PART 1

CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW

a. State Authority to Punish Crime
 1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 5
 1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1

1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 5 (Declaration of Principles and State Policies)

- SECTION 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion
of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy.

1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 1 (The Legislative Department)

- SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum.

b. Limitations on the Power

1. Must be General in application.
2. Must not partake of the nature of an Ex Post Facto law. (Retroactive Application)
3. Must not partake of the nature of a Bill of Attainder. (Legislature action that declares someone either a
group or a person, guilty of some crime and punish them without trial).
4. Must not impose cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines.
o 1987 Constitution, Art III, Sec 1, 14(1), 14(2), 18 (2), 19(1), 19(2), 20, 22
o 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 115
o Civil Code, Article 2
o Cases
 Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)
 Pesigan vs Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1994)

1987 Constitution, Art III, Sec 1, 14(1), 14(2), 18 (2), 19(1), 19(2), 20, 22

- SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

- SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

- SECTION 14. (2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to
have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has
been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
- SECTION 18. (2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted.

- SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

- SECTION 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted.
Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress
hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

- SECTION 19. (2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with
by law.

- SECTION 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

- SECTION 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

Rule 115 RIGHTS OF ACCUSED

SECTION 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled:

(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt;

(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him;

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from the arraignment to
the promulgation of judgment. The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to the
stipulations set forth in his bail bond, unless his presence is specifically ordered by the court for purposes of
identification. The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which
he had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused under
custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be
present on said date on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his
right without the assistance of counsel;

(d) To testify as a witness in his own behalf but subject to cross-examination on matters covered by direct
examination. His silence shall not in any manner prejudice him;

(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself;

(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the trial. Either party may utilize as part of its
evidence the testimony of a witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found in the
Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in another case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having had the opportunity to
cross-examine him;

(g) To have compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of witnesses and production of other evidence in
his behalf; (h) To have a speedy, impartial and public trial; and (i) To have the right of appeal, in all cases allowed
and, in the manner, prescribed by law.

Civil Code, Art. 2

- Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

Tanada vs Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985)

https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1985/apr1985/gr_l63915_1985.html

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND
NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as
Deputy Executive Assistant to the President, MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang
Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

Facts: The petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus in order to compel respondents to publish various presidential
decrees, administrative orders, general orders, proclamations and executive orders

Issue: Whether the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the NCC refers to the effectivity of laws and not to
the requirement of publication?

Civil Code of the Philippines Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such publication.

1973 Constitution Art. IV, Sec. 6 - The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,
shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (ignorantia legis neminem excusat
(ignorance of law excuses no one) Article 3 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

Principle: The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Art 2 of the New Civil Code refers to the effectivity of laws
and not to the requirement of publication. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.
Criminal Case - Presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex
post facto character becomes evident.

Pesigan vs Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1984/apr1984/gr_l64279_1984.html

G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984

Facts:
Before publication in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982, Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25,
1980, providing to the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos transported from one province to
another. Anselmo L. Pesigan and Marcelo L. Pesigan, carabao dealers, transported in an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck in the
evening of April 2, 1982 with twenty-six (26) carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur with Padre Garcia,
Batangas as the destination. In spite of having all the needed permit to transport and certificates, the carabaos , while
passing at Basud, Camarines Norte, were confiscated by Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa, the town’s police station
commander, and by Doctor Bella S. Miranda, provincial veterinarian, based on the aforementioned Executive Order No.
626-A. Doctor Miranda distributed the carabaos among 25 farmers of Basud and to a farmer from Vinzons municipal
nursing. The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda an action for recovery of the carabaos.

Issue:
(1) Whether the Pesigans may have the recovery of the carabaos.
(2) Whether the said Executive Order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982.

Ruling:
(1) Yes. The Pesigans are entitled to the return of their carabaos of the value of each carabao which is not returned for
any reason. The Pesigans are also entitled to a reasonable rental for each carabao from the 26 farmers who used them.
The farmers should not enrich themselves at the expense of the Pesigans.
(2) No. The Executive Order should not be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already noted, it is
a penal regulation published more than two months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982. It became effective
only 15 days thereafter as provided Article 2 of the Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

SCOPE OF APPLICATION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PHILIPPINE CRIMINAL LAW

1.) GENERALITY of Criminal Law

o 1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec 1
o Civil Code, Article 14
o Exceptions to the General Application of Criminal Law

1987 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec 1

- 1987 Philippine Constitution SECTION 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by
the provision on initiative and referendum.

Civil Code, Article 14

- Civil Code of the Philippines Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon
all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to
treaty stipulations.

2.) TERRITORIALITY of Criminal Law

o The Archipelagic Rule
o 1987 Constitution, Art. 1
o Exceptions, EXTRATERRITORIALITY

The Archipelagic Rule

- All bodies of water comprising the maritime zone and interior waters abounding different islands comprising the
Philippine Archipelago are part of the Philippine territory regardless of their breadth, depth, width or dimension.

1987 Constitution, Art. 1

 - The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and waters embraced therein,
and all other territories over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial,
fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their
breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY

- Extraterritoriality is defined as being free from the jurisdiction of the location where you live so you can't be
subject to legal action. When a diplomat cannot be prosecuted in the courts where he is living, this is an
example of extraterritoriality.

- Jurisdiction - Examples include where a state maintains jurisdiction over its citizens when they are overseas, and
where certain criminal offences can be prosecuted in a state regardless of where they were committed (e.g.,
piracy and child sex offences).

3.) PROSPECTIVITY/ IRRETROSPECTIVITY of Criminal Law

o RPC, Article 21 & 22
o Civil Code, Article 4
o Exception where a penal law may be given retroactive application
o Exception to the exception
 Case: - Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)
o Effects of Repeal /Amendment of Penal Law
 With reenactment
 Without reenactment

RPC, Article 21 & 22

- Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law
prior to its commission.

- Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this
Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict
is serving the same.

Civil Code, Article 4

- Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.

Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1971/jan1971/gr_30026_1971.html

Facts:
Petitioner Mario Gumabon, after pleading guilty, was sentenced on May 5, 1953 to suffer reclusion perpetua
for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson and kidnapping. Petitioners Gaudencio Agapito,
Paterno Palmares and Epifanio Padua, likewise pleaded guilty to the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder
and other offenses, and were similarly made to suffer the same penalty in decisions rendered, as to the first two, on
March 8, 1954 and, as to the third, on December 15, 1955. The last petitioner, Blas Bagolbagol, stood trial also for the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder and other offenses and on January 12, 1954 penalized with reclusion
perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been since then imprisoned and served for more than 13 years by virtue of the
above convictions.

Issue:
Whether or not petitioners be given a retroactive effect with habeas corpus as appropriate remedy.

Held:
Yes.

Ratio:
In Director v. Director of Prisons, it was explicitly announced by the Court “that the only means of giving
retroactive effect to a penal provision favorable to the accused… is the writ of habeas corpus.” While the above decision
speaks of a trial judge losing jurisdiction over the case, insofar as the remedy of habeas corpus is concerned, the
emphatic affirmation that it is the only means of benefiting the accused by the retroactive character of a favorable
decision holds true. Petitioners clearly have thus successfully sustained the burden of justifying their release.
CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS

 1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec 14(2)

 Pro Reo Doctrine
 Equipoise Rule
 Spanish text of the RPC prevails over its English translation
 Cases
o People v. Manaba (58 Phil 665. 668)
o Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec 14(2)

- In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Pro Reo Doctrine

- A court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or inconsistent punishments, should
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the more lenient punishment.

Equipoise Rule

- When the evidence of the prosecution and the defense are so evenly balanced the appreciation of such
evidence calls for tilting of the scales in favor of the accused

People v. Manaba (58 Phil 665. 668)

G.R. No. L-38725, October 31, 1933

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1933/oct1933/gr_l-38725_1933.php
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/c1e98

Summary

The respondent sought for the dismissal of his rape case on the ground of double jeopardy. However, the initial
complaint was invalid because it was not the offended party who filed it. Thus, the defendant was never in jeopardy.

Facts of the case

November 15, 1932 – defendant was found guilty of rape, sentencing him to 17 years and four months of reclusion
temporal, and accessory penalties of the law to compensate Celestina Adapon, offended party, with P500 to maintain
the offspring, if any, at P5 a month until said offspring should be of age, and to pay the costs.

The defendant appealed the decision and his attorney de oficio pointed out the following assignments of errors; that the
court

(1) has failed to consider the defense of double jeopardy in favor of the appellant,
(2) has failed to declare insufficient proof of identification of the defendant, (3) has failed to ignore the inconsistencies in
the witnesses’ accounts, and in not declaring that the liability of the appellant was beyond doubt, and
(4) has was wrong to convict the defendant for the crime and to not allow him to access his motion again.

May 10, 1932 – Chief of Police of Dumaguete swore to a criminal complaint charging Pedro Manaba with rape
committed to Celestina Adapon. Judgment was set aside and dismissed on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
over the defendant or the subject matter because the complaint was not filed by the offended party.

August 17, 1932 – Adapon subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the defendant with rape at the Court of First
Instance but was referred to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for preliminary investigation.

Defendant waived his right to the preliminary investigation but sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that
he had previously been in jeopardy for the same offense.
Motion was denied by the justice of the peace, remanding the case to the Court of First Instance where the provincial
fiscal charged the defendant with rape. Defendant renewed his motion and it was denied again.

Issue

W/N the defendant was in jeopardy for the second time

Ruling

The Spanish equivalent of the word “filed” was not found in the Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code. The first
complaint filed against the defendant was by the chief of police of Dumaguete, making it an invalid complaint, following
the third paragraph of Art. 344 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the decision was void for lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. The defendant was never in jeopardy.

RULING The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED, with the costs of both instances against the appellant. NOTES  Art.
334 (3). The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a
complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above – named persons, as the case may be.

Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

G.R. No. L-25018, May 26, 1969

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1969/may1969/gr_l-25018_1969.html
http://politicallawnotes.blogspot.com/2017/09/pascual-vs-board-of-medical-examiners.html

Facts:

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would present Pascual as
his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in the
meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The
lower court ordered that a writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing
or further proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter. Subsequently,
a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded and prohibiting the Board
"from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the complainant in said investigation without his
consent and against himself." Hence, the Board appealed.

Issue:

Whether a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of the constitutional guarantee
not to be a witness against himself.

Held:

Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative in character
possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the revocation of the license of the
respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take the witness stand.

BASIC MAXIMS IN CRIMINAL LAW

a) NULLUM CRIMEN, NULLA POENA SINE LEGE

“There is no crime if there is no penal law punishing it”.
b) ACTUS NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA
“The act cannot be criminal where the mind is not criminal.”
c) ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS ACTUS
“An act done by me against my will is not my act.”
d.) EL QUE ES CAUSA DE LA CAUSA ES CAUSA DEL MAL CAUSADO
“He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.”
II. CODAL PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Article 1 – Time when Act takes effect. – This Code shall take effect on the 1st of January 1932.
Article 2 – Application of Its Provisions

 Principle of Extraterritoriality
 English Rule v. French Rule
 Cases:
- People vs. Wong Cheng, (46 Phil 729)
- U.S. vs. Look Chaw, (18 Phil 573)
- U.S. vs. Ah Sing, (36 Phil 978)

Article 3 – FELONIES

A. Kinds of Felonies

1. INTENTIONAL FELONIES (DOLO)

- Elements
- Presumption of Criminal Intent
- Distinctions between INTENT and MOTIVE
- How motive is proved

Cases:

- Barrioquinto v. Fernandez (1949)

- People vs. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)
- People vs. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)
- People vs Delos Santos GR No. 135919, May 9, 2003

Barrioquinto v. Fernandez (1949)

G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949

LORETO BARRIOQUINTO and NORBERTO JIMENEZ, petitioners,

vs. ENRIQUE A. FERNANDEZ, ANTONIO BELMONTE and FELICISIMO OCAMPO, as Commissioners of the Fourteenth
Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1949/jan1949/gr_l-1278_1949.html
https://pdfcoffee.com/barrioquinto-v-fernandez-digest-pdf-free.html

FACTS:

• Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. Barrioquintohas not yet been arrested while
the case proceeded against Jimenez.

• After trial Court of First Instance of Zamboanga sentenced Jimenez to life imprisonment.

• Before the period for appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty
in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in furtherance of resistance to
the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy and committed from December 8, 1941, to
the date when each particular area where the offense was committed was liberated from enemy control and
occupation.

• On January 9, 1947, the Amnesty Commission issued an order returning the cases of the petitioners to the Court
of First Instance of Zamboanga, without deciding on the case saying that since Barrioquinto and Jimenez deny
having committed the crime, they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.

ISSUE:

W/N Barrioquinto and Loreto should be given Amnesty

People vs. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)

G.R. No. L-68969 January 22, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. USMAN HASSAN y AYUN, respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/jan1988/gr_l_68969_1988.html
https://pdfcoffee.com/people-v-hassan-pdf-free.html

Facts:

Hassan was accused of murder for the stabbing to death of Ramon Pichel, Jr. The deceased was employed as manager at
his father’s sand and gravel business, while Hassan was an illiterate 15-year-old pushcart cargador. The lone eyewitness
for the prosecution, Samson, claims that at about 7PM he and the deceased went to buy mangoes at Fruit Paradise. He
claims that he saw a person stab Pichel, who was seated at his red Honda motorcycle which was parked about two or
three meters from the fruit stand where he (Samson) was selecting mangoes; that he saw the assailant stab Ramon
"only once" and that after the stabbing, the assailant ran towards the PNB Building. When asked at the cross-
examination if he knew the assailant, Samson said, "I know him by face but I do not know his name." Samson described
the assailant as wearing a white, short-sleeved t-shirt and maong pants, but "he did not see if the aggressor was wearing
shoes," that the assailant stabbed Ramon with a knife but he did not exactly see what kind of knife it was, and he did not
see how long the knife was.

RULING:

WHEREFORE, the decision is hereby REVERSED, and the accused Usman Hassan y Ayun is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged. His release from confinement is hereby Ordered, unless he is held for another legal cause.

People vs. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)

G.R. No. L-66884, May 28, 1988

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/may1988/gr_l_66884_1988.html
https://pdfcoffee.com/017-people-v-temblor-pdf-free.html

SHORT VERSION:

While Cagampang and wife Victoria were manning a storeadjacent to their house, Temblor came and asked to buy a
half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes, Temblor shot Cagampang. Temblor
and another man demanded from Victoria to bring out Cagampang’s firearm which she did. Temblor took
Cagampang’s .38 caliber revolver and fled. Temblor was charged with murder. CFI and SC found him guilty. One of
Temblor’s contentions was that he lacked motive for killing Cagampang. But the court held that he had enough motive
(he was NPA and NPA had an agaw-armas campaign) and that, moreover, proof of motive is notessential in this case
because Victoria positively identified Temblor as the person who shot her husband.

FACTS:

At about 7:30 in the evening of December 30, 1980, Julius Cagampang (Cagampang), his wife Victoria and their two
children were in the store adjacent to their house in Brgy. Talo-ao, Agusan del Norte. Accused Vicente Temblor alias
Ronald arrived and asked to buy a half-pack of Hope cigarettes. While Cagampang was opening a pack of cigarettes,
there was a sudden burst of gunfire and Cagampang instantly fell on the floor, wounded and bleeding on the head.
Victorina, upon seeing that her husband had been shot ,shouted her husband's name "Jul"! Two persons barged into the
interior of the store through the main door and demanded that Victoria brings out her husband’s firearm. "Igawas mo
ang iyang armas!" ("You let out his firearm!") they shouted. The accused firedtwo more shots at the fallen victim.
Terrified, Victorina hurried to get the maleta where her husband's firearm was hidden. She gave the suitcase to the
accused who, after inspecting its contents, took her husband's .38 caliber revolver, and fled.Some months after the
incident, Victorina was summoned to the Buenavista police station by the Station Commander Milan, where she saw and
Identified the accused as the man who killed her husband. Temblor and his companions admitted members of the NPA
(New People’s Army) were not apprehended earlier because they hid in the mountains of Malapong. Temblor
surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass surrender of dissidents in August 1981. He was arrested
by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista public market on November 26, 1981. Temblor was later on charged with the
crime of murder. CFI: found him guilty of Murder, reclusion Perpetua with accessory penalties under Article 41 and 42
RPC and to indemnify the heirs of the victim. He appealed.

ISSUE:
WON TEMBLOR IS GUILTY OF MURDER
RULING:

Yes, Judgment appealed affirmed in all respects, Temblor guilty.

People vs Delos Santos GR No. 135919, May 9, 2003

G.R. No. 135919, May 9, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ, appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/may2003/gr_135919_2003.html
https://www.coursehero.com/file/28092398/case1-4docx/

Facts:

On November 6, 1997, in the Municipality of San Jose, Del Monte, Province of Bulacan, Philippines, appellant Danny
Delos Santos Fernandez accused guilty with intent to kill Rod Flores Juanitas, with evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab, hitting him on the
different parts of his body which directly caused his death. That on November 1997, De Leon witnessed the gruesome
killing of Flores, while drinking with three men (Salvador, Tablate & Rainier) in Sarmiento Homes, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan.

Issue:

Whether or not the testimonies of the witnesses are credible even after two months period.

Held:

Yes. The court ruled that the two-month delay is hardly an indication of a concocted story. It is but natural for witnesses
to avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as to show the
cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of retaliation can have a paralyzing effect to the
witnesses. Thus, in People vs.Dacibar, we held that the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer information about a
criminal case is of common knowledge and has been judicially declared as insufficient to affect credibility, especially
when a valid reason exists for such hesitance. Besides, settled is the rule that positive identification prevails over alibi
and denial. The decision is affirmed with modification.

2. CULPABLE FELONIES (CULPA)

o Elements
o Culpa distinguished from Dolo
 RPC, Article 3 & 365
 Cases:
o People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (1968)

People vs. Buan

G.R. No. L-25366, March 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1968/mar1968/gr_l-25366_1968.html
https://pdfcoffee.com/022-people-v-buan-pdf-free.html

Facts:

Accused Buan was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company along MacArthur Highway in Guiguinto, Bulacan.
Allegedly because of his negligence, he struck a passenger jeep. The jeep turned turtle. Jeep passengers were injured. o
6 – slight phys inj (med attendance 5-9 days) o 3 – serious phys inj (med attention 30-45 days) o Damaged jeep – P1,395
In the Guiguinto Justice of the Peace Court, charge against accused: “slight phys inj through reckless imprudence.” He
was tried and acquitted. Prior to this acquittal, Prov Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the CFI the info in the present case: “serious
phys inj and damage to property through reckless imprudence.” Accused was arraigned but moved to quash the info:
that he had already been acquitted of the same offense. CFI denied. MR denied. Accused appealed to the SC.
Issue:

W/N the second case placed the appellant (accused) twice in jeopardy

Ruling:

CFI Bulacan directed to quash and dismiss the charge. Once convicted/acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence,
he may not be prosecuted again for that same act.

B. Crimes Defined and Penalized by Special Laws

a. Case
i. Case: -- Padilla vs. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127 (1988)

Padilla vs. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127 (1988)

Adm. Case No. 3086 February 23, 1988

ALEXANDER PADILLA, complainant, vs. THE HON. BALTAZAR R. DIZON, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City Branch 113, respondent.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/feb1988/am_3086_1988.html
https://pdfcoffee.com/padilla-vs-dizon-case-digest-pdf-free.html

FACTS

This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6, 1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla,
against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon, RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a manifestly erroneous decision
due, at the very least, to gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in Criminal Case No. 8610126-P, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign
currency out of the country.

ISSUES

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in deciding that
criminal intent should be established in order to penalize the accused for violating Sec. 6 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 DECISION

Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in rendering the
decision in question

Ruling:

The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the
accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, theprosecution must establish that the accused had the criminal
intent to violate the law.
People vs. Trinidad, 169 SCRA 51 (1989)

G.R. No. 79123-25 January 9, 1989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMELIANO TRINIDAD, accused-appellant.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1989/jan1989/gr_79123_25_1989.html

FACTS
On 19 January 1983, using a Ford Fiera, Lolito Soriano a fish dealer based in Davao City and his helpers TAN, a driver, and
Marcial LAROA arrived at Butuan City to sell fish. In the morning of 20 January 1983 SORIANO drove the Fiera to
Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, together with LAROA and a helper of one Samuel Comendador. TAN was left behind in
Butuan City to dispose of the fish left at the Langihan market. He followed SORIANO and LAROA, however, to Buenavista
later in the morning.

While at Buenavista, accused Emeliano TRINIDAD, a member of the Integrated National Police, assigned at Nasipit Police
Station, and residing at Baan, Butuan City, asked for a ride to Bayugan, Agusan del Sur, which is on the way to Davao
City. TRINIDAD was in uniform and had two firearms, a carbine, and the other, a side-arm .38 caliber revolver. SORIANO,
LAROA, TAN, and TRINIDAD then left Butuan on 20 January 1983 at about 5:20 P.M. bound for Davao City. TAN was
driving the Fiera. Seated to his right was SORIANO, LAROA and the accused TRINIDAD, in that order. When they reached
the stretch between El Rio and Afga, TRINIDAD advised them to drive slowly because, according to him, the place was
dangerous. All of a sudden, TAN heard two gunshots. SORIANO and LAROA slumped dead. TAN did not actually see the
shooting of LAROA but he witnessed the shooting of SORIANO having been alerted by the sound of the first gunfire. Both
were hit on the head. TRINIDAD had used his carbine in killing the two victims.

TRINIDAD contended that he was in Cagayan de Oro City on the date of the incident, 20 January 1983. At that time, he
was assigned as a policeman at Nasipit Police Station, Agusan del Norte.

ISSUE

WON Emeliano Trinidad is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two crimes of Murder and one of Frustrated Murder.

RULING

The Court finds Emeliano Trinidad GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder and Frustrated Murder.
TRINIDAD had commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution which would have produced it by reason of causes other than his spontaneous desistance, such as, that the
jeep to which TAN was clinging was in motion, and there was a spare tire which shielded the other parts of his body.
Moreover, the wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is
not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder

People vs Velasco, 73 SCRA 574 (1976)

G.R. No. 127444 September 13, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. TIRSO D. C. VELASCO in his capacity as the Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 88,
Quezon City, and HONORATO GALVEZ, respondents.

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/sep2000/gr_127444_2000.html

Doctrine on double jeopardy, a revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the accused to the risk of answering
twice for the same offense.

FACTS