INDEX

Mandate of the committee

Topic A: Helping the UN Chart a Way Out of Libya’s Political Deadlock
● Introduction

● Definition of Key Terms

● Historical Background

● Timeline of Event

● Current Situation of Libya

● Past action by the African Union

● Impacts of the Libyan Crisis

● Country Stances

● Bibliography

Topic B: Bolstering the African Union’s Institutional Capacity

● Understanding the Topic

● The Institutional Capacity Building Project

● African Union’s Institutional Structure

● Key Components of Institutional Capacity

● Strategies for Bolstering iInstitutional Capacity

● Case studies

● Bibliography
Introduction to the AU
The AU is made up of 55 Member States which represent all the countries on the African

continent. The continental union covers and deals with social, political and economic issues

within the African Continent, the following are the goals that AU seeks to achieve throughout

the proceedings.

● Peace and Security: The African Union works to advance security, stability, and peace

throughout the continent. It supports efforts to resolve disputes between member states,

maintain peace, and resolve conflicts.

● Political Coordination: The African Union works to advance the rule of law, respect for

human rights, and democratic government throughout the continent. It promotes

democratic institutions and procedures as well as political stability and good governance.

● Advancement of socio-economic Development: The AU is dedicated to promoting

Africa's socio-economic development. In areas including agriculture, infrastructure, trade,

investment, and industrialization, it encourages economic integration, regional

collaboration, and sustainable development.

● Regional Integration: The African Union aspires to unite, flourish, and politically

integrate Africa by integrating the African economy. It backs programmes like the

African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to increase intra-African trade.

● Pan-Africanism: The AU fosters solidarity among African countries and Pan-Africanist

ideas. In addition to promoting unity among African states and peoples, it aims to

strengthen African identity, legacy, and culture.

● International Cooperation: To further Africa's interests, the AU collaborates with regional

and global institutions, governments, and organisations. It aims to increase Africa's global

impact, promote African perspectives on international issues, and cooperate on areas of

shared interest.
Topic A: Helping the UN chart a way out of Libya’s political deadlock
Introduction:
Libya is a country in northern Africa that borders the Mediterranean Sea.

Since gaining its freedom from Italian colonial domination, Libya has experienced a volatile

history marked by political squabbles, civil wars, and humanitarian crises. Although violence

had been intermittent since the 2011 uprising against Gaddafi, which took place three years

earlier, the Libyan civil war officially began in February of that year. When Gaddafi was

assassinated in 2011, his 40-year dictatorship over Libya came to an abrupt end.

The main actors involved in the Libyan political deadlock are the internationally recognized

Government of National Accord (GNA) based in Tripoli and the Libyan National Army (LNA)

led by General Khalifa Haftar, based in eastern Libya. Both sides have the support of various

militias, tribes, and foreign backers, further complicating the situation. The Libyan political

deadlock is characterised by territorial divisions, with the GNA controlling the western part of

the country, including Tripoli, while the LNA controls the east, including Benghazi. The rival

factions have engaged in sporadic armed clashes and territorial disputes, exacerbating the

political crisis.

To end the political impasse and bring about a long-lasting peace in Libya, efforts are still being

made. To promote communication and peace, diplomatic initiatives like the Berlin Conference

and regional mediation are still being attempted. A profoundly fractured and unstable nation like

Libya makes it difficult to develop a comprehensive and inclusive political solution.

DEFINITION OF KEY TERMS:

1. Political deadlock:
Political deadlock occurs when opposing factions or parties are unable to establish a consensus

on a matter of policy as a result of deep splits or differences. It prevents agreement and

advancement on important topics, paralysing governance and the implementation of policies.

Negotiations, compromise, and the involvement of impartial third parties are required to break

political impasses and achieve a resolution.

2. UN Charter:
UN Chart is a strategic planning method used by The United Nations to lay out a plan or

framework for tackling a particular problem. It entails assessing the problem, creating a strategy,

and coordinating actions with other member states and stakeholders. In order to successfully

address complex global concerns, the UN's activities and interventions are guided by the UN

Chart.

3. Proxy wars:
Proxy wars are battles in which rival states or groups wage war on one another without actually

fighting one another by supporting and funding them. These wars frequently arise when big

countries want to expand their influence or advance their interests in a region without taking a

chance on a direct clash. When resources, weaponry, and military assistance are provided to local

factions, it results in proxy wars, which serve as a stage for the indirect struggle of opposing

ideologies and objectives.

4. National Oil Corporation:

The National Oil Corporation is the only Libyan state oil company permitted to manage and sell

the country’s oil. It is based in Tripoli. There have been attempts by Haftar to break its

monopoly. Many international companies work with the NOC. The largest foreign oil producer

in Libya is Italy, but France is also expanding its operations there. Russia may also begin to work

with NOC.

5. UNSMIL (UNITED NATIONS SUPPORT MISSION IN LIBYA) :

The United Nations Support Mission for Libya is a special political mission established in 2011

by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 2009 (September 2011) at the request of the Libyan

authorities following six months of armed conflict to support the country's new transitional

authorities in their post-conflict efforts. The mandate of the Mission has been extended until the

15th of September 2017 with the Resolution 2323 (December 2016).

6. PEACEKEEPING OPERATION:
The Security Council's major duty is to uphold international peace and security, according to the

UN Charter. The Council can accomplish this by establishing a UN peacekeeping operation by

passing a resolution that expressly states its mandate, size, tasks, and other specifics
History and Background:
The modern Libyan state began to take shape within the Ottoman Empire from the mid-16th

century onward. Libya’s path to independent statehood was violently interrupted in 1911 with the

onset of an Italian conquest. Rome’s efforts to annex Libya through settler colonialism and ethnic

cleansing were in turn disrupted by World War II. The United Nations (UN) helped to guide

Libya to independence under the Sanusi monarchy in 1951, albeit in close collaboration with the

United Kingdom and the United States. The Sanusi monarchy, founded in the eastern region of

Cyrenaica in the late 19th century, faced substantial difficulties in its efforts to transform an

incredibly vast, thinly populated, socially diverse, and seemingly resource-poor country into a

modern nation state. Though the extraction and exportation of oil from the 1960s onward helped

to alleviate some of the financial constraints on the government, the increasing centralization of

power within the monarchy eventually led to a military coup in 1969. Libya’s new regime, under

the leadership of Muammar Al-Gaddafi, would eventually pursue a radical program involving

centralised economic planning funded through oil sales, a baroque system of popular

consultation, a terrifying array of “revolutionary” security institutions, military aggression in

Chad, and confrontations with North Atlantic powers directly and indirectly. Though the Gaddafi

regime was able to survive an array of domestic and international challenges for over four

decades, a mass armed uprising in 2011, which precipitated a merciless civil war and foreign

military intervention, led to its downfall. Subsequent international assistance and successive

transitional authorities, however, were unable to address the spiral of insecurity that consumed

Libya from 2012 onwards. A second civil war erupted in 2014, one fed not only by competing

domestic visions for the future of Libya, but also by the competing ambitions of other states in

the region.

Current situation:
Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA), which recently advanced on

Tripoli, has exposed Libya to the possibility of a protracted proxy conflict on the southern

frontier of Europe. With the march deep into the city's southern suburbs, the European Union and

its member countries now have a substantial stake in preventing the situation from spiralling into

a national conflict. The state will become even more unstable as a result of this escalation, and

organisations that violate the basic rights of local populations will have a safe haven.
Therefore, it is crucial that the authorities comprehend the global dynamics underlying the rising

violence in Libya. Foreign involvement in the nation will keep fueling the strife if they are not

stopped. Foreign nations' involvement in Libya's civil conflict has long been a threat but also a

very important one. The nation's factionalization and post-revolutionary battles have frequently

included interventions intended to further the political or regional objectives of foreign

governments. In order to create regional hegemony amid the Arab uprisings, a number of Gulf

Arab powers, most notably Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, have funded

armed organisations and political movements in Libya.

The international community also comments on decisions made by some countries, like the

Russian Federation or the United States of America, in the conflict. Their indirect military

intervention if the war is something that is really discussed in various committees of human and

civil rights, international unions, and international courts. In addition, the direct intervention of

other countries is also questioned and debated by the United Nations and other international or

supranational organisations.

Even if the formal violence has ceased, for now, a formal armistice will only put an

end to this conflict in peace, the attacks can start again or continue in the debate, but

the only thing for sure is that Libya is in the eyes of all nations, as this conflict is

practically a direct cause of the course of action taken by the international community

after the death of Muammar Gadafi.

Key Factors and Factions involved in the Libya conflict:

1- Government of National Accord (GNA) :In December 2015 delegates from Libya’s rival

factions signed the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA)—a UN-brokered power-sharing

agreement establishing a Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by a prime minister

and a nine-member presidency council drawn from constituencies and factions throughout the

country. Although the GNA received recognition from the UN Security Council as the legitimate

government of Libya, it struggled to consolidate its authority in both the eastern and western

halves of the country. In the east the House of Representatives, aligned with Haftar’s forces,

refused to endorse the GNA’s proposed ministerial appointments. In the west the NSG stepped

down to make way for the GNA, though the GNA met some resistance from NSG-associated

factions in late 2016. In September 2017 the UN Support Mission in Libya announced an effort
to amend the LPA, with the goal of creating a workable arrangement for sharing power between

the opposing factions. By the end of the year, though, prospects for an agreement looked dim,

while Haftar dismissed the legitimacy of the GNA, whose LPA mandate expired in December.

Nevertheless, efforts toward unity continued, and in May 2018 the factions endorsed a plan to

hold elections in the upcoming winter. The plans were disrupted, however, after a summer of

tumultuous events and a failure to meet a September deadline to establish the framework for

elections.

2- Libyan National Army (LNA) :Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar is the commander of the Libyan

National Army (LNA), a military organisation. The LNA was opposed to the internationally

recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli and was principally allied with the

Libyan House of Representatives, which was situated in the eastern city of Tobruk. In the Second

Libyan Civil War, which broke out in 2014, the LNA fought to seize control of the whole nation.

There were several factions, militias, and international actors participating in the complicated

battle in Libya. While the GNA got endorsement from the United governments and numerous

other countries, the LNA gained support from a number of governments, notably Egypt, the

United Arab Emirates, and Russia.

3- Misrata Militias: The militias of Misrata are renowned for their might and skill in battle. They

were essential in assisting the capital city of Tripoli's globally acclaimed Government of National

Accord (GNA). Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) was at odds with

the GNA, which was commanded by Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj. The Misrata militias were

made up of a variety of armed organisations with varying political and ideological perspectives.

They were one of the main players in the fight, and their presence had a big influence on how the

war played out.

4- Tribal Militias: Tribal militias, along with other armed factions and militias, became one of

the main protagonists in the fight during the Second Libyan Civil War, which began in 2014.

These tribal militias frequently sided with various political or geographical groupings, creating a

complicated and dispersed security environment throughout the nation.Tribal militias in Libya

have a history of establishing authority over certain areas, defending the interests of their people,

and occasionally engaging in combat with other tribes or armed opposition. They have

occasionally joined forces with more powerful political or military organisations, such the

Government of National Accord (GNA) or the Libyan National Army (LNA).

5- Islamic State (IS) : The Second Libyan Civil War's disarray and power vacuum provided the

Islamic State with the perfect opportunity to establish a foothold in Libya in 2014 and 2015. The

organisation seized Sirte and proclaimed it the capital of their new Libyan "wilaya" (province).

The Islamic State in Libya drew foreign militants and carried out high-profile strikes during its

height, posing a significant security danger to the area and beyond. However, efforts to reclaim

Sirte from the Islamic State were conducted in late 2016 by a coalition of Libyan troops

supported by foreign assistance and airstrikes, notably those of the United States. By December

2016, the Libyan troops had been able to successfully eject the last of the group's survivors from

Sirte.

6- Foreign Actors: Different factions have received backing from outside forces, which has been

a crucial factor in the fight. This includes nations with distinct agendas and interests, such as

Turkey, Egypt, Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar.

7- Fezzan Region: Fezzan is known for its vast desert landscapes, including parts of the Sahara

Desert, and is sparsely populated. The region's main urban centre is Sabha, which is also the

largest city in southern Libya.Due to its strategic location and natural resources, the Fezzan

Region has been a significant area of interest and contention throughout Libya's history. It has

played a crucial role in trade and trans-Saharan routes, connecting Libya to other African

countries to the south. Like other parts of Libya, Fezzan has also experienced its share of

instability and conflict, particularly during the Second Libyan Civil War that began in 2014.

Various armed groups, including tribal militias and factions, have vied for control over the

region, leading to security challenges and humanitarian issues.

8- Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) : The PFG was formed in 2013 during the

post-revolutionary period in Libya. It operates under the Ministry of Defense of the Government

of National Accord (GNA), which is based in Tripoli and has been internationally recognized.

However, like many other institutions in Libya, the PFG has experienced challenges related to its

cohesion and loyalty to central authorities. Different factions and militias within the PFG have

sometimes been influenced by regional and tribal allegiances, leading to internal divisions and

competition for control over lucrative oil facilities. As a result, some parts of the PFG have been

accused of engaging in conflicts or blockades to advance their interests. There have been

instances of clashes between rival factions vying for control over oil installations, leading to

disruptions in oil production and exports. These incidents have had significant economic
implications for Libya, as oil exports are a vital source of revenue for the country.

9- Migration and Smuggling Networks: Smuggling networks operate along the coast of Libya,

which acts as a significant transit country for migrants and refugees trying to reach Europe. This

instability is exacerbated by the presence of these networks.

Past AU actions:
The African Union has actively addressed the ongoing issue in Libya through a series of

resolutions. This show the commitment of the AU regarding the matter and are as follows:

a) Resolution 794:

Resolution 794 reaffirms the AU's support for Resolution 1973 of the UN Security

Council, which imposed sanctions and created a no-fly zone over Libya. It highlights

how crucial it is to protect African migrants and advocates for coordinated action to stop

their exploitation.

b) Resolution 787:

Resolution 787 solemnly condemns foreign intervention in Libya. It urges for an

immediate ending of hostilities. Stresses upon a political solution for the issue, dialogue

and restoring peace in the region.

c) Decision 456:

This decision raises concern over the deteriorating situation in Libya in regards to

security. Acknowledges and supports the endeavours of the UN Support Mission in Libya

(UNSMIL). Emphasises on the importance of political dialogue. Urges upon international

assistance to address the challenges faced by the people of Libya.

Past UN actions:
a. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1973 (S/RES/1973)

The United Nations Security Council Resolution, on the situation in Libya, adopted a measure in

March 2011 in order to stop the First Libyan Civil War. This resolution was proposed by France,

Lebanon and the UK. So, by this resolution, legal bases were formed for military intervention to

be attempted. It called for an immediate ceasefire. Some of the-key points are the establishment

of a no-fly zone over Libya, the arms embargo, assets freeze on Libyan authorities and the

authorization of all necessary means to protect civilians

b. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2491 (S/RES/2491)

This is the most recent resolution passed on Libya. It allows member states

to investigate vessels that are suspected to be used for migrant smuggling.

You can find the resolution:

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9

%7D/s_res_2491.pdf

c. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2486 (S/RES/2486) The resolution

allowed for the UNSMIL mission to continue until 15 September, 2020. You can find the

resolution:

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9

%7D/s_res_2486.pdf

d. Report on UNSMIL (R/2020/41) The latest report on UNSMIL You can find the

report:

https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9

%7D/s_2020_41.pdf

e. Adopting resolution 2647( S/RES/2647) the Council reiterated its decision that

UNSMIL should be led by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Tripoli and

called on the Secretary-General to promptly appoint the same. The

Council also called on the relevant Libyan institutions and authorities to implement

confidence-building measures to create an environment conducive for successful presidential and

parliamentary elections. Further, the Council called on the parties to refrain from any actions that

could undermine the political process or the 23 October 2020 ceasefire and, emphasising that

there can be no military solution in Libya, demanded full compliance by all Member States with

the arms embargo imposed in 2011.

f. The PSC of the African Union, in September 2019, discussed the need for this

Council to get more involved in concluding the Libyan crisis. In their 857th

session, they proposed a number of other measures that should be taken in

in order to ameliorate the situation. For example, they suggested that Libyan

authorities take action in protecting civilians, including migrants and refugees in

line with the International Humanitarian Law and Human Right Law. They also

demanded the warring factions in Libya to commit a permanent ceasefire and

they stressed the importance of national dialogue in order to promote political

and inclusive solution to the crisis.

g. The Libyan National Conference was scheduled for April 14-16, 2019, with the

goal of organising elections as part of the peace process in Libya. The conference had been

planned for nearly a year and a half, however it was postponed in early April 2019 due to

military actions. This conference had no executive power and merely aimed to provide

recommendations. Ghassan Salame, the Secretary General's special representative in Libya,

issued an official statement in which he stated that he is "more determined than ever to hold the

National Conference at the earliest possible opportunity, as we cannot allow the historic

opportunity it presents to be lost."10So, this conference is planned to take place as soon as

possible, and it was merely postponed due to the circumstances, according to

Political Aspects of Libyan Crisis

The battle for legitimacy and good administration in Libya is one of the country's main political

problems. A power vacuum resulted from Gaddafi's removal, and many factions fought to take

control of the nation. Due to this, the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and the

Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli were established as rival political

organisations. In contrast to the HoR, which enjoyed the support of the Libyan National Army

(LNA) under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the GNA received international recognition from the

UN.

Due to the split between the GNA and HoR, Libya's political landscape became fragmented, with

each group claiming to be the country's legitimate government. The creation of a cohesive,

inclusive administration that serves the interests of all Libyans has been hampered as a result.

Political impasse has made the problem worse by blocking progress in the peace process. The

absence of agreement and collaboration between the two parties has also made matters worse.

The existence of armed organisations and militias with various political and ideological

allegiances has had a big impact on Libya's political climate. These factions have frequently

sought out their own interests, which has resulted in bloodshed and unrest. Some have aimed to

take control of important resources, such oil facilities, which has caused economic disruptions

and made the problem worse.

The influence of outside parties on the Libyan situation has also been crucial. The conflict and

crisis in Libya have been made worse and longer by the help of many regional and international
forces. The proliferation of weapons and foreign fighters as a result of external operations has

increased bloodshed and made it more difficult to resolve the conflict.

In addition, there are intricate regional factors at play in the Libyan crisis, and both domestic and

foreign players are invested in how things turn out. Libya has become a transit nation for those

trying to go to Europe as a result of the influx of refugees and migrants through the country,

raising worries about human trafficking and smuggling networks. Furthermore, Libya's abundant

energy supplies have made it a focus for international energy security, with outside nations vying

for control of and access to the nation's oil resources. Due to the fact that several parties are

pursuing conflicting objectives, frequently at the expense of Libya's security and sovereignty,

this foreign participation has made the situation even more difficult.

Key Issues:
a. Foreign Involvement:

Foreign intervention has undoubtedly worsened the civil strife in Libya.

Before the war ever started, foreign governments were arming and training anti-Gaddafi

organisations. Through this interference, proxy conflicts developed, and they have since

erupted into open combat. This foreign assistance to proxies has only made the bloodshed

of the war worse. Each of the two main governments vying for control in Libya is

supported by different foreign nations. The House of Representatives, which is allied

with Haftar's Libyan National Army, is supported by Egypt, the United Arab Emirates,

Saudi Arabia, France, and Russia. The Government of National Accord is supported by

the UN, Italy, Qatar, Turkey, and officially the EU. The objectives of several of the

interested foreign countries are very dissimilar from those of typical Libyans. As was

already established, this is now an internationally financed and logistically supported

conflict in which foreign forces just contribute resources. Even though there has been an

international arms embargo since 2011, this still takes place. This is crucial because the

war will never stop as long as both sides receive constant international aid.

b. Libya’s Economy

Oil is the foundation of the Libyan economy and Libya possesses the greatest oil reserves

in all of Africa. The largest source of income for the nation, oil, has seen a more than

90% decline. Control of the oil resources has been a point of contention and conflict
between the warring parties. Due to security concerns, this has led to production

restrictions at the state oil company NOC. Previously, NOC had to shut down Libya's

biggest oil field and quickly remove all fuel. tankers from ports when extremist action in

the area threatened to cause destruction. Due to this, daily oil production has decreased

from 1.6 million to a mere 300,000 barrels. Concerns have been raised regarding Libya's

ability to support itself economically since armed groups continue to struggle over oil,

which lowers production.

c. Migrant Crisis

An important starting point for people migrating from the Middle East and northern

Africa to Europe is Libya. Many of these immigrants are being transported illegally

through Libya before being loaded onto crowded, hazardous vessels and sent towards

Europe, mainly Italy. Numerous people have drowned while trying to accomplish this

extremely risky expedition. Controlling migration is incredibly difficult in the war-torn

nation since it lacks a strong government. For the EU to effectively manage immigration

into Europe, stabilising Libya is crucial.

d. Humanitarian Crisis

The UN Refugee Agency calculates that more than 217,000 individuals have been

internally displaced as a result of the ongoing war in Libya. Due to severe violence and

damage, these people were forced to leave their homes against their will and search for

new places to start their lives. People who are in need of basic essentials like food, water,

and shelter are frequently displaced.

The quality of Libya's health services, including access to hospitals and medical care, is

declining. As of 2019, "an estimated 17.5% of hospitals, 20% of primary health care

facilities, and 18% of specialised hospitals are partially damaged or completely destroyed

throughout the country," according to UNICEF.

This continuous violence is thought to have put 500,000 children in danger. Violence

against children is on the rise. Children have also suffered from psychosocial discomfort

or trauma as a result of wartime violence. This may result in future impairments in their

life. Education quality and access have suffered as a result of the conflict. Children are

unable to attend school since many schools are being used to accommodate displaced

people.
Water and sanitation service quality has deteriorated. Because of the destruction and

fighting, sanitary services have been suspended in some areas, and the availability of safe

drinking water has decreased. This could lead to an upsurge in waterborne infections.

Electricity outages have also grown common in Libya.Recently, Libya has faced

flooding. This has caused around 4,250

people to be displaced from their homes and water treatment

infrastructure to be damaged and contaminated.

Socio-Economic Impact of Libyan crisis:

From 2011 to the present, the war has resulted in a considerable loss of economic potential in

Libya, estimated at 783.2 billion Libyan dinars. The conflict has had an impact on many

elements of the country's economic life. It has had a negative impact on the economy's

macroeconomic elements, with a major decline in growth and high volatility. Moreover, there has

been a sharp fall in government revenues, expenditure and investment. The conflict also affected

productive sectors that experienced a significant drop in their activities, including the

hydrocarbons, construction and agriculture sectors.

Libya has significant oil reserves and was a major oil producer in the past. The fighting,

however, interrupted oil production and export facilities, resulting in a considerable drop in

output. This has had a significant impact on government income and the wider economy, as oil

exports account for a large amount of Libya's GDP.

The prolonged turmoil has led the Libyan economy to decline. The country has seen its GDP fall,

inflation rise, and unemployment climb dramatically. Manufacturing, construction, and trade

have all been badly impacted, further compounding the economic depression.

During the fighting, infrastructure such as transportation networks, power plants, and

communication systems have been damaged or destroyed. This stifles economic activity and

reconstruction efforts, making it difficult for enterprises to operate efficiently and preventing the

delivery of basic services to the populace.

Libya's breakdown in government and security has aided the expansion of smuggling networks,

particularly for products, weapons, and people trafficking. These illegal operations exacerbate

insecurity and impede legitimate economic activity.

The Libyan conflict has had repercussions throughout the region. Libya's instability has
hampered regional trade and cross-border commercial activities. It has also aided in the

proliferation of weapons and the expansion of extremist groups, providing security threats that

reach beyond Libya's borders.

Libyans and non-Libyans adopted one or more negative food-based coping mechanisms to

maintain some level of food security. Relying on less preferred and less expensive foods,

reducing the number of meals eaten in a day and limiting food portion size for all household

members at mealtimes were the primary coping mechanisms cited by both Libyans and

non-Libyans. The reduced coping strategies index was low for more than 85 percent of

interviewed households in the summer of 2021 but is likely to have worsened throughout 2022 to

date.

As a result of Libya’s heavy dependence on food imports, specifically from Ukraine and Russia,

food security in the country has been significantly impacted by the Russia-Ukraine crisis. Since

the start of the crisis, Libya has been facing wheat and cereals supply disruptions, shortages,

speculative behaviours by producers and traders along the supply chain, and higher prices.

The crisis has put a pressure on the delivery of public services such as healthcare, education, and

public infrastructure. Hospitals and medical institutions have been damaged or are lacking in

critical resources, resulting in limited access to quality healthcare. Many schools have shuttered

or are operating under poor conditions, further disrupting educational institutions.

The Libyan conflict has been linked to human rights breaches and atrocities committed by

numerous factions and armed organisations. Arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, torture,

and extrajudicial killings are examples of these abuses. Civilians have been disproportionately

harmed, particularly vulnerable populations such as women, children, and migrants.

The crisis has exacerbated Libyan society's existing social imbalances. Economic disruptions,

rising unemployment, and inflation have resulted in a drop in living conditions for many

Libyans. These inequities frequently disproportionately affect vulnerable populations, such as

marginalised communities and rural areas.

Country stances
Egypt:

Egypt, as a conspicuous part of the African Union (AU), holds a critical position on the current

circumstance in Libya. Given its topographical vicinity and authentic ties with Libya, Egypt has
been effectively included in endeavours to stabilise the nation and bring almost a tranquil

determination to the strife.

Egypt's essential concern with respect to Libya is the effect of insecurity on its national security.

Egypt has reliably pushed for a political arrangement that guarantees the solidarity and regional

keenness of Libya, pointing to anticipate the spread of radicalism and fear based oppression over

its borders. Egypt has communicated its back for the Libyan National Armed force (LNA) driven

by Common Khalifa Haftar, because it sees the LNA as a constraint competent of combating

radical bunches and restoring stability.

Within the AU, Egypt has been an advocate for a serene determination and has effectively taken

an interest in different activities pointed at finding a political arrangement. Egypt has emphasised

the significance of the AU playing a central part in intervening between the clashing parties and

has called for an comprehensive exchange that includes all pertinent Libyan partners. Egypt has

upheld the AU's endeavours to facilitate with the Joined together Countries and other universal

accomplices to discover an enduring arrangement to the emergency.

Moreover, Egypt has looked to upgrade financial participation with Libya and has been included

in activities to modify the war-torn nation. Egypt accepts that financial improvement and

reproduction are basic components for long-term soundness in Libya.

Nigeria:

Nigeria, being one of the biggest and most persuasive nations in Africa, has kept up a dynamic

position on the current circumstance in Libya inside the African Union (AU). Nigeria recognizes

the potential effect of the strife in Libya on territorial solidity, movement, and psychological

warfare, and has been committed to finding a tranquil determination to the crisis.

Nigeria's approach to the Libya circumstance has been centred around discretion, discourse, and

a strong belief in African-led arrangements. Nigeria has reliably backed the AU's endeavours to

intercede between the warring groups in Libya and has called for a comprehensive political

handle that permits for the support of all Libyan partners.

Nigeria has emphasised the requirement for a comprehensive and all encompassing approach to

address the root causes of the struggle in Libya. It has supported the advancement of great

administration, regard for human rights, and the run the show of law in Libya as significant

components in accomplishing enduring peace. Nigeria has too pushed the significance of tending

to socio-economic challenges, such as unemployment and destitution, to avoid the repeat of

flimsiness.

Inside the AU, Nigeria has effectively contributed to peacekeeping endeavours in Libya and has

upheld activities pointed at fortifying the capacity of the AU and territorial organisations in

struggle determination. Nigeria has moreover called for expanded worldwide participation and

help to back the remaking and improvement of Libya.

South Africa:

South Africa, as a noticeable part of the African Union (AU), has been effectively locked in

talks and activities related to the current circumstance in Libya. South Africa has consistently

advocated for a tranquil determination to the strife in Libya and has emphasised the significance

of Libya's sway and regional keenness.

South Africa's position on the Libya circumstance inside the AU is based on its commitment to

the standards of non-interference, exchange, and inclusivity. South Africa has called for an

African-led and African-owned prepare to resolve the struggle, with the AU playing a central

part in intervening between the clashing parties.

South Africa has communicated its bolster for a political arrangement in Libya, emphasising the

requirement for all parties to lock in in an comprehensive discourse that addresses the grievances

of different Libyan groups. It has too focused on the significance of national compromise, the run

the show of law, and the assurance of human rights as essential columns for maintainable peace

in Libya.

QARMA
What are the main causes of the political impasse in Libya and how have they changed over

time?

What results were achieved by earlier UN-led or other international initiatives that attempted to

address Libya's political crisis?

What are the main difficulties and problems that the UN must take into account while developing

a plan to end the political impasse in Libya?

What possible roles may the nations that make up the area and those that border it play in helping

to resolve the political impasse in Libya?

How can the UN use diplomatic, economic, and security measures to foster political stability and

collaboration among the various Libyan factions?

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www.youtube.com/watch?v=IES-MJ68e7E

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www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12532929

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Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 8 Feb. 2020,

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www.youtube.com/watch?v=IObO5Hq6DiE

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Sept. 2016,

www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/northafrica/libya/ceasefire-and-
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TOPIC 2: Bolstering the AU’s Institutional Capacity:
Understanding the topic:
Bolstering the AU's institutional capacity refers to the process of boosting the African Union's

(AU) organisational capacities, resources, and efficiency. Developing the required human and

financial resources to support the AU's operations and goals entails taking proactive steps to

enhance the organisation's structures, methods, and procedures. By strengthening the AU's

institutional capacity, the organisation will be better able to carry out its mandate, put policies

into effect, and realise its objectives across a range of sectors, including peace and security,

governance, economic growth, and social affairs. It entails developing and bolstering the

essential elements that support the AU's operation, such as decision-making frameworks,

mechanisms for formulating and implementing policy, frameworks for partnerships and

cooperation, financial resources, human resources, and information and communication

technology.The AU can better coordinate, support, and lead projects and programmes that

address the challenges and possibilities facing the African continent by enhancing its institutional

capabilities. As a result, the AU is better equipped to address new problems, advance regional

integration, spur sustainable development, support peace and stability, and speak out for African

interests abroad.

The Institutional Capacity Building Project:

This AUC capacity-building project is an African-owned process that emanates from the AU’s

reform agenda. The project will support the AU’s reform agenda, launched in 2017, by

strengthening the AUC’s governance systems and processes, growing the expertise of AUC

personnel, and increasing the institution’s policy planning and coordination capabilities,

especially within the Cabinets of the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson. The project will

better position the AUC to address the continent’s challenges by more effectively implementing

programs that stimulate sustainable growth and development and deliver on the vision of Agenda

2063. The objective of the project is to improve the AUC’s capacity to drive Agenda 2063 and its

flagship projects and programs. The project aims to build the AUC’s institutional capacity and

develop, upgrade, and reform systems vital to the AUC’s planning, coordination, and service

delivery.
AU’S Institutional Structure:
Assembly of The African Union:

The Assembly came into existence on 25 May 1963, as part of the ratification of Organization of

African Unity (OAU). Initially the Assembly consisted of 32 independent members, the heads of

state of the African states that had achieved independence by 1963. Until 2001, the governing

constitution of the Assembly was the OAU Charter. It considers membership requests into the

Union, creates bodies for the Union, monitors the implementation of policies and decisions of the

Union as well ensure compliance by all Member States and creates a budget of the Union

Executive Council:

The Executive Council of the African Union is made up of ministers designated by the

governments of member countries. They discuss issues of concern and prepare material for the

Assembly, to whom they are responsible. They make decisions on foreign trade, social security,

food, agriculture and communications.

African Union Commission:

The African Union Commission (AUC) acts as the executive/administrative branch or secretariat

of the African Union (and is somewhat analogous to the European Commission). It consists of a

number of Commissioners dealing with different areas of policy. It Representing the AU and

defending its interests under the guidance of and as mandated by the Assembly and the

Executive Council

Pan African Parliament:

The Pan-African Parliament (PAP) was set up to ensure the full participation of African peoples

in the economic development and integration of the continent.The PAP is intended as a platform

for people from all African states to be involved in discussions and decision making on the

problems and challenges facing the continent. The Parliament sits in Midrand, South

Africa.Rather than being elected directly by the people, PAP members are designated by the

legislatures of their Member State and members of their domestic legislatures. The ultimate aim

is for the Parliament to be an institution with full legislative powers, whose members are elected

by universal suffrage. Until such time, the PAP has consultative, advisory and budgetary

oversight powers within the AU.

African Court of Justice:

The Court of Justice of the African Union was originally intended to be the principal judicial

organ of the African Union with authority to rule on disputes over interpretation of AU treaties.

The Court has, however, never come into existence because the African Union has decided that it

should be merged with the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights to form a new court: the

African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJHR). Underlying this decision was the concern

at the growing number of AU institutions, which the AU could not afford to support.A protocol

to set up the Court of Justice was adopted in 2003, and entered into force in 2009. It was,

however, superseded by a protocol creating the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.The

merger protocol was adopted during the 11th African Union Summit in July 2008. The united

court will be based in Arusha, Tanzania.

Peace and Security Council:

The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the standing decision-making organ of the AU for the

prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It is a collective security and early warning

arrangement intended to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations

in Africa. It is also the key pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which

is the framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.The Protocol Relating to

the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council was adopted on 9 July 2002 in Durban,

South Africa, and entered into force in December 2003. The PSC became fully operational in

early 2004. The PSC Protocol, together with the PSC Rules of Procedure, the AU Constitutive

Act and the conclusions of various PSC retreats, provide operational guidance to PSC activities.

African Central Bank:

The African Central Bank (ACB) is one of the original five financial institutions and specialized

agencies of the African Union. Over time, it will take over responsibilities of the African

Monetary Fund.

Challenges and Limitations faced in the past:

The African Union has faced political instability, poverty, corruption, internal disputes, and

extremist actors in its member states so the African Union (AU) is compelled to do more to

manage these often-recurring problems which requires financial resources. But the AU’s

financial resources have reduced since 2010, partly due to the internal political challenges in

Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa. These five countries have been the major

financial contributors to the AU and their weakened capacity has resulted in an increased
dependence on external partners such as the European Commission, at a time when many

international partners but also African leaders wanted to increase African self-funding. The AU

receives 60% of its funding from external partners and the more this dependence has increased,

the more compromised the AU’s independence has become, and the less influence it has had on

how the funds received can be used. Due to an extreme lack of financial resources it has limited

the AU’s ability to effectively implement its programs of institutional capacity building

The AU has struggled to implement its rules and enforce its rulings throughout all of its member

nations. The successful implementation of AU decisions has occasionally been hampered by the

absence of efficient enforcement measures, notably in efforts to resolve conflicts and maintain

peace. The AU has struggled to implement its rules and enforce its rulings throughout all of its

member nations. The successful implementation of AU decisions has occasionally been

hampered by the absence of efficient enforcement measures, notably in efforts to resolve

conflicts and maintain peace. All of this results in the decisions of the AU regarding bolstering

the institutional capacity not being implemented on.

Since the formation of the African Union (AU) in 2001, the level of African agency in peace and

security issues has increased significantly but the AU comprises of different bodies and

institutions such as the assembly, executive council, AUC etc. and ensuring efficacious

coordination and organization between all the bodies has remained a challenge in making

effective decisions. Inconsistencies in mandates have from time to time led to inefficiencies.

Findings reveal that although AU has achieved much in the realm of peace and security in

Africa, yet it lacks the needed human resources and institutional capacity to conduct effective

peace operations and peace-making initiatives. Numerous AU institutions have faced capacity

gaps in regards to Human resources, technical expertise, financial resources, administrative

capabilities and information management all of which hinder the AU’s ability to carry out its

mandate and achieve its objectives in regards to institutional capacity.

The AU has faced criticism for limited engagement and inclusion of civil society organizations

and citizens in its decision-making processes. Civil society organisations can be powerful agents

for change as partners in delivering better services for the poorest members of society, and as

enablers of social inclusion. They can also advocate for more effective, accountable and

transparent governments.

The delicate balance between national sovereignty and regional integration has been a challenge
for the AU. Divergent national interests among the participating states can occasionally obstruct

group decision-making and slow the advancement of regional integration initiatives. They need

to take into account the national interests of member states alongside the regional integration

goals striving for unity and solidarity which is crucial for its success for bolstering the

institutions of the AU.

Key Components of Institutional Capacity:

1. AU Commission: At the core of the AU Commission's structure are specialised divisions,

each tasked with handling specific thematic areas critical to the AU's agenda. These

divisions include Peace and Security, Political Affairs, Infrastructure and Energy, Social

Affairs, Trade and Industry, and more. The Peace and Security Division, for instance, is

responsible for conflict prevention, peacekeeping operations, and post-conflict

reconstruction efforts across the continent. On the other hand, the Social Affairs Division

focuses on issues such as health, education, gender equality, and youth empowerment,

working towards promoting the well-being and development of African citizens. In

addition to the thematic divisions, the AU Commission also houses various specialized

offices and agencies that address cross-cutting issues. One such office is the African

Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), which focuses on countering

terrorism and violent extremism in Africa. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), a

legislative body within the AU, is another crucial institution situated within the

Commission, providing a platform for African lawmakers to engage in continental policy

discussions.

2. Decision Making Structures: To enable debates, deliberations, and decisions among

member countries, the African Union (AU) uses a wide range of decision-making

organisations. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government acts as the highest

decision-making body for the AU. The chief executives of the member nations gather at

this annual conference to discuss pressing issues affecting the continent. It offers a

singular forum for decision-makers to have open dialogues, share ideas, and together set

the route for Africa's future.Supporting the Assembly, the Executive Council constitutes

another vital component of the AU's decision-making structure. Composed of foreign

ministers or designated representatives from each member country, the Executive Council
meets regularly to address a wide range of political, economic, and social matters. The

Council reviews and endorses policies and recommendations proposed by specialised

committees and technical bodies, playing a pivotal role in shaping the AU's agenda.

3. Policy Formulation and Implementation: African Union (AU) is a dynamic organisation

that formulates policies and strategies across a wide range of fields, recognizing the

interconnected nature of issues facing the continent. One critical aspect of the AU's

agenda is social affairs, encompassing areas such as health, education, gender equality,

and youth empowerment. The AU has adopted various initiatives to improve healthcare

systems, enhance access to quality education, and promote gender equality, aiming to

uplift the well-being and livelihoods of African citizens. Additionally, the AU prioritises

empowering the youth through entrepreneurship and skills development, recognizing

their potential as drivers of economic growth and social progress.

4. Partnerships and Cooperation: The African Union (AU) recognizes that achieving its

goals requires strong partnerships with other stakeholders, international organisations,

and regional economic communities. Collaborating with external partners enhances the

AU's institutional capability and amplifies its efforts to address the complex challenges

facing the continent. The AU has developed strategic partnerships with various

international organisations to leverage expertise, resources, and technical assistance. One

of the significant partnerships is with the African Development Bank (AfDB), a key

player in financing development projects and initiatives across Africa. The AU and AfDB

collaborate on various projects related to infrastructure development, regional integration,

and poverty reduction. The AfDB's financial support and technical expertise contribute to

the successful implementation of the AU's Agenda 2063 and other development

strategies.

5. Financial Resources: The institutional strength of the African Union (AU) is indeed

closely tied to its financial resources. As a continental organisation tasked with

addressing a wide range of challenges, from peace and security to economic development

and social affairs, securing sufficient funding is crucial to effectively carry out its

operations, programs, and initiatives. One of the primary sources of funding for the AU is

contributions from its member states. Member states make financial contributions based

on a scale of assessments that takes into account their respective Gross National Income
(GNI). This scale ensures that wealthier member states contribute more significantly to

the AU's budget, reflecting their capacity to support the organisation. However, the

voluntary nature of these contributions has sometimes resulted in inconsistent funding,

with some member states facing budgetary constraints and unable to meet their full

financial commitments.

6. Human Resources: The African Union's (AU) talented and varied labour force is a key

component of its institutional strength. For the AU to effectively carry out its everyday

operations and successfully carry out its ambitious programmes and initiatives, it is

essential to build and retain a skilled staff. Diplomats and experts in international

relations make up a significant portion of the AU's labour force. Diplomats participate in

talks, discussions, and diplomatic efforts on behalf of member states in the AU in an

effort to promote harmony and collaboration among African nations. They are essential in

settling disputes, promoting common interests, and furthering the goals of the AU on a

global scale.

7. Information and Communication Technology: The institutional capacity of the AU

depends heavily on the effective use of information and communication technology. It

makes decision-making, data management, information sharing, and communication

processes more effective.

8. Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanisms: The African Union (AU) understands how

crucial efficient monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are to the proper execution of

its policies and programmes. A key component of the AU's strategy is M&E, which

enables it to monitor progress, spot problem areas, and enforce responsibility for

outcomes.The AU uses a variety of techniques and equipment to aid M&E. The creation

of performance indicators and objectives for each programme and project is one of the

main techniques. These SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and

time-bound) indicators offer a precise framework for monitoring development and

results. The AU can evaluate the degree to which its programmes are producing the

desired benefits by defining specific goals.

9. Legal Framework: The African Union (AU) relies on a comprehensive framework of

laws and legal documents that underpin its institutional capabilities and guide its

operations. At the core of this framework is the AU Constitutive Act, which serves as the
organisation's primary legal instrument. Adopted in 2000 and in force since 2001, the

Constitutive Act outlines the AU's objectives, principles, and structures. It establishes the

AU as a continental organisation aimed at promoting unity, peace, security, and

development in Africa.The Constitutive Act lays the foundation for the AU's key organs,

including the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the Executive Council, the

Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC), and the Commission. It defines their

functions, responsibilities, and decision-making processes, providing a clear

organisational structure for the AU's operations.

Strategies for Bolstering Institutional Capacity:

Member states can increase their overall funding to the AU’s budget and lend more financial

resources which would reduce its reliance on external funding resources such as Development

partners ( UN, EU etc. ), Donor countries, private sectors and trust funds as currently the AU

receives more than 60% of its budget from external funders. This would have a positive outcome

as the AU itself would have more influence over where its fund are used. Developing innovative

financing mechanisms and exploring partnerships with regional and international institutions can

also enhance financial stability.

The AUC can facilitate the development of strategies that will improve human capacity on the

continent and engage Member States through dialogue emphasising the importance of investing

in health systems; education, vocational training, Science, Research and Innovation, as well as

Social security and protection of vulnerable groups. In particular, the Commission will ensure

that strategies to be implemented aim at improving skills _for competitiveness and ensuring that

training better matches the opportunities and requirements of the labour market. Development in

this sector would allow for the AU to prioritise capacity- building programs, training,

professional development, and knowledge exchange to enhance the expertise of the staff

officials. Collaborations with educational institutions, local training facilities, and other

international organisations may be necessary for this.

Strengthening coordination and cooperation between the institutions of the AU is vital. Since the

AU was formed, inconsistencies in the mandates of various institutions have led to wastefulness

and has hindered the process of institutional capacity building. To eliminate these contradictions

and inconsistencies these elements can be enhanced: Streamlining decision making processes,
clear and well defined mandates and responsibilities of each individual institution, harmonising

policies and approaches, regular communication and information sharing, enhancing regional

integration efforts, encouraging peer learning and best practise sharing and strengthening

partnerships. The implementation of these within the organs of the AU will also lead to an

increase in effectiveness.

To set Africa firmly on the path towards economic and social transformation, private sector

engagement is crucial. The African Union, has throughout the years worked closely with the

private sector to define the great contribution and significant role the private sector plays in

driving the economic development Agenda of the continent. The private sector in Africa

accounts for over 80 per cent of total production, two thirds of total investment, and three fourths

of lending within the economy. The sector also provides jobs for about 90 per cent of the

employed working-age population. Further, Small Medium Enterprise (SMEs) are the backbone

of the African private sector accounting for over 90% of businesses in Africa and translating to

63% of employment in low-income countries while contributing to over 50% of the Gross

Domestic Product (GDP) according to the UN Economic Commission for Africa. Increased

engagement and partnerships with private sectors can harness additional resources and expertise

for the missions of the AU.

Monitoring is an on-going activity consisting of the systematic collection of data and information

related to the indicators in order to provide the various actors of the ASS with information on the

progress and achievements of the objectives. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activities are

critical to the effective implementation of the SHaSA 2 ten-year Action Plan. The evaluations

will assess the progress of the activities and the achievement of expected outputs, the quality of

the work undertaken and the products obtained, including timeliness and the use of resources.

The effectiveness and impact of the AU’s actions can be understood through regular evaluation

of programmes and initiatives, which can then inform future resource allocation and decision

making.

It is important for the AU to position itself to reap big from the digital trade and technological

advancements even post COVID-19 pandemic. Artificial intelligence, blockchain technology,

e-commerce, all have the potential to improve lives and the time is ripe, for the AU to promote

these technologies and further innovations to be able to solve its own problems, be self-sufficient

and effectively trade on the global market. Technology adoption can strengthen the AU's
institutional capabilities. Efficiency and effectiveness can be increased by using digital tools for

information management, communication, and knowledge sharing. The AU's operations and

engagement with member states can be facilitated by investing in digital infrastructure and

fostering digital literacy.

The exchange of best practises and peer learning across member states can promote the

cross-pollination of thoughts and experiences. Sharing of effective strategies, lessons learned,

and creative solutions can be facilitated by knowledge exchange platforms including

conferences, seminars, and thematic networks.

Case Studies:
1- African Standby Force (ASF) :

To increase the capability of its regional standby troops, the ASF has created regional training

centres across Africa. These facilities offer specialised instruction in fields like crisis

management, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping. The ASF ensures that its soldiers are

equipped with the skills and knowledge required to successfully conduct peace support missions

by providing customised training programmes. Regional standby forces are coordinated,

interoperable, and operationally ready because to joint exercises and simulations the ASF

conducts with them. Through these training sessions, the forces can hone their skills in a

real-world environment, enhancing their institutional capacity to handle crises and conflicts. The

ASF has formed alliances with global players, such as the United Nations and regional economic

communities, in order to benefit from their knowledge and assistance in enhancing institutional

capacity. These alliances give participants access to materials, educational opportunities, and

logistical assistance, all of which help the ASF improve its operational efficiency and capability.

In numerous conflict-affected areas, the ASF has effectively deployed peacekeeping missions,

such as AMISOM in Somalia and AFISMA in Mali. These deployments gave the ASF the

opportunity to practise carrying out peace support operations and helped to build its institutional

capabilities. The ASF has proven via these operations that it is capable of addressing

emergencies and assisting in peacebuilding initiatives across the continent. The ASF has made

tremendous strides towards harmonising and standardising its command structures, policies, and

operational processes. As a result, the regional standby forces are uniform and coherent, which

improves their institutional capacity generally and their ability to cooperate. The creation of
standard training materials, operational doctrines, and logistical frameworks are examples of

standardisation activities.

2- African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM):

APRM is a tool for sharing experiences, reinforcing best practices, identifying deficiencies, and

assessing capacity-building needs to foster policies, standards and practices that lead to political

stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated sub-regional and

continental economic integration.Member countries within the APRM undertake self-monitoring

in all aspects of their governance and socio-economic development. African Union (AU)

stakeholders participate in the self-assessment of all branches of government – executive,

legislative and judicial – as well as the private sector, civil society and the media. The APRM

Review Process gives member states a space for national dialogue on governance and

socio-economic indicators and an opportunity to build consensus on the way forward. Peer

reviews are conducted by the APRM, where member states interact positively to share best

practises, exchange experiences, and make suggestions for enhancing institutional capacity and

governance. This procedure encourages countries to carry out the suggested reforms, enhancing

their institutional frameworks while facilitating cross-national learning. The APRM provides

technical assistance and capacity-building programmes to member states to aid in the

development of their institutional capacities. In areas including public administration, policy

creation, and execution, these efforts seek to improve the abilities and knowledge of government

employees, members of civil society organisations, and other stakeholders. The APRM leads to

better institutional performance by enhancing human capability. The APRM keeps track of the

application of the suggestions provided throughout the peer review process through a follow-up

and monitoring system. This system makes sure that everyone is held accountable and aids

members states in filling institutional capability deficiencies. The continued support and

capacity-building initiatives are facilitated by regular progress reports and engagements with

member states.

3- African Governance Architecture (AGA):

The African Governance Architecture (AGA) is a mechanism for dialogue between stakeholders

that are mandated to promote good governance and bolster democracy in Africa. The AGA is

fundamentally one aspect – probably the most significant – of recent international law of

governance. Furthermore, it is a key actor in promoting the domestication and implementation of

the objectives outlined in the legal and policy pronouncements in the African Union (AU) Shared

Values. The facility aims to especially promote: institutional capacity strengthening and building;

dialogues to facilitate citizen engagement in democratic governance processes; technical support

to Member States towards the ratification, domestication, implementation and reporting on AU

Shared Values instruments; and preventive diplomacy, post conflict reconstruction and

peacebuilding initiatives. The Pan-African Parliament (PAP), the African Court on Human and

Peoples' Rights (AfCHPR), the African Union Commission (AUC), the African Peer Review

Mechanism (APRM), and other important organisations are all part of the AGA. At the regional

and continental levels, these institutions are crucial for strengthening governance and ensuring

accountability. The AGA puts a lot of effort into enhancing institutional effectiveness and

governance procedures. It offers member nations and pertinent stakeholders technical assistance,

training, and knowledge-sharing programmes. Initiatives to create capacity improve the abilities

and expertise of public servants, members of civil society, and other stakeholders in fields like

public administration, democratic governance, and human rights. The AGA understands the

value of including individuals and members of civil society in governance processes. It promotes

the involvement of civil society actors, such as non-governmental organisations,

community-based organisations, and youth organisations, in the development, implementation,

and evaluation of policies. Participatory government and citizen involvement are strengthened by

this strategy.

4- African Centre for the study and research on Terrorism (ACSRT):

The purpose of the ACSRT is to contribute to and strengthen the capacity of the African Union

through the PSC in the prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa, with the ultimate

objective of eliminating the threat posed by terrorism to peace, security, stability and

development in Africa. To this end, the ACSRT will collect and centralise information, studies

and analyses on terrorism and terrorist groups and develop training programs by organising, with

the assistance of international partners, training schedules, meetings and symposia. By offering

member states and pertinent stakeholders training programmes, workshops, and seminars, the

ACSRT plays a significant part in capacity building. These capacity-building projects seek to

improve the security personnel, law enforcement organisations, and other pertinent

counterterrorism actors' knowledge, talents, and capabilities. The ACSRT makes it easier for

member states and pertinent stakeholders to exchange knowledge, best practices, and lessons
learnt. In order to strengthen cooperation and collaboration in the fight against terrorism, it

creates networks and partnerships with national and international organisations. The ACSRT acts

as a focal point for cross-border cooperation, joint operations, and intelligence exchange. The

ACSRT works with international partners to strengthen its institutional capabilities. These

partners include the United Nations, Interpol, and other regional organisations. This cooperation

makes it possible to coordinate the response to transnational terrorist actions, exchange

intelligence, and run cooperative training programmes.

Bibliography:
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