dated October 25, 2016, received online vide registration number MOIAB/R/2016/50541 and MIB’s response
dated December 2, 2016
13 WP(C). No. 28288 of 2021
14 Peggy Fen v/s Central Board of Film Certification, IIS, Regional Officer, Thiruvananthapuram & Others WP(C). No. 28288 of
2021
15 (1986) 88 Bom LR 525 [LNIND 1986 BOM 265]
16 Dealt with in part A & B of this Issue.
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The Information Technology Act, 2000 or the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital
Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. Hence, the petitioners were not expected or required by any law for the time
being in force, to obtain certification from CBFC.
C.1 The Cinematograph Act, 1952 & The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983:
Section 4(1) Of The Cinematograph Act, 1952, provides for making an application for a certificate to the
CBFC-‘Any person desiring to exhibit any film shall in the prescribed manner make an application to the
Board for a certificate in respect thereof.. and the Board may, after examining or having the film examined in
the prescribed manner’, may sanction or refuse to sanction the same.
According to Section 2(bb) of the same Act, certificate means the certificate granted by the Board under
section 5-A.
Section 8(1) read with S. 8(2)(c), of the Cinematograph Act, 1952 empowers the Central Government to make
rules for the manner of making an application to the Board for a certificate.
Rule 35(1) of The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983 provides the prescribed manner to issue the
certificate for public exhibition, which states that ‘A certificate authorising the public exhibition of a film shall
be in one of the [Forms IV, IV-A, V, V-A, VI, VI-A, VII or VIl-A set out in the Second Schedule according as
the film is fit for Ù' or ÙA' or À' or `S' or Ù' or `V/A' or `V/UA' or `V/S'] certificate, as the case may be.’
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court, that the Forms set out in the Second Schedule of the said
rules are silent on the prescribed manner to make application 17 as required by Section 4(1) of the Act, and also
the prescribed manner in which Certification is to be provided by the CBFC 18 for release on OTT platforms.
C.2. The Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules,
2021:
Part II (B),(C),(D)& (E) of the Code Of Ethics entrenched in the said Rules only provide that the publishers of
19
online-curated content have to classify their content into age-based content category, display category,
17 Schedule II, Form I and Form IA – is only restricted to application for Public Exhibition of films through Theatrical Release or
through Film on Video Tape or Compact Video Disc.
18 Certificates: relevant Forms mentioned in Rule 35(1) read with Schedule II cover certification for Public Exhibition of films
through Theatrical Release or through Video Tape or Compact Video Disc only.
19 2(u) ‗publisher of online curated content‘ means a publisher who, performing a significant role in determining the online curated
content being made available, makes available to users a computer resource that enables such users to access online curated content
over the internet or computer networks, and such other entity called by whatever name, which is functionally similar to publishers of
online curated content but does not include any individual or user who is not transmitting online curated content in the course of
systematic business, professional or commercial activity; 2(q) ‗online curated content‘ means any curated catalogue of audio-visual
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restriction of access to a child, and measures to improve accessibility by persons with disabilities, respectively.
It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble Court that there is no provision under the same for requiring
certification or obtaining license from any regulatory body for exhibition of any content on their platforms.
In Justice for Rights Foundation Vs. Union of India 20, while dismissing the petition, the Delhi High Court
stated that MIB was of the view that online platforms were not required to obtain any license from it for displaying
its content and that the same was not regulated by it.
In light of these arguments advanced, the counsel for the petitioners humbly submits before this Hon’ble Court
that the notices on the petitioners directing cease and desist of the release of ‘Indica Games’ on digital media
application Inflix and imposing penalty under Section 7 of the Act is invalid and have been wrongfully issued by
the CBFC, as the particular series in question is ultra vires the subject matter of the Act itself.
content, other than news and current affairs content, which is owned by, licensed to or contracted to be transmitted by a publisher of
online curated content, and made available on demand, including but not limited through subscription, over the internet or computer
networks, and includes films, audio visual programmes, documentaries, television programmes, serials, podcasts and other such
content.
20 WPC no. 11164/2018
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Issue III: Whether the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media
Ethics Code) Rules, 2022 (‘Rules’), are valid on the grounds that they have been promulgated
without any jurisdiction by the Ministry of Information Technology and are ultra vires the
Constitution of Indica?
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that, the Ministry of Information Technology21 have
promulgated the Rules without any jurisdiction, insofar as they relate to publishers of online curated content,
and are invalid, as OTT Platforms like Inflix and Inzon and their regulation under the Rules are beyond the
scope of the Information Technology Act, 2000, and are ultra vires the Constitution of Indica.
A. REGULATION OF ‘DIGITAL MEDIA’ OUT OF PURVIEW OF MEITY.
Rule 2(1)(i) of the IT Rules 2022 defines ‘digital media’ as ‘digitized content that can be transmitted over the
internet or computer networks and includes content received, stored, transmitted, edited or processed by- (i) an
intermediary; or (ii) a publisher of news and current affairs content or a publisher of online curated content.’
According to Rule 2(1)(q), ‘online curated content‘ means ‘any curated catalogue of audio-visual content,
other than news and current affairs content, which is owned by, licensed to or contracted to be transmitted by a
publisher of online curated content, and made available on demand, including but not limited through
subscription, over the internet or computer networks, and includes films, audio visual programmes,
documentaries, television programmes, serials, podcasts and other such content.’
Further, according to Rule 2(u), ‘publisher of online curated content‘ means ‘a publisher who, performing a
significant role in determining the online curated content being made available, makes available to users a
computer resource that enables such users to access online curated content over the internet or computer
networks, and such other entity called by whatever name, which is functionally similar to publishers of online
curated content but does not include any individual or user who is not transmitting online curated content in
the course of systematic business, professional or commercial activity.’
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that the MeitY does not have the authority to regulate digital
media or digitized content within its purview, as the same its absent from its list of subjects under the Second
Schedule of The Government of Indica (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961; and also, following the
notification issued by the Ministry of Information Technology, the Allocation of Business Rules was amended
21 Ministry Of Electronics and Information Technology (‘MeitY’), Government of Indica
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22 and digital/ online media is one of the subjects of the Ministry of Broadcasting (‘Ministry of I&B’) - 22A-
Films and Audio-Visual programmes made available by online content providers.
It is further humbly submitted that the regulation of publishers of online curated content, being outside the
purview of the Information Technology Act 23, also falls outside the regulatory authority of the MeitY 24, and
since the MeitY has issued the present rules in excess of its powers allocated to it under the 1961 Rules, it
makes the Rules in its entirety, invalid.
The Rules state that part II & III shall be administered by the MeiTY and Ministry of I&B respectively, but
since the MeitY itself cannot regulate the online publishers or digital media, it cannot issue the Rules
empowering the Ministry of I&B to do so. The same was held that what cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly in State of Tamil Nadu and Others v. K. Shyam Sunder and Others25 ‘It is a settled proposition
of law that what cannot be done directly, is not permissible to be done obliquely, meaning thereby, whatever is
prohibited by law to be done, cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance on the
principle of quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud An authority cannot be
permitted to evade a law by shift or contrivance’.
The same has also been held in Institution Of Mechanical Engineers (India) Through Its Chairman Versus
State Of Punjab And Others 26 , Jagir Singh v. Ranbir Singh 27, M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath 28 and Sant
Lal Gupta v. Modern Coop. Group Housing Society Ltd. 29
22 Cabinet Secretariat, Government of Indica (Allocation of Business) Three Hundred and Fifty-Seventh Amendment Rules, 2020
23 Dealt with in part B of this issue
24 Second Schedule to the Government of Indica (Allocation of Business) Rules, 1961, the MeitY can handle, among others, ‘Matters
relating to Cyber Laws, administration of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000) and other IT related laws.’
25 (2011) 8 SCC 737
26 LNIND 2019 SC 631
27 AIR 1979 381
28 LNIND 2000 893
29 2010 13 SCC
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B. REGULATION OF DIGITAL MEDIA ON OTT PLATFORMS IS ULTRA VIRES THE IT

ACT.
The Information Technology Act, 2000, according to its preamble, seeks to provide legal recognition for
transactions carried out by means of transactions carried out by means of electronic data interchange and other
means of electronic communication, ‘electronic commerce’, to facilitate electronic filing of documents with the
Government agencies and further to amend the Indian Penal Code, the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, the Banker’s
Books Evidence Act, 1891 and the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and for matters connected therewith or
incidental thereto.
The disputed Rules have been promulgated in exercise of the rule- making powers conferred by Section 87(1)
& (2)(z) & (zg) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (21 of 2000).
Section 87(2)(z) of the Act, states that rules can be made for the procedures and safeguards for blocking for
access by the public under sub-section (3) of section 69 A 30; and under clause (zg), for the guidelines to be
observed by the intermediaries under sub-section (2) of section 79 31
B.1. Non - recognition of OTT Platforms in the IT Act:
As defined earlier, according to Rule 2 (i), digital media includes digitized content that is received, stored,
transmitted, edited or processed by- (i) an intermediary32,; or (ii) a publisher of news and current affairs
content or a publisher of online curated content.’
As seen from the facts, over-the-top [“OTT”] platforms allow the streaming of audio-visual content on its
platforms for its subscribers, in lieu of payment of a fee. OTT platforms bypasses cable, broadcast, satellite
television and other platforms that generally act as a controller or distributor and enables disintermediation, but
30 Section 69A empowers Central Government to issue directions to any agency of the Government or intermediary for blocking for
public access of any information through any computer resource if is it is necessary or expedient so to do, in the interest of
sovereignty and integrity of India, defence of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States or public order or for
preventing incitement to the commission of any cognizable offence relating to above, on certain conditions; Sub-section (3) provides
punishment to the intermediary who fails to comply with the direction issued under (1).
31 Section 79 exempts liability of intermediary in certain cases for any third party information, data, or communication link made
available or hosted by him,on fulfilment of certain conditions. Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, the expression ―third
party information‖ means any information dealt with by an intermediary in his capacity as an intermediary.
32 Section 2(w) of the Act defines an intermediary with respect to any particular electronic records as to mean ‘any person who on
behalf of another person receives, stores or transmits that record or provides any service with respect to that record and includes
telecom service providers, network service providers, internet service providers, web-hosting service providers, search engines, online
payment sites, online-auction sites, online-market places and cyber cafes’.
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with OTT services, the content creators can interact with their audience directly through a web page or
Smartphone app. 33
Thus, OTT platforms cannot be intermediaries within Section 2(w) & Section 79 of the Act, as they do not
receive information on behalf of any another person, nor do they deal with any other third party, respectively.
It is humbly contended that the Rules have not only introduced a new term the provision for which was absent
in the parent act, but have also laid down new obligations and guidelines for such publishers to abide by; thus,
they fail to satisfy the test of rules within the general – rule making power of an Act not going beyond the
object of the parent Act. 34 A delegated power to legislate by making rules cannot be so exercised as to bring
into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities not contemplated by the provisions of the Act
itself.”35
In State of Karnataka and anr v. Ganesh Kamath & Ors 36 It was held that: “It is a well settled principle of
interpretation of statutes that conferment of rule- making power by an Act does not enable the rule making
authority to make a rule which travels beyond the scope of the enabling Act or which is inconsistent therewith
or repugnant thereto.”
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that since the publishers of online curated content are neither
intermediaries as defined in the Act nor is there any provision that recognises nor defines such OTT platforms
or digital media within the scope of the Act, even within S.69A or S.79 of the Act on which the said Rules have
been promulgated, the Rules, insofar as they relate to such OTT platforms, are invalid as they are ultra vires the
parent Act and its rule making powers.
B.2. Regulation of Publishers of Online Curated Content in Rules exceed purview of IT Act:
Rule 15(2), provides that the publishers of Online Curated content can be directed ‘to delete or modify or block
the relevant content and information generated, transmitted, received, stored or hosted in their computer
33 Sundaravel, E. and Elangovan, N. (2020), Emergence and Future of Over-The-Top (OTT) video services in India: An Analytical
Research
34 Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P. (2000) 3 SCC 40
35 Wipro Ltd. v. Assistant Collector Of Customs & Others 2018 ACR 121
36 (1983 SCR (2) 665); Agricultural Market Committee v. Shalimar Chemical Works Ltd, 1997 Supp(1) SCR 164, May 7, 1997;
State of Karnataka v. Ganesh Kamath, 1983 SCR (2) 665; Kerala State Electricity Board v. Indian Aluminium Company, 1976 SCR
(1) 552, September 1, 1975.
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resource for public access’ on recommendation of Inter-Departmental Committee in Rule 14, sub-rule (5)(e)&
(f). 37
Further, Rule 16(2) states that the Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting may, in case of
emergency nature, pass an order for blocking the content of such an online publisher in case of emergency 38,
without giving the publisher an opportunity of being heard.
The counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that such powers to direct the deletion/modification of content
of the Authorising Officer on grounds mentioned in Rule 14(5)(f), and of the Secretary of the Ministry in Rule
16, are not envisioned by any of the provisions of the IT Act, and thus, the Rules exceeds the rule - making
power within Section 69A and 79 in this regard as well.
A 3-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, held in Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v Union of India, 39‘There is
no unlimited right of delegation and subordinate legislation cannot go beyond the object and the scope of the
parent Act. If such Rule 15 or Regulation goes beyond what the parent Act contemplates, then it becomes ultra
vires the parent Act.’
C. REGULATION ENVISIONED BY THE RULES VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLES OF

NATURAL JUSTICE.
Further, Rule 16 (2) is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice in not giving the publishers a
reasonable opportunity of being heard before directing the deletion or modification of the content in cases of
emergency nature.
In Mohan Medical College and Hospital & anr. v. Union of India & anr.,40 it was held that reasonable
opportunity of hearing is synonymous to fair hearing. The rule of fair hearing requires that the affected party
37 The Inter-Departmental Committee may recommend such action to the Ministry of Broadcasting in Rule 14 (5)(e), to delete or
modify content for preventing incitement to the commission of a cognisable offence relating to public order; (f) in case of content
where the Committee is satisfied that there is a need for taking action in relation to the reasons enumerated in sub-section (1) of
section 69A of the Act.
38 The Authorised Officer, in any case of emergency nature, for which no delay is acceptable, shall examine the relevant content and
consider whether it is within the grounds referred to in sub-section (1) of section 69A of the Act and it is necessary or expedient and
justifiable to block such information or part thereof and submit a specific recommendation in writing to the Secretary, Ministry of
Information and Broadcasting. (Rule 16(1)[
39 (1984) 3 SCC 127.
40 (2017) 15 SCC 719
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should be given an opportunity to meet the case against him effectively and the right to fair hearing takes within
its fold a just decision supplemented by reasons and rationale.
In Prof. C.S. Gautam And Another Versus Union Territory Of Chandigarh And Others 41 it was held:"If
the amending body really exercised judicial power, that power was exercised in violation of the principles
of natural justice of audi alteram partem. Even if a power is given to a body without specifying that the rules
of natural justice should be observed in exercising it, the nature of the power would call for its observance."
Rule 17(2) providing for Review Committee to decide on whether the directions of blocking of content or
information issued under these rules are in accordance section 69A(1) of the Act or not, was criticised in the
following way in Live Law Media (P) Ltd. v. Union of India42 ‘The provision for ‘review’ under Rule 17
does not even provide any lip service to the rights of Digital News Media since the ‘Review Committee’ solely
comprises of members of the executive (with the same Ministries as involved in the Inter-Departmental
Committee); does not provide the aggrieved publisher with a right to be heard; and fails to provide any judicial
oversight over the censorship complaint by Respondent’. The Bench had restrained the State from taking any
coercive action against the petitioners for non-compliance with the provisions contained in Part III of the
impugned Rules.
D. THE RULES ARE ULTRA VIRES THE PURVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDICA:
The petitioners humbly submit before this hon’ble court that the provisions of Information Technology
(Intermediaries Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2022 violate Article 14, 19 and 21 of the
Constitution of Indica.
Rule 9. Observance and adherence to the Code.43—(1) A publisher referred to in rule 8 shall observe and
adhere to the Code of Ethics laid down in the Appendix annexed to these rules.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, a publisher referred to in rule 8 who contravenes any law
for the time being in force, shall also be liable for consequential action as provided in such law which has so
been contravened.
41 LNIND 2019 PNH 1732
42 WP(C) No.6272 of 2021
43 Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
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(3) For ensuring observance and adherence to the Code of Ethics by publishers operating in the territory of
India, and for addressing the grievances made in relation to publishers under this Part, there shall be a three-tier
structure as under—
(a) Level I - Self-regulation by the publishers;

(b) Level II – Self-regulation by the self-regulating bodies of the publishers;
(c) Level III - Oversight mechanism by the Central Government.
Rule 16. Blocking of information in case of emergency.44— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in rules
14 and 15, the Authorised Officer, in any case of emergency nature, for which no delay is acceptable, shall
examine the relevant content and consider whether it is within the grounds referred to in sub-section (1) of
section 69A of the Act and it is necessary or expedient and justifiable to block such information or part thereof
and submit a specific recommendation in writing to the Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting.
In the case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India,45 Section 66A of IT act was declared unconstitutional and
invalid. Section 66A of the IT Act stated that ‘any person who sends through a computer resource or
communication device any information that is grossly offensive, or with the knowledge of its falsity, the
information is transmitted for the purpose of causing annoyance, inconvenience, danger, insult, injury, hatred,
or ill will.’ In this case court held that the terms such like ‘annoyance’ and ‘inconvenience’ mentioned in the
Act could not be deemed to fall under Article 19(2) which deals with reasonable restrictions on the grounds of
issues of more gravity. It was hence decided that since the article sought to limit all the forms of internet
communication and thus the above article indeed was having the chilling effect on the right to freedom of
speech and expression and hence was unreasonable in nature.
As stated by the Court in the case of Romesh Thappar, 46, the circulation of ideas through press media
upholds Article 19(1)(a). Like any situation, the era of digital media can be looked at in two ways- as a blessing
or as a boon.
From the above cases it can concluded that when restriction is placed on freedom of speech and expression,
they have to be reasonable restrictions and further the should be allowed Art.19(2) ground such as for
44 Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021
45 2013 12 SCC 73
46 (1950) AIR 124
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emergence purpose as mentioned in rule 16 is not a ground under Article 19(2) and the court should strike
down this rule.
In Live Law Media (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, 47 “A bench of Chief Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice G S
Kulkarni stayed sub-clauses 1 and 3 of clause 9 of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and
Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021. It found "prima facie" (on the face of it) that these sub-clauses
violated the petitioners' constitutional right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19, the high
court said. Provisions of clause 9 also went beyond the scope of the substantive law (the Information
Technology Act of 2000), it said.”
The grounds for such draconian directions have deliberately been kept delightfully vague, including Rule 4(2)
which allows an order to be passed ‘for the purposes of prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or
punishment of an offence related to the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly
relations with foreign States, or public order’
Under clause 3 (d), all platforms have to remove any content deemed objectionable by the application, not by
any court, but by the ministry of such broad thresholds. Another provision gives the government the power to
ask social media platforms to remove any data that “belongs to another person and to which the user does not
have any right
The Court declared that the right to privacy fell under the ambit of Article 21 in the case of Justice K.S
Puttaswamy (Retd.) and Anr. v. Union of India (2018). From Section 3(j) of the rules we see that no actual
autonomy given is to the intermediary, as on receiving the Government’s orders in writing, they are required to
hand over personal information of the users and their data violating their right to privacy within 72 hours.
Under section 7 if for any particular reason the intermediate does not follow the rules the section 791 of the IT
Act 2000 which guarantee is the immunity of the intermediary also known as the safe Harbour provisions
becomes nullified and hands taken face action under the IPC 1860 because of this reason the intermediate is left
at the mercy of the Government and has to act as its puppet and an order to continue to receive this immunity it
has to listen to the government is an every order and hand out are private information to them leaving a data
and privacy address this causes a violation of an individuals right to privacy Violation of Article 50 Article
50 highlights the separation of powers between the legislature and the executive. This concept has been
reiterated in the case of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala(1973) as well as in Indira Nehru Gandhi v.
Shri Raj Narain & Anr. (1975). In the former case, the Court established that if any rule is found to be in
violation of the basic structure doctrine of the Constitution, it needs to be removed. It would appear from these
47 WP(C) No.6272 of 2021, 10-03 Government -2021
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rules especially under Section 3(d) that the (executive) might take advantage of the Courts (judiciary) and use
the power of the court to pass such orders to strengthen and further their own cause.
Further part III provides the executive with overboard prohibition of online speech and burdersome
adjudication mechanism without judicial recourse. Rules 3(2)(b) and 4(4) provides for identification and
removal of content which is delegated to private party. It requires intermediaries use technology-based
measures. The impugned Rules are further vague, arbitrary and violative of Article 14 and will have a chilling
effect.
In light of these arguments advanced, the counsel for the petitioners humbly contends that the Rules being ultra
vires the Information Technology Act, 2000, The Constitution of Indica, and the principles of natural justice,
the Ministry of Information Technology has no regulatory Authority over the OTT Platforms, and the Rules
have been promulgated without any jurisdiction.
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ISSUE IV: WHETHER THE FIR REGISTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONERS

BLOCKBUSTER FILMS AND MR. AMIT DEWAN UNDER SECTION 153, 505 (1)(B) OF
THE IPC IS GROUNDLESS, MALICIOUS AND ABUSE OF THE PROCESS OF LAW AND
HENCE LIABLE TO BE QUASHED?
The petitioners humble submit before this hon’ble court that the FIR registered against Blockbuster Films and
Mr. Amit Dewan is liable to be quashed as it is groundless and abuse of the process of law and malicious and
hence liable to be quashed.
Section 153 in The Indian Penal Code48153. Wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause riot—if rioting
be committed—if not committed.—Whoever malignantly, or wantonly, by doing anything which is illegal,
gives provocation to any person intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause the
offence of rioting to be committed, shall, if the offence of rioting be committed in consequence of such
provocation, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or
with fine, or with both; and if the offence of rioting be not committed, with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine, or with both.
Section 505(1) (b) in The Indian Penal Code49(1) Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement,
rumour or report,—(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or to any
section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against the
public tranquillity. 50
Section 504 in The Indian Penal Code504. Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace.—
Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person, intending or knowing it to be likely
that such provocation will cause him to break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or
with both.
Daryao and others v. The State of U.P. and others, the S.C observed “under the fundamental right
guaranteed by Art. 32 (1) is a very important safeguard for the protection of the fundamental rights of the
citizens, and as a result of the said guarantee this Court has been entrusted with the solemn task of upholding
48 Indian Penal Code (Act XLV of 1860).
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the fundamental rights of the citizens of this country. The fundamental rights are intended not only to protect
individual’s rights but they are based on high public policy. Liberty of the individual and the protection of his
fundamental rights are the very essence of the democratic way of life adopted by the, constitution, and it is the
privilege and the duty of this Court to uphold those rights. Hence this Court in thus constituted the protector and
guarantor of the fundamental rights, and it cannot, consistently with the responsibility so laid upon it, refuse to
entertain applications seeking protection against infringements of such rights.”
In Vinod Dua Versus Union Of India & Others51That the said allegations are false and the claims are bizarre
and unfounded. Mr.Vinod Dua has spread false and malicious news by stating that the PM has garnered votes
through acts of terrorism. This directly amounts to inciting violence amongst the citizens and will definitely
disturb public tranquillity. This is an act of instigating violence against the government and the Prime Minister.
He also creates panic amongst the public and disturbs public peace by trying to spread false information, such
as, the government does not have enough testing facilities which is absolutely false. The government has
sufficient facilities to curb the pandemic and have been taking all the measures to control the pandemic. By
making such false statements, Mr. Vinod Dua spread fear amongst the people. And was charged with offences
under Sections 124-A , 268 , 501 , 505 of IPC. The supreme court quashed the FIR in this case.
In Ramji Lal Modi vs. State of U.P.52 that for an offence under Section 295-A of the IPC, Finding such
element to be completely absent, the relief prayed for was granted by this Court. The relevant observations of
this Court were:-“In the instant writ petition preferred under Article 32 of the Constitution of India , the
petitioners, namely, the actor, producer and director of the movie, have prayed for quashing of FIR No. 34 of
2018, dated 14-2-2018, registered at Falaknama Police Station, Hyderabad, Telangana. That apart, a prayer has
also been made that no FIR should be entertained or no complaint under , Section 200 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 should be dealt with because of the picturisation of the song “Manikya Malaraya Poovi” by
Petitioner 1 in the film, namely, “Oru Adaar Love”.
Further the Supreme court in numerous cases have quashed FIR under article 32. the Court was pleased to
quash the concerned FIR in the following cases some such cases:
51 LNIND 2021 SC 177
52 13 (2004) 4 SCC 666
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Rini Johar and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Others; Monica Kumar and Another vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others53; Vijay Shekhar and Another vs. Union of India and Others54; Priya Prakash Varrier and
Others vs. State of Telangana and Another55; Rini Johar and Another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and
Others56; Laxmibai Chandaragi B. and Another vs. State of Karnataka and Others57
The power to quash the FIR flows from the meaning of law in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and
therefore where the High Court cancels a bail bond granted under section 436 to a person accused of a bailable
offence, the deprivation of the personal liberty of such person is not violative of Article 21.58 It is well-settled
that section 482 of the CrPC is the exception and not the rule. It maybe necessary to give effect to any order
under the Code or to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. But
the expressions “abuse of process of law” or “to secure the ends of justice”.
Courts, therefore, have inherent powers apart from express provisions of law which are necessary for proper
discharge of functions and duties imposed upon them by law. All courts, whether civil or criminal possess, in
the absence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the
right and to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice on the principle “quando lex aliquid alicui
concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsae esse non potest”.59
The petitioners humbly submit before this hon’ble court that if the interference with the petition to quash the
FIR will lead to abuse of the process of the court and failure of justice as the above FIR is groundless and there
are no reasonable grounds to proceed against the accused. Further the petitions submit that there is not a triable
case made out by the respondents in the complaint and hence grave injustice done to the petitioners as the
respondents have not proved any intention of the accused to instigate any violence or public unrest or hurt any
sentiments. It was a mere release of a movie containing political drama and such a topic is not a sensitive topic
i.e. religion, gender, caste, class, or any matters that would in the natural course of actions cause any violence
53 (2017) 16 SCC 169 16 (2019)
54 (2004) 4 SCC 666
55 SCC 432 17 (2021) 3 SCC 360 18 AIR (1957) SC 620
56 (2016) 11 SCC 703
57 (2021) 3 SCC 360 18 AIR (1957) SC 620
58 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: The Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st ed
59 Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: Indian Penal Code (PB), 36th ed
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or any matter perceived by a reasonable man to cause a turmoil, let alone a protest leading to destruction of
destruction of life and property, rather on the contrary it was a satirical political drama film.
If the court is satisfied that there is great miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court or the
required statutory provision has not been complied with or there is failure of justice, in that event, it is but the
duty of the court to have it corrected at the inception.60 Where the allegations made in the complaint make no
case and the essential ingredients of the offence are not disclosed the Magistrate’s order issuing process should
be quashed. Naveen Varshneya v State,61 When no fraudulent or dishonest intention from the very start of
the transaction has been alleged in the FIR and when no offence is made out Criminal proceedings cannot go
on. TK Kanungo v State of Bihar62.
If the court is satisfied that there is great miscarriage of justice or abuse of the process of the court or the
required statutory provision has not been complied with or there is failure of justice, in that event, it is but the
duty of the court to have it corrected at the inception.
A. Failure of respondents to make a prima facie case
The word “wantonly” merely means “recklessly” or “thoughtlessly” without regard for right or consequence.
The word “wantonly” occurs only in this section of the IPC, while the word “malignantly” occurs once again in
section 270, IPC, which refers to the wicked spread of infectious poison.63 Mir Chittan v Emperor64.
To constitute an offence under this section the accused must have been acting illegally and also with the
intention, or knowledge that it was likely to cause the offence of rioting to be committed. A mere chance of
provocation is however, not sufficient to justify a conviction under this section. (s.153)65 Where the accused
were exercising their ordinary rights without interfering with the rights of the complainants, it cannot be said
60 Sagat Singh v State of Rajasthan, 2003 (2) Crimes 33 (36) (Raj); Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri v State of Andhra
Pradesh, 2008 Cr LJ 1375 (1386) : AIR 2008 SC 784 .
61 AIR 1991 SC 1632
62 1988 (3) Crimes 419 , 421 (Pat)
63 R A NelsonJustice K T Thomas, Justice T S Doabia and M A Rashid RA Nelson's Indian Penal Code, 12th ed.
64 AIR 1937 All 13, p 14: 38 Cr LJ 202
65 State of Orissa v RC Chowla, AIR 1966 Ori 192
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that they were provoking a riot, “malignantly and wantonly by doing anything which is illegal” with the
meaning of this section.66
In the instant case although there were protests against the film, the there was no violence and nothing was
illegal about the film or about the release of the film. It was people of a certain section of society merely
showing their dislike towards the release of the film. When directing, producing and using inzon as platform,
the accused persons where merely carrying on their trade and their freedom of speech and expression. Further it
is important to note that the protest was not violent. The protest turned violent only after the release of the film,
paragraph 11 of the moot preposition uses the team “tragic turn” this indicates that its something not planned
and hence couldn’t be foreseen. It would be unreasonable for a prudent man to expect such a consequence
merely due to the release of a film. Further the film is about political drama nothing to do with religion or
mockery of religion or depiction of religion in a disrespectful manner. The charge under section 295A is
absolutely baseless and groundless.
further the petitioners humbly state that the following ingredients of section 505(1)(b) are not fulfilled: (a)the
accused made, published, or circulated, a statement, rumour, or report;
(b)he did so with intent to cause, or which was likely to cause, fear (or alarm) to the public (or to a
section of the public); and
(c)thereby a person was induced to commit an offence against the:(i)State, or (ii)public tranquillity
There is no prima facie commission of the offence under section 505(1)(b) as the accused persons had no
intention to cause any fear and it was a film regarding political drama, this couldn’t have caused any fear in the
mind of a reasonable person and plus it was a satirical political drama film indicates pure intention to cause
humour rather than fear. It is important to note the protest were prior to the release of the film, the film was not
yet published/broadcasted. There is a lack of nexus between the publication and the broadcasting of the film,
hence it was not the film that caused the that caused or intended to cause any fear in the mind on the people.
In instant case the violent/ tragic turn the protest took is too remote to foresee. To foresee such consequences is
an unreasonable expectation to have from a reasonable man. Hence, if such FIRs against film makers are
allowed to be registered then this would have to a serious consequence; it would have a chilling effect among
the producers and directors and OTT platform. This in turn would dent freedom of speech and expression and
freedom of trade, and effect our economy in a negative way.
66 Vijiaraghavachariar v Queen, 26 ILR Mad 554 (FB).
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A. Report of the independent committees of experts is reliable:
The petitioners would like to humbly draw the attention of the court that there were two independent committee
formed by Inzon on 16th July. These independent committees examined and assessed approximately 1000
complaints and grievances from various individuals and concluded that no part of Political Heist is violating
any religious sentiment and therefore, the Political Heist shall neither be blocked nor censored.
The first committee consisted of Mr. Inquilab Mehra, a renowned film critic and Mr. Vijay Johar, a renowned
film producer and10% shareholder in Inzon. As one can understand that Mr. Inquilab Mehra being a film critic
his opinion holds weight as he is an possesses such knowledge required for assessing and examining the
complaints in the instant case. While Mr. Vijay Johar begin a renowned film producer without doubt goes to
say, he would possess knowledge required in the film industry and producing films consisting of sensitive
material.
The second committee consisted of (b) Mr. Zorawar Malik, a reputed film director, being an expert in
producing films his report after examining and assessing of the complaints holds great weightage.
According to the Supreme Court in the case of State of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Jai Lal and others67 “in the
following words explained who an expert is and what his functions are.
• An expert witness, is one who has made the subject upon which he speaks a matter of
particular study, practice; or observations; and the must have a special knowledge of the
subject.
• In order to bring the evidence of a witness as that of an expert it has to be shown that he
has made a special study of the subject or acquired a special experience therein or in
other words that he is skilled and has adequate knowledge of the subject.
• An expert is not a witness of fact. His evidence is really of an advisory character. The
duty of an expert witness is to furnish the Judge with the necessary scientific criteria for
testing the accuracy of the conclusions so as to enable the judge to form his independent judgment by the
application of this criteria to the facts proved by the evidence of the
case.
• The scientific opinion evidence, if intelligible, convincing and tested becomes a factor
and often an important factor for consideration along with the other evidence of the case.
The credibility of such a witness depends on the reasons stated in support of his
conclusions and the data and materials furnished which form the basis of his conclusions.”
67 Case no.: Appeal (crl.) 530 of 1997
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Team Code: 30
Hence the petitions humbly request the court to consider the conclusion of the expert committee in the instant
case.
B. Malicious/ mala fide intent in registering the FIR:
In the instant case although there were approximately 1000 complaints assessed by the independent committee
form by inzon, there was only one FIR registered against the accused persons, and that was by Mr. Supriyo
Gaikwad, a Member of Parliament belonging to MHP, this raises a reasonable question as to why only one FIR
was registered against the accused persons and that being a member of the MHP party and on which the film
was made. It appears to be a get back/ revengers move against the accused persons rather then him actually
been aggrieved by the film.
In State of Haryana v Bhajan Lal,68a two Judge Bench of the Supreme Court considered the statutory
provisions of the court and the earlier decisions of the court and held that “in the following categories of cases
the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 CrPC, can be exercised by
the High Court either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,
further it stated that where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a
view to spite him due to private and personal grudge”. Where FIR is registered on reference being made by the
Criminal Court, there is hardly any scope of making allegations as to mala fide exercise of power, FIR would
not be quashed. 69
Hence for the above- mentioned reasons petitions humbly request the court to quash the FIR registered against
the petitioners.
68 AIR 1992 SC 604 : 1992 Cr LJ 527 (552) : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426
69 SK Kothari v State of Rajasthan, 2004 (1) Crimes 440 (443, 444) (Raj).
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ISSUE V: WHETHER THE HIND SWARAJ SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO JOIN AS AN

INTERVENER IN THE INSTANT PETITION?
The petitioners humbly submit before this hon’ble court that Hind Swaraj should not be allowed to join as an
intervener in the instant petition.
R. 8A70, Power of Court to permit a person or body of persons to present opinion or to take part in
proceedings.—While trying a suit, the Court may, if satisfied that a person or body of persons is interested in
any question of law which is directly and substantially in issue in the suit and that it is necessary in the public
interest to allow that person or body of persons to present his or its opinion on that question of law, permit that
person or body of persons to present such opinion and to take such part in the proceedings of the suit as the
Court may specify.
In Saraswati Industrial Syndicate Ltd. v. CIT,71 it was held the only purpose of granting an intervention
application is to entitle the intervener to address arguments in support of one or the other side. The Court cannot
pass an order in an intervention application. However, where the matter has been decided in the assessee’s
favour, the intervener may take advantage of that order. Intervener is a person who is not a party to the petition,
neither the petitioner nor the respondent and yet intervenes in the petition with the leave of the court, he may
file written submission, but is not entitled to address oral arguments unless otherwise directed by the court.
Intervener is not entitled to any substantive relief. No order can be passed in favour of an intervener.
An intervener ordinarily is not permitted to raise contentions that are not urged by the petitioner.72 Intervener
normally does not have a right of reply.73 he cannot raise points which are not canvassed by the petitioner in
pleading.74
Further Common judgment of the High Court where it allows several writ petitions, Appeal by State against
one petitioner, other petitioners can claim hearing as interveners. It is desirable on the part of the appellant State
to publicise fact of appeal so as to alert parties.75
70 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)
71 (1999) 237 ITR 1, 5 (SC)
72 St. Xaviers College v. State of Gujarat , AIR 1974 SC 1389
73 Khyerbari Tea Co. v. State of Assam , AIR 1964 SC 925
74 Gammon India Ltd. v. Union of India , AIR 1974 SC 960
75 P.D. Amman v. State of Karnataka , AIR 1985 SC 621
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Team Code: 30
In a question to when intervention is permissible and to what extent. Application for intervention in a case
between a State Government and a party while the State Government concerned with the applicants were not a
party before the Court for Relief Government of Tamil Nadu filing an appeal against High Court's order
holding the Madras Port Trust not to be liable to sales tax on sale of unclaimed and unserviceable goods the
Port Trusts of Cochin, Calcutta and Kandla filing interlocutory applications for intervention in this case since
the State Government was levying sales tax under State laws of the said applicants and they were not before
Supreme Court, the applicants were not allowed to argue in respect of leviability of sales tax under the
respective State enactments. However, permission granted to them to support the submissions of the Madras
Port Trust in the context of the Tamil Nadu statute (State of Tamil Nadu v. Board of Trustees of the Port of
Madras). 76
On the question of locus standi in Fertilizer Corp Kamgar Union v UOI, Justice Krishna Iyer said: “If a citizen
is no more than an officious intervener or a wayfarer without any sort of interest or concern beyond what
belongs to anyone of the 660 million people of the country, the door of the court will not be open to him. But if
he belongs to an organization which has special interest in the subject-matter, if has some concern deeper than
that of a busybody, he cannot be told off the doors, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may
still remain to be considered”. Learned Judge further observed: “If a plaintiff with a good case is not allowed
merely because he is not sufficiently affected personally, that means that some Government agency is free to
violate the law, and this is contrary to public interest”. In Jasbhai Motibhai v Roshan Kumar,77 it was held,
“While a procrastian approach should be avoided, as a rule, the court should not interfere at the instance of a
“stranger” unless in exceptional circumstances connecting a grave miscarriage of justice having an adverse
impact on public interest”.
From the above judicial decisions one can concluded that a intervention application maybe allowed if: a)The
organization which has special interest in the subject-matter, and b)There is an element of public interest
involved in the intervention application.
The petitioners humbly content that the Hind Swaraj intervention application should not be allowed, as the
petition is groundless it merely supports the rules and regulation. Further the reason for supporting the petition
is not backed up by any law that is, that is it claims that the OTT platforms are corrupting the Indican culture by
spreading westernisation such allegations are vague and have no concrete standing.
76 AIR 1999 SC 1647.
77 AIR 1976 SC 578
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Further many judgments of the supreme court have repeatedly stressed on the importance of diversity the our
country, and acknowledging and accepting of plurality of cultures. The ground for filing the intervening
application being to support the rules, is not in public interest or will there be any grave miscarriage of justice is
the Indica culture is not preserved, which was held to be ground for allowing an intervention application in
Jasbhai Motibhai v Roshan Kumar.78
Akkai Padmashali V Union Of India Thr Secretary Ministry Of Law And Justice, Navtej Singh Johar And
Others, Keshav Suri V Union Of India, Arif Jafar V Union Of India And Others, Ashok Row Kavi And Others
V Union Of India And Others, Anwesh Pokkuluri And Others V Union Of India Versus Union Of India Thr
Secretary Ministry Of Law And Justice,79 While decriminalizing of section.377 of IPC, as is violated the
certain fundament rights. Further the judgment highlights the need of preserving diversity “Further it was held
The Constitution brought about a transfer of political power. But it reflects above all, a vision of a society
governed by justice. Individual liberty is its soul. The constitutional vision of justice accommodates differences
of culture, ideology and orientation. The stability of its foundation lies in its effort to protect diversity in all its
facets: in the beliefs, ideas and ways of living of her citizens. Democratic as it is, our, Constitution does not
demand conformity. Nor does it contemplate the mainstreaming of culture. It nurtures dissent as the safety
valve for societal conflict.”
In K.S. Puttaswamy & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors,80 it was held “Privacy constitutes the foundation of all
liberty because it is in privacy that the individual can decide how liberty is best exercised. Individual dignity
and privacy are inextricably linked in a pattern woven out of a thread of diversity into the fabric of a
plural culture.” Similarly in the instant case if an individual is influence by western culture Hind Sawaraj is in
no way having an right to dictate according to which culture should one leave, it’s the decision of the
individual, and such right make decisions for oneself was upheld in this case.
While Government of NCT of Delhi v. Union of India, highlights that “If the moral values of
our Constitution were not upheld at every stage, the text of the, Constitution may not be enough to protect its
democratic values. A claim that homosexuality is against popular culture and is thus unacceptable in Indian
society. It was held popular morality or public disapproval of certain acts is not a valid justification for
restriction of the fundamental rights under Article 21. Popular morality, as distinct from a constitutional
78 AIR 1976 SC 578
79 AIR Online 2018 SC 146, 2018 (10) SCALE 386
80 (2017) 10 SCC 1
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Team Code: 30
morality. Constitutional morality acts a check against the tyranny of the majority and as a threshold against an
upsurge in mob rule. It was held to be a balance against popular public morality.” while in the instant case
preservation Indica culture without doubt goes to say is the popular culture. But in this case, we see how the
court states popular morality or public disapproval should not influence the court when it comes to infringement
of fundamental rights. Santosh Singh v Union of India, 81 Highlights the need for education to be universal and
have eternal values, oriented towards the unity and integration of our people, in our culturally plural society.
81(2016) 8 SCC 253
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Team Code: 30
PRAYER
Wherefore, in light of the facts stated, issues raised, authorities cited & arguments advanced, it is most humbly
and respectfully prayed before this Hon’ble court to:
1. Hold the present petitions as maintainable.

2. Hold that the petitioners do not need to obtain certification from the Central Board of Film Certification,
and quash the notices issued by the CBFC.
3. Hold that the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules,
2022 have been issued ultra vires the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Information Technology, The
Information Technology Act,2000 and the Constitution of Indica.
4. Hold that the FIR is liable to be quashed.
5. Not allow Hind Swaraj’s intervention application.
And pass any order that is deemed fit in the interest of justice, equity and good conscience for which the
petitioners will be forever obliged. All of which is respectfully submitted.
37
Team Code: 30

1St Mnlu, Nagpur National Moot Court Competition, 2022: Team Code: 30

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1st MNLU, NAGPUR NATIONAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2022 Team Code 30P

Before the Honourable Supreme Court of Indica

M/s. Johri Cine Films Limited and Inflix

Written Submissions for the Petitioner

Memorial on behalf of the Petitioners

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...III

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES …IV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION …VI

STATEMENT OF FACTS …VII

STATEMENT OF ISSUES …IX

AIR All India Reporter

Comp. L.L International Journal of Comparative Law

CriLJ/CrLJ Criminal Law Journal

CrPC Code of Criminal Procedure

Del Delhi High Court

FIR First Information Report

IPC Indian Penal Code

LEd United States Supreme Court Reports

Mad Madras High Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

UOI Union of India

u/s Under section

2. The Cinematograph (Certification) Rules, 1983.

3. Information Technology (IT) Act, 2000(21 of 2000)

5. The Constitution Of India 1949

6. The Indian Penal Code(Act XLV of 1860).

7. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)

8. Government of India (Allocation of Business) Rules,1961

2. Ratanlal & Dhirajlal: The Code of Criminal Procedure, 21st ed

9. Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P. (2000) 3 SCC 40

THE PETITIONERS HAVE APPROACHED THIS HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA

Regarding Indica Games

Regarding Political Heist

Regarding Information Technology Rules 2022

WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDICA?

WHETHER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES AND DIGITAL

WHETHER THE HIND SWARAJ SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO JOIN AS AN INTERVENER IN THE

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

ISSUE III WHETHER THE INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (INTERMEDIARY GUIDELINES

ISSUE I: WHETHER THE PETITIONS ARE MAINTAINABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

32.3 Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part:

3 Article 32 in The Constitution Of Indica 1949

A. CONTENT STREAMED ON OTT PLATFORMS OUT OF PURVIEW OF

4Mr Padmanabh Shankar v. Union Of India (LNINDORD 2019 KANT 8654)

5 LNINDORD 2019 KANT 865

6 LNINDORD 2019 LUCK 100

C. ABSENCE OF ANY REGULATORY PROVISION FOR CERTIFICATION OF DIGITAL

11 LNINDORD 2019 KANT 8654

13 WP(C). No. 28288 of 2021

15 (1986) 88 Bom LR 525 [LNIND 1986 BOM 265]

16 Dealt with in part A & B of this Issue.

20 WPC no. 11164/2018

A. REGULATION OF ‘DIGITAL MEDIA’ OUT OF PURVIEW OF MEITY.

21 Ministry Of Electronics and Information Technology (‘MeitY’), Government of Indica

23 Dealt with in part B of this issue

25 (2011) 8 SCC 737

26 LNIND 2019 SC 631

27 AIR 1979 381

28 LNIND 2000 893

B. REGULATION OF DIGITAL MEDIA ON OTT PLATFORMS IS ULTRA VIRES THE IT

B.1. Non - recognition of OTT Platforms in the IT Act:

34 Kunj Behari Lal Butail v. State of H.P. (2000) 3 SCC 40

C. REGULATION ENVISIONED BY THE RULES VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLES OF