Rodrigo Duterte assumed the Philippines presidency in 2016 with a promise to promote an

“independent” foreign policy. Yet as he detaches the Philippines from the United States, Duterte is
seemingly yielding to China. His own statements exposed the irony of his supposed independent
approach when he referred to the US and declared: “Do not treat us like a doormat because you’ll be
sorry for it. I will not speak with you. I can always go to China.”

Duterte’s carries accumulated frustrations with the US. He views it as the “enemy”, based on his long-
held perceptions of American colonial subjugation of the Philippines. Moreover, Duterte abhorred the
criticism levelled by the Obama administration over his so-called war on drugs involving extrajudicial
killings and human rights violations.

Duterte’s frustration was apparent when he suddenly announced in February the abrogation of the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA), which allows US troops to be stationed in the Philippines on a
rotational basis. The decision was triggered after the US cancelled visas of several of Duterte’s political
allies involved in the war on drugs. Duterte eventually called a six-month suspension for the cancellation
of the VFA beginning in June, after the Philippine Senate and other government officials collectively
called for a multi-agency review instead.

These factors also fit into Duterte’s scepticism about the US commitment of military support under the
1951 Mutual Defense Treaty. He doubts that the US will come to the aid of the Philippines in the event
of an armed conflict with China in the South China Sea. He also implied that the US government was not
helpful in preventing Chinese illegal construction of artificial islands:

If America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carries and missile frigates the moment China started
reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened.

Duterte’s scepticism about the US dovetails into a fawning approach towards China. This was evident
when he ordered the Philippine military to scale down its joint activities with the US from the previous
combat drills directed at a hypothetical threat emanating from the South China Sea into humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief and counter-terrorism exercises. Duterte also blocked US warships from
using Philippine bases during any freedom-of-navigation operations and announced that the country
would not participate in the regular naval exercises with the US, Australia and other allies, to avoid
antagonising the Chinese.
For all his radical shifts in Philippine foreign policy in the name of independence, Duterte has led the
country away from the clutches of the US into the arms of China.

In his four years in office, Duterte has led the Philippines to profit in the good graces of a powerful
China, rather than be the target of its wrath. It is no surprise then that his government downplayed the
Philippines’ victory in 2016 at the Permanent Court of Arbitration that invalidated China’s historic claims
over the South China Sea. Duterte subsequently secured US$24 billion in loans, credit and investments
pledges from China to fund infrastructure projects under his “Build, Build, Build” program. And in an
attempt to win priority access to a Covid-19 vaccine developed by China, Duterte has maintained his
non-confrontational stance on maritime issues, even with recent Chinese military drills and illegal
naming of features and districts in the contested waters. (He even volunteered to be tested with a
Russian vaccine.)

For all his radical shifts in Philippine foreign policy in the name of independence, Duterte has led the
country away from the clutches of the US into the arms of China. This is a precarious strategy that goes
against the general notion of an independent foreign policy which is not for or against any state, but
having equidistant relations with all. Duterte’s approach is further misguided in that it prioritises a view
of the country’s economic agenda at the expense of protecting its maritime interests. He effectively
relegates Philippines-US security arrangements with Philippine-China economic ties as the country’s
most important bilateral relations. Yet such compromise is unnecessary and a strategic miscalculation,
as both economic and security interests are equally important and not mutually exclusive.

Duterte’s policy diminishes the Philippines’ credibility as an ally to the US and reinforces perceptions of
subservience to China. Instead of achieving an independent stance, Duterte has only succeeded in
making the Philippines appear more anxious about its place in the world.

The Philippine government’s practice of foreign policy has been more reactionary than proactive and is
unlikely to be sustainable.

The prevailing view four years into the Duterte administration’s independent foreign policy is that no
substantive gains have been made and it has unnecessarily alienated an ally and potential strategic
partners. If indicative of anything, President Duterte’s exercise of foreign policy thus far has not been so
much a pursuit of independent foreign policy but is rather a significant misalignment with the views of
the majority of the population.