European Journal

of
East Asian Studies
EJEAS . () – www.brill.nl/ejea

Ripe for A New Asian Multilateralism?

Asean and Contemporary Regional Dynamics1

Dominique Caouettea and Denis Côtéb

a)
Université de Montréal, Canada
dominique.caouette@umontreal.ca
b)
Université de Montréal, Canada
gossantor@gmail.com

Abstract
At different rates and following different patterns, Asian multilateralism, particularly in
Southeast Asia, is under construction. For observers, the dynamics of regional cooperation
have been transformed (or have accelerated) over recent years.2 is new dynamism is
the result of three shocks: the end of the Cold War and the acceleration of economic
liberalisation; the Asian financial crisis of –; and the events of  September
. ese events modified regional processes and enabled the emergence of new forms of
regional cooperation. ese are characterised by the proliferation of free trade agreements,
greater financial cooperation, a renewal of dialogue initiatives on security issues, and the
multiplication of formal and informal regional institutions. In this article, we argue that we
are now witnessing a new form of ‘soft multilateralism’ emerging in Asia, in which ASEAN
is both well placed and very experienced. In such multilateralism, norms and principles
are seldom made explicit, and are even less made constraining, but act as guiding sets of
behaviours.

1)
is article is based on a research project made possible through a policy research grant
from the Asia-Pacific Foundation (Vancouver, Canada): Dominique Caouette (coord.),
Isabelle Beaulieu, Étienne Girouard and Ariane Pelé, ‘Le multilatéralisme émergent en Asie:
Nouvelles dynamiques régionales et nouveaux pour le Canada’, research report submitted to
the Asia-Pacific Foundation (). e authors would like to thank two EJEAS anonymous
reviewers for their relevant comments and suggestions as well as Étienne Girouard, Ariane
Pelé and Vanessa Bevilacqua for their assiduous research help.
2)
Ellen L. Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism (London: Lynne Rienner, ); Mark Beeson,
Institutions of the Asia-Pacific: ASEAN, APEC and Beyond (London: Routledge, );
Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden,  DOI: 10.1163/156805811X592496
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

Keywords
ASEAN; multilateralism; Asian regional organisations; economic and security cooperation;
international relations; political economy of Southeast Asia

Introduction
At different rates and following different patterns, multilateralism in Asia, par-
ticularly Southeast Asia, is under construction. Over the last  years some
multilateral institutions have been consolidated, such as the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) which gave rise to the ASEAN Regional
Forum in , ASEAN+ in  and the East Asia Summit (ASEAN+)
in . Other institutions have emerged, such as the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organisation (SCO) in , while new forums have been organised,
such as the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in
Asia (CICA) in . Beyond the limited context of Asia, institutions such
as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia–Europe Meeting
(ASEM) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) are trying to establish them-
selves as transcontinental integration gateways by bringing together states from
the Americas, Europe, Oceania and Asia, around the same table.
In an increasingly multipolar Asia, we are witnessing a reconfiguration of the
roles played in particular by China, Russia, Japan, India and Pakistan. ese
five powers, which previously saw their political autonomy constrained by
alliances specific to the Cold War, have progressively integrated the structure of
a globalised order which is increasingly driven by economic considerations and
decreasingly grounded in ideological categories. e liberalisation of national
markets has greatly contributed to both the expansion of Asian integration
and also the establishment and strengthening of integrative poles at the sub-
regional level in Southeast Asia and Central Asia. e other main regional
dynamic in Asia today is the fight against terrorism. Since  September,
security issues have been at the centre of numerous multilateral cooperation
initiatives and projects.
For observers, the dynamics of regional cooperation have been transformed
(or have accelerated) over recent years.3 Some observers even see a radical

Problem of Regional Order, second edition (London: Routledge, ); Vinod K. Arragawal
and Min Gyo Koo (eds) Asia’s New Institutional Architecture. Evolving Structures for Managing
Trade, Financial, and Security Relations, Political Economy of the Asia Pacific Series (Berlin:
Springer, ).
3)
Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism; Beeson, Institutions of the Asia-Pacific; Acharya, Construct-
ing a Security Community.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

change.4 is new dynamism is the result of three major events which have
impacted multilateralism in Asia, and ASEAN in particular: the end of the
Cold War and the acceleration of economic liberalisation; the Asian financial
crisis of –; and the events of  September . ese events
transformed regional dynamics and enabled the emergence of new institutions.
ese new forms of regional cooperation are characterised by the proliferation
of free trade agreements, by greater financial cooperation, by a renewal of
dialogue initiatives on security issues, and by the multiplication of formal and
informal regional institutions.
In this changing environment, ASEAN could play a focal role in South-
east Asia, but has yet to do so. As the current regional dynamic involves com-
plex interactions between China, Japan and the United States, ASEAN could
become an important stage used either to manage multilateral relations or to
compete and impose its will on others. Its constellation of forums now includes
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN+, ASEAN+ (or East Asia Sum-
mit) and the  Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity. Although
the formal structures of ASEAN have evolved slowly, this association has now
demonstrated resilience and a capacity to remodel itself over more than 
years.
At the same time, new forms of multilateral cooperation are multiplying
(see Table ). ese new forms are apparent in the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation and the Shangri-La Dialogue, a process officially called the Asia
Security Conference and managed by the International Institute of Strategic
Studies (IISS) in London.5 e first institution involves sovereign states, while
the Shangri-La Dialogue includes both state and non-state actors.
In Northeast Asia, the Six-Party Talks include China, Russia, North and
South Korea, Japan and the United States, and were set up to re-engage
North Korea in a dialogue process and to manage the nuclear threat which it
represents. For its part, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which
had always limited its activities to the realm of economics, in  extended its
discussions—at the impetus of the United States—to certain non-traditional
security issues.6 Another trend characterising the vast Asia-Pacific region since
the early s has been the multiplication of trade agreements. While most of

4)
Arragawal and Koo, Asia’s New Institutional Architecture.
5)
IISS website available at: http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/
shangri-la-dialogue-/speaker-agenda-/.
6)
Chien-peng Chung, ‘e role of Asia-Pacific organizations in maintaining regional secu-
rity’, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

Table . Emerging Multilateralism in Asia: A Partial List of Organisations and Forums7

Organisations, Forums, Treaties and Processes China USA ASEAN

ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), est. 1967 ¸
ASEAN+3, est. 1997 ¸ ¸
ASEAN+6 (also called East Asia Summit), est. 2005 ¸ ¸
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), est. 1994 ¸ ¸ ¸
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation-Pacifique), est. 1989 ¸ ¸ ¸
Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD), est. 2002 ¸ ¸
Boao Forum for Asia (BFA), est. 2001 ¸ ¸ ¸
Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building (CICA), ¸
est. 1999
Malacca Strait Patrols Information Sharing Exercise, est. 2004 ¸
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), est. 1996 ¸
Shangri-La Dialogue, est. 2001 ¸ ¸ ¸
Six-Party Talks, est. 2007 ¸ ¸
South China Sea Declaration of Conduct, est. 2002 ¸ ¸

these agreements have been bilateral,8 the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

(TPP) has also gathered some momentum as a platform for regional economic
integration. e TPP was signed by four countries (Singapore, Chile, New
Zealand and Brunei) in  and has an open accession clause. Several coun-
tries, including the United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam, Malaysia, Japan,
Canada, the Philippines and China, have expressed their interest in this plat-
form.
e form of multilateralism that is developing in these new institutions is
a recent one. e related literature focuses mainly on the new foreign policy
dynamics of the big powers involved in these processes, such as China, Japan,
Russia and the United States, or on ASEAN initiatives. For many, appreciating
the dynamics which are shaping regionalism in Asia means understanding the
tension between China and Japan, whose foreign policies are based on two
contradicting visions: the traditional Chinese vision of international relations
based on the principle of national sovereignty, and the Japanese view, which
focuses on openness and transparency.9

7)
e list does not seek to be exhaustive, but rather is illustrative of China’s growing
involvement in regional dynamics and processes. In fact, the rapid proliferation of organi-
sations, treaties, mechanisms, etc., has accelerated since the end of the Cold War and forms
part of what Frost describes as ‘Asia’s new regionalism’ (Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism).
8)
For an overview of the rapid multiplication of bilateral trade agreements in Asia, see
http://www.bilaterals.org/?lang=en, which monitors this trend.
9)
Christopher R. Hughes, ‘New security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: extending regional-
ism from Southeast to Northeast Asia’, e International Spectator, Vol. , No.  (),
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

Specialists of the region generally share the opinion that ASEAN lost its
initiative following the economic crisis of –.10 ASEAN’s incapacity
to prevent the crisis or to intervene as it unfolded highlighted the urgent
need to work towards economic cooperation, a need which now translates
into a multitude of bilateral trade agreements all over the Asia-Pacific region.
e crisis also brought to the fore the weaknesses or challenges facing the
institutions, mechanisms and dialogue processes in the region.11
In this article, we try to offer an alternative interpretation, suggesting that
we are now witnessing a new form of ‘soft multilateralism’ emerging in Asia,
a form in which ASEAN is well placed and at which it is well practised. In
soft multilateralism, norms and principles are seldom made explicit, and are
even less made constraining, but act as guiding sets of behaviours. Within
such a form of multilateralism, domestic politics remain the sole prerogative of
nation-states; trade and financial interests may lead to bilateral treaties, while
multilateral negotiations and processes may progress slowly. Our argument is
in line with the work of Acharya, who examined the possibility of constructing
a security community in Southeast Asia and looked especially at the role and
impact of ASEAN.12 Here, our goal is less far-reaching as we argue that soft
multilateralism enables a better understanding of both the current evolution of
ASEAN and also the multiplication of regional organisations of which ASEAN
is a part.13

pp. –, see p. . is China–Japan duality is still very common in the scientific
literature, especially within cultural approaches, even if some have underlined its limits;
Bertrand Fort and Douglas Webber (eds) Regional Integration in East Asia and Europe: Con-
vergence or Divergence (London: Routledge, ); Amitav Acharya, ‘How ideas spread:
whose norms matter? Norm localization and institutional change in Asian regionalism’,
International Organization, Vol.  (), pp. –.
10)
Amitav Acharya, ‘ASEAN at : mid-life rejuvenation?’ Foreign Affairs, Vol.  (August
), available at: http://www.foreignaffairs.org/faupdate/amitav-
acharya/asean-at--mid-life-rejuvenation.html (accessed  November ); Acharya,
How ideas spread; Amitav Acharya, ‘Will Asia’s past be its future?’ International Security,
Vol. , No.  (/), pp. –.
11)
Yukiko Fukagawa, ‘East Asia’s new economic integration strategy: moving beyond the
FTA’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –; Desmond Ball, Anthony
Milner and Brendan Taylor, ‘Track  security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific: reflections and
future directions’, Asian Security, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –; Hughes, New security
dynamics; Jim Rolfe, ‘Regional security for the Asia-Pacific: ends and means’, Contemporary
Southeast Asia, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
12)
Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia.
13)
In doing so, we hope to offer an explanation of the modus operandi behind what Frost
describes as the new regionalism in Asia (Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism).
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

Moreover, within such a frame of analysis, Chinese foreign policy, and

especially its Asian policies, becomes intelligible. As shown in Table , China’s
growing participation in Asian multilateral processes reveals its preference for
such a form of multilateralism. Given the rapid economic growth and the
definitive rise of the two Asian giants, India and China, ASEAN could be well
placed to play a more active and cohesive role in deepening such a form of
multilateralism.
To illustrate this perspective, we review the roles and interests attributed
to the actors operating within the various cooperation forums in Asia and
discuss the consequences and impacts of this emerging regional architecture.14
In particular, we try to understand the possible roles and contributions of
ASEAN within such multilateralism.

I. Multilateral Institutions and Regional Cooperation in Asia

Up to the present, multilateral relations in Asia have been characterised by an
aversion to formal and constraining regional structures. e idea that nations
should rely on regional cooperation to manage their own security, market or
politics is one that is evolving slowly and mostly in informal spaces. One impor-
tant institutional factor which has impeded regional cooperation throughout
the years is what has been identified as the ‘San Francisco System’. e treaty
signed between the Allies and Japan in  in San Francisco has shaped the
regional cooperation of Asian actors for decades. is system combined United
States-led bilateralism, which gave its allies easy access to its national market,
and an international multilateralism under US leadership, which encouraged
Asian countries to participate in international organisations and forums. Before
the s, in the context of the Cold War, this structure dominated interna-
tional relations in Asia and had a direct negative impact on the development
of regional initiatives.
Today, the emergence of China as a big power lies at the core of the mul-
tilateralism issue in Asia. For many researchers, China is the catalytic ele-
ment against which foreign policy decisions made by the region’s countries

14)
is article examines the question of multilateralism especially in East and Southeast
Asia. Here, East Asia includes China, Japan, Mongolia, North and South Korea and Tai-
wan, and Southeast Asia includes the  member countries of ASEAN (Brunei, Burma,
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, ailand, Singapore and Vietnam)
as well as Timor Leste, which has submitted a formal request to enter ASEAN in .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

should be measured.15 is should condition the trends observed in multilat-

eral relations16—and, more specifically, the United States–China binôme—for
the years to come. Indeed, if China becomes the dominant power in Asia, this
could have an impact on the role of the United States in the region, at least in
Southeast Asia, even with its allies.17
Against this literature focusing on the foreign policies of the great powers
in the region,18 other authors have noted that, despite the slowing impact of
the – Asian financial crisis on the evolution of multilateralism in the
region, dialogue processes have resumed. Today there is a real interest in build-
ing a more integrated political space which is not be limited to bilateralism in
terms of trade.19

Perspectives on Multilateralism in the Asia-Pacific

ere are two main competing views trying to explain the significance of
this redefinition of multilateralism. One approach sees the balance of power
at work in a potentially dangerous environment,20 while the other notes the
absence of conflict and the positive effect of the construction of norms through
the multiplication of institutions and dialogue processes in the region.21 e

15)
Masahiro Kawai, ‘EAFTA or CEPEA: which way forward?’ ASEAN Economic Bulletin,
Vol. , No.  (August ), pp. –.
16)
Joseph A. Camilleri, Regionalism in the New Asia-Pacific Order. e Political Economy of
the Asia-Pacific Region, Vol. II (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, ); Peter C.Y. Chow
(ed.) Economic Integration, Democratization and National Security in East Asia: Shifting
Paradigms in US, China, and Taiwan Relations (Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar, );
Aurelia George Mulgan, ‘Breaking the mould: Japan’s subtle shift from exclusive bilateralism
to modest minilateralism’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
17)
Evelyn Goh, ‘Great powers and hierarchical order in Southeast Asia: analyzing regional
security strategies’, International Security, Vol. , No.  (/), pp. –; Diane
K. Mauzy and Brian L. Job, ‘US policy in Southeast Asia: limited re-engagement after years
of benign neglect’, Asian Survey, Vol. , No.  (July/August ), pp. –; Robert
G. Sutter, China’s Rise in Asia: Promises and Perils (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield,
); Dana R. Dillon and John J. Tkacik Jr, ‘China and ASEAN: endangered American
primacy in Southeast Asia’, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No.  ().
18)
Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills, Strategic Asia –: Confronting Terrorism in
the Pursuit of Power (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, ); David Martin
Jones and M.L.R. Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations: Regional Delusion
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, ).
19)
Ball et al., Track  security dialogue.
20)
Rolfe, Regional security for the Asia-Pacific.
21)
Acharya, How ideas spread.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

two views hold different interpretations of the attitudes and commitments of

China, the United States, Japan, Russia and ASEAN.22 e literature can thus
be organised under two general banners: one which underlines its pitfalls and
even its impossibility, and one which analyses the possibility that multilateral
cooperation may evolve. In relation to these two views, a debate persists in
the literature between the balance of power approach and the institution-
building approach. Both approaches claim to best explain regional stability.23
Here, we present both and add an alternative dimension to the more optimistic
institutional approach that we call ‘soft multilateralism’.

Balance of Power Approach

For many, Friedberg’s diagnostic which stated that the Asia-Pacific region
was ‘ripe for rivalry’ is still relevant today.24 is reality, they feel, is seen
in every state’s determination to pursue a balance of power policy to match
China’s power. is perspective is inspired by realism in international politics.
Internally, states rely on self-help—by consolidating or developing their military
resources—while fostering and reinforcing their external alliances.25 Others
analyse the weight of China and conclude that there will be a return to a
hierarchical order dominated by China, which will force other Asian partners
to align themselves more closely with that nation.26
Since , the United States has been focusing its efforts around the fight
against terrorism and in many ways has neglected its commitments in the
region, something that has generated tensions with many of its Asian partners.
is attitude has created a vacuum in Asia that China is filling.27 Japan is
also rethinking its alliances and pursuing a balance of power policy.28 e
emergence of India on the Asian chessboard, as yet another element to consider

22)
Peter K. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, ).
23)
Goh, Great powers.
24)
Aaron L. Friedberg, ‘Ripe for rivalry: prospects for peace in a multipolar Asia’, Interna-
tional Security, Vol. , No.  (–), pp. –. e title of this article is a deliberate
play on the title of Friedberg’s contribution.
25)
Rolfe, Regional security for the Asia-Pacific; Hughes, New security dynamics; Jones and
Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations.
26)
David C. Kang, ‘Getting Asia wrong: the need for new analytical frameworks’, Interna-
tional Security, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
27)
Hughes, New security dynamics.
28)
Mulgan, Breaking the mould.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

in this game of alliances between countries of unequal size and weight, is also
an important piece of this new regional puzzle, because only Japan and India
have the potential to balance the power of China.
Obstacles to any form of multilateral cooperation, old or new, are still very
much prevalent today, and in particular the norm of non-interference in the
internal affairs of Asian countries. Non-interference appears as an insurmount-
able obstacle to the creation of a security regime. In addition to this issue, the
lack of agreement on a clear definition of the regional space creates further
difficulties.29
ere are other arguments to support the pessimistic thesis regarding multi-
lateralism: China’s military is growing; its foreign policies which have enabled
dialogue will not hold in a time of crisis; ASEAN lacks leadership; and the
rivalry between the great powers of the region (Russia, China, Japan and even
India) implies that even if new forms of cooperation emerge, they will only set
the stage for bilateral competition.
In this analytical approach, the recurrence of normative judgements is fre-
quent. We find, for example, the idea that Chinese cooperation, which has
evolved since , is merely instrumental, while other countries, such as the
United States and Southeast Asian countries, are be promoting a type of mul-
tilateralism that is different in kind, anchored in norms and with values linked
to cooperation.30

Institutional Approach
Other analysts suggest a more nuanced analysis rooted in neo-institutionalism.
According to Bailes, multilateral cooperation in East Asia, and in particular in
Southeast Asia, has undeniably contributed to stability.31 However, this is not
the case in Northeast Asia, where China, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan have
not yet established solid multilateral cooperation.
is approach is more optimistic regarding the evolution of multilateralism
in Asia, and particularly on non-economic issues. Since the end of the Cold
War the reorganisation of the forces in the region has been pacific and the

29)
Rolfe, Regional security for the Asia-Pacific.
30)
Nan Li, ‘e evolving Chinese conception of security and security approaches’, in
Amitav Acharya and See Seng Tan (eds) Security Cooperation: National Interests and Regional
Order (London: M.E. Sharpe, ), pp. –; see p. .
31)
Alyson J.K. Bailes, ‘Regional security cooperation: a challenge for South (and North-
East) Asia’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –; see p. .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

region has remained stable. While essentially conservative and rejecting inter-
ference in internal politics, Asian multilateralism has contributed to regional
stability, as realist authors Buzan and Segal themselves acknowledged in .32
To support this optimistic thesis, three important developments are put for-
ward: the creation of the Shangri-La Dialogue, the evolution of cooperation
in Southeast Asia around the issue of terrorism, and the establishment of the
Six-Party Talks.33 ese multilateral instances enabled dialogue, the develop-
ment of norms34 and the creation of a regional identity; deepened coopera-
tion with China; and integrated China into numerous cooperation processes.
Many analysts also highlight the engagement of China beyond its borders and
its willingness to participate in Asian multilateral spaces since the early s.35
Even if authors do not agree on China’s motivations, its engagement cannot be
denied, and neither can the engagement and openness of other Asian partners
for which cooperation with China is essential.36 However, this could hardly
be considered ‘bandwagonning’: no country has aligned itself militarily with
China, except for North Korea and Burma.37 Moreover, the economic interest
in trading with China does not necessarily imply an alignment with its foreign
policy, as the examples of Japan and the United States clearly demonstrate.
In parallel, countries of the region were able to indirectly pursue a diplo-
matic balance with China by ensuring the continued engagement of the United
States in the region.38 Although those who hold this view also acknowledge
the lack of ASEAN leadership,39 they nonetheless consider that Asia manages
the insecurity in the region increasingly well. e countries within the region
share norms, manage their increased economic interdependence, and are sow-
ing institutional links.

32)
Acharya, How ideas spread, p. ; Buzan and Segal, ‘Rethinking East Asian security’,
Survival, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
33)
Acharya and Tan, Security Cooperation.
34)
Norms and institutions, understood as principles of appropriate actions, are dominant
on the international scene, arguably more so than anarchy; Peter K. Katzenstein (ed.) e
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York: Columbia
University Press, ).
35)
Ball et al., Track  security dialogue; Rolfe, Regional security for the Asia-Pacific; Frost,
Asia’s New Regionalism.
36)
Acharya, How ideas spread ; Yu Xintian, ‘China and Northeast Asian regional security
cooperation’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
37)
Acharya, How ideas spread, p. .
38)
Goh, Great powers.
39)
Rodolfo C. Severino, ASEAN, Southeast Asia Background Series No.  (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ); Acharya, Constructing a Security Community.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

An Additional Dimension: Soft Multilateralism

e approach proposed here builds on the institutional approach, arguing
that Asia, and in particular Southeast Asia, is in fact now characterised by
what we described earlier as soft multilateralism. In the past, the term ‘soft
multilateralism’ was used by Wallerstein in 40 to describe the United States’
approach towards international relations under the successive presidencies of
Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Clinton. e multilateralism practised by these
administrations was ‘soft’ in the sense that the United States was not entirely
committed to treating other countries as equals in international negotiations:
while the US saw the use of unilateral force as a last resort, it did not rule
this out. Wallerstein’s concept of soft multilateralism thus refers to a process
in which states do not treat each other as equals and where powerful states use
enticement strategies to advance their policy positions.

e concept of soft multilateralism as understood in this paper is different.

It points to a preference for informal spaces, dialogue, consensus building
and mutual cooperation rather than formal treaties and binding institutional
mechanisms. It refers to informal processes where norms and principles may
act as guiding sets of behaviours but are not made constraining. By contrast,
‘hard multilateralism’ would refer to more binding structures and agreements.

ASEAN has been experimenting with this form of soft multilateralism to

different degrees of intensity for over  years now. Rather than talking about
a certain ‘Asian Way’, using the notion of soft multilateralism allows to move
away from this place-based cultural construct. In addition, East Asian countries
previously constrained by the  Treaty of San Francisco signed between
the Allies and Japan have become more involved and entangled in a range
of formal and informal regional organisations. e nature and functioning of
the emerging institutions and the development of new ASEAN mechanisms
and charters indicate that such a form of soft multilateralism is a resilient
phenomenon.

40)
Immanuel Wallerstein, Alternatives: e United States Confronts the World (Boulder, CO:
Paradigm Publishers, ).
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

II. Multilateralism and Major Powers in the Region

e American Multilateral Approach

e role of the United States has been analysed in many different ways over
the past few years. For some, the United States disengaged from Asia and has
only recently showed signs of a renewed interest.41 For others, it actually never
disengaged from the Asia-Pacific region, as its military and even diplomatic
efforts show.42 In fact, according to the analysis of the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), it seems that recently the United States
has re-adopted a vision of international relations centred more on regional
partnerships.43
e American participation in the Six-Party Talks and the decision of the
US in March  to join discussions involving Iraq and its neighbours to
talk about security concerns would seem to confirm one thing: Americans
seem open to reinvesting in multilateral forums, even if they have to share
the control and initiative with other participants.44 e United States sup-
ports the institutionalisation of the multilateral processes in Asia (APEC and
the ARF) to promote security and fight terrorism, but continues to support
bilateral and unilateral actions if necessary for its own security and that of its
allies.45
e Japan–United States alliance remains the cornerstone of American
strategy in Asia.46 However, this alliance, which was reconfirmed in the s,
is a problem for China, especially considering the fact that the Japanese 
White Paper published by the Ministry of Defence clearly mentions the issues
of Taiwan, North Korea and Chinese militarisation as potential sources of
problems for Japan.47

41)
Mauzy and Job, US policy in Southeast Asia.
42)
Ralph A. Cossa, ‘US security strategy in Asia and the prospects for an Asian regional
security regime’, Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
43)
Bailes, Regional security cooperation.
44)
Bailes, Regional security cooperation, p. .
45)
Cossa, US security strategy in Asia; Parag Khanna, ‘Waving goodbye to hegemony’, New
York Times ( January ), p. MM.
46)
Cossa, US security strategy in Asia, p. .
47)
Hughes, New security dynamics, p. .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

e Chinese Multilateral Approach

Since the end of the s, China has participated in multilateral processes
in the Asia-Pacific.48 In , China engaged in the establishment of a group
then referred to as the Shanghai Five (China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan
and Tajikistan) to discuss border security. With the inclusion of Uzbekistan
in , the forum consolidated into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO).
Another yardstick of Chinese multilateral engagement is its participation in
the Six-Party Talks. When meetings were organised in  to deal with the
Korean crisis, Beijing brought together the Americans, the Russians and the
Japanese to discuss the issue of security in Northeast Asia. China’s commitment
to these talks was motivated by three objectives: to prevent North Korea from
falling into economic and social disorder, which could be harmful to China;
to make sure that Taiwan does not develop nuclear technology; and to sustain
political exchanges with Washington. By re-engaging North Korea in these
negotiations, China wants to ensure the collaboration of the United States
regarding its policy towards Taiwan.49 In Southeast Asia, China has signed a
considerable number of multilateral agreements, clearly demonstrating that
this region has become its laboratory to experiment with and increase its
involvement in regional multilateralism.50
e Japan–China antagonism is often depicted as an important factor in
understanding Chinese foreign policy and its impact on multilateralism. Cul-
tural and historical irritants are numerous, but the fact that only one of the
two countries possesses the nuclear bomb is also a major issue of concern.51
We can note nonetheless some positive initiatives: China and Japan have ini-
tiated negotiations regarding the common exploitation of sea gas reserves—
reserves over which ownership has been contested—and a group of historians
have started to work towards creating a consensus around a single and common
historiography.52

48)
Hughes, New security dynamics, p. .
49)
Vasily Mikheev, ‘Prospects of East Asian community and the role of China’, in Gen-
nady Chufrin and Mark Hong (eds) Russia–ASEAN Relations: New Directions (Singapore:
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ), pp. –; see p. .
50)
Hughes, New security dynamics, p. .
51)
Bailes, Regional security cooperation, p. .
52)
Hughes, New security dynamics, p. .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

e Russian Multilateral Approach

Russia, like China, has redeveloped its multilateral relations in Asia: it par-
ticipated with China in the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisa-
tion (SCO); it became a partner of ASEAN in the late s; and in ,
it signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Russia also participates
in the Six-Party Talks. Sumsky notes that Russian leaders opted clearly for a
more important and diversified presence in the region.53 Unlike China, how-
ever, the Russian trade volume with Asian countries remains very limited, and
the nature of its relations with ASEAN and Southeast Asia seems superficial at
the moment.54 Moreover, the issue of energy resources in Russia and in Cen-
tral Asia is seen as a source of tension in the Asia-Pacific region. Access to these
resources represents a potential area of competition and conflict which could
hinder cooperation.55

Synthesis
Overall, one can observe that the Americans have expressed a renewed inter-
est in a multilateral approach through their participation in the Six-Party
Talks and their support for the institutionalisation of multilateral processes
such as APEC and the ARF. However, they also continue to support bilat-
eral and unilateral actions when this is deemed necessary for their security.
Although questions remain regarding their motivation, the Chinese have also
participated in the multilateral construction of the region since the end of the
Cold War by establishing SCO, engaging in the Six-Party Talks and increasing
China’s links with ASEAN. Although there have been some positive initia-
tives recently, the Japan–China antagonism still impacts on Chinese foreign

53)
Victor Sumsky, ‘China’s peace offensive in Southeast Asia and Russia’s regional impera-
tives’, in Gennady Chufrin and Mark Hong (eds) Russia–ASEAN Relations: New Directions
(Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, ), pp. –, see p. .
54)
Rodolfo C. Severino, ‘Russia, ASEAN and East Asia’, in Gennady Chufrin and Mark
Hong (eds) Russia–ASEAN Relations: New Directions (Singapore: Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, ), pp. –; see p. .
55)
Mikheev, Prospects of East Asian community, p. ; Mikkal E. Herberg, ‘China’s search for
energy security. e implications for Southeast Asia’, in Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon
(eds) China, the United States, and Southeast Asia, Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security
and Economics (New York: Routledge, ), pp. –, see p. .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

policy and the Japan–United States alliance remains a problem for China.
e Russian engagement in the multilateral architecture of the region, despite
Russia’s participation in SCO, has remained superficial.
Viewed through the lens of the balance of power perspective, the new
multilateralism in Asia is explained by the emergence of China as the main
powerhouse of the region. In order to balance China’s power, Asian countries
enter into new alliances, and it is the alliance between Japan and India which
has the greatest stabilisation potential for the region. ASEAN, through its lack
of leadership and non-interference principle, plays but a minor role. e new
forms of cooperation that are emerging remain a stage for bilateral competition.
rough the lens of the institutional approach, however, Asian soft multi-
lateralism has created common norms, an emerging common identity and an
interdependence which explains the absence of conflict and the region’s sta-
bility over the years. In this perspective, China is seen as an actor increasingly
involved in multilateral institutions, while ASEAN plays an important role as
it links together the Southeast Asian countries while engaging with the rest of
the region through forums such as the ARF, East Asia Summit and others.

III. New Multilateral Organisations: Nature, Actors and Consequences

To understand the current multilateral dynamics, we focus in this section on
emerging multilateral institutions in Asia, their impacts in terms of regional
integration and security, and also the consequences of these new institutions
in Asia for regional security and the economy, as well as for the institutions
that preceded them. e discussion that follows is based on a review of new
and old, formal and informal regional institution, using official publications,
the research literature and media and newspaper articles.

Formal Institutions
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO): Among these new forms of coop-
eration, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) has attracted much
attention because it brings China and Russia together in a common multilateral
process. e goal of the organisation is to appease tensions between these two
former enemies. Today it includes six member countries: China, Russia, Kaza-
khstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. SCO is a regional organisation
of multilateral cooperation established on the basis of a concerted mechanism
between heads of states which allows them to coordinate their military, security
and anti-terrorism strategies. e organisation now has its own Secretariat and
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

institutions.56 Issues related to economic security are also starting to be a part

of the agenda for discussion within the organisation. Issues of democracy and
governance, however, remain excluded. SCO is gradually taking root between
partners who are not used to cooperating with each other. However, the impor-
tance of the non-interference principle declared in its Charter remains a central
feature of its operations.57
At the centre of this organisation, the relation between Moscow and Bei-
jing takes precedence over all others. e hostility shown by Russia and China
towards the United States during the Iraq crisis provided an opportunity to
reinforce the links between the two powers. However, China appears to be the
most dominant power of the organisation.58 Recently, Russia was not able to
secure the organisation’s support for its policy towards Georgia. Members pre-
ferred to remain neutral and asked both Russia and Georgia to show restraint
so that the crisis might be resolved peacefully.59
Despite the fact that the United States is not supportive of this new struc-
ture because the cooperation between China and Russia might undermine tra-
ditional American unilateralism in Asia, SCO seems to be here to stay. In the
near future, Russia might be tempted to use it to counterbalance NATO, but
members of SCO seem to lack both the will and the capacity to establish a
political and military alliance. Moreover, the main concern for Beijing and
Moscow seems to be to control each other rather than to try to push back the
United States and its allies from Central Asia. us, China and Russia have
not been able to shut down the American airbase in Kirghizstan.60
Many analysts see the complex relation between Russia and NATO as one of
Moscow’s main motivations in creating and contributing to SCO. e Chinese
motivation is to be found elsewhere. China, it seems, wishes to penetrate
Central Asia through consensus and a multilateral structure in order to extend
its markets at a minimum strategic cost.61

56)
Chung, e role of Asia-Pacific organizations.
57)
Bailes, Regional security cooperation.
58)
Khanna, Waving goodbye to hegemony.
59)
David L. Stern, ‘Regional security group takes a neutral stance on Russia’s actions in
Georgia’, e New York Times ( August ), p. A.
60)
But what upsets the United States even more is the presence of Iran, which was attributed
observer status in . See Michel Guenec and Jean-Sylvestre Montrenier, ‘L’organisation
de coopération de Shanghai: une OTAN eurasiatique?’ Regard sur l’ est (), online,
available at: http://www.regard-est.com/home/breve_contenu_imprim.php?id=.
61)
Bailes, Regional security cooperation.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

Six-Party Talks: e Six-Party Talks are a formal negotiation process between

six states rather than a multilateral institution per se. e objective of these
negotiations is to resolve the problems associated with North Korea’s nuclear
programme, and the process is the result of a joint diplomatic initiative of
China and the United States to address the crisis created by the withdrawal of
Pyongyang from the Non Proliferation Treaty in .62 ese talks, held in
Beijing, bring together North Korea, South Korea, Russia, China, the United
States and Japan63 and are characterised by attempts on the part of North Korea
to bargain its nuclear disarmament.
e Six-Party Talks have initiated a multilateral dynamic uncommon in
Northeast Asia, where substantial geopolitical divisions remain. e desire
to make this diplomatic architecture permanent—even if the North Korean
nuclear problem were to be solved—is often perceived by ASEAN as an attempt
by the great powers (United States, Japan, China and Russia) to challenge such
security forums as the ARF or the EAS.64 e process has allowed the United
States to insert itself within the multilateral architecture of Northeast Asia.65
It also contributed to fostering cooperation between the United States and
China, although the Chinese have become the most influential actor of the
Six-Party Talks because of the intermediary role they play between Pyongyang
and Washington.66

Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (TPP): e Trans-

Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, commonly referred to as
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), is a multilateral free trade agreement
conceived as a platform for promoting economic integration among nations in
the Asia-Pacific region. e TPP is a comprehensive agreement which stands
out among the plethora of FTAs in the region for four reasons: (a) its trans-
Pacific membership, (b) a relatively comprehensive coverage of sectors, (c) an
open accession clause, and (d) the inclusion of labour and environment side

62)
Lee Joo-Hee, ‘-Party Talks look to add momentum’, e Korea Herald ( July ).
63)
Lee Joo-Hee, ‘-Party Talks likely to resume next Tuesday’, e Korea Herald ( Septem-
ber ).
64)
Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘ASEAN must make restoring the ARF its top priority’, e
Nation (ailand) ( April ).
65)
Tom Plate, ‘Oscar for patient diplomacy’, e Japan Times ( March ).
66)
Michael Hirsh, Melinda Liu and Sarah Schafer, ‘North Korea hold ’em’, Newsweek
(United States) ( October ), International, p. ; (no author) ‘China is biggest
beneficiary of -Party Talks’, Korea Times ( August ).
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

agreements.67 Negotiations for the TPP were launched on the sidelines of the
 APEC Leaders’ Meeting in Mexico and the agreement was signed in 
by Singapore, Chile, New Zealand and Brunei.
In , new rounds of negotiations were held to discuss the inclusion of
five new members of the TPP: the United States, Australia, Peru, Vietnam and
Malaysia. Working-level talks were also held in November  between these
nine countries and four others—Japan, Canada, the Philippines and China
—who have expressed interest in joining the negotiations.68 e agreement
is not an APEC initiative and does not fall within the APEC agenda. How-
ever, because the consensus framework of APEC makes it difficult to reach a
region-wide free trade deal, the TPP—with its open accession clause—is seen
by many as a starting point for a Free Trade Agreement of the Asia Pacific
(FTAAP).69

Informal Institutions
Shangri-La Dialogue: e Shangri-La Dialogue is an informal discussion
forum, a ‘Track II Diplomacy’ process, which was established in . e
official name of the process is the Asia Security Summit. Organised by the
International Institute of Strategic Studies in London (IISS), its main objective
is to discuss security issues in Asia.70 Although the forum focuses on traditional
security issues, non-traditional security issues are also discussed, such as natural
disasters or pandemics.71 e forum holds annual meetings at the Shangri-La
Hotel in Singapore and brings together defence ministers, army generals, high-
ranking officials and civil society actors from  countries of the Asia-Pacific,
the EU and the United States. Members are the same as in the ARF, and it

67)
Yuen Pau Woo, ‘Canada risks being left out of trans-Pacific trade deal’, editorial of the
CEO of the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada ( November ), available at: http://
www.asiapacific.ca/editorials/presidents-view/ (accessed  December ).
68)
Yomiuri Shimbun, ‘China warms to transpacific trade talks’ ( October ), avail-
able at: http://ptpp.dyndns.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=
:china-expresses-interest-in-tpp&catid=:latest-news (accessed  December ).
69)
Yuen Pau Woo, Canada risks being left out.
70)
David Boey, ‘Defense ministers fly in for forum’, e Straits Times (Singapore) ( June
).
71)
Chee Kin Chong and Teh Joo Lin, ‘Defense summit agrees on how to offer disaster
relief; accord reached on norms of behaviour guided by  principles in times of calamity’,
e Straits Times (Singapore) ( June ).
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

is still unclear whether the Shangri-La Dialogue will grow to compete with,
or complement, the ARF. e main funders of the process are Singapore and
Australia.72
Over the past few years, the main security issues discussed at the forum have
included terrorism, maritime security, humanitarian operations, the emergence
of India, the modernisation of the Chinese military, and nuclear armaments.73
Non-traditional security issues such as energy security and climate change have
also been added to the agenda.74 Observers argue that the Shangri-La Dialogue
has made at least three important contributions so far: it has given a tribune
to Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore to remind both China and the United
States that maritime security in the Malacca Straits is primarily their own
responsibility;75 it has enriched multilateralism around security issues in the
region by including civil society representatives;76 and it has led to China being
a little less secretive regarding its defence policies.77

Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building (CICA): Although the

idea to create the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Mea-
sures in Asia (CICA) was proposed as early as  by Kazak President Nur-
sultan Nazarbayev,78 the first meeting on its basic rules occurred in  and
its First Summit was held in . e objective is to create a forum to discuss
security issues in Asia and to support the emergence of confidence-building
measures. CICA has  members, among which are South Korea, China, India
and Russia. e only member from ASEAN is ailand, while Indonesia and
Vietnam—as well as the United States—have observer status. CICA members
rarely meet. Between  and , there were only three Ministerial Meet-
ings (,  and ) and two Summits (, ).

72)
IISS website, http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/.
73)
(No author) ‘e th Shangri-La Dialogue (– June )’, Business World ( August
), p. S/; (no author) ‘Dialogue on regional security’, e Straits Times, ( May
).
74)
Chee Kin Chong and Teh Joo Lin, Defense summit agrees; Teh Joo Lin, ‘High-ranking
defense officials from  nations in town’, e Straits Times ( May ).
75)
Patrick Walters, ‘Nations unite to secure vital Straits’, e Australian ( June ),
World, p. .
76)
Ralf Emmers, ‘Future of E. Asia’s new institutions’, e Straits Times ( December
).
77)
(No author) ‘Singapore: China sends top officials to attend and address summit’, e
Straits Times ( June ).
78)
(No author) ‘CICA process— years of success’, China Daily ( October ).
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

e main component of the CICA structure is its Secretariat, which is based

in, and largely financed by, Kazakhstan. is dialogue process is a tool of Kazak
diplomacy aimed at balancing power between the main actors of the region.
It proved useful during the First Summit in  as a discussion platform for
India and Pakistan, which were going through a serious political crisis at the
time. Russia, one of the main actors of CICA, expressed in  its will to
see this dialogue process remain informal.79 Although it was granted observer
status at the UN in , its activities have been limited since then.

Boao Forum for Asia (BFA): e Boao Forum for Asia is modelled after the
World Economic Forum of Davos and consists mainly in annual meetings,
held in Hainan (China), gathering businessmen, academics and government
officials to discuss issues related to economic development in Asia.80 It was
founded in February  following the Declaration on the Boao Forum for
Asia, which was adopted by the  founding members who were all from
North, East, Southeast and Central Asia.81 is non-governmental organisa-
tion was born in the aftermath of the  Asian financial crisis and advo-
cates for greater economic liberalism in Asia.82 e BFA has since accepted
the United States and Germany as members, and engages with the European
Union, the World Bank and other organisations of the region. e main objec-
tive of the BFA is to contribute to economic development and market liberal-
isation in Asia.
e BFA was originally a tripartite initiative led in  by former Philip-
pines President Fidel Ramos, former Prime Minister of Australia Robert James
Lee Hawke, and former Japanese Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa.83
China’s influence within the forum has grown ever since, partly because the
BFA is largely financed by the Chinese and because its Secretariat is located in
Beijing. e BFA’s authority is not legally binding, and the annual meetings
remain largely informal and more of a space for economic networking. e
main themes discussed at the BFA in the past have included the Doha round

79)
Online, available at: www.kremlin.ru/eng/events/articles////.
shtml.
80)
Boao Forum for Asia Annual Report , available at: http://www.boaoforum.org (ac-
cessed May ); (no author) ‘Boao may become much more than Asia’s Davos’, China
Daily ( April ).
81)
Xinhua News Agency, ‘BOAO regional forum wraps up in China’s Hainan’, BBC
Monitoring Asia Pacific ( April ).
82)
(No author) Boao may become much more than Asia’s Davos.
83)
Xinhua News Agency, Boao regional forum wraps up.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

of the WTO,84 cooperation on energy-related issues,85 corporate responsibil-

ity,86 environmental protection (BBC News, April ; BBC News, April ,
)87 and public–private partnerships. While many observers see the BFA as
a platform to promote free trade agreements, others point out that because the
forum sidelines political issues, it has been the only space so far which allowed
for a détente in the relations between Beijing and Taipei.

Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD): e Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD)

was established in  under the initiative of then ailand Prime Minister
aksin Shinawatra, who had great ambitions for this new structure.88 e
ACD seeks to promote cooperation in every possible area while supporting
the creation of an Asian identity from the Suez Canal all the way to Kam-
chatka.89 is ai diplomatic initiative hoped to make the ACD the main
community-building to reinforce friendship and trust between Asian nations.90
e organisation has no official publication or annual report. It remains mod-
est—it has no financing and no secretariat—and has developed two types of
activities: annual ministerial dialogues and working groups involved in a vari-
ety of projects around poverty reduction, information technologies, tourism,
agriculture, etc. Host countries finance the annual meetings.
e founding members of this organisation, which now comprises  states,
include China, Japan, India and all ASEAN countries. Russia joined in ,91
while Western states are not included. e relevance of the ACD has been ques-
tioned because its accomplishments remain minor and because it has been seen

84)
Xinhua News Agency, ‘China’s Boao Forum ends successfully’, BBC Monitoring Asia
Pacific ( April ).
85)
(No author) ‘BFA to start annual conference next week’, China Daily ( April );
Xinhua News Agency, Boao regional forum wraps up.
86)
Xinhua News Agency, ‘Philippine ex-President Ramos re-elected Boao Forum chair’,
BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific ( April ); Xinhua News Agency, ‘Annual Conference of
Boao Forum opens, focusing on green Asia’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific ( April ).
87)
Xinhua News Agency, Philippine ex-President Ramos and Annual Conference of Boao
Forum opens.
88)
Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘ailand’s foreign horizons are shrinking’, e Nation (ailand)
( February ); Kuensen (website), ‘Bhutan joins Asian Cooperation Dialogue’, BBC
Monitoring South Asia ( April ).
89)
Kuensen (website), Bhutan joins Asian Cooperation Dialogue.
90)
Kavi Chongkittavorn, ‘Regional perspective: tradition of ailand’s foreign policy is at
risk’, e Nation (ailand) ( March ).
91)
Kuensen (website), Bhutan joins Asian Cooperation Dialogue.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

as a stage to foster bilateral relations rather than stimulate multilateralism.92

Analysts have argued that the ACD has been used mainly by non-ASEAN
countries like China, Bahrain and Kuwait to promote their own interests93 and
that it is destined to disappear unless China or India chose to take a leadership
role.94

Technical Cooperation: Malacca Strait Patrols Information Sharing Exer-

cise: When speaking of the evolution of regional cooperation, the initiative of
Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia to integrate their surveillance forces to fight
piracy in the Malacca Straits is most often ignored in the literature on regional
trends. However, it is worth noting that, with the Malacca Strait Patrols Infor-
mation Sharing Exercise, three neighbouring countries have put together a
programme to jointly patrol the Malacca Straits. After refusing an American
intervention (the Regional Maritime Security Initiative—RMSI) in their terri-
torial waters in ,95 these three countries developed the programme ‘Eyes in
the Sky’. According to different observers, the cooperation between Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia, and the naval and aerial patrols of the programme,
have led to an important reduction of piracy incidents in recent years.96 Some
analysts, however, remain sceptical and consider this to be ‘more show than
substance’.97 In any case, the uniqueness of this programme needs to be recog-
nised since it is the first time that these forces have collaborated and worked
together on security issues.98

e South China Sea Declaration of Conduct (DOC): e South China

Sea Declaration of Conduct (DOC) was adopted by China and ASEAN in
.99 By signing this agreement, parties agreed to resolve their territorial

92)
Kavi Chongkittavorn, ailand’s foreign horizons are shrinking.
93)
Chongkittavorn, ailand’s foreign horizons are shrinking.
94)
(No author) ‘Govt must restore sound diplomacy’, e Nation (ailand) ( October
).
95)
Cossa, US security strategy in Asia.
96)
John F. Bradford, ‘Shifting the tides against piracy in Southeast Asian waters’, Caliber
( July ); AFP, ‘Nette diminution de la piraterie dans le détroit de Malacca’ ( Novem-
ber ), available at: http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/nette-diminution-de-la-
piraterie-dans-le-detroit-de-malacca_.html (accessed ).
97)
Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, pp. –.
98)
Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, p. .
99)
Xinhua News Agency, ‘Chinese agency carries text of White Paper on arms control,
nonproliferation’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific ( September ).
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

disputes in the South China Sea through peaceful means and new cooperation
mechanisms.100 e DOC was to lead to a binding South China Sea Code of
Conduct (COC), but this has so far not materialised despite the pressures of
ASEAN for its adoption.101

IV. ASEAN and Soft Multilateralism

Maybe more than anywhere else in Asia, the notion of soft multilateralism
is best illustrated by ASEAN’s recent evolution. Within ASEAN, multilateral
cooperation continues to evolve as can be demonstrated by the agreements,
the Charter, the treaties, etc.102 ASEAN has already reached regional trade
agreements with China, Japan and India. An important agreement is also being
negotiated with the EU.
ASEAN’s real weight in broader Asian regional dynamics has been ques-
tioned, in a large part because of the rising power of China. In fact, the rela-
tions between ASEAN members and China represent a major challenge for
the organisation, because Southeast Asian countries are deeply divided regard-
ing these relations.103 For some, the best strategy is one of complex alliances,
known as ‘hedging’, while others suggest that ASEAN countries focus strategi-
cally on their relations with other members to build a regional order. Goh sug-
gests that Southeast Asian countries have a clear preference for maintaining the
American presence in the region (military, political and economic) and wish
to avoid being exclusively within the Chinese sphere of influence. us, there
is a need to avoid ‘bandwagonning’.104 ese countries are rather in favour of
an ‘omni-enmeshment’, i.e. the multiplication of institutions, agreements, dia-
logues (economic and political) with a maximum of partners. is way they
are opting for an inclusive rather than an exclusive strategy, as Singapore Prime
Minister Lee Hsien Loong confirmed in a speech delivered during a security
conference in .105

100)
Xinhua News Agency, Chinese agency.
101)
ASEAN, ‘ASEAN–China Summit issues statement’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific (
November ); ASEAN, ‘ASEAN foreign ministers in Singapore issue joint communiqué
 July’, BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific ( July ).
102)
Severino, ASEAN.
103)
Goh Sui Noi, ‘ more countries ratify ASEAN Charter; Laos, Malaysia and Brunei join
S’pore;  others expected to do so by December’, e Straits Times (Singapore) ( February
), p. .
104)
Goh Sui Noi,  more countries, p. .
105)
Goh, Great powers, p. .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

e year  seemed to have confirmed the resilience of ASEAN as it

celebrated its th year of existence and adopted its first Charter. After four
decades of informal operations, which came to be referred to as the ‘ASEAN
Way’, the leaders of member countries agreed to sign a Charter giving ASEAN a
formal character and a legal personality. One could even argue that in the near
future the agreements and decisions of ASEAN may become more binding.
e Charter covers new areas of intervention such as human rights, democracy,
governance and non-traditional threats. is Charter represents an important
stage of ASEAN’s history. Its Secretary General, Surin Pitsuwan, declared in
 that the organisation would become better integrated, stronger, more
responsive to the needs of populations, and based on shared norms and rules.106
e implementation of this new Charter is a great challenge, although its text
essentially recalls the spirit which has characterised the organisation since 
and clearly reiterates the founding principle of non-interference in the internal
affairs of member countries.
Ever since its creation, ASEAN has operated by consensus and its main prin-
ciple remains respect for the sovereignty of its members. Generally, ASEAN
declarations have very limited binding power over its signatories. Until recently,
ASEAN remained governed by ‘soft law’ as it preferred declarations to treaties.
e enactment of the Charter should change this operating mode, but only
time will tell whether the dynamic of state relations will find itself transformed.
ASEAN invested a lot in the elaboration of this Charter and in having it
adopted on the year of its th anniversary. However, that year of celebra-
tion was tarnished by the situation in Burma. e political crisis that shook
the authoritarian regime illustrated the incapacity of ASEAN to influence the
course of events in its own region and in a member country. e cancella-
tion of the East Asia Summit—which was to be held in Bangkok in —
because of the political crisis in ailand further undermined the credibility of
the institution.

e Adoption of the Charter

Two very distinct trends influenced the development of the Charter. While
some were in favour of a charter and of new rules with regards to human rights

106)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Embarks on New Era. e total pop-
ulation of ASEAN members is around  million people and their economies represent a
GNP of over US  billion (Kent E. Calder and Francis Fukuyama, East Asian Multilateral-
ism: Prospects for Regional Stability (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, ), p. ).
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

and democratic governance, others were strongly opposed. In addition to the

will expressed by Singapore and Indonesia to develop the Charter,107 social
pressures also came into play. For example, ai unions expressed concerns over
the grave social inequalities in ASEAN countries and asked for the adoption
of a social charter for the organisation.108
It was after the ASEAN Summit—which took place in Kuala Lumpur in
December  under the theme ‘One vision, one identity, one commu-
nity’—that the soft multilateralist advocates were able to impose the idea of
a charter which would formalise the relations between ASEAN states by bring-
ing together the principles scattered throughout various past declarations, and
which would give the organisation a legal personality.109
In , the working group responsible for the development of the Char-
ter recommended the adoption of a sanction mechanism against states that
fell short of their obligations.110 In January , during the ASEAN Summit
held in Cebu (Philippines), this idea looked acceptable and foreign affairs min-
isters of ASEAN were in favour of adopting the recommendations, including
the one for the adoption of a sanctions mechanism against states not comply-
ing with the rules of the Charter. At this Summit, Burma was more preoccu-
pied with securing ASEAN’s support should Rangoon be subject to sanctions
from the UN.111 e regime in Rangoon managed to mobilise support and
the Malaysian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that ASEAN should con-
tinue to assist Burma in its national reconciliation process.112 In July ,
at the Ministerial Conference in Manila, member states of ASEAN promised
to include a human rights commission in the Charter, although Burma was
opposed to the idea.113 Because of Rangoon’s opposition, the characteristics

107)
Rabea Volkmann, ‘Why does ASEAN need a charter? Pushing actors and their national
interest’, ASIEN (October ), pp. –.
108)
Oh Boon Ping, ‘ASEAN Charter very much the focus; all members are expected to
ratify the document by December summit’, e Business Times (Singapore) ( July ).
109)
Endy M. Bayuni, ‘Kuala Lumpur summit takes ASEAN to higher plane’, e Jakarta
Post (Kuala Lumpur) ( December ), p. .
110)
Yunus Kamarul, ‘Charter meant to unite region’, New Straits Times, Malaysia (
August ), p. .
111)
BBC, ‘ASEAN urges Burma reform, backs North Korea Six-Way Talks’, BBC Monitor-
ing Asia Pacific ( January ).
112)
BBC, ASEAN urges Burma reform.
113)
Emma-Kate Symons, ‘ASEAN drags its heels on human rights’, e Australian ( August
), p. .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

of this commission remained vague and undefined.114 In November ,

a final version of the ASEAN Charter was adopted by the state leaders of
ASEAN.115 is version of the Charter rejected a large number of the work-
ing group’s recommendations. For many, this Charter simply codifies already
existing rules and ASEAN remains an essentially intergovernmental organisa-
tion.116
In January , Singapore became the first state to ratify the Charter (Goh
).117 In February, Laos, Brunei, and Malaysia also ratified it.118 In July
, during a Ministerial Meeting in Singapore, delegates agreed to name
high officials responsible for the implementation at the Secretariat in Jakarta
and to establish a committee of experts responsible for the creation of a human
rights commission. In July, Burma also ratified the Charter, after Vietnam
and Cambodia.119 For a few months, ailand, Indonesia and the Philippines
refused to ratify the document because it included no mechanism to sanction
authoritarian actions. Today, all member states have ratified the Charter and
the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was
established in October .120
e difficulties encountered during the adoption process of the Charter
revealed the profound divisions which still characterise the organisation and its
inclination for soft forms of multilateralism. ese represent a schism between
on one side the new members, those socialist or authoritarian states such as
Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Burma; and on the other side those democ-
racies, fragile or under construction, in the Philippines, ailand, Indone-
sia, Singapore and Malaysia.121 e Burma problem has undermined part of

114)
Symons, ASEAN drags its heels.
115)
Barry Desker, ‘Where the ASEAN Charter comes up short’, e Straits Times, Singapore
( July ).
116)
Desker, Where the ASEAN Charter comes up short.
117)
Goh Sui Noi,  more countries.
118)
Goh Sui Noi,  more countries.
119)
(No author) ‘Burma ratifies ASEAN charter’, e Australian ( July ), available
at http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/burma-ratifies-asean-charter/story-efrgt–
 (accessed ); Roger Mitton, ‘Vietnam ratifies ASEAN Charter’, e
Straits Times (Singapore) ( March ).
120)
omas Fuller, ‘ASEAN inaugurates human rights commission’, New York Times (
October ).
121)
Arnold Wayne, ‘ASEAN gets a charter and reveals its divisions: fight over Myanmar
points up problems among signatories’, e International Herald Tribune ( November
), p. .
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

the process, but several members of ASEAN seem eager to find a solution for
it. e nomination of Surin Pitsuwan as Secretary General of the organisation
might be a good sign. While he was ailand’s Minister of Foreign Affairs in
, Surin Pitsuwan actively campaigned within ASEAN to soften its non-
intervention doctrine in order to influence the regime in Rangoon, but also
to intervene on other issues such as the financial crisis, drug trafficking and
atmospheric pollution. He suggested that ASEAN should adopt a ‘flexible
engagement’ policy to face the threats which could put at risk the stability
and welfare of the region.

Economic Cooperation and Trade

To better grasp the relative importance of the Charter and why soft multilat-
eralism might prove a more fruitful way to understand ASEAN dynamics, it
is important to highlight the impact of disparities in terms of political and
economic development between member countries. ese differences might
in fact be the main impediment to the future evolution of ASEAN towards a
more binding or ‘hard’ form of multilateral organisation,122 rather than its for-
mal structures or even China’s economic strength and new role in the region.
Although adopting the Charter showed their concrete will to pursue the insti-
tutional development of ASEAN, member countries continue to rely on their
bilateral relations in the region and with the United States to manage their
security, their market and their politics. e multiplication of free trade agree-
ments is a good illustration of this trend.
In ,  bilateral free trade agreements had already been signed, were
under negotiation or had been officially proposed involving countries of South-
east Asia. In , this number added up to only four.123 is trend is thus very
recent; it has been moving very fast, and the bilateral approach has become
prevalent. Within ASEAN itself, although the objective to create a free trade
zone is clear, it is still far from being achieved. e ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) was established in  in a collective effort to develop greater trade
and industrial linkages among ASEAN member countries. So far, however,
ASEAN economic integration has been limited to tariff cuts and has not been

122)
Noel M. Morada, ‘ASEAN at : prospects for community building in Southeast Asia’,
Asia-Pacific Review, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –; David Martin Jones, ‘Security and
democracy: the ASEAN Charter and the dilemmas of regionalism in South-East Asia’,
International Affairs, Vol. , No.  (), pp. –.
123)
ADB FTA Database, Asia Regional Integration Centre, available at: www.aric.adb.org.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

successful in tackling intra-regional regulatory barriers.124 e will to estab-

lish an economic community is still alive, but the variety of geographical
options is great. More generally, such a zone could be formalised in the con-
text of the East Asia Summit (EAS) but this initiative is still at an embryonic
stage.
e first EAS was held in Kuala Lumpur in parallel to the ASEAN Sum-
mit in December . e EAS, also known as ASEAN+, is part of the
institutional constellation of ASEAN and brings together around the ASEAN
countries like Japan, China, South Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand.125
e creation of the EAS is the result of a Malaysian initiative which was relayed
by ASEAN. e United States and Russia were kept out of this initiative. e
 Kuala Lumpur Declaration described the main structure of the EAS.126
It was stated at the time that the core and dynamic force of the EAS remains
ASEAN. Also stated was the need for the EAS to be a transparent forum des-
tined to promote cooperation around issues of security, defence, finance and
economics.127
Economic cooperation in East Asia, which aims at creating an eventual eco-
nomic community, is likely to evolve around multiple forums and treaties
under the auspices of ASEAN, ASEAN+128 or the East Asia Summit (ASEAN
+) because New Zealand, Australia, and India are also getting involved. With-
out much success, China tried to limit this group to non-Western countries but
Japan opposed this and managed to have these three countries included. Since
then, China has shown less interest in this group, which met three times, for
a few hours only, in parallel with the ASEAN Summit in December  and
in January , and following an ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Singapore
in December . e meeting expected to take place in Bangkok in 
was cancelled because of the political crisis raging in ailand at the time.
While ASEAN remains the focal point of these initiatives, its regional
partners, such as Japan, China and India, command economies which have

124)
Razeen Sally, ‘Regional economic integration in Asia: the track record and prospects’,
ECIPE Occasional Paper No. / (), p. , available at: http://www.ecipe.org/
people/razeen-sally/other-publications/asiaregintegrationaug.pdf (accessed  May
).
125)
Simon Tay, ‘It’s time for ASEAN to deliver’, e Straits Times (Singapore) ( July
).
126)
Tay, It’s time for ASEAN to deliver.
127)
Tay, It’s time for ASEAN to deliver.
128)
ASEAN+ is a meeting process established after the  Asian financial crisis and
includes Japan, China, South Korea and ASEAN members.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

no common measure with those of its member countries. In many ways,

participation in ASEAN structures allows these giants to engage in multilateral
processes to coordinate their bilateral links.

Security
A product of ASEAN activities, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a pan-
Asian forum of dialogue which is concerned with security issues in Asia.
However, a lack of direction and leadership led to its declining relevance in
comparison to SCO and the Shangri-La Dialogue.129 As for ASEAN, the ARF
was seriously impacted by the  Asian financial crisis. e vast geopolitical
map that the ARF is supposed to cover—which in theory includes Southeast
Asia, Northeast Asia and Oceania—adversely affects its activities.130 While
the general trend since  has been to re-centre cooperation activities on a
regional basis, the ARF did the opposite and opened its membership to a total
of  countries who share very few common objectives. e structure of the
ARF has become too heavy and ASEAN is incapable of defining its objectives
and priorities.131 While members of SCO share a number of security objectives,
common fears and norms, this is not the case for the members of the ARF.132

Synthesis
ASEAN has shown itself to be a resilient institution. Over the past  years,
it has increased its membership to include all Southeast Asian countries (with
the exception of Timor Leste) and it has broadened the scope of its activi-
ties. e recent adoption of the ASEAN Charter is a major step in the insti-
tutionalisation process of the association, and an expression of its members’
commitment to a more formal engagement and their interest in new areas of
intervention. However, ASEAN faces two main challenges: one external and
one internal. e multiplication of new multilateral institutions and the rise of
China represents ASEAN’s external challenges; the division of its membership
is the internal challenge.

129)
Severino, ASEAN, p. .
130)
Chung, e role of Asia-Pacific organizations.
131)
Evgeny Kanaev, ‘ASEAN’s leading role in East Asian multilateral dialogue on security
matters: rhetoric versus reality’, in Chufrin Gennady and Mark Hong (eds) Russia–ASEAN
Relations: New Directions (Singapore: ISEAS, ), pp. –.
132)
Chung, e role of Asia-Pacific organizations.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

New institutions such as SCO, the Six-Party Talks and the Shangri-La
Dialogue have shifted the centre of gravity of regional security forums away
from the ASEAN-based ARF and EAS. Moreover, while ASEAN remains a
very potent player, as demonstrated by the numerous free trade agreements
and negotiations it has been involved in recently with China, Japan, India and
the EU, it is only one player in the free trade frenzy as great numbers of bilateral
agreements have been, and continue to be, signed by Asian countries, including
individual ASEAN members. ASEAN also faces internal challenges because its
members are divided in two opposing groups: the more progressive group of
fragile and ‘under construction’ democracies, such as the Philippines, ailand,
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; and the more conservative, socialist and
authoritarian states such as Brunei, Vietnam, Burma, Cambodia and Laos.

Conclusion
Up to now Asian cooperation has still been characterised by an aversion for
formal and constraining regional structures. With the exception of SCO, and
maybe the Six-Party Talks, the new regional cooperation institutions which
have flourished during the past  years have been informal spaces. Most of
these new institutions focus on security issues and have been helpful in appeas-
ing tensions and increasing cooperation between the major powers. e most
significant have been SCO, the Six-Party Talks and the Shangri-La Dialogue,
which have respectively appeased tensions between China and Russia; brought
the United States within the region’s multilateral processes and increased US–
China cooperation; and broadened discussions and participation to include
non-traditional security issues and civil society representatives. Other infor-
mal institutions, however, have had less impact. Although CICA did pro-
vide a space for India–Pakistan discussion at a time of crisis, its activities have
been limited. e South China Sea DOC saw China and ASEAN commit to
a peaceful resolution of territorial disputes but has yet to become a binding
instrument. e only significant multilateral economic institution which has
emerged in Asia in recent years is the BFA, an informal economic networking
space and a tool to promote market liberalisation and free trade agreements.
Some new institutions compete with the ASEAN constellation, while others
include it or fall out of its geographic range. e institutionalisation of the Six-
Party Talks, for one, has been viewed as a challenge to the ARF and the EAS as
regional security forums. e Shangri-La Dialogue includes the same members
as the ARF and also represents a challenge. e BFA and the ACD include
all ASEAN members, as well as the South China Sea DOC. SCO, however,
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () – 

falls out of its geographic range, and only ailand is a member of CICA.
But despite a preference for informal spaces, there is today an interest among
Asian countries in building a more integrated political space which does not
limit itself to bilateralism. e mushrooming of various informal spaces is but
one aspect of this trend. Another aspect is the evolution of ASEAN since the
adoption of its Charter.
While many analysts remain sceptical about ASEAN’s potential, as revealed
here, it has nonetheless acted as a hub for regional cooperation—not because
the group itself and its multiple forums are strong and binding but because no
country has been able to impose itself as the region’s leader. ASEAN remains
acceptable to everyone because it is weak, and in many ways it constitutes a
form of ‘soft’ multilateralism, exhibiting both the resilience and the limits of
such a form of cooperation. Its forums, such as the ARF and the EAS, show
once again the limits of the organisation: they have made only limited progress
and are now challenged by other regional forums.133
Internally, the heterogeneity of ASEAN continues to be a source of tensions,
particularly between the newest members (i.e. since the end of the Cold War),
such as Laos, Vietnam, Burma and Cambodia on one side, and the founding
members on the other side. e crisis in Burma illustrated those divisions when
ASEAN remained silent regarding the actions of Rangoon’s regime. e organ-
isation showed itself incapable of surmounting its internal divisions: on one
side the founding members, led by the Philippines, believe that the situation
in Burma threatens regional security; on the other side, Laos, Cambodia and
Vietnam wish to scrupulously respect the principle of non-interference in order
to avoid setting a precedent. Until now, the second approach has prevailed.134
e line between ASEAN founding countries and its newest members is clear.
ese two groups clashed again during the development of ASEAN’s Charter.
Any effort aimed at promoting democracy and good governance is systemat-
ically blocked by Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Burma, which are ASEAN
members indeed, but for whom an alignment with emerging China consti-
tutes a valid option should ASEAN put too much pressure on their political
regimes.135

133)
Tay, It’s time for ASEAN to deliver.
134)
Nicolas Vescovacci, ‘ASEAN: la Birmanie impose sa loi’, Radio France Internationale,
Actualités, Asie du Sud-Est ( November ), available at: http://www.rfi.fr/actufr/
articles//article_.asp.
135)
Jones, Security and democracy.
 Dominique Caouette and Denis Côté / EJEAS . () –

Even if multilateral relations within ASEAN remain characterised by an

aversion to formal and binding regional structures to manage their security,
their market or their politics, the idea of regional cooperation is developing
slowly and often in informal spaces. e intense institutional activity that
is occurring today in Asia, and particularly within and around ASEAN, is
evidence of the vitality of regional cooperation. is vitality, however, falls short
of confirming a strong will of states in the region to engage in institutions where
multilateralism is predominant or a thesis that the formation of a security
community is in the making. Nonetheless, the institutional development of
ASEAN remains important and has no equivalent in Asia. Such development
illustrates well the dynamism and specific characteristics of what we have
presented as soft multilateralism. It is difficult to conceive a radical change
in the coming years in terms of regional dynamics, and one could suggest that
such a form of multilateralism might become the norm in Asia, despite the rise
of two regional powers, India and China. What is certain is that the near future
promises to be exciting as various contending logics or strategic cultures may
encounter each other in this most dynamic zone of passages and exchanges.