For 2022 Bar RCO 2012-0012

LAST MINUTE TIPS IN CRIMINAL LAW

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Territoriality principle

For purpose of venue under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and territoriality principle in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the place of commission of the criminal act and the place of
occurrence of the effect of such act, which is an element of the offense , shall be considered. If one pulled the trigger of his gun in Quezon City and hit the victim in City of Manila, who died as a
consequence, Quezon City and City of Manila, which are the places of commission of the criminal act and the occurrence of the criminal effect, are proper venues. If the psychological violence
consisting of marital infidelity punishable under RA No. 9262 is committed in Singapore but the psychological effect occurred in the Philippines since the wife of the respondent, who suffered
mental anguish, is residing in the Philippines, our court can assume jurisdiction. (AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018)

However, if the commission of the criminal act consummates the crime and the effect thereof is not an element thereof, the place of occurrence of the effect shall not be considered for purpose of
venue and territoriality rule. Bigamy committed in Singapore is beyond the jurisdiction of our court although the offended spouse is residing in the Philippines since the psychological effect of
bigamy to her is not an element thereof.

Transitory crimes

Continued crime Continuing crime

(delito continuado)
Concept
Single crime produced by several acts performed separately during a period of time under a A crime which is consummated in one place but by reason of the nature of the offense, the
single criminal intent in violation of a single penal provision violation of the law is deemed continuing
Purpose
To treat several criminal acts committed under a single criminal impulse in violation of a single To determine the proper venue, validity of arrest and the commencement of the running of
penal provision as one crime prescription

RA 9262
- Continued crime principle is not applicable to violation against women under Section 5(i) of RA 9262 (or sexual abuse under RA 7610, rape and acts of lasciviousness under RPC). Thus,
psychological violence committed by the husband against the wife on two different occasions constitutes two counts of violence against women under RA 9262. (Dinamling v. People,
2015, J. Peralta; Bar 2015)
 AAA v. BBB, 2018
 What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or
continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case ; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
 It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3 (a),
Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a

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material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the
RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
- The act of denying support to a child (economic abuse under Section 5[e] of RA 9262) is a continuing offense. (Melgar v. People, 2018)

Continuing crimes:
a. Kidnapping with homicide (Bar 1947)
b. Rebellion (Umil v. Ramos, 1991, En Banc)
c. Violation of RA 9262 (AAA v. BBB, 2018; Melgar v. People, 2018)
d. Violation of BP 22 (Morillo v. People, 2015; Brodeth v. People, 2017)

Requisites of delito continuado:

1. Plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time
2. Unity of criminal intent and purpose
3. Unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated

Single larceny rule

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny (Santiago v. Garchitorena, 1993, En Banc)

Applying the concept of delito continuado, the following are treated as constituting only one offense:
a. The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same place and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 1939)
b. The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 1974)
c. The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 1926)
d. The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said
benefits. (People v. Sabbun, 1964) The collections of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made
under the same criminal impulse. (People v. Lawas, 1955)

On other hand, the concept of delito continuado were not applied to the following cases:
a. Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956. (People v. Dichupa, 1961) The said acts
were committed on two different occasions.
b. Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal the said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications
were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify (People v. Cid, 1938)
c. Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the
installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 1976)
d. 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 1975)

Several acts on single occasion

Petron Corp. v. Yao, 2021, C.J. Peralta

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 The crime of unfair competition is a continuing crime and cannot be considered as delito continuado. For a crime to be considered as delito continuado (continued or continuous crime),
there must be plurality of acts committed by the actor against different parties on the same occasion with the same criminal intent or purpose of violating the same penal provision. A delito
continuado is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.
 Here, respondents did not commit on the same occasion several acts of passing off their gas tanks as that of Petron or other parties. Rather, respondents only continued or repeated the
alleged singular crime committed in Cavite and all the way up to Makati. Hence, unfair competition does not fall under the criterion of a delito continuado. And there are also no two
separate crimes of unfair competition allegedly committed by respondents.

Single criminal impulse

1. To commit robbery: Several acts, which are performed separately during a period of time under a single criminal intent in violation of penal provision, constitute a continued crime. Thus,
several acts of taking away by force the money and valuables of the employees working in Energex gasoline station committed under a single criminal intent to commit robbery in that
place in violation of a single penal provision constitute a continued crime of robbery. (People v. De Leon, 2009, J. Peralta; People v. Dela Cruz, 1950; Bar 1996)
2. To satisfy lust:
a) Penis was inserted thrice for the purpose of changing position constitutes a continued crime of rape (People v. Aaron, 2002)
b) Penis was inserted thrice for the purpose of resting for 5 minutes; hence, satisfying lust every time of rest constitutes three separate crimes of rape because the three penetrations
were motivated by three separate intents to satisfy lust (People v. Lucena, 2014)

Santiago v. Garchitorena, 1993, En Banc

 We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against her.
 The original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an
undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the
allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was
legalized. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the
approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

Navaja v. De Castro, 2017

 In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated September 22, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 before
the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing; and (b) an Information dated August 27, 2004 charging him
of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit. While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in
different locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated
by a single criminal impulse — that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-
Bohol. The foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution.
 Petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly
motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238.
Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms.
Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same
case.
 However, since he was already charged — and in fact, convicted in a Judgment dated July 3, 2007 — in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events
that transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design. In order that delito continuado may exist, there should be plurality of acts

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performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the
same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be
dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.

Ambagan, Jr. v. People, 2018

 The two (2) Informations charging the petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 are strikingly identical except with respect to the name of the property owner, TCT No.,
affected area, and its value. The place, time, and manner of the commission of the offense are the same. The petitioner in the performance of the alleged criminal act is impelled by a
singular purpose — the realization of the Balite Falls development project. Consequently, the acts alleged in the two (2) Informations constitute only one offense which should have been
consolidated in one Information.
 This does not mean however that both cases must be dismissed as petitioner suggests. Considering that there is but one offense, there is no place for the issue of double jeopardy to arise in
the first place. The only implication of this pronouncement would be that the accused should, if found guilty, be meted with penalty for a single offense.

Different criminal impulses to defraud

1. Single victim on different occasions: There is no unity of criminal intent or purpose because while both offenses committed by accused consisted of conversion of sums of money
belonging to the offended party, they took place on different dates and under different circumstances. Thus, each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence
and criminal intent of its own. Hence, this is not a continuous crime of estafa through misappropriation. (People v. Ledesma, 1976; Bar 1976)
2. Different victims on the same scheme: The syndicated estafa charged in one case is different from the syndicated estafa charged in the other cases. While these cases arose out of the same
scheme, the fraudulent acts charged were committed against different persons; hence, they do not constitute the same offense. This is not delito continuado because the accused have
criminal intents to defraud as many as there are victims defrauded. (People v. Balasa, 1998; Bar 1976 and 2009)

Ilagan v. CA, 1994

 The series of acts committed against the seven lot buyers was not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer on different
dates and in separate places, hence they originated from separate criminal intents and consequently resulted in separate felonies. Moreover, after the commission of one estafa, the accused
could not have had the foreknowledge as to when or whether they could replicate the same felony against another victim still necessarily unknown.

Principle of delito continuado does not apply in malum prohibitum because malice or criminal intent is immaterial
a. Violation of BP 22 is malum prohibitum. Thus, the drawer for issuing several bouncing checks is liable for violations of BP 22 as many as there are checks issued. (Lim v. People, 2001;
Bar 2009)
 HOWEVER, violation of BP 22 is a transitory crime or continuing crime (as distinguished from continued crime). A criminal complaint for violation of BP 22 may be filed and
tried either at the place where the check was issued, drawn, delivered, or deposited. (Morillo v. People, 2015; Brodeth v. People, 2017)
b. Corruption under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 partakes the nature of malum prohibited. Yet, this crime must be committed with criminal intent since evidence bad faith or manifest partiality is
an element thereof. Thus, doctrine of delito continuado does not apply because criminal intent is material in this crime. (Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 1993, En Banc)

Rules on vessels:
I. FOR MERCHANT VESSELS:
A. If foreign vessel is in Philippine territorial water, apply any of the following: (TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE)
a. French rule (old rule)
 GENERAL RULE: Foreign jurisdiction (flag state)
 EXCEPTION: Local jurisdiction if the commission of the crime affects the peace and security of the country
b. English rule (old rule)

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 GENERAL RULE: Local jurisdiction

 EXCEPTION: Foreign jurisdiction (flag state) if the commission of the crime does not affect the peace and security of the country, or has no pernicious effect
therein
c. UNCLOS (new rule)
 GENERAL RULE: Foreign jurisdiction (flag state)
 EXCEPTION: Local jurisdiction in the following cases
a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the Philippines
b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the Philippines or the good order of the territorial sea
c) If the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the master of the ship or by a diplomatic agent or consular officer of the flag state
d) If such measures are necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotics drugs or psychotropic substances (Sec. 2, UNCLOS)
B. If local vessel is in foreign territory, apply the Flag State rule (EXTRA-TERRITORIALITY PRINCIPLE)
 The provisions of the RPC shall be enforced against those who should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship (or airship) (Art. 2[1])
II. FOR WARSHIPS:
- Warships are always reputed to be the territory of the country to which they belong and cannot be subjected to the laws of another state (Reyes citing US v. Fowler)

TRUE OR FALSE:

The territoriality rule applies to a crime committed by a Filipino in the Spratly’s Island.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

False. According to Judge Campanilla, the Philippines has no jurisdiction because the ownership of the Island is still being disputed by several states including the Philippines. For former Chief
Justice Panganiban, even if the Philippines won in the arbitral award before the Arbitral Tribunal against China, the award did not settle the issue of Chinese occupation and sovereignty over these
islands or features. In fact, the arbitral tribunal had no jurisdiction to award title or sovereignty over land territory.

Criminal jurisdiction of Philippine courts over violations of the Philippine fisheries code committed in the maritime zones
In Abogado v. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (G.R. No. 246209, September 3, 2019, En Banc, J. Leonen), petitioners sought the issuance of writs of kalikasan and continuing
mandamus under A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC, or the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases, over Panatag Shoal (Scarborough Shoal), Panganiban Reef (Mischief Reef), and Ayungin Shoal (Second
Thomas Shoal), located within the Philippines' exclusive economic zone. They relied on the Permanent Court of Arbitration's findings in its July 12, 2016 Arbitral Award that Chinese fisherfolk and
China's construction of artificial lands have caused severe environmental damage to the marine environment of these areas. Petitioners alleged that their constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology was being threatened and was being violated due to the omissions, failure, and/or refusal of Respondents to enforce Philippine laws in Panatag Shoal, Ayungin Shoal, and
Panganiban Reef. Specifically, petitioners wanted to enjoin respondents-government agencies to comply with their duties to protect and preserve the marine environment, as allegedly provided
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 8550, or the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998, as amended.

However, as we all know by now, the petition was unfortunately dismissed due to procedural defects. Nevertheless, the case is a rich source of potential Bar questions. In this article, we will delve
into the possible criminal liabilities of Chinese vessels that violate the provisions of the Philippine Fisheries Code.

In International Law, the United the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) recognizes the following treaty-based rights of States parties: the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and continental shelf (Article 77). (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011, En Banc, J. Carpio) Additionally, the coastal

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State enjoys the right of exploitation of oil deposits and other resources in the continental shelf. (Nachura & Gatdula, 2017, citing the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 ICJ Reports) Since
the area beyond the territorial sea is not part of the territory of the State, the coastal State may only exercise limited jurisdiction over the contiguous zone, and sovereign rights (this term is different
from “sovereignty”) over the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. This is the reason why it is only in territorial sea that States parties have sovereignty.

As earlier discussed, the petition in the Abogado case involved the enforcement of the Philippine Fisheries Code in the Philippines' exclusive economic zone (EEZ). By express provision of the
Code, the law shall be enforced in all Philippine waters including other waters over which the Philippines has sovereignty and jurisdiction, and the country’s 200-nautical mile Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ) and continental shelf. (Sec. 3[a]) In other words, the Philippine Fisheries Code encompasses not only the internal waters and the territorial sea but also the contiguous zone,
the EEZ, and the continental shelf, even though the Philippines have no sovereignty over the last three.

Does the Philippines have criminal jurisdiction over the Chinese vessels that allegedly violate the Philippine Fisheries Code?

With regard to the 12-mile territorial sea, the rules on criminal jurisdiction would depend on the nature of the ship involved. In case of commercial ships, the English Rule, the French Rule, and the
Rule on UNCLOS III are observed. In the Philippines, the English Rule is followed. (Nachura & Gatdula, 2017) It is the view, however, of a criminal law expert that the English Rule is the old
rule. Since the Philippines is a signatory to the UNCLOS III, it must be considered in determining the jurisdiction over crime committed aboard a foreign ship within the territorial water of the
Philippines. (Campanilla, 2017) There is no doubt, therefore, that the Philippines may institute a criminal case for violation of the Philippine Fisheries Code in the exercise of its sovereignty over its
territorial sea.

With regard to the 24-mile contiguous zone and the 200-mile EEZ, the coastal State may still prosecute violations of the Philippine Fisheries Code committed in these maritime zones in the exercise
of the coastal State’s limited jurisdiction and sovereign rights. This has been the basis of the legislature in expressly including among the coverage of the Philippine Fisheries Code the contiguous
zone, the EEZ, and the continental shelf.

Note, however, that the above rules apply only to foreign merchant vessels.

In case of foreign warships that committed violations of Philippine penal laws, its alien military crew are exempted from criminal liability pursuant to the rule of State immunity because they
were performing official military duties which is an exercise of sovereign and governmental acts (jure imperii) – as distinguished from jure gestionis similar to the criminal case of Joseph Scott
Pemberton. In the case of Arigo v. Swift (G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014, En Banc), alien respondents, who were commanding officers of the US Navy, were accused of violating R.A. No.
10067, or the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park Act of 2009, following the grounding of the US Navy ship, the USS Guardian, on the Tubbataha Reefs in Palawan. The petitioners in that case prayed,
among others, that the Supreme Court would direct the appropriate Philippine Government agencies to commence administrative, civil, and criminal proceedings against erring officers and
individuals to the full extent of the law, and to make such proceedings public. But, the Philippine Supreme Court ruled that the respondents, as commanding officers of the US Navy, are exempted
from criminal liability based on the doctrine of immunity from suit.

Based on these rules, it is now clear that only merchant vessels are covered by the penal provisions of the Philippine Fisheries Code because warships are exempted from criminal jurisdiction of the
Philippines, even though committed in any of the maritime zones. Of course, this does not mean that the foreign government where the warship belongs is exempted from other liabilities. Thus,
based on Article 30 of the UNCLOS III, if a warship or other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State, the latter
may require it the said warship or other government ships operated for non-commercial purposes to leave its territorial sea immediately. Furthermore, according to Article 31, any damage done by
the immune ship in the territory of the coastal State is attributable to the flag State of the erring ship. (Nachura & Gatdula, 2017)

As regards the Chinese vessels that plague the Philippines' EEZ, there may be some avenues to still uphold the sovereign rights of the Philippines other than the usual methods of criminal litigation.
According to Justice Jardeleza, there are a number of ways by which one can attempt to enforce international law obligations. Legal remedies may include (1) filing by affected States of a case with
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or under other modes of dispute settlement provided in any or all of the erring State's treaty obligations (such as in this case, UNCLOS), (2) invocation,

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through diplomatic action or other peaceful means, of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act to a natural or legal person that is a national of that
State (see Art. 1, Part 1, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, 2006), and (3) those provided under human rights mechanisms before regional courts such as the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights and the African Court, among others. (Separate Opinion in Abogado v. DENR, supra.)

Doctrine of mens rea

The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a crime, that ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a
crime, and accordingly, there can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. Mens rea has been defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent, and essential for
criminal liability. A crime cannot be committed if the mind of the one performing the act is innocent and without any criminal intent; That is, bereft of mens rea, which is defined as a guilty mind, a
guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent. A criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights. The criminal statute must also provide for the overt
acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. (Valenzuela v. People, 2007; People v. Moreno, 1998)

General elements of crimes

Every crime has two elements: the act or omission (actus reus) and the mental element which is commonly referred to as criminal intent (mens rea)

Mens rea is the mental element of a crime or the required state of mind for the commission of the crime by the accused. Take not that there is no single state of mind, or mens rea, that will suffice
for purposes of imposing criminal liability. Rather the requisite state of mind is defined separately for each specific crime.

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. (Manuel v. People, 2006)

In crimes by dolo, mens rea will refer to the requirements of freedom, intelligence and intent while doing the act or omitting to do the act

Intent means a state of mind which willingly consents to the act that is done, or free will choice, or volition in the doing of the act; it means that the act is voluntary, and that it proceeds from a mind
free to act.

Types of criminal intent:

a. General criminal intent – consists of the volition doing of a prohibited act. Accordingly, the only state of mind required is an intent to commit the act constituting the crime; the defendant
need not have intended to violate the law, nor need he have been aware that the law made his act criminal.
b. Special criminal intent – certain crimes require, in addition to general intent, an intent to do some further act or cause some additional consequence beyond that which must have been
committed or caused in order to commit the crime. These are so-called “specific intent crimes,” and the additional mens rea required is referred to as a “specific intent.”

Specific criminal intent

Hitting a child without intention to debase his “intrinsic worth and dignity” as a human being is not child abuse (Bongalon v. People, 2013; Abalde v. People, 2016; Escalano v. People, 2018)
 HOWEVER, hitting a child as a result of a willful intention of committing felonious act constitutes child abuse even if the child is an unintended victim (Patulot v. People, 2019, J. Leonen)

Patricio and Pacu were having intense discussion about local politics. The discussion resulted into physical scruples later. In his anger, Patricio threw burning oil from the frying pan
against Pacu. Pacu was able to dodge it. Unfortunately, the burning oil landed on right arm of Alfonso, 9 years old, who was sitting nearby. Alfonso suffered burn injuries, which
necessitated a week-long treatment. Alfonso’s parents filed a criminal case for child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act 7610, against Patricio. Patricio claimed that his target was
not the boy, but Pacu, and as such, he could not be deemed to have intended to violate or demean or degrade his intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, which is an essential
element for child abuse under the law. If ever, his liability towards the boy should only be less serious physical injuries, not child abuse.

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Is Patricio correct? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)

No. If the accused has willful intention of committing a felonious act on another person but the injury falls on the victim who is a minor child, as when he swung his arms to throw burning oil on his
adversary but the burning oil hit a baby instead, he would be criminally liable for child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI, of Republic Act 7610. Physical assault on a child is deemed to be
willful with the necessary criminal intention for child abuse. (Patulot v. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019)

Intent to kill

People v. Aviles, 2007

 Intent to kill is an element of both frustrated and attempted homicide. The extent of the injury may disclose the presence of the intent to kill. In the absence of proof either of intent to kill or
the extent of the injury or the period of incapacity for labor or of the required medical attendance, an accused can only be convicted of slight physical injuries.

IMPORTANT FOR THE BAR !!!

Etino v. People, 2008

 An accused who only fired a single shot at close-range, but did not hit any vital part of the victim’s body – the victim’s wounds, based on his Medical Certificate, were located at the right
deltoid (through and through) and the left shoulder – and immediately fled the scene right after the shooting should be liable for serious physical injuries only. According to the court, these
acts certainly do not suggest that accused had intended to kill the victim; for if he did, he could have fired multiple shots to ensure the latter’s demise.

Mens rea

In crimes by culpa under Article 3, the mental element of the crime (mens rea) refers to the requirements of freedom, intelligence, lack of foresight or skill, and the voluntariness of the act (US v.
Divino, 1908; People v. Carmen, 2001)

People v. Carmen, 2001

 Death as a result of faith healing
 It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual performed over the victim was consented to by the victim's parents. With the permission of the
victim's parents, accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceeded to subject the boy to a "treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's
body. Unfortunately, the strange procedure resulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Their liability arises from their reckless
imprudence because they ought that to know their actions would not bring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder.
 Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage
results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such as homicide or murder, what takes the place of the
element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil is the failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking into account his employment, or occupation, degree
of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place.

Quasi-offenses under Article 365 are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in the commission of a crime (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, 2010)

What is penalized under Article 365 is the mental attitude or condition behind the acts of dangerous recklessness and lack of care or foresight although such mental attitude might have produced
several effects or consequences (Sevilla v. People, 2014)

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The essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law
penalizes, thus, the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the
offense. (People v. Go, 2018)

No criminal liability will arise from involuntary acts nor from lawful acts

Calimutan v. People, 2006

 In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to
another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is unintentional, it being simply the incident of
another act performed without malice. As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. Absent the malicious intent to injure or
kill the victim, the conviction of the accused for the intentional crime of homicide cannot be sustained.

Mistake of fact Mistake of identity

Mistake pertains to the elements of justifying circumstance, exempting circumstance or
absolutory cause
Accused committed the act without dolo (malice) hence, he is not criminally liable, and
because of such mistake, the justifying circumstance, exempting circumstance or absolutory
cause shall be considered in his favor
Mistake pertains to the identity of the victim (error in personae)
Accused acted with dolo (malice) hence, he shall incur criminal liability for killing or injuring
a victim although the victim is different from the intended victim

Requisites for a mistake of fact to be a complete defense:

1. That the acts done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be
2. That the mistake of fact is not due to negligence
3. That mistake is not accompanied with criminal intent

People v. Oanis, 1943

 Mistake of fact principle in relation to performance of duty is not applicable because of negligence
 Accused, believing that the sleeping victim is the notorious criminal to be arrested by them, shot the victim. Accused was held guilty of murder.

Gaviola v. People, 2006

 Mistake of fact negates intent to gain in the crime of theft
 The taker honestly believes the property as his own or that of another, and that he has the right to take possession of it for himself or for another, for the protection of the latter
 Belief of ownership must be honest and in good faith

Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan, 2012, J. Peralta

 Mistake of fact principle is not applicable if there is negligence or bad faith
 Authorities shot the vehicle which did not stop after having been flagged down and killed the occupants, who turned out to be unarmed civilians
 Authorities have the duty to validate the information given to them, identify them, and to make a bloodless arrest unless they were placed in a real mortal danger

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People v. Gervero, 2018

 Mistake of fact applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
 There is no mistake of fact here:
First. There was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because they were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a
light bulb. In addition, the witnesses testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly. It must be borne in mind that it was not the first time that the accused had seen
the victims as, in fact, accused Bañes and Castigador met Hernando just a few hours before the shooting. Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly, the accused
who were all members of the CAFGU would know the residents of that town so as to easily distinguish them from unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA.
Second. When Jose fell down, Hernando identified himself and shouted, "This is Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities of the victims, the accused continued to
fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!").
Third. When the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point, they could no longer claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not contented,
they sprayed them with bullets such that Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds, Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds.
Fourth. Contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the first to fire their weapons, Brgy. Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused
whether the victims had fired at them, the accused answered him in the negative.
Fifth. The accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe word "Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine
whether they were members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe words as accused Gervero himself stated in his testimony that only he and his co-
accused were present when their commanding officer briefed them about the safe words to be used in their operation.

When Aris saw Ben rushing towards him holding a bolo and poised to strike him, he immediately picked up a pointed iron bar and believing that his life was in danger and Ben was close
enough, he made a thrust on Ben hitting him on the stomach which caused the death of Ben thereafter. The truth, however, is that Ben was merely trying to play a joke on Carl who was
then behind Aris. Is Aris criminally liable for the death of Ben? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
Aris is not criminally liable because he acted in self-defense due to mistake of fact. As the facts of the problem state, Aris thrusted the pointed iron bar on Ben, hitting him on the stomach as he
believed that his life was in danger because Ben was close enough when he rushed towards Aris holding a bolo and poised to strike him. Under the circumstances, Aris had no time or opportunity to
verify whether Ben was only playing a joke on Carl who was behind Aris. Hence, his mistake of the fact was without fault or carelessness. Aris had no alternative but to take the facts as they
appeared to him to justify his act. So, Aris acted in good faith without criminal intent.

Error in personae Aberratio ictus Praeter intentionem

Mistake of identity
A person is criminally responsible for committing an
intentional felony although the actual victim is different from
the intended victim due to mistake of identity
There are two persons who are present, the offender and the
actual victim
Mistake of blow
A person is criminally responsible for committing an
intentional felony although the actual victim is different from
the intended victim due to mistake of blow
There are three persons present: the offender, the intended
victim and the actual victim
Unintentional
A person shall incur criminal liability for committing an
intentional felony although its wrongful consequence is graver
than that intended
There are two persons who are present, the offender and the
actual victim

The conduct of the wife, Maria, aroused the ire of her husband, Mark. Incensed with anger almost beyond his control, Mark could not help but inflict physical injuries on Maria.
Moments after Mark started hitting Maria with his fists, Maria suddenly complained of severe chest pains. Mark, realizing that Maria was indeed in serious trouble, immediately
brought her to the hospital. Despite efforts to alleviate Maria's pains, she died of a heart attack. It turned out that she had been suffering from a lingering heart ailment.

What crime, if any, could Mark be held guilty of? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
Mark could be held liable for parricide because his act of hitting his wife with fist blows and therewith inflicting physical injuries on her, is felonious. A person committing a felonious act incurs
criminal liability although the wrongful consequence is different from what he intended. (Article 4, par. 1) Although Maria died of a heart attack, the said attack was generated by Mark's felonious

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act of hitting her with his fists. Such felonious act was the immediate cause of the heart attack, having materially contributed to and hastened Maria's death. Even though Mark may have acted
without intent to kill his wife, lack of such intent is of no moment when the victim dies. However, Mark may be given the mitigating circumstance of having acted without intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed. (Article 13, par. 3)

Error in personae
- If the penalty for the intended crime is different from that of the committed crime, the court shall impose the penalty for the intended crime or crime actually committed, whichever is
lesser, to be applied in its maximum period. (Art. 49) If the crime committed is parricide but the crime intended is homicide, the penalty for the lesser crime of homicide, which is
reclusion temporal, shall be applied in its maximum period. (Bar 1966 & 1983) Note that Article 49 applies only to error in personae.
- However, if the penalty for the intended crime is the same as that of the committed crime, Article 49 will not apply. Thus, if the crime committed is parricide, but the crime intended is
murder, Article 49 is not applicable because both crimes are punished by reclusion perpetua to death. (Bar 1966 & 1983)

Aberratio ictus

Intent to kill
 If the third person died, intent to kill is conclusively presumed hence, the crime is either homicide or murder
 If the third person suffered injuries and there is intent to kill, the crime committed is attempted or frustrated murder
 If the third person suffered injuries and there is no intent to kill, the crime committed is physical injuries

Aberratio ictus Error in personae

Subject to Article 48 (compound crime) Subject to Article 49
Penalty for the most serious crime Penalty for the intended crime or crime actually committed, whichever is lesser, to be applied in
its maximum period

If the crimes committed against the target victim and third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, were produced by a single act, the accused is liable for a complex crime. Thus, single act
of throwing a grenade killing one and injuring another constitutes a complex crime of murder and attempted murder. (People v. Guillen, 1950)

Cruz v. People, 2020

 Considering that the death of Torralba was caused by the same felonious act of shooting at Bernardo, the OSG is correct when it argues that Cruz should be held guilty of homicide as
originally charged. Torralba, an eight-year old boy, was at the wrong place and time during the shooting incident. While Cruz did not intend to end the life of this child, the latter's death is a
crime of homicide in accordance with Article 4 of RPC and prevailing jurisprudence.
 Under Article 4, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. Accordingly, the author
of the felony shall be criminally liable for the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof, whether intended or not. For this provision to apply, it must be shown, however, (1) that an
intentional felony has been committed, and (2) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender.
 The Court finds these elements present in this case. It has already been established that Cruz committed an intentional felony when he fired multiple shots at Bernardo. The death of
Torralba, who was hit by one of those bullets intended for Bernardo, is a direct, natural, and logical consequence of said intentional felony. The death of Torralba is an example of aberratio
ictus.

People v. Bendecio, 2020

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 As for Jonabel's death, what happened to this seven (7)-year-old was a clear case of aberratio ictus or mistake in the blow. Under the doctrine of aberratio ictus, as embodied in Article 4 of
the RPC, criminal liability is imposed for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. Thus, while it may not have been
appellant's intention to shoot Jonabel, this fact alone will not exculpate him of his criminal liability. Jonabel's death was unquestionably the natural and direct consequence of appellant's
felonious deadly assault against Gerry.
 Notably, the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Jonabel's killing. As pointed out by Justice Mario V. Lopez during the deliberation, although appellant did not intend to kill
Jonabel, treachery may still be appreciated in aberratio ictus, pursuant to the Court's ruling in People v. Flora (2000). There, the accused fired his gun at his target, but missed, and hit two
(2) other persons. The Court appreciated treachery as a qualifying circumstance and convicted the accused for murder and attempted murder because even if the death and injury of the two
(2) other persons resulted from accused's poor aim, accused's act of suddenly firing upon his victims rendered the latter helpless to defend themselves. This is applicable here. Just because
Jonabel was not the intended victim does not make appellant's sudden attack any less treacherous.

However, the accused is liable for separate crimes despite the application of the aberratio ictus rule, and not a compound crime:
a. If the bullet that killed that target victim is different from the bullet that killed the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus (Bar 1982; People v. Flora, 2000; People v.
Adriano, 2015)
 Cruz v. People, 2020
 Considering that the death of Torralba was caused by the same felonious act of shooting at Bernardo, the OSG is correct when it argues that Cruz should be held guilty of
homicide as originally charged. Torralba, an eight-year old boy, was at the wrong place and time during the shooting incident. While Cruz did not intend to end the life of
this child, the latter's death is a crime of homicide in accordance with Article 4 of RPC and prevailing jurisprudence.
 Under Article 4, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
Accordingly, the author of the felony shall be criminally liable for the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof, whether intended or not. For this provision to apply,
it must be shown, however, (1) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (2) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical
consequence of the felony committed by the offender.
 The Court finds these elements present in this case. It has already been established that Cruz committed an intentional felony when he fired multiple shots at Bernardo.
The death of Torralba, who was hit by one of those bullets intended for Bernardo, is a direct, natural, and logical consequence of said intentional felony. The death of
Torralba is an example of aberratio ictus.
b. If the crime committed against the third person is merely light felony such as slight physical injuries (Bar 2015; People v. Violin, 1997)
c. If the components of a compound crime are alleged in two different information (People v. Umawid, 2014)
d. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, is child abuse, which is an offense punishable under special law. (Patulot vs. People, 2019)
Components of complex crime must be felonies (punished by RPC), not special penal laws.

In Patulot, the intention of the accused is merely to inflict injury on CCC but because of aberratio ictus or mistake of blow, AAA and BBB were also injured. In sum, because of Article 4 of RPC,
accused is liable for the wrongful act done (child abuse against AAA and BBB) although it differs from the wrongful act intended (physical injuries on CCC). This is not a complex crime. Accused
is convicted of two counts of child abuse.

Patricio and Pacu were having intense discussion about local politics. The discussion resulted into physical scruples later. In his anger, Patricio threw burning oil from the frying pan
against Pacu. Pacu was able to dodge it. Unfortunately, the burning oil landed on right arm of Alfonso, 9 years old, who was sitting nearby. Alfonso suffered burn injuries, which
necessitated a week-long treatment. Alfonso’s parents filed a criminal case for child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act 7610, against Patricio. Patricio claimed that his target was
not the boy, but Pacu, and as such, he could not be deemed to have intended to violate or demean or degrade his intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, which is an essential
element for child abuse under the law. If ever, his liability towards the boy should only be less serious physical injuries, not child abuse.

Is Patricio correct? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)

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No. If the accused has willful intention of committing a felonious act on another person but the injury falls on the victim who is a minor child, as when he swung his arms to throw burning oil on his
adversary but the burning oil hit a baby instead, he would be criminally liable for child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI, of Republic Act 7610. Physical assault on a child is deemed to be
willful with the necessary criminal intention for child abuse. (Patulot v. People, 2019)

Impossible crime
a. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime
b. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime (Intod v. CA, 1992; Jacinto v.
People, 2009)

Jara, Arkie, and Romer planned to kill Ellen, a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They asked the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the place. On April 3, 2019, at about
10:00 in the evening, Jara, Arkie, and Romer, all armed with automatic weapons, went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her companions to the room in the house of
Ellen. Afterwards, Jara, Arkie, and Romer fired their guns at her room. Fortunately, Ellen was not around, as she attended a prayer meeting in another barangay. Jara, Arkie, and
Romer were then charged and convicted of attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court. On appeal, all the accused ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding them guilty of
attempted murder.

If you were the ponente, how will you decide the appeal? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgement convicting the accused of attempted murder and instead find them guilty of an impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Liability for impossible crime arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but likewise when it is factual or physical impossibility, as in the case at bar. Elsa’s absence from the house is a
physical impossibility which renders the crime intended inherently incapable of accomplishment. To convict the accused of attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2 practically useless as all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an incident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of attempted or frustrated felony.

There is no impossible crime if there is no proof that the victim is already dead when the accused stabbed him (People v. Callao, 2018)

Impossible crime is an intentional crime; hence, criminal intent is necessary

Impossible crime Attempted felony

Similarity
The offender did not commit the crime
Difference
External cause is the impossibility of accomplishing the crime or the employment of ineffectual or
External cause is the cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance
inadequate means

TRUE OR FALSE:

Impossible crime is not a crime.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:

True. Impossible crime is not a real crime since the accused did not commit the crime against person or property for it is impossible to do so. Art. 4 of the RPC punishes the accused not because of
the commission of the crime but on the basis of his tendency to do so. (Bar 1962 and 2000)

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Elements of impossible crime:

1. Offender performed an act which would have been an offense against person or property

If the accused abducted the victim with lewd design and with intent to rape not knowing that the victim is gay, who underwent gender reassignment, he could not be held liable for complex
crime of rape through forcible abduction since both components of this complex crime can only be committed against a woman. Nor is he liable for impossible crime of forcible
abduction since this is a crime against chastity. In impossible crime, the act, which is impossible to commit, must constitute crime against person or property. Neither is he liable
for impossible crime of rape since the act constitutes another violation of the law. He is liable for illegal detention.

2. Offender performed an act with an evil intent

Stabbing a dead person with intent to kill is an impossible crime. The accused shall incur criminal liability for performing an act which would have been homicide or murder were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment. Stabbing a dead person with knowledge of his dead condition is not impossible crime since it was not committed with evil intent to kill.
The act does not show criminal tendency, which is the basis of penalizing impossible crime, since he is aware that he is not killing someone at the time of stabbing.

3. Offender did not commit the offense because of the impossibility of its accomplishment or employment of inadequate or ineffectual means

If the check is funded, stealing the check and failure to present the same for payment with the bank will not make the accused liable for impossible crime. Even if the accused failed to
encash due to external cause such as apprehension by police or stop payment, he will be held liable for consummated theft. (People v. Seranilla, 1988) In theft, taking or gaining possession
of property with intent to appropriate and to gain consummates the crime. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. (People v. Bustinera, 2004) Thus,
failure to gain will not prevent the consummation of the crime.

If the check is unfunded, there is factual impossibility to accomplish the crime of qualified theft since the check is unfunded (Bar 2012)
 Jacinto v. People, 2009, J. Peralta
 Petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the
question arises on whether the crime of qualified theft was actually produced. The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
 The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3)
that its accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by
the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (a) legal impossibility, or (b) physical impossibility of accomplishing the
intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. On the
other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime.
 In this case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the
mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the check bounced, she
would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers. Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact
unknown to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because
the check was eventually dishonored, and Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check. There can be no question that as of the time
that petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of
accomplishment in this case. Thus, petitioner is guilty of impossible crime of theft.

4. Offender in performing an act is not violating another provision of the law

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Rape through sexual assault is a gender-free crime, while rape through sexual intercourse is committed by a man against a woman. If the gender element in rape through sexual
intercourse is not present, the crime is not impossible crime but acts of lasciviousness. Sexually assaulting a victim with intent to have sexual intercourse with her not knowing that the
victim is a gay is not impossible crime of rape. Although it is impossible to commit rape through sexual intercourse where the victim is a gay, the acts with intent to have sexual intercourse
committed against him constitute acts of lasciviousness. (Bar 1968)

Jara, Arkie, and Romer planned to kill Ellen, a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel, Batangas. They asked the assistance of Ella, who is familiar with the place. On April 3, 2019, at about
10:00 in the evening, Jara, Arkie, and Romer, all armed with automatic weapons, went to Barangay Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her companions to the room in the house of
Ellen. Afterwards, Jara, Arkie, and Romer fired their guns at her room. Fortunately, Ellen was not around, as she attended a prayer meeting in another barangay. Jara, Arkie, and
Romer were then charged and convicted of attempted murder by the Regional Trial Court. On appeal, all the accused ascribed to the trial court the sole error of finding them guilty of
attempted murder.

If you were the ponente, how will you decide the appeal? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
If I were the ponente, I will set aside the judgment convicting the accused of attempted murder and instead find them guilty of an impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code.
Liability for impossible crime arises not only when the impossibility is legal, but likewise when it is factual or physical impossibility, as in the case at bar. Elsa’s absence from the house is a
physical impossibility which renders the crime intended inherently incapable of accomplishment. To convict the accused of attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2 practically useless as all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an incident independent of the actor’s will which is an element of attempted or frustrated felony.

Stages of crime

Overt act is physical activity or deed indicating intention to commit a crime, more than mere planning or preparation, which if carried to its complete termination following its natural course,
without being frustrated by external obstacles not by voluntary desistance of perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. It is sufficient if it was the first or some
subsequent step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made. (Rait v. People, 2008; People v. Lamahang, 1935)

STAGES OF EXECUTION
Attempted stage Frustrated stage Consummated stage
When the offender commences the commission of a felony directlyWhen the offender performs all the acts of execution which would
When all the elements necessary for its execution and
by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, accomplishment are present (same)
which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance (Art. 6) of the perpetrator (same)

Distinction between attempted felony and frustrated felony

The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency between the beginning of the
commission of the crime and the moment when all of the acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the former there is such intervention and the offender
does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance. To put it another way,
in case of attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention of outside causes before the subjective phase is passed.

The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the
prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control

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— that period between the point where he begins and the points where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary
desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated. (US v. Eduave, 1917, En Banc)

If the wound/s sustained by the victim were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide (Etino v. People, 2018; People v. Trinidad, 1989)

Stages of execution of special penal laws

If the special law has not adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the intention of the law is not to adopt the provisions of this Code on imposition of penalties.
Moreover, modifying circumstances cannot be appreciated since the penalty not borrowed from the Code has no periods. The crime has no attempted or frustrated stage since this penalty cannot be
graduated one or two degrees lower.

Attempted sale or transportation of illegal drugs under RA 9165

People vs. Figueroa, 2012

 Poseur-buyer showed shabu for sale to poseur buyer. The sale was aborted when the police officers immediately placed accused under arrest. The crime committed is attempted sale.

People vs. Runana, 2020

 Accused intended to transport dangerous drugs to Malaysia through the use of drug couriers in the person of the confidential informant and IO2 Alarde. Confidential informant and IO2
Alarde were summoned to be given instructions regarding the transportation of certain luggage to Malaysia. The confidential informant and IO2 Alarde were brought by accused to a hostel,
where the prohibit drugs were discovered. At that point, the crime of transportation of prohibited drugs is already at its attempted stage. Even in the absence of actual conveyance, an
attempt to transport prohibited drugs is meted the same penalty prescribed for the commission thereof under Section 26 of R.A. 9165.

The accused cannot be convicted of attempted transportation of dangerous drugs where he was caught in possession thereon inside his car, which is not in transit. The theory of the prosecution that
there is clear intent to transport the drug is speculative. (San Juan v. People, 2011) But intent to transport illegal drugs is presumed whenever a huge volume thereof is found in the possession of the
accused until the contrary is proved. Here, 552 grams or half kilo of shabu is by no means a minuscule amount indicating as well intent of the accused to deliver and transport them in violation of
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165. (People vs. Macaspac, 2019)

People v. Burton, 1997

 The accused came from a hotel in Parañaque, where he stayed before he checked in at the NAIA and was bound for Sydney, Australia. At the departure area of the airport, authorities
discovered dangerous drugs in the two pieces of luggage of the accused. It was held that it is apparent that he wanted to bring the prohibited drug from Parañaque to Sydney. However,
because he was not able to pursue his trip, he should be considered only to have attempted to transport the prohibited drug to Sydney.

In People v. Dimaano (2016, J. Leonen), the accused, who was caught in possession of dangerous drugs at the departure area of Manila Domestic Airport was also convicted of attempted
transportation of dangerous drug. However, in People v. Jones, (1997), the accused was also caught in possession of dangerous drugs at the departure area of NAIA, and yet, he was convicted of
consummated transportation of dangerous drugs. At any rate, the penalty prescribed for transportation of dangerous drugs is the same as that for attempted transportation of dangerous drugs.

Crimes that have no frustrated stage:

a. Rape
b. Acts of lasciviousness
c. Theft
d. Arson

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e. Physical injury
f. Estafa
g. Adultery
h. Concubinage
i. Corruption of public officer
j. Coup d’etat

Rape
a. By sexual intercourse
b. By sexual assault

Attempted rape

People v. Lizada, 2003, En Banc

 Accused had previously raped the victim several times. During the subject incident, accused was wearing a pair of short pants but naked from waist up. He entered the bedroom of victim,
went on top of her, held her hands, removed her panty, mashed her breasts and touched her sex organ. However, accused saw Rossel peeping through the door and dismounted. He berated
Rossel for peeping and ordered him to go back to his room and to sleep.
 The term spontaneous is not equivalent to voluntary. Even if the desistance is voluntary, the same could not exempt the offender from liability for attempted felony if there is an external
constraint. The term “spontaneous” means proceeding from natural feeling or native tendency without external constraint; it is synonymous with impulsive, automatic and mechanical.
 Accused intended to have carnal knowledge of victim. The overt acts of accused proven by the prosecution were not merely preparatory acts. By the series of his overt acts, accused had
commenced the execution of rape, which, if not for his desistance, will ripen into the crime of rape. Although accused desisted from performing all the acts of execution, however, his
desistance was not spontaneous as he was impelled to do so only because of the sudden and unexpected arrival of Rossel. Hence, accused is guilty only of attempted rape.

Frustrated rape

In rape through sexual intercourse, slightest touch or mere grazing of the penis to the vagina consummates the crime of rape; hence, there is no frustrated rape, only attempted or consummated rape

People v. Orita, 1990

 Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In
a long line of cases, a uniform rule has been set that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no
penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the
nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

In rape through sexual assault, mere grazing or touching is not enough; there must be insertion. Without the element of insertion, the crime is act of lasciviousness, as the case may be.
 In People v. Bonaagua (2011), the Court ruled that the touching of the labia of the victim’s vagina by an instrument or object (e.g. finger) consummates the crime of rape through sexual
assault. According to Judge Campanilla, this ruling is not in accordance with the established rule that what consummates the crime of rape by sexual assault is the insertion (not mere
touching) of instrument or object into the genital orifice.

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Lutap v. People, 2018

 Intent to insert his finger inside the vagina of the victim is essential before an accused be convicted of attempted rape. For a charge of rape by sexual assault with the use of one's
fingers as the assaulting object, as in the instant case, to prosper, there should be evidence of at least the slightest penetration of the sexual organ and not merely a brush or a graze of its
surface, being that rape by sexual assault requires that the assault be specifically done through the insertion of the assault object into the genital or anal orifices of the victim. The mere
touching of a female's sexual organ, by itself, does not amount to rape nor does it suffice to convict for rape at its attempted stage.
 Petitioner’s direct overt act of touching AAA’s vagina by constantly moving his middle finger cannot convincingly be interpreted as demonstrating an intent to actually insert his finger
inside AAA’s sexual organ which, to reiterate, was still then protectively covered, much less an intent to have carnal knowledge with the victim. An inference of attempted rape by sexual
intercourse or attempted rape by sexual assault cannot therefore be successfully reached based on petitioner’s act of touching AAA’s genitalia and upon ceasing from doing so when AAA
swayed off his hand. Instead, petitioner’s lewd act of fondling AAA’s sexual organ consummates the felony of acts of lasciviousness. The slightest penetration into one’s sexual organ
distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape.

Acts of lasciviousness

Acts of lasciviousness are always consummated. (People v. Famularcano, CA, 43 OG 1721) Thus, hugging the victim with lewd design constitutes consummated acts of lasciviousness. (Bar 1964)

Theft

There is no more frustrated robbery because there is no more frustrated theft. The concept of theft is the same as that of robbery – taking without consent. Frustrated theft has been deleted because
(1) the mere taking consummates the crime of theft hence, asportation is not an element of theft and (2) ability to freely dispose the property taken is not an element of theft considering that mere
use is disposition.

Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Inability to dispose the stolen property is not
an element of theft. Unlawful taking is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Without unlawful taking, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft
cannot have a frustrated stage. (Bar 2013)

Arson

While the Court already ruled in US v. Valdes (1918) that there is frustrated arson, there is still a debate among experts as to whether or not a crime of frustrated arson exist. Nevertheless, the fact
that it is not doctrinal (for being unsettled) and the fact that frustrated arson was already asked in the 2019 Bar, it is very unlikely that it will be asked again in the 2022 Bar.

Physical injury

The crime of physical injuries is a formal crime since a single act consummates it as matter of law; hence, it has no attempted or frustrated stage (Regalado; Bar 2017)

Estafa

There is frustrated estafa inasmuch as he performed all the acts of execution which should produce the crime as a consequence, but which, by reason of causes independent of his will, did not
produce it, no appreciable damage having been caused to the offended party due to the timely discovery of the acts performed. (US v. Dominguez, 1921; Bar 1968)

Adultery & concubinage

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There is no frustrated stage: it is either that the accused were able to engage in sex or not
- Adultery is a crime of result and not of tendency; it is an instantaneous crime which is consummated and exhausted or completed at the moment of the carnal union. Each sexual intercourse
constitutes a crime of adultery. (People v. Zapata, 1951, En Banc)

Like adultery, concubinage has no frustrated stage

Corruption of public officer

The crime of corruption of public officer is a crime which is consummated upon the performance of “acts of execution by two persons,” to wit: offer of bribe by the offender and acceptance by a
public official. Such crime has no frustrated stage because if the public officer accepted the bribe, the crime of corruption of public officer is consummated, but if the public officer rejected the
bribe, the crime is attempted. (People v. Ng Pek, 1948, En Banc; Bar 1952)

Coup d’etat

As a formal crime, coup d’etat has no frustrated nor attempted stage. (Bar 2005) Once the military, police or public officer made a swift attack against facilities needed for the exercise and
continued possession of power for the purpose of seizing or diminishing state power, the crime is consummated. Actual seizure or diminution of state power is not necessary for the consummation
of the crime. But prior to a swift attack the plotters of coup d’etat can be held liable for conspiracy to commit coup d’etat.

Formal crimes
- Those crimes which are consummated in one instant or by performance of a single act of execution
- Formal crimes have no attempted or frustrated stage
- Slander, perjury, false testimony, illegal possession of picklock, physical injuries, acts of lasciviousness, coup d’etat

Attempted felony

The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:

1. The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
2. He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
3. The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
4. The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous desistance.

Marasigan v. Fuentes, 2016, J. Leonen

 The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: (1) that there be external acts; and (2) such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.
 We sustain the conclusion of Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla that there is basis for prosecuting respondents for murder in its attempted, and not in its frustrated, stage. Petitioner alleged
that respondents coordinated in assaulting him and that this assault culminated in efforts to hit his head with a stone or hollow block. Had respondents been successful, they could have dealt
any number of blows on petitioner. Each of these could have been fatal, or, even if not individually so, could have, in combination, been fatal. That they were unable to inflict fatal
blows was only because of the timely arrival of neighbors who responded to the calls for help coming from petitioner and witnesses Marcelo Maaba, Lauro M. Agulto, and Gregoria F.
Pablo.

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Effect of inflicting mortal wound

a. Inflicting non-mortal wound upon the victim by shooting him constitutes physical injuries if the accused did not further shoot him to inflict mortal wounds. The crime is not attempted
homicide because failure to shoot him further shows lack of intent to kill. (Pentecostes v. People, 2010, J. Peralta) Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting the victim to
inflict mortal wounds is a defense in attempted homicide.
b. Inflicting mortal wound upon the victim constitutes frustrated homicide even if the accused desisted from further shooting him. The fact that the wounds are mortal indicates intent to kill.
Moreover, spontaneous desistance from further shooting is not a defense in frustrated homicide. (People v. Abella, 2013)

Continued crime Continuing crime

(delito continuado)
Concept
Single crime produced by several acts performed separately during a period of time under a A crime which is consummated in one place but by reason of the nature of the offense, the
single criminal intent in violation of a single penal provision violation of the law is deemed continuing
Purpose
To treat several criminal acts committed under a single criminal impulse in violation of a single To determine the proper venue, validity of arrest and the commencement of the running of
penal provision as one crime prescription

RA 9262
- Continued crime principle is not applicable to violation against women under Section 5(i) of RA 9262 (or sexual abuse under RA 7610, rape and acts of lasciviousness under RPC). Thus,
psychological violence committed by the husband against the wife on two different occasions constitutes two counts of violence against women under RA 9262. (Dinamling v. People,
2015, J. Peralta; Bar 2015)
 AAA v. BBB, 2018
 What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or
continuing crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in
another. In such cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case ; it being
understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any
municipality or territory where the offense was in part committed.
 It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of violence under Section 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3 (a),
Paragraph (C) was committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a
material element of the offense. In the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the
RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over the case.
- The act of denying support to a child (economic abuse under Section 5[e] of RA 9262) is a continuing offense. (Melgar v. People, 2018)

Continuing crimes:
e. Kidnapping with homicide (Bar 1947)
f. Rebellion (Umil v. Ramos, 1991, En Banc)
g. Violation of RA 9262 (AAA v. BBB, 2018; Melgar v. People, 2018)

Requisites of delito continuado:

4. Plurality of acts performed separately during a period of time

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5. Unity of criminal intent and purpose

6. Unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated

Single larceny rule

The trend in theft cases is to follow the so-called "single larceny" doctrine, that is, the taking of several things, whether belonging to the same or different owners, at the same time and place
constitutes but one larceny (Santiago v. Garchitorena, 1993, En Banc)

Applying the concept of delito continuado, the following are treated as constituting only one offense:
e. The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same place and at the same period of time (People v. Tumlos, 1939)
f. The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time (People v. Jaranillo, 1974)
g. The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People v. De Leon, 1926)
h. The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer every time he collects veteran's benefits on behalf of a client, who agreed that the attorney's fees shall be paid out of said
benefits. (People v. Sabbun, 1964) The collections of the legal fees were impelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts of collection were made
under the same criminal impulse. (People v. Lawas, 1955)

On other hand, the concept of delito continuado were not applied to the following cases:
e. Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other from January 1956 to July 1956. (People v. Dichupa, 1961) The said acts
were committed on two different occasions.
f. Several malversations committed in May, June and July, 1936, and falsifications to conceal the said offenses committed in August and October 1936. The malversations and falsifications
were not the result of only one purpose or of only one resolution to embezzle and falsify (People v. Cid, 1938)
g. Two estafa cases, one committed in December 1963 involving the failure of the collector to turn over the installments for a radio and the other in June 1964 involving the pocketing of the
installments for a sewing machine (People v. Ledesma, 1976)
h. 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on different dates (Gamboa v. Court of Appeals, 1975)

Several acts on single occasion

Petron Corp. v. Yao, 2021, C.J. Peralta

 The crime of unfair competition is a continuing crime and cannot be considered as delito continuado. For a crime to be considered as delito continuado (continued or continuous crime),
there must be plurality of acts committed by the actor against different parties on the same occasion with the same criminal intent or purpose of violating the same penal provision. A delito
continuado is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy.
 Here, respondents did not commit on the same occasion several acts of passing off their gas tanks as that of Petron or other parties. Rather, respondents only continued or repeated the
alleged singular crime committed in Cavite and all the way up to Makati. Hence, unfair competition does not fall under the criterion of a delito continuado. And there are also no two
separate crimes of unfair competition allegedly committed by respondents.

Single criminal impulse

3. To commit robbery: Several acts, which are performed separately during a period of time under a single criminal intent in violation of penal provision, constitute a continued crime. Thus,
several acts of taking away by force the money and valuables of the employees working in Energex gasoline station committed under a single criminal intent to commit robbery in that
place in violation of a single penal provision constitute a continued crime of robbery. (People v. De Leon, 2009, J. Peralta; People v. Dela Cruz, 1950; Bar 1996)
4. To satisfy lust:
c) Penis was inserted thrice for the purpose of changing position constitutes a continued crime of rape (People v. Aaron, 2002)

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d) Penis was inserted thrice for the purpose of resting for 5 minutes; hence, satisfying lust every time of rest constitutes three separate crimes of rape because the three penetrations
were motivated by three separate intents to satisfy lust (People v. Lucena, 2014)

Santiago v. Garchitorena, 1993, En Banc

 We find that, technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner's case, and hence, there should only be one information to be filed against her.
 The original information charged petitioner with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such
privilege. The original information also averred that the criminal act: (i) committed by petitioner was in violation of a law — Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an
undue injury to one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the
allegation of the original information, except that instead of the word "aliens" in the original information each amended information states the name of the individual whose stay was
legalized. The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the
approval of the application or the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as when the approval was embodied in the same document.

Navaja v. De Castro, 2017

 In this case, two (2) separate Informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated September 22, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1 (a) of PD 1829 before
the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing; and (b) an Information dated August 27, 2004 charging him
of violation of Section 1 (f) of the same law before the MTCC-Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit. While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in
different locations, the Court holds that petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated
by a single criminal impulse — that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually dismissed by the OPP-
Bohol. The foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent or
resolution.
 Petitioner's acts of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly
motivated by a single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238.
Thus, applying the principle of delito continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one (1) count of violation of PD 1829 which may be filed either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms.
Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the same
case.
 However, since he was already charged — and in fact, convicted in a Judgment dated July 3, 2007 — in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events
that transpired in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner's single criminal design. In order that delito continuado may exist, there should be plurality of acts
performed separately during a period of time; unity of penal provision infringed upon or violated and unity of criminal intent and purpose, which means that two or more violations of the
same penal provision are united in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. Consequently, the criminal case in MCTC-Jagna must be
dismissed; otherwise, petitioner will be unduly exposed to double jeopardy, which the Court cannot countenance.

Ambagan, Jr. v. People, 2018

 The two (2) Informations charging the petitioner for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019 are strikingly identical except with respect to the name of the property owner, TCT No.,
affected area, and its value. The place, time, and manner of the commission of the offense are the same. The petitioner in the performance of the alleged criminal act is impelled by a
singular purpose — the realization of the Balite Falls development project. Consequently, the acts alleged in the two (2) Informations constitute only one offense which should have been
consolidated in one Information.
 This does not mean however that both cases must be dismissed as petitioner suggests. Considering that there is but one offense, there is no place for the issue of double jeopardy to arise in
the first place. The only implication of this pronouncement would be that the accused should, if found guilty, be meted with penalty for a single offense.

Different criminal impulses to defraud

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1. Single victim on different occasions: There is no unity of criminal intent or purpose because while both offenses committed by accused consisted of conversion of sums of money
belonging to the offended party, they took place on different dates and under different circumstances. Thus, each day of conversion constitutes a single act with an independent existence
and criminal intent of its own. Hence, this is not a continuous crime of estafa through misappropriation. (People v. Ledesma, 1976; Bar 1976)
2. Different victims on the same scheme: The syndicated estafa charged in one case is different from the syndicated estafa charged in the other cases. While these cases arose out of the same
scheme, the fraudulent acts charged were committed against different persons; hence, they do not constitute the same offense. This is not delito continuado because the accused have
criminal intents to defraud as many as there are victims defrauded. (People v. Balasa, 1998; Bar 1976 and 2009)

Ilagan v. CA, 1994

 The series of acts committed against the seven lot buyers was not the product of a single criminal intent. The misrepresentation or deceit was employed against each lot buyer on different
dates and in separate places, hence they originated from separate criminal intents and consequently resulted in separate felonies. Moreover, after the commission of one estafa, the accused
could not have had the foreknowledge as to when or whether they could replicate the same felony against another victim still necessarily unknown.

Principle of delito continuado does not apply in malum prohibitum because malice or criminal intent is immaterial
c. Violation of BP 22 is malum prohibitum. Thus, the drawer for issuing several bouncing checks is liable for violations of BP 22 as many as there are checks issued. (Lim v. People, 2001;
Bar 2009)
d. Corruption under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 partakes the nature of malum prohibited. Yet, this crime must be committed with criminal intent since evidence bad faith or manifest partiality is
an element thereof. Thus, doctrine of delito continuado does not apply because criminal intent is material in this crime. (Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 1993, En Banc)

Principles of criminal liability

1. For an accused to be criminally liable for the uninhabited consequences of criminal act, the following requisites must be present (1) that an intentional felony has been committed, and (2)
that the wrong done be the direct, natural and logical consequences of the felony committed by the offender (US v. Brobst; People v. Sales, 2011; People v. Martin, 1931; People v.
Adriano, 2015)
2. The rule is that if a man creates in another person’s mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who
creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries (People v. Page, 1977; People v. Toling, 1975; People v. Calixto, 1921)
3. For an accused to be held responsible to the resulting injury, the felony must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred (Batacalan v. Medina; People v. Cornel, 1947; Urbano v.
IAC, 1988; People v. Villacorta, 2011)

To hold the accused responsible for the resulting death of the victim on account of the felonies act of the accused when a severe tetanus infection occurred:
1. It should be medically established that tetanus developed from the injuries inflicted by the accused; and,
2. The possibility of an efficient intervening cause from the time injuries had been inflicted until death ensued is remote (People v. Cornel, 1947; Urbano v. IAC, 1988; People v. Villacorta,
2011)

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Justifying circumstances
(Art. 11)
The following do not incur any
criminal liability:
Exempting circumstances
(Art. 12)
The following are exempt from
criminal liability:
Mitigating circumstances Aggravating circumstances Alternative circumstances
(Art. 13) (Art. 14) (Art. 15)
The following are mitigating The following are aggravating Alternative circumstances are those
circumstances: circumstances: which must be taken into
consideration as aggravating or

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1. Anyone who acts in defense of
his person or rights, provided that
the following circumstances concur;
First. Unlawful aggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel
it.
Third. Lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the
person defending himself.
2. Anyone who acts in defense of
the person or rights of his spouse,
ascendants, descendants, or
legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters, or his relatives by
affinity in the same degrees and
those consanguinity within the
fourth civil degree, provided that the
first and second requisites
prescribed in the next preceding
circumstance are present, and the
further requisite, in case the
revocation was given by the person
attacked, that the one making
defense had no part therein.
3. Anyone who acts in defense of
the person or rights of a stranger,
provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first
circumstance of this Article are
present and that the person
defending be not induced by
revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
#bestbarever
1. An imbecile or an insane person,
unless the latter has acted during a
lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane
person has committed an act which
the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement
in one of the hospitals or asylums
established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be
permitted to leave without first
obtaining the permission of the same
court.
2. A person under fifteen (15) years
of age. (as amended by RA 9344)
3. A person over fifteen (15) years
of age and under eighteen (18),
unless he has acted with
discernment, in which case, such
minor shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of
Art. 80 of this Code.
When such minor is adjudged to be
criminally irresponsible, the court,
in conformably with the provisions
of this and the preceding paragraph,
shall commit him to the care and
custody of his family who shall be
charged with his surveillance and
education otherwise, he shall be
committed to the care of some
institution or person mentioned in
said Art. 80. (under RA 9344, the
child shall be subject to an
intervention program)
1. Those mentioned in the preceding
chapter, when all the requisites
necessary to justify or to exempt
from criminal liability in the
respective cases are not attendant.
2. That the offender is under
eighteen year of age or over seventy
years. In the case of the minor, he
shall be proceeded against in
accordance with the provisions of
Art. 80.
3. That the offender had no intention
to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed.
4. That sufficient provocation or
threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act.
5. That the act was committed in the
immediate vindication of a grave
offense to the one committing the
felony (delito), his spouse,
ascendants, or relatives by affinity
within the same degrees.
6. That of having acted upon an
impulse so powerful as naturally to
have produced passion or
obfuscation.
7. That the offender had voluntarily
surrendered himself to a person in
authority or his agents, or that he
had voluntarily confessed his guilt
before the court prior to the
presentation of the evidence for the
1. That advantage be taken by the
offender of his public position.
2. That the crime be committed in
contempt or with insult to the public
authorities.
3. That the act be committed with
insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of
his rank, age, or sex, or that is be
committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, if the latter has not
given provocation.
4. That the act be committed with
abuse of confidence or obvious
ungratefulness.
5. That the crime be committed in
the palace of the Chief Executive or
in his presence, or where public
authorities are engaged in the
discharge of their duties, or in a
place dedicated to religious worship.
6. That the crime be committed in
the night time, or in an uninhabited
place, or by a band, whenever such
circumstances may facilitate the
commission of the offense.
Whenever more than three armed
malefactors shall have acted
together in the commission of an
offense, it shall be deemed to have
been committed by a band.
7. That the crime be committed on
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mitigating according to the nature
and effects of the crime and the
other conditions attending its
commission. They are the
relationship, intoxication and the
degree of instruction and education
of the offender.
The alternative circumstance of
relationship shall be taken into
consideration when the offended
party in the spouse, ascendant,
descendant, legitimate, natural, or
adopted brother or sister, or relative
by affinity in the same degrees of
the offender.
The intoxication of the offender
shall be taken into consideration as a
mitigating circumstance when the
offender has committed a felony in a
state of intoxication, if the same is
not habitual or subsequent to the
plan to commit said felony but when
the intoxication is habitual or
intentional, it shall be considered as
an aggravating circumstance.
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4. Any person who, in order to avoid
an evil or injury, does not act which
causes damage to another, provided
that the following requisites are
present;
First. That the evil sought to be
avoided actually exists;
Second. That the injury feared be
greater than that done to avoid it;
Third. That there be no other
practical and less harmful means of
preventing it.
5. Any person who acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful
exercise of a right or office.
6. Any person who acts in obedience
to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose.
#bestbarever
4. Any person who, while
performing a lawful act with due
care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of
causing it.
5. Any person who act under the
compulsion of irresistible force.
6. Any person who acts under the
impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
an equal or greater injury.
7. Any person who fails to perform
an act required by law, when
prevented by some lawful
insuperable cause.
prosecution;
8. That the offender is deaf and
dumb, blind or otherwise suffering
some physical defect which thus
restricts his means of action,
defense, or communications with his
fellow beings.
9. Such illness of the offender as
would diminish the exercise of the
will-power of the offender without
however depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts.
10. And, finally, any other
circumstances of a similar nature
and analogous to those above
mentioned.
RCO 2012-0012
the occasion of a conflagration,
shipwreck, earthquake, epidemic or
other calamity or misfortune.
8. That the crime be committed with
the aid of armed men or persons
who insure or afford impunity.
9. That the accused is a recidivist.
A recidivist is one who, at the time
of his trial for one crime, shall have
been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of this
Code.
10. That the offender has been
previously punished by an offense to
which the law attaches an equal or
greater penalty or for two or more
crimes to which it attaches a lighter
penalty.
11. That the crime be committed in
consideration of a price, reward, or
promise.
12. That the crime be committed by
means of inundation, fire, poison,
explosion, stranding of a vessel or
international damage thereto,
derailment of a locomotive, or by
the use of any other artifice
involving great waste and ruin.
13. That the act be committed with
evidence premeditation.
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14. That the craft, fraud or disguise

be employed.

15. That advantage be taken of

superior strength, or means be
employed to weaken the defense.

16. That the act be committed with

treachery (alevosia).

There is treachery when the offender

commits any of the crimes against
the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended
party might make.

17. That means be employed or

circumstances brought about which
add ignominy to the natural effects
of the act.

18. That the crime be committed

after an unlawful entry.

There is an unlawful entry when an

entrance of a crime a wall, roof,
floor, door, or window be broken.

20. That the crime be committed

with the aid of persons under fifteen
years of age or by means of motor
vehicles, motorized watercraft,
airships, or other similar means. (As
amended by RA 5438).

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21. That the wrong done in the

commission of the crime be
deliberately augmented by causing
other wrong not necessary for its
commissions.

Justifying circumstances

Rustia v. People, 2016

 Unlawful aggression is of two kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with
physical force or with a weapon, an offensive act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor to cause the injury. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending
or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and positively strong (like aiming a revolver at
another with intent to shoot or opening a knife and making a motion as if to attack). Imminent unlawful aggression must not be a mere threatening attitude of the victim, such as pressing his
right hand to his hip where a revolver was holstered, accompanied by an angry countenance, or like aiming to throw a pot.

Defense of property
The defense of property is not of such importance as the right to life, and defense of property can only be invoked as a justifying circumstance when it is coupled with an attack on the person of one
entrusted with said property (People v. Apolinar; People v. Narvaez, 1983, En Banc)

IMPORTANT FOR THE BAR !!!

Fulfillment of duty
1. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office
2. That the injury caused or the offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office (People v. Delima, 1922;
Cabanlig v. SB, 2003)

Superior order
1. Order must be issued by superior
2. Order must be lawful
3. Means used to carry out the order is lawful

Death under exceptional circumstance (Art. 247)

- Either absolutory cause or exempting cause
- As absolutory cause – killing or inflicting serious physical injury
o The imposition of destierro is not a measure to impose a penalty but a measure designed to protect the accused from acts of reprisal principally by relatives of the victim (People v.
Araquel, 1959; People v. Coricor, 1947; Bar 2005)
- As exempting cause – inflicting physical injuries of any other kind
- Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall other have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of
this article (last paragraph)

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Rafa caught his wife, Rachel, in the act of having sexual intercourse with Rocco in the maid’s room of their own house. Rafa shot both lovers in the chest, but they survived. Rafa charged
Rachel and Rocco with adultery, while Rachel and Rocco charged Rafa with frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide.

In the adultery case, Rachel and Rocco raised the defense that Rafa and Rachel, prior to the incident in question, executed a notarized document whereby they agreed to live separately
and allowed each of them to get a new partner and live with anyone of their choice as husband and wife. This document was executed after Rachel discovered that Rafa was cohabiting
with another woman. Thus, they also raised the defense of in pari delicto. In the frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide cases, Rafa raised the defense that, having caught them in
flagrante delicto, he has no criminal liability.

Assuming that all defenses have been proven, will the actions for frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide prosper? (Bar 2018)
Yes. The actions for frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide will prosper, and Rafa will be found guilty of these crimes. The penalty, however, that the trial court can impose is only destierro
not penalties for frustrated parricide and frustrated homicide, being the spouse of Rachel. (Art. 247)

Killing in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter

The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. The killing by the husband of his wife must concur
with her flagrant adultery. There is no death under exceptional circumstance where killing of the wife occurred the day after she was caught in the commission of the adultery.

However, Article 247 does not state that the accused should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused’s rage.

People v. Gonzales, 1939

 Accused saw his wife was rising up with a man, who was standing and buttoning his drawers. Completely obfuscated, accused killed his wife. The circumstance indicates that she had just
finished having sexual intercourse with another man. This is not death under exceptional circumstance since he did not catch his wife in the very act of carnal intercourse, but after such act.

Legitimate spouse
To avail of the defense in Article 247, the marriage between the accused and his spouse must be legal. Thus, a married man, who caught his mistress in the act of having sexual intercourse with
another, shall be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion if he killed the lover of his mistress (Bar 2015) but not the absolutory cause under Article 247.

If the wife had sexual intercourse with another woman, will the rule on death under exceptional circumstance under Article 247 apply?
No. The phrase “in the act of committing sexual intercourse” in Article 247 should be interpreted within the Spanish context of adulterio, which excludes homosexual intercourse between a wife
and another woman. Thus, there is no death under exceptional circumstance if the accused caught his wife having homosexual intercourse with another woman. “Homosexual intercourse” is not
within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse” in Article 247. (Bar 2015 & 2016) The same rule applies if a wife caught her husband in the act of sodomizing a gay hence, the wife is
liable for parricide. “Sodomizing” is not within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse” in Article 247.

IMPORTANT FOR THE BAR !!!

Since “sodomizing” is not within the contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse” in Article 247, a husband who killed his wife upon discovery of being sodomized by another man is not entitled
to the benefits of death under exceptional circumstance under Article 247.

Fingering is not within the contemplation of sexual intercourse. However, the accused is entitled to mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13(6).

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Self-defense
For purposes of self-defense, attacking under exceptional circumstance is not an unlawful aggression. If the husband caught his wife having sexual intercourse with another man and attacked her
paramour, but the paramour defended himself and killed the husband. The paramour could not invoke self-defense since the attack made by the husband under exceptional circumstance is not an
unlawful aggression. The paramour knew well that by maintaining unlawful relations with a married woman, he was performing an unlawful and criminal act and exposed himself to the vengeance
of the offended husband. (US v. Merced, 1918; Bar 1985)

Exempting circumstances

What is the age of doli incapax in the Philippines? (Bar 2017)

If the accused is 15yrs of age or below, minority is an exempting circumstance. (Sec. 6, RA 9344) With or without discernment, the accused of such age is exempt from criminal liability. Lack of
discernment is conclusively presumed. Hence, the age of doli incapax in the Philippines is now 15 years of age or under.

A child above 15 years but below 18 years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil
liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Sec. 6, RA 9344)

Suspension of imprisonment sentence

- Suspension of sentence is applicable even if the accused who committed the crime in his minority had reached the age of beyond 21 years old. What matters is that the offender committed
the offense when he/she was still of tender age. Accused may be confined in an agricultural camp or any other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of RA 9344. (People v.
Ancajas, 2015; People v. Sisracon, 2018)
- RA 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense (People v. Lababo)

Insanity
- Art. 12(1) requires a complete deprivation of rationality in committing the act, i.e., that the accused be deprived of reason, that there be no consciousness of responsibility for his acts, or
that there be complete absence of power to discern (People v. Roy, 2018)
- Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability (People v. Puno, 1981)

Uncontrollable fear or irresistible force

- The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm

Mitigating circumstances
 If all of the requisites of a circumstance mentioned in Article 11 or 12 are present, justifying or exempting circumstance shall be appreciated
 If majority of the requisites of such circumstance are present, the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification or exemption shall be appreciated (Art. 69)
 If only minority of the requisites of such circumstance is present, the ordinary mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification or exemption shall be appreciated (Art. 13)
 If a circumstance has three requisites, such as self-defense, two out of three conditions is majority. If a circumstance has only two requisites, such as performance of duty, one out of two
conditions is tantamount to majority.
 In case of privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete justification or exemption, the penalty prescribed by law shall be lowered by one or two degrees
o In case of minority, the circumstance is either exempting or privileged mitigating. There is no ordinary mitigating circumstance of minority. In privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority, the penalty shall be lowered by one degree. (NOTE: Article 68[1] on lowering the penalty by two degrees is already obsolete in view of RA 9344. However, if
minority is present, the penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed under Article 68[2].)

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o In accident, the lawful act must be committed without dolo or culpa. If the act is committed with dolo, the crime committed is intentional felony. Penalty prescribed by law shall
not be adjusted. If the act is committed with culpa, the penalty prescribed under Article 67 or 365 shall be imposed.

No intention so grave a wrong

 Appellant adopted means to ensure the success of the savage battering of his sons. He tied their wrists to a coconut tree to prevent their escape while they were battered with a stick to inflict
as much pain as possible. Noemar suffered injuries in his face, head and legs that immediately caused his death. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong as
that actually perpetrated cannot be appreciated where the acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the victim. (People v.
Sales, 2011)
 Appellant's cruelty toward her young child wickedly defies human nature especially the mother's protective instinct toward her own. It is inexplicably tragic that the very person who
brought Ronald into this world, with the natural and unconditional obligation to protect and nurture him, was also the one who brought his life to a premature end at the very young age of
thirteen (13). Plainly, appellant's brutish acts sufficiently produced, and did actually produce, her son's death. Appellant, therefore, cannot be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong. (People v. Gonzales, 2019)

Passion and obfuscation

- Must originate from lawful sentiments – excitement which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation
- The act producing obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have regained his normal
equanimity (People Hicks)
- There is mitigating even if there is passion and obfuscation: (a) if made in the spirit of lawlessness; or (b) if made in the spirit of revenge
- Must lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the accused; offender suffers diminution of intelligence and intent (Bongalon v. People, 2012)

Salient features:
 Provocation and obfuscation arising from one and the same cause should be treated as only one mitigating circumstance
 Vindication of grave offense cannot co-exist with passion and obfuscation
 Passion and obfuscation is compatible with lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong
 Passion or obfuscation is incompatible with treachery
 Passion and obfuscation cannot co-exist with evident premeditation

Voluntary surrender
1. Offender has not been arrested
2. Offender surrendered to a person in authority
3. Surrender was voluntary

To be voluntary, the surrender must be spontaneous, showing the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his guilt or (b) he
wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture (People v. Rabanillo, 1999; People v. Manzano, 2018)

If the purpose is to clear his name, there is no voluntary surrender (People v. Evangelista)

Confession of guilt

Requisites for a plea of guilty

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1. Confession must be spontaneous

2. Must be made in open court
3. Made prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution (People v. Crisostomo; People v. Bueza)

Aggravating circumstances

Advantage taken of public position

- Use of influence, prestige or ascendancy which the public office gives the offender the means by which the realized

Dwelling is not appreciated in the following:

- If both offended party and offender shared the dwelling
- Dwelling does not belong to the offended party
- Offended party gave provocation

Band
- More than 3 armed malefactors; thus, there must be at least 4 persons
- All of them must be armed and principal by direct participation

IMPORTANT FOR THE BAR !!!

Occasion of public calamity

- Adding suffering by taking advantage of misfortune instead of lending aid to the afflicted

Recidivism Habitual delinquency

Definition/concept
A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously Habitual delinquent is a person who, within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or
convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same Title of the RPC (Art. 14) last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical injuries, robbery, theft, estafa or
falsification, is found guilty of any of the said crimes a third time or oftener
Crimes committed
The previous crime and the present crime are embraced in the same Title of the RPC The previous, subsequent and present crimes must be serious or less serious physical injuries,
theft, robbery, estafa or falsification of document
Period of time
What is important is the date of trial of the present crime in relation to the date of conviction of What is important is the date of conviction of the subsequent or present crime in relation to the
his previous crime date of his last release or conviction

The accused was being tried of the present crime when he was convicted of the previous crime The accused was convicted of the second crime within 10 years after conviction or release of
by final judgment the first crime; then, he is convicted of the third crime within 10 years after conviction or
release of the second crime; and so on and so forth
Number of crimes committed

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There must be at least 2 crimes There must be at least 3 crimes

Effects in relation to the penalty
Recidivism is an ordinary aggravating circumstance, the presence of which will require the Habitual delinquency is an extraordinary or special aggravating circumstance, the presence of
application of the penalty for the present crime in its maximum period unless it is offset by a which will require the imposition of penalty in addition to the principal penalty for the present
mitigating circumstance crime. This is not subject to the offset rule.

Manolo, the accused, already had three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft, when he was found guilty of Robbery with Homicide. In the last case, the trial Judge
considered against the accused both recidivism and habitual delinquency. The accused appealed and contended that in his last conviction, the trial court cannot consider against him a
finding of recidivism and, again, of habitual delinquency.

Is the appeal meritorious? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)

No, the appeal is not meritorious. Recidivism and habitual delinquency are correctly considered in this case because the basis of recidivism is different from that of habitual delinquency. Manolo is a
recidivist because he had been previously convicted by final judgment for theft and again found guilty for Robbery with Homicide, which are both crimes against property, embraced under the same
Title (Title Ten, Book Two) of the Revised Penal Code. The implication is that he is specializing in the commission of crimes against property, hence, aggravating in the conviction for Robbery
with
Homicide. Habitual delinquency, which brings about an additional penalty when an offender is convicted a third time or more for specified crimes, is correctly considered because Manolo had
already three (3) previous convictions by final judgment for theft and again convicted for Robbery.

Abuse of superior strength

- Superiority in number does not necessarily amount to abuse of superior strength. For the qualifying circumstance to be appreciated, it must be shown that the aggressors combined
forces in order to secure advantage from their superiority in strength. Differently stated, it must be proven that the accused simultaneously assaulted the deceased. Furthermore, the
evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. After all, to take advantage of superior strength means
to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. Thus, it had been held that when the victim was attacked by the assailants
alternatively, the claim that the accused abused their superior strength could not be appreciated. (People v. Campit, 2017)

Treachery
- The essence is to adopt a mode to insure accomplishment of criminal purpose
- Treachery exists when the following elements are present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. Thus, it is not sufficient that the victim was unable to defend himself. The Prosecution must show that the
accused consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. (Rustia v. People, 2016)

Treachery in case of continuous attack

a. When the aggression or attack is continuous, treachery must be present in the beginning of the assault
b. When the aggression or attack is not continuous, in that there was an interruption, it is sufficient that treachery was present at the moment the fatal blow was given (US v. Baluyut, 1919, En
Banc)

GENERAL RULE: Treachery is not presumed

EXCEPTIONS:

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a. Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense. Thus, when an adult person illegally attacks a minor, treachery exists (People v. Umawid,
2014)
b. When the victim was tied elbow to elbow with his body sustaining many wounds and his head cut-off, treachery is considered, or if a person is first seized and bound, with a view to
rendering him incapable of defense, and he is then slained either by the person who reduced him to his helpless state or by another, alevosia is present (People v. Mongado, 1969, En Banc)

Ignominy
- Ignominy is different from cruelty
- Adding suffering and humiliation to the victim
- There is ignominy when the accused ordered the victim to exhibit to them her complete nakedness for about 10 minutes before raping her (People v. Jose, 1971)

Alternative circumstances

People v. Crisostomo, 1988

 Under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code, intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender committed a felony in a state of
intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony. Otherwise when habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.

Bacerra v. People, 2017, J. Leonen

 For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused must neither be habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit a felony. Moreover, it must be
shown that the mental faculties and willpower of the accused were impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused's capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts.
The bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of the commission of the crime is insufficient. There must be proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect of intoxication on the
accused. There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime. A considerable amount of time had lapsed
from petitioner's drinking spree up to the burning of the nipa hut within which he could have regained control of his actions. Hence, intoxication cannot be appreciated as a mitigating
circumstance in this case.

APPLICATION OF INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW

Penalty (vis-à-vis Arts. 63 & 64)

REMEMBER: Period (minimum, medium, maximum) is different from degree (arresto mayor to prision correccional, reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, etc.)

Classification and duration of penalties under the RPC:

A. Capital punishment
 Death
B. Afflictive penalties
a. Reclusion perpetua – 20yrs, 1 day to 40yrs
b. Reclusion temporal – 12yrs, 1 day to 20yrs
c. Prision mayor – 6yrs, 1 day to 12yrs
C. Correctional penalties
a. Prision correccional – 6mos, 1 day to 6yrs
b. Arresto mayor – 1mo, 1 day to 6mos

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D. Light penalties
 Arresto menor – 1 day to 30 days

Reclusion perpetua Life imprisonment

20yrs, 1 day as minimum to 40yrs as maximum Lifetime
Carries accessory penalties Does not carry accessory penalties
Imposed by the RPC or special laws Imposed by special laws

Graduating penalty

GENERAL RULE: Whether single, compound, complex penalty, the graduated penalty is a single penalty

EXCEPTIONS:
a. If prescribed penalty in period, the graduated penalty is in period
 Single period – graduated penalty is single period
o In its minimum, medium or maximum period
 Compound period – graduated penalty is compound period
o In its minimum to medium, or medium to maximum
 Complex period – graduated penalty is complex period
o In its minimum to maximum
b. If prescribed penalty is combination of penalty in full and penalty in period, the graduated penalty is composed of three periods

Illustration: reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua

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Here the graduated penalty is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period because this penalty is composed of three periods and is immediately inferior to the
prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua

Indivisible penalties:
a. Reclusion perpetua
b. Reclusion perpetua to death
c. Death

Reclusion perpetua only Reclusion perpetua to death Death penalty only

It shall be applied by the court regardless of any mitigating or Determine the presence of aggravating circumstance. The It shall be reduced by the court to reclusion perpetua
aggravating circumstance (Art. 63) graver penalty of death shall be applied by the court if at least because of RA 9346
one aggravating circumstance (a) is present or (b) remains after
the application of offset rule

Single indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua only or death only) – do not consider aggravating and mitigating

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Two indivisible penalties (reclusion perpetua to death) – only consider aggravating

People v. Ramos, 2000

 Qualified rape punishable by death with special mitigating circumstances of confession and surrender
 Imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua regardless of the presence of special mitigating circumstances because death is an indivisible penalty. Since imposition of death penalty is
prohibited by RA 9346, it will be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

People v. Armodia, 2017, J. Leonen

 Simple rape punishable by reclusion perpetua with aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship
 Even if the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were present, the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua. Article 64 provides that in all cases in which the
law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

IMPORTANT FOR THE BAR !!!

Reclusion perpetua to death

- The graver penalty of death shall be applied by the court if at least one aggravating circumstance (a) is present (0M and 1A) or (b) remains after the application of offset rule (1M and 2A);
otherwise, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be applied. HOWEVER, death penalty shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua because of RA 9346.

People v. Takbobo, 1993

 The rules of application of invisible penalty under Article 63 has no provision on special mitigating circumstances. Thus, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death cannot be lowered by
one degree (reclusion temporal), no matter how many mitigating circumstances are present.

Divisible penalties (Art. 64)

- Penalties composed of three periods

Rules:
a. Graduation
a) Priority rule – graduating factors must first be applied
b) Indivisible to divisible
b. Proper imposable period
c. Fixing the penalty

0A and 0M – medium period

0A and 1M – minimum period
1A and 0M – maximum period
0A and 2 or more M – next lower degree in an applicable period

Presence of aggravating circumstance

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When only an aggravating circumstance is present, the prescribed penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period (Art. 64[3]) The effects of ordinary aggravating circumstance and special
aggravating circumstance are the same.

The presence of ordinary or special aggravating circumstance will require the application of the prescribed penalty in its maximum period but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher
degree. However, while an ordinary aggravating circumstance can be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance, a special aggravating circumstance is not subject to the offset rule.

Multiple aggravating circumstance (Art. 64[6])

- Regardless of number of aggravating circumstances, apply the penalty in its maximum period
- The following are special aggravating circumstances:
a) Taking advantage of position
b) Organized/syndicated crime group
c) Quasi-recidivism
d) Complex crime
e) Use of loose firearm
f) Under the influence of drugs
g) Exploitation of minor

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Here, the prescribed penalty is prision mayor but with 2 aggravating circumstances. The proper imposable penalty is prision mayor in its maximum period, not reclusion perpetua.

Offset rule
- Aggravating circumstance is offset with mitigating circumstance. After applying the offset rule, if there are remaining aggravating circumstances, the penalty shall be applied in its
maximum period; if there is no remaining modifying circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its medium period; if there are remaining mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be
applied in its minimum period.

Only ordinary aggravating and mitigating circumstances are subject to the offset rule
 Privileged mitigating circumstance cannot be offset by ordinary aggravating circumstance. If privileged mitigating circumstance and ordinary aggravating circumstance attended the
commission of felony, the former shall be taken into account in graduating penalty and the latter in applying the reduced penalty in its maximum period

Presence of mitigating circumstance

When only one mitigating circumstance is present, the prescribed penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period (Art. 64[2])

Special mitigating circumstance

2 or more mitigating and no aggravating

a. 2M and 0A – lower by one degree in its medium period
 The 2 mitigating circumstances shall be considered in lowering the prescribed penalty by one degree. Since the mitigating circumstances were already used and there is no
remaining mitigating circumstance that can be used to adjust the penalty in its minimum period, the reduced penalty shall be imposed in its medium period.
b. 3M and 0A – lower by one degree in its minimum period
 The 2 mitigating circumstances shall be considered in lowering the prescribed penalty by one degree and the remaining mitigating circumstance shall be taken to apply the reduced
penalty in its minimum period
c. 4M and 0A – lower by one degree in its minimum period
 The 2 mitigating circumstances shall be considered in lowering the prescribed penalty by one degree and the remaining 2 mitigating circumstances shall be taken to apply the
reduced penalty in its minimum period

REMEMBER: Mitigating and aggravating circumstances shall not be considered in the imposition of the penalty in the following cases:
a. If the crime is imprudence or negligence (Art. 365)
b. If the penalty is single and indivisible (Art. 63)
c. If special law has not adopted the technical nomenclature of the penalties of RPC (People v. Simon, 1994)

Complex crime
- Penalty for the most serious component
- Apply Article
- Not subject to offset rule because complex crime is a special aggravating circumstance

Indeterminate penalties (ISLAW)

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What is the purpose of ISLAW?

To allow the convict to be eligible for parole
 Upon serving the minimum – accused may be released on parole
 Upon serving the maximum – accused will be released

Instances when parole and indeterminate sentence are not applicable:

a. Treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason, rebellion or sedition, espionage or piracy
b. Habitual delinquents
c. Those who have escaped from confinement in prison or evaded sentence
d. Those who violated the terms of conditional pardon
e. Maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed 1 year
f. Death penalty, life imprisonment, or reclusion perpetua
g. Use of trafficked victim

Fix the indeterminate sentence for Pedring, 17 years old boy, who was convicted again for Piracy. Under the law, the penalty imposable for Piracy is Reclusion Temporal. Take note that
he Pedring also pleaded guilty to the crime charged. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
He should be penalized with the penalty provided for under Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code without the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law because the latter excludes the crime of
piracy from its application.

What is prescribed penalty?

The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the "prescribed penalty."
For instance, under Article 249 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of imprisonment. Further, the Code provides
for attending or modifying circumstances which when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is
referred to as the "imposable penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the
RPC shall be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty actually
imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve. (People v. Temporada, 2008, En Banc)

For purposes of determining the minimum penalty, use the prescribed penalty, not imposable penalty
The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad
question of the factors and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained limits (supra.)

Maximum – within the range of the proper imposable period

Minimum – within the range of the penalty next lower in degree

Consider first the modifying circumstances under Articles 63 and 64 before applying the rules in determining minimum and maximum periods then the court may sentence the accused an
indeterminate penalty within the minimum and maximum periods

REMEMBER: For purposes of the maximum period, after knowing the penalty upon applying the rules in Article 64, such penalty is the maximum period

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ILLUSTRATIONS:

1.

Reclusion temporal with 1M and 0A – penalty is reclusion temporal in its minimum period (because of the presence of 1 mitigating circumstance)
 Maximum – anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period
 Minimum – anywhere within the range of prision mayor (6yrs and 1 day to 12yrs) which is the next lower in degree

Thus, the court may sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as maximum and anywhere within the range of
prision mayor as minimum.

2.

Reclusion temporal with 1M and 1A – penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period (because 1 mitigating circumstance was offset with 1 aggravating circumstance)
 Maximum – anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period
 Minimum – anywhere within the range of prision mayor (6yrs and 1 day to 12yrs) which is the next lower in degree

Thus, the court may sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period as maximum and anywhere within the range of
prision mayor as minimum.

3.

Prision mayor with 2M and 1A – penalty is prision mayor in its minimum period (because there is a remaining 1 mitigating circumstance after applying the offset rule)
 Maximum – anywhere within the range of prision mayor in its minimum period
 Minimum – anywhere within the range of prision correccional (6mos. and 1 day to 6yrs) which is the next lower in degree

Thus, the court may sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty anywhere within the range of prision mayor in its minimum period as maximum and anywhere within the range of
prision correccional as minimum.

4.

IMPORTANT FOR THE BAR !!!

Complex crime of direct assault with homicide. Penalty is reclusion temporal for homicide, which is the most serious component. Being a complex crime, the penalty shall be applied in its
maximum period. (Art. 48)
 Maximum – anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its maximum period
 Minimum – anywhere within the range of prision mayor (6yrs. and 1 day to 12yrs) which is the next lower in degree

Thus, the court may sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its maximum period as maximum and anywhere within the range of
prision mayor as minimum

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5.

Complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. Penalty for estafa is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, while the penalty for falsification of public document is
prision mayor. There are 2M and 0A. The penalty of prision mayor for falsification, which is the most serious component of this complex crime (Art. 48), shall be reduced to prision correccional
because of the special mitigating circumstance. (Art. 64) Being a complex crime, the penalty of prision correccional shall be applied in its maximum period. (Art. 48)
 Maximum – anywhere within the range of prision correccional in its maximum period
 Minimum – anywhere within the range of arresto mayor (1mo. and 1 day to 6 months) which is the next lower in degree

Thus, the court may sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty anywhere within the range of prision correccional in its maximum period as maximum and anywhere within the range of
arresto mayor as minimum.

6.

Randy was prosecuted for forcible abduction attended by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism. After trial, the court held that the prosecutor was able to prove the charge.
Nonetheless, it appreciated in favor of Randy, on the basis of the defense’s evidence, the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, uncontrollable fear, and provocation. Under
Art. 342 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the penalty for forcible abduction is reclusion temporal.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, what penalty should be imposed on Randy? (Bar 2018)
Reclusion temporal is a single divisible penalty. In determining the proper penalty vis-à-vis the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender,
uncontrollable fear, and provocation, Article 64 of the RPC should be applied. Pursuant to Article 64(4) of the RPC, upon offsetting one ordinary aggravating circumstance with one mitigating
circumstance, two mitigating circumstances may be appreciated in favor of the accused in determining the maximum imposable penalty. Special mitigating circumstance cannot be appreciated
because of the presence of an aggravating circumstance pursuant to Art. 64(5). Thus, the maximum imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its minimum period. The minimum imposable penalty
shall be within the range of prision mayor which is the penalty next lower to the maximum imposable penalty.

Reclusion temporal with 3M and 1A – penalty is reclusion temporal in its minimum period (applying the offset rule, there are two remaining mitigating circumstances hence, reclusion temporal
shall be applied in its minimum period)
 Maximum – anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period
 Minimum – anywhere within the range of prision mayor (6yrs. and 1 day to 12yrs)

Thus, the court may sentence the accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty anywhere within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period as maximum and anywhere within the range of
prision mayor as minimum.

7.

Accused, a minor, committed frustrated homicide. There are 4 mitigating circumstances of passion, vindication, confession and voluntary surrender and no aggravating circumstance. (1982 Bar)

The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be reduced to prision mayor because of minority. (Art. 68) Prision mayor shall be reduced to prision correccional because of the frustrated stage of the
crime. (Art. 50) Prision correccional shall be reduced to arresto mayor because of the special mitigating circumstance. (Art. 64)

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Since there are only 2 mitigating circumstances used to reduce the penalty by degree, there are still 2 more remaining mitigating circumstances that can be used to apply arresto mayor in its
minimum period, which has a range from 1 month and 1 day to 2 months. ISLAW is not applicable because the penalty is not more than 1 year. Hence, the court may sentence the accused to suffer a
straight penalty of 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor.

Straight penalty

GENERAL RULE: ISLAW is mandatory to both RPC and special law hence, straight penalty is not allowed, unless the maximum term does not exceed 1yr

EXCEPTION: Straight penalty is to be imposed if the application of ISLAW would not be favorable to the accused (People v. Nang Kay, G.R. No. L-3565, April 20, 1951)

SERVICE OF SENTENCE

Service must be successive because imprisonments, by their nature, cannot be served simultaneously. It is successive when:
a. Penalties to be served are destierro and imprisonment
b. Penalties to be served are imprisonments

EXCEPTIONS: Service is simultaneous if the nature of the penalties so permit, to wit:

a. Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
b. Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
c. Public censure
d. Suspension from public office
e. Other accessory penalties

However, the successive service of sentence is subject to the three-fold rule and 40-year limit rule.

Under the three-fold rule, in serving multiple sentences, the period of imprisonment that a convict must serve must neither be more than 40yrs nor excess three-fold the length of time corresponding
to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him to avoid the absurdity of a man being sentenced to imprisonment for a longer period than his natural life.

Under the 40-year limit rule, the maximum period of imprisonment that a convict must suffer in serving multiple penalties must not exceed 40yrs. Note that Art. 70 speaks of service of sentence,
not imposition of sentence. Thus, the court must render a verdict of guilt and sentence the accused to suffer as many penalties as there are crimes of which he is convicted.

Prescription of crime Prescription of penalty

Similarity
Both are modes of total extinguishment of criminal liability (Art. 89)
Differences
The period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by The period of prescription commences to run from the date when the culprit should evade the
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents (Art. 91) service of his sentence (Art. 93)
The running of the period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of the complaint or The running of the period of prescription is interrupted:
information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the a. If the defendant should give himself up;
accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable b. If the defendant be captures;

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to him (supra.) c. If the defendant should go to some foreign country with which the Philippine
government has no extradition treaty; or
d. If the defendant commits another crime before the expiration of the period of
prescription (supra.)
Period of prescription
Penalty imposed Prescription of crime Prescription of penalty
Death 20yrs. 20yrs.
Reclusion perpetua 20yrs. 20yrs.
Reclusion temporal 20yrs. 15yrs.
Prision mayor 15yrs. 15yrs.
Prision correccional 10yrs. 10yrs.
Arresto mayor 5yrs. 5yrs.
Arresto menor 2mos. 1yrs.

In Del Castillo v. Torrecampo (G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002), Article 93 provides when the prescription of penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run
from the date the felon evades the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the RPC, evasion of service of sentence can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final
judgment by escaping during the term of his sentence. The petitioner never served a single minute of his sentence, and thus, prescription never started to run in his favor. Clearly, one who has not
been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom. (2015 Bar)

PRESCRIPTION OF CRIME
RPC Act 3326, as amended by Act 3763
The period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the offended party, the authorities, or their agents (Art. 91) the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceeding for its investigation and punishment. (Sec. 2)
Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal 20yrs. Fine or imprisonment of not more than 1 1yr.
month or both
Afflictive penalties (prision mayor) 15yrs. Imprisonment of more than 1 month but less 4yrs.
than 2yrs.
Correctional (including destierro) 10yrs. Imprisonment for 2yrs. but less than 6yrs. 8yrs.
Arresto mayor 5yrs. Imprisonment for 6yrs. or more 12yrs.
Libel and similar offenses 1yr. Internal revenue offenses 5yrs.
Oral defamation (grave) 6mos. Municipal ordinance 2mos.
Oral defamation (simple) 2mos.
Light offenses 2mos.

INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD

RPC Special penal laws Ordinance
Filing of complaint with prosecutor Filing of complaint with MTC
The institution of the criminal action shall interrupt the Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the

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running period of prescription of the offense charged unless time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription
otherwise provided in special laws (Rule 110, Sec. 1, Rules of shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
Court) dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. (Sec. 2, Act 3326)
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure,
the period of prescription. In cases involving special laws, the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period
accused interrupts the period of prescription. (People v. Pangilinan, G.R. No. 152662, June 13, 2012) where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
(Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua, G.R. No. 169588,
While Act No. 3326 speaks of judicial proceedings to suspend the period of prescription, the commencement of proceedings for October 7, 2013)
the prosecution of the accused serves to interrupt the prescriptive period, even if the case is not filed yet with the appropriate
court. While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure
punishment" in the old law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for purposes of that among the offenses it covers are violations of municipal or
prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of
judgment stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule
ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription. (Panaguiton v. Department of Justice, G.R. No. 110. Under Section [11] of the Rules on Summary Procedure,
167571, November 25, 2008) the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court
without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation. Both parties agree that this provision does not
prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary
investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be
deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive
period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in
court and not on any date before that. This interpretation is in
consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says
that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The
proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings." (Zaldivia v. Reyes, G.R. No. 102342, July 3,
1992, En Banc)

NOTE: As regards the interruption of prescriptive period involving criminal cases governed by summary procedure, it is not yet clear. This is controversial and might not be asked in the Bar until
finally settled by the Supreme Court. Some professors believe that the filing of complaint with MTC interrupts the running of the prescriptive period pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure; whereas, some professors believe that it is the filing of complaint with prosecutor that causes the interruption pursuant to Article 91 of RPC. With regard to the first view, the basis is the
ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes (1992) and Jadewell Parking Systems Corp. v. Lidua (2013). With regard to the second view, the basis is the ruling in Francisco v. CA (1983) and People v. Bautista
(2007).

Interruption of the running of the prescriptive period involving crimes punishable under special penal laws committed by public officers

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 People v. Lee, Jr., G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019 – There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of
the period of prescription. In cases involving special laws, the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. Thus, it was
clear that the filing of the complaint against the respondent with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 1, 2014 effectively tolled the running of the period of prescription. Thus, the filing
of the Information before the Sandiganbayan on March 21, 2017, for unlawful acts allegedly committed on February 14, 2013 to March 20, 2014, is well within the three (3)-year
prescriptive period of R.A. No. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Act).
 Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862, November 3, 2020 – There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. In cases involving special laws, the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of
prescription. Since the OMB carries the mandate of investigating acts or omissions of public officers or employees, the Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the prescriptive period was
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the OMB. The OMB's conduct of a preliminary investigation carries the same effect as that originally contemplated in Act No. 3326, which is
the institution of proceedings for the investigation and subsequent punishment of the offender . The filing of the complaint with the OMB on April 27, 2016 against Perez effectively
commenced the preliminary investigation proceedings. After the filing of the complaint, the OMB was duty-bound to determine whether probable cause existed to charge Perez with the
offenses stated in the complaint. It was at that point that the prescriptive period was interrupted — approximately 14 years and five months after the commission of the alleged offense.
Although the complaint was filed at the eleventh hour, so to speak, it was still made within the 15-year period under Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

(NOTE: In the Perez case, the Court used the old prescriptive period for offenses under RA 3019. However, beginning 2016, the prescriptive period for all offenses punishable under the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act is now 20 years pursuant to RA 10910)

EFFECT OF DEATH OF THE ACCUSED

Death of the offender or accused extinguishes his criminal liability. However, death of the offended party will not extinguish the criminal liability of the offender. (People v. XXX, G.R. No. 205888,
August 22, 2018)

When the death of the offender occurs after final judgment, only his criminal liability is extinguished. However, his civil liability is not affected by his death. Hence, despite the death of a convict
after finality of conviction for theft, his heirs are obligated to return to the offended party the stolen properties.

When the death of the offender occurs before final judgment, his liability as to the personal penalties and pecuniary penalties is extinguished under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

In People v. Bayotas (G.R. No. 102007, September 2, 1994), pecuniary penalties include not only fine and cost but also civil liability arising from crime. (2000, 2004, 2013, and 2015 Bar Exams)

As a rule, Article 89 merely provides modes of criminal extinction. The modes of extinguishing civil liability are found in the Civil Code. However, there is an exception. Under Article 89, death of
the offender, which occurs before the finality of judgment, is a mode of extinguishing both criminal liability and civil liability arising from crime.

Upon death of an accused pending appeal, his criminal liability and the corresponding civil liability arising from crime are extinguished, but civil liability arising from other source of obligation
such as quasi-delict, contract, quasi-contract or law survives. (People v. Bayotas, supra)

1. Civil Liability Arising from Crime — Civil action based on crime is deemed included in the institution of criminal action. Death of the accused pending appeal will cause the dismissal of both
the criminal action and civil action since the liabilities involved therein are extinguished. (People v. Bayotas, supra)

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2. Civil Liability Arising from Other Source — Civil action based on quasi-delict, contract, quasi-contract or law is not deemed included in the institution of criminal action. Since death of the
accused pending appeal does not extinguish civil liability arising from these sources of obligation, the private complainant must file a separate civil action against either the executor or
administrator, or the estate of the accused. The statute of limitations on this surviving civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case. (People v. Bayotas, supra)

3. Civil Liability Involving Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 — In violation of B.P. Blg. 22, the civil action based on crime, quasi-delict, contract (loan or sale), quasi-contract or law is mandatorily
included
in the institution of criminal action. Since death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes criminal liability and civil liability arising from crime, both criminal action and civil action based on
crime will be dismissed. But the civil action based on contract (or other sources of obligation), which was also deemed instituted in the criminal action for B.P. Blg. 22, will not be dismissed. Hence,
the court, despite the death of the accused, must determine this surviving civil liability arising from contract. (Bernardo v. People, G.R. No. 182210, October 5, 2015) In sum, the private
complainant is not required to file a separate civil action based on contract involving a dishonored check.

4. Civil Action in General and Civil Action in B.P. Blg. 22 — Civil action in general and civil action in B.P. Blg. 22 are distinguished as follows:
1) Civil action in general is deemed included in the institution of criminal action unless the offended party made a reservation. Civil action in B.P. Blg. 22 is mandatorily included in the
institution of criminal action. Reservation is not allowed. However, civil action in general or civil action in B.P. Blg. 22 is not included in the institution of criminal action if the former was
instituted prior to the latter;
2) Only civil action based on crime is deemed included in the institution of criminal action. In B.P. Blg. 22, civil action based on crime, quasi-delict, contract, quasi-contract or law is
mandatorily included in the institution of criminal action;
3) Upon death of the accused pending appeal, the criminal action and civil action based on crime will be dismissed. Offended party must file a separate civil action based on quasi-delict,
contract, quasi-contract or law against either the executor or administrator, or the estate of the accused. The statute of limitations on this surviving civil liability is deemed interrupted during
the pendency of the criminal case.

Upon death of the accused pending appeal in B.P. Blg. 22, the criminal action and civil action based on crime will be dismissed. But the civil action based on quasi-delict, contract, quasi-
contract or law, which is included in the institution of criminal action, will not be dismissed. The court despite the death of the accused must determine this civil liability arising from
contract, quasi-contract, quasi-delict or law.

Immutability of final judgment

Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even
if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Nonetheless, the immutability
of final judgments is not a hard and fast rule as the Court has the power and prerogative to relax the same in order to serve the demands of substantial justice. (People vs. Layag, G.R. No. 214875,
October 17, 2016)

If the death of the accused happened prior to the finality of the judgment convicting him of rape and acts of lasciviousness, but the Supreme Court was belatedly informed of such death only after
the finality of such judgment, the case will be re-opened for purposes of dismissing the case. (People vs. Layag, G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016) If the penalty imposed by the trial court is
outside the range prescribed by law, the Supreme Court can re-open a final and immutable judgement to impose the correct penalty under the law. (Bigler vs. People, G.R. No. 210972, March 19,
2016; Aguinaldo vs. People, G.R. No. 226615, January 13, 2021) If the new law prescribes a lesser penalty for the crime of which the accused was previously convicted by final judgement, the
Supreme Court can re-open a final and immutable judgment to impose the lesser penalty under the new law. In sum, the new law shall be given a retroactive effect. (Hernan vs. Honorable
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5, 2017) The Layag case, Bigler and Hernan case are exceptions to the immutability of final judgment rule.

CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS

(Arts. 246-266)

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Parricide
- Offender killed his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse (Art. 246)
- Relationship required:
a. If the victim is the parent or child of the accused (i.e., offender is the child or parent of victim), the relationship may either be legitimate or illegitimate
 An offender, who killed his illegitimate mother or illegitimate son or daughter, is liable for parricide
 Killing legitimate brother or sister is not parricide since he or she is just a collateral relative of the accused
b. If the victim is the spouse, grandparent or grandchild of the accused (i.e., offender is the spouse, descendant [other than the child of the victim] or ascendant [other than the parent
of the victim]), the relationship must be legitimate
 An offender who killed his illegitimate grandchild (illegitimate daughter or his legitimate son) is not liable for parricide. The crime committed is murder or homicide,
depending upon the circumstance of the case, with ordinary aggravating circumstance of relationship.

The relationship, except the spouse, must be in the direct line and by blood

People v. Patricio, 1923, En Banc

 For absence of relationship, a stranger who participates in the perpetration of parricide is not guilty of parricide but only of murder or homicide according to the factors present in the
offense

Relationship as qualifying or alternative circumstance

 As a qualifying circumstance under Article 246 on parricide, relationship between grandparent and grandchild must be legitimate
 As an alternative circumstance under Article 15, relationship between grandparent and grandchild may be legitimate or illegitimate

Killing of an adopted son is not parricide because the relationship by adoption is not within the contemplation of Article 246. However, ordinary circumstance of relationship shall be appreciated
because Article 15 covers relationship by adoption. The adopted son shall be considered the legitimate son of the adopters for all intents and purposes. (Bar 1999)

Personal relationship
The qualifying circumstance of relationship in parricide is personal. Hence, it can be appreciated against the wife but not against a co-conspirator, who is not related to her husband, the victim.
(People v. Bucsit, 1992, En Banc) Likewise, in a conspiracy to kill a two-week-old child, the mother is liable for parricide with ordinary aggravating circumstance of treachery while her brother is
liable for murder qualified by the circumstance of treachery. (Bar 1965)

REMEMBER: Concealment of dishonor is not a special mitigating circumstance since this can only be appreciated in abortion and infanticide and not in parricide

If the accused killed a person whom he does not know to be his father, is the accused liable for parricide?
Yes. The qualifying circumstance of relationship shall be appreciated because knowledge of his relationship with the victim is not an element of parricide. Moreover, even if the intention of the
accused is merely to commit homicide, he is liable for parricide because of Article 4. In sum, he is liable for the wrongful act done, and that is, parricide, although it differs from the wrongful act
intended, and that is, homicide. (Bar 1947 & 1970)

Murder
- Offender must NOT be the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or ascendant, descendant, or spouse of the victim; otherwise, the crime is parricide under Article 246
- Killing of another person attended by any of the following circumstances:

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a) With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity
b) In consideration of a price, reward, or promise
c) By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a street car or locomotive, fall of an airship, by means of motor
vehicles, or with the use of any other means involving great waste and ruin
d) On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity
e) With evident premeditation
f) With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse (Art. 248)
- If the killing is not attended by any of these circumstances, the crime is homicide (Art. 249)

Evident premeditation

People v. Ordona, 2017, J. Leonen

 For evident premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the following must be established by the prosecution with equal certainty as the criminal act itself:
1) The time when the offender determined to commit the crime;
2) An act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and,
3) A sufficient interval of the time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
 In order to be considered an aggravation of the offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation." The date and, if possible, the time
when the malefactor determined to commit the crime is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from such date and time. Evident
premeditation must be based on external acts which must be notorious, manifest and evident not merely suspecting indicating deliberate planning. Evident premeditation like other
circumstances that would qualify a killing as murder, must be established by clear and positive evidence showing the planning and preparation stages prior to the killing. Without such
evidence, mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical and probable, will not suffice. It is indispensable to show how and when the plan to kill was hatched or how much
time had elapsed before it was carried out.
 In this regard, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in the present case. The prosecution failed to establish the time when accused-appellant resolved to
kill Hubay. There is no evidence on record to show the moment accused-appellant hatched his plan. Accused-appellant's act of lurking outside the house can hardly be considered as an over
act indicating his resolution to kill Hubay.

Treachery

People v. Malolot, 2008

 When an adult illegally attacks a child, treachery exists even if the mode of attack is not proved by the prosecution because a child of tender years could not be expected to put up a defense,
hence, is at the mercy of the assailant.
 That the victims of the Attempted Murder, Frustrated Murder and Murder — Jovelyn, Junbert and Jonathan, respectively — were minors at the time of the incident has been proven.

People v. Enojo, 2019

 The killing of a child is characterized by treachery even if the manner of the assault is not shown in the Information, as the weakness of the victim due to his tender age results in the
absence of any danger to the accused. Hence, the mere allegation of the victim's minority is sufficient to qualify the crime to murder.

NOTE: For this reason, treachery is inherent in infanticide

People v. Ordona, 2017, J. Leonen

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 The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part. Two requisites must be established by the prosecution,
namely: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself or herself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of
attack employed by him or her.
 Both elements are present in this case. Hubay, who was then unarmed, was casually outside of his residence when accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him. There was no opportunity for
Hubay to retaliate or to parry accused-appellant's attack. The facts also establish that accused appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack. Accused¬ appellant lurked
outside Hubay's residence and waited for him to appear. When Hubay emerged from the house, accused-appellant called him "Pare" while walking towards him with a bladed, weapon and
immediately stabbed him. Although the attack was frontal, it was done suddenly and unexpectedly. A frontal attack, when made suddenly, leaving the victim without any means of defense,
is treacherous. The second stabbing also indicates treachery. At that time, Hubay was already wounded and was unprepared to put up a defense.

People v. Corpin, 2019

 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means and methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and specially
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must exist: (1) the assailant
employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or
forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting
victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without risk of himself. In order to appreciate treachery, both elements must be
present. It is not enough that the attack was "sudden", "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There must also be a showing that the offender consciously and deliberately
adopted the particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution, without risk to himself.
 In this case, the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery:
First. Although the attack was sudden and unexpected as he was hacked from behind, the prosecution did not prove that Corpin deliberately chose the particular mode of attack
he used to ensure the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself. As testified by the witnesses of the prosecution, the incident happened in a public market
where there were numerous other people, including the witnesses, who could have offered their help. In a similar case, the Court held that when aid is easily available to the
victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused indeed
consciously adopted the particular means he used to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. Moreover, after he was attacked by Corpin,
Paulo was able to run away and escape, which shows that the victim had the opportunity to defend himself.
Second. Corpin did not deliberately seek the presence of the victim. As testified by the prosecution witnesses and Corpin himself, he and Paulo have been working as meat
vendors in the same public market for several years. In addition, the weapon he used to kill the victim was a butcher's knife that he regularly used for his work. In this connection,
the Court ruled in another case that the fact that the victim and the accused were already within the same vicinity when the attack happened and that the accused did not
deliberately choose the particular weapon he used to kill the victim as he merely picked it up from within his reach is proof that there is no treachery involved.
 All told, based on the first and second circumstances abovementioned, Corpin's decision to attack the victim was more of sudden impulse than a planned decision. The prosecution failed to
prove the elements of treachery. Thus, Corpin can only be held guilty of the crime of Homicide.

People v. Estacio, 2009

 In the case at bar, kidnapping was not sufficiently proven. Although appellants bound and gagged Chua and transported him to Bulacan against his will, they did these acts to facilitate his
killing, not because they intended to detain or confine him. As soon as they arrived at the locus criminis, appellants wasted no time in killing him. That appellants’ intention from the
beginning was to kill the victim is confirmed by the conversation which Sumipo heard in the car in which Maritess said that a knife would be used to kill him so that it would not create
noise. The subsequent demand for ransom was an afterthought which did not qualify appellants’ prior acts as kidnapping.
 The crime committed was plain Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will
to prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate the killing.

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Roger, the leader of a crime syndicate in Malate, Manila, demanded the payment by Antonio, the owner of a motel in that area, of P10,000 a month as "protection money". With the
monthly payment, Roger assured, the syndicate would provide protection to Antonio, his business, and his employees. Should Antonio refuse, Roger warned, the motel owner would
either be killed or his establishment destroyed. Antonio refused to pay the protection money. Days later, at round 3:00 in the morning, Mauro, a member of the criminal syndicate,
arrived at Antonio's home and hurled a grenade into an open window of the bedroom where Antonio, his wife and their three-year old daughter were sleeping. All three of them were
killed instantly when the grenade exploded.

State, with reason, the crime or crimes that had been committed as well as the aggravating circumstances, if any, attendant thereto. (Bar 2008)
Roger & Mauro conspired to commit the crime of murder qualified by treachery, with the use of means involving great waste and ruin. In this case, Mauro is liable as a principal by direct
participation by using a grenade and hurled into an open window of the victim’s bedroom. Killing the victims while they were sleeping and in no position to defend themselves, is a treacherous
act. (People v. Aguilar, 1951) The following are the aggravating circumstances:
1. Sec. 3, R.A. 8294 – when a person commits any of the crime under the RPC or special laws with the use of explosive, etc. and alike incendiary devices which resulted in the death of any
person.
2. Art. 23, R.A. 7659 – organized/syndicated crime group.

Intent to kill
- Conclusively presumed when death resulted
- If death did not result, intent to kill must be proven and inferred from (a) means, (b) nature, (c) location, and (d) number of wounds inflicted on victim

Colinares v. People, 2011

 The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. Intent to kill inferred from, among other things: (1) means, (2)
nature, (3) location, and (4) number of wounds inflicted on victim.
 Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it knocked Rufino out. The great size of his weapon produced great impact. The location of the wounds
that Arnel inflicted on his victim. The Court was inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated, homicide. In Palaganas v. People (2006), the victim did not die
because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
In the testimony of Dr. Belleza, he said that "head injuries are always very serious," but he could not say that Rufino’s wounds in this case were “fatal.” Court finds Arnel liable only for
attempted homicide and mitigated by voluntary surrender.

Qualifying circumstances must be alleged in the information

Carlito, a member of the Alpha Rho fraternity, was killed by Gerald, a member of the rival group, Sigma Phi Omega. Gerald was then prosecuted for homicide before the Regional Trial
Court in Binan, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution was able to prove that the killing was committed by means of poison in consideration of a promise or reward and with cruelty.
If you were the Judge, with what crime will you convict the accused? Explain. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
Gerald should be convicted of the crime of homicide only, because the aggravating circumstances, which should qualify the crime to murder, were not alleged in the information. The circumstances
of using poison, in consideration of a promise or reward, and cruelty could only be appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances, since none of them have been alleged in the information to
qualify the killing to murder. A qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial to be appreciated as such.

Rules in case multiple qualifying circumstances under Article 248 attended the killing:
a. Doctrine of absorption
- If there are two or more circumstances based on the same incident, only one will be appreciated while the others are absorbed

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- If the offenders, who killed the victim, took advantage of their superior strength to render him defenseless, the crime committed is murder qualified by the circumstance of
treachery. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery. If the accused, who killed the victim, took advantage of the darkness of the night to render the victim defenseless,
the crime committed is murder qualified by the circumstance of treachery. Nighttime is absorbed in treachery.
b. Rule on qualifying circumstance and aggravating circumstances
- If there are two or more circumstances attended the killing, one will be appreciated to qualify the killing into murder and the others to aggravate the criminal liability of the
accused. If the offender killed the victim with the circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, treachery shall be appreciated to qualify the killing into murder; and
evident premeditation to aggravate the criminal liability.
- As a rule, qualifying circumstances in murder under Article 248 are also listed as ordinary aggravating circumstances in Article 14. However, there are exceptions. Scoffing at the
corps and employment of means to afford impunity are qualifying circumstances in murder, but they are not an ordinary aggravating circumstance. In this situation, the
appreciation of the qualifying circumstance must be given priority over that of ordinary aggravating circumstance.
c. Rule on infanticide, parricide, murder, and homicide
- To be held liable for parricide, the killing must not constitute infanticide. In sum, the child killed by the offender must not be less than 3 years old.
- To be held liable for murder, the killing must not constitute parricide or infanticide
- To be held liable for homicide, the killing must not constitute infanticide, parricide, or murder

Homicide
- Unlawful killing of any person, which is neither parricide, murder, or infanticide
- Elements:
1) Person is killed
2) Accused killed him
3) Killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide

Robbery with homicide

In robbery with homicide, all other felonies such as rape, intentional mutilation, usurpation of authority, or direct assault with attempted homicide are integrated into this special complex crime. This
special complex crime is committed as long as death results by reason or on occasion or robbery without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime. (People vs. De Leon, 2009, J. Peralta; People vs. Jugueta, 2016, En Banc, J. Peralta) There is no special complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated
homicide. The offense should have been designated as robbery with homicide alone, regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed. (People vs. Labuguen, 2020)

Homicide component
- A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation
against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is
the main purpose, and the objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery. Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed: (a) to facilitate the robbery or the escape
of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent discovery of the commission of the robbery; or (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the
crime. (People vs. Balute, 2015)
- If the original design is to kill the victim (e.g., there is motive to kill), and accused killed him, and took his property as an afterthought, the crimes committed are homicide or murder and
theft or robbery. (People v. Atanacio, 1960; People vs. Natindim, 2020)
- In robbery with homicide, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is a bystander, a responding policeman, or one of the robbers. (People vs. Barut, 1979; People vs. Pelagio, 1967;
People vs. Casabuena, 2020)

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- The victim was shot while accused was robbing the passengers of a jeepney. Even if victim's bag was not taken, accused are liable for special complex crime of robbery with homicide. In
this special complex crime, it is immaterial that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, as long as homicide occurs by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof.
(People vs. Madrelejos, 2018)

Collective responsibility
- Case law establishes that whenever homicide has been committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty
as principals of robbery with homicide although they did not take part in the homicide, unless it appears that they sought to prevent the killing. (People v. Dela Cruz, 2008, En Banc;
People v. Castro, 2012; People vs. Labagala, 2018; People vs. Bongos, 2018, J. Peralta; People vs. Casabuena, 2020)
- Once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would all be equally liable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the
occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape. (People v. Suyu, 2006; People v. De Leon, 2009, J. Peralta; People
vs. Madrelejos, 2018; People vs. Sanota, 2019, CJ Peralta)
- However, in fine, the long line of jurisprudence on the special complex crime of robbery with rape requires that the accused be aware of the sexual act in order for him to have the
opportunity to attempt to prevent the same, without which he cannot be faulted for his inaction. (People vs. Agaton, 2020, CJ Peralta) If there is no evidence that the accused is aware of the
commission of rape, he could not have prevented the rape. Hence, the accused is only liable for robbery and not robbery with rape. (People v. Canturia, 1995)
 Canturia principle where lack of awareness is a defense is applicable to kidnapping with rape, kidnapping with homicide, robbery with homicide, and robbery with arson. (People
v. Anticamaray, 2011, J. Peralta; People v. Corbes, 1997)

Rape with homicide

The phrase “by reason of the rape” obviously conveys the notion that the killing is due to the rape, which is the crime the offender originally designed to commit. The victim of the rape is also the
victim of the killing. In contrast, the phrase “on the occasion of the rape” as shown by Senate deliberations refers to a killing that occurs immediately before or after, or during the commission itself
of the rape, where the victim of the homicide may be a person other than the rape victim. (People vs. Villaflores, 2012, J. Bersamin; People vs. Laog, 2011) For the crime of robbery with rape, the
law does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery that was accompanied by rape. (People vs. Salen, 2020, J. Leonen)

Giving assistance to suicide

Punishable acts:
a. Assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is consummated or not
b. Lending assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent of doing the killing himself

Discharge of firearm v. alarm and scandal

Discharge of firearm Alarm and scandal

(Art. 254) (Art. 155)
A crime against persons An offense against public order
The gravamen is the discharge of a firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to kill The indispensable element is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or danger to
the public

People v. Doriquez, 1968, En Banc

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 Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under Article 155(1) of the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm instituted under Article 258 (now Art. 254)
of the same Code are closely related in fact (as the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely
diverse in law.
 The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may appear to be connected in fact.
Granting that the two indictments arose from the same act — a contention traversed by the State — they describe and constitute, nevertheless, essentially different felonies having
fundamentally diverse indispensable elements.

Lack of intent is an important element of discharge of firearm

Discharging firearm with intent to kill constitutes frustrated or attempted parricide, murder, or homicide

Infanticide
- Killing of a child less than 3 days (less than 72 hours)
- If the offender is the father, mother, or any ascendant, of the child, the crime is parricide under Article 246
 If the mother killed her 2-day old child, the crime committed is infanticide
 If the mother killed her 3-day old child, the crime committed is parricide
- If the child is abandoned without any intent to kill and death results as a consequence, the crime is not infanticide but abandonment under Article 276
- PENALTY: The penalty for infanticide is that prescribed for parricide or murder. If the mother or her parents committed infanticide to conceal dishonor, the law prescribed a lesser penalty.
However, special mitigating circumstance of concealment of dishonor cannot be appreciated in abortion or infanticide committed by the father or fraternal grandparents of the
fetus or infant.
 If infanticide is committed by the mother to conceal her dishonor, special mitigating circumstance of concealment of dishonor is appreciated because it is an extenuating
circumstance
 If parricide is committed by the mother to conceal her dishonor, special mitigating circumstance of concealment of dishonor is not appreciated because the degree of motivation to
kill the child to conceal dishonor is expected to wane after the mother took care of him for 3 days or more
 If abortion is committed by the mother to conceal her dishonor, special mitigating circumstance of concealment of dishonor is appreciated. However, conceal of dishonor will not
be appreciated in favor of the parents of the pregnant mother.

Abortion

Intentional abortion Unintentional abortion

(Arts. 256, 258 & 259) (Art. 257)
Article 256 Committed by any person who unintentionally causes an abortion by violence
a. Committed by any person who caused violence upon the pregnant woman
b. Committed by any person upon the pregnant woman without violence and without her
consent
c. Committed by any person with the consent of the pregnant woman

Article 258
d. Committed by the pregnant woman, who practices an abortion upon herself or
consents that other person should do so whether or not the purpose is to conceal her
dishonor

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e. Committed by the parent of the pregnant woman with the consent of said woman for
the purpose of concealing her dishonor

Article 259
f. Committed by a physician or midwife who, taking advantage of their scientific
knowledge or skill, causes an abortion or assist in causing the same
g. Committed by a pharmacist who, without the proper prescription from a physician,
dispenses any abortive

Viability of the child

a. Pre-natal death – If the victim (embryo or fetus) is killed inside the maternal womb, the crime is abortion or unintentional abortion regardless of its viability or its intrauterine life. In sum,
regardless of whether the intrauterine life of the fetus is less than or more than 7 months, the accused is liable for abortion or unintentional abortion.
b. Post-natal death – If the victim is killed outside the maternal womb, the crime is either abortion or unintentional abortion against a non-viable fetus; or infanticide against a viable infant
with a life of less than 3 days old.

If non-viable – abortion
If viable but less than 3 days old (less than 72 hours) infanticide
If 3 days old or more – parricide (if related) or murder (if not related)

X mauled his pregnant wife without intent to kill her or abort the unborn fetus. The wife and unborn fetus died. What crime did X commit?
X committed complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion

X mauled his wife (6 months pregnant) without intent to kill or to abort. The wife died and the fetus was expelled prematurely. Fetus died after a few minutes. What crime did X
commit?
X committed complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion

X mauled his wife (6 and a half month pregnant) without intent to kill or to abort. The wife died and the fetus was expressed prematurely. After 36 hours, the infant died. What crime did
X commit?
X committed complex crime of parricide and infanticide

X mauled his wife (6 and a half month pregnant) without intent to kill or to abort. The wife died and the fetus was expressed prematurely. After 3 days, the child died. What crime did X
commit?
X committed complex crime of double parricide

Physical injuries

Why is there no crime of frustrated serious physical injuries? (Bar 2017)

The crime of physical injuries is a formal crime since a single act consummates it as a matter of law; hence, it has no attempted or frustrated stage. Once the injuries are inflicted, the offense is
consummated.

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Serious physical injuries
(Art. 263)
a. Insanity, imbecility, loss of faculty for
speech, hearing or smelling, loss of any part
of the body or use thereof, deformity,
incapacity for habitual work, permanently or
for more than 90 days
b. Incapacity or illness for more than 30 days
Less serious physical injuries Slight physical injuries
(Art. 265) (Art. 266)
Incapacitated for labor or requires medical attendance for 10 a. Incapacitated for labor or requires medical attendance for 1
days or more but not more than 30 days (10-30 days) day to 9 days (1-9 days)
b. No incapacity or illness

If the offender shall ill-treat another by deed without causing any injury, the crime committed is maltreatment (Art. 266; Bar 2012)

Tumultuous affray vis-à-vis physical injuries

Physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray is committed by person or persons identified as responsible for using violence upon a participant of a tumultuous affray, who suffered serious or less
serious physical injuries committed by an unidentified person in the course thereof. (Art. 252) The provision on physical injuries inflicted in tumultuous affray is an evidentiary measure designed to
remedy a situation where the participant thereof, who inflicted serious or less serious physical injuries upon the victim, was not identified because of the confusion. Since there is uncertainty on
whether the one, who employed violence against the victim, committed serious or less serious physical injuries or merely slight physical injuries, the former will be punished for physical injuries
inflicted in a tumultuous affray with a penalty lesser than that for serious or less serious physical injuries. Failure to identify the offender who inflicted less serious physical injury upon victim is an
important element of physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. If the accused is positively identified as a person, who inflict the injuries on the victim, the former is not entitled to the
lesser penalty prescribed for physical injuries inflicted in a tumultuous affray. In such a case, there is no confusion, which is the essence of tumultuous affray. Hence, accused is liable for
the graver crime of less serious physical injuries. (Lacson vs. People, 2020)

Rape
a. Rape through sexual intercourse (organ rape or penile rape) – By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present (Art. 266-A, first par.)
b. Rape through sexual assault (instrument or object rape, or gender-free rape) – By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault:
a) By inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice
b) By inserting any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person (Art. 266-A, second par.)

In rape through sexual intercourse, slightest touch or mere grazing of the penis to the vagina consummates the crime of rape hence THERE IS NO FRUSTRATED RAPE; only attempted or
consummated rape

People v. Orita, 1990

 Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim, he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In
a long line of cases, a uniform rule has been set that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ is sufficient.
Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no

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penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the
nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

In rape through sexual assault, mere grazing or touching is not enough; there must be insertion. Without the element of insertion, the crime is act of lasciviousness, as the case may be.

Rape through sexual assault is committed by inserting his penis into another person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. Thus, there
is no rape if an instrument or object is inserted into mouth.

Rape shield rule

Sweetheart doctrine
- May be a defense in rape under RPC but not in sexual abuse under RA 7610

People v. Fruelda y Anulao, 2020

 The "sweetheart theory" is an affirmative defense often raised to prove the non-attendance of force or intimidation. When an accused in a rape case claims that he is in a relationship with
the complainant, the burden of proof shifts to him to prove the existence of the relationship and that the victim consented to the sexual act. In rape, the 'sweetheart' defense must be proven
by compelling evidence: first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and, second, that she consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important as the first, because
this Court has held often enough that love is not a license for lust. For the Court to even consider giving credence to such a defense, it must be proven by compelling evidence. The defense
cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory. Independent proof is required — such as tokens, mementos, and photographs.

Caballo v. People, 2013

 A child is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions and in consequence, remains vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults. Unlike rape, therefore,
consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another person.

In rape, what is the proper nomenclature of the crime if the victim is less than 12 years of age and the offender is her father? Is it qualified rape or statutory rape?
Statutory rape is committed when the offender has carnal knowledge of a victim whose chronological age or mental age is below 12 years. In this kind of rape, the element of force, threat or
intimidation is not necessary. It requires the confluence of carnal knowledge and the age of the victim. Whether the sexual act is consensual, the crime is still committed since the victim cannot give
her valid consent to the act. However, the rule is different when the sexual predator is a relative included in the enumeration under Art. 266-A of the RPC. Under the law, the crime is qualified when
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim. In determining the
proper nomenclature of the crime, the relationship, as qualifying circumstance, is controlling. In this kind of rape, the age of the victim is not taken into consideration. In a 2020 case, the Supreme
Court made a categorical ruling that when there is a concurrence of both the minority of the victim and the relationship of the parties, e g. father and daughter relationship, the proper crime is
qualified, not statutory, rape even if the victim is below 12 years of age. (People v. XXX, 2020)

Generally, silence does not negate sexual molestation

As a rule, silence and lack of resistance are not defenses in rape. HOWEVER, in People v. Amogis (2001), the Court held that resistance must be manifested and tenacious. A mere attempt to
resist is not the resistance required and expected of a woman defending her virtue, honor and chastity . And granting that it was sufficient, "AAA" should have done it earlier or the moment
appellant's evil design became manifest. In other words, it would be unfair to convict a man of rape committed against a woman who, after giving him the impression thru her unexplainable silence
of her tacit consent and allowing him to have sexual contact with her, changed her mind in the middle and charged him with rape. (People v. Tionloc, 2017)

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Marital rape
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives' bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear State policy expressly legislated in
Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.

R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335 of the RPC. The law reclassified rape as a crime against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes against chastity.
More particular to the present case, and perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist's legal
relationship with his victim.

The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory (i.e., the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract) . In his appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two
incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual, obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a legally married and
cohabiting couple. He argues that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.

The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.

The ancient customs and ideologies from which the irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already been superseded by modern global principles on the equality of rights between men and
women and respect for human dignity established in various international conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in the
traditional role of men as well as the role of women in society and in the family is needed to achieve full equality between them. R.A. No. 8353 eradicated the archaic notion that marital rape cannot
exist because a husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's body and thus her consent to every act of sexual intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least, presumed. Clearly, it is
now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the
Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

A marriage license should not be viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right to control her own body, as does an unmarried
woman. She can give or withhold her consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case she refuses.

All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration that on two separate occasions,
he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's narration
as believably corroborated by the testimonies of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's torn panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason and conscience of the Court is morally
certain that the accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the nights of October 16 and 17, 1998. (People v. Jumawan, G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014)

Maria Clara rule

The Maria Clara or women’s honor doctrine is a standard used by the court in assessing the credibility of a rape victim. Under this principle, women of decent repute, especially Filipinos, would not
publicly admit that she has been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her natural instinct to protect her honor. However, the factual setting in 1960 when the “women’s honor” doctrine
surfaced in our jurisprudence is that it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault. However, the women today have over the years transformed into a strong and confidently
intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights. Thus, in assessing the credibility of a rape victim, the Maria Clara standard should not be used . The testimony of the victim must be
evaluated without gender bias or cultural misconception. It is important to weed out the Maria Clara notions because an accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim. (People v.
Amarela, 2018)

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NOTE: In People vs. Perez, 2018, and People vs. ZZZ, 2020, the Supreme Court through Justice Leonen affirmed the Amarela principle, which abandoned the Maria Clara principle. Justice Leonen
also cited the Amarela principle in People vs. Tulagan. For purpose of the 2021 Bar Exam, it is advisable that the Amarela principle should be followed.

Perez v. People, 2018, J. Leonen

 The victim had openly expressed infatuation for her assailant prior to being abused, contrary to the fictional Maria Clara stereotype. However, the victim's digression from this stereotype
neither diminished the heinousness of what was done to her. Nor did it detract from her credibility, as her testimony was independently believable and sufficiently corroborated by other
evidence adduced by the prosecution.
 Consistent with our pronouncement in Amarela, AAA was no Maria Clara. Not being the fictitious and generalized demure girl, it does not make her testimony less credible especially
when supported by the other pieces of evidence presented in this case.

People v. ZZZ, 2020, J. Leonen

 Here, AAA's account of having been attacked by accused-appellant was sufficiently corroborated by Barangay Captain Lotec's testimony that he saw AAA "pale and trembling." Such
description is based on his personal knowledge, having actually observed and spoken to AAA regarding her ordeal. This, taken with the prosecution's other corroborating evidence and
AAA's straightforward identification of accused-appellant as the perpetrator, makes AAA's testimony sufficiently credible — independent of her perceived propensity for truthfulness based
on gender stereotypes

Absorption rule
If the accused commits rape and acts of lasciviousness, the latter is absorbed by the former. (People vs. Dy, 2002) But the doctrine of absorption is not applicable to rape and sexual assault. Inserting
lighted cigarette into the genital orifice and anal orifice of the victim and raping her constitutes two separate crimes of sexual assault and rape. (People vs. Crisostomo, 2014) Inserting the penis into
the mouth of the victim and into her genital orifice constitutes separate crimes of sexual assault and rape. (People vs. Espera, 2013; People vs. Dereco, 2020, CJ Peralta)

RULE: 12yrs old or more with a mentality of less than 12yrs old
- Simple rape only
- Statutory rape if below 12yrs old

People v. Dalan, 2014; People v. Baay, 2017

 We are not unaware that there have been cases where the Court stated that sexual intercourse with a mental retardate constitutes statutory rape. Nonetheless, the Court in these cases,
affirmed the accused's conviction for simple rape despite a finding that the victim as a mental retardate with a mental age of a person less than 12 years old. Based on these discussions, we
hold that the term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 (b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental
age is equivalent to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape under
Article 266-A, paragraph l(d), should still be designated as simple rape under paragraph l(b).

People v. XXX, 2021

 Rape of a person suffering from mental retardation falls under Article 266(A)(1)(b) when the offended party is deprived of reason. It does not fall under (1)(d) which is statutory rape of a
person below 12 years old or demented

Rape of a victim "deprived of reason"

One of the "mind-boggling" questions faced by law students (and even by bar examinees) is how to treat a crime of rape where the victim is a mental retardate. Admittedly, this is difficult to
understand in view of the amendment introduced by RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law). The law, now Article 266-A of the RPC, presents four (4) circumstances by which rape by sexual intercourse can be

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committed such as: (a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; (b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and (d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

If you are confronted with a problem where the victim in a rape is a mentally-retarded person, how would you classify the crime? Is it rape falling under par. (b) – the victim is deprived of reason?
Or par. (d) – the victim is demented? Or is it statutory rape where the victim is under 12 years of age?

Who is a mentally retarded person? He or she is person suffering from a mental retardation. Mental retardation is a chronic condition present from birth or early childhood and characterized by
impaired intellectual functioning measured by standardized tests. It manifests itself in impaired adaptation to the daily demands of the individuals own social environment. Commonly, a mental
retardate exhibits a slow rate of maturation, physical and/or psychological, as well as impaired learning capacity.

Article 266-A provides for two (2) circumstances when carnal knowledge of a woman with mental disability is considered rape: Par. 1(b) and par. 1(d).
Par. 1 (b) refers to rape of a person "deprived of reason." The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to encompass those suffering from mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation.
Par. 1(d) refers to rape of a "demented person." The term "demented" means having dementia, or one defined “mental deterioration; also madness, insanity;” or a "form of mental disorder in which
cognitive and intellectual functions of the mind are prominently affected; total recovery not possible since cerebral disease is involved."

Thus, a mental retardate can be classified as a person "deprived of reason," not one who is "demented" and carnal knowledge of a mental retardate is considered rape under par. 1(b), not par. 1(d) of
Article 266-A of the RPC.

Is the mental age of a mentally retarded victim material in this crime? The Supreme Court, in a series of cases, has varied rulings on this.

In Butiong and Martinez cases (2011 and 2018, respectively), the Court emphatically declared that it is “no longer debatable that rape of a mental retardate falls under par. 1(b), not Section 1(d). The
victim referred therein refers to a rape of a female "deprived of reason."

Now, what about rape of a mental retardate whose “mental age” is that of a person below 12 years? Is it rape under par. 1(b) – as one deprived of reason or 1(d) – as a statutory rape?

In 2014 (Quintos) and reiterated in 2016 (Bangsoy), the Court clarified that a sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory
rape under par. 1(d) and not par. 1(b), Article 266-A of the RPC.

The ruling of the Court in 2017 was different. In Baay case, it held that “(i)f the victim of rape is a person with mental abnormality, deficiency, or retardation, the crime committed is simple rape
under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(b) as she is considered "deprived of reason" notwithstanding that her mental age is equivalent to that of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a
mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years, while akin to statutory rape under Article 266-A, par. 1(d), should still be designated as simple rape under par. 1(b).”

As I mentioned here, the topic is really complicated. That is why, it is necessary that one should be aware of these decisions.

So, what is now the prevailing rule? Is it rape under par. 1(b) or 1(d)? This has been settled in People v. Castillo (2020) where the Court en banc held that the accused committed statutory rape under
par. 1(d), Art. 266-A of the RPC for raping a 14-year old victim with a mental age of 5 years old. The ruling in People v. Castillo is now the prevailing doctrine.

To recap, the rule now is:

1. Rape committed against a mental retardate falls under par. 1(b) of Art. 266-A, i.e., the victim is deprived of reason, and not as demented under par. 1(d)
2. If the victim, who is mentally retardate, has a mental age below 12 years, then the rape is under par. 1(d) or – it is statutory rape. (Nojara)

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Retarded person and demented person

Describing a mentally retarded person in the information as demented is improper. A mentally retarded person is not insane or demented. However, describing the victim in the information as a
"mentally defective woman” (People vs. Martinez, 2018), or “a demented person whose mental age is below 7 years old” (People v. Caoile, 2013) is sufficient compliance with the constitutional
mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against him. If the Information alleged the victim of rape is demented, but the evidence merely proves her mental retardation, the
accused cannot be convicted of rape unless the accused failed to raise the mistake in the Information as an objection. (People v. Ventura, Sr., 2014; People vs. Eleuterio, 2018)

What is the effect as to the liability when the offender lacks awareness as to the mental condition of the victim?
The Revised Penal Code punishes rape of a mentally disabled person regardless of the perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition, proof that the accused knew of the victim’s mental
disability is important only for qualifying the charge of rape which imposes death penalty if the offender knew of the victim’s mental disability. (People v. Martinez, 2018)

If with knowledge of mental disability – qualified rape

People v. Corpuz, 2017, J. Leonen

 Rape is qualified when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical handicad of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime. This
qualifying circumstance should be particularly alleged in the Information. A mere assertion of the victim's mental deficiency is not enough. For this reason, Allan can only be convicted of
four (4) counts of rape under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, because the prosecution failed to allege the qualifying circumstance in the information.

Qualified rape
Under the RPC, penalty for qualified rape is higher because of the gravity of the means used in committing the act of rape. This kind of rape requires that the victim is below 18 years old at the time
of the rape and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
(People v. Buclao, 2014, J. Leonen)

Qualifying circumstance
- Knowledge of the mental disability of the victim is not an element of rape (People v. Caoile, 2013) but it is an ingredient of the qualifying circumstance of mental disability, which must be
alleged in the information. (People v. Obogne, 2014; People v. Lascano, 2012; People v. Madeo, 2009)
- Relationship or minority alone is not enough to qualify rape. In qualified rape, there must be a concurrence of relationship and minority. Relationship includes the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity in order to qualify rape. In this case, the accused is the cousin of the victim's father. Their relationship is fifth degree. Hence, the crime is only simple rape. (People
v. XXX, 2020)
- The accused and victim have step-relationship if the former and mother of the latter is married; without marriage, their relationship is common-law. If the information alleged that the
accused is the step-father of the victim, but the evidence shows he is the common law husband of her mother there being no marriage certificate presented, the qualifying circumstance of
relationship and minority cannot be appreciated in rape. (People vs. Tuyor, 2020, CJ Peralta; People vs. XXX, 2019)

Absolutory cause in rape cases:

a. Marriage – does not affect co-conspirators
1) In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty
already imposed upon him
2) Because of RA 8353, marriage between the offender and offended party will not extinguish the criminal liability of the co-principal, accomplice or accessory of the crime of rape

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b. Pardon – since RA 8353 reclassified rape as a crime against persons (from crime against chastity), rape is no longer considered a private crime, or one which cannot be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended party in rape as evidence by execution of affidavit of desistance will not prohibit the institution of criminal
action or the continuation of the prosecution of the offender.

CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY

(Arts. 293-332)

Persons exempt from criminal liability in crimes against property

No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and,
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.

The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. (Art. 332)

NOTE: Robbery and syndicated estafa are not included

Robbery
a. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons (Arts. 294-298)
b. Robbery by the use of force upon things (Arts. 299-305)

If violence/intimidation of persons concurs with force upon things (committed by armed persons in an inhabited house, entry having been made by breaking a wall), robbery should be regarded as a
complex crime (Fransdilla v. People, 2015, J. Bersamin)

Taking
Under Article 293, any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of violence or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything shall
be guilty of robbery. The concept of “taking” in theft or robbery by means of violence or intimidation is the same as that in robbery by using force upon thing. Like theft and robbery by means of
violence or intimidation, ability to freely dispose the property and asportation (carrying away) are not elements of this robbery by using force upon thing. But if the intention of the robbers is to
break the locked receptacle or furniture outside the building, the crime will consummate only upon removal of the receptacle or furniture from the building. With respect to this mode of committing
this crime, taking the property away or removing it from the building is an element of robbery by using force upon thing as required in Articles 299 and 302.

Frustrated robbery
Since the ability to freely dispose the property is not an element of theft, there is no frustrated theft. Thus, if the thief acquired possession over the property, physically or constructively, theft is
consummated; otherwise, it is attempted. (Valenzuela v. People, 2007, En Banc) Since the concept of taking as an element of theft is the same as that of taking as an element of robbery, the
Valenzuela principle can be applied to robbery. In sum, if the robber acquired physical or constructive possession over the property by means of violence or intimidation, robbery is consummated;
otherwise, it is attempted.

Robbery by using force upon things

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The word “things” in robbery by using force upon things pertains to the building, or receptacle or furniture in the building. The building refers to an inhabited house, public building, edifice devoted
to religious worship, uninhabited house or private building. In robbery by using force upon things, the receptacle or furniture from where the property was taken must be inside the building.

Uninhabited place is different from uninhabited house

The title of the crime under Article 302 is robbery in an “uninhabited place” or private building. The term “uninhabited place” is equivalent to “despoblado.” However, the Spanish text thereof,
which is controlling, uses the words “lugar no habitado,” which means uninhabited house for being an antonym of “casa habitado” or inhabited house. (People v. Jaranilla, 1974) Uninhabited
place (despoblado) is a concept different from uninhabited house (lugar no habitado or casa no habitado). If a residential house is located in a forest, the house is inhabited while the place is
uninhabited. If an abandoned house is located in a subdivision, the house is uninhabited while the place is inhabited.

Inhabited house and uninhabited house

The main reason why the law provides a provision on robbery involving inhabited house separate from that involving uninhabited house is to lay down the basis of imposing penalty. In robbery
involving inhabited house, the penalty is based not only on the amount of the property stolen but also on the condition that the offender is armed. If the offender is armed, there is a risk that he
will use the same in hurting the occupants of the inhabited house. The intention of the law is to discourage arming by imposing a high penalty if the offender is armed. On the other hand, in robbery
involving uninhabited house, the penalty is merely based on the amount of the property stolen. Since there are usually no persons in an uninhabited house that can be hurt by the offender, the law
does not consider being armed as a basis of imposing penalty.

Private building
A structure to be considered as a private building contemplated in robbery by using force upon thing must be habitable. Thus, a chicken coop for not being habitable is not a private building.
Breaking the coop and taking chicken therein is not robbery by using force upon things. The crime committed is theft. (People v. Jaranilla, 1974) A bodega and a store for being habitable are
private buildings. (People v. Saldua, 1978; Marquez v. People, 2012) Breaking the door of a bodega or store, entering therein, and then, taking properties therein is robbery by using force upon
things.

Force
The word “force” in robbery pertains to the mode employed by the offender to enter the building or to open the furniture or receptacle in the building to steal the property therein. There is force
upon things in robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice devoted to worship:
a. If the offender enters the house or building in which the robbery is committed, by any of the following means: (a) unlawful entry; (b) forcible entry; (c) use of false keys or picklocks or
similar tools; (d) use of fictitious name; or (e) simulation of public authority; or
b. If the robbery be committed: (a) by breaking of doors, wardrobes, chests, or any other kind of locked or sealed furniture or receptacle; or (b) by taking such furniture or objects away to be
broken or forced open outside the place of the robbery. (Art. 299)

The qualifying circumstances of using force upon things in robbery in an inhabited house are the same as those in robbery in uninhabited house or private building except use of fictitious name
and simulation of public authority. (Art. 302) Since there is usually no person in an uninhabited house, the offender cannot use fictitious name or simulation of authority as a mode to gain entry
into the building for purposes of stealing properties therein.
Entry is an indispensable element of robbery using force upon thing
In breaking the window as a qualifying circumstance of robbery by using force upon things under Article 299 or Article 302, the offender must break the window to enter the building and to take
property therein. In breaking the window as an ordinary aggravating circumstance under Article 14, the offender must break the window to commit a crime. In sum, entry into the building is
indispensable to appreciate breaking the window as a qualifying circumstance. On the other hand, entry into the building is not required to appreciate breaking the window as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance.

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One evening, A climbed the wall of a house, broke the glass of a window and from outside was able to get a watch and the wallet of the owner of the house containing money. The crime committed
is theft. Breaking the window is not a circumstance that will qualify the taking into robbery by using force upon things since this crime requires that the breaking of window is used as a mode to
enter the building. (People v. Adorno, CA 40 O.G. 567; People v. Jaranilla, 1974) In this case, A did not enter the building. He took the watch and the wallet while he was outside the house.
However, breaking the window to commit theft is an ordinary aggravating circumstance.

Entry is not an element of robbery using force upon furniture or receptacle in the building
 Article 299(a) uses the phrase “The malefactors shall enter the house by breaking the window.” Because of the words “enter the house,” entry into the building is an element of robbery
involving using force upon the building. In this sense, breaking the window as a qualifying circumstance can be described as forcible entry.
 Article 299(b) uses the phrase “The robbery be committed under any of the following circumstances: By the breaking of furniture or receptacle.” Since the words “enter the house” is not
used by this provision, entry into the building is not an element of robbery involving using force upon the furniture or receptacle in the building.

In robbery involving using force upon the building, the offender forced the building to enter therein and to take properties therein. In robbery involving using force upon the furniture or receptacle
in the building, the offender forced the furniture or receptacle to open it and to take properties therein.

A broke a window and, without entering the house, took a wooden chest lying just underneath the window. He brought out the chest to the yard where he broke it open and took away the contents
thereof. Applying the Adorno principle, the qualifying circumstance of breaking the window shall not be considered since A did not break the window to enter the house. However, taking the chest
away to be broken outside the place of the robbery can be appreciated as a circumstance that will qualify the taking into robbery by using force upon things. According to Reyes, the crime
committed is robbery by using force upon things when chest was taken therefrom and broken outside even if the culprit did not enter the building by using force upon things.

A entered the house through an opened door and took properties therein. The owner of the house suddenly locked the door. A broke the window, and escaped with the loots through the broken
window. The crime committed is theft. Robbery by using force upon things is not committed since the window was not broken to enter the building for purposes of taking property therein. Ordinary
aggravating circumstance of breaking the window cannot be considered since the window was broken to escape and not to commit a crime.

Use of picklock to enter

Using picklock to open a locked cabinet and taking property therein is not robbery by using force upon things. To constitute robbery by using force upon things, the picklock must be used to enter
the building, and not merely to open a receptacle or furniture. (U.S. v. Macamay, 1917, En Banc) In this situation, the crime committed is theft and illegal possession of picklock. (Bar 1968 and
2008)

X left for a vacation. But before doing so, he entrusted the key to the door of his house to Y. One day, Y opened the house with the said key and took properties therein. The crime committed is not
robbery by using force upon things. The key entrusted by X to Y is not a false key. Entrusted key is picklocks or similar tools, stolen key or a key, which is not intended by the owner to be used in
unlocking his house. On the contrary, the owner intended to use this key to open the door of his house. Hence, entering the building with the use of the entrusted key is theft and not robbery by using
force upon things. But the qualifying circumstance of abuse of confidence may be appreciated.

Simulation of authority to enter

As a qualifying circumstance, simulation of authority (pretending to be a police officer) must be employed as a means to enter the building. If the simulation of authority was made after the accused
barged into the house of the victim, such circumstance will not qualify the taking into robbery by using force upon things. In such case, the crime committed is either theft or robbery by means of
violence or intimidation, and simulation of authority will be considered as ordinary aggravating circumstance of disguise.

Personal property must belong to another

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a. Use of force upon thing to obtain property belonging to the robber – not liable for robbery but liable for trespass to dwelling because he entered the house against the will of the owner (Bar
2014)
b. Use of violence or intimidation to obtain property belonging to the robber:
a) Not liable for robbery but liable for grave coercion taking was with violence or intimidation
b) Not liable for any crime if taking was without violence or intimidation

Conspiracy in robbery

Johnny and Josh asked their friend, Manny, to help them rob a bank. Johnny and Josh went inside the bank, but were unable to get any money from the vault because the same was
protected by a time-delay mechanism. They contented themselves with the customers’ cellphones and a total of P5,000 in cash. After they dashed out of the bank and rushed into the car,
Manny pulled the car out of the curb, hitting a pedestrian which resulted in the latter’s death. What crime or crimes did Johnny, Josh, and Manny commit? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
Johnny and Josh committed the crime of robbery, while Manny committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Johnny and Josh are criminally liable only for the robbery, because
that was the crime conspired upon and actually committed by them, assuming that the taking of the cellphones and the cash from the bank’s customers was effected with intimidation. They will not
incur liability for the death of the pedestrian because they have nothing to do with it. Only Manny will incur liability for the death of the pedestrian, aside from the robbery, because he alone brought
about such death. Although the death caused was not intentional but accidental, it shall be a component of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide because it was committed in the
course of the commission of the robbery.

Highway robbery/brigandage under PD 532 and brigandage under RPC

The concept of highway robbery/brigandage under PD 532 is the same as that of brigandage under Article 306 of RPC. Brigands or highway robbers, whether under the RPC or PD 532, are those
who are regularly hanging or roaming on highway, and chancing indiscriminately upon travelers who they can rob or seize for extorsion. However, PD 532 has amended the provision on brigandage
by increasing the penalty. (People v. Puno, 1993) Thus, if the acts of highway robbers violate Article 306 of RPC and PD 532, they shall be prosecuted for highway robbery/brigandage under PD
532 and not brigandage under the RPC.

NOTE: RA 10951 did not amend Article 306 of RPC; hence, the governing penalty for brigandage remains to be that prescribed in PD 532

Robbery by band vs. highway robbery

Under Article 294 (5) in relation to Article 295, and Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is committed when four (4) or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All members
are punished as principals for any assault committed by the band, unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the crime. Even if the crime is committed by
several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage under Presidential Decree No. 532. It is highway
robbery only when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of committing that crime. (Amparo v. People, 2017, J. Leonen)

Brigandage Highway robbery/brigandage Robbery in band

(Art. 306, RPC) (PD 532)
Place of commission
Band is formed to commit robbery on a highway Robbery is committed on a highway Place of commission is not important
Number of offenders
At least 4 armed men Can be committed by single offender because the law uses the At least 4 armed men
words “any person” in reference to the offender
Character of offenders
Offenders are brigands or highway robbers who are regularly hanging or roaming on highways and indiscriminately chancing Offenders are not brigands or highway robbers, and thus, this

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upon travelers who they can rob or seize for extorsion and, thus, to commit these crimes, the commission of robbery must not be crime can be committed even though the commission thereof
an isolated incident and the victim must be indiscriminate. BUT, if the place of commission is not a highway, the crime is an isolated incident and the victim is pre-determined. Thus,
committed is robbery by band regardless of whether or not the victim is indiscriminate or predetermined or the incident is if the place of commission is not a highway, the crime
isolated. committed is robbery by band regardless of whether or not the
victim is indiscriminate or predetermined or the incident is
isolated.
Consummation
Formation of at least 4 armed men for the purpose of Actual commission of robbery is an indispensable element of these crimes
committing robbery on the highway consummates the crime
Presumption
Armed men are presumed brigands if one is in possession of No presumption
an unlicensed firearm

Robbery with rape

Intention to rob must precede the rape

To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur:

1. The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;
2. The property taken belongs to another;
3. The taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and
4. The robbery is accompanied by rape.

The intent to rob must precede the rape. In robbery with rape, the intention of the felony is to rob and the felony is accompanied by rape. The rape must be contemporaneous with the commission of
the robbery. Nevertheless, there is only one single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape and any crimes committed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery are merged and integrated into a
single and indivisible felony of robbery with rape. (People v. Suyu, 2006)

HOWEVER . . .

People v. Salen, 2020, J. Leonen

 For the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before, during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery that was accompanied
by rape.
 The facts do not bear out that the robbery was a mere afterthought, considering that AAA testified that accused-appellant took time to disable her and then got away with her personal
belongings. In sum, the prosecution established accused-appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He was correctly convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code.

Conspiracy in case of robbery with rape

The long line of jurisprudence on the special complex crime of robbery with rape requires that the accused be aware of the sexual act in order for him to have the opportunity to attempt to prevent
the same, without which he cannot be faulted for his inaction. (People vs. Agaton, 2020, CJ Peralta) If there is no evidence that the accused is aware of the commission of rape, he could not have
prevented the rape. Hence, the accused is only liable for robbery and not robbery with rape. (People v. Canturia, 1995)

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Theft

The elements of theft are the same as those of robbery except that in theft the taking is made without the consent of the owner while robbery is made by means of violence of intimidation or by
using force upon thing

Personal property
The term “personal property” in the Revised Penal Code is interpreted in the context of the Civil Code. The only requirement for a personal property to be the object of theft under the Revised Penal
Code is that it be capable of appropriation. It need not be capable of asportation since asportation is not an element of theft. (Medina v. People, 2015, Peralta; Laurel v. Abrogar, 2009, En Banc)
Thus, any personal property, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal, capable of appropriation can be the object of theft. Since business can be appropriated, the business of providing
telecommunication and the telephone service is a personal property. (Laurel v. Abrogar, 2009, En Banc)

Ownership is immaterial
The subject of the crime of theft is any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim thereover, it is immaterial
whether said offender stole it from the owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property. (Miranda v. People, 2012)

Taking
Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. Inability to dispose the stolen property is not
an element of theft. Unlawful taking is the element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. Without unlawful taking, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. Thus, theft
cannot have a frustrated stage. (Bar 2013)

In the jewelry section of a big department store, Juana snatched a couple of bracelets and put these in her purse. At the store's exit, however, she was arrested by the guard after being
radioed by the store personnel, who caught the act in the store's moving camera. Is the crime consummated, frustrated, or attempted? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
The crime is consummated theft because the taking of the bracelets was complete after Juana succeeded in putting them in her purse. Juana acquired complete control of the bracelets after putting
them in her purse; hence, the taking with intent to gain is complete and thus the crime is consummated.

Frustrated theft
There is no more frustrated robbery because there is no more frustrated theft. The concept of theft is the same as that of robbery – taking without consent. Frustrated theft has been deleted because
(1) the mere taking consummates the crime of theft hence, asportation is not an element of theft and (2) ability to freely dispose the property taken is not an element of theft considering that mere
use is disposition.

Swindling (estafa)

Possession de jure/juridical possession – estafa (intent to cause damage is not enough; there must be actual damage)
Possession de facto/physical possession – theft (intent to gain is enough; actual gain is immaterial)

Guzman v. CA, 1956

 There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of
the funds received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an

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independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify
him for damages suffered without his fault.

Chua-Burse v. CA, 2000

 Being a mere cash custodian, the latter had no juridical possession over the missing funds and, thus, cannot be convicted of estafa

Roque v. People, 2004

 In People v. Locson (1932), we considered deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force
to money received by a bank teller at the beginning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession. Juridical possession remains with the bank.
In line with People v. De Vera (1921), if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony committed is theft and not estafa.

Reside v. People, 2020

 Therefore, as it now stands, a sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. Notably, such material
possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. As long as the juridical possession of the thing appropriated
did not pass to the employee, the offense committed is theft, qualified or otherwise.
 Employee has physical possession hence, crime is theft
 Variance rule: charged with estafa but convicted with qualified theft
 Modifies Chua-Burse case because instead of acquitting the accused for wrong crime charged, Reside convicted the accused with qualified theft using the variance rule under Section 4 in
relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

The same outcome happened in Libunao

Libunao v. People, 2020

 Petitioner received the payments of the customers of Baliuag on behalf of the latter. In fact, as provided in the Information, petitioner received the payments of the customers of Baliuag in
her capacity as cashier of the latter. Thus, petitioner only had material possession over the money paid by the customers of Baliuag. Petitioner was merely a collector of the payments and
she has the obligation to immediately remit the same to Baliuag. Petitioner's function as cashier of Baliuag is akin to that of a bank teller who has no juridical possession over the missing
funds. Therefore, petitioner cannot be convicted of Estafa through misappropriation.
 While it is true that petitioner did not acquire juridical possession of the payments made by the customers of Baliuag, and hence, she cannot be convicted of Estafa through
misappropriation, petitioner can nevertheless be convicted of Simple Theft, under Article 308 of the RPC, since the Information filed against her sufficiently alleged all the elements of
Theft. It is settled that what controls is not the designation of the offense but the description thereof as alleged in the Information.
 The elements of the crime of theft are: (1) there was taking of personal property; (2) the said property belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the consent of the owner; (4) the
taking was with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was done without violence or intimidation against persons, or force upon things. In this case, the prosecution has sufficiently established
that petitioner, as cashier and over-all in charge of the store in San Miguel, prepared the sales invoices of the customers of Baliuag and collected payments of the customers. In fact,
customers of Baliuag testified that they already paid petitioner the amount corresponding to the questioned sales invoices. Despite receipt of the said payments, petitioner failed to remit the
same to Baliuag. The fact that petitioner took the payments without the consent of Baliuag was established when petitioner failed to account for the same when demanded.

If the offender is not an employee (president of corporation), the crime is estafa

Can a person charged with qualified theft be convicted of estafa?

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As a rule, no. As provided in Article 310, qualified theft is defined as the taking of one’s property without the owner’s consent, and must be done by a domestic servant, with grave abuse of
confidence, if the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter, or cattle, consists of coconuts from premises of plantation, fish from fishpond, and taken during a calamity. Also, in theft, he only
took material possession of the thing. Estafa is defined as defrauding another through abuse of confidence or through means of deceit, where the owner consented to the voluntary giving of a thing
to the offender and was entrusted to take care of it for administration, trust, or commission. Thus, in qualified theft, the owner did not consent to the taking of the property, while in estafa, there is a
voluntary entrustment of the property. HOWEVER, by applying the variance doctrine pursuant to Tan v. People (2020), it may well be possible to convict an offender with the crime of estafa even
if he is charged in the information for the crime of qualified theft.

Ana is a bookkeeper of a bank. As such, Ana was authorized to collect and/or accept loan payments from the bank’s clients, accomplish a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking
day, and remit such payments to her supervisor. It was later on discovered, however, that Ana failed to remit some loan payments made by the bank’s clients. It was later on found out
that she used the said loan payments for her own benefit. When the bank discovered Ana’s dishonesty, it filed a case for Theft. During the preliminary investigation of the case, Ana
argued that she could not be held liable for theft, because technically, there was no taking of personal property considering that it is one of her duties to receive loan payments from the
bank’s clients. After due hearing, Prosecutor Elsa filed an Estafa case against Ana.

Is the ruling of the Prosecutor Elsa correct? Explain. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
No. The ruling of Prosecutor Elsa is incorrect. The crime committed is Theft. Records show that Ana was merely a collector of loan payments from the Bank's clients. At the end of every banking
day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she takes
custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day. Hence, as an employee of the Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no juridical
possession over the missing funds but only their physical or material possession. Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent who could have asserted a right
against the Bank over the same, Ana had only acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be charged for the crime of Estafa. In fine, the dismissal of the
Estafa charge against Ana should come as a matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the appropriate criminal charge against her as may be warranted under the circumstances of
this case. (Benabaye v. People, 2015)

Gringo was the managing director of Full Systems Exhaust Co. The company gave Gringo a number of machineries and equipment vital to the operations of the company for his
management, care, and custody. For months, Gringo did not receive his salary from Full Systems Exhaust Co. This prompted him not to return the machineries and equipment despite
the repeated demands of the company president. He claims that he has a lien over the subject properties.

May Gringo be held criminally liable? Explain. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
Yes. Gringo may be held criminally liable for the crime of estafa under Art. 315 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. A person is guilty of estafa if he is under the obligation or duty to return the property
but failed to return the same. It is immaterial even if a person merely retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his right of lien over them. Failure to return upon demand the properties
which one has the duty to return is equivalent to appropriating the same for his own personal use. (D’Aigle v. People, 2012)

Compromise or novation under estafa

- Criminal liability for estafa already committed is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted and punished by the State (People
v. Moreno, 1999)
- Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability. Article 89 (on total extinguishment) and Article 94 (on partial extinguishment) of the Revised Penal Code list down
the various grounds for the extinguishment of criminal liability. Not being included in the list, novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the liability, and, for that reason, is
not an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only the State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused. The role of novation may only be either to prevent the rise of
criminal liability, or to cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or not it was such that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal responsibility,
as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or other similar disguise is resorted to. (Degaños v. People, 2013, J. Bersamin)

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Degaños v. People, 2013, J. Bersamin

 Degaños claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his contract with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from criminal to civil. He insists that his
failure to complete his payments prior to the filing of the complaint-affidavit by the complainants notwithstanding, the fact that the complainants later required him to make a formal
proposal before the barangay authorities on the payment of the balance of his outstanding obligations confirmed that novation had occurred.
 Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may relieve an offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen here, for the partial payments and the
proposal to pay the balance the accused made during the barangay proceedings were not at all incompatible with Degaños' liability under the agency that had already attached. Rather than
converting the agency to sale, therefore, he even thereby confirmed his liability as the sales agent of the complainants.

Art. 315(2)(a)
- By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits

Accused fraudulently offered to sell to private complainant a share over Subic Island Club, while concealing from the former the material fact that accused has yet to secure the requisite
licenses and registration with the SEC to sell shares of the project and from the DENR and HLURB to develop and construct the same. Relying on the accused’s misrepresentations,
private complainant paid him the total amount of P835,999.94, as consideration but he was never able to gain possession of a Certificate of Membership given accused’s continued failure
to proceed with the project. Nonetheless, private complainant did not present evidence that accused misappropriated the amount he has given to him.

Can the accused be held liable for estafa under Article 315(2)(a)?
Yes. Unlike estafa under paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2(a) of that provision does not require as an element of the crime proof that the accused misappropriated
or converted the swindled money or property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent representation. The
prosecution in this case discharged its evidentiary burden by presenting the receipts of the installment payments made by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share. (Lopez v. People, 2013)

Art. 315(2)(d)
- By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) clays from receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder
that said check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prime facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
- Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) hereof shall be punished by:
1) The penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, if the amount of fraud is over Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000) but does not exceed Eight million
eight hundred thousand pesos (₱8,800,000). If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua.
2) The penalty of reclusion temporal in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over Two million four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000) but does not
exceed Four million four hundred thousand pesos (₱4,400,000).
3) The penalty of prisión mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over One million two hundred thousand pesos (₱1,200,000) but does not exceed Two million
four hundred thousand pesos (₱2,400,000).
4) The penalty of prisión mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos
(₱1,200,000).
5) By prisión mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000).

A chance meeting between Diana and Roma got them to converse. Diana learned that Roma had just opened a hardware store. Diana, on the other hand, needed to procure materials for
the construction
of his apartment house. Diana proposed to buy, and Roma agreed to sell, the items that the latter could supply on cash basis. As orders were placed on different dates by Diana, so also
were deliveries made by Roma. Each time, no payment was made; deliveries, however, continued until the total unpaid account reached P100,000.00. Roma kept on making demands for

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payment but Diana, on every such occasion, would ask for an extension of time within which to pay. Later on, Diana issued a check in favor of Roma as payment for her total
accountability. When presented for encashment, the check was dishonored, because the bank account had by then already been closed. Demands for payment of the due obligation were
again made by Roma, but the same fell on deaf ears. Hence, Roma filed a case for Estafa under paragraph 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code against Diana.

Will the case filed by Roma prosper? Explain. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
No. The law penalizes the issuance of a check only if it were itself the immediate consideration for the reciprocal receipt of benefits. In other words, the check must be issued concurrently with, and
in exchange for, a material gain to make it a punishable offense under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. In the issuance of a check to pay a pre-existing obligation, as in the
instant case, the drawer derives no such contemporary gain in return since the obligation sought to be settled is already incurred and outstanding before the check is issued. (Castro v. Mendoza,
1993)

Other forms of swindling. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium period and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value,
shall be imposed upon:
a. Any person who, pretending to be owner of any real property, shall convey, sell, encumber or mortgage the same .
b. Any person, who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded.
c. The owner of any personal property who shall wrongfully take it from its lawful possessor, to the prejudice of the latter or any third person.
d. Any person who, to the prejudice of another, shall execute any fictitious contract.
e. Any person who shall accept any compensation given him under the belief that it was in payment of services rendered or labor performed by him, when in fact he did not actually perform
such services or labor.
f. Any person who, while being a surety in a bond given in a criminal or civil action, without express authority from the court or before the cancellation of his bond or before being relieved
from the obligation contracted by him, shall sell, mortgage, or, in any other manner, encumber the real property or properties with which he guaranteed the fulfillment of such obligation.
(Art. 316)

Nery owned a parcel of land with an area of 1,452 square meters. Nery agreed to sell 295 sq.m. of her land to Mario in installment basis. Nery obliged herself to deliver to the spouses the
title to this portion of land free from all liens and encumbrances upon full payment by the said vendee of the purchase price. Nery later on mortgaged to a bank the entire lot, including
the portion subject of their agreement. When Mario completed their payment of the installments, he demanded from Nery the delivery of the title for the portion he bought and the
execution of the corresponding absolute Deed of Sale for said property. Nery executed a Deed of Absolute Sale for the lot in question with a statement in his Deed of Conveyance that the
subject land sold is “free from all liens and encumbrances” despite the fac that there was still an existing mortgage thereon in favor of the bank.

Did Nery commit any crime?

Yes, Nery committed other forms of swindling under Article 316(2). She placed an express warranty in the Deed of Absolute Sale that the lot in question is free from all liens and encumbrances,
when it was not so in fact. As fraud involves acts or spoken or written words by a party to mislead another into believing a fact to be true when it is not in fact — that express warranty in the Deed
of Absolute Sale covering the lot in question that said land is "free from all liens and encumbrances" constitutes the false representation or deceit and one of the elements giving rise to the crime of
estafa. Nery cannot rightfully claim that no damages on complainant was brought about by the false warranty made in the Deed of Absolute Sale. Mario’s damage inherently consists in his inability
to receive a property free from encumbrances. As the rightful vendee, he would acquire title to the property but subject to the restrictions of the existing liens. (Antazo v. People, 1985)

CRIMES AGAINST LIBERTY

(Arts. 267-274)

Illegal detention

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Public officer may be liable for illegal detention

In arbitrary detention, the public officer must arrest a criminal suspect in pursuit of his authority to make arrest. If the public officer acted in their purely private capacity, the crime is illegal
detention.

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention Slight illegal detention

(Art. 267)
Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him
of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
a. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five (5) days.
b. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
c. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
d. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of
extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-
mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
(Art. 268)
The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be imposed upon any private individual who shall
commit the crimes described in Article 267 without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated therein. The same penalty shall be incurred by anyone who shall furnish the place
for the perpetration of the crime.
If the offender shall voluntarily release the person so kidnapped or detained within three (3)
days from the commencement of the detention, without having attained the purpose intended,
and before the institution of criminal proceedings against him, the penalty shall be prisión
mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand
pesos (₱100,000). (as amended by RA 10951)

Kidnapping with rape

- Taking of the victim was without lewd design

Forcible abduction with rape

- At the outset, there is already lewd design

People v. Mirandilla, 2011

 Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime is only one kidnapping with rape. This is
because these composite acts are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659 punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659 depreciated the
seriousness of rape because no matter how many times the victim was raped, like in the present case, there is only one crime committed — the special complex crime of kidnapping with
rape.

Death in the course of kidnapping

- Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or
homicide can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended
by RA No. 7659. (People v. Mercado, 2000, En Banc; People v. Elizalde, 2016, J. Peralta)

Can a parent be guilty of kidnapping?

Yes. If the person committing any of the crimes covered by Article 270 and Article 271 shall be the father or the mother of the minor, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding Forty
thousand pesos (₱40,000), or both.
 Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall
deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.

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 Art. 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. - The penalty of prisión correccional and a fine not exceeding One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) shall be imposed upon anyone who
shall induce a minor to abandon the home of his parents or guardians or the persons entrusted with his custody.

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

(Arts. 161-189)

Falsification by public officer, employee or notary public or ecclesiastical minister

Under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, for falsification of a public document to be established, the following elements must concur:
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
2. That he takes advantage of his official position;
3. That he falsifies a document by committing any of the following acts:
a. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
b. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
c. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them;
d. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
e. Altering true dates;
f. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;
g. Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or
different from, that of the genuine original;
h. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry or official book

Undeniably, the foregoing elements of the crime were proven in the present case. The accused-petitioner is a public officer who has taken advantage of his position to commit the felonious acts
charged against him, i.e. knowingly subscribing or signing the oath as administering officer the affidavits mentioned in the informations under false circumstances. The accused-petitioner's acts of
signing the oaths as administering officer in the said affidavits were clearly in abuse of the powers of his office for his authority to do so was granted to him by law as municipal mayor and only in
matters of official business.

In Lumancas v. Intas (2000), this Court held that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of
the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.

Petitioner is consistent in his repeatedly decries stand that there is no proof that he authored such falsification or that the forgery was done under his direction. This argument is without merit. Under
the circumstances, there was no need of any direct proof that the petitioner was the author of the forgery. As keenly observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner notarized the Joint Affidavits
allegedly executed by Querubin and Aniceto whom petitioner admittedly never met and who were later proven to have been incapable of signing the said affidavits. Petitioner's signature also
appeared as the attesting officer in the Affidavits of Ownership, nine of which were undoubtedly without the participation of the indicated affiants. (Lonzanida v. People, G.R. Nos. 160243-52, July
20, 2009)

Taking advantage
- Offender really has the duty; he just took advantage of it

When is the offender considered to have taken advantage of his official position?

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a. Offender has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document
b. Offender has the official custody of the document which he falsifies (Typoco v. People, 2017, J. Peralta)

X and Y approached Mayor Z and requested him to solemnize their marriage. On the day of the ceremony, X and Y proceeded to Mayor Z's office but he was not there. Mayor Z's chief
of staff, Mr. U, however, represented that he himself can solemnize their marriage and just have Mayor Z sign the marriage certificate when the latter comes back. Consequently, upon X
and Y's assent, Mr. U solemnized the marriage, despite his lack of authority therefor.

a. What crime may Mr. U be charged with under the Revised Penal Code (RPC)? Explain.
Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions. (Art. 177) The elements are as follows:
1) The offender performs any act;
2) Pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof;
3) Under pretense of official position; and
4) Without being lawfully entitled to do so.

In this case, Mr. U falsely misrepresented himself as having the authority to solemnized the marriage when he in fact, did not, and as such, he usurped the authority and functions of Mayor
Z.

b. Assuming that Mayor Z signed the marriage certificate which stated that he solemnized the marriage of X and Y, what crime may Mayor Z be charged with under the RPC?
Explain.
Falsification by a public officer. (Article 171) Article 171 punishes public officers for falsifying a document by making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes
its meaning. The elements of falsification under this provision are as follows:
1) The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public;
2) The offender takes advantage of his or her official position; and
3) The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under Article 171.

Here, Mayor Z falsified said document in violation of Article 171.

A public officer who did not take advantage but committed acts of falsification is deemed a private individual under Article 172

Specific to Article 171(4), i.e., making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the elements are:
1. The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
2. The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him or her; and,
3. The facts that he or she narrated are absolutely false.

Legal obligation to disclose the truth

The prosecution need not identify a specific provision of law under which the accused has the obligation to disclose the truth. As long as the offender has such obligation from the very nature and
purpose of the document (Solis v. Sandiganbayan, 2018, J. Leonen)

Intent to gain is not important in falsification of public document under Article 171
- What is punished by law is the violation of public faith and destruction of the truth solemnly proclaimed (People v. Pacana, 1924)

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GENERAL RULE: Intent is not a defense in falsification

EXCEPTION: All heads of offices may rely in good faith on their subordinates who prepare bids, purchase of supplies, or negotiations (Arias principle)

Arias principle

GENERAL RULE: Heads of office can rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates on preparation of bids, purchase of supplies, or negotiations . Any executive head agencies or commissions
can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. Thus, executive head cannot be convicted on the sole basis of signature or approval appearing on a voucher. (Arias v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 81563, December 19, 1989)

EXCEPTION: The Arias principle is not applicable in the following cases:

a. For the Arias doctrine to apply, however, there must be no reason for the head of offices to go beyond the recommendations of their subordinates , which is not the case here. Given the
amounts involved and the timing of the alleged deliveries, the circumstances reasonably impose on Espina a higher degree of care and vigilance in the discharge of his duties. Thus,
he should have been prompted to make further inquiry as to the truth of his subordinates' reports. Had he made the proper inquiries, he would have discovered the non-delivery of the
procured items and the non-performance of the procured services, and prevented the unlawful disbursement. However, he did not do this at all. Instead, he blindly relied on the report and
recommendation of his subordinates and affixed his signature on the IRFs. Plainly, Espina acted negligently, unmindful of the high position he occupied and the responsibilities it carried,
and without regard to his accountability for the hundreds of millions in taxpayers' money involved. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Espina, G.R. No. 213500, March 15, 2017)
b. Simply put, when a matter is irregular on the document's face, so much so that a detailed examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing. Petitioner Typoco, therefore
cannot rely on the Arias doctrine because the falsification of the documents in it was not apparent. As discussed above, aside from the alteration in the subject PO, the other documents were
also obviously tampered which could have not escaped his attention. (Typoco v. People, G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017)
c. To clarify, the Arias doctrine is not an absolute rule. It is not a magic cloak that can be used as a cover by a public officer to conceal himself in the shadows of his subordinates and
necessarily escape liability. Thus, this ruling cannot be applied to exculpate the petitioners in view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have prompted them, as heads of
offices, to exercise a higher degree of circumspection and, necessarily, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared. Here, there were discrepancies in the voucher and the check,
which should have prodded petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang to examine the supporting documents for the fund disbursement. Thus, as properly held by the Sandiganbayan,
Arias is not applicable, and petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang were properly found guilty of malversation through negligence. (Escobar v. People, G.R. No. 205576, November 20,
2017, J. Leonen)

RULE: If there is a reason to go beyond the face of the document, Arias principle does not apply

Intent to injure government or to cause damage is immaterial in falsification of public document

- But, the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not
exist the essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by Article 3 of the Penal Code.
- It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is necessary
for the safeguard and protection of that general interest
- The time records have already served their purpose. They have not caused any damage to the government or third person because under the facts duly proven, petitioner may be said to have
rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper permission from her superiors. They may now even be condemned as having no more use to require their continued safe- keeping.
Public interest has not been harmed by their contents, and continuing faith in their verity is not affected. (Beradio v. CA, infra.)

The Beradio case must be distinguished in other cases involving public documents affecting the public welfare

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Ana counterfeited the signature of Brenda but what she entered in the SALN are all true and correct. Is there a crime committed?
Yes. In falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What is important is the fact that the signature of another was counterfeited. In a
crime of falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. Thus, intent to gain or inure is
immaterial. Even more so, the gain or damage is not necessary. (Caubang v. People, 1992)

 Intent to cause damage is not element in falsification of public document under Article 171
 Intent to cause damage is an element in falsification of private document under Article 172

Malabanan v. Sandiganbayan, 2017

 On September 1, 2004, Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the necessary papers to liquidate the cash advance. In his Post Travel Report, he declared that his official travel transpired on
July 28 to 31, 2004. He likewise attached an altered PAL ticket in support of his Post Travel Report. The date “August 22, 2004” was changed to read “July 28, 2004) and the flight route
“Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato” appearing on the PAL ticket was altered to read “Davao-Manila-Cotabato.” Accused was charged with falsification under Article 171 but was convicted of
falsification of a private document under Article 172.
 Comparing the two provisions and the elements of falsification respectively enumerated therein, it is readily apparent that the two felonies are different. Falsification under paragraph 2 of
Article 172 goes beyond the elements of falsification enumerated under Article 171. The former requires additional independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third
person.42 Simply put, in Article 171, damage is not an element of the crime; but in paragraph 2 of Article 172, or falsification of a private document, damage is an element necessary for
conviction. Therefore, not all the elements of the crime punished by paragraph 2, Article 172 are included under Article 1 71. Specifically, the former offense requires the element of
damage, which is not a requisite in the latter. Indeed, the Information charging Alid of a felony did not inform him that his alleged falsification caused damage or was committed with intent
to cause damage to a third party. Since Alid was not specifically informed of the complete nature and cause of the accusation against him, he cannot be convicted of falsification of a private
document under paragraph 2 of Article 172. To convict him therefor, as the Sandiganbayan did, violates the very proscription found in the Constitution and our Rules of Criminal
Procedure. On this ground alone, we find that the court a quo erred in its decision.
 Notwithstanding the erroneous conviction meted out by the Sandiganbayan, this Court proceeds to peruse the nature of the crime established in the records of this case. Guillergan v.
People declares that the falsification of documents committed by public officers who take advantage of their official position under Article 171 necessarily includes the falsification of
commercial documents by private persons punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172.
 Analyzing these felonies, we find that neither of them include damage or intent to cause damage as an element of the crime; and that Article 171 encompasses all the elements required in a
conviction for falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172. Thus, in Daan v. Sandiganbayan, we allowed the accused facing Informations for falsification of public documents under
Article 171 to plead guilty to falsification under Article 172. We specifically stated that in the charge for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense
of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the time book and payroll of the
Municipality of Bato, Leyte. Here, if the records show sufficient allegations that would convict Alid of paragraph I of Article 172, the Sandiganbayan is bound to sentence him to that lesser
offense.1âwphi1 But, as mentioned, it overlooked this provision and jumped to convicting him of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172. As discussed, the latter felony is not
covered by his indictment under Article 171.
 Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. Such intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a
person. Thus, the acts of Alid must have displayed, with moral certainty, his intention to pervert the truth before we adjudge him criminally liable. In cases of falsification, we have
interpreted that the criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases showing that (1) the accused did not benefit from the falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to the
government or to a third person. Here we find that, similar to Amara, Jr. and Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, there is no moral certainty that Alid benefitted from the
transaction, with the government or any third person sustaining damage from his alteration of the document. The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the PAL Ticket just
to be consistent with the deferred date of the turnover ceremony for the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of the DA Central Office in Quezon City. Notably, he had no control as to the
rescheduling of the event he had to attend. Neither did the prosecution show that he had incurred any additional benefit when he altered the document. Moreover, after he submitted the

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PAL Ticket that he had used to support his liquidation for a cash advance of ₱10,496, the public funds kept by the DA remained intact: no apparent illegal disbursement was made; or any
additional expense incurred.
 Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket - to remedy his liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his rescheduled travel - we find no malice
on his part when he falsified the document. For this reason, and seeing the overall circumstances in the case at bar, we cannot justly convict Alid of falsification of a commercial document
under paragraph 1 of Article 172.

Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents

a. Private individual who commits any of the acts of falsification in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any commercial document
b. Any person, who to the damage of third party, or with intent to cause such damage, shall in any private document committed any of the acts of falsification
c. Use of falsified document in a judicial proceeding or use in any other transaction (Art. 172)

NOTE: Article 171(7) cannot be committed by a private individual

- Issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from,
that of the genuine original

Azalea executed a Last Will and Testament. In said document, there were four (4) instrumental witnesses that were written, namely Wona, Xenxen, Yana, and Zinia. When Azalea signed
the Last Will and Testament, only witnesses Wona, Xenxen, and Yana were present and they were able to sign above their respective names. The name of Zinia had no signature at that
time. After Azalea, Wona, Xenxen, and Yana signed the document, Notaryo affixed his signature as the notary public. One (1) day after it has been notarized, one of the heirs of Azalea
showed Zinia the said Last Will and Testament. Zinia then affixed his signature above her name as one of the written witnesses. Subsequently, Notaryo was charged with falsification of
public document. The prosecution's theory, is that a falsity in a public document occurred, because Notaryo failed to delete Zinia's name in the Joint Acknowledgment. The trial court
convicted him on the ground that he made it appear that Zinia appeared before him and witnessed the execution of the Last Will and Testament. The trial court ruled that Notaryo
should have been aware of the legal consequences of leaving Zinia’s name on the document despite her absence and thus, Notaryo should have removed Zinia’s name from the document.

Is the ruling of the trial court correct? Explain. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
No. The ruling of the trial Court convicting Notaryo of falsification of a public document is erroneous. The due execution of a notarized will is proven through the validity of its attestation clause.
The
prosecution must prove that either the testator could not have authored the instrument, or the instrumental witnesses had no capacity to attest to the due execution of the will. Here, Notaryo was
found to have falsely certified in the Joint Acknowledgment that Zinia was an instrumental witness to the execution of A's Last Will and Testament, since he did not sign it in Azalea's presence. The
trial court, however, disregarded one crucial detail from its finding of facts: Zinia signed the Joint Acknowledgment after it was notarized by Notaryo. Thus, when Notaryo certified that the persons
who attested and subscribed to the document were present before him, there could have been no falsity. It was not Notaryo who made it appear that Zinia participated in the execution of the Joint
Acknowledgment, but Zinia himself. (Constantino v. People, 2019, J. Leonen)

Ms. Dimatinag was a utility worker at a private university. She made it appear on her leave application that she was on forced leave and vacation leave when in fact, she was serving a 20-
day prison term for a conviction she had for a crime of slight physical injuries. Ms. Dimatinag was able to receive her salary, since her leave was approved. Ms. Dimatinag’s supervisor,
Mr. Dimaano claims that the former is not entitled to receive her salary, because of her falsified leave application. Mr. Dimaano thereafter filed a case against Ms. Dimatinag for
falsification of public document.

Is Ms. Dimatinag liable for the crime? Explain. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
No, Ms. Dimatinag is not liable for the crime of falsification of public document. One of the requisites of falsification of public document is that the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated in the document. There is no law imposing upon Ms. Dimatinag the legal obligation to disclose where she was going to spend her leave of absence. Thus, Ms. Dimatinag

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may not be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making false statements in a narration of facts without any legal obligation to disclose where she was going during her
vacation and forced leave. (Enernecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, 2004)

Falsification and estafa

There is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document considering that the damage essential to both is the same. As a result, having such offenses compounded or
complexed in accordance with Article 48 9 of the Revised Penal Code is inherently disallowed. If falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, it is falsification. If
estafa can be committed without the necessary of falsifying a document, it is estafa. (Batulanon v. People, 2006; Co v. People, 2019, CJ Bersamin)

ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN & THEIR CHILDREN ACT

(RA 9262)

Rudy and Lorna were childhood sweethearts. Unfortunately, their relationship ended when Rudy courted Rosanna. Nevertheless, they continued to be neighbors and acted civil in each
other’s presence. One day, Lorna accosted Rudy when his goats grazed upon Lorna’s beautiful garden and levelled it to the ground. The verbal confrontation eventually turned physical,
when Rudy slapped Lorna, who retaliated by kicking him in between legs. They were pacified by people passing by. A week after, Lorna filed a case for violation of the Republic Act
9262, contending that the assault on her by Rudy constituted violence against women under the law, since they used to be sweethearts. Rudy did not deny that they had such relationship
several years back, but contended that the law was not applicable to the case, because their fights had nothing to do with the same. Eventually, the case was filed in court and Rudy was
convicted for physical violence under Republic Act 9262. Rudy appealed the case contending among others that if ever, he should be liable for serious physical injuries only, because the
injuries which Lorna allegedly suffered was not related to their previous relationship.

Should Rudy’s conviction under Republic Act 9262 be affirmed? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
Yes. For RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence exerted by the offender upon the offended party be a consequence of a dating relationship. It is immaterial whether
the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was
committed. (Dabalos v. RTC, Br. 59, Angeles City (Pampanga), G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013)

SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AGAINST ABUSE, EXPLOITATION & DISCRIMINATION ACT

(RA 7610)

SEXUAL CRIMES COMMITTED AGAINST A CHILD

Means committed
a. Through force, threat or intimidation
b. When deprived of reason or unconscious
c. Through fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority
Through exploitation in prostitution and other sexual abuse
(i.e. for money, profit or any other consideration or due to
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group)
With consent (without qualifying circumstances under RPC
Sexual intercourse
Below 12yrs old or demented
Statutory rape under Art. 266-A(1)(d), RPC (reclusion
perpetua, except when the victim is below 7 years old in which
case death penalty shall be imposed) (People v. Tulagan,
2019, En Banc)
12yrs old but below 18yrs old or 18yrs old or older but
unable to take care of himself due to physical or mental
disability of condition
Rape under Art. 266-A, RPC (reclusion perpetua) (People v.
Tulagan, 2019, En Banc)
Sexual abuse under Sec. 5(b), RA 7610 (reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion perpetua) (People v. Tulagan,
2019, En Banc)
No crime – technically, there is no rape or sexual abuse

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and RA 7610) (Monroy v. People, 2019; Bangayan v. People, 2020)

Introduction of any
object into the genitalia, anus or mouth
(this act is covered by both lascivious conduct under the IRR of RA 7610 and rape by sexual assault under Art. 266-A[2], RPC, as amended by RA 8353; this is not covered by acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336, RPC)
Below 12yrs old or demented 12yrs old but below 18yrs old or 18yrs old or older but unable to take care of himself due
to physical or mental disability of condition
Rape by sexual assault under Art. 266-A(2), RPC, in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610: Lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b), RA 7610: reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion temporal in its medium period (People v. Tulagan, 2019, En Banc) reclusion perpetua (People v. Tulagan, 2019, En Banc)
Other forms of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct
Below 12yrs old or demented 12yrs old but below 18yrs old or 18yrs old or older but unable to take care of himself due
to physical or mental disability of condition
Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336, RPC, in relation to Sec. 5(b), RA 7610: reclusion Lascivious conduct under Sec. 5(b): reclusion temporal in its medium period (People v. Caoili,
temporal in its medium period (People v. Caoili, 2017, En Banc; People v. Tulagan, 2019, En 2017, En Banc; People v. Tulagan, 2019, En Banc)
Banc)

Lagertha, an 11-year old girl, was walking along the estero of her Barangay when Ragnar, her neighbor of legal age, grabbed her arm and dragged her inside his house. Ragnar then
poked a knife at her and threatened to stab her if Lagertha would not undress. Lagertha was forced against her will to pull down her shorts. Ragnar then pulled down her underwear
and inserted his fingers into her private part. Ragnar then threatened to kill her, if she reports what happened with her to her mother. Lagertha was then allowed to leave and lost no
time to report what happened to her mother. Her mother then had Ragnar arrested by the Barangay officials.

Brought to inquest proceedings, what is/are the crime/s committed by Ragnar against Lagertha and the proper designation thereof? Explain. (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
I would file a case of Sexual Assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere
"crime against chastity" in the form of acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin to rape, the Supreme Court has held that that if the acts constituting sexual assault are committed
against a victim under 12 years of age or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of lasciviousness is no
longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353. (People vs. Tulagan, 2019, En Banc, J. Peralta)

Jasper Monroy was charged with Rape, in relation to RA 7610 for inserting his penis into the vagina of 14-year-old AAA against her will and without her consent thereby subjecting said
minor to sexual abuse which debased, degraded and demeaned her intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. AAA alleged that Jasper, while drunk, inserted his penis into her vagina
after pinning her to the bend and removing her shorts and underwear. When Jasper was through, AAA left a suicide note and consumed a medicine for dogs. On the part of Jasper, he
claimed that after AAA confessed her feelings for him but he rebuffed her, AAA attempted to commit suicide.

The RTC of Valenzuela City found Jasper guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610. According to the trial court, it was established that Jasper
had carnal knowledge of AAA, as shown by her candid and straightforward testimony and corroborated by the results of the physical examination conducted on her person. Likewise, it
was established that AAA was barely fourteen (14) years old at the time of the incident, therefore deemed to be a "child" under the provisions of RA 7610. Finally, it was shown that
AAA was intimidated by her previous encounters with Jasper, which included the instance when the latter poked a knife at BBB in AAA's presence. Clearly, as a child, AAA was an easy
prey for Jasper to satisfy his sexual desires.

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. In so ruling, the CA found that while it is true that Jasper had carnal knowledge of AAA, the sexual act was not forced;
instead, it was consensual for the following reasons: first, AAA admitted to having written a letter for Jasper stating, among others, that she loved him, that she was trying to prevent him
from going home to the province, and that she will tell everyone that Jasper raped her in retaliation for him leaving her; second, the contents of the said letter corroborated the defense
and version of the events offered by Jasper; third, Jasper did not threaten, intimidate, or force AAA to have sexual intercourse with him; and finally, AAA did not offer any form of
resistance to Jasper’s sexual advances. Nonetheless, the CA convicted Jasper for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610, under which — unlike rape — the consent of the
offended party is immaterial. Further, it held that the disparity between the ages of Jasper and AAA placed the former in a stronger position over the latter as to enable him to enforce
his will upon her, thereby constituting "influence" under RA 7610.

Is Jasper guilty of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610?

No. To be convicted of rape under Article 226-A(1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must prove the following elements beyond reasonable doubt: (1) offender had carnal knowledge of
the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation. Meanwhile, in order to be convicted under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 which penalizes sexual abuse,
there must be a confluence of the following elements: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

What is crucial at this point is whether the sexual congress transpired with AAA's consent, in light of the key element of “force, threat, or intimidation” that is the gravamen of the offense of rape.
Based on the evidence on record, the sexual intercourse between Jasper and AAA appears to be with the latter's consent.

As regards Jasper’s conviction for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 on the premise that consent is immaterial under such charges, it bears to point out that "consent of the child is
material and may even be a defense in criminal cases" involving the aforesaid violation when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 years old, as in AAA's case. The concept of consent
under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 peculiarly relates to the second element of the crime — that is, the act of sexual intercourse is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse. A child is considered "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" when the child is pre-disposed to indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct because of money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion of any adult, syndicate, or group, which was not shown in this case; hence, Jasper 's conviction for the said crime
cannot be sustained. (Monroy y Mora v. People, G.R. No. 235799, July 29, 2019)

Rodan Bangayan was charged with violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act 7610 for having sexual intercourse with 12-year-old AAA in her dwelling against her will and
consent on January 5, 2012. According to AAA’s brother, he saw Bangayan laying on top of AAA who were both naked from the waist down. Also, the doctor who examined AAA
testified and confirmed that AAA admitted to him that she had sexual intercourse with Bangayan on several occasions even prior to January 5, 2012. AAA executed an Affidavit of
Desistance stating that she has decided not to continue the case against Bangayan because they "are living together as husband and wife”. Bangayan and AAA had two children who were
born in 2012 and 2015.

The RTC of Quirino found Bangayan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of Republic Act 7610 because the prosecution was able to establish the
elements of Section 5 (b). The RTC ruled that it will not matter if AAA consented to her defloration because as a rule, the submissiveness or consent of the child under the influence of an
adult is not a defense in sexual abuse. In affirming Bangayan's conviction, the Court of Appeals emphasized that consent of the child is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section
5, Article III of R.A. 7610. It was held that for purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under R.A. 7610, the Sweetheart Theory defense is unacceptable.

May Bangayan use as a defense the consent of AAA and his on-going relationship with her which had already produced two children to exonerate himself from the charge of violation of
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. 7610?
Yes. Section 5(b) of RA 7610 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuse. It covers not only
a situation where a child is abused for profit but also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence, engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Pursuant to the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7610, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to

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engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. The present case does not fall under any of the circumstances enumerated. Therefore, not
all the elements of the crime were present to justify Bangayan's conviction.

Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610 qualifies that when the victim of the sexual abuse is under 12 years of age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. This means that, regardless
of the presence of any of the circumstances enumerated and consent of victim under 12 years of age, the perpetrator shall be prosecuted under the Revised Penal Code. On the other hand, the law is
noticeably silent with respect to situations where a child is between 12 years old and below 18 years of age and engages in sexual intercourse not "for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group." Taking into consideration the statutory construction rules that penal laws should be strictly construed against the state and liberally
in favor of the accused, and that every law should be construed in such a way that it will harmonize with existing laws on the same subject matter, the Court reconciled the apparent gap in the law by
concluding that the qualifying circumstance cited in Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610, which "punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution but also with
a child subjected to other sexual abuse," leave room for a child between 12 and 17 years of age to give consent to the sexual act. An individual who engages in sexual intercourse with a child, at
least 12 and under 18 years of age, and not falling under any of these circumstances, cannot be held liable under the provisions of R.A. 7610. The interpretation that consent is material in cases
where victim is between 12 years old and below 18 years of age is favorable to Bangayan.

While consent is immaterial in cases under R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age, consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases involving
violation of Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 under special circumstances.

If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" because she agreed to indulge in sexual intercourse "for money, profit
or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," then the crime could not be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of
statutory rape, and there was consent. That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610, and not under Article 335 of the RPC (now Article 266-A). But if the said
victim does not give her consent to sexual intercourse in the sense that the sexual intercourse was committed through force, threat or intimidation, the crime is rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A
of the RPC. However, if the same victim gave her consent to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit, consideration, coercion or influence is involved, then there is no crime committed , except
in those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element of rape is substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral authority," like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it is punished under
the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 or simple seduction under Article 338. (Bangayan v. People, G.R. No. 235610, September 16, 2020)

Melon, a 14-year old girl, and Coco, a 16-year old boy, were in a relationship. They dated and went out together to the disapproval of Melon's mother. Sometime in the early afternoon,
Melon left her home and went to Coco's house. When in the house, Melon went to Coco's bedroom and they both cuddled in bed. During the course of their cuddling, things became
heated and they both engaged in sexual intercourse for the first time. However, Melon’s mother found out that her daughter had gone and went to Coco's house. When Melon's mother
found out that her daughter was in the house, she immediately dragged her home and had Coco arrested by policemen. The police investigator then charged Coco with Rape, Consented
Abduction, and Violation of Republic Act No. 7610.

Are the charges correct? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)

No, the charges are not correct. Coco could not be charged for Rape since the sexual intercourse was consensual. RA 7610 is also inapplicable for a minor cannot be charged under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610. The coercion or influence must be done by an adult or by a syndicate. Moreover, Consented Abduction is inapplicable for there was no taking away of the minor girl. Melon left home on
her own free will without any cajoling from Coco.

Intrinsic worth and dignity of a child

Hitting a child without intention to debase his “intrinsic worth and dignity” as a human being is not child abuse (Bongalon v. People, 2013; Abalde v. People, 2016; Escalano v. People, 2018)
 HOWEVER, hitting a child as a result of a willful intention of committing felonious act constitutes child abuse even if the child is an unintended victim (Patulot v. People, 2019, J. Leonen)

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Patricio and Pacu were having intense discussion about local politics. The discussion resulted into physical scruples later. In his anger, Patricio threw burning oil from the frying pan
against Pacu. Pacu was able to dodge it. Unfortunately, the burning oil landed on right arm of Alfonso, 9 years old, who was sitting nearby. Alfonso suffered burn injuries, which
necessitated a week-long treatment. Alfonso’s parents filed a criminal case for child abuse under Section 10(a) of Republic Act 7610, against Patricio. Patricio claimed that his target was
not the boy, but Pacu, and as such, he could not be deemed to have intended to violate or demean or degrade his intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being, which is an essential
element for child abuse under the law. If ever, his liability towards the boy should only be less serious physical injuries, not child abuse.

Is Patricio correct? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)

No. If the accused has willful intention of committing a felonious act on another person but the injury falls on the victim who is a minor child, as when he swung his arms to throw burning oil on his
adversary but the burning oil hit a baby instead, he would be criminally liable for child abuse under Section 10(a), Article VI, of Republic Act 7610. Physical assault on a child is deemed to be
willful with the necessary criminal intention for child abuse. (Patulot v. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019)

SAFE SPACES ACT

(RA 11313)

Escandor v. People, 2020, J. Leonen

 In addition to Republic Act No. 7877, Congress has since enacted Republic Act No. 11313, otherwise known as the Safe Spaces Act. Signed into law on July 15, 2019, it penalizes gender-
based sexual harassment, and is founded on, among others, the recognition that "both men and women must have equality, security and safety not only in private, but also on the streets,
public spaces, online, workplaces and educational and training institutions." It addresses four categories of gender-based sexual harassment: (1) gender-based streets and public spaces
sexual harassment; (2) gender-based online sexual harassment; (3) gender-based sexual harassment in the workplace; and, (4) gender-based sexual harassment in educational and training
institutions. (SOWE)
 In line with fundamental constitutional provisions regarding human dignity and human rights, the Safe Spaces Act expands the concept of discrimination and protects persons of diverse
sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression. It thus recognizes gender-based sexual-harassment as including, among others, "misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic and sexist
slurs."
 The Safe Spaces Act does not undo or abandon the definition of sexual harassment under the Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995. The gravamen of the offenses punished under the
Safe Spaces Act is the act of sexually harassing a person on the basis of the his/her sexual orientation, gender identity and/or expression, while that of the offense punished under the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 is abuse of one's authority, influence or moral ascendancy so as to enable the sexual harassment of a subordinate.

A has a huge crush on his immediate supervisor, B, who happens to be their Company’s most eligible bachelor. One day, A followed B to the office restroom and by reason of passion and
obfuscation, was not able to resist the temptation of “checking” on B’s manhood while the latter was urinating, much to B’s surprise and protestation.

Is A liable for any work-related crime? (Legal Edge Mock Bar 2021)
Yes, A is liable for Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in the Workplace. Under the Safe Spaces Act, Gender-Based Sexual Harassment in the Workplace may be committed by a subordinate to a
superior officer by engaging on any act of sexual nature which is unwelcome, unreasonable, and offensive. Here, A committed an act of sexual nature against B by “checking” on B’s manhood
while he was urinating which act is unwelcome, unreasonable, and offensive to B. Hence, A committed a work-related crime punished under the Safe Spaces Act.

DATA PRIVACY ACT

(RA 10173)

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Section 25. Unauthorized Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information. – (a) The unauthorized processing of personal information shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who process personal information without the consent of the data subject, or without being authorized under this Act or any existing law.

(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos (Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process personal information without the consent of the data subject, or without
being authorized under this Act or any existing law.

Section 26. Accessing Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information Due to Negligence. – (a) Accessing personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by imprisonment
ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on
persons who, due to negligence, provided access to personal information without being authorized under this Act or any existing law.

(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos (Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, due to negligence, provided access to personal information without being
authorized under this Act or any existing law.

Section 27. Improper Disposal of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information. – (a) The improper disposal of personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging
from six (6) months to two (2) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed on
persons who knowingly or negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal information of an individual in an area accessible to the public or has otherwise placed the personal information of an
individual in its container for trash collection.

b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly or negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal information of an
individual in an area accessible to the public or has otherwise placed the personal information of an individual in its container for trash collection.

Section 28. Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information for Unauthorized Purposes. – The processing of personal information for unauthorized purposes shall be
penalized by imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million
pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing personal information for purposes not authorized by the data subject, or otherwise authorized under this Act or under existing laws.

The processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized purposes shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from two (2) years to seven (7) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons processing sensitive personal information for purposes not authorized by the
data subject, or otherwise authorized under this Act or under existing laws.

Section 29. Unauthorized Access or Intentional Breach. – The penalty of imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly and unlawfully, or violating data confidentiality and security data systems,
breaks in any way into any system where personal and sensitive personal information is stored.

Section 30. Concealment of Security Breaches Involving Sensitive Personal Information. – The penalty of imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, after having knowledge of a security breach and of the
obligation to notify the Commission pursuant to Section 20(f), intentionally or by omission conceals the fact of such security breach.

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Section 31. Malicious Disclosure. – Any personal information controller or personal information processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who, with malice or in bad faith, discloses
unwarranted or false information relative to any personal information or personal sensitive information obtained by him or her, shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6)
months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).

Section 32. Unauthorized Disclosure. – (a) Any personal information controller or personal information processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who discloses to a third party
personal information not covered by the immediately preceding section without the consent of the data subject, shall he subject to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a
fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).

(b) Any personal information controller or personal information processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who discloses to a third party sensitive personal information not covered by the
immediately preceding section without the consent of the data subject, shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00).

Section 33. Combination or Series of Acts. – Any combination or series of acts as defined in Sections 25 to 32 shall make the person subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6)
years and a fine of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00).

Section 34. Extent of Liability. – If the offender is a corporation, partnership or any juridical person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case may be, who
participated in, or by their gross negligence, allowed the commission of the crime. If the offender is a juridical person, the court may suspend or revoke any of its rights under this Act. If the
offender is an alien, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further proceedings after serving the penalties prescribed. If the offender is a public official or
employee and lie or she is found guilty of acts penalized under Sections 27 and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed herein, suffer perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification from office, as the case may be.

Section 35. Large-Scale. – The maximum penalty in the scale of penalties respectively provided for the preceding offenses shall be imposed when the personal information of at least one hundred
(100) persons is harmed, affected or involved as the result of the above mentioned actions.

Section 36. Offense Committed by Public Officer. – When the offender or the person responsible for the offense is a public officer as defined in the Administrative Code of the Philippines in the
exercise of his or her duties, an accessory penalty consisting in the disqualification to occupy public office for a term double the term of criminal penalty imposed shall he applied.

Section 37. Restitution. – Restitution for any aggrieved party shall be governed by the provisions of the New Civil Code.

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