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Article in Nursing standard (Royal College of Nursing (Great Britain): 1987). Special supplement · December 2014
DOI: 10.7748/ns.29.15.37.e9520
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The synthesis of art and science is lived by the nurse in the nursing act
Josephine G Paterson
new destination (Gluyas and Morrison 2013). process relies on pattern matching (‘this is the same
However, these cognitive skills come with the as that’) or frequency gambling (unconsciously
drawback that humans have limited cognitive choosing the most frequent schema in similar
processing capabilities, and are prone to slips, circumstances). Rule-based mistakes happen when
lapses and mistakes, especially in circumstances a situation has been assessed incorrectly or the
where individuals are stressed, have a heavy wrong schema is retrieved (Dekker 2011).
workload or are undertaking unfamiliar tasks Mistakes may also occur during
(Reynard et al 2009). knowledge-based actions if the action is based
Rasmussen and Jensen (1974) proposed that the on inadequate knowledge to allow successful
way humans function at a cognitive level changes completion of the task (Woods et al 2010).
according to the actions being undertaken. When faced with an unfamiliar task, as with
They proposed three different types of cognitive rule-based actions, the memory is searched for
performance based on the degree to which actions schemata that will provide information to enable
or problem solving are directed by the conscious the task to be undertaken correctly. Lack of
or automatic functions of the mind. The three previous experience in undertaking the task, or a
types of performances are (Parker and Lawton similar task, means the individual does not have
2006, Dekker 2011, Carayon 2012, Endsley a store of appropriate schemata from which to
and Jones 2012): choose, potentially resulting in the task being
Skill-based, which is automatic, requires limited undertaken incorrectly (Dekker 2006).
attention, is fast and effortless. Slips, lapses and mistakes are all more likely
Rule-based, which requires a combination of to happen if a person is stressed or distracted
automatic and conscious attention, relying by a demanding workload or busy environment
on training or experience to make choices (Gluyas and Morrison 2013). This complex
about actions. interaction between cognitive processing and
Knowledge-based, which relies on conscious organisational or system factors leading to errors
attention directed to new or novel situations, has been described by Reason (2004) as active
and requires cognitive effort. failure influenced by latent factors. The actual
Skill-based performance is liable to slip-and-lapse error at the point of care is termed the active
types of error, for example forgetting to do failure, and the many contributory organisational
something, doing something incorrectly or leaving or system factors are the latent factors. Before
a step out of a process. Such errors are more likely discussing these factors in relation to medication
to happen when the individual is interrupted or errors, an Australian coroner’s report, conducted
distracted by competing priorities (Reason 2004). following the death of a nursing home resident,
Slips and lapses may also be related to the will be used to highlight the causes of a medication
misidentification of objects (Reason 2008). error that occurred before the resident’s death.
Humans have limited cognitive resources in terms
of the amount of information that can be processed
at any one time. When undertaking routine tasks The inquest
automatically, humans unconsciously filter the In March 2013, a coronial inquest was held
information that the brain receives at the conscious into the death of a nursing home resident in
level and fill in the gaps in the cognitive processing Australia. The coroner found that the cause of
of the mental picture that is formed to guide the death was related to underlying disease and that
action being undertaken (Endsley and Jones 2012). no person contributed to his death. However,
What can happen during such automatic routine in the course of the inquest it was established that
activity, therefore, is that humans see what they a medication error had occurred in the hours
expect to see (Endsley and Jones 2012). Applying preceding the resident’s death, involving the
the above to the occurrence of medication errors, subcutaneous administration of 25mg of morphine
it is easy for practitioners simply to see the wrong instead of 2.5mg.
medication label, for example where similar The coronial report identified that the nurse
packaging or a similar dose is involved (Institute involved was a new graduate, working her second
for Safe Medication Practices 2009). shift as a registered nurse at the nursing home.
Rule-based actions may give rise to mistakes, The nurse had not undergone the requisite two
since they require retrieval of a mental model, days’ orientation or ‘buddying’ required for new
also known as a schema (stored knowledge of members of staff at the nursing home. During
what an object, scenario or event is, and/or what the shift in question, the nurse was in charge,
it means), that fits the requirements for the current working with three extended care assistants
situation (Endsley and Jones 2012). The retrieval (nursing assistants). There were 36 residents,
unfamiliar tasks. In reviewing this case it is and lapses that accompany automatic processes
possible to see significant stress factors related (Wachter 2012). Organisations that have a culture
to the nurse performing her new role, including in which checks are undertaken mindfully find
having to liaise with external healthcare this to be an effective strategy in error prevention.
professionals while managing residents’ nursing However, the culture in health care is that these
care. In addition, she was inexperienced with checks are often cursory (Shearer et al 2012,
regard to the responsibility of managing other Wachter 2012).
workers, and she had received insufficient support Increasing individuals’ awareness of human
or orientation. The nurse was also interrupted fallibility can highlight situations where the
frequently by being reminded that medication was potential for error is increased. Mnemonics such
overdue. The workload was high: there were 36 as IMSAFE (illness, medication, stress, alcohol,
residents, half of whom were classified as having fatigue and emotion) challenge the individual to
‘high needs’, all required medication and several assess frequently which factors are present that
required ongoing nursing interventions. Finally, might increase the potential for error (WHO
the nurse was required to undertake a medication 2011). The three-bucket model (Reason 2004)
round and administer medication with which she is similar; it asks the person to assess their current
was unfamiliar. Other latent factors that affected situation against factors of increased stress
this situation include a lack of professional, on-site focusing on self, context and task, represented
support and a lack of adherence to policies such as by the buckets. The more negative factors that
orientation for new staff members. are in each of the buckets, the higher the risk of
error. In this case study the nurse would have had
significant risks in each of the buckets, which may
Human factors strategies have been enough to highlight the significant risk
Human factors strategies targeting the reduction of error had the nurse or the organisation been
of errors involve designing systems, processes, aware of this model (Boakes 2009).
work environments and technology that recognise Increasing organisational awareness of
human fallibility (Carayon 2012). There are error probability and human fallibility related
several human factors strategies that may decrease to cognitive processing and overload, should
the likelihood of medication errors of the type encourage attention to workload and resourcing
described in the case above. Avoiding reliance on issues, supervision and professional support
memory is a human factors strategy that requires strategies, thereby mitigating the chance of
protocols and evidence-based resources to be medication error (Reid-Searl et al 2010). A positive
readily available against which practitioners may organisational safety culture is also an important
check their knowledge (Beaumont and Russell feature in the prevention of errors, including
2012). These resources might be in the form of those involving medication (Morello et al 2013).
written or software resources. However, the key This type of culture supports the monitoring of
to error reduction is that the resources are easily errors and risk mitigation, and empowers staff
accessible and that a culture exists that encourages members to notify the organisation about concerns
the use of such resources. It was not possible to and safety risks.
establish if such resources were available in the The nurse in the case study was a new
case described. graduate with limited experience. The use of
Another strategy based on human factors scenario-based simulations is a strategy that
involves making things highly visible. This would can be employed in educational and clinical
include posters or diagrams that detail the sectors. Simulation provides the opportunity to
steps and the considerations necessary when address knowledge-based and rule-based errors
undertaking a certain task (Mahlmeister 2009). (Habraken and van der Schaff 2008). In terms of
In this situation a poster describing the dosages recognising and responding to the deteriorating
contained in morphine ampoules and a calculation patient, simulated experiences provide a pool of
table of dosage versus volume might have alerted cognitive schemata on which decisions for action
the inexperienced nurse to the overdose. may be based. They also provide the opportunity
The use of checklists, briefings and verbal to develop these schemata in a non-threatening
double-checking protocols can lessen the environment (Pian-Smith et al 2009). Although
likelihood of error in medication administration it is impossible to prepare graduate nurses
(Fryer 2012). However, checking procedures to be familiar with all situations, the use of
are shown to be useful only if undertaken with simulation, particularly in relation to error-prone
conscious attention. If undertaken in a routine, situations such as medication administration, is a
automatic way, then they are prone to the slips valuable technique.
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For further information contact the art and science editor Gwen Clarke at gwen.clarke@rcnpublishing.co.uk