North Korea Nuclear Issue

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has an active nuclear

weapons program and tested nuclear explosive devices in 2006, 2009, 2013, and
2016. The DPRK is also capable of enriching uranium and producing weapons-
grade plutonium. North Korea deploys short- and medium-range ballistic missiles
and successfully launched long-range rockets in 2012 and 2016. North Korea is
also believed to possess biological and chemical weapons programs.

Pyongyang unilaterally withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation

of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in January 2003 and is not a party to the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) or a member of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The DPRK is not a party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC), and is believed to possess a large chemical weapons
program. North Korea is a party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) and Geneva Protocol, but is suspected of maintaining an offensive
weapons program in defiance of the BTWC.

North Korea's interest in a nuclear weapons program dates to the end of

World War II. Since then, Pyongyang developed a nuclear fuel cycle capability
and has both plutonium and enriched uranium programs capable of producing
fissile material. North Korea declared it had roughly 38.5kg of weapons-grade
plutonium extracted from spent fuel rods in May 2008, however external estimates
have varied. In November 2010, North Korea unveiled a uranium enrichment
program ostensibly intended to produce low enriched uranium for power reactors,
though it is possible for Pyongyang to produce highly enriched uranium for
weapons purposes. North Korea conducted four nuclear weapons tests in 2006,
2009, 2013, and 2016 claiming that the January 2016 test was a thermonuclear
device; however, experts remain skeptical.

The Six-Party Talks between North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China,
Russia, and the United States began in 2003 with the goal of denuclearizing the
Korean Peninsula. However, these talks have been suspended since April 2009.
Initial uncertainties about North Korea's nuclear program after the death of Kim
Jong Il were tempered when Pyongyang agreed to suspend nuclear tests, uranium
enrichment, and long-range missile tests in exchange for food aid from the U.S. on
February 29, 2012. However, after a dispute with the United States over the launch
of a rocket in April 2012, North Korea declared the agreement void, and conducted
a nuclear test in February 2013.

In April 2013, North Korean state media announced that Pyongyang would
restart all nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, including its 5MW graphite-moderated
reactor, and uranium enrichment plant. By August 2013, satellite imagery
confirmed steam venting from the 5MW reactor's turbine and generator building.
The reactor is capable of producing 6 kg of plutonium a year, however, it is not
clear how the modified cooling system, and repeated shutdowns will affect
production. In November 2014, imagery analysis suggested that the 5MW reactor
had been shut down. In September 2015, however, state media announced that all
nuclear facilities were in normal operation with ongoing missions to improve the
“quality and quantity” of the country’s nuclear stockpile. This is consistent with
recent satellite imagery that reveal an increase in both plutonium and uranium
production-related activities.

Kim Jong Un also claimed to have thermonuclear capabilities during his

December 2015 visit to the Pyongchon Revolutionary Site, although this claim was
met with much skepticism from the international community. On January 6, 2016
North Korea conducted a fourth nuclear test. Despite the test, and subsequent claim
it was a hydrogen bomb, experts continue to doubt North Korea’s thermonuclear
capabilities. Some speculate the test could have been a boosted fission device;
however, it is not possible to determine the device’s nature unless a radionuclide
monitoring station captures particles in the atmosphere for analysis, which did not
occur. The test prompted widespread international condemnation. Even China, a
traditional ally of the regime, endorsed a UN resolution to apply further sanctions
against North Korea.

Although the DPRK signed the Geneva Protocol and acceded to the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1987, it is suspected of
maintaining an ongoing biological weapons program. Defectors from the DPRK
and defense agencies in the United States and South Korea generally agree that the
country began to acquire a biological weapons capability in the early 1960s under
the orders of Kim Il Sung. However, open source information on the DPRK's
biological weapons program varies. The 2012 Defense White Paper by South
Korea's Ministry of National Defense estimates that the DPRK possesses the
causative agents of anthrax and smallpox, among others. The U.S. Secretary of
Defense’s 2014 report indicated that the DPRK possesses a potentially robust
biological warfare capability.

North Korea began its missile development program in the 1970s and tested
a Scud-B ballistic missile in April 1984. North Korea is not a member of the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In its short-range arsenal,
Pyongyang has produced the 500km-range Scud-C, the 700km-range Scud-D, and
the solid-fueled KN-02, which is an upgraded version of the Russian SS-21
"Scarab" with a slightly longer range of about 120km. In its medium and
intermediate-range arsenal, North Korea has the 1,300km-range missile known as
the Nodong (Rodong), which it initially tested in 1993 (500km). North Korea has
deployed between 175 and 200 Nodong missiles. Pyongyang has also displayed its
Musudan IRBM in parades, although it has never flight-tested the missile. A yet-
unnamed Nodong-variant was also displayed in October 2010, which possesses
visible similarities to Iran's Ghadr-1. North Korea's Taepodong-1 (Paektusan-1), an
1800km-range space launch vehicle, has also been flight-tested. North Korea's
three-stage Taepodong/ Unha SLV has been tested with two successful launches as
of March 2016.

North Korea agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile tests in exchange

for food aid from the United States in February 2012. However, in April 2012 it
attempted to launch the Kwangmyong-3 satellite into orbit using an Unha-3 launch
vehicle. The launch failed after approximately 80 seconds, and the debris landed
off the western coast of South Korea. The U.S. government withdrew its offer of
food aid because it considered the space launch, which relied on missile
technology, to be a violation of the bilateral agreement as well as UN Security
Council Resolutions 1718 and 1874. Subsequently, North Korea displayed six
never-before-seen missiles in a parade in honor of its founder Kim Il Sung. These
missiles, known externally as KN-08s (Hwasong-13), were likely only mock-ups.
The missiles were displayed on six trucks of Chinese-origin that were converted to
transporter-erector-launchers (TELs). More recently, in October 2015, North Korea
displayed a new version of the KN-08 with a smaller, less conical warhead.

On December 12, 2012, North Korea reattempted its Unha-3 launch,

successfully putting a Kwangmyong-3 satellite into orbit. This test proved a
significant advancement in North Korean missile technology. In order to deliver a
nuclear payload, the rocket would require the addition of a re-entry vehicle which
requires technology and advanced materials experts believe the regime is still
working on acquiring. In October 2014, North Korea completed upgrades to launch
pads at the Sohae Satellite Launching Station, potentially allowing the country to
launch rockets larger than the Unha-3. On February 7, 2016, North Korea used the
station to successfully launch the Kwangmyongsong-4 satellite into low earth orbit
using the Unha-3 rocket. The launch was widely condemned by the international
community as a test of North Korea’s ballistic missile capabilities, which, in
conjunction with its January 2016 nuclear test, triggered another round of UN
sanctions against the country.

Pyongyang has also tested anti-ship cruise missiles numerous times since
1994. The North Korean missile identified as the AG-1 is based on the Chinese
CSSC-3 'Seersucker'. Anti-ship cruise missile tests on May 25 and June 7, 2007 are
believed to have been either the KN-01 or the Chinese-made CSSC-3 'Seersucker'.
In June 2014, North Korea released propaganda footage showing what appears to
be a variant of the Russian Kh-35 anti-ship cruise missile. Kim Jong Un observed a
launch of the KH-35 on February 7, 2015.

North Korea has added to its list of test launches a series of short-range
rockets, including the SLBM-Polaris 1 in the summer of 2014; a test from a
submerged barge in May 2015; and a failed KN-11 SLBM test in November 2015.
In January 2016, shortly after the nuclear test, North Korea released footage
purportedly showing an SLBM test. Later analysis of the footage by a team of
experts proved it was a false claim. On March 9, 2016, North Korea released
photographs of Kim Jong Un inspecting what appears to be a miniaturized
implosion device in front of several partially assembled KN-08 mod 1 and mod 2
rockets. On March 15, 2016, North Korea announced plans to conduct another
nuclear test along with more missile tests.
 On March 24, 2016, North Korea tested a solid-fueled rocket motor. Only a
month later on April 23, North Korea tested what experts believe was a solid-
fueled SLBM. The missile flew only 30 km, well below the expected range of 300
km according to South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the transition from
solid to liquid-fueled technology is a major technological improvement for North
Korea, and represents a significant proliferation concern. Unlike liquid-fueled
missiles which require hours of preparation and fueling prior to launch, solid-
fueled missiles are “launch ready,” and can therefore be used much more rapidly.

Barack Obama began his presidency with an impassioned plea for a world
without nuclear weapons Mr Obama has made progress on nuclear-arms reduction
and non-proliferation. He signed a strategic-arms-control treaty (New START)
with Russia in 2010. A series of nuclear-security summits helped stop fissile
material getting into the wrong hands.

No country in history has spent such a large share of its wealth on nuclear
weapons. North Korea is thought to have a stockpile of around 20 devices. Every
six weeks or so it adds another. This year the pace of ballistic missile testing has
been unprecedented. An underground nuclear detonation in January, claimed by
the regime to be an H-bomb, has been followed by tests of the technologies behind
nuclear-armed missiles. Although three tests of a 4,000-kilometre (2,500-mile)
missile failed in April, North Korean engineers learn from their mistakes. Few
would bet against them succeeding in the end.

North Korea is not bound by any global rules. Its hereditary dictator, Kim
Jong Un, imposes forced labour on hundreds of thousands of his people in the
gulag, including whole families, without trial or hope of release. Mr Kim
frequently threatens to drench Seoul, the South’s capital, in “a sea of fire”. Nuclear
weapons are central to his regime’s identity and survival. Deterrence is based on
the belief that states act rationally. But Mr Kim is so opaque and so little is known
about how decisions come about in the capital, Pyongyang, that deterring North
Korea is fraught with difficulty. Were his regime on the point of collapse, who is to
say whether Mr Kim would pull down the temple by unleashing a nuclear attack?

The mix of unpredictability, ruthlessness and fragility frustrates

policymaking towards Mr Kim. Many outsiders want to force him to behave better.
In March, following the recent weapons test, the UN Security Council strengthened
sanctions. China is infuriated by Mr Kim’s taunts and provocations. It agreed to
tougher measures, including limiting financial transactions and searching vessels
for contraband.

But China does not want to overthrow Mr Kim. It worries that the collapse
of a regime on its north-eastern border would create a flood of refugees and
eliminate the buffer protecting it from American troops stationed in South Korea.
About 90% of North Korea’s trade, worth about $6 billion a year, is with China. It
will continue to import North Korean coal and iron ore (and send back fuel oil,
food and consumer goods) as long as the money is not spent on military activities
—an unenforceable condition. Protected by China, Mr Kim can pursue his nuclear
programme with impunity. The sanctions are unlikely to stop him. If anything, they
may spur him to strengthen and upgrade his arsenal before China adopts harsher
ones.

Understandably, therefore, Mr Obama has preferred to devote his efforts to

Iran. Because the mullahs depend on sales of oil and gas to the outside world,
embargoes on Iran’s energy exports and exclusion from the international payments
system changed their strategic calculus. But this logic will not work with North
Korea.

Can anything stop Mr Kim? Perhaps he will decide to shelve his “nukes
first” policy in favour of Chinese-style economic reform and rapprochement with
South Korea. It is a nice idea, and Mr Kim has shown some interest in economic
development. But nothing suggests he would barter his nuclear weapons to give his
people a better life. Perhaps dissent over Mr Kim’s rule among the North Korean
elite will lead to a palace coup. A successor might be ready for an Iran-type deal to
boost his standing both at home and abroad. That is a possibility, but Mr Kim has
so far shown himself able to crush any challengers to his dominance.

The last hope is that tougher sanctions will contribute to the collapse of the
regime—which, in turn, could lead to reunification with the South and
denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula. That would be the best outcome, but it is
also the one that carries the most danger. Moreover, it is precisely the situation
China seeks to avoid.
 Without any good options, what should America’s next president do? A
priority is to strengthen missile defence. New THAAD anti-missile systems
should be sent to South Korea and Japan, while America soothes objections that
their radar could be used against China’s nuclear weapons. China should also be
cajoled into accepting that sanctions can be harsher, without provoking an
implosion. Were that to lead initially only to a freeze on testing, it would be worth
having. Because a sudden, unforeseen collapse of Mr Kim’s regime is possible at
any time, America needs worked-out plans to seize or destroy North Korea’s
nuclear missiles before they can be used. For this China’s co-operation, or at least
acquiescence, is vital. So clear and present is the danger that even rivals who clash
elsewhere in Asia must urgently find new ways to work together.

Mg Pyay Thar Lin Maung

DIR-88
Assignment-(III), Module-(VIII)