Article 19 - Principle of Abuse of Rights

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Uypitching v. Quiamco G.R. No. 146322; December 6, 2006

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/dec2006/gr_146322_2006.html
https://www.studocu.com/ph/document/adamson-university/bachelor-of-science-in-customs-administration/
uypitching-vs-quiamco/12265875

FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to amicably settle the civil
aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them.

The motorcycle had been sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-
owned corporation managed by petitioner.

To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner corporation.

When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and continued the payments.

However, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner corporation’s collector that the
motorcycle had allegedly been "taken by respondent’s men."

Thereafter, petitioner accompanied by policemen to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police team talked to
the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While the police team leader and the clerk were talking, petitioner
paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering "Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."

Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against respondent.
Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had neither stolen nor
bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint.

Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners. He sought to hold the petitioners liable for acts
humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.

The RTC ruled that petitioner was motivated with malice and ill will when he called respondent a thief, took the
motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of
human relations

HELD:
Yes. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human
relations. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly disregarded the
lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. The basic principle of human
relations, embodied in Article 19 of the CivilCode, provides: Art. 19. Every person must in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use his right unjustly
or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude the use of, or the
tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised
solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise,
liability for damages to the injured party will attach.

Cebu Country Club v. Elizagaque G.R. No. 160273; January 18, 2008

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/jan2008/gr_160273_2008.html
https://pingthing.law.blog/2018/09/16/cebu-country-club-inc-v-elizagaque-case-digest/

FACTS:
Cebu Country Club is a domestic corporation operating as a non-profit and non-stock private membership club.
Sometime in 1987, San Miguel Corporation, a special company proprietary of CCCI, designated Ricardo Elizagaque,
its senior vice-president and operations manager for the Visayas and Mindanao, as a special non-proprietary
member. In 1996, Elizagaque filed an application for proprietary membership. He purchased a share for Php3 million.
Unknown to Elizagaque, however, was that the club had amended their by-laws in which a unanimous vote of the
directors is required before an applicant may be admitted. This amendment was not reflected in the application
form Elizagaque filled up. The Board adopted a black ball system in which the directors would drop a white ball when
they approve of the applicant and a black one if they do not. During the voting, there was one black ball, which
means the unanimous decision was not satisfied.

On August 1, 1997, Elizagaque received a letter from CCCI’s corporate secretary, informing him that the board
disapproved his application for proprietary membership. Elizagaque, through Edmundo Misa, wrote a letter of
reconsideration, but no reply came. They wrote two more times, but CCCI still did not reply. On December 1998,
Elizagaque filed a complaint for damages against CCCI.

ISSUE:
Is Elizagaque entitled to payment of damages?

RULING:
Yes. The Court cited Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code in its decision.

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of
some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.

It was shown that Elizagaque’s letters remained unanswered and he was not even made aware of the club’s new
rules. In defense of the failure to print a new application form with the amendments added, CCCI said that it was not
able to print the updated form because of economic reasons. Being an exclusive golf club, it is unbelievable that the
club would not be able to pay for printing costs of the updated application forms.

The Court found that CCCI violated the rules governing human relations and is thus liable for damages pursuant to
Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Ardiente v. Javier G.R. No. 161921; July 17, 2013

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jul2013/gr_161921_2013.html
http://talkaboutphilippinelaw.blogspot.com/2016/06/joyce-ardiente-v-spouses-javier-and-ma.html

FACTS:
Ma. Theresa Pastorfide entered a MOA with Joyce Ardiente where the latter sold, conveyed, and transferred all their
rights and interests in the Emily Homes Housing unit to the former. It has been agreed by the parties that the water
bill will remain in the account of Ardiente. On March 12, 1999, Ma. Theresa's water supply was disconnected without
notice. She complained to the Cagayan De Oro Water District (COWD) and she found out that the account has
become delinquent. She paid the three months due and wrote a letter through her counsel to the COWD to explain
why her water supply was cut without notice.

The general manager of the COWD, Gaspar Gonzalez, replied that it was Joyce Ardiente who requested the
disconnection of the water supply. A complaint for damages was filed against Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez by Ma.
Theresa. The RTC ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa on the ground that the defendants committed abuse of their rights.
The ruling was upheld by the CA on appeal with modification on the award of the amount for damages.Hence this
petition before the SC.

ISSUE:
whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or other
applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case.

RULING:
Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code was violated. It provides
that "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."

A right, although it is legal for being recognized by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of illegality
(Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v CA), when it is exercised in a manner that does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and the same causes damage to another. The person exercising an abuse of right is thus liable
for damages caused to another. The herein petitioner is liable for damages by ordering the cutting of the water
supply of the respondent without giving notice about such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are likewise liable for
damages by disconnecting the water supply without prior notice and for their subsequent neglect of reconnecting
the water supply even when the respondent already paid the delinquent account.

Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 160689; March 26, 2014

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/mar2014/gr_160689_2014.html
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cdd79

Fact:
This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H. Sesbreño founded on abuse of rights. Sesbreño
accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check
his electric meter with conducting an unreasonable search in his residential premises. But the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 13, in Cebu City rendered judgment on August 19, 1994 dismissing the claim;1 and the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the dismissal on March 10, 2003.2

Issue:
Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse of rights? Was Sesbreño entitled to recover damages for abuse
of rights?

Rulling:
the RTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint.7 It did not accord credence to the testimonies of Sesbreño’s
witnesses, Bebe Baledio, his housemaid, and Roberto Lopez, a part-time salesman, due to inconsistencies on
material points in their respective testimonies.

the inspection on his household was just one of many others that the VOC Team had conducted in that subdivision.
Yet, none but plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño complained of the alleged acts of the VOC Team. Considering that there is
no proof that they also perpetrated the same illegal acts on other customers in the guise of conducting a Violation of
Contracts inspection, plaintiff-appellant Sesbreño likewise failed to show why he alone was singled out.

MWSS V. CMS Construction G.R. No. 209359, October 17, 2018

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2018octoberdecisions.php?id=864
https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cfc92?user=4169

FACTS:

On June 29, 1992, petitioner Metroheights Subdivision Homeowners Association, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC)[3] of Quezon City a complaint[4] for damages with prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction and writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against respondents

Petitioner alleged, among others, that it sought the assistance of respondent MWSS to address the insufficient
supply of water in its subdivision to which the latter advised the improvement and upgrading of its private internal
water distribution lines, foremost of which was the transfer or change in the location of its tapping source and the
change in size of its water service line from the old line tapped at Sanville Subdivision to a new tapping source on
Visayas Avenue, Quezon City; that on November 16, 1990, petitioner entered into a contract with respondent MWSS
for the new water service connection, and respondent MWSS awarded the project to a contractor which
implemented the same, the cost of which was solely shouldered by contribution from petitioner's members
amounting to P190,000.00, inclusive of labor, materials, and respondent MWSS' fees and charges; and that since
then, there was already sufficient and strong water pressure twenty-four (24) hours a day in the petitioner's
subdivision.

However, sometime in April 1992, respondent CMS Construction made diggings and excavations, and started to lay
water pipes along Fisheries Street and Morning Star Drive in Sanville Subdivision, Quezon City, petitioner's
neighboring subdivision; that in the process, respondent CMS Construction, with the knowledge and consent of
respondent MWSS but without petitioner's knowledge and consent, unilaterally cut-off and disconnected the latter's
new and separate water service connection on Visayas Avenue... espondent CMS Construction only made a
temporary reconnection with the use of a 2-inch rubber hose to the new water line it constructed at Sanville
Subdivision; and that despite petitioner's verbal and written demands, respondents have failed to restore
petitioner's water line connection in its original state and to return the missing PVC pipes and radius elbow.

RTC rendered a Decision... in favor of the plaintiff

The RTC found, among others, that respondents did not have the authority to simply cut, disconnect and transfer
petitioner's water supply with impunity, without notice to or without getting its consent; and that respondents acted
in concert and in bad faith, which made them jointly and severally liable for damages. Respondent MWSS filed its
notice of appeal while respondents CMS Construction and the Cruzes filed a motion for new trial which the RTC
granted. On May 18, 2006, the RTC issued a Decision[7] which affirmed its earlier Decision

The RTC found that respondents' claim of damnum absque injuria was not tenable.

CA

REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The CA found that the respondents' rehabilitation project was not undertaken without any notice at all; that
respondents' actions were merely consequential to the exercise of their rights and obligations to manage and
maintain the water supply system, an exercise which includes water rehabilitation and improvement within the area,
pursuant to a prior agreement for the water supply system; and that the alleged abuse of right was not sufficiently
established.

ISSUES:

whether the respondents should be held liable for damages for the cutting off, disconnection and transfer of
petitioner's existing separate water service connection on Visayas Avenue without the latter's knowledge and
consent which also resulted in petitioner's subdivision being waterless.

RULING:

We reverse the CA. Article 19 of the New Civil Code deals with the principle of abuse of rights, thus: Art. 19. Every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith.

Article 19 [of the New Civil Code] was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for
the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide[,] specifically in statutory
law. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages for injury caused thereby, with more
reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable.

The absence of good faith is essential to abuse of right.

The elements of an abuse of rights under Article 19 are: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad
faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another."... had petitioner's officer not complained about the
water service interruption in their subdivision and the rubber hose connection was not made to temporarily fix
petitioner's concern, petitioner's homeowners would have continuously suffered loss of water service.

respondents admitted in their respective Comments that the inconvenience of the temporary stoppage of water
supply in petitioner's area was highly inevitable in the process of changing petitioner's water pipe size crossing the
bridge up to Visayas Avenue where the tapping source is connected. Notwithstanding, respondents proceeded with
the cutting off and disconnection of petitioner's water connection without the latter's consent and notification
thereby causing prejudice or injury to the petitioner's members because of the unexpected water loss for three (3)
days. Respondents' actions were done in total disregard of the standards set by Article 19 of the New Civil Code
which entitles petitioner to damages.

In MWSS v. Act Theater, Inc.,[20] we held that petitioner's act of cutting off respondents' water service connection
without prior notice was arbitrary, injurious and prejudicial to the latter, justifying the award of damages under
Article 19 of the New Civil Code

When a right is exercised in a manner which discards these norms (set under Art. 19) resulting in damage to another,
a legal wrong is committed for which actor can be held accountable. In this case, the petitioner failed to act with
justice and give the respondent what is due to it when the petitioner unceremoniously cut off the respondent's
water service connection.

We do not agree with the CA's finding that respondents' actions were merely consequential to the exercise of their
rights and obligations to manage and maintain the water supply system. "Having the right should not be confused
with the manner by which such right is to be exercised.

Article 19 of the New Civil Code sets the standard in the exercise of one's rights and in the performance of one's
duties, i.e., he must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. "The exercise of a
right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others. The
mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modem concept of social law.

Here it was established, as shown by the above discussions, that respondents indeed abused their right.
We find that respondents MWSS and CMS Construction should be held liable for damages to petitioner but not the
Cruzes who are the directors and stockholders of respondent CMS Construction. Section 31 of the Corporation Code
is the governing law on personal liability of officers for the debts of the corporation

TOCOMS vs. PHILIPS ELECTRONICS G.R. No. 214046; February 05, 2020

https://lawlibrary.chanrobles.com/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=90728:66168&catid=1658&Itemid=566
https://my-legal-notes.com/2021/12/21/tocoms-philippines-inc-tocoms-vs-philips-electronics-and-lighting-inc-peli-
g-r-no-214046-february-05-2020/

FACTS:

Tocoms was the distributor of Philips Singapore and its agent in the Philippines, PELI, by virtue of a Distributorship
Agreement that was renewed annually from 2001 to 2012. Tocoms successfully introduced and established Philips
Domestic Appliance to the Philippine market from 2001 to 2008, and consistently delivered and even surpassed its
annual sales targets. Before the end of 2012, Tocoms revealed to Philips representatives its marketing plans for the
year and had complied with all the requirements of Philips in preparation for the renewal of the Distributorship
Agreement. However, in January 2013, without giving Tocoms sufficient notice of a change of the distributorship,
PELI did not renew the Agreement, as it already contracted with a new distributor, Fabriano, as early as December
2012.

Tocoms found that PELI has been selling to Fabriano the products subject of the Distribution Agreement at a much
lower price, to the great prejudice of Tocoms. Fabriano prodded Western Marketing, one of Tocoms’ strongest
clients, to return its existing inventory amounting to P5 million with a promise to deliver the same at a much lower
price. PELI demanded to buy-back all inventory that remain in possession of Tocoms under unreasonable, unfair and
one-sided terms. It even coerced Tocoms into accepting the terms by recalling the Import Commodity Clearance
(ICC) stickers that allow the selling of the items to the public. Tocoms sent a buy-back counter-offer which PELI
refused to heed.

Hence, this suit for damages and preliminary mandatory injunction filed by Tocoms, averring that PELI violated its
rights under the Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code on account of PELI’s acts that are clearly tainted with
bad faith, in view of the significant investments made by Tocoms during the effectivity of the Distribution Agreement
and in the run-up to the expiration thereof in 2012. PELI filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the RTC. On
appeal, the CA granted PELI’s petition. It held that Tocoms has no cause of action because its essential thrust was a
prayer for damages, resulting from the non-renewal of the Distributorship Agreement, that was nonexclusive and
already expired.

ISSUE:

Did the non-renewal of the Distributorship Agreement constitute a violation of Article 19 of the New Civil Code?

RULING:

Yes.

[T]he principle [of abuse of rights] may be invoked if it is proven that a right or duty was exercised in bad faith,
regardless of whether it was for the sole intent of injuring another. Thus, it is the absence of good faith which is
essential for the application of this principle.

The foregoing discussion highlights bad faith as the crucial element to a violation of Article 19. The mala fide exercise
of a legal right in accordance with Article 19 is penalized by Article 21, under which “[a]ny person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.” Stated differently, Article 19 imposes upon all persons exercising their legal
rights the duty to act with justice, give everyone his due, and to observe honesty and good faith. Failure to discharge
such duties is compensable under Article 20 if the act is “contrary to law”; and under Article 21 if the act is legal but
“contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy.”

In determining the sufficiency of a cause of action, the test is, whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of
the allegations of fact made in the complaint, the court may validly grant the relief prayed for in the complaint. x x x ,
if the allegations in Tocoms’ complaint are hypothetically admitted, these acts constitute bad faith on the part of
respondent PELI in the exercise of its rights under the Distributorship Agreement, in violation of Article 19, and as
punished by Article 21. Consequently, the court may validly award damages in favor of Tocoms as prayed for in its
Complaint. While it has submitted voluminous documents to show that its actions were justified by the terms of the
Distributorship Agreement, PELI has not had the opportunity to prove that the foregoing acts mentioned in the
Complaint were indeed made without malice and bad faith, since it was not even able to file an answer to Tocoms’
complaint. x x x Bad faith under the law cannot be presumed; it must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. As such, the case must be reinstated so that PELI may once and for all prove its bona fides in its dealings
with Tocoms, in connection with the expiration of their Distribution Agreement.

PRINCIPLE OF DAMNUM ABSQUE INJURIA

Sps. Custodio vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 116100; February 9, 1996

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1996/feb1996/gr_116100_1996.html
https://www.lexanimo.com/2016/10/11/spouses-custodio-vs-ca/

FACTS:
Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2-door apartment. The property is surrounded by other immovables. When
Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property, and there were supposed two
different passageways. First passageway with an approximate 1 meter wide and 20 meters distance to P. Burgos
Street. The second about 3 meters wide and 26 meters away.

When Mabasa went to see the premises after one of the tenants vacated, he saw that there had been built an adobe
fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The Santoses first constructed the said adobe
fence . Defendant Morato constructed her own adobe fence and even extended said fence that entirely closed the
said passage way. The remaining tenants vacated thereafter.

The case was brought to the trial court and ordered the Custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet
ingress and eggress to the public street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way
2) Whether or not the CA erred in awarding damages.

RULING:
1) Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of
his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied.

2) Yes. The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant
the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute
a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.
An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm resulting from the injury is damage. Damages
are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.
In this case, the petitioners merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid exercise of
their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there was no abuse of right as provided for in Article 21
of the New Civil Code and where the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff. None of these requisites was present in this case.
As a general rule, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and
proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or
loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner
in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having
been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of
community life.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful,
but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.

Amonoy vs. Gutierrez G.R. No. 140420; Feb. 15, 2001

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/feb2001/gr_140420_2001.html
http://lawtechworld.com/blog/blog/2013/07/case-digest-amonoy-v-gutierrez/

FACTS:

Amonoy was the counsel of the successors of the deceased Julio Cantolos for the settlement of the latter’s estate.
On January 1965, the lots were adjudicated to Asuncion Pasamba and Alfonso Formilda. On January 20, 1965,
Pasamba and Formilda executed a deed of real estate mortgage on the said two lots adjudicated to them, in favor of
Amonoy to secure the payment of his attorney’s fees. But on August 6, 1969, after the taxes had been paid, the
claims settled and the properties adjudicated, the estate was declared closed and terminated. When Pasamba and
Formilda passed away, Formilda was succeeded by the spouses Gutierrez. On January 21, 1970, Amonoy filed for the
closure of the two lots alleging the non-payment of attorney’s fees. The herein respondents denied the allegation,
but judgment was rendered in favor of Amonoy.

Still for failure to pay attorney’s fees, the lots were foreclosed. Amonoy was able to buy the lots by auction where
the house of the spouses Gutierrez was situated. On Amonoy’s motion of April 24, 1986, orders were implemented
for the demolition of structures in the said lot, including herein respondents’ house. On September 27, 1985, David
Formilda petitioned to the Supreme Court for a TRO for the suspension of the demolition, which was granted, but
the houses have already been demolished. A complaint for damages was filed by respondents, which was denied by
RTC but granted by CA, thus this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Amonoy was liable for damages to respondents.

RULING:

Petitioner invokes that it is well-settled that the maxim of damage resulting from the legitimate exercise of a
person’s rights is a loss without injury — damnum absque injuria — for which the law gives no remedy, saying he is
not liable for damages. The precept of Damnum Absque Injuria has no application is this case. Petitioner did not
heed the TRO suspending the demolition of structures. Although the acts of petitioner may have been legally
justified at the outset, their continuation after the issuance of the TRO amounted to an insidious abuse of his right.
Indubitably, his actions were tainted with bad faith.

Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards
which may be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These
standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. This
must be observed. Clearly then, the demolition of respondents’ house by petitioner, despite his receipt of the TRO,
was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right. The petition is denied. The decision of CA is
affirmed.

SPS. Carbonell v. METROBANK G.R. No. 178467; April 26, 2017

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2017/apr2017/gr_178467_2017.html
https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cf63f?user=687
Article 20 – Damages

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.

Buenaventura v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 127358; March 31, 2005

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/mar2005/gr_127358_2005.html
https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/ca739

Article 21 – Acts contrary to Morals

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Albenson Enterprises v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 88694; January 11, 1993

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/jan1993/gr_88694_1993.html
https://bingbing-wanders.blog/case-digest-albenson-enterprises-corp-vs-the-court-of-appeals/

BREACH OF PROMISE TO MARRY

Wassmer vs. Velez G.R. No. L-20089; Dec. 26, 1964

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1964/dec1964/gr_20089_1964.html
https://sarimanoklawclinic.com/2020/12/14/wassmer-vs-velez-g-r-no-l-20089-december-26-1964-2/

FACTS:

With their mutual promise of love, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer decided to settle down and get married on
September 4, 1954. They purchased all the necessary preparations for their wedding and even sent out invitations to
their relatives, friends, and acquaintances. However, two days before the event, on September 2, 1954, Francisco
went back to his province and left a note to Beatriz stating that he ha
d to go home because the wedding was not approved by his mother, but he assured the latter to return.

However, on the date of the ceremony, Francisco did not appear. Eventually, Beatriz filed for damages against
Francisco, and the Judgment was made in her favor. On appeal, Francisco argued that he should not be held liable or
pay Beatriz for the costs incurred when there is no provision in the law to claim damages upon breach of promise to
marry. The appellate court then held in favor of Francisco. Unacceptable, this caused Beatriz to elevate the case to
the Supreme Court and prayed that she would be granted payment for suffering from the acts of Francisco, which
led to the cancellation of their wedding.

RULING:

The Supreme Court stated that a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. Yet, it is already
different when they officially set up a wedding and go through all the planning and announcements only to walk out
of it when the marriage is about to commence. Thus, the defendant’s act of walking away from his own marriage is
still punishable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, which states that “any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.” Under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages
for sustaining physical suffering, tainted reputation, wounded feelings, moral shocks, social humiliation, and other
similar injuries. Furthermore, she was entitled to claim an award for exemplary damages, for which the purpose of
this is to discourage Francisco from doing the same act. Finally, the court held in favor of Beatriz and allowed her to
claim damages for the expenses she incurred for their wedding.

Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 97336; February 19, 1993

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/feb1993/gr_97336_1993.html
https://lawyerly.ph/digest/c78e0?user=717

FACTS:

private respondent... filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint... or damages against the petitioner for the
alleged violation of their agreement to get married.

petitioner... is an Iranian citizen... and is an exchange... student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges... the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get
married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the... school semester... the petitioner forced her to
live with him... she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such
maltreatment, she sustained injuries... petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live
with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone... the lower court, applying Article 21 of the
Civil Code, rendered... a decision... favoring the private respondent.

Court of Appeals... promulgated the challenged decision... affirming in toto the trial court's ruling

ISSUES:

whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the

Philippines.

RULING:

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.

where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the... proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual... act,
could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have... been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would... keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage.

In short, the private respondent surrendered her... virginity, the cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction -- the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier
adverted to.
The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under... either Article 337 or Article 338 of
the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction.

Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise to marry
where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered... if there was... seduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without
any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a... man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words... directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's
partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by
accepting his... proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security.
Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and so brazenly defied the traditional respect Filipinos
have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner... committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard
of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe
honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

the instant petition is hereby DENIED

Rumbaua vs. Rumbaua G.R. No. 166738; Aug.14, 2009

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/aug2009/gr_166738_2009.html
https://adrianantazo.com/2022/04/07/rowena-padilla-rumbaua-vs-edward-rumbaua-g-r-no-166738-august-14-
2009/

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for Nullity of Marriage using the ground of Article 36 of the Family
code or psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage. Petitioner submitted her
Judicial Affidavits, Testimonies, and the Psychological Report of s Psychologist as her evidence. The RTC ruled in favor
of the complainant and nullify the said Marriage. However, the office of the Solicitor General appealed the decision
of the RTC to the CA alleging among others was the insufficiency of evidence of the petitioner.

CA granted the petition of the OSG and reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. In her appeal to the SC,
petitioner assigned that the CA erred in reversing the decision of the RTC, instead of vacating the decision of the
courts a quo and remanding the case to the RTC to recall her expert witness and cure the defects in her testimony,
as well as to present additional evidence, would temper justice with mercy. The petitioner maintains that vacating
the lower courts’ decisions and the remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally
permissible.

She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard
Tabago, and asserts that remanding the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She
posits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should be liberally construed in her favor to
serve the ends of justice.

ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in not remanding the case back to the RTC instead of dismissing it completely.
HELD:
No. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to the grant of a new trial that is not
procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to
set aside a judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period for taking an appeal.

In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence that could not have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the aggrieved
party’s rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the
aggrieved party could not have discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if
presented.

In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence presented by her former counsel as basis for
a remand. She did not, however, specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of nullity
prima facie shows that the petitioner’s counsel had not been negligent in handling the case. Granting arguendo that
the petitioner’s counsel had been negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e. one
that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The negligence that the petitioner apparently
adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First Metro Integrated Steel Corporation where we explained:

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience
or incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for
re-opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel could be employed to allege
and show that the prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium
on the willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of
conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case. Thus, we find no justifiable reason to grant the petitioner’s
requested remand.

Guevarra, et al. v. Banach G.R. No. 214016; Nov. 24, 2021

https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/26981/
https://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/26987/

The Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine as it granted the Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the rulings of
the Court of Appeals (CA), which reversed the decision of a Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding petitioner liable for
damages to respondent, her German former fiancé. Petitioner broke up with the respondent after finding out that
the latter lied about his identity and marital status.

In a Decision penned by Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, the Court granted the petition of Jhonna Guevarra, et al. and
deleted the award of actual damages in the amount if P500,000 to respondent Jan Banach.

Guevarra and Banach met through a pastor, and the latter subsequently courted the former until they became a
couple. Both agreed to get married, with Banach giving Guevarra P500,000 to buy a lot for their conjugal home.

However, Guevarra broke up with Banach after she found out that he was not a divorcee, as he led her to believe,
but was actually still married to his third wife.

This prompted Banach to sue Guevarra and her parents before the RTC.

The RTC ruled in favor of Banach and awarded moral damages and attorney’s fee. On appeal, the CA issued a
Decision on January 29, 2007 similarly ordering Guevarra and her parents to return the money under the principle of
unjust enrichment. However, it deleted the awards of moral damages and attorney’s fees, as it ruled that Banach’s
actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and that he did not have the purest intentions in expressing his desire to
marry Guevarra.

Both parties sought reconsideration of the CA’s 2007 Decision. On July 14, 2014, the CA issued a Resolution denying
the Motions for Reconsideration. The case was then elevated to the Supreme Court, the main issue being whether or
not the Order to return the P500,000 is proper.

The Court agreed with the CA that Banach’s actions were tainted with fraud and deceit, and that he did not have the
purest intentions in marrying Guevarra. It noted that Banach lied about his marital status, and even hid his true
name from Guevarra.

“These acts suffice to justify the wedding’s cancellation. Finding out that one’s betrothed is still married to another
person, and that they are not who they say they are, are reasons enough to conclude bad faith…Since

respondent himself did not act in good faith; he cannot claim damages under the New Civil Code. The unjust
enrichment principle under Article 22 only applies if the property is acquired without legal grounds,” said the Court.

The Court explained that Banach gave the money as a gift to help Guevarra and her parents with their possible
eviction from their home. It added that the money being a gift, petitioner Guevarra is correct to say that she cannot
be compelled to return the same.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

Tan vs. Valeriano G.R. No. 185559; August 2, 2017

https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/1/63274

Article 22 – Unjust Enrichment

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Hulst vs. PR Builders G.R. No. 156364; September 3, 2007

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/sep2007/gr_156364_2007.html
https://lawyerly.ph/digest/cb756?user=794

FACTS:

Petitioner filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration insofar as he was ordered to return to respondent the
amount of P2,125,540.00 in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner.

Petitioner contends that the Contract to

Sell between petitioner and respondent involved a condominium unit and did not violate the Constitutional
proscription against ownership of land by aliens. He argues that the contract to sell will not transfer to the buyer
ownership of the land on which the unit is situated;... thus, the buyer will not get a transfer certificate of title but
merely a Condominium Certificate of Title as evidence of ownership; a perusal of the contract will show that what
the buyer acquires is the seller's title and rights to and interests in the unit and the common... areas.
ISSUES:

This resolves petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

RULING:

Under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 4726, otherwise known as the Condominium Act, foreign nationals can own Philippine
real estate through the purchase of condominium units or townhouses constituted under the Condominium
principle with Condominium Certificates of Title.

Where the common areas in a condominium project are held by a corporation, no transfer or conveyance of a unit
shall be valid if the concomitant transfer of the appurtenant... membership or stockholding in the corporation will
cause the alien interest in such corporation to exceed the limits imposed by existing laws.

The law provides that no condominium unit can be sold without at the same time selling the corresponding amount
of rights, shares or other interests in the condominium management body, the Condominium Corporation; and no
one can buy shares in a Condominium Corporation without at... the same time buying a condominium unit.

It expressly allows foreigners to acquire condominium units and shares in condominium corporations up to not more
than 40% of the total and outstanding capital stock of a Filipino-owned or controlled corporation.

Under this set up, the... ownership of the land is legally separated from the unit itself. The land is owned by a
Condominium Corporation and the unit owner is simply a member in this Condominium Corporation.

Bliss Development v. Diaz G.R. No. 213233; August 5, 2015

https://lawyerly.ph/juris/view/cee2a
https://remediallawnotes.blogspot.com/2016/09/arreza-vs-diaz-case-digest.html

FACTS:
Bliss Development Corporation is the owner of a housing complex located in Quezon City. It instituted before RTC
Makati an interpleader case against Arreza and Diaz who were conflicting claimants of the property (Civil Case No.
94-2086). The RTC ruled in favor of Arreza. In view of said decision, Bliss executed a contract to sell the property to
Arreza and Diaz was constrained to transfer possession together with all improvements to Arreza.

Thereafter, Diaz filed a case against Arreza and Bliss for the reimbursement of the cost of his acquisition and
improvements on the property (Civil Case No. 96-1372). Arreza filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of res
judicata and lack of cause of action. RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss.

Arreza appealed to CA which dismissed the petition saying that res judicata does not apply because the interpleader
case only settled the issue on who had a better right. It did not determine the parties‘ respective rights and
obligations. The action filed by Diaz seeks principally the collection of damages in the form of the payments Diaz
made to Bliss and the value of the improvements he introduced on the property matters that were not adjudicated
upon in the previous case for interpleader.

ISSUE:
Are Diaz's claims for reimbursement against Arreza barred by res adjudicata?

HELD:

The court in a complaint for interpleader shall determine the rights and obligations of the parties and adjudicate
their respective claims. Such rights, obligations and claims could only be adjudicated if put forward by the aggrieved
party in assertion of his rights. That party in this case referred to respondent Diaz. The second paragraph of Section 5
of Rule 62 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the parties in an interpleader action may file
counterclaims, cross-claims, third party complaints and responsive pleadings thereto, as provided by these Rules.
The second paragraph was added to Section 5 to expressly authorize the additional pleadings and claims
enumerated therein, in the interest of a complete adjudication of the controversy and its incidents. Pursuant to said
Rules, respondent should have filed his claims against petitioner Arreza in the interpleader action. Having asserted
his rights as a buyer in good faith in his answer, and praying relief therefor, respondent Diaz should have crystallized
his demand into specific claims for reimbursement by petitioner Arreza. This he failed to do. Having failed to set up
his claim for reimbursement, said claim of respondent Diaz being in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim is now
barred.

The elements of res adjudicata are: (a) that the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which rendered
judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d)
there must be between the first and second causes of action identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.
In the present case, we find there is an identity of causes of action between Civil Case No. 94-2086 and Civil Case No.
96-1372. Respondent Diaz's cause of action in the prior case, now the crux of his present complaint against
petitioner, was in the nature of an unpleaded compulsory counterclaim, which is now barred. There being a former
final judgment on the merits in the prior case, rendered in Civil Case No. 94-2086 by Branch 146 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, which acquired jurisdiction over the same parties, the same subject property, and the same cause
of action, the present complaint of respondent herein (Diaz) against petitioner Arreza docketed as Civil Case No. 96-
1372 before the Regional Trial of Makati, Branch 59 should be dismissed on the ground of res adjudicata.

National Power Corporation vs. Delta P, Inc., G.R. No. 22170; October 16, 2019

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2019octoberdecisions.php?id=900

Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of
the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be
vigilant for his protection.

Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or
emergency may be stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable
institution.

Article 26 – Protection of Human dignity

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other
persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of
action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical
defect, or other personal condition.

RCPI v. Verchez G.R. No. 164349; January 31, 2006

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/jan2006/gr_164349_2006.html
https://lawyerly.ph/digest/c9f84?user=8698

FACTS:

On January 21, 1991, Editha Hebron Verchez (Editha) was confined at the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital

(Grace) immediately hied to the Sorsogon Branch of the Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) whose services she engaged to send a telegram to her sister Zenaida Verchez-Catibog
(Zenaida)

As three days after RCPI was engaged to send the telegram to Zenaida no response was received from her, Grace
sent a letter to Zenaida, this time thru JRS Delivery Service, reprimanding her for not sending any financial aid.

Immediately after she received Grace's letter, Zenaida, along with her husband Fortunato Catibog, left on January 26,
1991 for Sorsogon. On her arrival at Sorsogon, she disclaimed having received any telegram.

The telegram was finally delivered to Zenaida 25 days later or on February 15, 1991.[4] On inquiry from RCPI why it
took that long to deliver it, a messenger of RCPI replied that he had nothing to do with the delivery thereof as it was
another messenger who... previously was assigned to deliver the same but the address could not be located, hence,
the telegram was resent on February 2, 1991, and the second messenger finally found the address on February 15,
1991.

Our investigation on this matter disclosed that subject telegram was duly processed in accordance with our standard
operating procedure. However, delivery was not immediately effected due to the occurrence of circumstances which
were beyond the control and... foresight of RCPI.

On September 8, 1993, Verchez, along with his daughters Grace and Zenaida and their respective spouses, filed a
complaint against RCPI before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sorsogon for damages. In their complaint, the
plaintiffs alleged that, inter alia, the... delay in delivering the telegram contributed to the early demise of the late
Editha to their damage and prejudice

RCPI filed its answer, alleging that except with respect to Grace,[13] the other plaintiffs had... no privity of contract
with it; any delay in the sending of the telegram was due to force majeure, "specifically, but not limited to, radio
noise and interferences which adversely affected the transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message"

Finding that the nature of RCPI's business obligated it to dispatch the telegram to the addressee at the earliest
possible time but that it did not in view of the negligence of its employees to repair its radio transmitter and the
concomitant delay in delivering the telegram on... time, the trial court, upon the following provisions of the Civil Cod

In the instant case, the obligation of the defendant to deliver the telegram to the addressee is of an urgent nature.
Its essence is the early delivery of the telegram to the concerned person. Yet, due to the negligence of its employees,
the defendant failed to... discharge of its obligation on time making it liable for damages under Article 2176.

The negligence on the part of the employees gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the
employer.

RCPI invokes force majeure, specifically, the alleged radio noise and interferences which adversely affected the
transmission and/or reception of the telegraphic message

ISSUES:

"Are the stipulations in the 'Telegram Transmission Form,' in the nature "contracts of adhesion" (sic)?

RULING:

RCPI's stand fails. It bears noting that its liability is anchored on culpa contractual or breach of contract with regard
to Grace

In the case at bar, RCPI bound itself to deliver the telegram within the shortest possible time. It took 25 days,
however, for RCPI to deliver it.
Assuming arguendo that fortuitous circumstances prevented RCPI from delivering the telegram at the soonest
possible time, it should have at least informed Grace of the non-transmission and the non-delivery so that she could
have taken steps to remedy the situation.

But it did not. There lies the fault or negligence.

Considering the public utility of RCPI's business and its contractual obligation to transmit messages, it should
exercise due diligence to ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at the given address and should
provide a system whereby in cases of... undelivered messages the sender is given notice of non-delivery.

RCPI's arguments fail. For it is its breach of contract upon which its liability is, it bears repeating, anchored. Since
RCPI breached its contract, the presumption is that it was at fault or negligent. It, however, failed to rebut this
presumption.

RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

RCPI failed, however, to prove that it observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

After RCPI's first attempt to deliver the telegram failed, it did not inform Grace of the non-delivery thereof and
waited for 12 days before trying to deliver it again, knowing as it should know that time is of the essence in the
delivery of telegrams. When its second... long-delayed attempt to deliver the telegram again failed, it, again, waited
for another 12 days before making a third attempt. Such nonchalance in performing its urgent obligation indicates
gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The fourth requisite is thus also... present.

Principles:

In culpa contractual x x x the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure of its compliance justify,
prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. The law, recognizing the obligatory force of... contracts, will not permit a
party to be set free from liability for any kind of mis performance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention
of the tenor thereof.

The effect of... every infraction is to create a new duty, that is, to make recompense to the one who has been injured
by the failure of another to observe his contractual obligation unless he can show extenuating circumstances, like
proof of his exercise of due... diligence x x x or of the attendance of fortuitous event, to excuse him from his ensuing
liability.

For the defense of force majeure to prosper,... x x x it is necessary that one has committed no negligence or
misconduct that may have occasioned the loss. An act of God cannot be invoked to protect a person who has failed
to take steps to forestall the possible adverse consequences of... such a loss.

Castro v. People G.R. NO. 180832; July 23, 2008

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2008/jul2008/gr_180832_2008.php
https://pdfcoffee.com/castro-v-people-article-26-pdf-free.html

FACTS:
Reedley International School (RIS) dismissed Albert Tan’s son, Justin Albert for violating the terms of his disciplinary
probation. RIS imposed that Justin is prevented from participating in the graduation ceremonies. Albert eventually
brought a complaint to Dep-Ed. After the thoroughly investigation, the Dep-Ed found out that RIS code violation
point system allowed the summary imposition of unreasonable sanctions which has no basis in fact and in law.
Therefore, the system violated the due process. Hence, the Dep-Ed nullified RIS’s imposition and allowed Justin to
attend the graduation ceremonies.

After the graduation, Albert met Bernice C. Ching, a fellow parent in RIS. In course of their conversation,
Albert was contemplating suit against the officers of RIS.
 Bernice telephoned Jerome Castro sometime the first week of April and told him about Albert’s plan on
suing the officers in their personal capacities. Before ending the call,

Jerome told Bernice: Okay, you too, take care and be careful talking [Tan], that’s dangerous.

Bernice then called albert and informed him that Jerome said talking to him was dangerous. Feeling insulted,
Albert filed a complaint for grave oral defamation in the Office of the City Prosecutors of Mandaluyong City
against the petitioner on August 21, 2013.

Tan testified that petitioner’s statement shocked him as it portrayed him as someone capable of committing
undesirable acts. He added that petitioner probably took offense because of the complaint he filed against RIS in the
Dep-Ed. On the other hand, the petitioner denied the harboring ill-feelings against Tan despite the latter’s complaint
against RIS in the Dep-Ed. Although he admitted having conversation with Ching on the telephone a few days after
RIS 2013 commencement exercises.

ISSUE:
Is Castro Liable for grave oral defamation?

HELD:
No, Castro is not liable for grave oral defamation but he may be liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code.
Due to criminal procedural rules, Castro cannot be held criminally liable for grave oral defamation. Because the OSG
did not raise errors of jurisdiction, The CA erred in taking cognizance of its petition and worse, in reviewing the
factual findings of the RTC decision so as not to offend the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Petitioner could have been liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code: Article 26. Every person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages,
prevention and other relief:

Article 27 – Relief against Public Officials

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals & Delmo G.R. No. L-54598; April 15, 1988

https://www.projectjurisprudence.com/2020/11/case-digest-ledesma-v-ca-gr-no-54598.html
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/apr1988/gr_l_54598_1988.html

FACTS: A college student was scheduled to graduate with magna cum laude honors. However, this was deprived of
her because her lending of money to members of an organization of which she was a member, purportedly in
violation of existing school rules and regulations, according to the President of the State College. This was done
although the Bureau of Public Schools already intervened and instructed give her said honors. Despite this, she was
made to graduate as a plain student. The Supreme Court held the President liable for damages.

ISSUE: IS THE PRESIDENT LIABLE FOR DAMAGES?

HELD: Yes, the President is liable for damages.

We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that
Violeta Delmo went through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner’s neglect of duty and
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.

"There is no argument that moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of defendant's wrongful
act or omission."
Campugan v. Tolentino, Jr. A.C. No. 8261; March 11, 2015

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015marchdecisions.php?id=319
https://lawyerly.ph/digest/ceb69?user=1185

Facts:
the complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres, they
inherited upon the deaths of their parents a... residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao,
Quezon City registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City... that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that TCT No.

It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in
order to end their dispute,[5] whereby the complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds thereof would
be equally divided between... the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would be withdrawn respectively by
the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty.
Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint... which the RTC granted in its order.

The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order... hey could no longer locate or
contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and visits to his office... that they found out... that new
annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546 The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the
RTC of the order... hey could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite making several phone calls and
visits to his office... that they found out... that new annotations were made on TCT No. N-290546.

Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their having paid him for his professional
services, the complainants felt that said counsel had abandoned their case.

Issues:
disbarment of respondents for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis for the cancellation of their
annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.

Ruling:
We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in
his professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether... his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an officer of
the Court.

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office,... grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without... authority so to do.  The complainants'
allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient to establish any censurable conduct against them.

Article 28 – Unfair Competition

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

Willaware Products vs. Jesichris Manufacturing G.R. No. 195549; September 3, 2014

http://brulcasedigest.blogspot.com/2015/07/willaware-products-corp-vs-jesichris.html
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_195549_2014.html
Facts:
Jesichris Manufacturing Company the respondent filed this present complaint for damages for unfair competition
with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin Willaware Products Corporation the petitioner from manufacturing
and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to Jesichris Manufacturing Company. The respondent, alleged
that it is a duly registered partnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic and metal products,
with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City.

Since its registration in 1992, Jesichris Manufacturing Company has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant
and distributing throughout the Philippines plastic-made automotive parts. Willaware Products Corporation, on the
other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal
has its office near that of the Jesichris Manufacturing Company. Respondent further alleged that in view of the
physical proximity of petitioner’s office to respondent’s office, and in view of the fact that some of the respondent’s
employees had transferred to petitioner, petitioner had developed familiarity with respondent’s products, especially
its plastic-made automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these
products at a lower price as [respondent’s] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers. Respondent
alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture of automotive under chassis
parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorber bushing, center bearing cushions, among others.

Issue: 
1. Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors and there
is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?

Held:
Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or
in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed
method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."

From the foregoing, it is clear that what is being sought to be prevented is not competition per se but the use of
unjust, oppressive or high-handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to
earn a living. Plainly, what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means use dare fair
and legitimate.

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code. However, since the award of Two
Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should concomitantly be modified and lowered to
Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).