The UN Humanitarian Intervention in Libya

The UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) on Libya authorized

Member States, acting either alone or through regional organizations or
arrangements, “to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under threat of
attack in the country, including Benghazi”. The resolution was in response to
allegations of killings and mistreatment of civilians in parts of Libya by the
country’s government following anti-government protests. In Resolution 1970
(2011) which preceded Resolution 1973, the Security Council had expressed
grave concerns about the violence in the country and the use of force against the
country’s civilians. It also deplored the gross and systematic violation of human
rights, including the repression of peaceful demonstrators, expressing deep concern
at the deaths of civilians, and rejecting unequivocally the incitement to hostility
and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the
Libyan government. The members of the Security who voted in favour of the
resolution were clear that the resolution is based on humanitarian considerations.
I f   humanitarian intervention in Libya is warranted, the article suggests that the
General Assembly, rather than the Security Council, is the legitimate UN organ to
authorize it.

Intervention by states in the territory of a sovereign state is

generally proscribed in international law by the doctrine of non-intervention.
Intervention has been defined as a coercive tactic used to manipulate a country into
taking a certain path that would not otherwise be chosen and consist of military
involvement or the encouragement of the use of force by an outside power in a
domestic conflict.

Intervention therefore occurs: when a state interferes in the relations of other

states without the consent of one or both of them, or when it interferes in the
domestic affairs of another state irrespective of the will of the latter for
the purpose of maintaining or altering the actual condition of things within it.
Intervention may also be by means other than armed force, including payment to
political parties or supporting rebel or opposition forces in another country.

Non-intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states is a fundamental

doctrine of international law which is closely linked to the security of states and
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the peace and the stability of the international order. The doctrine means that states
have no right unilaterally to interfere by force, the threat of force, or other coercive
means in the internal affairs of other states. Foreign governments also “cannot seek
to expand influence by a direct appeal to citizens of another country by occupation,
or by using home territory as a base for opposing another regime” . Although
intervention in the affairs of states is normally forbidden in international law, the
international community may undertake collective intervention in a
sovereign state on humanitarian grounds. Collective interventions are those
undertaken by the international community under the auspices of the United
Nations.

Humanitarian intervention has been defined as the use of force in

order to protect the people of another state from treatment which is so
arbitrary and persistently abusive as to exceed the limits of authority within
which a sovereign is presumed to act with reason and justice.

It is submitted that the situation in Libya does not constitute a threat to, or
breach of international peace and security and does not amount to aggression as
envisaged by the Charter. The violent suppression of demonstrations, protests,
armed rebellion or insurgency is a domestic matter that has little implication on
international peace and security. Even gross violations of human rights and the
commission of international crime do not endanger international peace and security
unless they have an international dimension. There was no indication that
neighbouring countries are threatened or likely to be threatened by Libya and there
was no indication that neighbouring countries are involved or going to be involved
in the conflict. Interestingly, when the situation in Syria which is not similar
in Libya came up for discussion in the Security Council, even a
condemnatory statement could not be agreed largely because some of the
members insisted the situation did not breach or threaten international peace and
security. It is submitted, that the situation in Libya raises issues of human rights
and humanitarian concerns which do not fall within the competence of the Security
Council.

Libya’s situation should be the prerogative of the Human Rights Council

(HRC) to determine whether the threshold for humanitarian intervention has been

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reached and to recommend to the General Assembly w h e t h e r c o l l e c t i v e
humanitarian intervention should be undertaken. The General Assembly would
then vote to authorise any necessary action. The Human rights Council is
responsible   for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights
around the globe. Its main purpose is to address the situation of human rights
violations and m a k e recommendations on them to the General Assembly.

It is suggested that the Security Council did not take reasonable steps to
resolve the situation in Libya by non-violent means before it authorised the use of
force. Although Resolution 1970 (2011) imposed sanctions, including arms
embargo, assets freeze and travel ban on officials of the Libyan government,
these measures were not given the time to work before military force was
authorised. The Council also made little attempt to contact the Libyan
government with a view to ending the conflict peacefully.

Moreover, the Security Council did not do enough to verify the

facts on the ground before it embarked on hostile action against the
Libyan administration. Although Resolution of 1970 of February 2011
welcomed the decisions of Human Rights Council to immediately send to Libya an
international commission of enquiry to investigate all alleged violations of
international human rights law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to establish the
facts and circumstance of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated,
and where possible, indentify those responsible, it proceeded on 17
March 2011 to pass Resolution 1973 (which authorized the use of
military force) before it has had the opportunity to receive a report from the UN
commission of enquiry.

The Libya intervention is the latest in a series of international military

actions after the cold war justified on the basis of protecting noncombatants. This
renaissance of humanitarian intervention started in the early 1990s with prominent
deployments of United Nations-authorized air and ground forces to northern Iraq,
Bosnia and Somalia.

Despite the failures of the past, Libya revealed that the international
community can act in a timely fashion to halt mass atrocity crimes when sufficient
political will and operational capacity exists. The swift and unanimous adoption of

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Resolution 1970 contrasts sharply with the paralysis that overtook the UN during
the Rwandan genocide and the painful dithering during the Balkans wars of the
1990s. On a military level, it took two days between the adoption of Resolution
1973 and the imposition of the no-fly zone. By comparison, it had taken NATO
twelve days to initiate operations over Bosnia two decades earlier. In this sense,
Libya represents an important demonstration of what can happen when political
will and operational capacity align.

The Secretary-General argued that the international community had

“advanced the Responsibility to Protect” in Cote d’Ivoire and Libya, both of which
were “important victories for justice and international law.” But given the lingering
disagreement over the Libya intervention, perhaps we should also recall the words
of Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame in May 2011. No country knows better than
my own the costs of the international community failing to intervene to prevent a
state killing its own people. Through UN Resolution 1973, we are seeing a
committed intervention to halt the crisis that was unfolding in Libya.

At the opening of the sixty-sixth UN General Assembly during September

2011, Syria’s Foreign Minister declared that in confronting mass protests and the
“blatant conspiracies” of foreigners, the government of Syria had “exercised its
responsibility to protect its citizens.” Ironically, by invoking R2P language the
Syrian Foreign Minister paid a backhanded compliment to the strength of the
emerging norm, despite the political backlash from Libya. Within the UN the
debate now is about how R2P should be practically implemented in specific cases
and crises rather than whether such an abstract responsibility exists. But the
struggle to give deeper meaning, operational substance and institutional structure
to R2P continues to develop. Misuse of R2P debases the concept. Clarity of
purpose, proportionality and precision remain essential.

Finally, we cannot be distracted by the obfuscation of those who argue that

Libya is the sole benchmark by which to measure the Responsibility to Protect.
Despite division and debate about the meaning and implications of the Libyan
intervention, R2P is still the best instrument we have to bridge the gap between the
noble aims of the UN and the imperfect world of global diplomacy. R2P remains
our best hope to make “never again” a living principle, rather than a cliche to
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whisper as we shuffle past the memorials and mass graves of those who died while
the world sat in silence.

Mg Pyay Thar Lin Maung

DIR-88
Assignment-(3), Module-(6)