U.S. v.
Go Chico The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised
Care must be exercised in distiguishing the differences between the intent to
commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. The accused did not
consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and
the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself - intent and all. The
wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act
is the crime. The accused intended to put the device in his window. Nothing
more is required to commit the crime.
People v. Lacerna, G.R. No. 109250
Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be
distinguished. A person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime;
but if he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of
things, the crime itself, then he can be held liable for the malum
prohibitum. ntent to commit the crime is not necessary, but intent to
perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law must be shown
People v. Manzano,
Delivery means a person's act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to
another personally or otherwise, and by any means, with or without
consideration. Proof of knowledge is necessary.
People vs. Sy Bing Yok
It is settled that lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charged is malum prohibitum
Padilla v. Dizon,
Proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses
punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita. lack of malice or wilfull
intent is not a valid defense

 which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm.
People v. Quijada y Circulado, G.R. Nos. 115008-09,
If intent to commit the crime were required in mala prohibita, enforcement of
the decree and its policy or purpose would be difficult to achieve. Hence, there
is conceded wisdom in punishing illegal possession of firearm without taking
into account the criminal intent of the possessor. All that is needed is intent
to perpetrate the act prohibited by law, coupled, of course, by animus
possidendi. It must be clearly understood that this animus possidendi is
without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent which an accused may
have harbored in possessing the firearm.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan
Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly
that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of
the offender is determined by his criminal intent. (Exception to GR that special
penal laws does not require intent)
People v. Macaranas
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended, defines carnapping as the taking,
with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's
consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation against persons, or
by using force upon things. (Intent is necessary despite being a special penal
law)
Go v. Sandiganbayan
There is no question that the Sandiganbayan may exercise jurisdiction over
private individuals, but it may only do so upon information alleging
with specificity the precise violations of that private individual. The liability of
private individuals should not be made to depend on whether the facts alleged
in the information against the public officer constituted a crime under Section
3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. Rather, it should be made to depend on whether the
facts alleged in the information support a prima facie finding that the private
individual conspired with the public officer, or that he knowingly induced the
accused public official to commit the crime charged.
Dela Cruz v. People
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person
for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Such intent to
possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or felonious intent
Criminal intent here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an
offense with the use of an unlicensed firearm. This is not important in
convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in order that
one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the
accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended
to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and
without criminal intent.
Jacaban v. People
Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which
is largely dependent on attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from
the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances
Teves v. Comelec
Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to
justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in
the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society
in general.
Moral turpitude implies something immoral in itself, regardless of the fact that
it is punishable by law or not. It must not be merely mala prohibita, but the
act itself must be inherently immoral. The doing of the act itself, and not its
prohibition by statute fixes the moral turpitude. Moral turpitude does not,
however, include such acts as are not of themselves immoral but whose
illegality lies in their being positively prohibited.
The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h)
of the Anti-Graft Law, which is possession of a prohibited interest. However,
conviction under the second mode does not automatically mean that the same
involved moral turpitude. A determination of all surrounding circumstances of
the violation of the statute must be considered.
Sanchez v. People,
The penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in its minimum
period. This penalty is derived from, and defined in, the Revised Penal Code.
Although R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, the rules in the Revised Penal Code
for graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper period should
be applied.
Thus, where the special law adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in felonies.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which,
in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum of which shall be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.
People v. Saley, 291 SCRA 715 (1998)
In imposing the penalty, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the
application of the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability of an
accused cannot be considered, these provisions being inapplicable to special
laws.
People v. Simon
Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their
technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact,
for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, the court have
applied the provisions of the amended Section 20 of said law to arrive at
prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the
medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now
in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code.
LADONGA, vs.PEOPLE
B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the
provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg.
22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily.
People v. Mantalaba
A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment to
death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a
minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided
in the same law shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means
that the penalty can now be graduated as it has adopted the technical
nomenclature of penalties provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
People v. Bustinera
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different
from the crime of robbery and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. The
anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of motor
vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has
been taken, with intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the
taking was done with or without the use of force upon things. Without the
anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would fall within
the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the
enactment of said statute.
GO-TAN V. SPOUSES TAN
the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied
suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47
that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of
the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.
The court held that parents-in-law may be included in the petition for the
issuance of a PPO, in accordance with RA 9262 as Section 5 of R.A. No.
9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their
children may be committed by an offender through another.
Citibank v Tanco-Gabaldon
Act 3362 applies when a special law does not provide for prescriptive periods
for the enforcement of criminal liabilities
PCGG v. CARPIO-MORALES
there are two reckoning points for the counting of the prescription of an
offense:
1) the day of the commission of the violation of the law; and
2) if the day when the violation was committed be not known, then it shall
begin to run from the discovery of said violation and (UNTIL) the institution
of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment.
Disini v. Sandiganbayan
GR: the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge
of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not
prevent the running of the prescriptive period.
XPN’s: "blameless ignorance" doctrine. - "the statute of limitations runs only
upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause
of action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of
limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no reasonable means of
knowing the existence of a cause of action."
PEOPLE VS PANGILINAN
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
 filing of the complaint in the MTC even if for purposes of preliminary
investigation should interrupt the prescription period of the criminal
responsibility if there was no trial on the merits yet.
 filing of the complaint before the fiscal’s office also suspended the
prescriptive period.
PEOPLE V BON
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower
than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed
by the CA on appellant for attempted rape
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and the minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense"
The purpose of the prescription of minimum and maximum periods under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the privilege granted under the same
law, for prisoners who have served the minimum penalty to be eligible for
parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate Sentence
Re: Penalty imposed by Judge Teofilo Guadiz, Jr.
Specifying the minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment, in accordance
to the ISL, is a mandatory requirement and applicable for ALL criminal
offenses in the RPC as well as in special laws.
XPN: those with indivisible penalties
BATISTIS v. PEOPLE
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment
should be an indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge
de Guzman,Jr., the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum
and minimum periods in criminal cases not excepted from the coverage is
mandatory, viz:
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the
indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary and excessive
deprivation of liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the accused,
since he may be exempted from serving the entire sentence, depending upon
his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral record.
Dimakuta v. People
What Section 4 of the Probation Law prohibits is an appeal from the judgment
of conviction, which involves a review of the merits of the case and the
determination of whether the accused is entitled to acquittal. However, under
the recommended grounds for appeal which were enumerated earlier, the
purpose of the appeal is not to assail the judgment of conviction but to
question only the propriety of the sentence, particularly the penalty imposed
or the crime for which the accused was convicted, as the accused intends to
apply for probation upon correction of the penalty or conviction for the lesser
offense.
LLAMADO VS CA
"Perfecting an appeal" has no sensible meaning apart from the meaning given
to those words in our procedural law and so the law-making agency could
only have intended to refer to the meaning of those words in the context of
procedural law.
The Probation Law is not a penal statute. The provisions were clear and
unambiguous. The true legislative intent must be given effect. The meaning
set forth in Sec. 4 is plain and unmistakable.
PEOPLE V GALUGA Y WAD-AS
Galgua, as he is sentenced herein to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
cannot apply for parole
Galuga is likewise disqualified from applying for probation as Section 9 (a) of
the Probation Law is clear that the benefits of probation shall not extend to
those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six
(6) years
An accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself
of probation. Jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually exclusive
remedies because the law is unmistakable about it
SALGADO v. CA
The primary consideration in granting probation is the reformation of the
probationer. That is why, under the law, a post sentence investigation, which
is mandatory, has to be conducted before a person can be granted probation
to help the court in determining whether the ends of justice and the best
interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served by the granting
of the probation
The trial court is given the discretion to impose conditions in the order granting
probation "as it may deem best."
Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint v Samson
Probation is not a sentence, but rather a suspension of the imposition of
sentence
Grant of probation suspends the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public
office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of sufferage
Bala v. Martinez
Probation is not coterminous with its period. There must first be issued by the
court of an order of final discharge based on the report and recommendation
of the probation officer. Only from such can the case of the probationer be
deemed terminated.
The period of probation may either be shortened or made longer, but not to
exceed the period set in the law. This is so because the period of probation,
like the period of incarceration, is deemed the appropriate period for the
rehabilitation of the probationer.
Quarto v. Marcelo, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011
The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative
prerogative. The exclusive power of Congress to define crimes and their
nature and to provide for their punishment concomitantly carries the power
to immunize certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of
state interests, among them, the solution and prosecution of crimes with high
political, social and economic impact.
The Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s
exercise of his investigatorial and prosecutorial powers (among them, the
power to grant immunity to witnesses), and respects the initiative and
independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, “beholden to no one, acts as
the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
service.”
People v. Sandiganbyan
The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. The
decision to employ an accused as a state witness must necessarily originate
from the public prosecutors whose mission is to obtain a successful
prosecution of the several accused before the courts. The courts do not as a
rule have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution’s evidence until after
the trial is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment
of the prosecution and deny a motion to discharge an accused so he can be
used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet the requirements of
Section 17, Rule 119.
Ampatuan v. De Lima
The two modes by which a participant in the commission of a crime may
become a state witness are, namely: (a) by discharge from the criminal case
pursuant to Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court; and (b) by the
approval of his application for admission into the Witness Protection Program
of the DOJ
there is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6981 for the Prosecution to
first charge a person in court as one of the accused in order for him to qualify
for admission into the Witness Protection Program. The admission as a state
witness under Republic Act No. 6981 also operates as an acquittal, and said
witness cannot subsequently be included in the criminal information except
when he fails or refuses to testify. The immunity for the state witness is
granted by the DOJ, not by the trial court. Should such witness be meanwhile
charged in court as an accused, the public prosecutor, upon presentation to
him of the certification of admission into the Witness Protection Program, shall
petition the trial court for the discharge of the witness. The Court shall then
order the discharge and exclusion of said accused from the information

People vs. Catantan,
defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away
of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal
belongings of the complement or passengers, irrespective of the value
thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the
complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy.
The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter
provided.
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave
coercion would be to ignore the fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine
waters was seized by the accused by means of violence against or intimidation
of persons.
People v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 291581,
Sec. 2(a) of PD 532 defines PH waters as all bodies of water, such as but not
limited to, seas, gulfs, bays around, between and connecting each of the
Islands of the Philippine Archipelago, irrespective of its depth, breadth, length
or dimension, and all other waters belonging to the Philippines by historic or
legal title, including territorial sea, the sea-bed, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction
People vs. Tulin
Piracy is a crime which falls under the exception to the rule on territoriality in
criminal law. It is well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same,
piracy is a
reprehensible crime against the whole world.
Elements of Piracy under Art 122:
1. Vessel is on the high seas or PH waters
2. Offender is not a crew nor a passenger
1. Modes:
There is attacking or seizing the vessel; or
Seizure of the whole or part of the cargo,
equipment, and/or personal belongings of crew
and passengers

Difference with PD 532:
1. The offense is committed on PH waters
2. The offender can be any person

People v. Morial, G.R. No. 129295, [August 15, 2001] E.B.
A custodial investigation is understood to mean as "any questioning initiated
by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. It
begins when there is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect,i.e., when the police
investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense.
A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights, which
attach upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain
silent, (2) to competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights.
For even as the person under custodial investigation enjoys the right to
counsel from its inception, so does he enjoy such right until its termination —
indeed, "in every phase of the investigation.

People v. Andan y Hernandez, G.R. No. 116437, [March 3, 1997] 

Constitutional guarantees during custodial investigation do not apply to
spontaneous statements not elicited through questioning by the authorities
and given during ordinary conversation or during media interviews, whereby
the suspect orally admits the commission of the crime. However, it does not
authorize the police to obtain confessions they cannot otherwise obtain
through media reporters who are acting for the police.

Confessions to be deemed admitted must be given free from any undue

influence from the police authorities.

People v. Olivarez, Jr., G.R. No. 77865

Such invitation, however when construed in the light of the circumstances is
actually in the nature of an arrest designed for the purpose of conducting an
interrogation. Mere invitation is covered by the proscription on a warrantless
arrest because it is intended for no other reason than to conduct an
investigation. Thus, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article IV of the 1973
Constitution which was in effect at that time, "any evidence" obtained in
violation of their right under Section 3, Article IV (pertaining to invalid
warrantless arrests) "shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any


People v. Diaz y Indino, G.R. No. 186490 (Notice), [June 28, 2017] 

RA 7438 requires that any person arrested, detained, or under custodial
investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel. Custodial investigation
includes the practice of inviting a person who is investigated in connection
with an offense he is suspected to have committed.

Any extrajudicial confession must be in writing and signed by the person under
custodial investigation in the presence of his counsel. An extrajudicial
confession must be made VOLUNTARILY, IN WRITING, and made with the
ASSISTANCE AND PRESENCE OF COUNSEL in order to be admissible as
evidence against the accused.