Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte’s China policy has long been condemned as appeasement, amid

claims that jumping on the bandwagon of Chinese growth has led to a failure to rein in Chinese activities
in the South China Sea (SCS). Two issues stand out: President Duterte’s sclerotic attitude towards China,
and his supposed disregard for the 2016 SCS Arbitral Award won by the previous Aquino administration.
Duterte has stated that China is ‘in possession’ of the SCS, that the Philippines is ‘indebted’ to China, and
that going to war with China would be ‘suicidal’, running the risk of setting off a ‘nuclear war’ if the
alliance with the US is leveraged in the SCS. He even framed the tensions in the SCS as a byproduct of
China–US great power rivalry, claiming that the Philippines could become either a ‘province of China’ or
a ‘colony of the US’.

For these reasons, Duterte has been lambasted by domestic critics for presenting the public with a false
choice in which the only options vis-à-vis China are war or cooperation, with some claiming that his
foreign policy is ‘pro-China’ and ‘anti-US’. Regarding the Arbitral Award, Duterte has been denounced
for echoing China’s official position that the Award cannot be enforced as it is a ‘mere piece of paper’,
defying his earlier speech at the UN General Assembly – which drew praise even from oppositionists –
where he said that ‘The Award is now part of international law, beyond compromise and beyond the
reach of passing governments to dilute, diminish or abandon. We firmly reject attempts to undermine
it’.

The above statements are, however, mostly observations at the level of the individual. They are
undoubtedly important, as in the hierarchy of policy statements those of the president matter most –
especially given that in the Philippines, the president is the ‘chief architect’ of foreign policy – but a
number of other factors are also at play.

The Duterte administration has been accused of lacking a coherent strategy, because while Duterte
himself has struck a conciliatory tone towards China, government ministries such as the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Department of National Defense (DND) continue to file diplomatic protests
against China, asserting the Arbitral Award at the UN and occasionally making statements in support of
the US. For example, DND Secretary Delfin Lorenzana has mentioned that he welcomes the Biden’s
administration’s renewed commitment to Asia as it will help to ‘counterbalance’ China, while DFA
Secretary Teodoro Locsin Jr welcomed the establishment of the Australia, UK and US (AUKUS) trilateral
security partnership for maintaining a favourable regional balance of power. Accused of being a dictator
at home who dominates all decision-making institutions, Duterte has ironically chosen to keep the heads
of the DFA and DND – unlike other appointees who he has fired – despite their policy positions
appearing to openly conflict with his.
What this implies is that President Duterte’s policy pronouncements are not in and of themselves
instructive regarding the overall foreign policy behaviour of the Philippines, and that there is more to
the country’s approach towards China than meets the eye. Thus, there is a need to look beyond
statements and weigh them against various material indicators. If only statements were to be
considered, then instances such as Hitler’s non-aggression pact with Stalin or Imperial Japan’s public
denial of plotting to bomb Pearl Harbor would always be taken at face value. Moreover, only considering
policy statements would sideline the other modalities of policy analysis. This is where the role of
ministries – as decision-making units – and domestic politics comes into play. These two factors arguably
account for why Duterte can be influenced by the opinions of his cabinet members, and it is because of
public pressure that Duterte finds the need to make popular but baffling policy decisions so as to deflect
criticisms against him, divert political attention and/or bargain with the US.

Specific policy actions that may be attributed to the role of Philippine government ministries include the
ongoing modernisation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with plans to import Brahmos missiles
from India and additional frigates from South Korea; the first ever docking of a naval vessel on the
Philippine-occupied Pag-Asa Island in the Spratlys; increased sovereignty patrols in the SCS; the
expulsion of Chinese fishing and naval vessels; and the renaming of ‘Benham Rise’ – where China has
conducted maritime activities in recent years – to ‘Philippine Rise’. And when there were reports in 2019
that China would develop the strategically located Fuga Island, Duterte ordered that 20 hectares of the
area be allotted for a naval base.

US military assistance to the Philippines has also continued, and the most important Philippines–US
military exercise, the ‘Balikatan’ (Shoulder-to-Shoulder), has resumed. One could even argue that the
Philippines–US alliance has emerged stronger under Duterte, as Washington’s assurances that it would
come to the aid of Manila in the event of an armed assault in the SCS have become clearer – whereas
during the Obama administration, the most common statements were that the US ‘does not take sides’
on competing maritime and territorial claims in the SCS. Additionally, the US has issued a strong
statement regarding the Scarborough Shoal, should China seek to occupy or reclaim it. Meanwhile,
although he is known for being anti-American, Duterte surprisingly granted an absolute pardon to a US
soldier who was found guilty of killing a Filipino transgender person.

More recently, the Philippines–US Visiting Forces Agreement – which had been impulsively suspended
not in an attempt to appease China, but because of US criticisms of the Duterte administration on
human rights issues – was reinstated. And when previously asked whether the alliance with the US
should be abrogated, Duterte said that it is not for him alone to decide. At the same time, joint
hydrocarbon development with China in the SCS is still in the works, with the Philippine side placing
emphasis on creating a legal framework that would not go against the Philippine Constitution or the
Arbitral Award. In relation to this, Duterte has stated that he will dispatch the Philippine Navy if China
unilaterally drills for oil in the SCS. In direct contrast to his defeatist statements regarding China, Duterte
has also dared the US, France and the UK to help the Philippines reclaim its territories in the SCS.

It is important to view President Duterte’s foreign policy beyond the context of US–China rivalry. For
instance, the Philippines has implemented a policy of stronger engagement with the Quad grouping of
countries, including Japan, Australia and India, and has carried out military and coastguard exercises
with all three states. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Duterte administration rejected China’s
bid to develop Subic Port, a port strategically located on the Philippines’ Luzon Island, and has instead
considered an Australian firm as a partner for this project. And despite media claims that China is
dominating projects in the Philippines, Japan remains the country’s largest source of official
development assistance and the leading financier of the Philippine government’s ‘Build, Build, Build’
infrastructure programme. Based on these facts, it can be stated that the Duterte administration has
practiced ‘selective engagement’ vis-à-vis China.