THIRD DIVISION

PEOPLE OF G.R. No. 183619

THE PHILIPPINES,  
Appellee, Present:
   
  CARPIO, J.,
     Chairperson,
  CHICO-
          - versus - NAZARIO,
  VELASCO, JR.,
  NACHURA, and
  PERALTA, JJ.
   
  Promulgated:
SALVINO SUMINGWA,  
Appellant.    October 13, 2009
   
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DECISION
 
NACHURA, J.:
                            
 

 
 
          On appeal before us is the January 31, 2008 Court
of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 30045
affirming with modification the February 14, 2006
Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Consolidated
Judgment[3] against appellant Salvino Sumingwa in
Criminal Case Nos. 1644 and 1645 for Acts of
Lasciviousness; 1646, 1649 and 1654 for Rape; 1651
for Attempted Rape; and 1655 for Unjust Vexation.
Assailed also is the June 5, 2008 CA Resolution[4] denying
appellant’s motion for reconsideration.
 
          In twelve Informations, the prosecution charged
appellant with two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness,
[5]
 four (4) counts of Rape,[6] three (3) counts of Unjust
Vexation,[7] one (1) count of Other Light Threats,[8] one
(1) count of Maltreatment,[9] and one (1) count of
Attempted Rape[10] for acts committed against his
minor[11] daughter AAA from 1999-2001.
 
          Appellant pleaded “not guilty” to all the
charges.  On September 24, 2004, the RTC
dismissed[12] Criminal Case Nos. 1647 for Rape; 1648 for
Unjust Vexation; 1650 for Other Light Threats; 1652 for
Unjust Vexation; and 1653 for Maltreatment, on the basis
of the Demurrer to Evidence[13] filed by appellant.
 
 Sometime in August 1999, between 8:00 and 10:00 in
the morning, AAA, together with her brothers and her
father, appellant herein, was in their residence
in Mountain Province, watching television. Appellant
called AAA and ordered her to sit in front of him.  As she
was sitting, appellant told her that it was not good for a
girl to have small breasts.  Suddenly, he inserted his hands
into AAA’s shirt then fondled her breast.  AAA resisted
by moving her hands backwards.[14] 
 
          One afternoon in September 1999, AAA’s mother
and brothers went to school leaving AAA and appellant in
their house. While in the master’s bedroom, appellant
ordered AAA to join him inside. There, appellant
removed his undergarments then forced her to grasp and
fondle his penis until he ejaculated.  Appellant thereafter
told her not to be malicious about it.[15]  
 
          The same incident took place in August 2000.  This
time, appellant forced AAA to lie down on the bed, went
on top of her, removed her short pants and panty, then
rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice. AAA resisted
by crossing her legs but appellant lifted her right leg and
partially inserted his penis into her vagina. As she
struggled, appellant stood up then ejaculated. AAA felt
numbness on her buttocks after the bestial act committed
against her.[16]
 
          Appellant repeated his dastardly act against AAA
on separate occasions in September and November 2000.
During these times, appellant satisfied himself by rubbing
his penis against AAA’s vagina without trying to
penetrate it. After reaching the top of his lust, he used
AAA’s short pants to wipe his mess. Instead of keeping
her harrowing experience to herself, AAA narrated it to
her best friend.[17] 
 
          On November 24, 2000, appellant approached AAA
and told her that he wanted to have sex with her.  When
she refused, appellant forcibly removed her pants and
boxed her right buttock.  AAA still refused, which
angered appellant.  He then went to the kitchen and
returned with a bolo which he used in threatening her.
Luckily, AAA’s grandmother arrived, prompting
appellant to desist from his beastly desires.[18]
 
          On December 20, 2000, AAA and her best friend
were doing their school work in front of the former’s
house.  When appellant arrived, he embraced AAA.  He,
thereafter, pulled her inside the house and kissed her on
the lips.[19]
 
          The last incident occurred inside the comfort room
of their house on May 27, 2001.  When AAA entered,
appellant pulled down her short pants and panty, unzipped
his trousers, brought out his penis, then repeatedly rubbed
it on her vagina while they were in a standing position.[20]
 
          AAA decided to report the sexual abuses to her
grandmother who forthwith brought her to the National
Bureau of Investigation where she was examined by the
medico-legal officer.  It was found during the
examination that there were no extragenital physical
injuries on AAA’s body but there were old, healed, and
incomplete hymenal lacerations.[21] 
 
          Appellant denied all the accusations against
him.  He claimed that in August and September 1999, he
was at the house of his mistress in Antipolo City.  He also
explained that in August 2000, he stayed
in Baguio City and worked there as a karate
instructor.  He added that he only went home in
September 2000 but left again in October for Quirino,
Ilocos Sur where he stayed for three weeks. When he
went back home, his wife informed him that AAA had not
been coming home.  Thereafter, appellant went
to Baguio City to buy medicine for his wife, then returned
home again on the third week of December 2000.  While
there, he was confronted by his wife about his
womanizing.  His wife got mad and refused to forgive
him despite his repeated pleas. Consequently, he became
furious and almost choked his wife to death when she
ignored and refused to talk to him.  This prompted him to
leave and go back to Baguio.[22]
 
          Sometime in April 2001,         appellant went back
home to reconcile with his wife.  While talking to his wife
and the latter’s family, his mother-in-law berated him and
demanded his separation from his wife.  Appellant got
mad and threatened to kill his wife’s family. His mother-
in-law, in turn, threatened to file charges against him.[23]
 
          To belie the claim of AAA that she was sexually
abused in August, November and December 2000,
allegedly during school hours, her teacher testified that
the former was not absent in class during those times.[24]
 
          On November 24, 2004, AAA executed an
Affidavit of Recantation[25] claiming that while appellant
indeed committed lascivious acts against her, she
exaggerated her accusations against him.  She explained
that appellant did not actually rape her, as there was no
penetration. She added that she charged appellant with
such crimes only upon the prodding of her mother and
maternal grandmother.
 
          On February 14, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision
convicting appellant of six (6) counts of acts of
lasciviousness,[26] one (1) count of attempted rape[27] and
one (1) count of unjust vexation,[28] the dispositive portion
of which reads:
 
          WHEREFORE, a Consolidated Judgment is
hereby rendered sentencing Salvino Sumingwa to
suffer –
 
1. The penalty of six (6) months of [arresto
mayor] as minimum to six (6) years of [prision
correccional] as maximum; and ordering him to pay
the offended party P10,000.00 [as] indemnity [ex-
delicto], P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00
as exemplary damages for each count of Acts of
Lasciviousness charged in Crim. Cases 1644, 1645,
1646, 1649 and 1654;  
 
2. The penalty of six (6) years of [prision
correccional] as minimum to twelve (12) years of
[prision mayor] as maximum; and ordering said
offender to pay the victim P15,000.00 as indemnity
[ex-delicto], P15,000.00 as moral damages
and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in Crim. Case
1651 for Attempted Rape; and
 
3. The penalty of thirty (30) days of [arresto
menor] and fine of P200.00 for Unjust Vexation in
Crim. Case 1655.
 
SO ORDERED.[29]
 
  
           The trial court gave credence to AAA’s testimonies
on the alleged lascivious acts committed against her.  In
view of the withdrawal of her earlier claim of the fact of
penetration, the court sustained the innocence of appellant
on the rape charges and concluded that the crime
committed was only Acts of Lasciviousness.
 
          In Criminal Case No. 1651, the RTC found that
appellant committed all the acts of execution of the crime
of Rape, but failed to consummate it because of the
arrival of AAA’s grandmother.  Hence, he was convicted
of attempted rape.  In embracing and kissing AAA in full
view of the latter’s best friend, appellant was convicted of
Unjust Vexation.
 
          On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of
appellant, except that in Criminal Case No. 1646; it
convicted him of Qualified Rape instead of Acts of
Lasciviousness. The pertinent portion of the assailed
decision reads:
 
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein
appeal is hereby DISMISSED for evident lack of
merit and the assailed Consolidated Judgment
dated 14 February 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATION:
 
 1.         The Appellant SALVINO SUMINGWA
is hereby convicted of the crime
of QUALIFIED RAPE in Criminal Case
No. 1646 and the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA is hereby imposed upon
him.  The Appellant is likewise ordered to
pay the Victim, [AAA], civil indemnity in
the amount of Php75,000.00 as well as
moral damages in the amount of
Php50,000.00, in conformity with prevailing
jurisprudence.
 
2.         In Criminal Case No. 1651 for
Attempted Rape, the Appellant, is hereby
ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA] in
the sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
plus the sum of P25,000.00 as moral
damages.
 
SO ORDERED.[30]
 
 
The appellate court concluded that, notwithstanding
AAA’s retraction of her previous testimonies, the
prosecution sufficiently established the commission of the
crime of Rape.  It added that the qualifying circumstances
of minority and relationship were adequately proven.
 
Hence, this appeal.
 
 First, in light of the recantation of AAA, appellant
questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and
insists that his constitutional right to be presumed
innocent be applied.[31]  Second, he argues that in Criminal
Case No. 1651 for Attempted Rape, he should only be
convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, there being no overt
act showing the intent to have sexual intercourse.
[32]
 Lastly, he insists that he could not be convicted of all
the charges against him for failure of the prosecution to
show that he employed force, violence or intimidation
against AAA; neither did the latter offer resistance to
appellant’s advances.[33]
 
          In rape cases particularly, the conviction or
acquittal of the accused most often depends almost
entirely on the credibility of the complainant’s
testimony.  By the very nature of this crime, it is generally
unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for
herself.  When a rape victim’s testimony is
straightforward and marked with consistency despite
grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence
and cannot be discarded.[34] If such testimony is clear,
consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond
reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction
by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her
original testimony. [35]  
 
 A retraction is looked upon with considerable
disfavor by the courts.[36] It is exceedingly unreliable for
there is always the probability that such recantation may
later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from
witnesses through intimidation or monetary consideration.
[37]
 Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of
credibility based on the relevant circumstances and,
especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.
[38]
  
 
          As correctly held by the CA, AAA’s testimony is
credible notwithstanding her subsequent retraction.  We
quote with approval its ratiocination in this wise:
 
          Clearly, the retraction made by the Victim is
heavily unreliable.  The primordial factor that
impelled the Victim to retract the rape charges against
her father was her fear and concern for the welfare of
her family especially her four (4) siblings.  It does not
go against reason or logic to conclude that a daughter,
in hopes of bringing back the harmony in her family
tormented by the trauma of rape, would eventually
cover for the dastardly acts committed by her own
father. Verily, the Victim’s subsequent retraction does
not negate her previous testimonies accounting her
ordeal in the hands for (sic) her rapist.[39]
 
 
          We now proceed to discuss the specific crimes with
which appellant was charged.
 
Criminal Case Nos. 1646, 1649 and 1654 for Rape
 
          The CA correctly convicted appellant of Qualified
Rape in Criminal Case No. 1646, and of Acts of
Lasciviousness in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
 
     The crime of rape is defined in Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997, as follows:
 
            ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How
Committed. - Rape is committed –
 
            1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge
of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
 
            a.         Through force, threat or intimidation.
 
 
In her direct testimony, AAA stated that appellant
removed her short pants and panty, went on top of her and
rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice. She resisted
by crossing her legs but her effort was not enough to
prevent appellant from pulling her leg and eventually
inserting his penis into her vagina. Clearly, there was
penetration.
  
It is noteworthy that appellant pulled AAA’s leg, so
that he could insert his penis into her vagina.  This
adequately shows that appellant employed force in order
to accomplish his purpose. Moreover, in rape committed
by a father against his own daughter, the former’s moral
ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute
for actual physical violence and intimidation. The moral
and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow
the victim into submission to his beastly desires, and no
further proof need be shown to prove lack of the victim’s
consent to her own defilement.[40]
 
While appellant’s conviction was primarily based on
the prosecution’s testimonial evidence, the same was
corroborated by physical evidence consisting of the
medical findings of the medico-legal officer that there
were hymenal lacerations. When a rape victim’s account
is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the
medical findings of the examining physician, the same is
sufficient to support a conviction for rape.[41]
 
Aside from the fact of commission of rape, the
prosecution likewise established that appellant is the
biological father of AAA and that the latter was then
fifteen (15) [42] years old.  Thus, the CA aptly convicted
him of qualified rape, defined and penalized by Article
266-B of the RPC, viz.:
  
ART. 266-B.  Penalties. – x x x.
 
x  x  x  x
 
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
 
1)    When the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law
spouse of the parent of the victim.
 
 
 In view of the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.)
9346, appellant was correctly meted the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
 
As to damages, appellant should pay
AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, which is awarded if
the crime is qualified by circumstances that warrant the
imposition of the death penalty.[43] In light of prevailing
jurisprudence,[44] we increase the award of moral damages
from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00.  Further, the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00[45] is
authorized due to the presence of the qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship.[46]
  
In Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654, although
appellant was charged with qualified rape allegedly
committed on the second week of November 2000 and
May 27, 2001, he should be convicted with Acts of
Lasciviousness committed against a child under Section
5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610,[47] which reads:
 
SEC. 5.  Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse.
 
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
the following:
 
xxxx
 
(b)        Those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve
(12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
 be:  Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct
when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x. 
(Italics supplied.)
 
 
The elements of sexual abuse under the above
provision are as follows:
 
1.         The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.
 
2.         The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse.
 
3.         The child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age.[48]
 
 
AAA testified that in November 2000, while she and
appellant were inside the bedroom, he went on top of her
and rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice until he
ejaculated.[49] She likewise stated in open court that on
May 27, 2001, while inside their comfort room, appellant
rubbed his penis against her vagina while they were in a
standing position.[50] In both instances, there was no
penetration, or even an attempt to insert his penis into her
vagina.
  
The aforesaid acts of the appellant are covered by the
definitions of “sexual abuse” and “lascivious conduct”
under Section 2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations
on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases
promulgated to implement the provisions of R.A. 7610:
 
(g) “Sexual abuse” includes the employment,
use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or
coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another
person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with
children;
 
(h) “Lascivious conduct” means the intentional
touching, either directly or through clothing, of the
genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks,
or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or
opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire
of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious
exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.
 
 
Following the “variance doctrine” embodied in
Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of
the lesser crime of Acts of Lasciviousness committed
against a child. The pertinent provisions read:
 
            SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between
allegation and proof. – When there is variance
between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as
charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in
the offense proved.
 
            SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is
included in another. – An offense charged necessarily
includes the offense proved when some of
the  essential  elements  or  ingredients  of  the former,
as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute
the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily
included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of
those constituting the latter.
 
 
As the crime was committed by the father of the
offended party, the alternative circumstance of
relationship should be appreciated.  In crimes against
chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness, relationship is
always aggravating.[51]
 
 Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 prescribes the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua. Since there is an aggravating circumstance and
no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in
its maximum period --- reclusion perpetua for each count.
[52]

 
Consistent with previous rulings[53] of the Court,
appellant must also indemnify AAA in the amount
of P15,000.00 as moral damages and pay a fine in the
same amount in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
 
Criminal Case Nos. 1644 and 1645 for Acts of
Lasciviousness
 
          Appellant is likewise guilty of two (2) counts of
Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5(b), Article III,
R.A. 7610 committed against AAA on the second week of
August 1999 and on the first week of September
1999.  AAA testified that in August, appellant, with lewd
design, inserted his hands inside her shirt then fondled her
breasts; and in September, he forced her to hold his penis
until he ejaculated. 
 
          The trial and the appellate courts were correct in
giving credence to the victim’s testimony, in dismissing
appellant’s defense of denial and alibi, and in disbelieving
that AAA initiated the criminal cases only upon the
prodding of the latter’s grandmother.  Settled
jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of one’s
involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the
positive testimony of the offended party.[54]
 
We are not unmindful of the fact that appellant was
specifically charged in an Information for Acts of
Lasciviousness defined and penalized by Article 336 of
the RPC. However, the failure to designate the offense by
statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the
act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does
not vitiate the information if the facts alleged clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged.[55] The
character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of
the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by
the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.[56]
 
In the present case, the body of the information
contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been
committed by appellant which unmistakably refers to acts
punishable under Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610.
 
          Appellant should, therefore, be meted the same
penalties and be made to answer for damages as in
Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
 
Criminal Case No. 1651 for Attempted Rape
         
          AAA testified that on November 24, 2000, while
AAA and her brothers were sleeping inside their parents’
bedroom, appellant entered and asked AAA to have sex
with him. When AAA refused, appellant forcibly
removed her clothes and boxed her right buttock.  As she
still resisted, he took a bolo, which he poked at
her.  Appellant desisted from committing further acts
because of the timely arrival of AAA’s grandmother.
With these, appellant was charged with Other Light
Threats in Criminal Case No. 1650; Attempted Rape in
Criminal Case No. 1651; Unjust Vexation in Criminal
Case No. 1652; and Maltreatment in Criminal Case No.
1653.
 
          On September 24, 2004, the RTC dismissed
Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653 for
insufficiency of evidence.  Criminal Case No. 1651,
among others, proceeded, however.  Eventually, appellant
was convicted of Attempted Rape, which the CA
affirmed.
 
          A careful review of the records reveals, though, that
the evidence is insufficient to support appellant’s
conviction of Attempted Rape.
         
 Rape is attempted when the offender commences the
commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not
perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
[57]
 The prosecution must, therefore, establish the
following elements of an attempted felony:
 
1.       The offender commences the commission of the
felony directly by overt acts;
 
2.       He does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony;
 
3.       The offender’s act be not stopped by his own
spontaneous desistance;
 
4.       The non-performance of all acts of execution was
due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.[58]
 
 
The attempt that the RPC punishes is that which has a
logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; and
that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense
by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its
realization and consummation.[59] In the instant case, the
primary question that comes to the fore is whether or not
appellant’s act of removing AAA’s pants constituted an
overt act of Rape.
  
We answer in the negative.
 
Overt or external act has been defined as some
physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to
commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or
preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary
desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and
necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.[60]
 
          The evidence on record does not show that the
above elements are present.  The detailed acts of
execution showing an attempt to rape are simply
lacking.  It would be too strained to construe appellant’s
act of removing AAA’s pants as an overt act that will
logically and necessarily ripen into rape. Hence, appellant
must be acquitted of Attempted Rape.
 
          Neither can we hold appellant liable for Other Light
Threats for threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust
Vexation for undressing her without her consent, causing
disturbance, torment, distress, and vexation; nor for
Maltreatment for boxing the right side of AAA’s
buttocks. Although all of the above acts were alleged in
the Information for Attempted Rape in the Order
dated September 24, 2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650,
1652 and 1653 involving the above crimes were
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence based on the
demurrer to evidence filed by appellant.
 
          The order granting appellant’s demurrer to evidence
was a resolution of the case on the merits, and it
amounted to an acquittal.  Any further prosecution of the
accused after an acquittal would violate the proscription
on double jeopardy.[61] Accordingly, appellant’s
conviction of any of the above crimes, even under
Criminal Case No. 1651, would trench in his
constitutional right against double jeopardy. 
 
Criminal Case No. 1655 for Unjust Vexation
 
          Appellant was charged with Unjust Vexation,
defined and penalized by Article 287 of the RPC, which
reads:
 
          ART. 287. Light coercions. – Any person who,
by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging
to his debtor for the purpose of applying the same to
the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period and a fine
equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less
than 75 pesos.
 
 Any other coercion or unjust vexation shall be
punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to
200 pesos, or both.
 
 
The second paragraph of this provision is broad enough to
include any human conduct that, although not productive
of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably
annoy or vex an innocent person.  The paramount
question to be considered is whether the offender’s act
caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or
disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it was
directed.[62]
 
          Appellant’s acts of embracing, dragging and kissing
AAA in front of her friend annoyed AAA.  The filing of
the case against appellant proved that AAA was
disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of appellant.
 
          The penalty for coercion falling under the second
paragraph of Article 287 of the RPC is arresto menor or a
fine ranging from P5.00 to P200.00 or both. Accordingly,
appellant is sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to
pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties
thereof.
 
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the January
31, 2008 Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
30045 with MODIFICATIONS. The Court finds
appellant Salvino Sumingwa:
 
1. GUILTY of QUALIFIED RAPE in Criminal
Case No. 1646.  He is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and
ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00
as exemplary damages.
 
2. GUILTY of four (4) counts of ACTS OF
LASCIVIOUSNESS under Section 5 (b) Article III of
R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case Nos. 1644, 1645, 1649, and
1654.  He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay AAA P15,000.00 as moral
damages and a fine of P15,000.00, for EACH COUNT.
 
3. NOT GUILTY in Criminal Case No. 1651.
 
4. GUILTY of UNJUST VEXATION in Criminal
Case No. 1655.  He is sentenced to suffer 30 days
of arresto menor and to pay a fine of P200.00, with the
accessory penalties thereof.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
                                      ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
                                      Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
 
MINITA V. CHICO- PRESBITERO J.
NAZARIO VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 
 
ATTESTATION
 
          I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 
 
 
                                      ANTONIO T. CARPIO
                                      Associate Justice
                                      Chairperson, Third Division
 
 
CERTIFICATION
 
          Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
 
 
 
                                      LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
                                      Acting Chief Justice

[1]
               Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal, with Associate
Justices Jose Catral Mendoza and Jose C. Reyes, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 2-38.
[2]
               Branch 35, Bontoc Mountain Province.
[3]
               Penned by Pairing Judge Artemio B. Marrero; CA rollo, pp. 59-74.
[4]
               Rollo, pp. 42-44.
[5]
               Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1644 and 1645.
[6]
               Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1646, 1647, 1649 and 1654.
[7]
               Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1648, 1652 and 1655.
[8]
               Docketed as Criminal Case No. 1650.
[9]
               Docketed as Criminal Case No. 1653.
[10]
             Docketed as Criminal Case No. 1651.
[11]
             The acts complained of were committed when the victim was 15 and 16
years old.
[12]
             Records (Criminal Case No. 1644), pp. 156-158.
[13]
             Id. at 141-148.
[14]
             TSN, December 10, 2003, pp. 4-6.
[15]
             Id. at 6-8.
[16]
             Id. at 8-10.
[17]
             Id. at 11-12.
[18]
             Id. at 12-13.
[19]
             Id. at 14.
[20]
             Id. at 14-15.
[21]
             Records (Criminal Case No. 1644), p. 20.
[22]
             Rollo, pp. 10-11.
[23]
             Id. at 11.
[24]
             Id
[25]
             Records (Criminal Case No. 1644), p. 206.
[26]
             In Criminal Cases No. 1644, 1645, 1646, 1649, and 1654.
[27]
             In Criminal Case No. 1651.
[28]
             In Criminal Case No. 1655.
[29]
             CA rollo, p. 73.
[30]
             Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[31]
             Id. at 56.
[32]
             Id. at 56-58.
[33]
             CA rollo, p. 53.
[34]
             People v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473, August 17, 2007, 530 SCRA 675,
687-688.
[35]
             People v. Deauna, 435 Phil. 141, 163 (2002).
[36]
             People v. Miñon, G.R. Nos. 148397-400, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 671,
685-686.
[37]
             People v. Deauna, supra note 35, at 164.
[38]
             People v. Miñon, supra note 36, at 685-686.
[39]
             Rollo, pp. 17-18.
[40]
             Campos v. People, G.R. No. 175275, February 19, 2008, 546 SCRA
334, 347-348; People v. Balonzo, G.R. No. 176153, September 21, 2007, 533
SCRA 760, 771.
[41]
             People v. Guambor, 465 Phil. 671 (2004).
[42]
             AAA was born on November 12, 1984 as shown in her Certificate of
Live Birth; records (Criminal Case No. 1644), p. 138.
[43]
             People v. Antonio, G.R. No. 180920, March 27, 2008, 549 SCRA 569,
574.
[44]
             People v. Bejic, G.R. No. 174060, June 25, 2007, 525 SCRA
488; People v. Ibañez, G.R. No. 174656, May 11, 2007, 523 SCRA 136.
[45]
             People of the Philippines v. Lilio U. Achas, G.R. No. 185712, August 4,
2009; People of the Philippines v. Adelado Anguac y Ragadao, G.R. No. 176744,
June 5, 2009; The People of the Philippines v. Lorenzo Layco, Sr., G.R. No.
182191, May 8, 2009.
[46]
             People v. Bejic, supra note 44; People v. Ibañez, supra note 44, at 145.
[47]
             “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act.”
[48]
             Malto v. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 643,
656; Navarrete v. People, G.R. No. 147913, January 31, 2007, 513 SCRA 509,
521; Olivares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA
465, 473.
[49]
             TSN, December 10, 2003, p. 22.
[50]
             Id. at 25.
[51]
             People v. Montinola, G.R. No. 178061, January 31, 2008, 543 SCRA
412.
[52]
             Id.
[53]
             Id; People v. Candaza, G.R. No. 170474, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA
280; Olivares v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48.
[54]
             People of the Philippines v. Heracleo Abello y Fortada, G.R. No.
151952, March 25, 2009.
[55]
             Malto v. People, supra. note 48.
[56]
             Olivares v. Court of Appeals, supra note 48.
 
[57]
             People of the Philippines v. Catalino Mingming y Discalso, G.R. No.
174195, December 10, 2008; Baleros, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 138033, February
22, 2006, 483 SCRA 10, 27.
[58]
             People of the Philippines v. Catalino Mingming y Discalso, supra note
57; People v. Lizada, G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62, 94.
[59]
             Baleros, Jr. v. People, supra note 57, at 27.
[60]
             Baleros, Jr. v. People, id. at 27-28; People v. Lizada, supra note 58, at
94.
[61]
             People v. Lizada, Jr.,  G.R. No. 128587, March 16, 2007, 518 SCRA
393, 403; People v. Sandiganbayan, 426 Phil. 453 (2002). 
[62]
             Maderazo v. People, G.R. No. 165065, September 26, 2006, 503 SCRA
234, 247; Baleros, Jr. v. People, supra note 57, at 30.

Republic of the P
SUPREME
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 202976               February 19PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -

vs.
MERVIN GAHI, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal from a Decision1 dated August 31, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in
CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 00335, entitled People of the Philippines v. Mervin Gahi, which aff
Decision2 dated April 22, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Carigara, Leyte, Bran
Criminal Case Nos. 4202 and 4203. The trial court convicted appellant Mervin Ga
counts of rape defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

The accusatory portions of the two criminal Informations, both dated October 9, 20
charging appellant with one count of rape are reproduced below:

[Criminal Case No. 4202]

That on or about the 11th day of March, 2002, in the Municipality of Capoocan, Pr
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
with deliberate intent and with lewd designs and by use of force and intimidation, arm
knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge
[AAA3] against her will and a 16[-]year old girl, to her damage and prejudice.4
[Criminal Case No. 4203]

That on or about the 12th day of March, 2002, in the Municipality of Capoocan, Pr
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
with deliberate intent and with lewd designs and by use of force and intimidation, arm
knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge
[AAA] against her will and a 16[-]year old girl, to her damage and prejudice.5

When he was arraigned on November 4, 2002, appellant pleaded "NOT GUILTY" to the
leveled against him.6 Thereupon, the prosecution and the defense presented their evide

The pertinent facts of this case were synthesized by the Court of Appeals and presen
assailed August 31, 2011 Decision in this manner:

The Prosecution’s Story

The following witnesses were presented by the prosecution, who testified, as follows:

AAA is sixteen years old and a resident of x x x, Leyte. She testified that she knows
Mervin Gahi, the latter being the husband of her aunt DDD.

The First Rape

AAA recounted that on March 11, 2002 at about 11:30 in the morning, she wa
grandmother BBB’s house with her epileptic teenage cousin, CCC. At that time BBB w
the house to collect money from debtors. While she was in the living room mopping
accused Mervin arrived in the house. The latter was a frequent visitor as he used
charcoal in the premises. When Mervin arrived, AAA was by her lonesome as CCC w
the house.

AAA recounted that Mervin came near her and instructed her to "Lie down, lie down
upon hearing Mervin’s orders, AAA stopped mopping the floor. Mervin, with his right h
held AAA’s right arm. He pushed AAA, causing her to lose her balance and fall on
Mervin raised AAA’s skirt and proceeded to take off her underwear. All this time, Me
holding a knife with a blade of about 6 inches long, poking it at AAA’s right breast. Fear
life, AAA did not resist Mervin’s initial advances. After taking off AAA’s underwear, Me
on top of her and while in that position, he took off his shorts, inserted his penis inside h
and ejaculated. AAA’s efforts to free herself from Mervin’s hold were unsuccessful. As a
her struggle, she felt tired and weak. After satisfying his lust, Mervin warned AAA to ke
what transpired or else he would kill her. Afraid that he would make good his threat, AA
mention to anybody what happened, even to her aunt DDD, the wife of the accused.

The Second Rape

AAA recalled that the second rape occurred on March 12, 2002 at about three o’clo
afternoon. On her way to the field and with a carabao in tow, she was met by Mervin
foot trail. While on the foot trail, Mervin went near AAA, prompting her to hurriedly sc
BBB’s house. Mervin followed her. Once in the living room of BBB’s house, Mervin ap
AAA, poked a knife at the right side of her body, pushed her and made her lie down. O
she didn’t resist Mervin’s advances. He threatened and ordered her to "keep quiet, d
Then he raised her skirt and took off her underwear, after which, he took off his short p
his brief, laid himself on top of her, and made pumping motions until he ejaculated. Blo
out of AAA’s vagina. After the rape, AAA cried while the accused left the house. Just lik
she did not mention the incident to anybody, not even to her grandmother and to her a
for fear that Mervin might kill them.

AAA narrated that the first person she told about her ordeal was Lynlyn, her employer i
where AAA spent three months working, when the former was able to detect her preg
was also Lynlyn who accompanied her to the Capoocan Police Station to report an
case. After reporting the matter to the police, AAA did not go back to Ormoc anymore
gave birth. Instead, she and her baby stayed with the Department of Social We
Development (DSWD).

Dr. Bibiana O. Cardente, the Municipal Health Officer of Capoocan, Leyte testified that
request of the Chief of Police of Capoocan, Leyte, she attended to AAA, a sixteen[-]yea
was allegedly raped by the husband of her aunt. The findings of Dr. Cardente were re
the form of a Medical Certificate issued on August 23, 2002, which she also identified
the contents thereof in open court, as follows:

"Patient claimed that she was allegedly raped by the husband of her aunt. The pat
recall the exact date when she was raped.

Phernache – at the age of 13 years old,

Pregnancy test done at Carigara District Hospital today at August 23, 2002.

Result: Positive for UGC, LMP-unknown

Findings: Fundal Height-1 inch above the umbilicus compatible with 5 months pregnanc
Presentation: cephalic

FHB – RLQ"

Ofelia Pagay, a Social Welfare Officer III of the DSWD Regional Haven, Pawing, Pa
testified that she interviewed AAA upon the latter’s admission to their office on August
Also interviewed were her mother, the MSWD of Capoocan, Leyte and the Social Welf
Unit of the DSWD. In her case study report on AAA, Ofelia recommended the n
intervention for her because of an existing conflict in their family.

The Version of the Defense

BBB, AAA’s 74-year old grandmother, testified that AAA is the daughter of her son
EEE. She took custody of AAA after her parents got separated. Along with AAA her
granddaughter, CCC was also living with them.

BBB recounted that on March 11, 2002, she was at her house doing household cho
morning until noon. She denied that a rape incident ever occurred at the said date as sh
at home the whole day and did not chance upon Mervin at her house nor did AAA in
about any rape incident.

BBB also recalled that on March 12, 2002 she stayed at home the whole day. She nar
after having breakfast at about seven o’clock in the morning, AAA took a bath. She
AAA writing notes. At around three o’clock in the afternoon, AAA went to herd the carab
uphill portion of the place. Later, AAA returned and stayed in the house the rest of the a
BBB again denied that a rape occurred on that day of March 12, 2002, as she did not se
in her house. Neither did she observe any unusual behavior on the part of AAA no
receive a complaint from the latter that she was raped by Mervin.

Filomeno Suson, 51 years old, married, a farmer and a resident of Brgy. Visares, C
Leyte testified that on March 11, 2002 he was with Mervin at the copra kiln dryer situate
Sandayong, Brgy. Visares, Capoocan, Leyte from eight o’clock in the morning un
o’clock noon. Mervin was with his wife and two children and never left the place. He rec
he left the place at 12:30 in the afternoon, and returned at 1:30 in the afternoon. He sa
still processing the copra. He stayed at the dryer until five o’clock in the afternoon an
see Mervin leave the place. The following day, March 12, 2002, he went back to the
eight o’clock in the morning and saw Mervin near the copra kiln dryer regulating the fir
the copra will not get burned. He stayed there until past noontime and did not see Mer
the place. When he returned at one o’clock in the afternoon, Mervin was already pl
copra inside the sack. He stayed until five o’clock in the afternoon. The following day, M
2002, he saw Mervin hauling the copra. He did not observe any unusual behavior from h

Jackie Gucela, 18 years old, single, a farm laborer and a resident of Brgy. Lonoy, Kana
testified that he and AAA were sweethearts. Jackie recounted that the first time he go
and had sex with AAA was sometime in March 2000. He recalled that the last time he
had sex was sometime in April 2002. He admitted that it was he who got AAA pregnant.

Mervin Gahi, 35 years old, married, a farmer and a resident of Brgy. Visares, Capooc
denied having been at the place of the alleged rapes on the days asserted by the com
He recalled that on March 11, 2002, he was at the area of Sandayong, Sitio Agumayan,

Visares, Capoocan, Leyte processing copra owned by Mrs. Josefina Suson. He

processing copra at six o’clock in the morning until about nine o’clock in the evening.
were his wife and two children, May Jane and Mervin Jr. His landlord, Filomeno arrive
the morning, and stayed until twelve o’clock noon. After having lunch at his house,
returned at one o’clock in the afternoon. Mervin recounted that he stopped working whe
lunch at his nearby house with his family, and during the intervening time, he did not
place to watch over the copra. After eating his lunch, he went back to the copra kil
refuel and again watched over the copra. He stayed there and never left the place
o’clock in the evening.

On March 12, 2002, Mervin recalled that he was at the copra kiln drier segregating th
copra from the uncooked ones until nine o’clock in the morning. When he was
segregating, he smoked the uncooked copra. With him were his wife and children, and h
at the copra kiln dryer until six o’clock in the evening. The only time that he left the s
was when he had his lunch at eleven o’clock in the morning at his house. After having h
he returned to the copra kiln drier. He admitted that he was familiar with Brgy. S
Capoocan, Leyte.

Mervin testified that on March 13, 2002 at twelve o’clock noon, he delivered the
weighing to the house of his landlord at Brgy. Visares, Capoocan, Leyte. It was his K
(Filomino) and Ate Pensi (Maria Esperanza) who actually received the copra, with the la
recording the delivery. According to him, it was impossible for him to have raped AA
alleged dates as he was at Brgy. Visares processing copra. He argued that a mis
committed by AAA in accusing him considering the similarity between his name Mervin
Jack[ie] Gucela’s nickname, Melvin, who was known to be a suitor of AAA.

Ma. Esperanza V. Villanueva, 48 years old, married, a housewife and a resident

Visares, Capoocan, Leyte testified that she knows Mervin. According to her, Mervin was
and has been working as a copra drier for them for a couple of years. Esperanza recalle
March 13, 2002, Mervin and his wife delivered copra to her house. The delivery, she
also recorded by her.7 (Citations omitted.)

At the conclusion of trial, the April 22, 2005 Decision convicting appellant was rendere
trial court. Dispositively, the said ruling states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, applying Article 266-A and 266-B of the Revis
Code as amended, and the amendatory provisions of R.A. 8353, (The Anti-Rape Law
in relation to Section 11 of R.A. 7659 (The Death Penalty Law), the Court found
MERVIN GAHI, GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of RAPE charg
Criminal Cases No. 4202 and 4203, and sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of D
both cases and to pay civil indemnity in the amount of Seventy[-]Five Thousand (₱7
Pesos for each case and exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty[-]Five (₱2
Thousand Pesos for each case, to the victim [AAA]; and pay the costs.8

The case was subsequently elevated to the Court of Appeals. After due deliberation, the
Appeals affirmed with modification the appealed decision of the trial court in the now
August 31, 2011 Decision, the dispositive portion of which is reproduced here:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated April 22, 2005 of the
Trial Court, Eight Judicial Region, Branch 13 of Carigara, Leyte in Criminal Case Nos.
4203, finding appellant Mervin Gahi guilty of two counts of Rape, is hereby AFFIRMED
modification that accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion per
each count. Further, he is ordered to pay AAA the amount of Php50,000.00 for each
rape as moral damages.9

Having been thwarted twice in his quest for the courts to proclaim his innocence,
comes before this Court for one last attempt at achieving that purpose. In his Brief,
submits a single assignment of error for consideration, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT O

COUNTS OF RAPE DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HI
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10

Appellant maintains that AAA’s incredible and inconsistent testimony does not form
basis for him to be convicted of two counts of rape. He argues that his testimony along
of other defense witnesses should have been accorded greater weight and credibility.
the trial court for ignoring the extended time period between the alleged rapes and th
AAA’s baby; and for disbelieving Jackie Gucela’s testimony which stated that the l
AAA’s lover and the father of AAA’s child, contrary to AAA’s claim that the baby was th
appellant’s unlawful carnal congress with her. He also insists that his alibi should have c
the trial court that he is innocent because he was at another place at the time the ra
allegedly committed by him. On the strength of these assertions, appellant believes t
deserving of an acquittal that is long overdue because the prosecution failed miserably
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

We are not persuaded.

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code defines when and how the felony of rape is co
to wit:

Rape is committed –

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
circumstances:

(a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even tho
of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 her
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or an
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

According to the prosecution, appellant used force or intimidation in order to successf

unlawful carnal knowledge of AAA. To be exact, appellant is alleged to have utilized
occasions, a knife and the threat of bodily harm to coerce AAA into submitting to his e
desires. A careful perusal of AAA’s testimony in open court reveals that she was c
straightforward in her assertion that appellant raped her twice in the manner describe
prosecution. We sustain as proper the appellate court’s reliance on the following po
AAA’s testimony regarding the first instance of rape:

[PROSECUTOR MERIN]

Q And you were alone in the house of your lola?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when you were alone in your lola’s house at the sala, what did this accused do to

A He suddenly went inside the sala and at that time I was mopping the floor.

Q What did you use in mopping the floor?

A Coconut husk.

Q And when the accused suddenly appeared [at] the sala, while you were mopping the
a coconut husk, what did the accused do next, tell this court?

A He said, lie down, lie down.

Q You mean he was fronting at (sic) you?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what did you do with his instruction to let you lie down?

A Nothing.

Q You mean you stop[ped] mopping the floor?

A Yes, sir.

Q Now, after you stop[ped] mopping, what next transpired if any, tell this court?

A He held me and let me lie down.

xxxx

Q And after you were laid down by the accused and you already [were lying] on the fl
next transpired if any, tell the court?

A He raised my skirt and took off my panty.

Q What did you do when he tried to raise your skirt and took off your panty?
A I was trembling.

Q Why were you trembling?

A Because I was afraid.

Q Why were you afraid of Mervin Gahi x x x?

A Because he held something.

Q What was he holding?

A A knife.

xxxx

Q And what did he do with that knife he was holding?

A It was poked [at] me.

Q What part of your body was poked upon (sic)?

A (Witness indicated her right breast)

xxxx

Q While the accused was on top of you and took off his pants, what did the accused
your person?

A He inserted his penis.

Q You mean his penis was inserted [in]to what?

A To my vagina.

Q Now, how did you feel when he tried to insert his penis [in]to your vagina?

A I became weak.11

As for the second instance of rape, we agree with the lower courts that AAA was likew
and straightforward in recounting that:
[PROSECUTOR MERIN]

Q Where were you on March 12, 2002 when raped again by the accused?

A I was tethering a carabao.

xxxx

Q When you were trying to bring that carabao what happened tell the court?

A At that time when I was able to bring the carabao to be fed I saw him.

Q Whereat did you see him?

A He was on the foot trail.

xxxx

Q When you saw the accused on your way to tether the carabao of your lola, wha
accused do [to] you?

A He drew nearer to me.

Q After he drew nearer to you, what did he do next?

A He poked a knife [at] me.

xxxx

Q After you were poked by that knife by the accused, what else happened?

A He said, "Keep quiet, don’t talk."

Q After he said that what next happened?

A He made me to (sic) lie.

Q Whereat?

A When he poked his knife at me he held my upper arms.

Q Were you already lying?

A He pushed me and I was made to lie.

Q You mean on the roadside?

A No, at the sala of the house of my grandmother.

Q You mean you were led to the house of your Lola?

A No sir.

Q Where were you brought?

A At that time when I was able to bring the carabao to be [fed] when I saw him I ran ba
house of my grandmother.

xxxx

Q And when you were already inside the house of your Lola what happened, tell the Co

A He was already there.

xxxx

Q After your skirt was raised up by the accused, what did the accused do next, tell the C

A He took off my panty.

xxxx

Q Did you not prevent Mervin from taking off your panty?

A No sir.

Q Why did you not wrestle out?

A I am afraid because of the knife.

xxxx
Q After he took off his brief, what did accused do, tell the Court?

A He laid himself on top of me.

Q After he laid himself on top of you, what else did he do?

A He inserted his penis [in]to my vagina.

xxxx

Q Was he successful in inserting his penis [in]to your vagina?

A Yes sir.

Q After inserting his penis [in]to your vagina, what else did accused do to his penis?

A He kept on pumping himself, meaning making a going and out movement.

Q You mean he was making in and out movement of (sic) your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q Was he able to reach ejaculation?

A Blood.

Q You mean blood came out?

A Yes, sir.

Q From where?

A From my vagina.12

Appellant questions the weighty trust placed by the trial court on the singular and uncorr
testimony of AAA as the basis for his conviction. On this point, we would like to remind
that it is a fundamental principle in jurisprudence involving rape that the accused
convicted based solely on the testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is
natural, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.13

It is likewise jurisprudentially settled that when a woman says she has been raped, sh
effect all that is necessary to show that she has been raped and her testimony alone is
if it satisfies the exacting standard of credibility needed to convict the accused.14 Thu
jurisdiction, the fate of the accused in a rape case, ultimately and oftentimes, hinge
credibility of the victim’s testimony.

In this regard, we defer to the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of AAA’s testimo
especially, when it is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In People v. Amistoso, 15 we reite
rationale of this principle in this wise:

Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the vict
prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and resp
generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court ov
misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance w
alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so because trial cou
the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of witnesses
their actual observation of the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their demeanor and be
court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of observing the witness’ deportment and m
testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneer
calmness, sigh, or the scant or full realization of an oath" – all of which are useful ai
accurate determination of a witness’ honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, c
determine if such witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh c
testimonies. Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked
considered, might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and
they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said fin
sustained by the Court of Appeals.

Anent the inconsistent statements made by AAA in her testimony which were pointe
appellant, we agree with the assessment made by the Court of Appeals that these are
discrepancies that do little to affect the central issue of rape which is involved in t
Instead of diminishing AAA’s credibility, such variance on minor details has the net
bolstering the truthfulness of AAA’s accusations. We have constantly declared th
discrepancies and inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses referring to minor de
not in actuality touching upon the central fact of the crime do not impair the credibil
witnesses because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed testimony.16

Notable is the fact that no ill motive on the part of AAA to falsely accuse appellant
brought up by the defense during trial. This only serves to further strengthen AAA’s ca
we have consistently held that a rape victim’s testimony as to who abused her is credib
she has absolutely no motive to incriminate and testify against the accused.17 It is als
important to highlight AAA’s young age when she decided to accuse her kin of rap
through the ordeal of trial. In fact, when she painfully recounted her tribulation in court,
just at the tender age of sixteen (16) years old.18 Jurisprudence instructs us that n
woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an exam
her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subjected to public trial, if she
motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her.19

In a bid to exculpate himself, appellant argues that he could not have possibly been guil
because the time period between the rape incidents and the birth of the alleged fruit of
is more than the normal period of pregnancy. He also points out that defense witne
Gucela’s admission that he was AAA’s lover and the father of her child should suffice
any notion that he raped AAA twice. Lastly, he puts forward the defense of alibi.

We are not convinced by appellant’s line of reasoning which appears ostensibly comp
the outset, but is ultimately rendered inutile by jurisprudence and the evidence at hand.

With regard to appellant’s first point, we express our agreement with the statement ma
Court of Appeals that it is not absurd nor contrary to human experience that AAA gave
(10) months after the alleged sexual assault as there may be cases of long gestation
event, we dismiss appellant’s contention as immaterial to the case at bar because juris
tells us that impregnation is not an element of rape.20 This rule was eloquently exp
People v. Bejic21:

It is well-entrenched in our case law that the rape victim’s pregnancy and resultant chil
irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential e
the crime of rape. Whether the child which the rape victim bore was fathered by the ac
by some unknown individual, is of no moment. What is important and decisive is
accused had carnal knowledge of the victim against the latter’s will or without her con
such fact was testified to by the victim in a truthful manner. (Citation omitted.)

Likewise, we assign no significance to the testimony of defense witness Jackie Gucel

AAA categorically denied that Jackie Gucela was her boyfriend22 or that she had sexual
with him or any other person other than appellant near the time of the rape inc
issue.23 For the sweetheart theory to be believed when invoked by the accused, c
evidence to prove the existence of the supposed relationship must be presente
proponent of the theory. We elucidated on this principle in People v. Bayrante,24 to wit:

For the ["sweetheart"] theory to prosper, the existence of the supposed relationship
proven by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such evidence renders hi
be self-serving and of no probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there sho
corroboration by their common friends or, if none, a substantiation by tokens o
relationship such as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like. (Citation omitted.)

In the present case, although it is a person other than the accused who is claiming
victim’s sweetheart and the father of her child, such an assertion must nonetheless be b
demonstrated by the evidence.

The defense failed to discharge the burden of proving that AAA and Jackie Gucela had
of romantic or sexual relationship which resulted in AAA’s pregnancy. We quote with
the discussion made by the Court of Appeals on this matter:

Like the trial court, We have our reservations on [Jackie]’s credibility.1âwphi1 AAA,

outset, has denied any romantic involvement with [Jackie]. On the other hand, to prove
that they were sweethearts, [Jackie] presented three love letters purportedly authored
An examination of the contents of the letters however fails to indicate any intimate
between AAA and [Jackie]. Nowhere in the contents of the said letters did AAA even pr
love for [Jackie]. In the first letter, [Jackie] maintained that AAA signed the letter as "SHE
her identity. Other than such assertion, he however failed to establish by any conclus
that the "SHE" and AAA were one and the same person. Neither did he explain if he
"Boy" being alluded to in the first letter. The second letter, which was also unsigned by A
a poem written by Joyce Kilmer entitled Trees, and the third letter although vague
contents, does not appear to be a love letter at all. Our inevitable conclusion: the letter
love letters at all between AAA and [Jackie]. Even if We were to assume for the
argument that [Jackie] fathered AAA’s child, We are hard pressed to find malice or any
on the part of AAA to falsely accuse no less than her uncle, if the same was not true.
We believe that [Jackie]’s testimony is a desperate attempt on his part to let Mervin off
so to speak.25 (Citations omitted.)

In any event, even assuming for the sake of argument that AAA had a romantic attachm
a person other than the accused at the time of the rape incidents or thereafter, this circu
would not necessarily negate the truth of AAA’s statement that the appellant, h
husband, twice had carnal knowledge of her through force and intimidation and wi
consent.

We are similarly unconvinced with appellant’s defense of alibi. We have consistently

alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate an
unreliable.26 Moreover, we have required that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the
must prove that he was somewhere else when the offense was committed and that he w
away that it was not possible for him to have been physically present at the place of the
at its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.27

In the case at bar, the testimony of defense witness Filomeno Suson made known to
court that the distance between the scene of the crime and the copra kiln dryer where
claimed to have been working the entire time during which the incidents of rape occurre
traversed in less than an hour.28 Thus, it was not physically impossible for appellant to
locus criminis on the occasion of the rapes owing to the relatively short distance. This
detail coupled with AAA’s positive and categorical identification of appellant as h
demolishes appellant’s alibi since it is jurisprudentially-settled that alibi and denial cann
over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of an accused by the comp

Having affirmed the factual bases of appellant’s conviction for two (2) counts of simple
now progress to clarify the proper penalties of imprisonment and damages that s
imposed upon him owing to the conflicting pronouncements made by the trial court and
of Appeals. To recall, the Court of Appeals downgraded the penalty imposed on appe
death (as decreed by the trial court) to reclusion perpetua. It has been established that
committed the aforementioned felonies with the use of a deadly weapon which acc
Article 266-B, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code30 is punishable by reclusion pe
death. There being no aggravating circumstance present in this case, the proper p
imprisonment should be reclusion perpetua for each instance of rape.

It is worth noting that appellant is an uncle by affinity of AAA.

Following the 5th paragraph (1) of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, 31 a re
within the third degree of consanguinity or affinity taken with the minority of AAA wo
merited the imposition of the death penalty. However, no such close relationship was
this case as accused appears to be the husband of AAA’s father’s cousin. In any case,
penalty has been abolished by the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which also m
that the outlawed penalty be replaced with reclusion perpetua. A qualifying or ag
circumstance, if properly alleged and proven, might not have the effect of changing th
imprisonment but it would, nevertheless, be material in determining the amount of p
damages to be imposed.

Thus, in view of the foregoing, we affirm the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals w
reclusion perpetua for each conviction of simple rape. The award of moral damag
amount ₱50,000.00 is likewise upheld. However, the award of civil indemnity should be
from ₱75,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 in line with jurisprudence.32 For the same reason, the
exemplary damages should be increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.33 More
amounts of damages thus awarded are subject further to interest of 6% per annum from
of finality of this judgment until they are fully paid.34
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 31, 2011 of the
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR.-H.C. No. 00335, affirming the conviction of appellant Me
in Criminal Case Nos. 4202 and 4203, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that

(1) The civil indemnity to be paid by appellant Mervin Gahi is decreased from Sev
Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00);

(2) The exemplary damages to be paid by appellant Mervin Gahi is increased from Tw
Thousand Pesos (₱25,000.00) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00); and

(3) Appellant Mervin Gahi is ordered to pay the private offended party interest on all da
the legal rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A.
Chief
Chairperson

BERSAMIN MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,

LUCAS P.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in t
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the wri
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A.
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
 Rollo, pp. 4-33; penned by Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando with Associate
Edgardo L. de los Santos and Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, concurring.
2
 CA rollo, pp. 26-42.
3
 The Court withholds the real name of the victim-survivor and uses fictitious initials i
represent her. Likewise, the personal circumstances of the victims-survivors or a
information tending to establish or compromise their identities, as well as those
immediate families or household members, are not to be disclosed. (See People v. Cab
533 Phil. 703 [2006].)
4
 Records, p. 16.
5
 Id. at 1.
6
 Id. at 15.
7
 Rollo, pp. 6-14.
8
 CA rollo, p. 42.
9
 Rollo, p. 32.
10
 CA rollo, p. 52.
11
 TSN, February 28, 2003, pp. 6-9.
12
 TSN, July 3, 2003, pp. 9-13.
13
 People v. Penilla, G.R. No. 189324, March 20, 2013, 694 SCRA 141, 149.
14
 People v. Monticalvo, G.R. No. 193507, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 715, 734.
15
 G.R. No. 201447, January 9, 2013, 688 SCRA 376, 387-388 citing People v. Aguilar,
233, 247-248 (2007).
16
 People v. Batula, G.R. No. 181699, November 28, 2012, 686 SCRA 575, 586-587.
17
 People v. Cabungan, G.R. No. 189355, January 23, 2013, 689 SCRA 236, 246.
18
 TSN, February 28, 2003, p. 2.
19
 People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 187740, April 10, 2013, 695 SCRA 545, 554.
20
 People v. Maglente, 578 Phil. 980, 996 (2008).
21
 552 Phil. 555, 573 (2007).
22
 TSN, August 6, 2003, p. 6.
23
 TSN, December 5, 2003, p. 11.
24
 G.R. No. 188978, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 446, 465.
25
 Rollo, pp. 25-26.
26
 People v. Gani, G.R. No. 195523, June 5, 2013.
27
 People v. Piosang, G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013.
28
 TSN, October 6, 2004, pp. 18-19.
29
 People v. Gani, supra note 26.
30
 Article 266-B. Penalties. – x x x.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more per
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
31
 Article 266-B. Penalties. – x x x.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with an
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, as
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degre
common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
32
 People v. Lomaque, G.R. No. 189297, June 5, 2013.
33
 People v. Basallo, G.R. No. 182457, January 30, 2013, 689 SCRA 616, 645.
34
 People v. Vitero, G.R. No. 175327, April 3, 2013, 695 SCRA 54, 69.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

e Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23035             October 13, 1925

In re will of Ignacio Abuton y Poncol, deceased.

TEODORA GUINGUING, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AGAPITO ABUTON and CALIXTO ABUTON, opponents-appellants.

M. Abejuela for appellants.

No appearance for appellee.

STREET, J.:

In the course of the administration of the estate of Ignacio Abuton,

deceased, resident of Oroquieta, Province of Misamis, it appeared that the
deceased died testate on March 8, 1916, leaving two sets of children by
two different wives, the first of whom was Dionisia Olarte, who died about
twenty years ago, and by whom the deceased had twelve, children, three of
whom died without issue. The second wife was Teodora Guinguing, to
whom the testator was married on July 14, 1906, and by whom he had four
children, all still living. A will of the testator, executed on November 25,
1914, was probated in court and allowed on October 9, 1917 (Exhibit A);
and one Gabriel Binaoro was appointed administrator. In due course of
proceeding Binaoro submitted to the court an inventory of the properties
belonging to the deceased at the time of his death. In this inventory he
included only the lands which the testator had devised to the children of the
second marriage, omitting other lands possessed by him at the time of his
death and which were claimed by the children of the first marriage as
having been derived from their mother. Accordingly, on March 14, 1922,
Teodoro Guinguing, in representation of herself and her four minor
children, presented a motion in court, asking that the administrator be
required to amend his inventory and to include therein all property
pertaining to the conjugal partnership of Ignacio Abuton and Dionisia
Olarte, including property actually in the hands of his children by her which
(the motion alleged) had been delivered to said children as an
advancement. The purpose of the motion was to force the first set of
children to bring into collation the properties that had been received by
them, in conformity with article 1035 of the Civil Code; and the motion was
based partly on the supposition that Ignacio Abuton had never in fact
effected a liquidation of the conjugal property pertaining to himself and
Dionisia Olarte. This motion was formally opposed by two of the children of
the first marriage, namely, Agapito and Calixto Abuton y Olarte.

Upon hearing the proof the trial judge found that no property had been
acquired by the testator during his second marriage and that the
administration was concerned only with property that had been acquired
before the death of the first wife. The trial judge further found that after the
death of the first wife the testator had liquidated the ganacial estate
pertaining to them and had divided among the first set of children all of the
property that pertained to the first wife in the division, with the exception of
the home-place in the poblacion, in which the testator had continued to
reside till death. The share pertaining to the testator in said division was, so
the court found, retained in his own hands; and this property constituted the
proper subject matter of the present administration proceedings.
Accordingly an order was entered to the effect that the administrator should
include in the inventory of the estate of Agapito Abuton all of the property of
which the testator was possessed at the time of his death. From this order
the two opponents of the motion appealed.

We entertain serious doubts as to whether the order in question here was

really such a final order as to be appealable under section 783 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, since the making of the inventory is necessarily of a
preliminary and provisional nature, and the improper inclusion of property
therein or the improper omission of property therefrom is not absolutely
decisive of the rights of persons in interest. But, passing this point without
decision, we proceed to consider whether there is any merit in the errors
assigned to the order which is the subject of the appeal.  1awph!l.net

The contention made in the first assignment of error, to the effect that an
order of the character of that appealed from cannot be made by a court
without formal notice being given to all persons in interest, in the same
manner as if a new action had been begun, is clearly untenable, since all
the heirs are already virtually represented in the administration and are
bound by all proper orders made therein, so far and so far only as such
orders have legal effect. This is not inconsistent with the proposition that
contested claims of ownership between the administrator and third persons
should be tried in separate proceedings, which is entirely true. The
question here is merely between some of the heirs and the administrator,
as representative of all persons in interest. Besides, it should be pointed
out, the inclusion of a property in the inventory does not deprive the
occupant of possession; and if it is finally determined that the property has
been properly included in the estate, the occupant heir is liable for the fruits
and interest only from the date when the succession was opened (art.
1049, Civ. Code). The provisions of the Civil Code with reference to
collation clearly contemplate that disputes between heirs with respect to the
obligation to collate may be determined in the course of the administration
proceedings.

The second and third assignments are directed to the supposed errors of
the court in having based its findings as to the property belonging to the
estate of Agapito Abuton in part upon the recitals of his legalized will
(Exhibit A) and in part upon the recitals of a previous will (Exhibit 1), which
had been superseded by the last. This older will appears to have been
produced by the representatives of the first set of children in the
proceedings for the probate of the will which was admitted, and was
attached to that expediente. It is said in appellants' brief that this document
was not introduced in evidence at the hearing of the present controversy.

It was not error, in our opinion, for the trial court to look to the recitals of the
legalized will for the purpose of determining prima facie whether a certain
piece of property should or should not be included in the inventory, without
prejudice of course to any person who may have an adverse title to dispute
the point of ownership. The use made of the superseded will (Exhibit 1) in
the appealed order is of more questionable propriety, but we are of the
opinion that the facts stated by the court can be sufficiently made out from
the other evidence submitted at the hearing.

As we gather from the record, the crux of the controversy consists in the
fact that among the properties remaining in possession of Ignacio Abuton
at the time of his death was a piece of land covered by a composition title
No. 11658, issued in 1894 in the name of Dionisia Olarte. At the same time
that this title was issued, Agapito Abuton procured two other titles, Nos.
11651 and 11654, covering adjacent properties to be issued in his own
name. From the circumstance that title No. 11658 was issued in the name
of Dionisia Olarte the opponents appear to believe that this land was her
particular property and should now vest exclusively in her heirs. This
conclusion is erroneous. There is nothing to show that the land covered by
title No. 11658 was not acquired by the spouses during their marriage, and
the circumstance that the title was taken in the name of the wife does not
defeat its presumed character as ganacial property. Therefore, in
liquidating the ganacial property of the first marriage it was within the power
of the surviving husband to assign other property to the first set of children
as their participation in the estate of their mother and to retain in his own
hands the property for which a composition title had been issued in the
name of the wife.

Upon the whole we are unable to discover any reversible error in the
appealed order, and the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Villa-Real, JJ.,

concur.
Separate Opinions

ROMUALDEZ, J., concurring:

I concur, without prejudice to the right of the appellants over the properties
in question.

G.R. No. L-23273             October 9, 1925

THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
C. S. SALMON, defendant-appellant.

J. W. Ferrier for appellant.

Jose C. Abreu for appellee.

STREET, J.:

This action was instituted on February 5, 1924, in the Court of First

Instance of the City of Manila by the Manila Railroad Company for the
purpose of recovering from the defendant, C. S. Salmon, the unpaid
balance due to the railroad company as freight charges on various
quantities of coconut shells shipped over the railroad by the
Philippine By-Products Co., which charges had been guaranteed by
Salmon. Upon the petition of Salmon, his codefendant W. G. Frisbie
was impleaded, and the cause proceeded thenceforth against the two.
Upon hearing the cause judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff
to recover of Salmon the sum of P1,647.22, with interest from the date
of the filing of the complaint, but Frisbie was absolved with all costs
of the cause against Salmon. From this judgment Salmon appealed.

It appears in evidence that in the year 1918 W. G. Frisbie and W. J.

Allen, under the name of the Philippine By- Products Co., undertook
to buy coconut shells in the provinces for use by the Government of
the United State in the prosecution of war. Much of the material
collected by them had to be brought to Manila by rail; and Salmon,
being the agent of the American buyer with whom Frisbie and Allen
had contracted, guaranteed to the Manila Railroad Company the
payment of any freight for coconut shells shipped over the railroad by
the Philippine By-Products Co. The note by which this obligation was
created is as follows:

May 6, 1918          

The MANILA RAILROAD CO.,

Manila

GENTLEMEN: Relative freight charges on coconut shell shipped over

your railroad by the Philippine By-Products Co. I hereby personally
guarantee payment of same. Bills may be rendered daily or monthly at
my office, 314 Kneedler Building, at your convenience.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) C. S. SALMON          

While engaged upon the contract above-mentioned, Frisbie and Allen,

under the name of the Philippine By-Products Co., caused 846,000
kilos of coconut shells to be transported over the plaintiff railroad to
Manila from various municipalities in the provinces of Laguna and
Tayabas. The freight charges on these shipments amounted to
P3,294.44. To recover this debt the plaintiff instituted a prior civil
action (No. 20206) in the court of the City of Manila, in the course of
which both Frisbie and Allen were brought in as codefendants with
Salmon. Before that case reached its conclusion Allen died; and upon
motion of the plaintiff showing this fact, the action was dismissed as
against Allen, in order that the claim against him might be presented
through proper channels in the proceedings for the administration of
his estate. As a consequence the case proceeded to judgment against
Frisbie and Salmon only.

Upon hearing the cause the trial judge found and declared that the
Philippine By-Products Co. was not a legal entity, inasmuch as no
articles of partnership or incorporation had been entered into by
Frisbie and Allen; and the court further found that the two principals,
Frisbie and Allen, should be held liable as partners in a civil
partnership, each being responsible for one-half of the debt. It was
further declared that Salmon, as guarantor, was liable in a subsidiary
capacity only. Judgment in favor of the plaintiff was therefore given
against Frisbie for half of the amount due and against Salmon for the
same amount in the event that it should not be made out of Frisbie.
As the action had been dismissed as against Allen nothing was
adjudicated with respect to Salmon's subsidiary liability for the half
which pertained to Allen. Neither the plaintiff nor defendants against
whom judgment had been rendered appealed from this decision, and
Frisbie afterwards satisfied the judgment as against himself, leaving
Salmon free from any liability under the judgment.

It further appears that the plaintiff's claim against Allen was in due
time submitted to the committee on claims in the proceedings on
Allen's estate, by which committee it was approved. Later, the court
ordered the claim to be paid, but Allen's estate proved insolvent and
nothing was ever realized upon the claim. The present action was
then begun by the plaintiff to recover of Salmon the amount which the
plaintiff had unsuccessfully attempted to get out of Allen's estate.

The case for Salmon as presented in his brief on appeal in this court
is planted on the following line of reasoning, namely, first, that the
judgment in the first case was erroneous in that Frisbie was there
held liable only to the extent of one-half of the plaintiff's claim, when
judgment should have been given against him for the whole; and,
secondly, that Salmon, as guarantor, has been released by the failure
of the plaintiff to obtain judgment against Frisbie for the entire
indebtedness in that action. We are of the opinion that this contention
is unsound and that the defendant Salmon is liable for the amount
awarded against him in this action whether the first action was
correctly decided or not. To make this intelligible it is necessary first
to explain why, in the former action, the Court of First Instance
declared Frisbie liable for one-half of the debt only. 1awph!l.net

In the case of Hung-Man-Yoc vs. Kieng-Chiong-Seng (6 Phil., 498), it

was held that where a partnership engages in business without the
recording of articles of partnership in the mercantile register, such
partnership cannot be recognized as having legal existence, and
under article 120 of the Code of Commerce only those members of the
partnership who engage in the management of its affairs are liable to
its creditors. This decision, though perhaps necessary under the
provision cited, has not infrequently been invoked to the prejudice of
creditors; and the courts, in order to give creditors all possible
protection, have been inclined to hold the individual members of such
a partnership liable as members of a civil partnership, for it will be
remembered that in civil partnership all who participate in the
enterprise are liable for the acts of the management though only to
the extent of the proportionate share of each. Thus, in Co-Pitco vs.
Yulo (8 Phil., 544), it was held that certain individuals who had
engaged in the operation of a sugar estate constituted a civil
partnership, as distinguished from a mercantile partnership and each
member of the society was bound to pay his pro rata share. In
Dietrich vs. Freeman (18 Phil., 341), three individuals operated the
Manila Steam Laundry; and in an action to recover damages caused
by the enterprise, it was held that the three associated were liable as
members of a civil partnership and that each must pay his part of the
claim. Again, in Bachrach vs. "La Protectora" (37 Phil., 441), the same
doctrine was applied to the case of various individuals who had
engaged in the business of transporting passengers and freight at
Laoag, Ilocos Norte. In the light of these decisions the action of the
Court of First Instance in declaring the Philippine By-Products Co., to
be a civil partnership and the two partners to be each liable for one-
half the plaintiff's claim is comprehensible enough. It follows
furthermore, in the view of the case, that the present action is
properly maintainable against Salmon to recover the share for which
Allen was liable but which, because of the insolvency of Allen's
estate, could not be recovered from him. In this connection it is to be
borne in mind that Salmon, as guarantor, has claimed the benefit of
the exhaustion of the liability of his principals; and for this reason no
judgment could be entered against Salmon in the former case for
Allen's part of the debt after the cause was dismissed as against
Allen. Indeed, no question is made in the appellant's brief upon the
point that judgment was rightly entered against Salmon in this case,
supposing that Frisbie and Allen were each liable only to the extent of
one-half of the plaintiff's claim.

But it is contended for the appellant that both Frisbie and Allen were
jointly and severally liable for the entire amount, in accordance with
the rule of liability in commercial partnerships (article 127, Code of
Commerce); and in this connection emphasis is placed upon the
undeniable fact that the purchase and sale of coconut shells is
commercial business. It must be remembered, however, that the
Philippine By-Products Co. had never been registered in the
commercial register; and in such case, as we have already pointed
out, only the manager, or managers, of the enterprise are solidarily
liable, the other partners not being liable at all. In the absence
therefore of a finding that both Allen and Frisbie were managers of
the Philippine By- Products Co., it could no even be said that they
were both solidarily liable even though it be admitted that the
enterprise was a commercial rather than civil partnership.

The attorney for the appellant relies upon the case of the Manila
Engineering Co. vs. Cranston and Heacock (45 Phil., 128), as having
established that the liability of persons operating as partners in an
unregistered partnership is solidarity and not pro rata. It is true that in
the case mentioned both Cranston and Heacock were held jointly and
severally liable, but the facts of that case, if examined, will show, we
think, that both Cranston and Heacock were managers of the
partnership and were hence solidarily liable by the express terms of
article 120 of the Code of Commerce.

But admitting that the appellant's view as to the joint and several
liability of Frisbie and Allen is correct and that judgment might
properly have been entered in the former case against Frisbie (who is
solvent) for the whole, it by no means follows that Salmon was
discharged by the failure of the plaintiff to prosecute that cause with
full effect against Frisbie. The fact that the lower court in that action
failed, even though erroneously, to give judgment against Frisbie for
the whole debt cannot be imputed to the plaintiff as an act of bad faith
towards Salmon. Neither can it be said that the plaintiff owed Salmon
the positive duty of bringing that case by appeal to this court, even
supposing that success might have crowned the effort, which is
doubtful. Rather it might be said to have been the duty of Salmon to
prosecute an appeal for his own protection, if he deemed it of
importance in that action, to fix primary liability for the whole debt
upon Frisbie.

One apparent anomaly in this case there undoubtedly is, which

consists in the fact that two actions have been successfully
maintained against Salmon upon a single obligation; but this is due to
the circumstance that Salmon guaranteed a liability which has turned
out to consist of the separable obligations of two persons and
Salmon, relving upon the subsidiary character of his own
undertaking, had insisted upon the exhaustion of legal remedies
against each of his principals. But his own election he has, therefore,
made it impossible for his own liability to be settled in a single
lawsuit.

Our conclusion, upon a careful examination of all aspects of the case,

is that no error was committed in the judgment which is the subject of
appeal, and the same will be affirmed. So ordered, with costs against
the appellant.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24843             October 30, 1925

CECILIO AYO, petitioner,
vs.
Honorable TOMAS FLORDELIZA, Judge of First Instance of Sorsogon,
JUSTO DELLOSA, JULIAN LACRE and VICENTE
DICHOSO, respondents.

Pacifico F. Lim and Agustin Frivaldo for petitioner.

The respondent judge in his own behalf.
Francisco Arellano for the respondent Dellosa.
No appearance for the other respondents.

STREET, J.:

This is an application for the writ of mandamus by which the

petitioner, Cecilio Ayo, seeks to compel the respondent Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon to reinstate an election protest
which said respondent had dismissed and to compel the same judge
to issue a subpoena duces tecum to the municipal secretary of
Bacon, Sorsogon, to produce in court the return of the municipal
council as a board of canvassers showing the number of votes
received by the several candidates for the office of president of the
municipality of Bacon at the last general election. The cause is now
before us upon the demurrers of the respondents.

It appears that the petitioner was a defeated candidate for the office of
the municipal president of Bacon, Sorsogon, at the last election, the
successful candidate being one Justo Dellosa. In due time thereafter
the present petitioner instituted a contest over the office and made
the said Dellosa, with two other defeated candidates, parties to the
proceeding. In his motion of protest the petitioner asked for a recount
of the votes in the fifth precinct. The successful candidate, Justo
Dellosa, met the protest with the counter-protest, in which he asked
for the recount of the votes in precincts Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 6. One of the
unsuccessful candidates, Vicente Dichoso, also came back with a
counter-protest, in which he asked for a recount of the votes cast in
all six of the election precincts of the municipality. In due course the
recount was begun, but after the votes cast in the first precinct had
been recounted by the commissioners, Dichoso, apparently finding
no encouragement in the results, made a motion to withdraw effect of
placing the votes of the third precinct out of the litigation; and in
order to bring the votes to this precinct. back into the controversy the
petitioner asked for leave to amend and to make the proper changes
that would justify a recount of the votes of this precinct. This motion
of the petitioner was denied by the court as having been presented
out of time. The recount of the votes of the five precincts was
continued, however, and concluded. The matter of the contest then
came before the respondent judge for decision, but as the returns
from only five of the precincts were before the court, and no evidence
whatever to show the returns from the third precinct, his Honor, on
August 1, 1925, dismissed the protest, with costs against the
petitioner.

It is insisted for the petitioner that this action on the part of the
respondent judge was unlawful, inasmuch as the law requires the
judge in charge of a protest proceeding to make a finding as to who
was elected, or whether no person was elected. It is true that the law
so provides but the law contemplates that the proof upon which a
lawful decision can be made shall be placed by the contending parties
before the court; and in a case where a cause is submitted without
sufficient proof to enable the court to determine the protest, it is not
improper, indeed it is necessary, merely to dismiss the
contest. 1awph!l.net

The principal contention presented in this petition arises over the

responsibility for the situation which arose in the manner above
stated; and the petitioner seeks to put the blame on the court for not
having before it the return of the board of canvassers, which would
have shown the result of the election in the uncontested precinct. In
this connection it appears that in his original motion the petitioner
asked the court to issue a subpoena duces tecum against the
municipal secretary of Bacon, who is supposed to be the proper
custodian of the report of the canvassing board. In acting upon the
petition his Honor made a proper order upon the municipal treasurer
to produce the boxes, lists of registered voters, and other papers and
documents used in the general election, to the end that the contest
could be proceeded with. His honor, however, either by oversight of
believing that all of the necessary documents and papers would be
produced by the treasurer, failed to make an order upon the municipal
secretary to produce the return of the board of canvassers. It does
not appear that the attention of his Honor was especially called to the
request for a subpoena duces tecum to the municipal secretary, and
the non-production of the evidence concerning the returns as to the
third precinct was not noted until the cause was submitted.
In behalf of the respondents it is pointed out that it was the duty of
the petitioner to produce the necessary evidence upon which a proper
judgment could be made, and in particular it is insisted that the duty
of issuing the subpoena duces tecum is a ministerial duty of the clerk
of court, not requiring a special order of the court. This suggestion
given is, we think, satisfactory; and in our opinion no one is
chargeable with the oversight except the petitioner himself.

The petition is therefore, in our opinion, not well founded; and the
demurrers to the petition will be sustained and the petition declared
insufficient. It furthermore appearing that the petition suffers from a
defect not curable by amendment, an order absolute will be entered,
dismissing the same, with costs against the petitioner.

Avanceña, C. J., Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez, and

Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 241353

DANILO ROMERO, VICTORIO ROMERO AND EL ROMERO,

REPRESENTING THEIR DECEASED FATHER LUTERO ROMERO,
PETITIONERS, VS. CRISPINA SOMBRINO, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CAGUIOA, J:

Security of tenure may be invoked only by tenants de jure and not by those

who are not true and lawful tenants but became so only through the acts of
a supposed landholder who had no right to the landholdings. Tenancy
relation can only be created with the consent of the landholder who is either
the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the land.1

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 (Petition) under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the heirs of Lutero Romero
(Lutero), i.e., petitioners Danilo Romero, Victorio Romero, and El Romero
(petitioners Heirs of Lutero), against respondent Crispina Sombrino
(respondent Sombrino), assailing the Decision3 dated January 22, 2018
(assailed Decision) and the Resolution4 dated June 8, 2018 (assailed
Resolution) rendered by the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN.
The Essential Facts and Antecedent Proceedings

As culled from the records of the instant case, the essential facts and
antecedent proceedings are as follows:

The instant Petition centers on a two-hectare portion of Lot No. 23, Pls-35
located at Marauding Annex, Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte (subject
property), with an aggregate area of 12.0717 hectares, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-2261, which is registered in the name of Lutero
after the latter's homestead application was approved in 1967.5

The final and executory Decision of the Court, Third Division in Teodora
Saltiga de Romero, et al. v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 1093076

Prior to the present controversy, the subject property was subject of a legal
dispute involving Lutero and his siblings, the heirs of the late spouses
Eugenio Romero (Eugenio) and Teodora Saltiga (Teodora) (collectively
referred to as the Sps. Romero). The Sps. Romero begot nine children, i.e.,
Lutero, Eutiquio, Ricardo, Generosa, Diosdada, Mindalina, Lucita,
Presentacion and Gloriosa. The issue regarding the ownership and
possession of the subject property was dealt with in two civil cases tried
jointly before the Regional Trial Court of Lanao Del Norte, Branch 7 (RTC):

1. Civil Case No. 591, entitled Teodora Saltiga de Romero, et al. v.

Lutero Romero, et al. - for Reconveyance with Damages and
Cancellation of Registration of Mortgage

2. Civil Case No. 1056, entitled Lutero Romero, et al. v. Spouses

Meliton Pacas, et al. - for Annulment of three Affidavits of Sales,
Recovery of Possession with Damages

In sum, it was alleged by the petitioners in Civil Case No. 591, i.e.,

Teodora, Presentacion, Lucita, Gloriosa, and Mindalina, that Lutero merely
held the subject property in trust for the benefit of the heirs of his father
Eugenio since the latter was actually the one who first applied for the
homestead, but such application was denied because Eugenio was already
disqualified to apply for a homestead, having previously applied for a
homestead over another parcel of land with the maximum limit of 24
hectares. Moreover, it was alleged that Lutero employed fraud in procuring
the homestead patent covering the subject property.7
In addition, the petitioners in Civil Case No. 591 also claimed that Lutero
subsequently sold the subject property by allegedly executing three
affidavits of sale in favor of the respondents in Civil Case No. 1056, i.e.,
spouses Lucita and Meliton Pacas, spouses Presentacion and Sabdullah
Mama, and spouses Gloriosa and Dionisio Rasonable. Hence, it was
alleged that Lutero no longer has any claim over the subject property
pursuant to these affidavits of sale.8

The RTC rendered a Decision dated March 11, 1991 in favor of Lutero,
declaring the three affidavits of sale null and void and ordering the
respondents in Civil Case No. 1056 to surrender possession of the subject
property to Lutero. On appeal, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC.9

The consolidated cases were then resolved with finality by the Court
in Teodora Saltiga de Romero, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al.10 (De
Romero v. CA). In the said case, the Court held that Lutero is the true and
lawful landowner of the subject property, having exclusively acquired the
subject property after successfully applying for a homestead patent over
the land in 1967. Lutero's exclusive ownership over the subject property
was even recognized by some of Lutero's sisters, i.e., Gloriosa,
Presentacion, and Lucita.11

The Decision in De Romero v. CA likewise found that the family patriarch,
Eugenio, never owned the subject property. Eugenio himself tried to apply
for a homestead patent over the subject property, but this was denied
"because he was disqualified by virtue of the fact that he already had
applied for the maximum limit of 24 hectares to which he was entitled
[pertaining to land located on the adjacent lot; and the] land in question
could not therefore have passed on from him to his children."12

Furthermore, the said Decision held that the supposed sale of the subject
property by Lutero in favor of the respondents in Civil Case No. 1056 was
null and void for being violative of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No.
141,13 which prohibited the alienation of a homestead within five years
from the issuance of the patent.14

After the Court's Decision in De Romero v. CA became final and executory,
the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution before the RTC on March 10, 2003. On June 16, 2003, the RTC
issued a Writ of Execution.15
However, the implementation of the Writ of Execution was held in
abeyance because respondent Sombrino filed a Motion for Intervention,
alleging that she was a tenant of the subject property. The RTC allowed the
intervention and granted respondent Sombrino the opportunity to present
evidence to show good cause why the Writ of Execution should not be
implemented against her.16

After due hearing and deliberation, the RTC ordered the implementation of
the Writ of Execution, as shown by the Sheriffs Report. Subsequently, a
Writ of Demolition was issued by the RTC on March 29, 2005. On April 5,
2005, respondent Sombrino was ousted from the subject property.17

Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of Possession before the

Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

Because respondent Sombrino failed to successfully assert her right to

possess the subject property before the RTC, she sought recourse before
the Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD)
of Iligan City by filing a Complaint for Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of
Possession (PARAD Complaint) against the petitioners Heirs of Lutero.
The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. X-543-LN-2005.

In the PARAD Complaint, respondent Sombrino alleged that she was the
actual tenant-cultivator of the subject property as she and her late husband
Valeriano were installed as tenants over the subject property in 1952 by the
alleged original owners of the subject property, the Sps. Romero, until the
said spouses were succeeded by Lucita and her heirs as
landowners.18 Hence, respondent Sombrino asked that her security of
tenure as tenant of the subject property be upheld and that she be allowed
to peacefully possess and cultivate the subject property.

The Ruling of the PARAD

In the Decision19 dated October 28, 2005, the PARAD rule4 in favor of

respondent Sombrino and declared her to be a de jure tenant of the subject
property. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby

rendered as follows[:]
 1. Declaring complainant Crispina Sombrino to be a de
jure tenant and ordering her reinstatement to the subject
landholding[;]

2. Ordering herein respondents and/or any person in

occupation/possession of the subject landholding to vacate and turn-
over its possession to the complainant;

3. Directing the MARO, DAR of Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte

to execute an agricultural leasehold contract between the herein
parties pursuant to DAR A.O. No. 5, Series of 1993[;]

4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis.

SO ORDERED.20

The PARAD held that respondent Sombrino was able to establish that she
was installed as tenant by the Sps. Romero in 1952. According to the
PARAD, "[w]hile indeed, there [was] no tenancy relations that [existed]
between [respondent Sombrino] and [the petitioners Heirs of Lutero] as
there were no shares received by [the latter,] x x x it is as if [Lutero]
succeeded the ownership of the subject land from Spouses Eugenio and
Teodora Romero[; thus, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero] who inherited the
property [were] bound to [assume] and respect the tenancy rights of
[respondent Sombrino]."21 Hence, the PARAD held that "[o]nce such
relationship is established, the tenant shall be entitled to security of
tenure."22

The petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which

was denied by the PARAD in the Order dated January 12, 2006. Feeling
aggrieved, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero appealed before the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The appeal was
docketed as DARAB Case No. 14261.

The Ruling of the DARAB

In the Decision23 dated June 28, 2010, the DARAB denied the appeal for
lack of merit. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal
is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision dated 28 October 2005 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.24

The DARAB held that through the final and executory judgment in Civil
Case Nos. 591 and 1056, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero were vested
ownership over the subject property.25 However, since Section 10 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 384426 states that the agricultural leasehold relation
shall not be extinguished by mere sale, alienation, or transfer of the
leaseholding and that the transferee shall be subrogated to the rights and
substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor; the agricultural
leasehold relation instituted between the Sps. Romero and respondent
Sombrino "is preserved even in case of transfer of the legal possession of
the subject property."27

The petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for Reconsideration on

September 1, 2010,28 which was denied by the DARAB in the
Resolution29 dated February 26, 2016.

Hence, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Petition for Review30 under

Rule 43 of the Rules of Court before the CA. The appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN.

The Ruling of the CA

In the assailed Decision, the CA denied the appeal for lack of merit. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, Petition for Review

is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 28,
2010 and Resolution dated February 26, 2016 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.31

According to the CA, respondent Sombrino sufficiently established by

substantial evidence the essential elements of tenancy:
Indeed, respondent sufficiently established by substantial evidence the
essential elements of tenancy. The late Spouses Eugenio and Teodora
Romero are the landowners; respondent, together with her late husband, is
their tenant. The subject matter of their relationship is agricultural land, a
farm land. They mutually agreed to the cultivation of the land by respondent
and share in the harvest. The purpose of their relationship is clearly to bring
about agricultural production. After the harvest, respondent pays rental as
well as the irrigation fees. Lastly, respondent's personal cultivation of the
land was conceded by Lucita Romero Pacas, [who] succeeded her parents
the Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero, thru a leasehold agreement
which became the contract between the parties.32

Thus, the CA held that the petitioners Heirs of Lutero are bound to respect
the leasehold relationship between the Sps. Romero and respondent
Sombrino:

Given the foregoing, the petitioners are bound to respect the leasehold
relationship between the late Spouses Eugenio and Teodora Romero and
respondent notwithstanding the transfer of legal possession of the subject
agricultural land. Accordingly, respondent cannot be dispossessed of her
possession and cultivation of the subject agricultural land without any valid
and just cause. Security of tenure is a legal concession to agricultural
lessees which they value as life itself and deprivation of their land holdings
is tantamount to deprivation of their only means of livelihood. Perforce, the
termination of the leasehold relationship can take place only for causes
provided by law x x x as specified in Sections 8, 28 and 36 of R.A. No.
3844. A perusal of these provisions will show that no such valid cause
exists in the present case warranting the termination of the leasehold
relationship. Hence, the rights of respondent as tenant should be
respected.33

Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners Heirs of Lutero filed a Motion for

Reconsideration34 dated February 7, 2018, which was denied by the CA in
the assailed Resolution.

Hence, the instant Petition before the Court.

On January 14, 2019, respondent Sombrino filed her Comment35 dated

December 14, 2018 to the instant Petition wherein she asserted that she
was able to duly establish her tenancy with respect to the subject
property.36 Despite the Court's Resolution37 dated March 13, 2019
requiring the petitioners Heirs of Lutero to file their Reply, the latter failed to
do so.

Issue

Stripped to its core, the critical issue is whether there exists an agricultural
leasehold tenancy relationship between the petitioners Heirs of Lutero and
respondent Sombrino. Otherwise stated, is respondent Sombrino a
tenant de jure that enjoys security of tenure as guaranteed by tenancy
laws?

The Court's Ruling

The instant Petition is meritorious. Respondent Sombrino is not a tenant de

jure and does not enjoy the security of tenure accorded to agricultural
tenants. There is no tenancy relationship between the petitioners Heirs of
Lutero and respondent Sombrino.

Propriety of a Factual Review

Preliminarily, the Court is aware that the determination of whether a person

is an agricultural tenant is basically a question of fact.38 As a general rule,
questions of fact are not proper subjects of appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court as this mode of appeal is confined to questions of
law.39

Nevertheless, the foregoing general rule admits of several exceptions such

as when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations,
surmises and conjectures; when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken; and when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts.40

The Court finds that the aforesaid exceptions to the general rule apply in
the instant case. Therefore, the Court shall proceed to rule on the main
issue.

Agricultural Leasehold Tenancy

According to RA. 1199, as amended, otherwise known as the Agricultural

Tenancy Act of the Philippines, an agricultural leasehold tenancy exists
"when a person who, either personally or with the aid of labor available
[from] members of his immediate farm household, undertakes to cultivate a
piece of agricultural land susceptible of cultivation by a single person
together with members of his immediate farm household, belonging to or
legally possessed by, another in consideration of a fixed amount in money
or in produce or in both."41

The existence of a tenancy relation is not presumed. According to

established jurisprudence, the following indispensable elements must be
proven in order for a tenancy agreement to arise:

1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee;

2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land;

3) there is consent between the parties to the relationship;

4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural

production;

5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural

lessee; and

6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or

agricultural lessee.

The absence of any of the requisites does not make an occupant,

cultivator, or a planter a de jure tenant which entitles him to security of
tenure under existing tenancy laws.42

However, if all the aforesaid requisites are present and an agricultural

leasehold relation is established, the same shall confer upon the
agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until
such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected
therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.43 In
case of death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessor, the
leasehold shall bind the legal heirs.44

To recall, in the instant case, the PARAD, as concurred by the DARAB and
the CA, found that an agricultural leasehold tenancy relation exists between
respondent Sombrino and the petitioners Heirs of Lutero because the
supposed original landowners of the subject property, i.e., the Sps.
Romero, allegedly entered into a tenancy agreement with respondent
Sombrino in 1952. And because the leasehold relation subsists and binds
the legal heirs of the agricultural lessors even upon the latter's death,
Lutero and, subsequently, his heirs are bound by this leasehold relation.

Respondent Sombrino failed to provide substantial evidence on the

existence of an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between herself
and the Sps. Romero

The Court finds that respondent Sombrino failed to provide sufficient

evidence that there was, in the first place, an agricultural leasehold tenancy
agreement entered into by herself and the alleged landowners, the Sps.
Romero.

Tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. An assertion that one is a

tenant does not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Nor does the
sheer fact of working on another's landholding raise a presumption of the
existence of agricultural tenancy. One who claims to be a tenant has
the onus to prove the affirmative allegation of tenancy.45 Hence,
substantial evidence is needed to establish that the landowner and tenant
came to an agreement in entering into a tenancy relationship.

Considering the foregoing, jurisprudence has held that self-serving

statements regarding supposed tenancy relations are not enough to
establish the existence of a tenancy agreement.46 Moreover, certifications
issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a
tenant are merely provisional, not conclusive on the courts, and have little
evidentiary value without any corroborating evidence.47 There should be
independent evidence establishing the consent of the landowner to the
relationship.48

In the instant case, the pieces of documentary evidence presented by

respondent Sombrino do not provide proof that the latter and the Sps.
Romero came into an agreement as to the establishment of an agricultural
leasehold tenancy relationship.

As explained by the DARAB, "[t]o prove her claim, [respondent Sombrino

submitted] the Joint Affidavit of Sarillo Bacalso and Neil Ocopio, whom she
allegedly hired in several occasions as planters, mud boat operators and
thresher operators[.]"49

Such evidence severely fails to establish the existence of a tenancy

agreement. At most, the aforementioned Joint Affidavit merely establishes
that respondent Sombrino occupied and cultivated the subject property at
some point in time.

In Heirs of Florentino Quilo v. Development Bank of the Philippines-

Dagupan Branch, et al.,50 the Court held that an affidavit of the same
nature as the said Joint Affidavit fails to prove consent of the landowner. In
the said case, the Court explained that such document in no way confirms
that the alleged tenant's presence on the land was based on a tenancy
relationship that the landowners had agreed to as "[m]ere occupation or
cultivation of an agricultural land does not automatically convert the tiller
into an agricultural tenant recognized under agrarian laws."51

In believing that respondent Sombrino was able to establish the existence

of a tenancy agreement with the Sps. Romero, the DARAB also gave
credence to "the Affidavit of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee
(BARC) Chairman."52

In Soliman, et al. v. Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc., et al.,53 the

Court held that the certifications issued by a BARC Chairman to the effect
that the alleged tenants were actually cultivating the agricultural land
deserve scant consideration in determining the existence of a tenancy
relationship. Citing the findings of the court a quo, the Court held therein
that "[o]bviously, the barangay captain x x x whose attestation appears on
the document-was not the proper authority to make such determination
[because even] certifications issued by administrative agencies and/or
officials concerning the presence or the absence of a tenancy relationship
are merely preliminary or provisional and are not binding on the courts."54

With respect to acknowledgment receipts presented by respondent

Sombrino showing the payment of irrigation fees and rentals to
Lucita,55 such pieces of documentary evidence fail to show that the Sps.
Romero installed respondent Sombrino as a tenant of the subject property.
The said receipts merely establish that, at most, respondent Sombrino
entered into an arrangement with Lucita and not with the Sps. Romero.
More doubt is engendered in the mind of the Court as to the existence of
the alleged agricultural tenancy agreement because of the undisputed fact
that "Eugenio Romero died sometime in 1948."56 To recall, at the heart of
respondent Sombrino's claim of tenancy is her allegation that Eugenio,
together with Teodora, installed her as tenant in 1952. Needless to say,
with the death of Eugenio in 1948, contrary to the contention of respondent
Sombrino, it was impossible for Eugenio to have instituted respondent
Sombrino as tenant of the subject property.

All in all, the Court finds that respondent Sombrino failed to discharge her
burden of proving that a tenancy relationship existed between her and the
Sps. Romero.

Assuming that it even existed, the supposed tenancy agreement was

invalid as it was not entered into with the true and lawful landowner of the
subject property

Even assuming arguendo that the Sps. Romero indeed entered into a

tenancy agreement with respondent Sombrino in 1952, such agreement
would not have created a valid tenancy relationship.

Tenancy relationship can only be created with the consent of the true and
lawful landowner who is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor
of the land. It cannot be created by the act of a supposed landowner, who
has no right to the land subject of the tenancy, much less by one who has
been dispossessed of the same by final judgment.57

The Court's ruling in Heirs of Teodoro Cadeliña v. Cadiz, et al.58 is on all

fours. In the said case, the respondents-farmers therein claimed that the
alleged landowner, Nicanor Ibuna, Sr. (Ibuna), validly installed them as
tenants. Analogous to the instant case, by virtue of a final and executory
judgment recognizing the ownership of the petitioners' predecessor-in--
interest, Teodoro Cadeliña (Teodoro), over the subject property therein as
the latter was a holder of a homestead patent, the respondents-farmers
were ousted from the land. As in the instant case, the respondents-farmers
filed complaints for reinstatement of possession of the land before the
DARAB.

In dismissing the respondents-farmers' claim of tenancy relationship, the

Court explained that a tenancy relationship could only be created with the
true and lawful landowner who was the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal
possessor of the land. Since Ibuna was not the true and lawful landowner,
he could not have validly installed the respondents-farmers as tenants of
the land. Further, the Court held therein that upholding Ibuna as the legal
possessor of the land was inconsistent with Teodoro's homestead, which
was already deemed valid in a final and executory judgment, since a
homestead applicant was required to occupy and cultivate the land for his
own and his family's benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else, viz.:

In this case, Ibuna's institution of respondents as tenants did not give rise
to a tenure relationship because Ibuna is not the lawful landowner, either in
the concept of an owner or a legal possessor, of the properties. It is
undisputed that prior to the filing of the complaint with the DARAB, the
transfers of the properties to Ibuna and his predecessor, Andres Castillo,
were declared void in separate and previous proceedings. Since the
transfers were void, it vested no rights whatsoever in favor of Ibuna, either
of ownership and possession. x x x

Notably, upholding Ibuna as the legal possessor of the properties is

inconsistent with petitioners' homestead since a homestead applicant is
required to occupy and cultivate the land for his own and his family's
benefit, and not for the benefit of someone else. x x x 59

In the instant case, to reiterate, it has already been decided in the Court's
final and executory Decision in De Romero v. CA that:

x x x Eugenio Romero was never the owner of the land in question

because all he bought from the Jaug spouses were the alleged rights and
interests, if there was any, to the said land which was then part of the
public domain. The Jaugs could not have sold said land to Eugenio as they
did not own it. Eugenio Romero was not granted, and could not have been
granted, a patent for said land because he was disqualified by virtue of the
fact that he already had applied for the maximum limit of 24 hectares to
which he was entitled. The land in question could not therefore have
passed on from him to his children.60

Moreover, De Romero v. CA definitely held that Lutero's homestead patent

over the subject property was validly acquired and he was the true and
lawful landholder of the subject property, viz.:

On the other hand, Lutero Romero applied for a homestead patent over the
land in question and his application was duly approved. The appellants
have not established that there was any fraud committed in this application.
In fact it appears that there was even a hearing conducted by the Bureau of
Lands on the application because a certain Potenciano Jaug had been
contesting the application. Under the presumption of law, that official duty
has been regularly performed, there appears to be no ground to question
the grant of the patent to Lutero Romero in 1967.

His sisters Gloriosa, Presentacion, and Lucita apparently recognized

Lutero's ownership of the property when in 1969 they sought the help of the
mayor of Kapatagan to convince Lutero to execute affidavits of sale in their
favor.61

In sum, with the finality of De Romero v. CA, it can no longer be disputed
that the Sps. Romero never became the owners of the subject property.
Neither did they become the lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of the
subject property. Hence, the Sps. Romero had no capacity whatsoever to
install respondent Sombrino as a leasehold tenant on the subject property.
Consequently, neither could the heirs of the Sps. Romero (aside from
Lutero) validly enter into any tenancy agreement over the subject property.

Given the foregoing, with the absence of the first essential requisite of an
agricultural tenancy relationship, i.e., that the parties to the agreement are
the true and lawful landholders and tenants, respondent Sombrino cannot
be considered a de jure tenant who is entitled to security of tenure under
existing tenancy laws. And corollarily, there being no agricultural tenancy
relationship existing in the instant case, the PARAD and DARAB acted
beyond their jurisdiction when they ordered the petitioners Heirs of Lutero,
among other things, to restore possession of the subject property to
respondent Sombrino.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision

dated January 22, 2018 and Resolution dated June 8, 2018 rendered by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07367-MIN are REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated October 28, 2005 rendered by the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board and the Decision dated
June 28, 2010 rendered by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Complaint for
Illegal Ejectment and Recovery of Possession in DARAB Case No. X-543-
LN-2005 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C. J., (Chairperson), J. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ.,

concur.

Footnotes

1 Cunanan v. Judge Aguilar, 174 Phil. 299, 313 (1978); citation

omitted.

2 Rollo, pp. 15-48.

3 Id. at 50-57. Penned by Associate Justice Oscar V. Badelles, with

Associate Justices Romulo V. Borja and Tita Marilyn Payoyo-
Villordon, concurring.

4 Id. at 60-61.

5 Id. at 51.

6 377 Phil. 189 (1999).

7 Id. at 197.

8 Id. at 201-202.

9 Id. at 196-199.

10 Supra note 6.

11 Id. at 198.

12 Id.

13 THE PUBLIC LAND ACT; Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No.

141 was repealed by Republic Act No. 11231 entitled "An Act
Removing the Restrictions Imposed on the Registration, Acquisition,
Encumbrance, Alienation, Transfer and Conveyance of Land Covered
by Free Patents Under Sections 118, 119 and 121 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, otherwise Known as 'The Public Land Act,' as
amended," (February 22, 2019).

14 De Romero v. CA, supra note 6 at 200-201.

15 Rollo, p. 65.

16 Id.

17 Id. at 52, 65.

18 Id. at 102.

19 Id. at 102-108. Penned by Provincial Adjudicator Noel P. Carreon.

20 Id. at 108; emphasis in the original.

21 Id. at 106-107.

22 Id. at 107.

23 Id. at 89-97. Penned by DARAB Member Arnold C. Arrieta, with

DARAB Chairman Nasser C. Pangandaman and DARAB Members
Ma. Patricia Rualo-Bello, Ambrosio B. De Luna, Gerundio C.
Madueno, Jim G. Coleta, and Isabel E. Florin, concurring.

24 Id. at 96.

25 Id. at 93-94.

26 AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM CODE.

27 Rollo, p. 94.

28 Id. at 22.

29 Id. at 99-101.

30 Id. at 62-86.

31 Id. at 57.
32 Id. at 55.

33 Id. at 56; citation omitted.

34 Id. at 109-121.

35 Id. at 141-149.

36 Id. at 146.

37 Id. at 154-155.

38 Heirs of Florentino Quilo v. Development Bank of the Philippines-

Dagupan Branch, et al., 720 Phil. 414, 422 (2013); citation omitted.

39 Goyena v. Ledesma-Gustilo, 443 Phil. 150, 158 (2003).

40 See Almelor v. The Hon. RTC of Las Piñas City, Br. 254, et al.,
585 Phil. 439 (2008).

41 RA 1199, Sec. 4, as amended by RA 2263.

42 Heirs of Teodoro Cadeliña v. Cadiz, et al., 800 Phil. 668, 677

(2016); citation omitted.

43 RA 3844, Sec. 7.

44 RA 3844, Sec. 9.

45 Soliman, et al. v. Pampanga Sugar Development Co., Inc., et al.,

607 Phil. 209, 224 (2009).

46 See id. at 226.

47 Reyes v. Heirs of Pablo Floro, 723 Phil. 755, 769 (2013).

48 Caluzor v. Llanillo, et al., 762 Phil. 353, 367 (2015).

49 Rollo, p. 90; citation omitted.

50 Supra note 38.
 51 Id. at 425; citation omitted.

52 Rollo, p. 90.

53 Supra note 45.

54 Id. at 226; italics in the original, citation omitted.

55 Rollo, pp. 103-104.

56 De Romero v. CA, supra note 6 at 194; underscoring supplied.

57 Cunanan v. Judge Aguilar, supra note 1 at 311; citation omitted,

underscoring supplied.

58 Supra note 42.

59 Id. at 678-679; citations omitted.

60 De Romero v. CA, supra note 6 at 198.

61 Id.; underscoring supplied.

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 237102, March 04, 2020 ]

CRC 1447, INC., PETITIONER, VS. ROSALINDA CALBATEA,

EDUARDO CALBATEA, RICARDO DULA, RICARDO DULA, JR., GUIDO
BALUYOT, FRANCISCO LIWANAG, ARIEL CORDOVA, JOVI
MANALANSAN, ROMEO ORTEGA, REYNALDO ALFONSO,
DOMINADOR CALING, REMEGIO GODINES, EFREN LAGTU, RODELIO
QUINTO, JONATHAN RAMOS, AND ANY AND/OR ALL PERSONS
CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER THEM, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

REYES, J. JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision2 dated June 16, 2017
and the Resolution3 dated January 31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV. No. 105421, which affirmed the Order4 dated January 19,
2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5 in
Civil Case No. DH-1341-14.

The Facts

Subject of this Petition is a portion of an estate originally owned by Liberty

Hizon Vda. De Luna (Hizon) and Eufemia Rivera (Rivera). Sometime in
1993, said estate was the subject of a Notice of Coverage pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
Hence, an application for conversion of said property from agricultural to
industrial was filed, which was granted per Decision of the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37386 dated February 9, 1999. Upon finality of said CA Decision,
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an order of conversion as
directed by the CA, subject to the condition, among others, that the
development of the area shall be completed within five years from the
issuance of said order.5

In 2004, Rivera filed a petition before the DAR, which sought for an
extension to comply with the condition of developing the property.6

In the meantime, the subject property was purchased by CRC 1447, Inc.
(petitioner) sometime in 2006, and thereafter registered under its name as
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-260935 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bataan.7

On October 24, 2007, the DAR issued an Order denying Rivera's petition
for extension and instead, directing the issuance of a Notice of Coverage
over the entire estate which includes the subject property. Thus, petitioner
received a Notice of Coverage8 dated December 11, 2008.

Petitioner then filed a petition to lift said Notice of Coverage before the
DAR. While this was pending, petitioner sent demand letters to
respondents for them to vacate the subject property. Unfortunately for
petitioner, the petition was denied by the DAR in an Order9 dated February
8, 2013. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said Order was likewise
denied in an Order10 dated September 10, 2013.

On February 26, 2014, petitioner filed a Complaint11 for Recovery of

Possession before the RTC against herein respondents, who claimed to be
actual occupants and potential agrarian reform beneficiaries of the subject
landholding.

In their Answer,12 respondents sought the dismissal of said petition on the

ground of lack of jurisdiction, or referral of the same to the DAR for
determination and certification that the issue involves an agrarian dispute
or matter pursuant to the Supreme Court Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) Circular No. 62-2010,13 as the subject matter of the case involves
an agrarian dispute. Respondents posited that since they are actual
occupants and potential agrarian reform beneficiaries and the subject
property is an agricultural land placed under CARP coverage by virtue of
the DAR Notice of Coverage, and considering also the denial of petitioner's
petition to lift said Notice of Coverage, the issue as to who has the right to
possess and/or use the subject property is within the competence of the
DARAB.

In its Reply,14 petitioner argued, among others, that the case does not
involve an agrarian dispute and that the Notice of Coverage over the
subject property was patently illegal. Hence, petitioner insisted on the
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

The RTC Ruling

Considering that the subject property is the subject of a DAR Notice of

Coverage, and that petitioner alleged in its Reply the issue on the validity of
the Notice of Coverage over the subject property, the RTC held that the
case involves an agrarian dispute. According to the RTC, "the
determination of whether or not the Notice of Coverage was illegally issued
remains within the exclusive and primary jurisdiction of the DAR and still
falls within the definition of 'agrarian dispute'." As such, the RTC ruled for
the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this case is hereby

ordered DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.

Consequently, the Clerk of Court of the Office of the Clerk of Court is

hereby ordered to refund the excess deposit in the Sheriff's Trust Fund to
its payor upon submission of pertinent documents.

SO ORDERED.15
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied
by the RTC in its Order dated June 11, 2015:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed

by [petitioner] is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of this Court
dated January 19, 2015 dismissing the instant case still stands.

SO ORDERED.16

The CA Ruling

The CA sustained the RTC's conclusion that the case involves an agrarian
dispute. The CA ruled that since the case is "an offshoot of the Notice of
Coverage issued by the DAR," and "considering that the property in
question became the subject of conversion and was reverted to being an
agricultural land by the DAR," the case falls squarely under the matters
relating to the implementation of the CARP. Citing OCA Circular No. 62-
2010, the CA upheld the dismissal of the case for want of jurisdiction. It
disposed, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is Denied.

The January 19, 2015 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan,
Bataan, Branch 5 in Civil Case No. DH-1341-14 is hereby AFFIRMED for
the reason that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) which has
primary jurisdiction to adjudicate the controversy.

SO ORDERED.17

Undaunted, petitioner now seeks refuge before this Court, maintaining its
position that the RTC, not the DAR, has jurisdiction over the case for
recovery of possession. Petitioner argues that the issuance of the Notice of
Coverage is merely a preliminary step for the State's acquisition of the land
for agrarian reform purposes and it does not automatically vest title or
transfer the ownership thereof to the government. In fine, petitioner
contends that a Notice of Coverage does not ipso facto render the land
subject thereof a land reform area. Petitioner also maintains that while
respondents may have been actual occupants, which may make them
potential CARP beneficiaries, this does not give rise to tenancy relationship
for the DAR, through its Adjudication Board (DARAB), to acquire
jurisdiction over the case.
The Issue

Ultimately, the only issue for our resolution is whether the courts a
quo correctly dismissed the case for recovery of possession on the ground
of lack of jurisdiction.

The Court's Ruling

It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an
action is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the
complaint.18 Further, jurisdiction should be determined by considering not
only the status or the relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the
issues or questions that is the subject of the controversy.19 Specifically in
this case, if the issues between the parties are intertwined with the
resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such
dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.20

The jurisdiction of the DAR is laid down in Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as
amended by R.A. No. 9700,21 viz.:

SEC. 18. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby

further amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested

with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
DENR."

xxxx

SEC. 19. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, as amended, is hereby

further amended by adding Section 50-A to read as follows:

"SEC. 50-A. Exclusive Jurisdiction on Agrarian Dispute. - No court or

prosecutor's office shall take cognizance of cases pertaining to the
implementation of the CARP except those provided under Section 57 of
Republic Act No. 6657, as amended. If there is an allegation from any of
the parties that the case is agrarian in nature and one of the parties is a
farmer, farmworker, or tenant, the case shall be automatically referred by
the judge or the prosecutor to the DAR which shall determine and certify
within fifteen (15) days from referral whether an agrarian dispute exists:
Provided, That from the determination of the DAR, an aggrieved party shall
have judicial recourse. In cases referred by the municipal trial court and the
prosecutor's office, the appeal shall be with the proper regional trial court,
and in cases referred by the regional trial court, the appeal shall be to the
Court of Appeals." (Emphases supplied)

Under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A,22 the DARAB was created,

which was designated to assume the powers and functions of the DAR with
respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases, and matters relating to
the implementation of the CARP and other agrarian laws.23 Corollary,
under Section 1, Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the
DARAB's jurisdiction is not limited to agrarian disputes where tenancy or
leasehold agreement between the parties exists. Specifically, Section 1(a)
of said Rule provides that its primary and exclusive original and appellate
jurisdiction includes, among others, cases involving "[t]he rights and
obligations of persons engaged in the management, cultivation, and use of
all agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the
[CARL], as amended, and other related agrarian laws."

DAR Administrative Order No. 03-1124 also finds relevance in this case,

wherein it was declared that the DAR shall have exclusive jurisdiction on all
cases that are agrarian in nature pursuant to the landmark case
of Department of Agrarian Reform v. Cuenca,25 wherein the Court ruled
that "[a]ll doubts, [with regard to jurisdiction on agrarian reform matters],
should be resolved in favor of the DAR since the law has granted it special
and original authority to hear and adjudicate agrarian matters." Said
Administrative Order also cited the OCA Circular No. 62-2010, which
directs all courts and judges concerned to "refer all cases before it alleged
to involve an agrarian dispute to the DAR."

In this case, the averments in the Complaint seemingly make out a case for
recovery of property, which is clearly within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Said Complaint, however, failed to mention that the subject property
is an agricultural land, placed under the coverage of the CARP as stated in
the Notice of Coverage. The Court has previously explained that "[a] notice
of coverage is a document that aims to inform the landowner that his land
has been determined by the DAR, on the basis of the latter's preliminary
identification, to be under the coverage of the [CARP]."26 Further, the fact
that respondents are the actual occupants and potential agrarian reform
beneficiaries of the subject agricultural landholding cannot be disregarded.
Moreover, the denial of petitioner's petition to lift the Notice of Coverage
before the DAR is likewise revealing. Notably, the Order27 of the DAR in
said petition gave weight to the reports and recommendations of the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Hermosa, Bataan and the Legal
Division of DAR Bataan Provincial Office, to which the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Officer concurred with, which were all one in concluding that the
Notice of Coverage should be upheld.28 Considering all these
circumstances, it cannot, therefore, be denied that the subject property is
within the land reform area. As such, the issue on the possession or use
thereof is well-within the jurisdiction and competency of the DARAB.

Petitioner's narrow and restrictive understanding of the concept of agrarian

matters within the jurisdiction of the DARAB cannot be sustained.  To 1âшphi1

reiterate, the DARAB's jurisdiction is not limited to agrarian disputes where

tenancy and leasehold agreement issues between the parties are raised.
Also, there is nothing under Section 1(a), Rule II of the 2009 DARAB Rules
of Procedure which limits the jurisdiction of the DARAB only to agricultural
lands under the administration and disposition of the DAR and the Land
Bank of the Philippines.29 As above-stated, all cases involving agrarian
matters, which include issues on the management, cultivation, or use of all
agricultural lands covered by the CARL, are within the jurisdiction of the
DARAB. In Sarne v. Maquiling,30 the Court explained that under Section
431 of R.A. No. 6657, agricultural lands under the coverage of the CARP
include all private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture.

A notice of coverage, therefore, is not necessary in order for the DARAB to

have jurisdiction over a case that involves "[t]he rights and obligations of
persons, whether natural or juridical, engaged in the management,
cultivation, or use of an agricultural land covered by R.A. No. 6657."32

Furthermore, while it is true that the issuance of the Notice of Coverage is

merely a preliminary step in land acquisition for agrarian reform purposes
and issuance of the same does not vest title upon the State, it does not
take the fact that the DAR has already determined through its preliminary
identification that the land subject thereof is under the coverage of the
CARP. In all, it is inaccurate to argue that the case simply involves an
ordinary recovery of possession controversy. The subject of petitioner's
Complaint undoubtedly involves the use of an agricultural land, which is the
subject of the implementation of the CARP. Verily, the RTC and the CA
correctly found that the case falls squarely within the jurisdictional ambit of
the DARAB.33

In these lights, the Court finds the RTC's dismissal of the petition a quo, as
affirmed by the CA, in order.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED.

Accordingly, the Decision dated June 16, 2017 and the Resolution dated
January 31, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 105421,
which affirmed the Order dated January 19, 2015 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan, Branch 5 in Civil Case No. DH-1341-14
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), on official business.

Caguioa, (Acting Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, and Lopez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 8-24.

2 Penned by Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a Member of the

Court), with Associate Justices Ramon R. Garcia and Leoncia R.
Dimagiba, concurring; id. at 25-33.

3 Id. at 34-35.

4 Penned by Acting Presiding Judge Amelita Cruz Corpuz, id. at 57-

62.

5 Id. at 11.

6 Id. at 12.

7 Id. at 11-12.
8 Id. at 43-44.

9 Records, pp. 93-99.

10 Id. at 50-51.

11 Id. at 2-4.

12 Rollo, pp. 46-49.

13 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTIONS 7 AND 50-A OF R.A. NO.

6657, ALSO KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS RESPECTIVELY AMENDED BY
SECTIONS 5 AND 119 OF R.A. NO. 9700 (AN ACT
STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF ALL AGRICULTURAL LANDS, INSTITUTING
NECESSARY REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE
CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM LAW OF 1988, AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR, April 28, 2010.

14 Records, pp. 54-56.

15 Rollo, p. 62.

16 Id. at 64.

17 Id. at 32.

18 Union Bank of The Philippines v. The Hon. Regional Agrarian

Reform Officer, 806 Phil. 545, 561 (2017).

19 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Robles, 775 Phil. 133, 146

(2015), citing Heirs of Julian dela Cruz v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz, 512
Phil. 389, 401 (2005).

20 Department of Agrarian Reform v. Robles, id.

21 AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN
REFORM PROGRAM (CARP), EXTENDING THE ACQUISITION
AND DISTRIBUTION OF ALL LANDS, INSTITUTING NECESSARY
REFORMS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW OF 1988,
AS AMENDED, AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR,
approved on August 7, 2009.

22 MODIFYING ORDER NO. 129 REORGANIZING AND

STRENGTHENING THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, approved on July 26, 1987.

23 Chailese Development Company, Inc. v. Dizon, G.R. No. 206788,

February 14, 2018, 855 SCRA 377, 388.

24 REVISED RULES AND REGULATIONS IMPLEMENTING

SECTION 19 OF R.A. NO. 9700 (JURISDICTION ON AND
REFERRAL OF CASES THAT ARE AGRARIAN IN NATURE),
effective July 23, 2011.

25 482 Phil. 208, 211 (2004).

26 Robustum Agricultural Corporation v. Department of Agrarian

Reform, G.R. No. 221484, November 19, 2018.

27 Records pp. 93-99.

28 Id. at 96.

29 Id.

30 431 Phil. 675 (2002).

31 Sec. 4. Scope. — The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of

1989 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity
produced, all public and private agricultural lands, as provided in
Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other
lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.
 More specifically the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public

domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No
reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural
lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act
until Congress, taking into account ecological,
developmental and equity considerations, shall have
determined by law, the specific limits of the public
domain.

(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific

limits as determined by Congress in the preceding
paragraph;

(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to

or suitable for agriculture; and

(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture

regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can
be raised thereon.

32 See Department of Agrarian Reform v. Robles, supra note 19, at

149.

33 See Cubero v. Laguna West Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., 538

Phil. 899, 908 (2006).

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