The rise of the Maratha accelerated the problem for

Aurangzeb - Gaurav Sharma

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Aurangzeb is one of the most controversial rulers of medieval India,

how much love and praise historians showered on the Akbar for
religious tolerance, the same amount of hatred Aurangzeb have
received from these historians for his religious orthodoxy, he is seen
as a one who reversed the clock of harmony between the
communities developed by his successors especially Akbar, not only a
nationalist or communal historian but also many other historians went
through the same route, they undermined the fact that two rulers,
who ruled at a different time even at the same area, had different
challenges and different resources to tackle those challenges, so
comparing any of the rulers with Aurangzeb is unfair. Aurangzeb was
born on 3 November 1618, in Dohad, Gujrat, during the period of his
grandfather, Jahangir, Aurangzeb was the third son of the Shahjahan
after Dara Shikho and Shah Shuja and have one younger brother
Murad, Shahjahan has always favored the Dara Shikho over any of his
sons, according to the European traveler peter mundi, the firework on
Dara’s marriage can be seen from the half a mile and in the night, it
looks like a day, Shahjahan spend 32 lakhs on the marriage. The
graphical description of the marriage and guest who attended the
marriage was given in the Padshanama, but Aurangzeb who was 14
years at the time, reportedly attended these events, although he does
not merit even an appearance among the hundreds of figures who fill
the Padshahnama illustrations of the wedding procession 1 , which
show how irrelevant Aurangzeb was for those writes, who doesn’t
bother to mention the future emperor of Hindustan in the biography
of the ruling emperor or they thought Dara will be the next emperor.
From the age of 16, Aurangzeb was taking care of the empire around

1
Audrey Truschke, Aurangzeb the man and the Myth, Penguin Books, India, 2017, p.
India, he went to Balkan, Bundelkhand, Qandahar and administering
Gujrat, Multan, and Deccan, but the question is what Dara was doing
during this period because most of the historians who wrote
Aurangzeb was bigot, always considered Dara Shikoh as a better Page | 2
alternative than Aurangzeb but when Aurangzeb was gaining the
ground experience to run the administration and proving himself on
the battlefield, Dara was living in leisure at the court under the
protection of his beloved father Shahjahan, only campaign Dara took
was in Qandahar and during this campaign, he tried to use the
guidance of Sufi, yogi, and sorcerer to conquer the fort even when he
has two-time war veteran of Mughal-Safavid war Rajrup and Raja Jai
Singh with him,2 this campaign of Dara was an utter failure, he has no
quality of military leadership, which he will again prove in the war of
succession. Mughal kingship is guided by the principle of “Ya Takht Ya
Tabut”, Shah Jahan ordered the murder of two of his brothers,
Khusrav, and Shahryar and also executed two of his nephews and two
male cousins upon being come to the power, Khusrav who ‘was
destined for a stormy career and a bloody grave’. He was now a
prisoner in the charge of Shahjahan, and to remove him from his way
the latter had him murdered in cold blood.3 Shahryar was defeated by
Asaf Khan near Lahore and he was ordered to be imprisoned, and two
days later was blinded. Shortly after, Tahmurs and Hoshang, sons of
Danyal, were also consigned to prison.4 Jahangir was evolved in the
death of Danyal, Mughal has no rule for succession to the throne
anyone can sit on the throne if he proves himself worthy moreover
whoever came to the throne has executed others or make them
prisoner or blinded them to prevent the future conflict, in this scenario
war of succession is more for survival war than a war of throne

2
Supriya Gandhi, The Emperor who Never Was Dara Shukoh in Mughal India, The Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, London, 2009, p.151.
3
B P Saksena, history of Shahjahan, Bhartiya Kala Prakashan, New Delhi, 2013, p.33.
4
Ibid., p.52.
because they all know whoever will come to the throne will either
execute them or take them prisoner or blinded them.
Aurangzeb was accused of being destroying the Hindu temple, but
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sometimes we add modern-day reasoning that religion and politics
were different but in ancient and medieval India it was not, temples
were the source of legitimacy to the king, temples are built mostly
through state patronage or by the patronage of the powerful and
wealthy individuals mostly nobles or Hindu Rajas and these are part of
the politics of that time, and these place of worship also have political
significance, so breaking the religious structure is also symbolize
destroying once legitimacy or political significance 5 . Although court
historians presented them with a religious angle and hailed Aurangzeb
as a true Muslim for attacking the Hindu temple, most of these actions
were political in nature rather than religious. For example, in 1669,
there arose a rebellion in Benares among landholders, some of whom
were suspected of having helped Shivaji, who was Aurangzeb’s arch-
enemy, escape from imperial detention. It was also believed that
Shivaji’s escape had been initially facilitated by Jai Singh, the great-
grandson of Raja Man Singh, who almost certainly built Benares’s
great Vishwanath temple. It was against this background that the
emperor ordered the destruction of that temple. 6 In 1683, when he
visited the caves of Ellora, he noted that ‘on all their ceilings and walls
many kinds of images with life like forms have been craved’. However,
he did not try to destroy them, only noted their desolation and stated
that it ‘aroused a sense of warning to those who contemplate the
future.’ 7 Here he didn’t destroy the painting because these are
Buddhist paintings and were not patronized by any Hindu ruler of that
time who was in power and destroying them would be useless.

5
Similarly, in the 20th-century demolition of the Babri mosque was a more political and less religious issue,
and even today construction of the Rama temple is more political and less religious issue.
6
Richard M. Eaton, Temple Desecration and Indo-Muslim States in Essays on Islam and Indian history, oxford
India paperbacks, New Delhi, 2002, pp.118-20.
7
Satish Chandra, Religious policy of Aurangzeb during the later part of his reign in Essays in Medieval Indian
History, Oxford Indian Paperback, New Delhi, 2003, p.483.
Aurangzeb ruled in the medieval times where the authority of the
state mostly depends upon the how strong emperor was and in the
patrimonial state weak ruler means the breakup of empire or regular
revolt, to establish once authority one has to take some bold steps to Page | 4
prevent the revolt and indiscipline in the army and the nobility.
Aurangzeb spends a substantial amount of time in the Deccan as a
viceroy during the reign of Shahjahan, although as a Viceroy of the
Deccan, Aurangzeb had been an advocate of the forward policy there,
after his accession, he followed a caution policy towards the Deccani
states. 8 Aurangzeb was always worried about the rise of Maratha
especially Shivaji, he wrote to the Adil Shah, ‘Expel shiva who has
sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to
entertain his service, give him jagirs in the Karnataka far away from
imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them’. 9 Shivaji has
Sacked the city of Surat multiple times, Shivaji pillaged the Konkan
mercilessly and ruined its trade, and this worry of Aurangzeb one can
sense from his letter to Adil Shah. Aurangzeb sends Jai Singh as
governor of Deccan to tackle the Maratha Issue, in 1665 treaty of
Purandar was signed, Jai Singh forced Shivaji to surrender twenty-
three forts in the Mughal territory, and attached territory worth four
crore Huns. In return, the equivalent territory was awarded to him at
the expense of Bijapur, in addition to what he already held there. To
convince Shivaji of Mughal goodwill, Jai Singh visualized a joint
Mughal-Maratha campaign Against Bijapur. He wrote of Aurangzeb,
‘the conquest of Bijapur is the preface to the conquest of all Deccan
and Karnataka’10 but the joint campaign of the Mughal-Maratha failed
against the Bijapur and Jai Singh was called off from the Deccan,
according to the Jai Singh Maratha could be great allies of Mughal for
their success in Deccan but Aurangzeb didn’t take the Jai Singh advice.

8
Satish Chandra, The Deccan Policy of The Mughal- under Aurangzeb in Essays in Medieval Indian History,
Oxford Indian Paperback, New Delhi, 2003, p.483.
9
Ibid., p.463
10
Ibid., p.464
Shivaji Arrived at Agra in 1666 and he was welcomed in Agra by Ram
Singh son of Jai Singh, Shivaji was brought to the Diwan-i-Khas, where
the emperor ordered to brought the Shivaji forward and presented
him one thousand Mohars and two thousand rupees as his Nazar and Page | 5
Rs. 5ooo as Nisar, it was emperor birthday and Khilats 11 for the
occasion were presented to nobles but Shivaji was not given one
which made him enraged and Shivaji walked away from court, but
later emperor ordered Multafat Khan, Aqil Khan and Mukhils Khan to
go and console Shiva and gave him a Khilat and bring him back but
Shivaji refuse to accept the Khilat, but later Ram Singh persuaded him
and Shivaji agreed to send his son to the imperial court, the emperor
gave robe and jeweled dagger and Peral necklace as Inam to his son.
But there is a fraction in court which spoken to the emperor against
shiva (this is the anti-Jai Singh fraction), Raja Jaswant Singh said “he is
a mere Bhumia, and he came and displayed such discourtesy and
violence! It is your majesty’s concern if you overlook it. But he ought
to be punished.” 12 Misunderstanding between the Aurangzeb and
Shivaji and this misunderstanding was used by the Anti-Jai Singh
fraction in the court which led to the further deterioration in the
relation of Aurangzeb and Shivaji, Aurangzeb posted Shivaji in Kabul
but he refused to go there and was held prisoner by Aurangzeb, Shivaji
started negotiating with the Aurangzeb for his release, Shivaji wrote a
petition to the Aurangzeb for his release “if your majesty restores to
me all my forts taken by you, I shall pay you two kores of rupees. Give
me leave to depart; my son will remain here in your service and I shall
take every oath that you may ask for. I have come here in firm trust in
your majesty. My loyalty is strong. Whenever you plan a campaign,
summon me and I shall attend there. Your majesty is now at war with
Bijapur. Let me go there, fight and die and thereby render service to
you.”13 But all the petitions Shivaji wrote to Aurangzeb were of no use
11
Khilat is Royal robe given to nobles as honour.
12
Jadunath Sarkar, House of Shivaji (Studies and documents on Maratha History: Royal period), M.C Sarkar &
Sons LTD, Calcutta, 1995, p. 159.
13
Ibid., pp. 163-164.
and on 18th Aug 1966 he escaped from the Agra, this escape not only
deteriorates Mughal-Maratha relationship but also hampers
Kacchwaha Rajput and Mughal relation, as Ram Singh was in charge of
Shivaji, Aurangzeb believed he helped Shivaji in escape from Agra. Page | 6
Thus, the failure of Aurangzeb to consolidate Shivaji in Mughal nobility
will cause serious problems for him in the future. Considering Shivaji
a mere Bhumia or a rebel state is another big mistake of the
Aurangzeb, by his death in 1680 he was very much more than just
another rebel. He controlled an area of about 50,000 square miles, or
4.1 percent of the area of the whole subcontinent. His revenue was
between one-fifth and one-sixth of that of Aurangzeb. In his territory
he had set up a comparatively elaborated administrative apparatus. 14
Given his conviction that Shivaji was unreliable and ambitious, and
that it was not possible to arrive at a stable understanding with him,
Aurangzeb had three options:
(1)To adopt a policy of strict neutrality towards the Deccan even if
it implied the conquest of Bijapur by Shivaji, singly or in alliance
with Golconda; or
(2)To attempt to shore up Bijapur against Maratha incursions, even
against its wishes, by finding a reliable instrument or fraction at
the Bijapur court to support this policy, and if possible, to get
Golkonda to join in this enterprise; or
(3)Outright annexation of both the Deccani states, or of Bijapur to
begin with.
The first option was unthinkable and was never considered seriously…
Aurangzeb therefore veered round to the second option, and finally
abandoned it in favor of the third in 1684 when he was at last
convinced, on the basis of his personal experience, that the Deccani

14
M.N Pearson, Shivaji and the decline of the Mughal empire in The Journal of Asian Studies vol. 35, No. 2,
Association for Asian studies, 1976, pp. 226-227.
states would never join hands with him to completely crush the
Marathas.15
Aurangzeb arrived in Deccan in 1680 in pursuit of rebel prince Akbar
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who has taken refuse in court of Sambhaji, in his initial days Aurangzeb
continues his earlier policy towards Deccan, he was concentrated in
Maratha and pressurize the Deccani state to not provide support to
the Maratha, by 1684, Aurangzeb came to the conclusion that he
could not achieve his objective without first undertaking outright
annexation of one or both Deccani states 16 . In order to control
Maratha, he first annexed Bijapur in 1686 and Golkonda in 1687 but
the decision to annex the Deccani state in 1684, rather than twenty
years earlier, as advised by Jai Singh, had many attendant
disadvantages. The position of the Marathas had become much
stronger in the interval, for they had been able to establish a second
line defense in the Karnataka, and developed their guerilla tactics.17
Mughal forces always fought wars in the plain area, and fighting a war
against the Maratha in the hilly terrain was very difficult, and use of
guerilla tactics in warfare made this struggle much more difficult for
the Mughal army, Similar kind of struggle Maratha will face when they
will come to north India to fight Ahmed Shah Abdali in the Third battle
of Panipat as they were not accustomed to fight a war in a plain. As
we already discussed above by the time of his death Shivaji was
controlling the large area and has developed an administrative
structure. After the fall of Bijapur, and Golkonda, there was an influx
of Maratha and Deccanis into the Mughal service. The Marathas
constituted half the number of Hindu office-holders and a sixth of the
total of Mansab holders. 18 Yet Maratha sardars were not trusted.
Unlike the Rajputs, they were never given offices of trust and

15
Satish Chandra, The Deccan Policy of The Mughal- under Aurangzeb in Essays in Medieval Indian History,
Oxford Indian Paperback, New Delhi, 2003, p.465.
16
Ibid., p.470.
17
Ibid., p.472.
18
Satish Chandra, Religious policy of Aurangzeb during the Later part of his reign in Essays in Medieval Indian
History, Oxford Indian Paperback, New Delhi, 2003, p.332.
responsibility. Thus, the Maratha could not be integrated into the
Mughal political system. Most of the land which was annexed in
Deccan was added to the Khaslia land, it created the problem of be-
jagiri which lead to dissatisfaction among the nobles who are newly Page | 8
admitted to the Mughal administration, As too many Mansabdar were
now chasing too few jagirs, “Ek annar sau bimar” as a result Many of
them had to remain jagir less for years and even when a jagir was
assigned, there was no guarantee that they would not be transferred
within a short period, as a result, the entire nobility was in sense of
personal insecurity, another problem was due to long stretch of
Mughal territory, it created the long line of communication which was
open for Maratha attacks, even those nobles who got jagir in Deccan
found it difficult to collect their dues, due to Maratha attacks, as a
result, jagirdar made a pact with them to collect the dues. Another
problem was the “one size fits all” approach of Aurangzeb,
Aurangzeb’s attempt to introduce into the Deccan the system of
administration that had been developed by the Mughal in north India
implied a reduction of the perquisites of the Deshmukh, zamindars,
muniwars, muqaddams, etc., as also a weakening of their
administration control over the countryside. The net result was the
growth of lawlessness, and the inability of the central government to
protect the cultivator against their local oppressors and corrupt
officials.19 All these alienated zamindars joined hands with Marathas
and made the functioning of administration much more difficult for
Mughal nobles. As a result, dues collected were very less and it
became hard for Mansabdar to maintain the required number of
troops and many didn’t maintain their required quota. In 1689
Aurangzeb captured the Sambhaji son of Shivaji along with his son
Shahuji, Aurangzeb rather negotiating peace with Shahuji, executed
him.

19
Satish Chandra, The Deccan Policy of The Mughal- under Aurangzeb in Essays in Medieval Indian History,
Oxford Indian Paperback, New Delhi, 2003, p.479.
Aurangzeb fondly believed that by his brutal execution of Sambhaji,
he would strike terror into the hearts of the Marathas; that left
without a recognized head, the Maratha movement would collapse;
and that would enable him to dictate his own terms to a captive Page | 9
Shahuji. Like all rulers drunk with military power 20 , by executing
Sambhaji, he only threw away his chance of peace with Martha but
provided the Maratha a new cause. At the same time in the absence
of single rallying point, the Maratha sardars were left free to plunder
the Mughal territories, disappearing at the approach of the Mughal
forces, and rallying again. Instead of having destroyed the Maratha
state, Aurangzeb made the Maratha opposition all-pervasive in the
Deccan. 21 The rise of Maratha and Aurangzeb’s inability to fully
consolidate Maratha in the Mughal administration created many
problems for him and some of these problems later became the cause
of the fall of Mughal power.

20
Ibid., p.478.
21
Satish Chandra, History of Medieval India, Orient BlackSwan, New Delhi, 2007, p.367.
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