Case 1. Floresca Vs. Philex, G.R. No.

L-30642, April 30, 1985

Facts:
The petitioners in this case are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining
Corporation (hereinafter referred to as Philex), who, while working at its copper mines
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave-in
that buried them in the runnels of the mine.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and
regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the lives of its men working underground.
That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working at defendant PHILEX's mine on
the said date, five (5) were able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were rescued
within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number, were left mercilessly to their fate,
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, were not rescued due to defendant Philex’s decision
to abandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in
the premises;
Issues:
"Whether the action of an injured employee or worker or that of his heirs in case of his
death under the Workmen's Compensation Act is exclusive, selective or cumulative, that is
to say, whether his or his heirs' action is exclusively restricted to seeking the limited
compensation provided under the Workmen's Compensation Act or whether they have a
right of selection or choice of action between availing of the worker's right under the
Workmen's Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for
higher damages (actual, moral and/or exemplary) from the employer by virtue of
negligence (or fault) of the employer or of his other employees or whether they may avail
cumulatively of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen's
Compensation Act and sue in addition... for damages in the regular courts."
Ruling:
Workmen's compensation refers to liability for compensation for loss resulting from injury,
disability or death of the working man through industrial accident or disease, without
regard to the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages under the
Civil Code which petitioner pursued in the regular court, refers to the employer's liability
for reckless and wanton negligence resulting in the death of the employees and for which
the regular court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
On August 3, 1978, petitioners-heirs of deceased employee Nazarito Floresca filed a motion
to dismiss on the ground that they have amicably settled their claim with respondent
Philex. In the resolution of September 7, 1978, the petition was dismissed only insofar as
the aforesaid petitioners are concerned, it appearing that there are other petitioners in this
case.
It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the
Workmen's Compensation Act but a complaint for damages (actual, exemplary and moral)
in the total amount of eight hundred twenty-five thousand (P825.000.00) pesos. Petitioners
did not invoke the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act to entitle them to
compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegation appeared in the complaint that the
employees died from accident arising out of and in the course of their employments. The
complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure on the part
of Philex to protect the lives of its workers as a consequence of which a cave-in occurred
resulting in the death of the employees working underground. Settled is the rule that in
ascertaining whether or not the cause of action is in the nature of workmen's compensation
claim or a claim for damages pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Code, the test is the
averments or allegations in the complaint recovery under the New Civil Code for damages
arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the New Labor Code. And the
damages recoverable under the New Civil Code are not administered by the System
provided for by the New Labor Code which defines the "System" as referring to the
Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System (Art. 167 [c], [d], and
[e] of the New Labor Code).
Furthermore, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code, decisions of the Supreme Court form
part of the law of the land.
Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides:
"Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines."
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People vs. Licera,
ruled:"Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system.
These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws
mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as
of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation
merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports
to carry into effect" (65 SCRA 270,  272-273, [1975]).
WE ruled that judicial decisions of the Supreme Court assume the same authority as the
statute itself
In regards to the intent of the Legislature under the foregoing provisions: "A cardinal rule
in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the law-making body
must be sought, first of all, in the words of the statute itself, read and considered in their
natural, ordinary, commonly-accepted and most obvious significations, according to good
and approved usage and without resorting to forced or subtle construction. Courts,
therefore, as a rule, cannot presume that the law-making body does not know the meaning
of words and the rules of grammar. Consequently, the grammatical reading of a statute
must be presumed to yield its correct sense."
Case No. 2. People v. Concepcion,44 Phil 126 (29 November 1922)
Facts:

By telegrams and a letter of confirmation to the manager of the Aparri branch of the
Philippine National Bank, Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank,
between April 10, 1919, and May 7, 1919, authorized an extension of credit in favor of
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000. This special authorization was
essential in view of the memorandum order of President Concepcion dated May 17, 1918,
limiting the discretional power of the local manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant loans and
discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in certain cases, could be increased to
P10,000. Pursuant to this authorization, credit aggregating P300,000, was granted the firm
of "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C," the only security required consisting of six demand notes.
The notes, together with the interest, were taken up and paid by July 17, 1919.
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was a copartnership capitalized at P100,000. Anacleto
Concepcion contributed P5,000; Clara Vda. de Concepcion, P5,000; Miguel S. Concepcion,
P20,000; Clemente Puno, P20,000; and Rosario San Agustin, "casada con Gral. Venancio
Concepcion," P50,000. Member Miguel S. Concepcion was the administrator of the
company.
On the facts recounted, Venancio Concepcion, as President of the Philippine National Bank
and as member of the board of directors of this bank, was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Cagayan with a violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. He was found guilty by
the Honorable Enrique V. Filamor, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to
imprisonment for one year and six months, to pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
Section 35 of Act No. 2747, effective on February 20, 1918, just mentioned, to which
reference must hereafter repeatedly be made, reads as follows: "The National Bank shall
not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the
bank nor to agents of the branch banks." Section 49 of the same Act provides : "Any person
who shall violate any of the provisions of this Act shall be punished by a fine not to exceed
ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment not to exceed five years, or by both such fine and
imprisonment." These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts
took place, but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30,1921.
Counsel for the defense assign ten errors as having been committed by the trial court.
These errors they have argued adroitly and exhaustively in their printed brief, and again in
oral argument, Attorney-General Villa-Real, in an exceptionally accurate and
comprehensive brief, answers the propositions of appellant one by one.
The questions presented are reduced to their simplest elements in the opinion which
follows:
I. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" within the
meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747? Counsel argue that the documents of record do not
prove that authority to make a loan was given, but only show the concession of a credit. In
this statement of fact, counsel is correct, for the exhibits in question speak of a "credito"
(credit) and not of a "prestamo" (loan).
The "credit" of an individual means his ability to borrow money by virtue of the confidence
or trust reposed by a lender that he will pay what he may promise. (Donnell vs. Jones
[1848], 13 Ala., 490; Bouvier's Law Dictionary.) A "loan" means the delivery by one party
and the receipt by the other party of a given sum of money, upon an agreement, express or
implied, to repay the sum loaned, with or without interest. (Payne vs. Gardiner [1864], 29
N. Y., 146,167.) The concession of a "credit" necessarily involves the granting of "loans" up
to the limit of the amount fixed in the "credit."
II. Was the granting of a credit of 300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C," by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, a "loan" or a
"discount"? Counsel argue that while section 35 of Act No. 2747 prohibits the granting of a
"loan," it does not prohibit what is commonly known as a "discount."
In a letter dated August 7, 1916, H. Parker Willis, then President of the National Bank,
inquired of the Insular Auditor whether section 37 of Act No. 2612 was intended to apply to
discounts as well as to loans. The ruling of the Acting Insular Auditor, dated August 11,
1916, was to the effect that said section referred to loans alone, and placed no restriction
upon discount transactions. It becomes material, therefore, to discover the distinction
between a "loan" and a "discount," and to ascertain if the instant transaction comes under
the first or the latter denomination.
Discounts are favored by bankers because of their liquid nature, growing, as they do, out of
an actual, live, transaction. But in its last analysis, to discount a paper is only a mode of
loaning money, with, however, these distinctions: (1) In a discount, interest is deducted in
advance, while in a loan, interest is taken at the expiration of a credit; (2) a discount is
always on double-name paper; a loan is generally on single-name paper.
Conceding, without deciding, that, as ruled by the Insular Auditor, the law covers loans and
not discounts, yet the conclusion is inevitable that the demand notes signed by the firm
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." were not discount paper but were mere evidences of
indebtedness, because (1) interest was not deducted from the face of the notes, but was
paid when the notes fell due; and (2) they were single-name and not double-name paper.
The facts of the instant case having relation to this phase of the argument are not
essentially different from the facts in the Binalbagan Estate case. Just as there it was
declared that the operations constituted a loan and not a discount, so should we here lay
down the same ruling.
III. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership, "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, an "indirect loan"
within the meaning of section 35 of Act No. 2747?
Counsel argue that a loan to the partnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." was not an
"indirect loan." In this connection, it should be recalled that the wife of the defendant held
one-half of the capital of this partnership.
In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain and give
effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of the Legislature is
plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director of the bank. The
prohibition against indirect loans is a recognition of the familiar maxim that no man may
serve two masters-that where personal interest clashes with fidelity to duty the latter
almost always suffers. If, therefore, it is shown that the husband is financially interested in
the success or failure of his wife's business venture, a loan to a partnership of which the
wife of a director is a member, falls within the prohibition.
Various provisions of the Civil Code serve to establish the familiar relationship called a
conjugal partnership. (Articles 1315, 1393, 1401, 1407, 1408, and 1412 can be specially
noted.) A loan, therefore, to a partnership of which the wife of a director of a bank is a
member, is an indirect loan to such director.
That it was the intention of the Legislature to prohibit exactly such an occurrence is shown
by the acknowledged fact that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his
personal and family affairs with his official duties, and to permit the loan of P300,000 to a
partnership of no established reputation and without asking for collateral security.
In the case of Lester and Wife vs. Howard Bank ([1870], 33 Md., 558; 3 Am. Rep., 211), the
Supreme Court of Maryland said:
"What then was the purpose of the law when it declared that no director or officer should
borrow of the bank, and 'if any director/ etc., shall be convicted,' etc., 'of directly or
indirectly violating this section he shall be punished by fine and imprisonment?" We say to
protect the stockholders, depositors and creditors of the bank, against the temptation to
which the directors and officers might be exposed, and the power which as such they must
necessarily possess in the control and management of the bank, and the legislature
unwilling to rely upon the implied understanding that in assuming this relation they would
not acquire any interest hostile or adverse to the most exact and faithful discharge of duty,
declared in express terms that they should not borrow, etc., of the bank."
In the case of People vs. Knapp ([1912], 206 N. Y., 373), relied upon in the Binalbagan
Estate decision, it was said:
"We are of opinion the statute forbade the loan to his copartnership firm as well as to
himself directly. The loan was made indirectly to him through his firm."
IV. Could Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, be convicted of a
violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747 in relation with section 49 of the same Act, when
these portions of Act No. 2747 were repealed by Act No. 2938, prior to the filing of the
information and the rendition of the judgment?
As noted along toward the beginning of this opinion, section 49 of Act No. 2747, in relation
to section 35 of the same Act, provides a punishment for any person who shall violate any
of the provisions of the Act. It is contended, however, by the appellant, that the repeal of
these sections of Act No. 2747 by Act No. 2938 has served to take away the basis for
criminal prosecution.
This same question has been previously submitted and has received an answer adverse to
such contention in the cases of United States vs. Cuna ([1908], 12 Phil., 241); People vs.
Concepcion ([1922], 43 Phil., 653); and Ong Chang Wing and Kwong Fok vs. United States
([1910], 218 U. S., 272; 40 Phil., 1046). In other words, it has been the holding, and it must
again be the holding, that where an Act of the Legislature which penalizes an offense
repeals a former Act which penalized the same offense, such repeal does not have the effect
of thereafter depriving the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict, and sentence offenders
charged with violations of the old law.
V. Was the granting of a credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." by Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank, in violation of
section 35 of Act No. 2747, penalized by this law?
Counsel argue that since the prohibition contained in section 35 of Act No. 2747 is on the
bank, and since section 49 of said Act provides a punishment not on the bank when it
violates any provision of the law, but on a person violating any provision of the same, and
imposing imprisonment as a part of the penalty, the prohibition contained in said section
35 is without penal sanction.
The answer is that when the corporation itself is forbidden to do an act, the prohibition
extends to the board of directors, and to each director separately and individually. (People
vs. Concepcion, supra.)
VI. Does the alleged good faith of Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National
Bank, in extending the credit of P300,000 to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en
C." constitute a legal defense?
Counsel argue that if defendant committed the acts of which he was convicted, it was
because he was misled by rulings coming from the Insular Auditor. It is furthermore stated
that since the loans made to the copartnership "Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." have been
paid, no loss has been suffered by the Philippine National Bank.
Neither argument, even if conceded to be true, is conclusive. Under the statute which the
defendant has violated, criminal intent is not necessarily material. The doing of the
inhibited act, inhibited on account of public policy and public interest, constitutes the
crime. And, in this instance, as previously demonstrated, the acts of the President of the
Philippine National Bank do not fall within the purview of the rulings of the Insular
Auditor, even conceding that such rulings have controlling effect.
Morse, in his work, Banks and Banking, section 125, says:
"It is fraud for directors to secure by means of their trust, any advantage not common to
the other stockholders. The law will not allow private profit from a trust, and will not listen
to any proof of honest intent."
JUDGMENT
On a review of the evidence of record, with reference to the decision of the trial court, and
the errors assigned by the appellant, and with reference to previous decisions of this court
on the same subject, we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that no reversible error was
committed in the trial of this case, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial
judge falls within the limits of the punitive provisions of the law. Judgment is affirmed, with
the costs of this instance against the appellant.
Case No. 3. Alonzo v. IAC, G.R. No. 72873, 28 May 1987

Facts:
Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered
in the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of
Tarlac.[1]
On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share to the
herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. [2] One year later, on April
22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an
instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P440.00. [3]
By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area
corresponding to two?fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The
vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their
son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area.
[4]

On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five co-heirs, sought to redeem the area
sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was
an American citizen.[5] On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her
own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. [6]
The trial court* also dismisses this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed,
not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964.
Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the
co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law.[7]
In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The
other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604
square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners. [8] Eustaquia herself, who had
sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed
redemption.[9] Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends
and neighbors whose children went to school together.[10]
It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they
thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been
mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was
impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been
purchased by them from the other co-heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon
of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done without
objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs.

Issues:
The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application
of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the
private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows:
"Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the
partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one
month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor."
Ruling:
In reversing the trial court, the respondent court* declared that the notice required by the
said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute.
Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals[11] applied by the trial court, the
respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed
the need for written notice although no particular form was required.
Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co-
heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the
requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is
informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for
redemption start running."
In the earlier decision of Butte v. Uy,[12] the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist,
emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees,
conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except
within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors,
as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property,
unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to
all possible redemptioners.
"The right of redemption of co?owners excludes that of the adjoining owners."
As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a
particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court
held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the
30-day period.
The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases
make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was
really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and
interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such
deficiency, the 30-day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in
1977.
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add,
by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern
of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of
our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their
language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice
may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."[13] While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to
interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not
read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of
it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to
"the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the lawmaker's will.
"The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute
must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the
statute although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but
not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the
intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing
which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of
the lawmakers."[14]
In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly
notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day
period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a
general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of
alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.
The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked
not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by
Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second
sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of
course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption.
Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would
such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was
not in writing, would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had
expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977?
In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that
they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By
requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in
favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its
purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly
notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually
informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice
was sufficient.
Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin?
While we do not here declare that this period started from the dates of such sales in 1963
and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first
complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale
and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could
have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs
made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua
filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the
period for its exercise had already expired.
The following doctrine is also worth noting:
"While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged
right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his
claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of
ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make
it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts." [15]
It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who
were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a
house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a
mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly
situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts,
which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim
the right of redemption, but then it was already too late.
We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of
the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the
doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly
stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Butte doctrines. What we
are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar
circumstances of this case.
The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in
writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and
ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for
redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are
the justifications for this exception.
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one his due."[16] That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an
essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a
way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin
with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED
and that of the trial court is reinstated, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Case No. 4. Government of the Philippines Islands v. HSBC, G.R. No. 44257, 22
November 1938

1. STATUTES; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ACT NO. 4007. —

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the act.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; BUREAU OF BANKING. — The title of Act No. 4007 is: "An Act to reorganize
the departments, bureaus and offices of the Insular Government, and for other purposes."
At the time of the passage of this Act, the Bureau of Banking was already in existence as one
of the bureaus of the Insular Government. (Act No. 3519.) It seems clear therefore that
bureau is embraced in that title. On the other hand, the contents of section 11 are germane
to and connected with the organization and maintenance of said bureau.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BANKING BUSINESS. — It is now beyond question that the banking
business is so effected with a public interest as to justify its regulation and control under
the police power of the estate. The legislature may establish such reasonable and general
regulations of banking institutions as may be essential to the public safety, and provide for
the enforcement of such regulations by a board or bureau supported by moderate
assessments upon those engaging in the banking business.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NATIONAL CITY BANK NOT SUBJECT TO TAXATION BY THE
PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT. — The National City Bank of New York, one of the herein
appellees, being an agency of the United States, was not subject to taxation by the
Philippine Government except as permitted by Act of Congress. The form of taxation
imposed under section 11 of Act No. 4007 was not permitted by any act of Congress.
Section 11 of Act No. 4007 is constitutional. It does not, however, apply to the National City
Bank of New York.

DECISION

Facts:

The appellees are banking institution doing business in this country. This action was
brought by the appellant to determine the liability of the appellees under section 11 of Act
No. 4007. All the appellees demurred to the complaint upon the ground that it did not state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, in that the statutory provision relied upon by
the appellant was unconstitutional. The National City Bank of New York alleged further, in
support of the demurrer filed by it, that there was a misjoinder of parties defendant, and
that section 11 of Act No. 4007 did not impose any tax upon national banking associations,
in which class it belonged. The court below sustained the demurrers filed by the appellees,
on the sole ground that the complaint did not allege a cause of action, because the statutory
provision involved was unconstitutional.

Issues:

The question now presented is the constitutionality of section 11 of Act No. 4007, which
reads as follows: "SEC. 11. The provisions of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding,
the total annual expenses of the Bureau of Banking shall be reimbursed annually to the
Government by assessment levied upon all banking institutions subject to inspection by the
Bank Commissioner. The proportion of expenses of the Bureau of Banking to be assessed
against each such banking institution shall be the same as the proportion which its average
total assets bear to the average total assets of all such banking institutions during the year
in which the expenses were incurred." library

1. Appellees contend that the subject matter contained in this section is not embraced in
the title of the Act, in violation of section 3 of the Jones Law which provides, among other
things: "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject,
and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This provision is similar to those
found in the constitutions of most of the States of the Union. It has been said that the
purpose of such a provision is to prevent the evils of socalled "omnibus bills" and
surreptitious or unconsidered legislation. "The mischief sought to be remedied by the
requirement of a single subject or object of legislation was the practice of bringing together
in one bill matters having no necessary or proper connection with each other but often
entirely unrelated and even incongruous. By the practice of incorporating in proposed
legislation of a meritorious character provisions not deserving of general favor but which,
standing alone and on their own merits, were likely to be rejected, measures which could
not have been carried without such a device and which were sometimes of a pernicious
character were often incorporated in the laws; for, to secure needed and desirable
legislation, members of the legislature were, by this means, often induced to sanction and
actually vote for provisions which, if presented as independent subjects of legislation,
would not have received their support. It was also the practice to include in the same bill
wholly unrelated provisions, with the view of combining in favor of the bill the supporters
of each, and thus securing the passage of several measures, no one of which could succeed
on its own merits. To do away with this hodge podge or ’log rolling’ legislation was one, and
perhaps the primary, object of these constitutional provisions. Another abuse that
developed in legislative bodies was the practice of enacting laws under false and
misleading titles, thereby concealing from the members of the legislature, and from the
people, the true nature of the laws so enacted. It is surreptitious legislation in this manner
that the subject or object of a law is required to be stated in the title. While the objects of
these constitutional provisions are variously stated, the authorities are agreed that they
were adopted to remedy these and similar abuses. The purposes of these constitutional
provisions have been summarized as follows: (1) to prevent ’log rolling’ legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise, or fraud, in the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the
titles give no intimation; and (3) to apprise the people of the subject of legislation under
consideration." (25 R. C. L., pp. 834-836.)

Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede proper legislation. In Detroit v. Detroit
Citizens’ Street R. Co. (184 U.S., 368, 392; 46 Law. ed., 592, 609), the Supreme Court of the
United States quoted with approval the following language of Judge Cooley: "We must give
the constitutional provision a reasonable construction and effect. The Constitution requires
no law to embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. Now, the
object may be very comprehensive and still be without objection, and the one before us is
of that character. But it is by no means essential that every end and means necessary or
convenient for the accomplishment of the general object should be either referred to or
necessarily indicated by the title. All that can reasonably be required is that the title shall
not be made to cover legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can
be considered as having a necessary or proper connection."crvirtua1aw library

The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a
reasonable and not a technical construction. (Carter County v. Sinton, 120 U.S., 517, 522; 30
Law ed., 701, 702.) It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to
include the general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and
every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. (Knights Templars’ & Masons’ Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman,
187 U.S., 197; 47 Law. ed. 139.) mode of making the subscription.’

"In States where constitutional provisions like that now under consideration have been
decided to be mandatory, and not directory only, it had generally been held that the
requirement is satisfied if the law has but one general object, and that is clearly expressed
in the title. It is enough if the body of the Act is germane to the title."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The title of Act No. 4007 is: "An Act to reorganize the departments, bureaus and offices of
the Insular Government, and for other purposes." At the time of the passage of this Act, the
Bureau of Banking was already in existence as one of the bureaus of the Insular
Government. (Act No. 3519.) It seems clear therefore that the bureau is embraced in that
title. On the other hand, the contents of section 11 are germane to and connected with the
organization and maintenance of said bureau.

2. It is now beyond question that the banking business is so affected with a public interest
as to justify its regulation and control under the police power of the state. (Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S., 104; 55 Law. ed., 112.) "Since banks are indispensable agencies
through which the industry, trade and commerce of all civilized countries and communities
are carried on, the business which they transact, though for private profit, is of a
preminently public nature, and it therefore universally recognized as a proper subject of
legislative regulation under the police power of the state." (3 R.C.L., 379.) The legislature
may establish such reasonable and general regulations of banking institutions as may be
essential to the public safety, and provide for the enforcement of such regulations by a
board or bureau supported by moderate assessments upon those engaging in the banking
business. (Oxford v. Love, 250 U.S., 603; 63 Law. ed., 1165.)

3. The National City Bank of New York, one of the herein appellees, being an agency of the
United States, was not subject to taxation by the Philippine Government except as
permitted by Act of Congress. The form of taxation imposed under section 11 of Act No.
4007 was not permitted by any act of Congress. (Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S.,
497; 80 Law. ed., 351.)0

Our conclusion is that section 11 of Act No. 4007 is constitutional. It does not, however,
apply to the appellee, the National City Bank of New York.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed with regard to the appellee, the National City Bank
of New York, and reversed as to the other appellees; and the case is remanded to the court
below for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. So ordered.
Case No. 5Antonio v. Miranda, G.R. No. 135869, 22 September 1999

Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the Commission on Elections
("COMELEC") in an election protest involving a barangay position five (5) days per
COMELEC Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as provided for in Republic Act 66791 and
the Omnibus Election Code? This is the sole issue posed in the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the order
dated August 3, 1998 of the Second Division of the COMELEC, 2 dismissing the appeal of
petitioner Rustico Antonio for having been filed out of time pursuant to COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, and the order promulgated on October 14, 1998 of the COMELEC en banc,
denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

The antecedents as found by the COMELEC in the order dated October 14, 1998 are:
"The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay Ilaya,
Las Piñ as City, Metro Manila. After the board of canvassers proclaimed protestee-appellant
Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T. Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest
docketed as Election Protest Case No. 97-0017 against Antonio before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Las Piñ as City (Branch LXXIX). The trial court rendered a Decision dated 9
March 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, the Court declares the protestant Vicente Miranda as the duly elected
Barangay Chairman of Barangay Ilaya, Las Piñ as City, Metro Manila.

Antonio admitted receipt of the above-quoted decision on 18 March 1998. Subsequently,

Antonio filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 27 March 1998 or nine (9) days after
receipt thereof . Meanwhile, Miranda moved to execute the trial court’s decision. Rustico, in
his Opposition to the Motion for Execution or Execution Pending Appeal, argued against
Miranda’s motion for execution. After the trial court denied the motion for execution, the
records of this case was forwarded to the Commission (Second Division).chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this Commission
(Second Division) an Order dated 3 August 1998 stating as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

In the light of the aforequoted rules, protestee RUSTICO ANTONIO, failed to perfect his
appeal within the five (5) days period prescribed for perfecting his appeal, as he filed his
Notice of Appeal only on March 27, 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt of the decision
sought to be appealed.

The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his appeal
within the said period deprives the Commission of its appellate jurisdiction.

ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction."virtua1aw

library
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

The instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and We AFFIRM the Order dated 3
August 1998 of this Commission (Second Division)." 3

In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal for the
following reasons:

"(a) In barangay electoral protest cases, the period of appeal is ten (10) days from receipt
of the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court. This is provided for by Sec. 9 of
R.A. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code;
(b) The provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure providing for a
five-day period within which to appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal
Trial Court could not prevail upon the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 6679 and Sec. 252
of the Omnibus Election Code;

(c) Moreover, the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction when it disregarded the
provisions of Sections 5, 6 & 7, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring the
filing of briefs by the appellant and the appellee. The questioned resolution of August 3,
1998 was issued motu propio and without prior notice and hearing. The petitioner was fast
tracked; virtual law library

(d) The alleged winning margin of the private respondent over the petitioner as found by
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Piñ as is only four (4) votes the results being MIRANDA
— 1,171; ANTONIO — 1,167. The people’s will must not go on procedural points. "An
election protest involves public interest, and technicalities should not be sanctioned when
it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of
its public officials." [Macasundig v. Macalanagan, 13 SCRA 577; Vda. De Mesa v. Mensias, 18
SCRA 533; Juliano v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 808; Genete v. Archangel, 21 SCRA 1178;
Maliwanag v. Herrera, 25 SCRA 175; De Castro v. Genete, 27 SCRA 623]

(e) The questioned resolutions violated the above principle because the COMELEC did not
appreciate the contested ballots." 4

In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure which reads:

"SECTION 21. Appeal. — From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may
appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the
decision." library

On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions of the
Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay officials is governed
by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section 9 of

Republic Act 6779 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC
rationalized thus:

"Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code providing for a ten-day period to appeal prevails over the provisions of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. According to Antonio, quasi-judicial bodies, including this
Commission, cannot amend an act of Congress and in case of discrepancy between the basic
law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the former prevails. Generally, yes. But
the situation herein does not fall within the generic situation contemplated therein.

No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3)
grants and authorizes this Commission to promulgate its own rules of procedure as long as
such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in 1993 as
amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is promulgated
by this Commission pursuant to a constitutionally mandated authority which no legislative
enactment can amend, revise or repeal.

The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the decision
rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections
within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our
Rules of Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in election
protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the Commission for failure to file the
required notice of appeal within the prescribed period.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9) day
from receipt of the decision appealed from or four (4) days after the five-day prescribed
period to appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed. For it is
axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down
by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. As a
consequence, the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period as required by
the Rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party and precluding the
appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. So the High Court rules in
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, Et. Al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should also be in the case
at bar.

Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or repealed
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII Section 5[5]) providing that rules of
procedure of . . . quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. But far from being disapproved the COMELEC Rules of Procedure received
approbation and has constantly been cited by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions
such as in the case of Pahilan v. Tabalba (230 SCRA 205, at 211) and Rodillas v. Commission
on Elections (245 SCRA 702, at 704). In the more recent case of Calucag v. Commission on
Elections promulgated on 19 June 1997 (G.R. No. 123673), the Supreme Court stated
that:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the
appeal WHICH APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER THE PROMULGATION
OF THE MTC DECISION . . . (page 4-5).

The repeated recognition given by the Supreme Court of this five-day rule within which to
file the required notice of appeal will make questionable the legislative enactment
providing for a ten-day period." 5

Without adopting the foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC, we nonetheless find the
instant petition devoid of merit.

Equally devoid of merit is the contention that petitioner was fast tracked because the
COMELEC did not require the parties to file their appeal briefs; that the dismissal was
issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing; and that dismissal of the appeal
defeats the people’s will on procedural points. Suffice it to state that the period for filing an
appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential
requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory
as if no appeal was filed at all. The right of appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of
the law. 19 Further, by virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which provides that "an appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the
instance of the Commission for failure to file a notice of appeal within the prescribed
period", the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a case where the appeal is not
filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.

The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed orders of the Commission on Elections dated August 3, 1998 and October 14, 1998
are hereby AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Case NO. 6. Tatad v. DOE, G.R.No. 124360, 3 December 1997

History

 In 1971, oil crisis. Enacted Oil Industry Commission Act -> created Oil Industry
Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing products

OIC has power to fix market prices

 1973: Marcos created Phil. National Oil Corp. (PNOC) to break control by
foreigners of our oil. PNOC refines, stores and ships petroleum.

o PNOC owned ESSO and Filoil and Bataan Refining Corp -> Soon, Petron

 1984: Marcos created Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) to cushion effects of
frequent changes in the price of oil o OPSF sourced from taxes

 1985: Caltex, Shell, PNOC

 1992: DOE was created to control all programs of gov related to energy

o purpose toward privatization of gov agencies related to energy

o deregulation of power and reduction of dependency on oil-fired plants

 March 1996: “Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996”

o To allow any person to import or purchase crude oil from foreign or domestic
source, lease or own and operate refineries for his own requirement

o 2 phases

 Transition

 Controls of the non-pricing aspects to be lifted

 Liberalization of oil importation, etc

 Full Deregulation

 Controls on the price of oil and OPSF to be abolished

Facts

 Feb 8, 1997: Full deregulation

 Petitioner assails constitutionality of both RA 8180 and EO 372 o Seeks

annulment of Sec. 5(b) of RA 8180 (Tatad)  “tariff duty shall be imposed on
imported crude oil at 3% and imported refined petroleum products at 7%”

o Seeks annulment of Sec. 15 RA 8180 and EO 392 or DOE Act  Sec. 15: “upon
approval of Pres, DOE shall implement deregulation not later than March 1997,
and time it when the prices in world market are declining and when exchange
rate of peso in relation to US dollar is stable”  EO 372: “DOE, upon approval of
Pres, institute the programs and time table of deregulation

Issues & Ratio

WON Sec. 5(b) violates the one title-one subject requirement of the Constitution.

NO.  Title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and
minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title
may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may
be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and
means of carrying out the general subject.

WON Sec. 15 violates constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power.

NO.  Delegation of legislative power has become and inevitability in light

of the increasing complexity of task of gov.

Also, it passed both the completeness and sufficient standard test, which is
necessary to determine a valid delegation. o Congress expressly provided that full
deregulation starts at the end of March 1997 and is mandatory o The discretion
of Pres. is merely to advance the date of full regulation before the end of March
1997. However, Executive dept. should not have considered the factor of
depletion of OPSF Fund to hasten the full deregulation.

WON RA 8180 on tariff differential, inventory reserves, and predatory prices

imposed barriers to the entry and exit of new players in our downstream oil
industry.

YES.  The tariff differential of 4% works to the immense benefit of Petron,

Shell and Caltex (as a foreign oligopoly).  Those who will compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%.  The first
need is to attract new players without heavy disincentives. Thus, the argument
that tariff diff is desirable bec it will induce players to invest in refineries, puts the
cart before the horse.  The provision on inventory also benefits the three main
players, as they can easily comply with it in view of their existing storage facilities.
 Finally, the ban on predatory pricing. The penal sanction will deters new players
from entering the oil market and the practice of lowering prices is now
condemned as a criminal act. Hence, the prohibition should be removed. Thus,
the total effect of the untimely deregulation, the imposition of 4% tariff
differential, the requirement of inventory and the prohibition on predatory
pricing renders the whole RA 8180 unconstitutional.
Case No. 7. Tañada v. Tuvera,

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it
was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24,
1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees,
declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect."
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification
of that decision.[1] Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are
not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means
complete publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official
Gazette.[2]

In the Comment[3] required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion
was a request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the
merits, that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant
that the publication required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when
necessary, did not have to be made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject
decision was concurred in only by three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited
a Reply[4] refuting these arguments. Came next the February Revolution and the Court
required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in view of the supervening events,
under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he submitted that issuances
intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for particular
persons did not have to be published; that publication when necessary must be in full and
in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not
binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. [5]

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication."
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the
original petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold,
that the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause
does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval,
or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An
example, as pointed out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in
the original decision,[6] is the Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen
days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such publication."
The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which
of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any
legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and
this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, [the legislative enactments of
the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application,
for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some
that do not apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a
particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant
naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public although
it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a
matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation
or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the
public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that
place. All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a
public place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are
meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that
body is supposed to enforce.

However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of

Social Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules
laid down by the head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his
personnel or the wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are
not covered by this rule but by the Local Government Code.

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its
purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such
decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity,
and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in
which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. [7] The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette [8] and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. [9] One reserved his vote[10] and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it
should be made.[11] It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to
arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by
the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers
of general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the
people as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out
regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or
authorized by existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of
the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we
have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or
modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the
legislature. Our task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by
the political departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil
Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere,
as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after
a different period provided by the legislature. [NOTE THAT THIS HAS BEEN
CHANGED BY AN EXECUTIVE ORDER ALLOWING PUBLICATION IN A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION.]

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as
possible, to give effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the parties, that a law could be rendered
unenforceable by a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to cause its
publication as required. This is a matter, however, that we do not need to examine at this
time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again
an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and
available always to public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain
democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.

Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review
the work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their
freedom of expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the
legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade
is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon
their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette,
to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date
specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.