OPINION REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT’s ‘POLICY OF CO-EXISTENCE’ WITH

CHINA.

Since he took office on June 30, Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte — also known as
“Duterte Harry” — has earned international notoriety for a harsh anti-drug campaign that has led
to the extrajudicial killings of more than 3,600 alleged traffickers around the country. The
crackdown has alarmed the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States. At one
point Duterte called Barack Obama “a son of a whore,” later telling the U.S. president “to go to
hell” after Washington dared to criticize the murders. Sooner or later, Duterte has vowed, he will
“break up with America,” the Philippines’ longstanding treaty ally and security guarantor.

There’s one international power that doesn’t seem particularly bothered by Duterte’s excesses.
“The Chinese side fully understands and firmly supports the Duterte administration’s policy that
[prioritizes] the fight against drug crimes,” said Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines Zhao
Jianhua in a speech last month. He went on to express his satisfaction at the “friendly
interactions’ between the two countries since the new president began his term, predicting that
the sun “will shine beautifully on the new chapter of bilateral relations.”

So why the shift in policy? On one level, Duterte’s desire to seek friendship with the Chinese
reflects a willingness to appease Beijing’s aggressive stance in the disputed waters. Chinese
Coast Guard warships armed with machine guns and water cannons have harassed Philippine
fishermen, preventing them from earning their livelihoods in their traditional fishing grounds in
the South China Sea (90 percent of which China claims as its own). Chinese dredges have been
deployed well within the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone, where they
have destroyed irreplaceable coral reefs to build airstrips and naval bases aimed at enhancing
Chinese offensive power. China has also forcibly prevented Filipinos from developing valuable
oil, gas, and mineral resources that they’ll need in the coming years to power their electricity
grid. “I will not go to war” over such matters, Duterte has declared.

On July 12, just short of two weeks into Duterte’s presidential term, an international tribunal in
The Hague ruled that China has been acting in violation of Beijing’s sworn obligations under
international maritime law. The litigation was brought in 2013 by Duterte’s predecessor,
Benigno Aquino Jr., who sought to use the rule of law to rally international opinion to pressure
the Chinese to respect Philippine sovereignty. Now Duterte appears to be signaling that he’s
willing to overlook the tribunal’s findings if China is willing to do a deal.

There are various explanations for Duterte’s eagerness to seek a compromise. Some of those who
know the president well suggest that the pivot is rooted in the left-of-center ideology he has
professed in his past, which left him with a residual suspicion of the West (and Americans in
particular). Duterte openly admires one of his former college professors, Jose Maria Sison — the
founder of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing, the New People’s Army.
Others point out that Duterte, who has several times threatened to declare martial law, has
praised authoritarian leaders like former Philippine strongman Ferdinand Marcos. And besides
China’s President Xi, Russia’s Vladimir Putin has been wooing the Philippine president with
suggestions of cheap financing for Russian attack helicopters.

In his eagerness to establish close economic ties with Beijing, Duterte has also said he is looking
to revive various Chinese-Philippine joint ventures that were envisioned a decade ago during the
presidency of Gloria Arroyo. The most notable project on Arroyo’s watch involved a $329
million telecommunications contract with China’s state-owned ZTE Corp. While no corruption
allegations have surfaced in the new Duterte administration, the concerns about the adverse
consequences of doing business with China remain. As Philippine professor Aileen Baviera has
observed, the ZTE deal “was an example of how Chinese wealth … can undermine already weak
institutions and government norms in a recipient country.”
While some members of the Manila elite worry that Duterte’s campaign of extrajudicial killings
threatens to corrode the hard-won rule of law, Filipino-Chinese businessmen are among the most
vocal defenders of the president’s drug war.

Filipino-Chinese businessmen are among the most vocal defenders of the president’s drug war.
And a tycoon from mainland China, Huang Rulun, who first acquired his wealth while living in
the Philippines, has pleased Duterte by volunteering to pay for a new internment camp for
thousands of drug users who have surrendered to police rather than fall victim to the slaughter.
Filipino-Chinese businessmen are among the most vocal defenders of the president’s drug war.

Senior Deputy Minority Leader and Buhay Party-list Rep. Lito Atienza lauded Duterte for his
“position of actively promoting closer ties between Philippines and the People’s Republic of
China.”

Duterte’s “sheer political will and foresight” gave the country economic benefits from China,
Atienza said.

“Judging from the optimism and interest of Chinese businessmen to invest anew in the
Philippines, we can be sure that the best is yet to come” said Atienza.

The former Manila mayor’s praise for Duterte contradicted the position aired by some
opposition leaders who warned that the Chief Executive’s pro-China stance could weaken the
country’s claim to contested areas in the West Philippine Sea

“We are elated that President Duterte has been actively strengthening the relationship between
Manila and Beijing through his administration’s policies on business, trade and even the
opening of job opportunities in China for thousands of Filipino workers,” said Atienza.

“We commend the President for his political will, sharp economic sense and wisdom which has
brought the Philippines closer to China, an economic superpower,” he pointed out.

According to opposition solon, Duterte’s efforts have started to “bear fruit for Filipinos
everywhere.”

“We have just met with Chinese businessmen who have expressed their renewed confidence in
investing in the Philippines now due to the closer relations between our two countries,” Atienza
said.

“Relations between the Philippines and China had gone cold during the previous
administration. It took someone like President Duterte to revive Manila’s close relations with
our superpower neighbor,” Atienza noted.

Atienza added: “Not only has China been providing military assistance to the Philippines, but it
has now opened some 300,000 jobs for teachers, musicians, nurses, cooks, household service
workers, and caregivers.”
Departing from the previous government’s strong opposition to China’s expansive claims and
assertive actions in the South China Sea, Duterte has downplayed the territorial and maritime
disputes in favor of pursuing close economic and political ties with China. 

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte welcomed by Chinese President Xi Jinping during Leader's Roundtable Summit of the Belt and Road Forum on International Cooperation. Source: Rappler

This shift has been rewarded by pledges of major fund infusions in support of the Philippine
government’s infrastructure development, with a long wishlist of construction projects (including
roads, bridges, railways, industrial zones, ports, flood control, etc.) now in the pipeline or in
various stages of negotiation. Filipino fishermen have started returning to their normal fishing
activities in the vicinity of Scarborough Shoal, albeit under close watch by Chinese Coast Guard
vessels.

Instead of China’s past efforts to diplomatically isolate the Philippines after Manila filed an
arbitration suit seeking to protect its own maritime entitlements under international law, it now
sees the Philippines as a welcome partner in its major diplomatic initiatives such as the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China has also apparently
come around to the idea of signing with ASEAN a Code of Conduct to regulate activities in the
South China Sea, although at best that is still bound to be a protracted process (and at worst,
an exercise in futility).

While island construction activities in the reefs held by China continued unabated, including on
Mischief Reef which the arbitration ruling acknowledged to be subject to the Philippines’ EEZ
rights, there have been no reports of major provocative actions that had become almost daily
media fare in previous years. No new construction activities are under way on Scarborough
Shoal, which some would attribute to the United States and Philippines signalling that this
would be a “red line” that China would do best not to cross. Instead, official channels of bilateral
dialogue between Manila and Beijing have resumed and new ones have opened up, including
early resumption of discussions on the dispute itself as announced during Duterte’s second
visit to Beijing (May 13-15) to participate in the BRI Summit.

Duterte’s strategy of de-emphasizing and compartmentalizing, while not abandoning, the

territorial and maritime issues, is a wise move that can pay off if done smartly. By delinking
economic relations from management of the disputes, Manila can benefit from economic links
with Beijing at a time when sustained high growth and investor confidence in the Philippines
coincides with a massive drive by China to invest in global infrastructure buildup and trade,
industrial and financial connectivity programs as part of the BRI. The challenge will be to see
that China itself separates the two aspects of relations, since we have seen it try to use economic
leverage in the past (via travel bans and suspension of banana imports) for political ends.

Duterte’s shift in China policy also reduces what used to be open disagreement within ASEAN
over handling of the disputes in the relations with China, but at the same time forces some of
the other stakeholders (including some who were free-riding on the Aquino administration’s
efforts) to shoulder more of the responsibility to ensure progress on the issue, thus easing
pressure on the Philippines.

Despite some minor revision, security and other relations with the U.S. remain strong, being
highly institutionalized, while security cooperation with Japan and other countries are growing.
Military-to-military contacts with China, which were quite active during the Ramos to Arroyo
administrations, have also resumed, hopefully leading to renewed confidence-building and
reduced risk of miscalculation.  

The policy shift may or may not reflect a fully thought-out strategy, but thus far its relatively
successful outcomes have also relied on fortuitous developments well beyond Duterte’s
control. Serendipity played a role.

One factor was the hard-won arbitration ruling itself, which came within the first twelve days of
Duterte’s taking the helm of government. The favorable ruling for the Philippines is now part of
international jurisprudence, whether the Duterte government pushes for full compliance now
or later. Because the ruling is final and binding, Manila is as much duty-bound as China is, to
comply with it and see it through. Aquino’s successful “lawfare” (or legal ‘warfare’) has opened a
new platform for management and resolution of the disputes, one that the current or any
future governments of the Philippines and China should pursue (preferably sooner rather than
later, but when conditions are favorable), if they are genuinely committed to rule of law in the
international system.

The second serendipitous event was the election of US President Donald Trump. China-US
relations had been moving in a dangerous downward spiral, and in the course of Washington’s
supposed show of support for its Philippine ally, Manila’s disputes with Beijing ran the risk of
becoming less about the former’s maritime rights and resource entitlements and more about
major powers’ competition for influence and right to conduct military activities at sea. With
Trump at the helm, and considering his administration’s yet unclear foreign policy towards
China (other than seeking China’s help in constraining North Korea’s renewed belligerence),
Beijing has reason to act more studiously and with greater caution  in the South China Sea.
After all, Trump may provide opportunities for China to attain strategic gains even larger in
importance than control of the South China Sea (perhaps leading to its aspiration for a “new
type of major country relations”). On the other hand, because US commitment to engage in the
South China Sea is also unclear under Trump (whether on behalf of allies or purely on its own
behalf), the Philippines has reason to push the thought of military solutions to the backburner
and return to a mainly diplomatic track.

The third fortuitous development for Duterte is Xi Jinping’s launch of the bold and ambitious
“Belt and Road Initiative”. BRI is a major campaign for China-led economic, industrial, financial,
technological, and sociocultural connectivity (mainly through infrastructure support) that would
link 65 countries from Asia, Europe and Africa, ostensibly to spur development and growth in
light of the slow recovery of the global economy from the 2007 crisis. It is also intended to
stimulate growth in China’s backward frontier provinces, and to put China’s excess
manufacturing capacity and foreign currency surplus into profitable use. 

The successful implementation of the program will elevate China further into the ranks of
leading countries, but it relies as much on China’s powers of persuasion, soft power diplomacy
and internationalist credentials as on its massive financial resources. This will likely translate
into China downplaying nationalist emotions and territorial claims, or restraining military
adventurism, possibly giving Duterte breathing space both for repairing relations with China,
and reorienting the alliance with the US away from a China focus and towards what he feels are
more convergent objectives at the moment.

The overall interests of both China and the Philippines may not have changed, but the changes
in circumstances unarguably paved the way for adjustments in Philippine strategy in directions
preferred by the new president, and no doubt by China. The policy must to coexist with China.

Janina Marie Pacis Garcia