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MALA IN SE V MALUM PROHIBITUM
ESTRADA V SANDIGAN BAYAN
Facts:
Joseph Ejercito Estrada is prosecuted under RA No.
7080 which is “An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder,” as amended by RA 7659
● Sec.12 of RA No. 7080 - provides that any public
officer who acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts that
amount to at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of
plunder
● Estrada questions the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law based on three arguments (all of which
he claims are clear violations of the fundamental
rights of the accused:
○ It suffers from the vice of vagueness (with
regards to terms “combination or series of
overt or criminal acts)
○ It dispenses with the “reasonable doubt”
standard in criminal prosecutions
○ It abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under the RPC
■ Mens rea - the intention or knowledge of
wrongdoing that constitutes part of a
crime, as opposed to the action or conduct
of the accused.
● Estrada’s reliance on the “void-for vagueness”
doctrine is wrong
● There is no need to prove each act alleged to be
committed by the accused to amass ill-gotten
wealth
Issues - Rationale:
1. Whether or not Plunder Law is unconstitutional
for being vague
2. Whether or not the Plunder Law requires less
evidence for providing the predicate crimes of
plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process
3. Whether or not plunder as defined in RA 7080 is
a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is
within the power of Congress to so classify it.
Held:
1. No. As long as the law affords some
comprehensible guide or rule that would inform
those who are subject to it what conduct would
render them liable to its penalties, its validity will
be sustained.
2. No. Sec. 4 (Rule of Evidence) states that: For
purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it
shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of
the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to
establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
3. No. It is malum in se which requires proof of
criminal intent, because the constitutive crimes are
mala in se the element of mens rea must be
proven in a prosecution for plunder.
Ruling:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by
RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the
petition to declare the law unconstitutional is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Separate Opinions:
PANGANIBAN J., concurring
KAPUNAN J., Dissenting - acts do not constitute
plunder under R.A. 7080, as amended by R.A. No.7659.
The acts may be charged with R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-graft
and Corrupt practices Act.
PARDO J. Dissenting - plunder law is mala in se thus
charges must be specific acts that violate the law. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be present in the
component crimes of the act of plunder
YNARES-SANTIAGO J., Dissenting - statutes allow too
broad discretionary and arbitrary powers
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ J., Dissenting - R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional because it violates the due process
clause of the constitution because not each criminal act
is required to be proved by the prosecution.
RPC AND SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
Art 10 RPC. Offenses not subject to the provisions of
this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may
be punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
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supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.
RA No. 9165
Sec 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code.
– Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the
contrary, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act
No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the
provisions of this Act, except in the case of minor
offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty
for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death
provided herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
PADILLA V CA
FACTS:
Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992.
He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian
witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms
were found in his possession:
1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition
2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo
3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo
4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver
Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest
for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of
Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On
Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal
Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of
Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day
of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of
reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals
confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of
Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest.
Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of
Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a
sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete
turnaround and filed “Manifestation in Lieu of
Comment” praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).
ISSUES:
WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and
consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in
the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under
the exclusionary rule
HOLDING:
No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the
legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant
was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se
did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge
illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure—a
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an
unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioner’s warrantless
arrest was proper since he was actually committing
another offence in the presence of all those officers.
There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse
of time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of
evidence are admissible.
Instances when warrantless search and seizure of
property is valid:
? Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” elements of
which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid
warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in
pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly
discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c)
evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view
justified mere seizure of evidence without further
search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are
prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant)
? Search of moving vehicle
? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest
recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court
and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of
incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is
that item to be searched must be within arrestee’s
custody or area of immediate control and search
contemporaneous with arrest.
Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of
his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually
arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run.
The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers
function in collaboration with private citizens.
Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence,
any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest
must be made before the accused enters his plea.
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2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is
authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum
Receipt, to carry the subject firearms
No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two
requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of
the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused
who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess. The first
element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions were seized from petitioner’s possession
via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in
evidence during trial. As to the second element, the
same was convincingly proven by the prosecution.
Indeed, petitioner’s purported Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the
more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our
meticulous review of the records reveals that the
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere
afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious
circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent
court’s incisive observation. Furthermore, the
Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a
certification as required by the March 5, 1988
Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is
not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list
of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would
justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866).
Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38
caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.
3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal
possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution
Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent
court “in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience
(sic) and a non-subversive context” and adds that
respondent court should have applied instead the
previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the
reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no
longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years
and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of
firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the
Constitution.
The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The
trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply
the governing law at the time of appellant’s commission
of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only
by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial
officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And
until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for
applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous
statutes adverted to by petitioner.
Equally lacking in merit is appellant’s allegation that the
penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional.
The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should
be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum
to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellant’s erroneous
averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto
make the same cruel and excessive.
Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of
the statute in question lies with the appellant which
burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To
justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful
and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact,
the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice
by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that “the
pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not]
contrary to any provision of the Constitution…”
Appellant’s grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed
penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws. That question falls exclusively within the province
of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive
who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the
courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of
the CA sustaining petitioner’s conviction by the lower
court of the crime of simple illegal possession of
firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that
petitioner’s indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to “10
yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as
maximum.
PADILLA V DIZON (1988)
NATURE: Malum prohibitum as exception to mens rea
DOCTRINE: When a crime is punishable by a special law,
intent to commit a crime is not necessary. In mala
prohibita, it is sufficient that the prohibited act was
intentionally done.
FACTS:
This is an administrative complaint, dated August 6,
1987, filed by the then Commissioner of Customs,
Alexander Padilla, against respondent Baltazar R. Dizon,
RTC Judge, Branch 115, Pasay City, for rendering a
manifestly erroneous decision due, at the very least, to
gross incompetence and gross ignorance of the law, in
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Criminal Case No. 86- 10126-P, entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Lo Chi Fai", acquitting said accused of the
offense charged, i.e., smuggling of foreign currency out
of the country.
The respondent rendered a decision of acquittal
involving a tourist, Lo Chi Fai, who was caught by a
customs guard and two PAFSECOM officers on July 9,
1986, while on board Flight PR 300 of the Philippine Air
Lines bound for Hongkong while attempting to smuggle
foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out
of the country (380 pieces) amounting to US$
355,349.57, in various currency denominations.
The accused stated that he was a businessman from
Hongkong and that the reason for his coming to the
Philippines was to invest in business in the Philippines
and also to play in the casino. He also testified that his
business associatesstarted putting their money for the
business in a common fund, hence, every time anyone
of them came to the Philippines, they would declare the
money they were bringing in, and all declarations were
handed to and kept by him; these currency declarations
were presented at the trial as exhibits for the defense.
He also testified on cross-examination that the reason
he was going back to Hongkong bringing with him all
the money intended to be invested in the Philippines
was because of the fear of his group that the
"revolution" taking place in Manila might become
widespread.
The respondent Judge decided to acquit the accused
and allowed the release of US$3,000.00 based on the
presented evidence which, according to him, showed
that the accused had no willful intention to violate the
law.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty of gross
incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in deciding
that criminal intent should be established in order to
penalize the accused for violating Sec. 6 of Central Bank
Circular No. 960
RATIO:
The respondent-judge has shown gross incompetence
or gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict
the accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No.
960, theprosecution must establish that the accused
had the criminal intent to violate the law. The
respondent ought to know that proof of malice or
deliberate intent (mens rea) is not essential in offenses
punished by special laws, which are mala prohibita.
The respondent ignored the fact that most of the CB
Currency declarations presented by the defense at the
trial were declarations belonging to other people which
could not be utilized by the accused to justify his having
the foreign exchange in his possession.
The respondent judge again displayed gross
incompetence and gross ignorance of the law in
invoking the provisions of CB Circular No. 960 to justify
the release of US$ 3,000.00 to the accused. There is
nothing in the said CB Circular which could be taken as
authority for the trial court to release the said amount
of U.S. Currency to the accused.
The story concocted by the accused was so palpably
unbelievable that thefindings of the respondent judge
were obviously contrived to favor the acquittal of the
accused, thereby clearly negating his claim that he
rendered the decision "in good faith."
RULING:
The court ordered that the Respondent Judge be
DISMISSED from the service. All leave and retirement
benefits and privileges to which he may be entitled
were forfeited with prejudice to his being reinstated in
any branch of government service, including
government-owned and/or controlled agencies or
corporations.
PEOPLE V SIMON (1994)
TOPIC: retroactivity of penal laws, special laws and
mitigating/aggravating, special laws and indeterminate
sentence law
LAW: Dangerous Drugs Act amended by RA 1972
SUMMARY:
Appeal of a drug pusher convicted under RA 6425
before the amendment, appealed after the
amendment. Amendment modifies old penalties that
does not make sense in Court and thus Court had to
construct and set out correct penalties based from the
amendments.
FACTS:
10/22/1988 - DATE IMPORTANT.
 Prosecution:
o Accused was arrested following a buy-bust
operation in Pampanga. Accused sold two
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teabags of marijuana to NARCOM operative
and was thereafter arrested by NARCOM
team in the operation. Two more teabags
were confiscated in possession of accused.
o Accused orally waived his right to counsel.
o Medical examination upon arrest shows no
signs of physical abuse. Upon checking
history, doctor finds accused has a history
of peptic ulcer.
 Defendant:
o Accused was visited by three persons he did
not know and was asked to come to Camp
Olivas. Upon alighting the jeepney, accused
was told that he was a pusher. He then
tried to escape but was handcuffed instead.
o Upon arrival at camp, accused was boxed
eight to nine times in the stomach by Sgt.
Pejoro when he refused to sign papers.
After the abuse, he signed the papers.
o Accused then escaped NARCOM, consulted
a quack doctor for stomach pains due to the
abuse, and then went to the hospital.
 12/4/1989: TC convicted appellant to life
imprisonment and penalty of 20k.
Defendant's plea:
 frame-up should be upheld
 Exhibit G (receipt of property confiscated)
inadmissible (confession)
 should not be convicted of Dangerous Drugs Act
ISSUES:
Whether TC was correct in convicting appellant under
the Dangerous Drugs Act and whether the new
amendment (effective 12/1993) to the aforementioned
applies, and what penalties should be imposed if it
does.
HOLDING:
. Frame-up argument, inconclusive. Evidences
presented, prior investigation leading to the buy-bust
operation, and testimonies of operatives prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the appellant is guilty. However,
conviction for sale of dangerous drugs is only correct as
to the two teabags, not the other two confiscated in
appellant's possession.
There is also no proof of any abuse outside
appellant's own testimonies.
2. Exhibit G is inadmissible because it was not made
in front of counsel. While appellant waived his right to
counsel, he did so orally. Hence, whatever
confession/admission appellant made is inadmissible.
3.1: Conviction according to new amendment to RA
6425, (should SC apply/reduce penalty as per new
amendment):
----DANGEROUS DRUGS LAW (RA 6425) amended by RA
7659 12/31/1993.
SPECIAL LAW AMENDMENTS RELEVANT TO CASE:
Sec. 13.
Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 of Art. II of Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby
amended to read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery,
Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited
Drugs. — The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred
thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver,
give away to another, distribute, dispatch in
transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act
No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation
and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instrument of
the Crime. — The penalties for offenses under
Sections 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections
14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act shall
be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in
any of the following quantities:
xxx xxx xxx
5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or
marijuana
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derived from RPC)...cannot be below prison
xxx xxx xxx correcional.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than
the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range
from prision correccional to reclusion perpetua
depending upon the quantity.
SC required to render judgment to fulfill requirements
of RPC Article 22 on Retroactivity of Penal Laws.
3.2: SC constructs amendment as there is error in sale
of 750g and above (Reclusion perpetua min) and below
(Reclusion perpetua max).
3.5: If Indeterminate Sentence Law applies: Yes, it
applies to Special Laws where penalty is derived from
RPC as per sec 1 of said law. Thus, minimum should be
the one lower than minimum, which in this case would
be arresto mayor (6 mo).
RULING: Affirmed with modification. Sentenced to 6
months of arresto mayor to 6 years of prision
correcional.

we hereby hold that the penalty to be imposed

where the quantity of the drugs involved is less
than the quantities stated in the first paragraph
shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion temporal, and not reclusion perpetua.
This is also concordant with the fundamental
rule in criminal law that all doubts should be
construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

3.3: As per ammendment, penalty is dependent on

quantity of drugs sold which is now only 2 teabags
(3.8g). SC interpreted ammendment further as:

if the marijuana involved is below 250 grams,

the penalty to be imposed shall be prision
correccional; from 250 to 499 grams, prision
mayor; and 500 to 749 grams, reclusion
temporal.

3.4: What applies to accused is prison correcional as per

foregoing SC construction of the new ammendment. It
is either 6 months and 1 day to 6 years.

Mitigating and aggravating circumstances under RPC

not applicable to Special Laws. However, SC states that
this is because of Special Laws who impose own
penalties and do not depend on RPC for them. In this
amendment and case, penalty depends on RPC thus
mitigating/aggravating circumstances applies only as to:

While not squarely in issue in this case, but

because this aspect is involved in the discussion
on the role of modifying circumstances, we have
perforce to lay down the caveat that mitigating
circumstances should be considered and applied
only if they affect the periods and the degrees of
the penalties within rational limits (if penalty