The Pacific Review

ISSN: 0951-2748 (Print) 1470-1332 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpre20

The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of

discourses on the ASEAN Norms

Taku Yukawa

To cite this article: Taku Yukawa (2018) The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses
on the ASEAN Norms, The Pacific Review, 31:3, 298-314, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2017.1371211

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1371211

Published online: 04 Sep 2017.

Submit your article to this journal

Article views: 1760

View Crossmark data

Citing articles: 2 View citing articles

Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at

https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpre20
THE PACIFIC REVIEW, 2018
VOL. 31, NO. 3, 298–314
https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1371211

The ASEAN Way as a symbol: an analysis of discourses on

the ASEAN Norms
Taku Yukawa
Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

ABSTRACT
Has the ‘ASEAN Way’ – a set of rules of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) centered on the principle of non-interference and consensus decision-
making – really established its position as an ASEAN norm? This paper aims to analyze
the discourses of each ASEAN country and empirically explain their attitudes toward
the norm. Specifically, I review various documentations to examine how various
ASEAN diplomats have used the term ‘ASEAN Way.’ How did they come to call the
principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making ‘ASEAN Way’ in the early
1990s? Why have they begun using the term negatively, as something to be reformed,
in recent years? By describing the discourses on the ‘ASEAN Way’ and their changes
over the years, I show that the rationality of non-interference and consensus decision-
making has changed over time and shifted the positioning of the ‘ASEAN way’ as a
symbol. This presents a new and empirical interpretation of the changes in ASEAN
Norms.

KEYWORDS ASEAN Way; non-interference; consensus; discourse analysis

Introduction
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has undergone a major transforma-
tion. When founded in 1967, the ASEAN was only an arena for foreign ministers to meet
in person to build relationships. Subsequently, it showed various changes, such as
strengthening functional cooperation in areas such as economy, expanding member
countries from 5 to 10, and establishing broad frameworks like the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) that subsumed ASEAN itself. Then, with the 2007 ASEAN Charter, it
acquired judicial personality and reformed itself to promote efficient cooperation. By
the end of 2015, the association realized the ASEAN Community, which encompassed
the idea of building a community in each of the following three areas: political-security,
economic, and sociocultural. Having gone through such dramatic changes, ASEAN has
grown to become a complex organization, with its various committees holding more
than 1,000 meetings a year. They have also implemented advanced integration in the
economic domain and become an important player in the international community.

CONTACT Taku Yukawa yukawa@osipp.osaka-u.ac.jp

This article was originally published with errors. This version has been corrected. Please see Corrigendum ( http://dx.
doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2018.1428317)
© 2018 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 299

While the ASEAN itself has dramatically changed in 50 years as described, the way
the ASEAN is analyzed has changed significantly as well. The biggest turning point in
ASEAN research, its theorization, took place in the late 1990s. That is, researchers began
discussing about the ASEAN in terms of the theory of international relations, especially
constructivism, during this period. Specifically, the standpoint of explaining the ASEAN’s
success – in particular, peace – in terms of ideational factors such as norms and identity
has become mainstream. Such studies referred to prior ASEAN research as ‘realism’ and
reproduced the realism versus constructivism scheme – a very familiar one in the theory
of international relations – in ASEAN research.
While ASEAN research was undergoing such changes, the concept of the ‘ASEAN
Way’ became a focus. The term ‘ASEAN Way’ refers to a set of rules in the ASEAN.
Although what it actually encompasses might vary depending on who you speak to, it
includes procedural norms such as decision-making based on consultation and consen-
sus, as well as informality, in addition to the general code of conduct within the interna-
tional community such as the principle of non-interference, territorial integrity, and
peaceful settlement of conflict (Jones, 2010, p. 480; Kivimaki, 2012, p. 406). Regarding its
characteristics, first, it is a type of norm that does not question the sovereignty of mem-
ber countries in general. Second, the principle of non-interference and consensus deci-
sion-making are two factors particularly valued by all. As discussed in the next section,
one of the key discussion points in ASEAN research is how to understand this ASEAN
Way. Has the ASEAN Way really established its position as a norm for ASEAN countries?
Further, has the ASEAN countries really formed a collective identity based on the norm?
This paper is intended to make a new contribution to the field of ASEAN research by
empirically studying how ASEAN member country diplomats themselves have used the
term ‘ASEAN Way.’ It is by no means merely a concept of academic analysis; it is a concept
used by not only researchers to refer to the unique set of rules prevalent within the ASEAN
but also the ASEAN country diplomats to express their own ways. However, previous studies
have not systematically analyzed the ASEAN Way in terms of how the diplomats have spo-
ken of it. This task has not been done even by constructivists who emphasize the perception
and value of diplomats. Thus, for the first time, this paper systematically explains how the
parties involved have used the term ‘ASEAN Way’ over the entire history of the ASEAN so
that it can shed new light on the above-described important argument in ASEAN research.
In drawing from various discourses, to avoid arbitrariness, the primary sources were
selected from representative materials, including official ASEAN documents, speeches
from ASEAN Foreign Minister Meetings, and presentations from the ASEAN Summit. Sec-
ondary sources were drawn from materials available on ASEAN’s website and from state-
ments made by the diplomats of the ASEAN nations, as reported in newspapers and
other media. One caveat: source countries are not cited in equal proportions. For exam-
ple, more documents are cited from Thailand, Indonesia, and Singapore than from other
countries. However, that is not an intentional manipulation by the author, but simply a
reflection of the fact that those countries have more frequently expressed their opinions
on the ASEAN norms, and consequently more remarks were made on the subject.

Issues related to the ASEAN Way

The 1990s witnessed a major turning point, progress in theorization, in ASEAN research
(Acharya & Stubbs, 2006, p. 1; Huxley, 1996, p. 86). Studies on the ASEAN dating before
the 1990s tended to describe either the history chronologically or the activities of the
300 T. YUKAWA

ASEAN by function or issue. There were not many attempts to conceptualize and theo-
rize the ASEAN, and there was almost no discussion related to the paradigm of interna-
tional relations theories, such as (neo) realism and (neo) liberalism (Ganesan, 1995).
It was in the 1990s, particularly the late 1990s, that such research trends emerged.
During this period, the interest in ASEAN research increased. This was driven by the fact
the ASEAN gained popularity overnight due to its successful handling of the Cambodian
conflict in the 1980s. Furthermore, the introduction of constructivism, which is a theory
that emphasizes ideational factors such as norms and identities, was directly important.
In other words, it became a trend to use norms and identities to explain the fact that no
serious armed conflict has occurred between the member countries since the establish-
ment of the ASEAN in 1967.
The core of ASEAN research based on such constructivism is the concept of ‘ASEAN
Way,’ which represents behavioral norms of the ASEAN. The expression ‘ASEAN Way’
started appearing in ASEAN research only in the late 1990s1; however, it rapidly became
an important concept. This is also evident from the fact that most of the representative
studies on ASEAN written after 2000 analyze the history of the ASEAN based on its
norms and behavior patterns (Acharya, 2001; Ba, 2009; Caballero-Anthony, 2005; Haacke,
2003; Narine, 2002; Roberts, 2012).
Hence, what type of argument are the constructivists making in ASEAN research? The
theory ‘a collective identity, which was formed as they shared norms created in their
interactions over time, led to peace’ was applied to the ASEAN (Jepperson, Wendt, &
Katzenstein, 1996; Wendt, 1994). For this purpose, over time, people first shared during
their interactions since 1967 the idea that the non-interference principle and consensus
decision-making were their own norms, or the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Acharya, 2000, p. 71; Busse,
1999, p. 45). Second, having shared the norms, they developed a collective identity, the
‘ASEAN identity’ or ‘ASEAN spirit.’ (Acharya, 2001, p. 24; Busse, 1999, p. 53; Kivimaki,
2001, p. 17). In that sense, it is said ‘the “ASEAN Way” has been at the core of efforts to
build a Southeast Asian regional identity in the modern era’ (Acharya, 2001, p. 29). Third,
the collective identity prevented armed conflict and established peace among the
ASEAN member countries. This is the essence of ASEAN research based on constructiv-
ism. Acharya, a leading ASEAN researcher, stated that the ASEAN came to form a
nascent security community in the 1990s through shared norms and identity (Acharya,
2001).
There are objections to the constructivism that explains the history of and peace
established by the ASEAN based on norms and identities in this manner (Khoo, 2004).
The most straightforward and important criticism is probably that norms have not been
shared and collective identity has not been formed. In other words, there is an argument
that each ASEAN country is only following their own interest and factors such as norms
and identities are not important in explaining the ASEAN’s international relations (Jones
& Smith, 2002; Leifer, 1989, p. 148). This is a simple criticism that the argument of con-
structivism is factually incorrect based on empirical observation.
The section above presents the current state of arguments and research regarding
the norms in ASEAN. One intention of this paper is to contribute by providing proof by
analyzing the discourses. The biggest reason for the criticism is the lack of validity in
constructivism. It has been repeatedly noted that demonstrating ideational factors such
as norms and identity is generally difficult. In ASEAN research, it is particularly important
to demonstrate that the non-interference principle and consensus decision-making are
recognized as the organization’s own norms. The constructivists must empirically show
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 301

that there is really an awareness regarding the norms if they want to present the argu-
ment that this awareness leads to collective identity; without it, the basis of the argu-
ment will fall apart.
If so, how can we show that the ASEAN came to recognize the principle of non-inter-
ference and consensus decision-making as their own norms? Specifically, this is an
attempt to explore the internal awareness or subjectivity of the parties involved. In
doing so, an analysis of discourse will become important, that is, an attempt to explore
the subjectivity based on how diplomats themselves used to speak and how that has
changed.
As I explore the changes in norms based on a discourse analysis, I focus on the term
‘ASEAN Way’ in this paper. The non-interference principle and consensus decision-mak-
ing, or respect for sovereignty, are, in fact, not unique to the ASEAN alone. Aside from
the fact that the principle of non-interference is a general norm listed in the Charter of
the United Nations, it is commonly found in regional organizations in developing coun-
tries, such as the Organisation of African Unity and Arab League. Making decisions
based on consensus is also common in the area of national security among international
organizations, as well as regional organizations in developing countries. Therefore,
within the ASEAN, the process by which they began referring to the ordinary rules of
non-interference and consensus decision-making as the so-called ‘ASEAN Way’ is impor-
tant. Furthermore, if we can capture the timing and process of the norms becoming the
‘ASEAN Way’ based on documentation, we can empirically understand the dynamics of
the norms within the ASEAN.
To reiterate, previous studies deemed that the awareness regarding the norm called
the ASEAN Way emerged in the 1990s as a result of repeated interactions. However, at
the time, adequate empirical analysis was not done and the way the term ‘ASEAN Way’
had been used was not systematically studied. As an example of a few descriptions on
this point, Busse (1999, p. 54) made a short remark that ‘Slogans like “the Spirit of
ASEAN,” “doing things the ASEAN Way” or “Think ASEAN” became ever more popular in
the foreign policy circles of the region.’ However, it remains an argument of impression
alone. Therefore, in the following sections, I conduct an empirical analysis on the aware-
ness regarding ASEAN norms by systematically studying how ASEAN diplomats have
used the term ‘ASEAN Way.’
The primary aim of this paper is to conduct an empirical analysis of the ASEAN norms
and identity by researching the discourses on the subject of the ‘ASEAN Way,’ as found
in the primary source materials. However, before going forward with the analysis itself,
it would be necessary to make clear where the author stands in understanding the
changes seen in the theoretical concepts behind the norms in ASEAN.
In this paper, the norms of the so-called ASEAN Way – for example, the set of rules
that consider the sovereignty of the participating nations as absolute – seem to change
in usefulness and rationality over time. Specifically, such norms regarding the respecting
of each other’s sovereignty are useful when each of the participating nations holds
mutual suspicions and similar positions because the primary aim of the regional organi-
zation is not to executing a specific project, but rather to build confidence to prevent
the escalation of conflicts. In situations with the potential for conflict, the principle of
non-intervention in domestic affairs and the consensus method of decision-making will
benefit all the participating nations. This approach can be found throughout the history
of ASEAN, even from its inception in the 1970s.
302 T. YUKAWA

On the other hand, two factors can lower the usefulness or rationality of such norms.
One such factor would be an introduction of the norms in such a way as to question the
domestic governance of ASEAN member states, such as a criticism of the status of their
human rights or their democracy. This conflicts with the norm that calls for respect
toward the sovereignty of all member nations. The other factor is in regard to the devel-
opment of functional cooperation, such as with economic integration. To formulate and
implement concrete projects for economic cooperation, the regional organizations
themselves must be transitioned away from the arena of merely confidence-building
and toward a more efficient, functional organization. Therefore, the development of
functional cooperation necessarily calls for a slight departure from the norms based on
the respect of sovereignty. The discussion up to this point has focused on the usefulness
and fluctuations in the traditional norms of ASEAN. In the following, this paper will
empirically show how such changes and fluctuations in the norms of the ASEAN are
reflected in its discourses regarding the ASEAN Way.

The principle of non-interference and consensus decision-making prior to

the ‘ASEAN Way’
Most importantly, I first determine when the diplomats began using the term ‘ASEAN
Way.’ When and who (which countries) began using the term ‘ASEAN Way’ in what kind
of context? Is ‘ASEAN Way’ a term used first by researchers in the first place?
The ‘ASEAN Way’ was a term that (1) the diplomats began using (2) in the early 1990s,
as supported by the following facts. First, when I extracted the term ‘ASEAN Way’ from
the statements made by each country’s foreign minister at the annual ASEAN Ministerial
Meetings (AMMs) every year since the establishment of the ASEAN, I found a noticeable
trend. Specifically, while the term ‘ASEAN Way’ appeared once in 1974 and then again
in 1989, multiple foreign ministers began using it every year after 1994, and the fre-
quency of use increased rapidly, especially in the late 1990s (see Figure 1). This is quite
an extreme change. Second, it was also in the early 1990s that the media began using
the term ‘ASEAN Way’ to refer to the traditional way of the ASEAN. Therefore, we can
see that it was in the early 1990s that the parties involved began using the term. Mean-
while, it was in 1995 that researchers in the field of ASEAN research began using the
term ‘ASEAN Way.’ It is almost certain that the parties involved began using the term
earlier.
Also, in relation to this, the author would like to point out the constancy and com-
monality in terms of what the ‘ASEAN Way’ means. First, the term the ‘ASEAN Way’,
which first appeared in the first half of the 1990s, has not substantially changed in
meaning. As stated, the ASEAN Way views the member nations’ sovereignty as absolute
and holds a core value of non-interference while building consensus decision-making.
Those core values have not changed. As an example of that consistency, we do not find
any usage (within the documents) of phrases such as ‘the New ASEAN Way.’ Second,
there are no differences among the ASEAN member nations on how they used the term
‘ASEAN Way.’ As discussed below, though there are major differences in the stances
toward such norms among the member nations, the term the ‘ASEAN Way’ points to
the same meaning and seems to be used consistently by all members.
The term the ‘ASEAN Way’ first appeared in the first half of the 1990s. However, the
non-interference principle and consensus decision-making – components of the ASEAN
Way – were found in discourse before the early 1990s. For example, the principle of
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 303

Figure 1. Frequency of use of ‘ASEAN Way,’ ‘consensus,’ and ‘non-interference’ in AMM statements (1967–2000).

non-interference has been positioned as an important norm in ASEAN agreement docu-

ments and discourses. It was in the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration
issued at the AMM in 1971 that the expression ‘non-interference in affairs of States’ first
appeared in an agreement and the principle of non-interference was positioned as an
important concept for the ASEAN. Since then, non-interference has been recognized
and promoted as an indispensable norm. It is also evident from the remark made by the
Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik at the eighth annual AMM, referring to the principle
of non-interference as a ‘new framework of relations within our own region’ (ASEAN Sec-
retariat, 1987, p. 195).
With respect to consensus decision-making, for example, Foreign Minister Romulo of
the Philippines said in 1985, ‘But more than the compulsion of legal covenants, the Phil-
ippines will, …, respect our reserved customs and traditions in Southeast Asia of prior
fraternal consultations and consensus.’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 1987, p. 517). In addition,
although they are not sufficiently important to be called the principle of the ASEAN, con-
sensus decision-making have been specified in ASEAN agreements several times since
1977. Examples include Agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trade Arrangements (1977),
Basic Agreement on ASEAN Industrial Projects (1980).
Subsequently, at the first ASEAN Summit held in 1976, the organization clarified its
basic norms as two treaties, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia and
Declaration of ASEAN Concord. According to Foreign Minister Romulo, ‘important docu-
ment formalizes our determination to solve possible intra-regional disputes wholly and
solely through peaceful means, in the unique ASEAN approach to regional security.’ In
304 T. YUKAWA

other words, in addition to sending reconciliation messages to the countries comprising

Indochina, these were institutionalizing the regional friendship and solidarity that was
being practiced for 10 years. There, an emphasis is placed on the norms of respecting
sovereignty, including the principle of non-interference. Therefore, by this period,
almost all the elements that subsequently constituted the ASEAN Way were present.
The ASEAN emphasized the norms such as the principle of non-interference and con-
sensus decision-making to respect sovereignty because they really focused on stabiliz-
ing international relations by building confidence during the initial phase (Narine, 2004).
Since each member country was in the process of state-building, all the countries
needed to direct most of their resources domestically. Therefore, since it wanted to proj-
ect an image of being a cost-free, comfortable organization, the ASEAN placed utmost
value on the norm of respecting the sovereignty of states. However, it is noteworthy
that the name ‘ASEAN Way’ was not given to the norm at this point.
As described, the idea that the regional order actually exists for the purpose of stabi-
lizing the domestic order makes the relationship between national interests and
regional cooperation in the diplomatic forum of the ASEAN unique. For example, during
the early stages of the formation of the ASEAN, in his opening statement at the third
AMM in 1969, Thai Foreign Minister Thanat stated
Indeed, at this stage we do not expect member countries to undertake joint projects merely
because they are regional but they may be at the expense of national interests of some individual
countries. (ASEAN Secretariat, 1987, p. 76)

and in his opening statement at the fourth AMM in 1971, Singapore Foreign Minister
Rajaratnam stated,
ASEAN has been used by member nations as a devise for promoting national rather than regional
interests. This is understandable. National interests exist. We can define them and recognize
them. Regional interests, on the other hand, are abstract concepts. (ASEAN Secretariat, 1987,
p. 88).

The organization did not approach regional cooperation ‘for the sake of Southeast Asia,’
and it did not even try to conceal that the ASEAN cooperation was pursuing national
interest or self-interest. It is necessary to understand the norms such as non-interference
and consensus decision-making in this context, as well.
Finally, I briefly summarize the ASEAN norms prevalent during the 1980s. The main
activity of the ASEAN at the time was international lobbying in opposition to Vietnam’s
advance in the Cambodian conflict. In this context, they often mentioned the principle
of non-interference. While it was used to condemn Vietnam’s violation of the sover-
eignty of Cambodia, it was actually expressed as a general principle of the international
community, rather than the ASEAN Way. For example, at the Joint Communique of the
20th AMM in 1987, they said that
The Foreign Ministers reiterated ASEAN’s conviction that Vietnam’s military occupation of Kampu-
chea constituted a flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of international law embodied
in the Charter of the United Nations. Vietnam’s military occupation of Kampuchea, now in its ninth
year, also violated the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states and
the right of the Kampuchean people to self- determination.

They must have considered it better to condemn Vietnam for the infringement of the
norm of the international community in general or the Charter of the United Nations,
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 305

than for the infringement of the ASEAN norms like the ASEAN Way if they wanted to
effectively mobilize international public opinion. The choice of which term is used to
express the norm to respect sovereignty is itself very strategic.

The emergence of the concept of the ASEAN Way

In this section, I attempt to examine the argument of constructivism in ASEAN research
by showing how people suddenly began using the term ‘ASEAN Way’ in the 1990s. Since
the 1970s, each component of the ASEAN Way itself, including the principle of non-
interference and consensus decision-making, has often been depicted as a matter of
importance to the ASEAN. However, it was not until the 1990s that these were expressed
collectively by the term ‘ASEAN Way’ and gained international attention. Consequently,
it can be said there is a significant time lag between the practice becoming established
and term becoming a keyword. I examine why the time lag occurred and the principle
of non-interference and consensus decision-making were referred to as the ‘ASEAN
Way’ at a specific time.
Two trends can be noted regarding the reason why people began using the term
‘ASEAN Way’ in the early 1990s. The first was their opposition to Western human rights
diplomacy. The ASEAN focused particularly on responding to the military regime of
Myanmar. In contrast to the Western countries, which had more forceful attitudes, the
ASEAN deemed it necessary to maintain a temperate dialogue. They justified their own
way by calling it ‘constructive engagement’ and used the term ‘ASEAN Way’ in this con-
text. For example, in 1992, a Malaysian government official said while justifying the con-
structive involvement of the ASEAN ‘We prefer to do things quietly, the ASEAN way, so
as to give face to the other side,’ and an Indonesian government official said ‘We are tell-
ing them very quietly, in a Southeast Asian way, without any fanfare, without any state-
ment.’ (Straits Times, August 26 1992). In other words, the ‘ASEAN Way’ was used with
the aim of presenting their unique human rights and democracy values compared to
those of Europe and the United States. In that sense, it is somewhat linked to the con-
cept of Asian value, which emerged at about the same time (Mauzy, 1997).
The second was an appeal to the outside world, that is, to show off the organization’s
own ways to non-member countries while the ASEAN expanded itself and established
the ARF. The ASEAN faced the necessity of promoting their traditional ways to the out-
side world in order to take the initiative in the ARF. For example, Singaporean Foreign
Minister S. Jayakumar stated ‘The tradition of “mushawarah dan mufakat” or consensus-
building has to live on. This “ASEAN way” will contribute significally towards continued
peace and stability within Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.’ (ASEAN Secretar-
iat, 1995, p. 17). The ASEAN was always conscious of the method proposed by Australia
and Canada in the process of establishing the ARF (Leifer, 1996); therefore, they argued
for a more informal system, or the ‘ASEAN Way.’
The term ‘ASEAN Way’ also seemed to indicate to other countries attempting to join
the ASEAN that the organization had its own traditional ways of doing things. For exam-
ple, in the statements made at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in 1995, Bruneian
Foreign Minister Mohamed Bolkiah said ‘I am sure they have been able to get to know
the ASEAN way of doing thing’ (Asean Secretariat, 1995, p. 10) and Singaporean Foreign
Minister Jayakumar said ‘Cambodia will gain a better understanding of the ASEAN Way
of consultation and consensus, and prepare for eventual membership of ASEAN.’ at the
28th AMM in 1995 (ASEAN Secretariat, 1995, p. 42).
306 T. YUKAWA

In this way, the ASEAN nations tout their traditional ways within the broad range of
regimes of foreign nations subsuming to the ASEAN. As they appeal to the new coun-
tries that are joining the ASEAN, they continue to use the term the ‘ASEAN Way.’ In other
words, it can be said that it has been through the interaction with other extraterritorial
forces that ASEAN defines the ASEAN Way, its own way of doing things. The concept of
an ASEAN Way came about through such an external dynamic.
The background or foundation from which ASEAN was able to promote its ASEAN
Way to foreign countries, and convince them that it is the best way to operate, has to
do with the fact that they had already developed a strong reputation as having built
successful regionalism within the 1980s (Yukawa, 2011). Though the principle of non-
interference and the consensus decision-making methods are not necessarily unique to
ASEAN, the success of ASEAN made it possible to use the ‘ASEAN Way’ almost like a slo-
gan or favorable ‘brand name.’
While the concept of ‘ASEAN Way’ emerged in this manner, the use of the term in dis-
course by the parties involved did not rapidly increase until the late 1990s, as shown in
Figure 1. Now, I explain its background. In the late 1990s, a confrontation over Myanmar
became a problem. However, this time, it was not ‘the ASEAN vs. the West.’ In addition
to Europe and the United States, Thailand and the Philippines – member countries –
advocated the postponement of Myanmar’s accession to the ASEAN. Unlike the external
dynamics of the first half of the 1990s, the ASEAN Way concept became frequently refer-
enced in controversies among the member nations in the latter half of the 1990s.
Myanmar applied for ASEAN membership in 1996 as soon as it gained the status of
an observer of the ASEAN. However, toward the end of September 1996, approximately
two months after filing the formal membership application, there was an incident in
Myanmar where a large number of democratic activists were detained and a protest by
students was subdued. In response, Thailand and the Philippines expressed strong con-
cern over immediately granting ASEAN membership to Myanmar, insisted on reviewing
the constructive engagement, and considered democratization and human rights at the
time of the accession (Far Eastern Economic Review, October 10 1996, p. 22.). Only Thai-
land and the Philippines opposed the accession of Myanmar since both the countries
had been promoting democratization before others in the region.
However, these arguments by Thailand and the Philippines were completely rejected
due to the opposition offered by Singapore; Malaysia; Indonesia; and Vietnam, which
was a new member, and Myanmar was allowed to join in July 1997, as planned. Further-
more, these countries criticized the opposition shown by Thailand and the Philippines
that their assertions were against the principle of non-interference and claimed that it
was a deviation from the ASEAN’s traditional way, or the ASEAN Way. For example, in
his keynote address at the 30th annual AMM in 1997, Prime Minister Mahathir of Malay-
sia stated
Instead of encouraging ASEAN to accept all South East Asian countries, as soon as possible,
ASEAN has been urged to pass judgement, deny membership and apply pressure on a potential
candidate so as to force that country to remain poor and therefore unstable. ASEAN must resist
and reject such attempts at coercion. They are not a part of the ASEAN way. We will resolve our
problem in our own way and in our own time.2

In other words, owing to the conflicting views of the member countries, it became nec-
essary for them to express their own norm of ‘making decisions based on consensus
without really interfering in each other’s domestic affairs’ as the ‘ASEAN Way’ this time.
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 307

Seeking to engagement in Myanmar’s domestic problem after the accession, Thai-

land and the Philippines attempted to challenge the principle of non-interference itself
in 1998. This is the ‘flexible engagement’ controversy (Haacke, 1999). Thailand’s Foreign
Minister Surin Pitsuwan argued that they should interfere in a member country’s domes-
tic affairs when necessary rather than firmly adhering to the principle of non-interfer-
ence and advocated the concept of flexible engagement at various occasions after June
1998. It was opposed by all the members of the ASEAN except the Philippines. In this
manner, the basic philosophy of the ASEAN became a topic of head-on discussion
among the member countries for the first time in the organization’s history.
It was at the AMM in July 1998 that this issue was extensively discussed. In this event,
Surin presented the Non-Paper on the Flexible Engagement Approach, raised various
problems faced by the ASEAN at the time, and proposed to formally review the principle
of non-interference and consensus decision-making. For example, in his opening
statement at the AMM, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia,
said
The constant building of consensus, and the supreme importance attached to maintaining cohe-
sion, avoiding confrontation, and not interfering in the internal affairs of other member states
have been the hallmarks of ASEAN existence. Now, there are calls, first from outside ASEAN and
now also from within ASEAN, for change.3

However, the Philippines was the only country to agree to this proposal by Thailand.
Other countries completely opposed it, and the term ‘flexible engagement’ was
replaced by ‘enhanced interaction,’ which is almost meaningless. Thus, the attempts by
both countries were basically torn down at this point.
Those authoritarian countries strongly opposed Thailand and the Philippines primar-
ily because they were facing problems related to human rights and democratization
domestically. However, considering that the ASEAN countries had built neighborly
friendships up to that point by ensuring each other’s stance to respect sovereignty,
interfering with the human rights and democratization problems of other member
countries was an important challenge to the greatest success achieved by the ASEAN. In
that sense, it is understandable that Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas condemned Sur-
in’s proposal at the Foreign Ministers Meeting in 1998 by stating ‘We will return to the
situation before AEAN was born, with a lot of suspicion, a lot of tension.’ (Far Eastern Eco-
nomic Review, August 6 1998, p.24).
Since ‘flexible engagement’ had a characteristic of squarely challenging the principle
of non-interference and consensus decision-making themselves, many remarks were
made to reaffirm the norms in opposition from 1997 to 1999. For example, it was stated
‘The Foreign Ministers stressed ASEAN’s commitment to the principle of non interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of other countries’ at the Joint Comminuque The 30th AMM
in 1997. And in his closing statement at the 31st AMM in 1998, Foreign Minister Jayaku-
mar of Singapore stated that ‘We are now clearly of one mind, resolute and united. The
basic principles of non-intervention and decision-making by consensus would remain
the cornerstones of ASEAN.’4
Furthermore, in the same context, the proposal by Thailand attracted much condem-
nation, ‘that is against the ASEAN Way,’ from other member countries. In addition, many
remarks reaffirming the basic principles of the ASEAN were made. For instance, at the
31st annual AMM held in July 1998, Jayakumar said, ‘never forget the success of the
ASEAN way of consultation and consensus building’ and ‘the fundamental principles
308 T. YUKAWA

will be conserved, when meeting future challenges.’5 Furthermore, at the ASEAN Sum-
mit in December 1998, Prime Minister Than Shwe of Myanmar said
The ASEAN way of seeking consensus continues to be valid today as it has strengthened the rela-
tions of the members for more than three decades. By pursuing quiet diplomacy enhanced posi-
tive interaction, we shall surely be able to overcome the pessimists and build an ASEAN worthy of
taking its rightful place in the international community.6

Thus, the proposals by Thailand and the Philippines were rejected using the rhetoric of
‘ASEAN Way’ just as they were when Myanmar’s accession had become an issue.
Therefore, in conclusion, foreign diplomats began referring to the ‘ASEAN Way’ fre-
quently in the late 1990s because, at the time, some member countries attempted to
change the traditional norms of the organization, such as non-interference and consen-
sus decision-making. In other words, the concept of ASEAN Way emerged as a defensive
rhetoric because a force that upheld human rights and democracy appeared and chal-
lenged the traditional way, rather than the norms converged over many years of interac-
tion, and resulted in the concept of ASEAN way as described by constructivists. The
‘ASEAN Way’ was not a symbol of the unity that leads to collective identity, as argued by
constructivists; instead, it was a symbol of controversy. The most important background
of those controversies can be found in the differences in degree of democratization
within the region. The early democratization of the Philippines and Thailand sparked
the dispute regarding the norms of respect for sovereignty within ASEAN, thus prompt-
ing a need for that concept within the ASEAN Way.

Becoming a symbol of change for the ASEAN

How did the term ‘ASEAN Way’ come to be used after the controversy in the late 1990s?
In terms of frequency, the usage has not increased in the discourses of the parties
involved, albeit it has not disappeared, after it increased drastically in the late 1990s.
Nowadays, the structure in which the conservative ASEAN countries use the rhetoric of
‘ASEAN Way’ to defend themselves against the forces that challenge the ASEAN’s basic
principles of non-interference and consensus decision-making is also observed less fre-
quently. In that sense, the circumstances surrounding the concept of ASEAN Way are dif-
ferent from the ones that existed in the late 1990s.
Two points can be noted as the reasons. First, the ASEAN itself began upholding
human rights and democracy. Whereas the principle of non-interference and the ASEAN
Way were advocated to oppose them in the 1990s, the need to emphasize the ASEAN
Way decreased in the later period because the ASEAN itself began to uphold them.
The ASEAN countries adopted the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II at the 9th Summit
in December 2003 to realize the ASEAN Community. On this occasion, it said ‘at peace
with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious envi-
ronment,’ and the term ‘democratic’ was used probably for the first time in an official
ASEAN document. Although this was the only part of the document that mentioned
democracy, this one word triggered a fierce dispute among the member countries. The
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Cambodia insisted on keeping the word
‘democratic,’ whereas Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar opposed the word’s use (Emmerson,
2005, p. 179). It is interesting how Indonesia and Malaysia, who insisted on adhering to
the principle of non-interference during the ‘flexible engagement’ dispute, changed
their stands. Today, the picture is changing, with new members arguing for reinstating
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 309

the traditional way of the ASEAN and the original members advocating the organization
to grow out of it. One of the major reasons was the democratization of Indonesia in
1998, following which Indonesia became the most aggressive advocate of democracy
and human rights in the ASEAN. Furthermore, democracy was included in the Vientiane
Action Programme intended to realize the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II adopted in
the following year and the ASEAN Charter signed in December 2007. Thus, democracy
was upheld by the ASEAN as an important value.
Similarly, the ASEAN is beginning to include human rights as a norm, and the estab-
lishment of the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) is
noted as a significant change. In other words, the ASEAN has reached the point where it
not only upholds the term ‘human rights’ but also installed a regional human rights
institute.7 While there was an intense confrontation among the member countries at
the time of establishing the AICHR, the picture was the same as described above: the
original members versus new members. However, questioning the democracy and
human rights of member countries should have inherently collided with the principle of
non-interference (Koh et al., 2009). In that sense, the circumstances surrounding the
norm of respecting sovereignty within the ASEAN are changing.
The second underlying factor was that the ASEAN became serious about functional
cooperation, including economic integration, and began striving to become more effi-
cient. The institutional management based on the principle of non-interference and
consensus decision-making was very reasonable during the time when the main aim of
the ASEAN was national security and it was functioning as a forum for building confi-
dence. However, that is not necessarily appropriate once they are at the phase of func-
tional cooperation of planning a specific project, obtaining consensus, and
implementing it completely.
The main functions of the ASEAN had been building trust among the member coun-
tries until the mid-1970s and lobbying for an extraterritorial dispute called the Cambo-
dian conflict in the 1980s. It was after the ASEAN Free Trade Area initiative was
launched in 1992 that the ASEAN undertook the full-scale implementation of economic
cooperation. This economic cooperation was strengthened after the 1997 Asian financial
crisis, and the ASEAN Economic Community was proposed in the 2003 ASEAN Commu-
nity Initiative for the organization to continue advancing economic integration within
the region. However, since the ASEAN had only implemented approximately 30% of all
the agreed on items at the time of formulation of the ASEAN Charter (Narine, 2009, p.
376), it was necessary to make the ASEAN a more efficient organization in order to pro-
mote functional cooperation. This is why they have implemented reforms such as
expanding the authority of the ASEAN Secretariat and introducing a dispute resolution
mechanism in the economic area after the 1990s.
In such a context, consensus decision-making has also been regarded as a problem.
In the AMM in 1992, Foreign Minister Arsa Sarasin of Thailand stated ‘It is very difficult
indeed to achieve such a consensus and it comes to concrete effective cooperation, it is
almost impossible.’ (Far Eastern Economic Review, June 20 1991, pp. 24–25). As a counter-
measure, they gradually introduced the ASEAN minus X formula, which is a system that
ensures flexibility so that each country can initiate implementation as it becomes ready
to agree, rather than sticking to the consensus methods. On the other hand, although it
was eventually rejected in the process of formulating the Charter, the introduction of
majority voting system and sanctions against nonperformance were also discussed
(Economist, August 4 2007). In this manner, as economic integration is becoming the
310 T. YUKAWA

core of ASEAN cooperation and functional cooperation is becoming increasingly impor-

tant, consensus decision-making and the principle of non-interference are also gradually
being questioned. Therefore, the cases where the concept of ‘ASEAN Way’ is used for
defending consensus methods should have decreased, as well.
Instances where the non-interference principle and consensus become obstacles in
functional cooperation are not limited to the case of economic integration. Sometimes,
it becomes an issue in other cases, such as countermeasures for terrorism, cracking
down illegal drugs, and cross-border issues like disaster countermeasures, when they
are addressed regionally because it is not possible to implement effective measures on
cross-border issues while strictly respecting each country’s sovereignty (Loh, 2015;
Martel, 2017). In 2002, Tan Sri Razali Ismail, United Nations special envoy for Myanmar,
said the country (Malaysia) has to accept that the ASEAN way was not designed to
address international terrorism, which is currently the biggest threat to the region.
(New Straits Times, April 6 2002). Further, the chairman’s statement at the 15th ARF in
July 2008 was as follows:
While acknowledging the importance of the basic principles of decision-making by consensus
and non-interference, the Ministers agreed that the ARF should undertake more concrete cooper-
ation to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges confronting the region.

The fact that it specifically mentioned non-interference and consensus indicates that
ASEAN members themselves are conscious that responding to non-traditional security
threats can conflict with the traditional norms.
Needless to say, the non-interference principle and consensus, which are clearly
stated in the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II and ASEAN Charter, have not completely
lost their position as the basic principles of the ASEAN. However, it is certain that they
are upset by two underlying factors: (1) the ASEAN itself upholds human rights and
democracy, and (2) functionalism cooperation is increasingly becoming important
within the ASEAN. For example, Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad
Badawi stated ‘ASEAN’s fundamental policy of non-interference should be redefined or
updated for it to be relevant and responsive to the changing needs of its members.’
(BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, August 9 2006) in 2006 when the formulation of the ASEAN
Charter was underway. Moreover, in 2008, Fidel V. Ramos, former president of the Philip-
pines, also said
Based originally on consultation and consensus, ASEAN must empower itself somehow to enforce
its laws, agreements, policies, and programs’ and ‘decision-making by consensus has been –
unavoidably – decision-making by the ‘least common denominator’ of agreement among the
contracting states. (Thai News Service, March 13 2008).

Such remarks have often been made in the ASEAN after 2000.
This adds to a new side of the discourse on the ASEAN Way. In other words, people
are beginning to use the term ‘ASEAN Way’ as a symbol of something to change from or
grow out of, or as a symbol of an unchanged ASEAN. In simple terms, in addition to the
positive usage of the term in the past, negative usages have appeared.
The Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter showed it clearly.
Established in the preliminary stage of formulation of the Charter, the Eminent Persons
Group consists of 10 experts from the member countries. In this report, it is stated
to accelerate regional integration, ASEAN would need to improve on the ‘ASEAN Way’, although it
has worked well in the past. Recent events such as the Asian Financial Crisis, the SARS epidemic
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 311

and the Asian tsunami disaster of 2004 remind ASEAN Member States that their well-being and
future are now more intertwined. This will require ASEAN Member States to calibrate their tradi-
tional approach of noninterference in areas where the common interest dictates closer coopera-
tion. More effective decision-making processes are also necessary to deal with less sensitive
issues as well as to respond to urgent crises.

While the group does not represent the government of each ASEAN country, it is an
interesting example of the ‘ASEAN Way’ being used in an important document as a sym-
bol of something to overcome.
In 2006, Ali Alatas, former Foreign Minister of Indonesia, said at a seminar in Jakarta
‘We can no longer take decisions using the ASEAN way, which is very slow, consensual
and flexible. ‘Now all decisions must be taken in accordance with strict rules.’ (Straits
Times, April 18 2006). And in 2009, S. Pushpanathan, Deputy Secretary-General of the
ASEAN, said ‘ASEAN Way alone will not be sufficient to bring ASEAN to its next level of
integration.’8 In 2014, H. E. Le Luong Minh, Secretary-General of the ASEAN, said in a
speech,
Another area that may see change will be ASEAN’s own institutional processes. While continuing
the ASEAN Way, the existing pattern of integration, which is incremental, informal and consen-
sual, which have served ASEAN well, as ASEAN will become more integrated and moving closer
to a rules-based Community; we expect in due course a review of ASEAN’s decision-making pro-
cesses and its organs.10

Furthermore, in 2015, Datuk Seri Nazir Razak, CIMB Group chairman, Malaysia, stated
that the region has to get over the basic conflict of choosing between the ‘ASEAN way’
and the reality of economic integration. And he said
That is the ASEAN way, which is the consensus. As a result, they are struggling with the conflict of
the ASEAN way and the reality of economic integration. The ASEAN way sovereignty is where eco-
nomic integration is concerned, you ultimately have to give way to external decisions. (New Straits
Times, April 25 2015)

This usage of the ‘ASEAN Way’ as a symbol of something to be reformed is also a charac-
teristic of the ASEAN in recent years. Of course, there are still many cases where the term
is used positively.9 The fact that the ‘ASEAN Way’ has been used both positively and
negatively suggests that there are diverse attitudes regarding the norm to respect sov-
ereignty, like consensus decision-making and non-interference, and there are conflicts
among the ASEAN member countries.

Conclusion
In this paper, I have attempted something completely new by systematically analyzing
how ASEAN diplomats have used the term ‘ASEAN Way.’ The use of this term can be bro-
ken down into approximately three periods: (1) the time when consensus and the princi-
ple of non-interference were not considered the ASEAN Way; (2) the time when they
came to be expressed as the ASEAN Way; and (3) the time when the term came to be
used as a symbol of the traditional, inefficient way that should be reformed.
Conversely, it can be said that the usage of the term ‘ASEAN Way’ and its changes
illustrate well the change in the ASEAN countries’ attitude toward the norms.
Two trends can be pointed out, which provide a background to the dynamics sur-
rounding the ASEAN Way as a symbol. One is the emergence of countries within ASEAN
member states that have begun to advocate strongly for human rights and democracy.
312 T. YUKAWA

The other is the fact that ASEAN itself has begun to raise the subject of human rights
and democracy. Thus, their traditional way of deferring to the absolute sovereignty of
the member nations is now being challenged. The other factor within ASEAN is that
functional cooperation on economic projects has developed since the ‘90s. While ASEAN
functioned as an arena for the foreign ministers and its head of states to foster trust
among each other, there were no issues with the traditional methods. However, once
they reach the stage of planning and implementing concrete projects, the consensus
decision-making methods and the principle of non-interference and informality become
more challenging. Previously, under the traditional rules, the various parties would
adapt/defer to the most conservative nation’s standards, and even during execution of
a joint plan, ASEAN lacked the will or the ability to monitor one another or to apply suffi-
cient corrective sanctions. Thus its executive offices remained small and it was difficult
to carry projects forward. The principle of non-interference in internal affairs makes it
difficult to deal smoothly with conflicting issues that cross borders. Among the dynam-
ics surrounding these norms, this paper particularly emphasizes the discrepancy in the
viewpoint of constructivists regarding the aforementioned second period.
The ‘ASEAN Way’ emerged not because the member countries fostered an awareness
of the norm as a result of many years of interaction but because a force that tried to
change the traditional norm appeared among them. Therefore, the ‘ASEAN Way’ is a
symbol of controversy, and countries did not foster a collective identity under this way.
Nonetheless, this paper is not intended to discuss the superiority of any ‘-ism’ by say-
ing that ‘realism, not constructivism, is correct.’ I stress that demonstration and verifica-
tion are important when examining norms like the ASEAN Way and the identity derived
from them and note that when doing so an analysis of the discourses of the parties
involved is useful.

Notes
1. Refer to Kusuma (1995) for a study on how the term began appearing and Acharya (1997) for a dis-
cussion on how the term was popularized. As a note, although Solidum had used the term ‘ASEAN
way’ in 1981, which is exceptionally early, it should be regarded as a kind of outlier since it has noth-
ing to do with the trend of the ‘ASEAN way’ depicted in ASEAN research after 1995 (Solidum, 1981).
2. Keynote address by the honorable Dato’ Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamed The Prime Minister of Malaysia;
retrieved May 15, 2007, from http://asean.org/?static_post=keynote-address-by-the-honourable-
dato-seri-dr-mahathir-mohamed-the-prime-minister-of-malaysia.
3. Opening statement of H. E. Dato’ Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi Minister of Foreign Affairs of Malay-
sia at 31st AMM, Manila, July 24 1998; retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://asean.org/?static_post=op
ening-statement-of-he-dato-seri-abdullah-ahmad-badawi-minister-of-foreign-affairs-of-malaysia-at-
31st-asean-ministerial-meeting-manila-24-july-1998.
4. Closing statement of H. E. Prof. S. Jayakumar, Minister For Foreign Affairs, at the 31st AMM, Manila,
July 25 1998; retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://asean.org/?static_post=closing-statement-of-he-
prof-s-jayakumar-minister-for-foreign-affairs-at-the-thirty-first-asean-ministerial-meeting-manila-25-
july-1998.
5. Closing statement of H. E. Prof. S Jayakumar, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at the 31st AMM, Manila,
July 25 1998; retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://asean.org/?static_post=closing-statement-of-he-
prof-s-jayakumar-minister-for-foreign-affairs-at-the-thirty-first-asean-ministerial-meeting-manila-25-
july-1998.
6. Opening remark by H. E. Senior General Than Shwe, Prime Minister of Myanmar at the Sixth ASEAN
Summit Hanoi, December 15 1998; retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://asean.org/?static_post=open
ing-remark-by-hesenior-general-than-shwe-prime-minister-of-myanmar-at-the-sixth-asean-summit-
hanoi-15-december-1998.
 THE PACIFIC REVIEW 313

7. The AICHR was expected to bolster the ASEAN regional institution’s legitimacy, rather than to actu-
ally improve the human-rights situations in each member state (Katsumata, 2009).
8. Speech by Mr S. Pushpanathan, Deputy Secretary-General of ASEAN at the National Resilience Insti-
tute of Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, May 20 2009; retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://asean.org/
wp-content/uploads/images/archive/Speech-DSG-AEC-SP-NationalResilienceInstitute.pdf.
9. When it comes to bilateral cooperation with extraterritorial actors, such as the United States and EU,
and in a broader framework such as with ARF, typically the member nations emphasize the positive
aspects of the ASEAN Way. In that sense, it can be said that the ASEAN Way shows a slightly differ-
ent tendency toward those they deal with on the outside than toward those within the region.
10. Speech by H. E. Le Luong Minh, Secretary-General of ASEAN at the Nikkei – 20th International Con-
ference on the Future of Asia, 23 May 2014, Tokyo; retrieved May 15, 2017, from http://www.asean.
org/wp-content/uploads/images/resources/Speech/SG/2014/23%20May%202014_Speech_%20
Nikkei%20%2020th%20International%20Conference%20on%20the%20Future%20of%20Asia_
ASEAN%20in%20the%20Next%2020%20Years.pdf.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This work was supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [grant number 16K17069].

Notes on contributor
Taku Yukawa is an associate professor of Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University,
Osaka, Japan.

References
Acharya, A. (2000). The quest for identity: International relations of Southeast Asia. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
Acharya, A. (2001). Constructing a security community: ASEAN and the problem of regional order. London:
Routledge.
Acharya, A., & Stubbs, R. (2006). Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations: An introduction. The Pacific Review,
19(2), 125–134.
ASEAN Secretariat. (Ed.). (1987). Statements by the ASEAN foreign ministers at ASEAN Ministerial Meetings;
1967-1987. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.
ASEAN Secretariat. (Ed.). (1995). 28th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, post-ministerial conferences with the dia-
logue partners, and ASEAN Regional Forum. Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat.
Ba, A. D. (2009). (Re)negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, regionalism, and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Busse, N. (1999). Constructivism and Southeast Asian security. The Pacific Review, 12(1), 39–60.
Caballero-Anthony, M. (2005). Regional security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way. Singapore:
ISEAS.
Emmerson, D. K. (2005). Security, community, and democracy in Southeast Asia: Analyzing ASEAN. Japa-
nese Journal of Political Science, 6(2), 165–185.
Ganesan, N. (1995). Testing neoliberal institutionalism in Southeast Asia. International Journal: Canada’s
Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 50(4), 779–804.
Haacke, J. (1999). The concept of flexible engagement and the practice of enhanced interaction: Intramu-
ral challenges to the “ASEAN Way ”. The Pacific Review, 12(4), 581–611.
Haacke, J. (2003). ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture: Origins, development and prospects. London:
Routledge-Curzon.
314 T. YUKAWA

Huxley, T. (1996). Southeast Asia in the study of international relations: The rise and decline of a region.
The Pacific Review, 9(2), 199–228.
Jepperson, R. L., Wendt, A., & Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). Norms, identity, and culture in national security. In
P. J. Katzenstein (Ed.), The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. New York,
NY: Columbia University Press, 33-75.
Jones, L. (2010). ASEAN’s unchanged melody: The theory and practice of “non-interference” in Southeast
Asia. The Pacific Review, 23(4), 479–502.
Jones, D. M., & Smith, M. L. R. (2002). ASEAN’s imitation community. Orbis, 46(1), 93–109.
Katsumata, H. (2009). ASEAN and human rights: Resisting Western pressure or emulating the West. The
Pacific Review, 22(5), 619–637.
Khoo, N. (2004). Deconstructing the ASEAN security community: A review essay. International Relations of
the Asia-Pacific, 4(1), 35–46.
Kivimaki, T. (2001). The long peace of ASEAN. Journal of Peace Research, 38(1), 5–25.
Kivimaki, T. (2012). Southeast Asia and conflict prevention. The Pacific Review, 25(4), 403–427.
Koh, T., Manalo, R. G., & Woon, W. (Eds.). (2009). The making of the ASEAN Charter. Singapore: World
Scientific.
Kusuma, S. (1995). ASEAN’s security cooperation: Searching for a regional order. The Pacific Review, 8(3),
518–530.
Leifer, M. (1989). ASEAN and the security of South-East Asia. London: Routledge.
Leifer, M. (1996). The ASEAN regional forum: Extending ASEAN’s model of regional security. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Loh, D. M. H. (2015). ASEAN’s norm adherence and its unintended consequences in HADR and SARS oper-
ations. The Pacific Review, 29(4), 549–572.
Martel, S. (2017). From ambiguity to contestation: Discourse(s) on non-traditional security in the ASEAN
community. The Pacific Review, 30(4), 549–565.
Mauzy, D. K. (1997). Human value and “Asian Values” debate in Southeast Asia: Trying to clarify the key
issues ”. The Pacific Review, 10(2), 12–36.
Narine, S. (2002). Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Narine, S. (2004). State sovereignty, political legitimacy, and regional institutionalism in the Asia-Pacific.
The Pacific Review, 17(3), 423–450.
Narine, S. (2009). ASEAN in the twenty-first century: A sceptical view. Cambridge Journal of International
Affairs, 22(3), 369–386.
Roberts, C. B. (2012). ASEAN regionalism: Cooperation, values, and institutionalization. London: Routledge.
Solidum, E. D. (1981). The role of certain sectors in shaping and articulating the ASEAN way. In R. P. Anand
& P. Quisumbing (Eds.), ASEAN: Identity, development and culture. Quezon City: University of Philip-
pines Law Centre and East West Center Culture Learning Institute, 130–145.
Wendt, A. (1994). Collective identity formation and the international state. American Political Science
Review, 88(2), 384–396.
Yukawa, T. (2011). ‘Transformation of ASEAN’s image in the 1980s: The Cambodian conflict and the eco-
nomic development of ASEAN member countries”. Southeast Asian Studies, 49(2), 240–267.