ANSELMO L. PESIGAN v.

JUDGE DOMINGO MEDINA ANGELES 3

PEOPLE V. VERIDIANO 4

TANADA V. TUVERA 5

CUSTOMS V. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION 8

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA v. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013 11

KASILAG V. RODRIQUES, 69 PHIL 217 13

USON VS. DEL ROSARIO 15

ACOSTA V. PLAN 17

SPOUSES DACUDAO V. GONZALES 19

BPI v. IAC 21

DE BORJA v DE BORJA 23

ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE V. SPS. GRAVADOR 25

GUINGONA V. CARAGUE 26

S. D. MARTINEZ v. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK 28

AMARGOS V. CA 29

NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION (NAMARCO) V. MIGUEL D. TECSON, INSURANCE COMMISSIONER 30

Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales 31

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO G.R. No. L-19671 33

VAN DORN V. ROMILLO 35

PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA 37

People v. Ritter 39

ARDIENTE V. SPOUSES PASTORFIDE 41

DONATO V. LUNA 43

Landicho v. Relova 45

ROE v. WADE 47

GELUZ V CA 48

Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13 , July 31, 1970 49

De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 863 Nov. 28, 1933 51

Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante 52

DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS INC 53

Eugenio v Velez 55

JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO 57

SMITH BELL V. NATIVIDAD 59

BARLIN VS. RAMIREZ 62

STANDARD OIL CO. V. ARENAS 63

Mercado v. Espiritu 65

BAMBALAN V. MARAMBA 66

Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara 67

De Braganza v. De Villa Abrille 68

US v VAQUILAR 70

People v. Rafanan, 71

Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 Sep. 3, 1991 1

CASE # 1
ANSELMO L. PESIGAN v. JUDGE DOMINGO
MEDINA ANGELES
GR No. L-64279, Apr 30, 1984, Aquino, J. |
TOPIC: Effectivity of laws
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the
contents of the regulations and make the said penalties
binding on the persons affected thereby.
FACTS
● Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan, carabao dealers,
transported on April 2, 1982, 26 carabaos and a calf from
Camarines Sur with Batangas, as the destination.
● They had (1) a health certificate (2) a permit to transport
large cattle and (3) certificates of inspection
● In spite of these, while passing at Basud, Camarines
Norte, they were confiscated by Zenarosa, the town's
police station commander, and by Doctor Miranda,
provincial veterinarian.
● The confiscation was based on the aforementioned
Executive Order No. 626-A which provides "that
henceforth, no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be
transported from one province to another.
● The Pesigans filed against Zenarosa and Doctor Miranda
an action for replevin for the recovery of the carabaos.
The case was dismissed for lack of cause of action.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
● Can E.O. 626-A be enforced against the Pesigans when
it was only published on June 14, 1982?
RULING
● NO. The said executive order should not be enforced
against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982 because, as already
noted, it is a penal regulation published more than two
months later in the Official Gazette dated June 14, 1982.
It became effective only fifteen days thereafter as
provided in article 2 of the Civil Code and section 11 of
the Revised Administrative Code.
● The word "laws" in article 2 includes circulars and
regulations which prescribe penalties. Publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the
persons affected thereby.
● This applies to a violation of E.O. No. 626-A because its
confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes
it a penal statute. Justice and fairness dictate that the
public must be informed of that provision by means of
publication in the Gazette before violators of the
executive order can be bound thereby.
● Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential
executive orders having general applicability should be
published in the Official Gazette. It provides that "every
order or document which shall prescribe a penalty shall
be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect".
● The summary confiscation was thus not in order.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the trial court's order of dismissal and the confiscation
and dispersal of the carabaos are reversed and set aside.
Respondents Miranda and Zenarosa are ordered to restore the
carabaos, with the requisite documents, to the petitioners, who as
owners are entitled to possess the same, with the right to dispose of
them in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.
CASE # 2
PEOPLE V. VERIDIANO
G.R. No. L-62243 | TOPIC: Effectivity of Laws
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Actual publication of the penal law is indispensable for
its effectivity.
FACTS
● On or about the 2nd week of May 1979, private
respondent Benito Go Bio Jr. issued a check amounting
to P200, 000 to one Filipinas Tan. Said check was
subsequently dishonored and despite repeated
demands, the respondent failed to make the necessary
payment. Hence, the filing of charges against him for
violation of B.P. 22 or the Bouncing Check law.
● Go Bio filed a Motion to Quash alleging that the
information did not charge an offense on ground that
BP 22 had not yet taken effect when the offense was
committed in May 1979.
● Said law took into effect on June 29, 1979. The
prosecution opposed the motion and contended that
the date of the dishonor of the check -- September 26,
1979, is the date of the commission of the offense,
hence BP 22 is applicable.
● The respondent judge granted Go Bio's motion and
dismissed the criminal action hence, this petition.
● Petitioner contends that BP 22 was published in the
Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became
effective 15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979. PR
contends however that said publication was only
released on June 14, 1979 but since the questioned
check was issued about the second week of May 1979,
then he could not have violated BP 22 because it was
not yet released for circulation at the time.
ISSUES
● W/N BP 22 was already in effect when the offense was
committed
RULING
● No.
● The penal statute in question was circulated only on
June 14, 1979 and not on its printed date of April 9,
1979.
● Publication of the law is necessary so that the public
can be apprised of the contents of a penal statute
before it can be bound by it. If a statute had not been
published before its violation, then in the eyes of the
law there was no such law to be violated.
● Hence, the accused could not have committed the
alleged crime.
● In effect, when the alleged offense was committed
there was still no law penalizing it. If BP 22 intended to
make the printed date of issue of the Official Gazette
as the point of reference in the determination of its the
effectivity, it could have provided a special effectivity
provision. Finally, the term "publication" in BP 22 must
be given the ordinary accepted meaning, to make
known to the people in general.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated August 23,
1982 is hereby AFFIRMED.
NOTES:
 CASE # 3
TANADA V. TUVERA
G.R. NO. L-63915, Dec.29, 1986 | TOPIC:
Effectivity of Laws
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The clause “unless otherwise provided” in Art. 2 of the
NCC refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted.
FACTS
● Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due
process in demanding the disclosure of a number of
Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been
published as required by Law.
● The government argued that while publication was
necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise
provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that
they were to become effective immediately upon
approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming
the necessity for publication of some of the decrees.
○ The court ordered the respondents to publish in
the official gazette all unpublished Presidential
Issuances which are of general force and effect.
● The petitioners are now before the Supreme Court again
for reconsideration and suggest that there should be no
distinction between laws of general applicability and
those which are not. The publication means complete
publication, and that publication must be made in the
official gazette.
● In a comment required by the solicitor general, he
claimed first that the motion was a request for an
advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed, and on the
merits, that the clause “unless otherwise provided” in
Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative, that the
publication when necessary, did not have to be made in
the official gazette.
ISSUES
● Does the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Art. 2 of
the NCC refer to the effectivity of laws and not to the
requirement of publication
● Can prior publication of laws before they become
effective be dispensed with? NO.
● For purposes of the prior publication requirement for
effectivity, does the term “laws” refer to all laws? YES
RULING
1. It refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any
event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or on any other date, without its previous
publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
2. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process
insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the
laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could
validly provide that a law be effective immediately upon
its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication.
3. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only
to those of general application, for strictly speaking all
laws relate to the people in general albeit there are
some that do not apply to them directly.
An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular
individual, like a relative of President Marcos who was
decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said
that such a law does not affect the public although it
unquestionably does not apply directly to all the
people. The subject of such law is a matter of public
interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law
without any bearing on the public would be invalid as
an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or
some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letters of instructions issued by administrative
superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be
published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects
only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those
naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or
requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary
Board must be published if they are meant not merely
to interpret but to "fill in the details” of the Central
Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
WHAT ARE NOT COVERED?
However, no publication is required of the instructions
issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare on the
case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the
rules laid down by the head of a government agency on
the assignments or workload of his personnel or the
wearing of office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal
ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.
Other Rules:
Publication must be full or no publication at all
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed
out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the number
of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the
supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement
of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement. This is not even substantial compliance.
Under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette and not
elsewhere
There is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership.
Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could
 better perform the function of communicating, the laws thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official
to the people as such periodicals are more easily Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their
available, have a wider readership, and come out publication, or on another date specified by the legislature, in
regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
publication is not the one required or authorized by
existing law. As far as we know, no amendment has NOTES:
been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor
General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not
yet been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon

the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if we find
it impractical. That is not our function. That function
belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved
by the political departments of the government in
accordance with the prescribed procedure.
Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that
under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazette and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after
fifteen days from such publication or after a different
period provided by the legislature.

Publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon

as possible

We also hold that the publication must be made

forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give effect
to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that
possibility, of course, although not suggested by the
parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by
a mere refusal of the executive, for whatever reason, to
cause its publication as required. This is a matter,
however, that we do not need to examine at this time.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above

defined shall immediately upon their approval, or as soon
CASE # 4
CUSTOMS V. HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 179579 | TOPIC: when laws
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The basic requirements of hearing and publication as provided
for by the Revised Administrative Code must be complied
with.
FACTS
● In 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued
CMO 27-2003 where wheat was classified according to
the following: (1) importer or consignee; (2) country of
origin; and (3) port of discharge; and which would be
the basis if wheat would be classified either as food
grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food
grade wheat was 3%, for feed grade, 7%.
● On December 19, 2003, respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the Las Piñas City RTC since it
feared that their importation of Chinese milling wheat
would be affected by the memorandum. Respondent
argued that the order was in violation of the Revised
Administrative Code and publication or registration with
the University of the Philippines Law Center.
● Hypermix alleged that the regulation adjudged their
import as feed grade without the benefit of prior
examination; thus, it would be subjected to the 7%
tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing them to
pay 133% more than was proper.
● Respondent also contended that the equal protection
clause of the Constitution was violated when the
regulation treated non-flour millers differently from
flour millers for no reason at all.
● Lastly, respondent asserted that the retroactive
application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.
● In 2004, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) effective for twenty (20) days from notice.
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss.
● Customs alleged that: (1) the RTC did not have
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case,
because respondent was asking for a judicial
determination of the classification of wheat; (2) an
action for declaratory relief was improper; (3) CMO 27-
2003 was an internal administrative rule and not
legislative in nature; and (4) the claims of respondent
were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of
Customs (BOC) had yet to examine respondent’s
products.
● In 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision without having
to resolve the application for preliminary injunction and
the Motion to Dismiss since both parties agreed that it
would be resolved together in the main case.
● The trial court ruled in favor of respondent Hypermix
The RTC struck down the regulation, ruling that the
basic requirements of hearing and publication in the
issuance of CMO 27-2003 were not complied with.
Petitioners appealed to the CA which was dismissed,
hence this petition.
ISSUES
 ● Whether or not the new regulation shall be struck
down.
RULING
● YES. petitioners failed to follow the requirements
enumerated by the Revised Administrative Code, the
assailed regulation must be struck down.
● Applying the provisions of the Rules of administrative
code
Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to wit:
Section 3. Filing. - (1) Every agency shall file with the University
of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that
date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against
any party of persons.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9. Public Participation. - (1) If not otherwise required by
law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate
notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any
rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before
the first hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature,
its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance,
for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself
has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the
administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the
means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the
burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and
thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law.
● The Tariffs and Customs law mandates that the
customs officer must first assess and determine the
classification of the imported article before tariff may
be imposed. Unfortunately, CMO 23-2007 has already
classified the article even before the customs officer
had the chance to examine it. In effect, petitioner
Commissioner of Customs diminished the powers
granted by the Tariff and Customs Code with regard to
wheat importation when it no longer required the
customs officer's prior examination and assessment of
the proper classification of the wheat.
● Petitioners violated respondent's right to due process in
the issuance of CMO 27-2003 when they failed to
observe the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code. Petitioners likewise violated
respondent's right to equal protection of laws when
they provided for an unreasonable classification in the
application of the regulation. Finally, petitioner
Commissioner of Customs went beyond his powers of
delegated authority when the regulation limited the
 powers of the customs officer to examine and assess
imported articles.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is DENIED.,

NOTES:
CASE # 5
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA v. MILITARY SHRINE
SERVICES G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
TOPIC: Effectivity; Publication
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents
of the laws.
FACTS
● President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 427
to reserve parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig,
Taguig, Parañaque, Rizal and Pasay City for a military
reservation which is now known as Fort Bonifacio.
● President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No.
208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a
certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a
national shrine. The excluded area is now known as
Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine
Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).
● Again, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476
that further amended the proclamation that excluded
the barangays of Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and
Signal Village and a handwritten addendum which
includes Western Bicutan for the disposition of the
area. The proclamation was published in the Official
Gazette without the handwritten addendum.
● President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No.
172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No.
2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2
of Western Bicutan and declared said lots open for
disposition.
● Through the years, informal settlers increased and
occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier
General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order No.
1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause
the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
● Members of petitioner NagkakaisangMaralita ng
SitioMasigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the
Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
and prayed for the reclassification of the areas they
occupied, covering Lot 3 of Western Bicutan, from
public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant
to Proclamation No. 2476.
● COSLAP issued a Resolution granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and
disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.
● The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation
No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention
of the President could not be defeated by the
negligence or inadvertence of others.
● NMSMI and WBLOAI filed Petition for Review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
● W/N handwritten addendum of President Marcos have
the force and effect of law though it was not included
in the publication?
RULING
● NO, the handwritten addendum of President Marcos did determination of whether the handwritten addendum
not have the force and effect law since it was not has the force and effect of law.
included in the publication. We agree that the
publication must be in full or it is no publication at all DISPOSITIVE PORTION
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are
of the laws. hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the
● Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2. Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009
Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been
effect one year after such publication. Under the above rendered moot. No costs.
provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law
itself has otherwise provided.
● Laws should refer to ALL LAWS and not only to those
of general application. To be valid, the law must
invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole. We
hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, SHALL BE PUBLISHED as a
condition for their effectivity.
● We agree that the publication MUST BE IN FULL or it is
no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. Furthermore, under
Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative
Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima
facie evidence of its authority.
● Petitions were denied for LACK OF MERIT because their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos alleging that he intended to include
Western Bicutan in the reclassification of public land to
alienable and disposable property. The resolution on
whether or not subject lots were reclassified to
alienable and disposable property lies in the
CASE # 6
KASILAG V. RODRIQUES, 69 PHIL 217
G.R. NO. 46623 | TOPIC: Ignorance of the Law
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be
the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such
basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he
is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding
the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof
and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know,
as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited
by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of
the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the
basis of GF.
FACTS
● Marcial Kasilag and Emiliana Ambrosio entered a
contract of mortgage.
○ The contract is for the improvements of land
acquired as homestead to secure the payment of
the indebtedness of P1,000 plus interest.
○ The parties stipulated that Emilina Ambrosio was
to pay the debt with interest within 4 ½ years.,
and in such case, mortgage would not have any
effect.
○ They also agreed that Emiliana Ambrosio would
execute a deed of sale if it would not be paid
within 4 ½ years and that she would pay the tax
on the land.
● After a year, it turned out that she was not able to pay
the tax. Hence, they entered into a verbal agreement.
She conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on
the condition that they would not collect the interest of
the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax,
would benefit by the fruits of the land, & would introduce
improvement thereof.
○ These pacts made by the parties independently
were calculated to alter the mortgage a contract
clearly entered into, converting the latter into a
contract of antichresis.
○ The contract of antichresis, being a real
encumbrance burdening the land, is illegal and
void because it is legal and valid.
ISSUES
● Whether the petitioner should be deemed the possessor
of the land in good faith because he was unaware of any
flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by
which it is invalidated?
RULING
● It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant with the
laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the
mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the
well-grounded belief that he was not violating the
prohibition regarding the alienation of the land.
● In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive
its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that
the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes
of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a
lien, was prohibited by section 116.
 a. These considerations again bring us to the
conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance
of the provisions of section 116 is excusable and
may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
● We do not give much importance to the change of the
tax declaration, which consisted in making the petitioner
appear as the owner of the land, because such an act
may only be considered as a sequel to the change of
possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner,
about which we have stated that the petitioner's
ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We,
therefore, hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in
taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.
● Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be
the basis of GF but excusable ignorance may be such
basis (if it is based upon ignorance of a fact.) It is a fact
that the petitioner is not conversant w/ the laws bec. he
is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the
improvements he proceeded on the well-grounded
belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding
the alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof
and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did not know,
as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and
enjoyment of the fruits are attributes of the contract of
antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited
by Sec. 116. Thus, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of
the provisions of sec. 116 is excusable and may be the
basis of GF.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE,

NOTES:
CASE # 7
USON VS. DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. L-4963 | TOPIC: Retroactivity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● "If a right should be declared for the first time in this
Code, it shall be effective at once, even though the act
or event which gives rise thereto may have been done
or may have occurred under the prior legislation,
provided said new right does not prejudice or impair
any vested or acquired right, of the same origin."
FACTS
● This is an action for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of five (5) parcels of land situated in the
municipality of Labrador, Province of Pangasinan, filed
by Maria Uson (petitioner - lawful wife) against Maria
del Rosario and her four children (defendants -
common law wife and illegitimate children)
● Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda
who upon his death in 1945 left the lands involved in
this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir
except his widow Maria Uson. However, plaintiff claims
that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-
law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of
said lands
● Defendants argue that Maria Uson and her husband, the
late Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document
whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife
and, in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson
was given a parcel of land by way of alimony and in
return she renounced her right to inherit any other
property
● RTC: rendered decision ordering the defendants to
restore to the plaintiff the ownership and possession of
the lands
● Defendants’ argument: while it is true that the four
minor defendants are illegitimate children of the late
Faustino Nebreda and under the old Civil Code are not
entitled to any successional rights, however, under the
new Civil Code which became in force in June, 1950,
they are given the status and rights of natural children
and are entitled to the successional rights which the
law accords to the latter (Article 2264 and article 287,
new Civil Code), and because these successional rights
were declared for the first time in the new code, they
shall be given retroactive effect even though the event
which gave rise to them may have occurred under the
prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).
ISSUES
● WON the successional rights under the NCC should be
given retroactive effect. NO.
RULING
● Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that
rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event which gave
rise to them may have occurred under the former
legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do
not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same
origin
● The right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in
question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her
late husband and this is so because of the imperative
provision of the law which commands that the rights to
succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code).
 ● The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor
of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot,
therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested
right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
costs.

NOTES: Petitioners win.

CASE # 8
ACOSTA V. PLAN
G.R. NO. L-44466 | TOPIC: Retroactivity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied
retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants.
'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the
time of their passage.
FACTS
NATURE OF THE ACTION:
This is a petition for review on certiorari from the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Isabela in Civil Case No. 1201, may
be dismissed for tardiness in submitting their record on appeal.
● Petitioners filed an accion publiciana against private
respondent Magday at the CFI of Isabela.
● The Court dismissed the complaint.
o MR = denied.
● On December 22, 1975, they filed a motion for leave to
appeal as paupers and on December 23, 1975, they filed
a notice of appeal.
o The CFI granted their motion to appeal as paupers.
● Believing that as pauper litigants they did not have to
submit a record on appeal, they waited for the trial court
to elevate the entire records of the case to CA (as
provided in Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court).
● On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal
for failure to file a record on appeal, hence this petition.
o Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record
on appeal was indeed required to be filed by a
pauper appellant although it did not have to be
printed.
ISSUES
Whether or not a timely submission of a record on appeal is
required for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant
RULING
No, a timely submission of a record on appeal is not required
for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant.
Under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on
appeal was indeed required to be filed by a pauper appellant
although it did not have to be printed. However, under B.P. Blg.
129, which has overtaken this case before it could be decided,
a record on appeal is no longer required for the perfection of an
appeal. This new rule was given retroactive effect in Alday vs.
Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 where We Ruled:
"The reorganization having been declared to have
been completed, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is now in
full force and effect. A record on appeal is no longer
necessary for taking an appeal. The same proviso
appears in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines issued by this Court on January 11, 1983.
As held in People v Sumilang, being procedural in nature, those
provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of
petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure
of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retrospective in that sense and to that extent.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 WHEREFORE, the decision dated October 3, 1975, of the
trial court and its orders of June 16, 1976 and August 23, 1976
are hereby set aside. The trial court is hereby ordered to
forward the entire records of Civil Case No. 1201 to the Court of
Appeals for the determination and disposition of the
petitioners' appeal on the merits.

NOTES:
CASE # 9
SPOUSES DACUDAO V. GONZALES
G.R. NO. 188056 | TOPIC: Retroactivity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect.
However, an exception to the rule is when the law
concerned is procedural in nature as it does not create
new rights or take away vested rights.
FACTS
● Petitioners were among the investors whom Celso G.
Delos Angeles, Jr. and his associates in the Legacy
Group of Companies (Legacy Group) allegedly
defrauded through the Legacy Group’s “buy back
agreement” that earned them check payments that
were dishonored.
● After their written demands for the return of their
investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of
charges for syndicated estafa against Delps Angeles, Jr.
in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City.
● On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued DO
No. 182, directing all Regional State Prosecutors to
forward all cases already filed against Delos Angeles,
Jr. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila
for appropriate action.
● Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners
were forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Davao City to the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the
DOJ.
● Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have
directly come to the SC via petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus.
● They claim that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of
justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of
laws with retroactive effect.
ISSUES
● W/N DO No. 182 was issued in violation of the
prohibition against passing laws with retroactive effect.
RULING
● No. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive
effect. However, an exception to such rule concerns a
law that is procedural in nature.
● The reason is that a remedial statute or a statute
relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only
operates in furtherance of the remedy or the
confirmation of already existing rights.
● A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent.
● The retroactive application is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel adversely affected, for, verily,
no vested right generally attaches to or arises from
procedural laws.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.

NOTES: There were also constitutional issues raised in the

case, but not relevant to the topic.
CASE # 10
BPI v. IAC
G.R. NO. 66826 | TOPIC: D. Acts executed
against mandatory or prohibitory laws; NCC 5
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity.
● See the highlighted portion of the ruling.
FACTS
● Plaintiff Rizaldy Zshornack and his wife had maintained
both a dollar savings, and a peso current account with
petitioner BPI’s predecessor Commercial Bank and Trust
Company [COMTRUST] Quezon City Branch.
● On December 8, 1975, Rizaldy entered into a written
contract of deposit with COMTRUST by entrusting his
$3,000 [also called greenbacks] for safekeeping.
● When Rizaldy requested for the return of his greenbacks
on May 10, 1976, COMTRUST could no longer return the
same because it was sold by COMTRUST and was then
converted and deposited into Rizaldy’s pesos current
account:
○ $2,000 sold on Dec. 29, 1975 for P14,920;
○ $1,000 sold on Feb. 3, 1976 for P8,350.
● Moreover, the bank asserts that it could not enter into a
contract of deposit because it is prohibited by a Central
Bank Circular. Thus, said contract is a purely personal
transaction between Rizaldy and the bank’s assistant
branch manager Garcia because it was the latter who
entered into such contract.
● As a result, Rizaldy filed a complaint against COMTRUST
to retrieve his greenbacks, and in his complaint, Rizaldy
attached the written contract [an actionable document]
which the bank failed to specifically deny under oath.
● The CFI ruled in favor of Rizaldy and ordered the bank to
return his $3,000 greenbacks. BPI appealed with the
Intermediate Appellate Court, but it merely reiterated
the CFI’s decision. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
● Could Rizaldy enforce his contract of deposit against
BPI? No
RULING
● The transaction herein involves a foreign exchange
receipt by a bank. Under a Central Bank Circular, the
foreign currency received needs to be sold immediately
to the Central Bank. Thus, COMTRUST’s contract of
deposit with Rizaldy is void because the banks cannot
enter into such contracts in violation of the Central
Bank’s Circular.
● The mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling
them to the Central Bank within one business day from
receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB
Circular No. 20; hence it is a prohibited transaction. Thus,
pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having
been executed against the provisions of a
mandatory/prohibitory law.
● Neither of the parties has a cause of action against the
other because: "When the nullity proceeds from the
illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the
act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in
pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action against
each other . . . " [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.]
● In this case, only the State has a remedy, that is to
prosecute the parties for violating the law.
 DISPOSITIVE PORTION company or corporation residing or located within the
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Philippines, who acquires foreign exchange shall not, unless
Petitioner is ordered to restore to the dollar savings account of private authorized by the Central Bank, dispose of such foreign
respondent the amount of US$1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to earn exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value,
interest at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar savings deposits. nor delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is
Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent the amount of
customary; Provided, That, within one business day upon taking
P8,000.00 as damages. The other causes of action of private
ownership or receiving payment of foreign exchange the
respondent are ordered dismissed.
aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such foreign
NOTES: exchange to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.
Irrelevant facts to the issue, na baka itanong parin for additional
case context: Contract of Deposit:
● On October 27, 1975, COMTRUST’s Assistant Branch We acknowledged (sic) having received from you today the sum
Manager Virgilio V. Garcia accomplished a $1,000 dollar of US DOLLARS: THREE THOUSAND ONLY (US$3,000.00) for
draft application (a check application) payable to a safekeeping. Sgd. Virgilio Garcia
certain Leovigilda D. Dizon which was charged against
Rizaldy’s dollar savings account; however, the purchaser
of said dollar draft was left anonymous. On the same
day, the said check was issued under Garcia’s signature.
● Rizaldy noticed the unauthorized withdrawal of $1,000
from his dollar savings account; the bank explained that
the withdrawal was caused by Rizaldy’s brother [Atty.
Ernesto Zshornack Jr.] when the latter encashed a
cashier’s check issued by the Manila Banking Corp which
was payable to Ernesto.
● Rizaldy, unsatisfied with the COMTRUST’s explanation,
filed a case to retrieve his $1,000, which the Court
eventually granted with interest and damages because
the withdrawal was unauthorized and it appeared that
Ernesto’s transaction was entirely different from the
$1,000 withdrawal assailed by Rizaldy.

Central Bank Circular No. 20, as amended – All receipts of

foreign exchange by any resident person, firm, company or
corporation shall be sold to authorized agents of the Central
Bank by the recipients within one business day following the
receipt of such foreign exchange. Any resident person, firm,
CASE # 11
DE BORJA v DE BORJA
G.R. NO. | TOPIC: 5. Waiver of Right, NCC 6,
NCC 301
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The hereditary share in a decedent's estate is
transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of
the death of the causante or predecessor in interest, and
there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite
contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual
extent of such share is not determined until the
subsequent liquidation of the estate. The effect of such
alienation is to be deemed limited to what is ultimately
adjudicated to the vendor heir, but the aleatory
character of the contract does not affect the validity of
the transaction.
FACTS
● Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa
Tangco, filed a petition for the probate of her will
○ The will was probated, Francisco de Borja was
appointed executor and administrator: their son,
Jose de Borja, was appointed co-administrator.
● Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second
wife, Tasiana Ongsingco.
● Upon Francisco's death, Tasiana (2nd wife) instituted
testate proceedings where, in 1955, she was appointed
special administratrix.
● The relationship between the children of the first
marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued with
several court suits and counter-suits
● In order to put an end to all these litigations, a
compromise agreement was entered into by and
between "The heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his
first marriage, namely, Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco,"
and "The heir and surviving spouse of Francisco de Borja
by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja,
assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton, Jr."
● Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval the
agreement (CFI Rizal and CFI Nueva Ecija)
● Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed both
instances on the ground that:
○ (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind of
agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco de Borja;
○ (2) that the same involves a compromise on the
validity of the marriage between Francisco de
Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and
○ (3) that even if it were valid, it has ceased to
have force and effect.
● In assailing the validity of the agreement, Tasiana relies
on this Court’s decision in Guevara v. Guevara wherein
the Court held the view that presentation of a will for
probate is mandatory and that the settlement and
distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when
the decedent left a will, is against the law and public
policy.
ISSUES
● Is the compromise agreement valid?
RULING
● Yes. The doctrine of Guevara vs. Guevara, ante, is not
applicable to the case at bar.
 ● Paragraph 2 of said agreement specifically stipulates
that the sum of P800,000 payable to Tasiana Ongsingco
—"shall be considered as full — complete payment —
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the
late Francisco de Borja as well as the estate of Josefa
Tangco, . . . and to any properties bequeathed or devised
in her favor by the late Francisco de Borja by Last Will
and Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa
or purportedly conveyed to her for consideration or
otherwise."
● There was no attempt to settle or to distribute the
estate of Francisco among the heirs thereto before the
probate of his will.
● The clear object of the contract was merely the
conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her individual share
and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of
Francisco and Josefa. Since a hereditary share in a
decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately
from the moment of the death of such predecessor in
interest, there is no legal bar to a successor disposing of
her or his hereditary share immediately after such death,
even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate. Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be
deemed limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the
vendor heir.
● The aleatory character of the contract does not affect
the validity of the transaction; neither does the
coetaneous agreement that the numerous litigations
between the parties are to be considered settled and
should be dismissed, although such stipulation gives the
contract the character of a compromise that the law
CASE # 12
favors, for obvious reasons, if only because it serves to
avoid a multiplicity of suits.
● Since the compromise contract Annex A was entered
into by and between "Jose de Borja personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco" on
the one hand, and on the other, "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage,
Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", it is clear that the
transaction was binding on both in their individual
capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even
without previous authority of the Court to enter into the
same
● The only difference between an extrajudicial
compromise and one that is submitted and approved by
the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution
proceedings. Art. 2037 of the Civil Code is explicit on the
point:
Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the
effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no
execution except in compliance with a judicial
compromise.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal in Case No. L-28040 is hereby affirmed;
while those involved in Cases Nos. L-28568 and L-28611 are
reversed and set aside. Costs against the appellant Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de Borja in all three (3) cases.
NOTES:

ASIAN CATHAY FINANCE V. SPS. GRAVADOR
G.R. NO. 186550 | TOPIC: Waiver of Rights
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and
effective, it must, in the first place, be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to
the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. Additionally, the intention to
waive a right or an advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly.
FACTS
● Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (ACFLC)
extended a loan of P800,000 to respondents. The loan
was payable in sixty (60) monthly installments of
P24,400.00 each. To secure the loan, respondent Cesario
executed a real estate mortgage over his property in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. The real estate mortgage contains a
provision on the waiver of the mortgagor's right of
redemption.
● Respondents paid the initial installment due but they
were unable to pay the subsequent ones. The ACFLC
sent a letter to them demanding payment of
P1,871,480.00 within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
Respondents requested for an additional period to settle
their account, but ACFLC denied the request.
● Subsequently, respondents filed a suit for annulment of
real estate mortgage, and declared as null and void the
provisions on the waiver of mortgagor's right of
redemption and imposition of the liquidated damages.
RTC ruled against the respondents upholding the validity
of the waiver.
● Then they appealed to the CA. Fortunately, it reversed
the decision of RTC and said that such waiver is against
public policy. Consequently, ACFLC petitioned for review.
ISSUES
● Whether or not the waiver for the right of redemption
of the respondents is valid.
RULING
● No. Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and
effective, it must, in the first place, be couched in clear
and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to
the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which
legally pertains to him. Additionally, the intention to
waive a right or an advantage must be shown clearly and
convincingly. Unfortunately, ACFLC failed to convince us
that respondents waived their right of redemption
voluntarily.
● As the CA had taken pains to demonstrate:
a. The supposed waiver by the mortgagors was
contained in a statement made in fine print in the
REM. It was made in the form and language
prepared by [petitioner] ACFLC while the
[respondents] merely affixed their signatures or
adhesion thereto. It thus partakes of the nature of
a contract of adhesion. It is settled that doubts in
the interpretation of stipulations in contracts of
adhesion should be resolved against the party that
prepared them. This principle especially holds
true with regard to waivers, which are not
presumed, but which must be clearly and
convincingly shown. [Petitioner] ACFLC presented
no evidence hence it failed to show the efficacy of
this waiver.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
83197 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
CASE # 13

GUINGONA V. CARAGUE
196 SCRA 221 , April 22, 1991
GR 94571 Repeal of laws
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● This transitory provision of the Constitution has
precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the
social order so that legislation by the then President
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in
force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the
Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or
revoked.
FACTS
● The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic
appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service) and
P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831: The General
Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the
appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
● The petitioners seek the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177,
and P.D. No. 1967. They also aver that the said automatic
appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then
President Marcos became functus oficio when he was
ousted in February, 1986. Also, it should have become
inoperative after adoption of 1987 Constitution and that
said decrees are inconsistent with:
● Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, whereby bills
have to be approved by the President, then a law must
be passed by Congress to authorize said automatic
appropriation and
● Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which
provides: No money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
ISSUES
● WON the Presidential decrees became inoperative when
Pres. Marcos was ousted and/or the PD’s are
inconsistent with the constitution. - No
RULING
● Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes
that "All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the
Constitution shall remain operative until amended,
repealed or revoked." This transitory provision of the
Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers
to preserve the social order so that legislation by the
then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are
to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent
with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended,
repealed or revoked.
● The argument of petitioners that the said presidential
decrees are inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of
Article VI of the Constitution is untenable. The framers
of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing
laws in the statute books including existing presidential
decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere
"bills" that must again go through the legislative. The
only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the
Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean
appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If
the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they
should have expressed their decision in a more direct or
express manner. Repeal or amendment by implication is
frowned upon.
● PDs were not automatically revoked upon the ouster of
Marcos. The Court held that these laws remain operative
 until they are amended, repealed, or revoked, and so long
as they are not inconsistent with the Constitution. In
addition, the Court dismissed petitioners' argument that
the aforecited PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24,
Art. VI pertaining to "all appropriation, revenue or tariff
bills," mainly because the PDs in question are considered
enacted laws and not bills.
● The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended
by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967
constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations,
unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by
Congress.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without
pronouncement as to costs

NOTES:
CASE # 14
S. D. MARTINEZ v. WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK
GR No. 5691, Dec 27, 1910, Moreland, J. |
TOPIC: Customs
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● See bold.
FACTS
● In 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding a
carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon
owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of
fodder and to which two horses are attached), came
from the opposite direction, while their carromata went
close to the sidewalk in order to let the delivery wagon
pass by. However, instead of merely passing by, the
horses ran into the carromata occupied by the plaintiff
with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut
upon the plaintiff’s head.
● The defendant contends that the cochero, who was
driving his delivery wagon at the time of the accident,
was actually a good servant and was considered a safe
and reliable cochero. He also claims that the cochero
was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle Herran, and
for that purpose the defendant’s employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the
delivery wagon for the purpose of unloading the forage
to be delivered. However, a vehicle passed by the driver
and made noises that frightened the horses causing
them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses
since he was thrown upon the ground.
● The lower court ruled that the defendant was guilty of
negligence under Art. 1903 NCC. Hence, this is appeal.
ISSUES
● Was the cochero negligent and liable for the accident?
RULING
● NO. The court applied jurisprudence and customary
practices to determine that the defendant was not
negligent in his acts. They held that the act of the
defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner
proved was not unreasonable or imprudent. Accidents
sometimes happen and injuries result from the most
ordinary acts of life.
● It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof
that it is the universal practice of merchants to deliver
merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the
time of the injury, in the manner in which that was
then being delivered; and that it is the universal
practice to leave the horses in the manner in which
they were left at the time of the accident. This is the
custom in all cities. It has not been productive of
accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself
unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced for years
without objection. Ought the public now, through the
courts, without prior objection or notice, to be
permitted to reverse the practice of decades and
thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting
under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces,
the customs of a people? We think not.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, The judgment is reversed, without special
finding as to costs. So ordered.
CASE # 15
ARMIGOS V. CA
G.R. NO. | TOPIC:
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
●
FACTS
● The private respondent, Cristito Mata, filed a complaint
against the herein petitioner with the Municipal Court
of Digos Davao del Sur, for the collection of damages
and attorney’s fees. After trial, judgement was rendered
in favor of the private respondent.
● A copy of the decision was received by the petitioner
on 8 June 1977 and the following day, he filed a notice
of appeal with the said municipal court.
● On June 24, 1977, he completed the other requirements
for the perfection of an appeal including the filing of an
appeal bond and the payment of the appellate court
docket fee.
● However, when the case was elevated to the CFI for
consideration of the appeal, the presiding judge thereof
ruled that the appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; consequently, he dismissed the
appeal.
● Petitioner contended that from June 9 to June 24, 1977,
when he perfected his appeal, only 15 days had elapsed
so that the the decision of the CFI Davao del Sur,
dismissing his appeal for having been filed beyond the
reglementary period, is erroneous and contrary to law;
that the computation of the period to appeal should
commency from the hour he received the copy of the
decision, so that the first of the 15-day period
comprising 24 hrs is from 4 o clock pm of June 9 to 4
pm of June10; and the last day from 4pm of June 23 to
4 pm of June 24.
ISSUES
● Whether the computation of period by the petitioner is
correct?
RULING
● No. The Court considered the day as synonymous with
the date. Consequently, the 5th day shall be the 15 days
after the appeal regardless of the time when it was
submitted.
● The rule in Art. 13 of the Civil Code to the effect that
“In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded
and the last day included, is similar but not identical to
Sec. 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided
that “Unless otherwise specially provided, the time
within which an act is required by law to be done shall
be computed by excluding the first day and including
the last; and if the last be Sunday or a legal holiday, it
shall be excluded,” as well as the old Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court which stated that prescribed or allowed
by the ROC by order of a court or by any other
applicable statute, the day of the act, event or default
after which the designated period of time begins to run
is not to be included. The last day of the period so
computed is to be included, unless it is a Sunday or
legal holiday. In which event the time shall run until the
end of the next day which is neither a Sunday or a legal
holiday.
CASE # 16
NATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION
(NAMARCO) V. MIGUEL D. TECSON, INSURANCE
COMMISSIONER
G.R. NO. L.29131 | TOPIC: Legal Periods
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of the NCC, an action upon a
judgment must be brought within 10 years from the
time the right of action accrues, which in the language
of Art. 1152, commences from the time judgment sought
to be revived has become final.
FACTS
● On Nov. 14, 1955, CFI rendered a decision in a civil case,
entitled Price Stabilization v. Miguel Tecson and Alto
Surety Insurance, ordering Tecson and Alto to pay
plaintiff PRATRA the sum of 7,200.
○ The decision was served upon the defendants on
Nov. 21, 1955.
● On Dec. 21, 1965, the National Marketing Corporation, as
successor to all the propertis, assets, rights and
chooses in action of the Price Stabilization Corporation,
filed with the same court, a complaint, against the
same defendants, for revival of the judgment rendered
in the previous civil case.
● Defendant Tecson moved to dismiss on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter and
prescription of action.
● Court issued an order on Feb. 14, 1966, stating that the
complaint is dismissed for being prescribed 2 days late.
(Decision was final on Dec. 21, 1955, revival of decision
was filed on Dec. 21, 1965, and with 1960 & 64 as leap
years, it is 2 days late.
ISSUES
● Is the present action for the revival of a judgment
barred by the statute of limitations? YES
RULING
● YES. Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of the NCC, an action upon
a judgment must be brought within 10 years from the
time the right of action accrues, which in the language
of Art. 1152, commences from the time judgment sought
to be revived has become final.
In this case, the decision became final on Dec. 21, 1955 as
there was no appeal or thirty days from notice of judgment.
Thus, it is confined to the date of Dec. 21, 1965 as its deadline.
Pursuant to Art. 7 of the NCC, whenever months are referred
to in the law, it shall be understood that the months are of 30
days, not the “natural, solar or calendar months”, unless they
are designated by name, in which case, they shall be
computed by the actual number of days they have.
Sec. 13 of RAC states that “months shall be understood to
refer to a calendar month.”. But in People v. Del Rosario, a
month is considered as the regular 30 day month and years
explicitly ordains 365 days. To uphold the RAC would be
judicial legislation and it is not for the Courts to interpret. It is
up to Congress to modify through legislative process and not
through the Supreme Court by judicial decree.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from should, as it is hereby
affirmed, without costs. It is so ordered.
CASE # 17
Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales
G.R. NO. L-37048| TOPIC: Binding effect
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and
their property, and those intended to promote public
order and good morals, shall not be rendered without
effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything
done or any agreements entered into a foreign country
FACTS
● The plaintiff & defendant were both citizens of the
Philippines, married & lived together from January 1919
until Spring of 1926. After which they voluntary
separated & have not lived together as man & wife, they
had 4 minor children together.
● After negotiations, both parties mutually agreed to
allow Manuela Barreto (plaintiff) for her & her children’s
support of P500 (five hundred pesos) monthly which to
be increased in cases of necessity & illness, and that
the title of certain properties be put in her name.
● Shortly after the agreement, Augusto Gonzales
(defendant), went to Reno, Nevada & secured in that
jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the ground of
desertion dated November 28, 1927.
● On that same date he went through the forms of
marriage with another Filipino citizen as well & had 3
children with her.
● When Gonzales left the Philippines, he reduced the
amount he had agreed to pay monthly for the support
of Manuela Barreto & her children & has not made the
payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
● Gonzales came back to the Philippines in August 1928
and shortly after, Barreto brought an action at the CFI-
Manila requesting to confirm & ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the courts of Nevada & invoked sec 9
of Act 2710.
● Such is requested to be enforced, and deliver to the
Guardian ad litem the equivalent of what would have
been due to their children as their legal portion from
respective estates had their parents died intestate on
November 28, 1927, they also prayed that the marriage
existing between Barreto & Gonzales be declared
dissolved & Gonzales be ordered to pay Barreto P500
per month, counsel fees of P5000 & all the expenses
incurred in educating the 3 minor sons.
● the CFI-Manila granted the judgement in favor of the
plaintiff & intervenors, but reduced the attorney’s fees
to P3000 instead & also granted the costs of the action
against the defendant, Hence, this appeal by Gonzales
saying that the lower court erred in their decision.
ISSUE
whether or not the divorce decree issued by the State of
Nevada can be ratified by Philippine Court
RULING
● NO. The Divorce Decree cannot be ratified in the
Philippines. Invoking Article 9 of the Civil Code, “The
laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are
binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a
foreign country.”
● And Article 11 of the Civil Code “the prohibitive laws
concerning persons, their acts and their property, and
those intended to promote public order and good
morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any
foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any
agreements entered into a foreign country”
● Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the
courts to approve of their own actions or permit the
personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be
affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which
our Government believes is contrary to public order and
good morals.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

● The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City

of Manila must therefore be reversed and defendant
absolved from the demands made against him in this
action. This, however, without prejudice to any right of
maintenance that plaintiff and the intervenors may
have against defendant. No special pronouncement as
to costs. So ordered.

TENCHAVEZ V. ESCANO G.R. No. L-19671
TOPIC: Divorce from foreign country | J. Reyes
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Divorce obtained in another country cannot be applied in
the Philippines being contrary to public policy. Well-
established is the principle that foreign decrees cannot be
enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy.
FACTS
● On February 24, 1948, Vicenta Escaño exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez without the knowledge of her
parents before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was the
culmination of a previous love affair and was duly
registered with the local civil registrar. As of June, 1948
the newlyweds were already estranged.
● On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for
divorce against the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial
District Court of the State of Nevada on the ground of
“extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character”.
● On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, “final and
absolute”, was issued in open court by the said tribunal. In
1951 Mamerto and Mena Escaño (Vicenta’s parents) filed a
petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their
daughter’s marriage to Pastor. On 10 September 1954,
Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her marriage.
● On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American,
Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. Tenchavez initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First
CASE # 18
Instance of Cebu against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents
whom he charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her
affections, and against the Roman Catholic Church, for
having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the
annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal separation
and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a valid
divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her
present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parents
denied that they had in anyway influenced their daughter’s
acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
● The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation,
but freed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to
acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the
counterclaim of Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against
the plaintiff-appellant.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce sight by Vicenta Escano is valid and
binding upon the Courts of the Philippines.
RULING
● NO. Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce.
Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign
decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens
because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such
grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens
who can afford divorce in foreign countries. The
adulterous relationship of Escano with her American
husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed
by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez
and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between
Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition
neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity
in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for
damages.
CASE # 19
Whether the divorce decree obtained by Alice is recognized in
VAN DORN V. ROMILLO
G.R. NO. L-68470 | TOPIC: Binding Effect
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality.
○ However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law.
FACTS
● Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the PH, while
respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the US. They
were married in HK and thereafter established their
residence in the PH. They begot 2 children, but the
parties were divorced in Nevada, US.
○ Alice remarried also in Nevada, to Theodore Van
Dorn.
● Upton filed suit against Alice stating that Alice’s business
in Ermita (the Galleon Shop) is conjugal property, and
asking that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of
that business, and Upton be declared with right to
manage the conjugal property.
● Alice moved to dismiss = barred by divorce proceedings.
○ RTC = denied MTD. Divorce decree has no bearing
because property is located in the PH.
ISSUE/S
the PH?
RULING
● Yes, the divorce obtained by Alice is recognized in the
Philippines.
● There can be no question as to the validity of that
Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States.
The decree is binding on private respondent as an
American citizen.
● For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner,
as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary
to local law and public policy.
● It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals
are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public
policy and morality.
● However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
● In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage.
● Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is
no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his
 right over the alleged conjugal property.
● To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, ALICE has to be considered still married to Upton
and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109,
et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
● Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is

hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No.
1075-P of his Court.
CASE # 20
PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA
G.R. NO. 80116 | TOPIC: Binding effect
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● A divorce and its legal effects obtained in another
country may be recognized in the Philippines in view of
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of
status of persons.
FACTS
● Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen,
and private respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a
German national, were married in Germany. The couple
lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born.
● Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual
recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.
● After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in private respondent
initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in
Germany
● Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal
separation, support and separation of property before
the Regional Trial Court of Manila where the same is
still pending.
● Court of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on
the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The
custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
○ The records show that under German law said
court was locally and internationally competent
for the divorce proceeding and that the
dissolution of said marriage was legally founded
on and authorized by the applicable law of that
foreign jurisdiction
● More than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, private respondent filed two complaints for
adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that,
while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had
an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982
and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983".
● Petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice
asking that the aforesaid resolution of respondent
fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed.
● Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining
order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower
court denying her motion to quash.
○ The petition is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio
(sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse
having obtained a final divorce decree under his
national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint."
ISSUE: WON Private respondent had legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was
the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. NO.
RULING
● Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime
of adultery, as well as four other crimes against
chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn
 written complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has b. Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
long since been established, with unwavering therefrom that the complaint can still be filed
consistency, that compliance with this rule is a after the declaration of nullity because such
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
● We are convinced that in cases of adultery, the status equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be being no marriage from the beginning, any
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. complaint for adultery filed after said declaration
● Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must of nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on.
be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is c. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the and within the purview of the decision in said
filing of the complaint. case is the situation where the criminal action
● In the present case, the fact that private respondent for adultery was filed before the termination of
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal the marriage by a judicial declaration of its
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines would necessarily apply where the termination of
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a
the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter valid foreign divorce.
of status of persons.
● Private respondent, being no longer the husband of
petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the
offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
● The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be
successfully relied upon by private respondent.
a. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code,
substantially the same as Article 333 of the
Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery
"although the marriage be afterwards declared
void", the Court merely stated that "the
lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital
vows, even though it should be made to appear
that she is entitled to have her marriage contract
declared null and void, until and unless she
actually secures a formal judicial declaration to
that effect".
CASE # 21
People v. Ritter
G.R. NO. 88582 | TOPIC: Human Relations |
March 5, 1991 | GUTIERREZ, JR., J.
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is also free
from civil liability which is impliedly instituted with the criminal
action. The well-settled doctrine is that a person while not
criminally liable may still be civilly liable. While the guilt of the
accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required
in a civil action for damages. The appellant certainly committed
acts contrary to morals, good customs, public order or public
policy (Article 21 Civil Code).
FACTS
The appellant challenges his conviction of the crime involving a
young girl of about 12 years old who had been allegedly raped
and who later died because of a foreign object left inside her
vaginal canal.
1. On or about October 10, 1986, accused Ritter brought
Jessie Ramirez and Rosario Baluyot inside his hotel room
in Olongapo City.
● Inside the hotel room, the accused told them to
take a bath. When Rosario came out of the
bathroom, she was told to remove her clothes by
the accused and to join him in bed.
● At that time, Jessie was already asleep but
Rosario touched him to call his attention. When
he looked, he saw the accused placing his penis
against the vagina of Rosario and that he was
trying to penetrate but it would not fit.
2. The following morning the accused left after paying the
children.
3. Rosario then told Jessie that the accused inserted
something in her vagina. Sometime the following day,
Jessie saw Rosario and he asked her whether the object
was already removed from her body and Rosario said
"Yes". However, Jessie claimed that on the evening of
that same date, he saw Rosario and she was complaining
of pain in her vagina and when he asked her, she said
that the foreign object was not yet removed.
4. Seven months later, Rosario was brought to the hospital
with bloodied skirt, unconscious and foul smelling.
5. After 6 days, Rosario got serious and was pronounced
dead subsequent to her operation with a portion of a
sexual vibrator extracted from her vagina.
6. A case for Rape with Homicide was filed against Ritter.
7. The Regional Trial Court of Olongapo rendered a decision
declaring him guilty beyond reasonable doubt citing the
rationale of Art 4 of the Revised Penal Code “He who is
the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
8. The Supreme Court however, reversed the judgment of
the lower court and acquitted Ritter.
ISSUE
Whether or not the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case
also releases him from civil liability?
RULING
1. No. It does not necessarily follow that the appellant is
also free from civil liability which is impliedly instituted
with the criminal action. The well-settled doctrine is
 that a person while not criminally liable may still be 6. The Court cannot overstress the responsibility for proper
civilly liable. behavior of all adults in the Philippines, including the
2. While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution appellant towards young children. The sexual
must be established beyond reasonable doubt, only a exploitation committed by the appellant should not and
preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action cannot be condoned. Thus, considering the
for damages. (Article 29, Civil Code). The judgment of circumstances of the case, the Court awarded damages
acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot in the amount of
only when it includes a declaration that the facts from P30,000.00.
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
3. Rosario Baluyot is a street child who ran away from her WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and
grandmother's house. Circumstances forced her to SET ASIDE. Appellant HEINRICH STEFAN RITTER is ACQUITTED
on grounds of reasonable doubt. The appellant is ordered to
succumb and enter this unfortunate profession.
pay the amount of P30,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary
Nonetheless, she has left behind heirs who have damages to the heirs of Rosario Baluyot. The Commissioner of
certainly suffered mental anguish, anxiety and moral Immigration and Deportation is hereby directed to institute
shock by her sudden and incredulous death as reflected proper deportation proceedings against the appellant and to
in the records of the case. Though the SC is acquitting immediately expel him thereafter with prejudice to re-entry
the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, it into the country.
emphasizes that it is not ruling that he is innocent or
blameless.
4. It is only the constitutional presumption of innocence
and the failure of the prosecution to build an airtight
case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts
of unlawful conduct do not exist. As earlier stated, there
is the likelihood that he did insert the vibrator whose end
was left inside Rosario's vaginal canal and that the
vibrator may have caused her death. The Court cannot
convict on probabilities or possibilities but civil liability
does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. The
Court can order the payment of indemnity on the facts
found in the records of this case.
5. The appellant certainly committed acts contrary to
morals, good customs, public order or public policy
(Article 21 Civil Code). As earlier mentioned, the
appellant has abused Filipino children, enticing them
with money.
CASE # 22
ARDIENTE V. SPOUSES PASTORFIDE
G.R. NO. 161921 | TOPIC: Human Relations
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform to the standards set forth in Art. 19 & 20 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby
committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.
FACTS
● Joyce Ardiente and her husband Dr. Roberto Ardiente
are owners of a housing unit in Cagayan de Oro City.
● Joyce Ardiente entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement selling, transferring, and conveying in favor
of respondent Ma. Theresa Pastoride all their rights and
interests in the housing unit in consideration of
P70,000.
● The MoA contains a stipulation: “That the water and
power bill of the subject property shall be for the
account of Pastorfide.”
● For 4 years, Ma. Theresa’s use of the water connection
in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never questioned
nor perturbed until March 1999, when without notice,
the water connection was cut off.
● When she went to Cagayan de Oro Water District
(COWD) to complain, she was told that she was
delinquent for 3 months from December 1998.
● She was later told that it was at the instance of Joyce
Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
● Aggrieved, Theresa filed a complaint for damages
against the petitioner, COWD, and its manager,
Gonzalez.
● In the meantime, the water line was restored only when
the trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction.
● The RTC ruled in favor of Pastorfide, stating that the
defendants did not act with justice, and did not give the
plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith.
● Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
and ruled that petitioner has a legal duty to honor the
possession and use of water line by Pastorfide pursuant
to their MoA.”
ISSUE: W/N the petitioner is liable for damages for the
disconnection of the water line?
RULING
● YES. The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in
Art. 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
● Corollarily, Art. 20 provides that “every person who,
contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage
to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.”
● When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.
● In this case, petitioner’s acts which violated the said
provisions is her unjustifiable act of having the
respondent spouses’ water supply disconnected,
coupled with her failure to warn or at least notify the
respondents of such intention.
● On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure to
give prior notice of the impending disconnection and
 their subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent
spouses’ water supply despite the latter’s settlement
of their delinquent account.
● The Court awarded the respondents moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is

DENIED.
CASE # 23
DONATO V. LUNA
G.R. No. 53642. April 15, 1988 |
Prejudicial Question
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The mere fact that there are actions to annul the
marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case
does not mean that 'prejudicial questions' are
automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the
suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case
of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial
question to the bigamy case against the accused, it must
be shown that the accused's consent to such marriage
must be the one that was obtained by means of duress,
force and intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of
his conviction for the crime of bigamy.
FACTS
● Petitioner Leonilo Donato, who still had a subsisting
marriage unknown to private respondent/complainant
Paz B. Abayan, cohabited with the latter for at least 5
years. Eventually the two got married without the
requisite marriage license because they executed a joint
affidavit evidencing their cohabitation for 5 years.
● More than a year after their marriage, Paz filed a civil
action for nullity of marriage on the ground of deceit
because she had no previous knowledge of her
husband’s first marriage. Leonilo answered that his 2nd
marriage was void for the lack of marriage license, and
that his consent for his marriage with Paz was obtained
through force, violence, intimidation, and undue
influence.
● Paz also filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against
Leonilo and before trial on the merits ensued, Leonilo
filed a motion to suspend the criminal proceedings on
the basis that a prior civil case filed by Paz raises a
prejudicial question which must first be determined
before the criminal case could proceed. However, Judge
Luna denied this motion on the basis of the Landicho vs.
Relova case.
● Leonilo’s MR citing De la Cruz vs. Ejercito, a more recent
case concerning prejudicial questions on bigamy was still
denied. Hence, this petition with the SC assailing Judge
Luna’s denial.
ISSUE
WON a criminal case for bigamy pending before the CFI should
be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage
pending before another Court because the latter constitutes a
prejudicial question? No
RULING
No, Leonilo cannot request for the suspension of the criminal
proceedings because his case does not have a prejudicial
question.
A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and
for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear that [1] the
civil case involves facts intimately related to the criminal
prosecution AND [2] the resolution of the issue/s raised in the
civil case would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
The nullity case filed by Paz was not determinative of Leonilo’s
guilt or innocence in bigamy. Pursuant to the doctrine discussed
in Landicho vs. Relova, Leonilo cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions because a case for annulment of marriage
can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused if it is proved that the petitioner's
consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence, or intimidation in order to establish that his act in the
subsequent marriage was an involuntary one and as such the
same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in this case because Leonilo’s invocation
of viation of consent in entering the marriage was merely an
afterthought.

Obviously, Leonilo merely raised the issue of prejudicial

question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case because
prior to Leonilo’s second marriage, he had been cohabiting with
Paz for more than five years. Thus, Leonilo’s averments that his
consent in entering a subsequent marriage was vitiated by Paz
is belied by the fact that both Leonilo and Paz executed an
affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband
and wife without benefit of marriage for at least five years, until
their marital union was formally ratified by the second
marriage. Moreover, it was Paz who eventually filed the civil
action for nullity and that Leonilo only came up with the story
that his consent was vitiated as his defense in the civil action
for nullity because he continued to live with Paz until the latter
left their abode upon knowing that Leonilo was an already
married man.
CASE # 24
Landicho v. Relova
G.R. No. L-22579; 23 Feb 1968 | TOPIC:
Prejudicial Question
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court, and
jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another
court.
FACTS
● Petitioner Rolando Landicho was charged before the
Court of First Instance of Batangas for the offense of
bigamy. It was alleged that petitioner, while lawfully
married to Elvira Makatangay, which marriage had not
been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage
with Fe Lourdes Pasia.
● An action was thereafter filed before the respondent
Judge by the second wife, Pasia, seeking to declare her
marriage to petitioner Landicho as null and void ab initio
because of the alleged use of force, threats and
intimidation employed by petitioner and because of its
bigamous character.
● Subsequently, Ladicho, in said case, filed a third-party
complaint, against the third-party defendant
Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage
with Makatangay be declared null and void, on the
ground that by means of threats, force and intimidation,
she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with
her.
● Landicho moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal
case pending the decision on the question of the validity
of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit.
● Respondent Judge denied the motion for lack of merit.
The motion for reconsideration to set aside the order
was likewise denied.
ISSUE
● Is the existence of a civil suit for the annulment of
marriage at the instance of the second wife against
petitioner, with the latter in turn filing a third party
complaint against the first spouse for the annulment of
the first marriage, constitutes a prejudicial question in a
pending suit for bigamy against him
RULING
● No.
● A prejudicial question is that which arises in a case, the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains
to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be
determinative of the case before the court, and
jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another
court. (Zapanta vs. Mendoza)
● Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having
such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party
who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy.
● At the time the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on
February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies
had been contracted appeared to be indisputable. Then
on March 15, 1963, it was the second spouse, not
petitioner, who filed an action for nullity on the ground
of force, threats and intimidation. It was sometime later,
on June 15, 1963, to be precise, when petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his
marriage with her should be declared null and void on
the ground of force, threats and intimidation. As was
correctly stressed in the answer of respondent Judge,
parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having
such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the
validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party
who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk
of being prosecuted for bigamy.
● There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the
third-party complaint against the first wife brought
almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was
started could have been inspired by the thought that he
could thus give color to a defense based on an alleged
prejudicial question.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and
the writ of preliminary injunction issued dissolved. With
costs.1äwphï1.ñët
CASE # 25
injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not
warranted.
ROE v. WADE
● The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the
410 U.S. 113 | TOPIC: Civil Personality
United States and Wade cross-appealed the district
court’s judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Prenatal Life – Fetuses – is not within the definition of ISSUE
persons. There is no consensus that fetuses have full ● Whether or not a woman’s right to privacy as protected
rights. by the Constitution includes the right to abort her child.

FACTS
RULING
● Roe (P), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action
● It was ruled in the affirmative that The “right of privacy
suit challenging the constitutionality of the Texas
x x x is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision
abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
attempt an abortion except on medical advice to save
● Texas law violated Roe's right to privacy. Zone of privacy
the life of the mother.
covered marriage, contraception and child rearing
● Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit included Hallford, a doctor
activities. Court ruled that the "zone of privacy" is broad
who faced criminal prosecution for violating the state
enough to encompass a woman's decision WON to
abortion laws; and the Does, a married couple with no
terminate her pregnancy.
children, who sought an injunction against enforcement
● Prenatal Life – Fetuses – is not within the definition of
of the laws on the grounds that they were
persons. There is no consensus that fetuses have full
unconstitutional. The defendant was county District
rights.
Attorney Wade (D).
● However, the court ruled that a narrower state laws
● A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases
regulating abortion might be sufficiently important to be
together and held that Roe and Hallford had standing to
constitutional. The State might constitutionally protect
sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that
the 6 month old fetus from abortion due to its viability
declaratory relief was warranted. The court also ruled
except when the life of the mother is at risk. Second and
however that injunctive relief was not warranted and
third trimester abortions also present more health risks
that the Does’ complaint was not justiciable.
to mothers.
● Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district
● In the first trimester, the State's interest can never be
court held that the Texas abortion statutes were void as
found important enough. Such abortions are to be dealt
vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and
by the patient and her doctor.
Fourteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does
lost, however, because the district court ruled that
CASE # 26
GELUZ V CA
G.R. NO. l-16439 | TOPIC: Natural Person
(unborn baby)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Article 2206 of the Civil Code does not endow the unborn
fetus.
FACTS
● Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz)
for the first time in 1948 — through her aunt Paula Yambot.
● In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before
they were legally married.
● Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting
on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the
defendant.
● After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she
had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953.
Less than two years later, she again became pregnant.
● On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister Purificacion
and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the
defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila,
where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of
the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency.
● The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan,
campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not
know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
ISSUE
● WON the unborn fetus has been endowed with personality by
the provisions of the Civil Code
RULING
● No. The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the
award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error, for the
said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the
death of a person, does not cover the case of an unborn
foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the
system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la
categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de
Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having
rights and obligations.
● Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal
injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy
to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted
on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it
received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to
its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue
on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by
its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take
place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer
to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil
Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later
with the condition specified in the following article". In the
present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
CASE # 27
Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13 , July 31, 1970
TOPIC: Natural Persons
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
to it. It is explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Therefore, the unborn child has a right to
support from its progenitors.
FACTS
● This is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Zamboanga del
Norte, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and
another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
● Carmen Quimiguing (petitioner) and Felix Icao (defendant)
were neighbors in Dapitan City, they had close and
confidential relations; although defendant was married, the
latter succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff
several times by force and intimidation, and without her
consent; as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts
and drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop
studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney’s fees.
● Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since
the complaint did not allege that the child had been born, the
trial judge sustained defendant’s motion and dismissed the
complaint.
● Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a
baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant’s objection, ruled
that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff
appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE
● W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask for support and damages
from defendant despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint
RULING
● YES. The Court ruled that plaintiff-appellant had right to
support of the child she was carrying and an independent
cause of action for damages.
● A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a
provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable
to it. It is explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines. Therefore, the unborn child has a right to
support from its progenitors.
● It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable
to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article” (i.e., that the
foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were,
the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and
ineffective.
● A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is
that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield
to his lust constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his
victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the
damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
● The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same
Code. ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases: (3) Seduction, abduction,
rape, or other lascivious acts. Hence, the girl has a cause of
action.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee
Felix Icao. So ordered.
CASE # 28
De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 863 Nov. 28, 1933
TOPIC: Natural Persons | J. Street
FACTS
● This is an action by Antonia de Jesus in her own right
and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, her
infants, against Cesar Syquia, among others, to compel
the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural
children, with support and costs.
● Cesar Syquia and June Antonia Loanco, both 23,
engaged in a courtship and amorous relations, resulting
in her pregnancy. Cesar was a constant visitor during
the early months of her pregnancy, and gave her a note
directed to the padre who was expected to christen the
baby: "The baby due in June is mine and I should like
for my name to be given to it.
● Even while abroad, Cesar expressed concern for the
child. When the baby arrived on June 17, 1931. Cesar
made arrangements for the birth. They lived together
for a year. But, when Antonia was again pregnant, Cesar
decamped and married another woman. In the
christening of the child, Cesar caused the name Ismael
Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Jr.
● The trial court entered a decree requiring the defendant
to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to
pay maintenance. Hence, this appeal.
● YES. The acknowledgment is sufficient.
● It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon
being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and
capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact
that it is as yet unborn is no impediment to the
acquisition of rights. The problem here of the
recognition of an unborn child is really not different
from that presented in the ordinary case of the
recognition of a child already born and bearing a
specific name. Only the means and resources of
identification are different. Even a bequest to a living
child requires oral evidence to connect the particular
individual intended with the name used.
● The words of recognition contained in the note refer to
a baby expected to be born in June. Any doubt that
might arise on this point is removed by the letters
which make repeated reference to junior as the baby.
The judgment appealed from is in all respects affirmed,
without costs. So ordered.

ISSUE:
● Whether the note to the padre and Cesar’s letters to
the mother during pregnancy proves an
acknowledgment of paternity, under the Civil Code?

RULING
CASE # 29
ISSUE
● W/N the estate of Fragante may be extended an
Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante
artificial judicial personality
80 Phil. 776| TOPIC: Natural Persons

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE RULING

● It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the ● Yes, because under the Civil Code, “estate of a dead
mass of property, rights and assets left by the person could be considered as artificial juridical person
decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with for the purpose of settlement and distribution of his
his rights and obligations which survive after his properties.
demise. ● Fragante has rights and fulfillment of obligation which
survived after his death. One of those rights involved
FACTS the pending application for public convenience before
● Pedro O. Fragante applied for a certificate of public the PSC. The state or the mass of property, rights left
convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice by the decedent, instead of heirs directly, become
plant in San Juan, Rizal. vested and charged with his rights and obligations.
● The Public Service Commission approved the ● Under the present legal system, rights and obligations
application and held that evidence showed that the which survived after death have to be exercised and
public interest and convenience will be promoted in a fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.
proper and suitable manner by the authorization of the
operation of another ice--plant, that Pedro Fragante
was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death and that
his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining
the proposed service.
● The commission ordered that a certificate of public
convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante.
● Petitioner contends that the commission erred in
allowing the substitution of the legal representative of
the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party
applicant, and in subsequently granting to said estate
the certificate applied for, which is said to be in
contravention of law.
CASE # 30
DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS INC
G.R. NO. L-27956 |
Topic:Classes of persons and their distinctions;
Elements of civil capacity Juridical capacity v.
personality ; Juridical capacity v. capacity to
act
● Dionisio Dumlao – Administrator of Pedro Oria’s estate
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● One’s juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is lost through death.
FACTS
● A judgment for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on
February 28, 1962 ordering defendants Soliven, Pedro
Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity
Quality Plastics the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of
interest from November 1958 before its decision became
final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to
foreclose the bond.
● Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit
given.
● Oria's land, which was covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths
hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at
public auction on September 24, 1962 which he has given
as security under the bond.
● Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before
June 13, 1960.
● Quality Plastics was not aware on Oria‖s death. The
summons and copies of complaint was personally served
on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the
latter acknowledged and signed in his own behalf and his
co defendants.
● Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed
Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in Oria's duly
probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on
March 1, 1963 for the annulment of the judgment against
Oria and the execution against his land (T-873).
● Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of
Oria’s testate estate.
ISSUE:
Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land
be annulled on the ground of lack in juridical capacity. - YES
RULING
● Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the
judgment against him is a patent nullity.
● As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court's judgment
against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lack of
jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he could not
have been, validly served with summons. He had no more
civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the
fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost
through death.
● The lower court erred in ruling that since Soliven's
counsel also appeared as counsel for Oria, there was a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire
jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23,
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counsel
could not have validly appeared for a dead co-defendant.
Estoppel has no application to this case.
● But from the fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the
judgment against Oria, it does not follow that they are
entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation.
 The parties herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. was unaware of Oria's
death. Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the
appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-
defendant.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set

aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is
declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution sale of
Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
CASE # 31
Eugenio v Velez
G.R. NO. | TOPIC: Natural Persons
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● corpus over the deceased;
FACTS
● Vitaliana Varga’s brothers and sisters unaware of the
former death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for
Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC
of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined
by the herein petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial
residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.
● The trial court issued the writ of habeas corpus, but
the writ was returned unsatisfied. Tomas refused to
surrender the body of Vitaliana to the sheriff, reasoning
that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus
proceedings and besides, he had already obtained a
burial permit. Tomas claims that as her common law
husband, he has legal custody of her body.
● petitioner also argued that HCis not applicable to a
dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention of a live person.
● The Brothers and sisters of Vitaliana contended that, as
the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana
● The RTC treated the action for custody of a dead body
and awarded the custody of Vitaliana's body to her
brothers and sisters.
● Vitaliana, 25 year old single, died of heart failure due to
toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenio’s residence.
● The court ordered that the body should be delivered to
a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the
lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE
Whether or not court had jurisdiction to issue writ of habeas
Whether or not the RTC was correct in awarding the custody
of the dead body to the brothers and sisters of Vitaliana.
RULING
● 1. Yes – Court did not lose jurisdiction over the nature
and matter of the case because it could entertain the
case through allegations of the petition as to who
should be given the custody of the deceased’s body by
virtue of Batas Pambansa Bld. 129.
BP Bld. 129 Section 19(5): “RTCs shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction [over]: …(5) in all actions involving the
contract of marriage and marital relations.”
● 2. The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was
correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters.
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which
provides:
● “Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased
was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any
kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the
nearest kin of the deceased.
● Philippine Law does not recognize common law
marriages. A man and woman not legally married who
cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who
represent themselves to the public as husband and
 wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in
the community where they live may be considered
legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in
the Philippines.
● Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under
Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein
not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the
absence of such qualification, he is the rightful
custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and
sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does
not recognize common law marriages. A man and
woman not legally married who cohabit for many years
as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.

● While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside

the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of
properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form
of co-ownership requires that the man and woman
living together must not in any way be incapacitated to
contract marriage. In any case, Tomas has a subsisting
marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying
Vitaliana.
CASE # 32
JOAQUIN V. NAVARRO
G.R. No. L-5426 | TOPIC: Personality; Evidence
on survivorship
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Evidence of Survivorship need not be direct; it may be
indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are
facts, known or knowable, from which a rational
conclusion can be made, the presumption does not
step in, and the rules of preponderance of evidence
controls.
FACTS
● On Feb. 1945, while the battle for the liberation of
Manila was raging, the sps. Joaquin Navaro (JN, Sr. )
and Angelo Joaquin (AJ), with their 3 daughters and
their son Joaquin (JN Jr.) and the latter’s wife.
● They sought refuge in the ground floor of the building
known as the German Club. During their stay, the
building was packed with refugees, shells were
exploding, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously,
the Japanese started shooting at the people inside the
building, especially those who were trying to escape.
The three daughters were hit and fell on the ground. JN
Sr. and his son decided to abandon to move to a safer
place but they could not convince AJ. The others
including Francisco Lopez (a neighbor and sole witness
in this case) except AJ dashed out of the burning
building. As they went out, JN Jr was shot in the head
by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped.
● The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club
premises to avoid the bullets. Later, the German Club
collapsed and a lot of people were trapped inside,
presumably including AJ.
● JN Sr, JN Jr and his wife, Francisco Lopez, managed to
reach an air raid shelter nearby, and stayed there for 3
days. However,days later, JN Sr and his daughter was
shot by Japanese people.
● At the time of the massacre, JN Sr was at the age of
70, his wife was about 67 yrs old, JN Jr was 30 and the
other siblings were between 23-25 years old. With this,
3 proceedings were instituted, which were jointly heard,
for the summary settlement of the estates of the
deceased, by the petitioner, an acknowledged natural
child of AJ and adopted child of the deceased spouses,
and by the respondent son of JN Sr. by first marriage.
● TC found the mother to have survived her son but the
appellate court found otherwise.
ISSUE
Whether the mother (AJ) died first before her son, JN Jr., or
vice versa.
RULING
● The Son died first based on the story of Francisco
Lopez, Jr. It is believe that the conditions painted by
FL (sole witness), a fair & reasonable inference can be
arrived at; that JN Jr died before his mother.
● This presumption that the mother died first was based
on speculations, not evidence. While the opposite
theory (JN Jr died first/mother out lived the son) is
deduced from established facts which, weighed by
common experience, engender the inference as a very
strong probability.
● Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence
on which civil cases are to be decided, this inference
should prevail.
 ● Evidence of survivorship may be direct, indirect,
circumstantial, or inferential.

Wherefore, the Court reversed the decision under review, and

hold that the distribution of the decedents' estates should be
made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This
result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of
"reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical
theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded that of her
son. Without costs.
CASE # 33
SMITH BELL V. NATIVIDAD
G.R. NO. 15574 | TOPIC:
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The word "person" includes aliens. Private corporations,
likewise are "persons" within the scope of the guaranties
in so far as their property is concerned. Classification
with the end in view of providing diversity of treatment
may be made among corporations, but must be based
upon some reasonable ground and not be a mere
arbitrary selection.
FACTS
● Smith, Bell & Co., (Ltd.), is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippine Islands.
● A majority of its stockholders are British subjects.
● It is the owner or a motor vessel known as the Bato built
for it in the Philippine Islands of more than 15 tons gross
The Bato was brought to Cebu in the present year for the
purpose of transporting plaintiff's merchandise between
ports in the Islands.
● Application was made at Cebu, the home port of the
vessel, to the Collector of Customs for a certificate of
Philippine registry.
● The Collector refused to issue the certificate, giving as
his reason that all the stockholders of Smith, Bell & Co.,
Ltd., were not citizens either of the United States or of
the Philippine Islands.
● The instant action (A writ of mandamus) is the result.
● On February 23, 1918, the Philippine Legislature enacted
Act No. 2761. The first section of this law amended
section 1172 of the Administrative Code to read as
follows:
○ SEC. 1172. Certificate of Philippine register. - Upon
registration of a vessel of domestic ownership,
and of more than fifteen tons gross, certificate of
Philippine register shall be issued for it. If the
vessel is of domestic ownership and of fifteen
tons gross or less, the taking of the certificate of
Philippine register shall be optional with the
owner.
■ "Domestic ownership," as used in this
section, means ownership vested in some
one or more of the following classes of
persons: (a) Citizens or native inhabitants
of the Philippine Islands; (b) citizens of the
United States residing in the Philippine
Islands; (c) any corporation or company
composed wholly of citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States or
of both, created under the laws of the
United States, or of any State thereof, or of
thereof, or the managing agent or master of
the vessel resides in the Philippine Islands.
■ Any vessel of more than fifteen gross tons
which on February 8, 1918, had a certificate
of Philippine register under existing law,
shall likewise be deemed a vessel of
domestic ownership so long as there shall
not be any change in the ownership thereof
nor any transfer of stock of the companies
or corporations owning such vessel to
person not included under the last
preceding paragraph.
● The first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights of the
Philippine Bill, repeated again in the first paragraph of
the Philippine Bill of Rights as set forth In the Jones Law,
provides "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
 which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or deny to any person
therein the equal protection of the laws.
● Counsel says that Act No. 2761 denies to Smith, Bell &
Co., Ltd., the equal protection of the Jaws because it. In
effect, prohibits the corporation from owning vessels,
and because classification of corporations based on the
citizenship of one or more of their stockholders is
capricious. and that Act No. 2761 deprives the
corporation of its properly without due process or law
because of the passage of the law company was
automatically deprived of every beneficial attribute of
ownership in the Bato and left with the naked title to a
boat it could not use.
ISSUE/S
Whether or not the Government of the Philippine Islands,
through its Legislature, can deny the registry of vessel in its
coastwise trade to corporations having alien stockholders.
RULING
● YES, this is a valid exercise of police power. Common
carriers which in the Philippines as in the United States
and other countries are, as Lord Hale said, "affected with
a public interest," can only be permitted to use these
public waters as a privilege and under such conditions
as to the representatives of the people may seem wise.
a. Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature, in
denying to corporations such as Smith, Bell &. Co.
Ltd., the right to register vessels in the Philippines
coastwise trade, does not belong to that vicious
species of class legislation which must always be
condemned, but does fall within authorized
exceptions, notably, within the purview of the
police power, and so does not offend against the
constitutional provision.
● The guaranties of the Fourteenth Amendment and so of
the first paragraph of the Philippine Bill of Rights, are
universal in their application to all person within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences
of race, color, or nationality. The word "person" includes
aliens. Private corporations, likewise are "persons"
within the scope of the guaranties in so far as their
property is concerned. Classification with the end in
view of providing diversity of treatment may be made
among corporations, but must be based upon some
reasonable ground and not be a mere arbitrary selection.
● A literal application of general principles to the facts
before us would, of course, cause the inevitable
deduction that Act No. 2761 is unconstitutional by reason
of its denial to a corporation, some of whole members
are foreigners, of the equal protection of the laws.
● To justify that portion of Act no. 2761 which permits
corporations or companies to obtain a certificate of
Philippine registry only on condition that they be
composed wholly of citizens of the Philippine Islands or
of the United States or both, as not infringing Philippine
Organic Law, it must be done under some one of the
exceptions.
a. One of the exceptions to the general rule, most
persistent and far reaching in influence is, broad
and comprehensive as it is, nor any other
amendment, "was designed to interfere with the
power of the State, sometimes termed its `police
power,' to prescribe regulations to promote the
health, peace, morals, education, and good order
of the people, and legislate so as to increase the
industries of the State, develop its resources and
add to its wealth and prosperity.
b. From the very necessities of society, legislation of
a special character, having these objects in view,
must often be had in certain districts. This is the
 same police power which the United States
Supreme Court say "extends to so dealing with the
conditions which exist in the state as to bring out
of them the greatest welfare in of its people." For
quite similar reasons, none of the provision of the
Philippine Organic Law could could have had the
effect of denying to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, acting through its Legislature,
the right to exercise that most essential, insistent,
and illimitable of powers, the sovereign police
power, in the promotion of the general welfare
and the public interest.
● Without any subterfuge, the apparent purpose of the
Philippine Legislature is seen to be to enact an anti-alien
shipping act. The ultimate purpose of the Legislature is
to encourage Philippine ship-building.
CASE # 34
BARLIN VS. RAMIREZ
G.R. NO. | TOPIC: Public corporations; Private
corporations; Partnerships
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
●
FACTS
● There had been priests of the Roman Catholic Church in
the pueblo of Lagonoy, in the Province of Ambos
Camarines. The church and convent were burned but
were rebuilt. There was evidence that this was done by
the order of the provincial governor. The labor
necessary for this reconstruction was performed by the
people of the pueblo the direction of the cabeza de
barangay. After the completion of the church it was
always administered by a priest of a Roman Catholic
Communion
● The defendant, Ramirez, having been appointed by the
plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the church.
His successor made a demand on this defendant for the
delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery,
and the sacred ornaments, books, jewels, money, and
other property of the church. The defendant, by a
written document of that date, refused to make such
delivery (argued that the parish property is now outside
of the control of the Pope and his representatives in
the PH)
● The plaintiff brought this action against the defendant,
Ramirez, alleging in his amended complaint that the
Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church
building, the convent, cemetery, the books, money, and
other property belonging thereto, and asking that it be
restored to the possession thereof and that the
defendant render an account of the property which he
had received and which was retained by him, and for
other relief.
● Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants. The defendants then brought
the case here by a bill of exceptions.
ISSUE: WON defendant Ramirez has actual possession of the
church and other property and not the municipality as a
corporate body. YES. // WON the Roman Catholic Church has
legal personality to sue. YES.
RULING
● It is suggested by the appellant that the Roman
Catholic Church has no legal personality in the
Philippine Islands. This suggestion, made with reference
to an institution which antedates by almost a thousand
years any other personality in Europe, and which
existed "when Grecian eloquence still flourished in
Antioch, and when idols were still worshiped in the
temple of Mecca," does not require serious
consideration.
● Since the latter half of the third century, and more
particularly since the year 313, when Constantine, by
the edict of Milan, inaugurated an era of protection for
the church, the latter gradually entered upon the
exercise of such rights as were required for the
acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property
the same as any other juridical entity under the laws of
the Empire.
CASE # 35
STANDARD OIL CO. V. ARENAS
G.R. NO. L-5921 | TOPIC: Presumption of
Capacity | 25 JULY 1911 | EN BANC | ARELLANO,
C.J.
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person
who has not previously been declared incapable, and such
capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was
incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind: which, in the
opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case.
FACTS
1. December 15, 1908: Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco
Lara del Pino, as principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente
Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as sureties
sign a bond in favor of plaintiff for the obliged to pay the
amount of P 3,305.76 at three months from date, with
interest at P 1.00 per month.
2. April 5, 1909: Standard Oil sued the five debtors for
payment of sum, together w/ the interest thereon at rate
of 1 per cent per month from date of assumed obligation
(12/15/08) and the costs; Defendants were summoned,
w/ record that showed summons was served on Vicente
Sixto Villanueva on April 17.
3. May 12, 1909: Villanueva did not appear, and was declared
in default.
4. Court of 1st Instance (of the city of Manila) sentenced all
defendants to pay (jointly and severally) to plaintiff
company the aforementioned sum, w/ interested
thereon at 1 per cent a month from Dec. 15, 1908 until
complete payment of principal + costs.
5. While judgment was in course of execution, Elisa Torres
de Villanueva (Vicente’s wife), appeared and alleged the
ff:
a. July 24, 1909: latter was declared to be insane by
Court of 1st Instance (Manila);
b. She was appointed his guardian by same court;
c. Oct. 11: she was authorized by the court as his
guardian to institute the proper legal proceedings
in the present cause (issued in behalf of the
plaintiff-appellee co.);
d. She as guardian was not aware of the proceedings
had against Vicente and was only by chance
informed of it, and;
e. When Vicente gave the bond, he was already
permanently insane and was in such state when
summoned and still continued to do so.
f. In conclusion, she petitioned court to relieve her
husband from compliance, and to reopen the trial
for the introduction of evidence on his behalf,
with respect to his capacity at the time of the
bond’s execution.
6. Court granted the petition, thus trial was reopened for
introduction of evidence (after due consideration); court
decided that when Vicente Villanueva, on 12/15/1908,
executed bond in question, he understood perfectly the
nature and consequences of the act performed by him.
7. As a result of such findings, court ruled that the petition
for an indefinite stay of execution of the judgment
rendered in the case be denied, and that said execution
be carried out.
8. After filing of an exception to the ruling, a new hearing
was requested “w/reference to the defendant Vicente S.
Villanueva” and upon its denial, a bill of exceptions was
presented in support of said appeal, submitted to SC and
based on a single assignment of error:
Because the lower court found that the monomania of
great wealth, suffered by the defendant…does not imply
incapacity to execute a bond…
 ISSUE Therefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the
Whether or not suffering from monomania of wealth costs of this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
necessarily warrants the conclusion that the person does not
have capacity

RULING

No. Villanueva was a person capable of executing a contract of

bond.

SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. it would have been

necessary to show that:
1. Such monomania was habitual and constituted a
veritable mental perturbation in the patient;
2. That the bond executed was the result of such
monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that
is, that there were not, or could there have been any
other cause for the contract than the ostentation of
wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania
of wealth.
3. That the monomania existed on the date the bond in
question was executed. Monomania of wealth does not
necessarily imply that the person is incapable of
executing a bond such as that in question.
4. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person
who has not previously been declared incapable, and
such capacity is presumed to continue for so long as the
contrary is not proved, that is, at the moment of his
acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his
mind; which, in the opinion of the court has not been
proved in this case.

It would have been necessary to show that such monomania

was habitual It is very evident that it cannot be concluded
therefrom that, on December 15, 1908, when Villanueva
subscribed the obligation now contested, he did not possess
the necessary capacity to give efficient consent with respect to
the bond which he freely executed.
CASE # 36
● The plaintiffs contend that the deed of sale is void on
the ground that they were minors when they entered
Mercado v. Espiritu
into the contract.
G.R. NO. L-11872 | TOPIC: Minority

ISSUE: W/N the deed of sale executed is void on the ground of

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE minority
● The minors who pretended to be of legal age cannot
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the RULING
obligations contracted by them, or to have them ● NO. The deed of sale is valid.
annulled. ● The minors who pretended to be of legal age cannot
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
FACTS obligations contracted by them, or to have them
● Siblings Domingo and Josefa Mercado received P400 annulled.
from Luis Espiritu in exchange for a deed of sale of land ● The judgment that holds such a sale to be valid and
that was primarily owned by their mother, Margarita, absolves the purchaser from the complaint filed against
with a size of 48 hectares. him does not violate the laws relative to the sale of
● It was alleged that the plaintiffs (Mercados) were minors’ property, nor the juridical rules established in
induced and the defendant (Espiritu) fraudulently consonance therewith.
acquired the title of the property.
● In the suit filed by the plaintiffs, they alleged that For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the
during the time that they executed the deed of sale, judgment appealed from have been refuted, and deeming said
they were still minors. judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of
● Due to the fact that the timeline of the case was during record, we should, and do hereby, affirm the same.
the war, the baptismal certificates of the plaintiffs
were burned down. There were no other documents
that proved their age.
● When the party of Espiritu defended their case, they
provided three documents: (1) Absolute deed of sale
amounting to P2,000 executed by their mother, who
was given an authority to sell the said property by her
husband; (2) A real mortgage executed by their father,
Wenceslao, in the amount of P600; and (3) The deed of
sale executed by the parties in this case amounting to
P400.
CASE # 37
BAMBALAN V. MARAMBA
G.R. No. 27710. January 30, 1928. | Minority
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The case of Mercado vs . Espiritu – wherein the minor
was held to be estopped from contesting the contract
executed by him pretending to be of age – is not
applicable when the vendor, a minor, did not pretend to
be of age and his minority was known to the purchaser.
FACTS
● Spouses Vicente and Paula, the parents of the plaintiff
Isidro Jr., had received an approximately P150-P200 loan
from defendant Genoveva. Later on, Genoveva learned
that the deceased father of the plaintiff, Isidro Sr., had
owned a parcel of land registered in his name (Isidro Sr.).
Thus, Genoveva coerced Isidro Jr., who was still a minor
back then, to sign a deed of conveyance involving the
said land in favor of Genoveva because Isidro Jr. was the
sole and universal heir of the deceased landowner, Isidro
Sr.
● It was alleged by Isidro Jr. that Genoveva threatened him
by saying that his mom Paula would be sent to prison if
Isidro Jr. did not sell the said land to Genoveva.
Moreover, Genoveva was the one who paid for Isidro Jr.
first cedula for the acknowledgment of the deed of
conveyance.
● Hence, Isidro Jr. filed this case against Genoveva
assailing the sale he made to Genoveva when he was still
a minor on the ground of minority and vitiated consent.
Genoveva defends by citing the case of Mercado v.
Espirito where the minor was held estopped from
contesting the sale because the latter was pretending to
be of age during the perfection of the contract.
● Moreover, Genovevo presented the deed of conveyance
as proof of the allegedly valid transfer of land.
ISSUE/S
WON the contract of sale was valid even if it was entered into
by Isidro Jr. during his minority.? No
RULING
No, the contract of sale was not valid (it is voidable) as
to Isidro Jr. because it was entered into by Genovevo despite
knowing that Isidro Jr. was still a minor back then. However, it
was worded in the case as this:
The defendants affirm they did and as proof of such
transfer present document Exhibit 1, dated July 17, 1922.
The plaintiff asserts that while it is true that he signed
said document, yet, he did so by intimidation made upon
his mother Paula Prado by the defendant Genoveva
Muerong, who threatened the former with
imprisonment. While the evidence on this particular
point does not decisively support the plaintiff's
allegation, this document, however, is vitiated to the
extent of being void as regards the said plaintiff, for the
reason that the latter, at the time he signed it, was a
minor, which is clearly shown by the record and it does
not appear that it was his real intention to sell the land
in question.
The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado vs.
Espiritu, wherein the minor was held to be estopped from
contesting the contract executed by him pretending to be of
age, is not applicable herein. In this case, Isidro Jr. did not
pretend to be of age since his minority was well known to the
purchaser, Genovevo, who was the one who purchased the
plaintiff's first cedula to be used in the acknowledgment of the
document.
CASE # 38
Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara
G.R. No. L-1720; March 4, 1950 | TOPIC: Minority
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The sale of real estate, made by minors who pretend to
be of legal age, when it fact they are not, is valid, and
they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them, or
to have them annulled
FACTS
● Rufino Alcantara and sons (including respondent
Ramon) executed a deed of sale dated August 3, 1931,
conveying five parcels of land to petitioner Sia Suan.
● A few days later (within the month after the sale of the
parcels of land), Ramon‘s counsel wrote to Suan‘s
husband, Gaw Chiao, disavowing the contract on the
ground that Ramon was a minor when the signing took
place.
● After Gaw Chiao responded to the letter, Ramon went
to the office of Gaw Chiao‘s counsel to ratify the sale.
● After ratification, Ramon received Php 500.00 from Gaw
Chiao, as payment for the sold parcels of land.
● Nine years later, Ramon filed a case at the Court of
First Instance of Laguna, praying that the deed of sale
may be annulled on the ground of his minority at the
time of its sale to Sia Suan and Gaw Chiao. The action
was denied.
● Ramon brought the case to the Court of Appeals which
reversed the CFI Decision.
ISSUE
● Is the deed of sale is binding against Ramon Alcantara
in view of his minority on the date of its execution
RULING
● Yes.
● Ramon may not be allowed to execute a deed of sale,
but due to his act of ratification, the contract was given
its binding effect.
● In Mercado and Mercado v. Espiritu, the Court held:
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid
down the rule that the sale of real estate, made by
minors who pretend to be of legal age, when it fact
they are not, is valid, and they will not be permitted to
excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the
obligations contracted by them, or to have them
annulled in pursuance of the provisions of Law 6 title
19, of the 6th Partida; and the judgment that holds such
a sale to valid and absolves the purchaser from the
complaint filed against him does not violate the laws
relative to the sale of minors' property, nor the juridical
rules established in consonance therewith.
● Under the doctrine laid down by Mercado v Espiritu,
herein followed, to bind a minor who represents
himself to be of legal age, it is not necessary for his
vendee to actually part with cash, as long as the
contract is supported by a valid consideration. The
circumstance that about one month after the date of
the conveyance, the appellee informed the appeallants
of his minority, is of no moment, because appellee’s
previous misrepresentation had already estopped him
from disavowing the contract.
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
reversed and the appellants absolved from the complaint,
with costs against the appellee, Ramon Alcantara. So ordered
CASE # 39
De Braganza v. De Villa Abrille
G.R. NO. L - 12471 | TOPIC: Restrictions on Civil
Capacity – MINORITY
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● ART 1399. When the defect of the contract consists in
the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated
person is not obliged to make any restitution except
insofar as he as been benefited by the thing or price
received by him.
FACTS
● October 30, 1944: Petitioners received from Villa Abrille
P70,000 in Japanese war notes and promised in writing
to pay him P10,000 in “legal currency of the P.I. two years
after the cessation of the present hostilities or as soon
as International Exchange has been est in the Ph”, plus
2% per annum
● March 1949: Since Payment had not been made, Villa
Abrille sued them
○ Defendants (herein petitioners): claimed to have
received P40,000 only, averred that Guillermo and
Rodolfo were minors when they signed the
promissory note (Exhibit A)
○ The court rendered judgment which the CA
affirmed, in the terms above presented.
○ Guillermo and Rodolfo Braganza were minors (16
and 18 respectively) when they signed
promissory note.
○ However, the CA found them liable pursuant to
the ff:
■ These 2 appellants did not make it appear
in the promissory note that they were not
yet in legal age. If they were really to their
creditor, they should have appraised him on
their incapacity.
○ When minors, like in the instant case, pretended
to be of legal age, in fact they were not, they will
not later be permitted to excuse themselves from
the fulfillment of the obligation contracted by
them or to have it annulled.
● Hence, this petition for review of the CA’s decision.
ISSUE
● Whether or not Rodolfo and Guillermo Braganza legally
bound by their signatures on the promissory note?
RULING
● No, Rodolfo and Guillermo could not be legally bound
by their signatures in Exhibit A.
● The minors’ failure to disclose their minority in the same
promissory note they signed, it does not follow as a legal
proposition, that they will not be permitted thereafter to
assert it. They had no juridical duty to disclose their
inability.
● In order to hold infant liable, however, the fraud must be
actual and not constructure. It has been held that his
mere silence when making a contract as to age does not
constitute a fraud which can be made the basis of an
the
action or deceit.
 ● The Court further held that the Mecado case cannot be the total amount of P1,166.67 plus 6% interest beginning March
used as basis for the contention of the petitioner. 7, 1949, when the complaint was filed. No costs in this instance.
a. In the case of Mercado, the minor specifically
stated that he was of age. However, in the
present case no such statement was given.
b. Mercado = minor was guilty of active
misrepresentation
c. Present case = minors were guilty at all (passive
or constructive misrepresentation)
● Upon the other hand, these minors may not be entirely
absolved from monetary responsibility. In accordance
with the provisions of Civil Code, even if their written
contract is unenforceable because of non-age, they shall
make restitution to the extent that they have profited by
the money they received.
a. There is testimony that the funds delivered to
them by Villa Abrille were used for their support
during the Japanese occupation.
● Rosario Braganza will be liable to pay her share in the
contract because it does not absolve her from liability
given that her children were minors at that time.

DISPOSITIVE
Wherefore, as the share of these minors was 2/3 of P70,000 of
P46,666.66, they should now return P1,166.67.Their promise to
pay P10,000 in Philippine currency, (Exhibit A) can not be
enforced, as already stated, since they were minors incapable
of binding themselves. Their liability, to repeat, is presently
declared without regard of said Exhibit A, but solely in
pursuance of Article 1304 of the Civil Code.
Accordingly, the appealed decision should be modified in the
sense that Rosario Braganza shall pay 1/3 of P10,000 i.e.,
P3,333.334 plus 2% interest from October 1944; and Rodolfo
and Guillermo Braganza shall pay jointly5 to the same creditor
CASE # 40
● The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that
he is insane. The popular meaning of crazy is not
US v VAQUILAR
synonymous with the legal terms insane.
G.R. NO. L-9471/2 | TOPIC: Insanity on Marriage
● The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in
jail is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE (not saying a word in the cell, crying out loud at night)
● The fact that a person acts crazy is not conclusive that who has reflected and felt remorse after the
he is insane. The popular meaning of crazy is not commission of the crime.
synonymous with the legal terms insane. ● The court further held that mere mental depravity, or
moral insanity which results not from any disease of
FACTS the mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral
● Evaristo Vaquilar was found guilty of killing his wife system where the person is mentally sane, does not
and his daughter, as well as injuring other persons with exempt one from criminal responsibility.
a bolo. ● In the absence of proof that the defendant had lost his
● Eyewitnesses testified that the defendant appeared to reason or became demented after a few moments prior
be insane prior to the commission of the crimes. They to or during the perpetration of the crime, it is
also testified that the appellant was complaining of presumed that he was in a normal state of mind.
pains in his head and stomach prior to the killing.
● The witnesses‘ evidence for insanity include:
● appellants eyes were very big and red with his sight
penetrating at the time he was killing his wife.
● he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not, he
wouldn‘t have killed his family at the moment of
cutting those people,
● he looked like a madman; crazy because he would cut
anybody at random
ISSUE
● Whether or not these pieces of evidence are sufficient
to declare the accused as insane - No
RULING

● The evidence is insufficient to declare him insane. The

appellant‘s conduct was consistent with the acts of an
enraged criminal, not of a person with an unsound mind
at the time he committed the crimes.
CASE # 41
People v. Rafanan,
204 SCRA 65 November 21, 1991 | Insanity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Jurisprudence shows common reliance on the test of
cognition (complete deprivation of intelligence) rather than
the test of volition (total deprivation of the will)
FACTS
● Complainant Estelita Ronaya who was then only 14 years old
was hired as a househelper by the mother of the accused. The
accused Policarpio Rafanan and his family lived with his
mother in the same house
● Rafanan called the complainant to help him close the door of
the store and as the latter went near him, he suddenly pulled
the complainant inside the store and raped her.
● Rafanan held a bolo measuring 1–1/2 feet which he pointed to
the throat of the complainant threatening her
● After the sexual intercourse, Rafanan warned her not to
report the matter otherwise he would kill her.
● Rafanan claims that he was suffering from mental aberration
characterized as schizophrenia. The trial court suspended the
trial and ordered Rafanan to be confined at the National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and
treatment until he is confirmed by the physician that he is in
“a mental condition to stand court trial"
● Until a series of court reports by the attending physicians,
spanning over a year, he was therefore confirmed to stand on
trial. Trial of the case resumed. Dr. Nerit stated that prior to
the act he committed, Rafanan was already suffering from
schizophrenia for two years.
ISSUE
● WN Rafanan's plea of insanity is sufficient to relieve himself
of criminal liability
RULING
● No, the Court rejected the insanity defense of Rafanan.
● According to People v Formigones, the required standards of
legal insanity:
a. There must be a complete deprivation of intelligence
b. The accused be deprived of reason
c. There be no responsibility for his own acts
d. That he acts without the least discernment
e. There be a complete absence of power to discern; or
f. There be a total deprivation of freedom of the will
● A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards
suggests that Formigones established two (2) distinguishable
tests: (a) the test of cognition—"complete deprivation of
intelligence in committing the [criminal] act,” and (b) the test
of volition—"or that there be a total deprivation of freedom of
the will.”
● But our caselaw shows common reliance on the test of
cognition, rather than on a test relating to “freedom of the
will;” examination of our caselaw has failed to turn up any case
where this Court has exempted an accused on the sole ground
that he was totally deprived of “freedom of the will,” i.e.,
without an accompanying “complete deprivation of
intelligence.”
● Schizophrenia pleaded by appellant has been described as a
chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to
distinguish between fantasy and reality, and often
accompanied by hallucinations and delusions.
● Rafanan was not completely devoid of consciousness as
stated by the Dr. Jovellano. Furthermore. The testimonies
given by the physicians consisted of broad statements based
on general behavioral patterns of people afflicted with
schizophrenia. The fact that Rafanan threatened Ronaya with
death constitutes that Rafanan was aware of the
reprehensible moral quality of that assault or act. Whereas,
the defense sought to suggest, that Rafanan was deprived
from power of self-control due to his illness. But the Court
pointed out that the “complete loss of intelligence which must
be shown if the exempting circumstance of insanity is to be
found.” (test of cognition)
● The presumption is that every man is sane, if not, the person
accused of the crime has the burden of proving their
affirmative allegation of insanity. Here, the appellant failed
to present a clear and convincing evidence regarding his state
of mind before and during the act.
CASE # 42
DO NOT ERASE DIGEST FORMAT
Was Larrazabal able to comply with the residency
requirement to be able to run for provincial governor?
Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 Sep. 3, 1991
TOPIC: DOMICILE AND RESIDENCE
FACTS
● A petition for disqualification was filed against
Larrazabal for alleged false statements in COC
regarding her residence.
● Abella, another candidate for provincial governor,
intervened in the disqualification case.
● Larrazabal was eventually disqualified, but
COMELEC, in the same decision disallowed
Abella’s proclamation.
● Hence, these petitions.
● Petitioners: Respondent Larrazabal is neither a
resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte
as she claimed, but a resident of Ormoc City, a
component city but independent of the province.
● Larrazabal claims she is a resident of Kananga,
Leyte. She had intent to return (animus
revertendi) to Kananga even if she physically
transferred to Ormoc.
● Larrazabal also claims she canceled her
registration in Ormoc City and then transferred
her registration to Kananga, Leyte.
● Hence, this petition before the SC en banc.
ISSUE
1
RULING
● NO. There is no evidence to prove that the
petitioner temporarily left her residence in
Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to pursue any calling,
profession or business. What is clear is that she
established her residence in Ormoc City with her
husband as a resident therein.
● The intention of animus revertendi not to
abandon her residence in Kananga, Leyte
therefor, is not present. The fact that she
occasionally visits Kananga, Leyte through the
years does not signify an intention to continue
her residence therein. It is common among us
Filipinos to visit places where we formerly
resided specially so when we have left friends
and relatives therein although for intents and
purposes we have already transferred our
residence to other places.
● Despite the insistence of the petitioner, the
evidence shows that her supposed cancellation
of registration in Ormoc City and transfer of
registration in Kananga, Leyte, is not supported
by COMELEC records. There were various
irregularities in its documentation.
● Under the law, Ormoc City when organized was
not yet a HUC but is, nevertheless, considered
 2

independent of the province of Leyte to which it

is geographically attached because its charter
prohibits its voters from voting for the provincial
elective officials.
● This independence from the province carries
with it the prohibition or mandate directed to
their registered voters not to vote and be voted
for in the provincial elective offices.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the second division of the
COMELEC and Resolution of COMELEC En Banc are
hereby AFFIRMED.
CASE #

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 3
Madridejo vs. Deleon 44
James Obergefell, et.al. v. Richard Hodges, Director, Ohio Department Macua v. Avenido 45
of Health, et.al. 5
Keuppers v. Judge Murcia 47
Republic v. Albios, October 16, 2013 7
PALMA AND MERCADO v. JUDGE OMELIO 49
Cabague v. Auxillo 10
Abbas v. Abbas 52
DOMALAGAN v. BOLIFER 11
Ninal v. Bayadog 55
HERMOSISIMA V. CA 12
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v JUDGE ROQUE R SANCHEZ, MTC,
Wassmer v. Velez 13 Infanta, Pangasinan 56
Estremos v Ephan 15 Republic v. (Liberty) Albios 58
Tanjanco v. CA 16 CASE TITLE 59
PAÑGANIBAN v. BORROMEO 17 Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 61
In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 June 21, 1940 19 People v. Mendoza 62
CASE TITLE: Saturnino SELANOVA v. Alejandro MENDOZA 20 CASE TITLE 64
CASE TITLE 22 People v. Proceso Aragon 65
Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114, October 5, 2005 23 WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DY, 143 SCRA 499 67
GARCIA-RECIO V. RECIO 25 DONATO V. LUNA 68
Republic v. Manalo 27 Terre v. Terre 70
Juego-Sakai v. Republic 29 REPUBLIC V. GRANADA 72
Dela Cruz Morisono v. Morisono 31 Republic v. Cantor 75
Racho v. Tanaka, 33 Jones v. Hortiguela 77
PUGEDA v. TRIAS 4 SCRA 849, March 31, 1962 36 IN RE SZATRAW 49 OG 243 78
SISON v. TE JAY LI 38 REPUBLIC v. CA and MOLINA 80
Vilar v. Paraiso 40 Choa v.Choa 82
Aranes v. Occiano 42 BARCELONA v. CA 83
 4
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano 85 ANAYA v. PALAROAN 138

Republic v. Encelan 87 Jose Ruiz v Pelagia Atienza 140

Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz 89 Sarao v. Guevara 142

GARLET v. GARLET 93 JIMENEZ v. CAÑIZARES, 143

CASE TITLE: Teresita YAPTINCHAY v. Hon. Guillermo TORRES 96 CASE TITLE 144

Kalaw v. Hernandez 101 Lukban v. Republic 145

Concepcion Singson v Benjamin Singson 103 In the matter of petition for the declaration of William Gue
presumptively dead. Angelina Gue v. Republic 1
Espina-Dan v. Dan 105

Republic v. Javier 107

Republic v. Mola Cruz, 109

Mirasol v. Republic 110

MINORU FUJIKI vs MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY 112

GARCIA-QUIAZON v. BELEN, G.R. No. 189121 116

REPUBLIC V. OLAYBAR 118

Republic v. Cote 120

TENEBRO v. COURT OF APPEALS 122

CAPILI v. PEOPLE 124

People v. Odtuhan 127

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan 129

Jocson v. Robles 131

Tolentino v. Villanueva 132

Buccat v. Buccat 134

Aquino v. Delizo 135

CASE # 43

James Obergefell, et.al. v. Richard Hodges, Director, Ohio
Department of Health, et.al.
576 U.S. _____ | TOPIC: Marriage; Concept and Nature;
Definition
DOCTRINE: The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent
in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right and
that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental
right to marry. No longer may this liberty be denied to them.
FACTS: Obergefell, the named petitioner, traveled to Maryland
to marry his ailing (same-sex) partner who was suffering from
amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS). His partner died in Ohio, the
couple’s home state, shortly after they were married; but,
because the laws of Ohio did not allow for same-sex marriage,
Obergefell could not be listed as his partner’s surviving spouse
on Obergefell’s death certificate. Obergefell sued with the co-
plaintiffs to have his Maryland marriage recognized in Ohio so
that his name could appear on his dead husband’s death
certificate.
Other petitioners: same-sex partners April DeBoer and Jayne
Rowse have three adopted children. However, Michigan permits
only opposite-sex married couples or single persons to adopt.
Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura got married in New York where
same-sex marriage was legal before Ijpe was deployed to
Afghanistan. Upon his return, they settled in Tennessee where
their marriage was not recognised, with the result that their
legal status in relation to each other changes as they travel
between states.
The cases were heard in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio and
Tennessee, each of which defines marriage as between a
5
woman and a man. In each case, the relevant District Court
found in favour of the petitioner. Each of the respondents,
however, who were state officials responsible for enforcing the
relevant laws, appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit consolidated the respondents’ appeals and reversed the
decisions, finding in favour of the respondents. The petitioners
then sought certiorari in the Supreme Court.
Petitioners’ Arguments: they argued that the actions of the
respondents violated Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution […nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws] by either denying them their right to
marry, or by denying the recognition of their marriage legally
performed in another state.
Respondents’ Arguments: the respondents argued that the
petitioners did not seek recognition of the right to marry but
sought recognition of a new and non-existent “right to same-
sex marriage”. They argued that marriage was by nature
between a man and a woman. Recognition of same-sex
marriage would demean the institution of marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state officials violate the Fourteenth
Amendment by denying same-sex couples the right to marry.
(Yes)
RULING: Yes. The institution of marriage has evolved over time
both legally and socially. Limiting marriage to opposite-sex
partners is inconsistent with the “central meaning of the right
to marry”. Such knowledge must lead to recognition that
banning of same-sex marriage imposes “stigma and injury of
the kind prohibited by our basic charter.” It would diminish the
personhood of same-sex couples and disparage their choices if
they were denied the same rights to marry as opposite-sex
couples under the Constitution.
 6
The Court held that the Constitution protects personal choices
as to marriage, noting the fact that the Due Process Clause of Henceforth, it follows from the decision that same-sex couples
the Fourteenth Amendment protects liberties which include may marry in all states and that there is no lawful basis for a
“intimate choices”. The Court said that the “right to marry” state to refuse to recognize a same-sex marriage lawfully
protects an “intimate association”. The Court defined “intimate performed in another state.
association” as a means of defining oneself “through
commitment to” another person. It asserted that same-sex
couples are just as entitled as opposite-sex couples to an
“association” that “responds to the universal fear that a lonely
person might call out only to find no one there”. In so doing,
the Court suggested that denying the freedom of “intimate
association” to same-sex couples denies them equal enjoyment
of a freedom which addresses basic and universal human
needs.

The right to same-sex marriage is also guaranteed by the Equal

Protection Clause. The marriage laws challenged by the
petitioners are “in essence unequal”. They denied same-sex
couples all the benefits granted to opposite-sex couples and
work as a “grave and continuing harm”, serving to disrespect
and subordinate gays and lesbians. The Court then described
the benefits of marriage to society and to individual citizens. It
described the good that marriage does for society, including and
the way in which it “safeguards children and families” within a
stable family structure and protects children from the potential
stigma of being in a non-traditional family not solidified by a
marriage. Finally, the Court outlined the benefits afforded to
those who are allowed to marry—namely, “dignity”, “expression,
intimacy, and spirituality”—as well as financial (e.g., tax)
benefits, suggesting that those who are not offered those
benefits are being denied equal protection. It noted that,
because marriage is considered to be a “keystone of the social
order,” the law offers a range of other exclusive benefits to
married couples. It went on to describe how “locking” same-
sex couples out of such a key societal institution would be not
only unfair and unequal but also “demeaning” to them.

Also, the respondents showed no foundation to conclude that

recognizing same-sex marriage would harm the institution of
marriage.

CASE # 44
Republic v. Albios, October 16, 2013
G.R. No. 198780 | TOPIC: Nature of Marriage
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE: A marriage may only be
declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law.
There is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into
for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares,
such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship
FACTS: October 22, 2004, Fringer, american, and Albios, got
married before Judge Calo of the MeTC, as evidence by the
Certificate of Marriage (Register No. 2004-1588)
December 6, 2006, Albios filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Fringer. Alleging that immediately
after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband
and wife because they never really had any intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. Their marriage made in jest, is null and void
ab initio.
RTC declared marriage void ab initio:
● Parties married for convenience only.
○ Enter into marriage to enable Albios to acquire
American citizenship, in consideration, she agreed
to pay him an amount of 2,000USD.
● After the ceremony, parties separated ways.
○ She never paid him the 2,000USD and he never
processed her citizenship papers.
● Thus ruled marriage was entered into for purpose other
than establishment of a conjugal and family life, such
7
was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception
CA affirmed RTC ruling: Found essential requisite of consent
lacking
● Parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was
similar to a marriage in jest
● Parties never intended to enter into the marriage
contract and never intended to live as husband and wife
or build a family
● Purpose was only for personal gain (Albios to obtain
foreign citizenship and Fringer the consideration of
2,000USD)
ISSUES: WON, a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of 2,000USD,
void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent - NO
RULING:
1. Lack of Consent
● The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on
the parties’ supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of
the Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of
marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the
absence of any essential requisite shall render a
marriage void ab initio.
● Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer.
● A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting
parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent

under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as
fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.
● Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the
parties must be capable of intelligently understanding
the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should
not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or
hypnotism.
● Case at bar, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of
consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the
beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
● That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates
that they willingly and deliberately contracted the
marriage.
● There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of
an application for citizenship. There was a full and
complete understanding of the legal tie that would be
created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
2. Marriage in jest
● A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form
but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear
understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a
purpose to enter into such a relation.
8
● It is a pretended marriage not intended to be real and
with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in
jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or
unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence of
consent.
● There is no genuine consent because the parties have
absolutely no intention of being bound in any way or for
any purpose.
● Case at bar, not a marriage in jest. Albios and Fringer had
an undeniable intention to be bound in order to create
the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to
acquire American citizenship.
● Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them
to further their objective, considering that only a valid
marriage can properly support an application for
citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to
enter into the actual marriage status and to create a
legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose. Genuine consent
was, therefore, clearly present.
● The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the
Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage
might have no real intention to establish a life together
is, however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely
entered into in accordance with law.
● The same Article 1 provides that the nature,
consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation.
● A marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable
under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes
other than what the Constitution or law declares, such
as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
 9
● Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal
requisites prescribed by law are present, and it is not
void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it
shall be declared valid.

● Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the

ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the
same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non-
disclosure of a previous conviction involving moral
turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by
another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted
disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction,
alcoholism, or homosexuality.
● No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute
fraud as a ground for an action to annul a marriage.
Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed
circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the
ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured or
innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured
party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.
● Petition is granted, petition for declaration of nullity is
dismissed.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06
is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

CASE # 45
Cabague v. Auxillo
G.R. No. L-5028. November 26, 1952, Bengzon,
J. | TOPIC: Breach of Promise to Marry
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
One can file an action for damages as may have resulted from
failure to carry out mutual matrimonial promises.
FACTS
● Felipe Cabague and his son Geronimo sued the
defendant Matias Auxilio and his daughter Socorro to
recover damages resulting from defendants' refusal to
carry out the previously agreed marriage between
Socorro and Geronimo.
● According to plaintiffs, defendants promised marriage
to plaintiffs, provided the plaintiffs would improve the
defendants' house in Basud and spend for the wedding
feast and the needs of the bride. Relying upon such
promises plaintiffs made the improvement and spent
P700. However, without cause defendants refused to
honor their pledged word.
● Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the contract
was oral, unenforceable under the rule of evidence. The
court dismissed the case. On appeal to the CFI, the
plaintiffs reproduced their complaint and defendants
reiterated their motion to dismiss.
ISSUES
Whether there was a breach of promise to marry entitling
plaintiff for damages - YES
10
RULING
● Here, there are two kinds of agreement: 1) the agreement
between Felipe Cabague and the defendants in
consideration of the marriage of Socorro and Geronimo,
and 2) the agreement between the two lovers, as "a
mutual promise to marry".
● For breach of that mutual promise to marry, Geronimo
may sue Socorro for damages. This is such action, and
evidence of such mutual promise is admissible.
● However Felipe Cabague's action may not prosper,
because it is to enforce an agreement in consideration of
marriage. Evidently as to Felipe Cabague and Matias
Auxilio this action could not be maintained on the theory
of "mutual promise to marry". Neither may it be regarded
as an action by Felipe against Socorro "on a mutual
promise to marry."
● Consequently, SC declares that Geronimo may continue
his action against Socorro for such damages as may have
resulted from her failure to carry out their mutual
matrimonial promises.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore this expediente will be returned to the lower court
for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. So
ordered.

CASE # 46
DOMALAGAN v. BOLIFER
G.R. No. L-8166 | TOPIC: BREACH OF PROMISE
TO MARRY
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed with the
necessary form.
FACTS
● The plaintiff Domalagan alleged that, in the month of November, 1909,
he and the defendant Bolifer entered into a contract wherein Domalagan
was to pay to Bolifer the sum of P500 upon the marriage of his son
Cipriano Domalagan with the daughter of the defendant, Bonifacia
Bolifer.
● Later on, plaintiff Domalagan completed his obligation under said contract
by paying to the defendant Bolifer Php 500, together with the further sum
of P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage."
● Notwithstanding said agreement, the said Bonifacio Bolifer, in the month
of August 1910, was joined in lawful wedlock to Laureano Sisi.
● Immediately upon learning of the marriage of Bonifacia Bolifer, plaintiff
Domalagan demanded of the defendant Bolifer the return of the said sum
of P516 together with the interest and damages.
○ The damages which he suffered resulted from the fact that he, in
order to raise said sum of P500, was obliged to sell certain real
property belonging to him, located in the Province of Bohol, at a
great sacrifice.
ISSUES
Whether or not plaintiff Domalagan can recover from defendant Bolifer the
return of the consideration paid by Domalagan, as well as damages, in view of the
breach of Bolifer of their contract regarding the future marriage of their children
[YES]
judgment of the lower court based upon either assignment of error. Therefore the
● Actual issue sa case: Whether plaintiff Domalagan can recover from the
defendant Bolifer despite the fact that their agreement had not been
reduced to writing
11
RULING
● ARGUMENT: Bolifer, as per the provisions of paragraph 3 of section 335
of the Code of Procedure in Civil Action, contends that a contract, such as
the one relied upon by the plaintiff, in order to be valid, must be reduced
to writing.
○ That part of said section 335 which the appellant relies upon for
relief provides:
In the following cases, an agreement hereafter made shall be
unenforceable by action unless the same, or some note or
memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the
party charged, or by his agent; evidence, therefore, of the
agreement can not be received without the writing or
secondary evidence of its contents:
1. . . .
2. . . .
3. An agreement made upon the consideration of marriage,
other than a mutual promise to marry.
● Said section (335) does not render oral contracts invalid.
○ A contract may be valid and yet, by virtue of said section, the
parties will be unable to prove it.
○ Said section simply provides the method by which the contract
mentioned therein may be proved.
○ It does not declare that said contract are invalid, which have not
been reduced to writing, except perhaps those mentioned in
paragraph 5 of said section (335).
● A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it is not clothed
with the necessary form.
● If the parties to an action, during the trial of the cause, make no objection
to the admissibility of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in
question and permit the contract to be proved, by evidence other than a
writing, it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced
to writing.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
We find nothing in the record justifying a reversal or modification of the
judgment of the lower court is hereby affirmed, with costs.

CASE # 47
HERMOSISIMA V. CA
GR No. L-14628 | TOPIC: Breach of promise to marry
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
"the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced upon the faith of such promise".
FACTS
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later
she became an insurance underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima,
23 years old (apprenticeship pilot), fell in love with each other. Since
1953, both had a regular intimate and sexual affair with each other.
In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry
Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next
month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named
Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the
latter to recognize his daughter with Soledad and for damages due
to Francisco’s breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial
court ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the trial court and even increased the award of damages.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages
because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for
him in order to satisfy his sexual desires – that being, the award of
moral damages is proper.
ISSUES
Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for
breach of promise to marry.
RULING
No. Breach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong as has been
definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866.
12
Further, in the light of the clear and manifest intent of our law
making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry,
the award of moral damages made by the lower courts is,
accordingly, untenable.
The Court of Appeals, rely its decision on the award of moral
damages on paragraph 3 of Article 2219 of the Civil Code: . . . Moral
damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxx (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
However, the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that
the "seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such
in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code, which does not
exist in the present case. The Court was unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who
around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a
former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed
to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but also because, the court of first instance found
that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, she
was "overwhelmed by her love" for him, and she "wanted to bind"
"by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
With the elimination of this award for moral damages, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, in all other
respects, without special pronouncement as to costs in this
instance. It is so ordered.

CASE # 48
Wassmer v. Velez
G.R. No. L-20089 | TOPIC: Breach of promise to marry
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
A mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is
about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant
Velez must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides "any person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."
FACTS
1. Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their
mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day.
2. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet —
Will have to postpone wedding — My mother opposes
it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason
why — That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
3. But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following
telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
4. Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
5. Thus, Beatriz sued for damages. But Velez filed no answer and
was declared in default.
13
6. On April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering Velez to pay
Beatriz P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees; and the
costs.
7. On June 21, 1955, Velez filed a petition for relief from orders
and motion for new trial and reconsideration.
8. Beatriz moved to strike it cut. But the Court ordered the
parties to appear and to explore the possibility of arriving at
an amicable settlement. If one of the parties failed to appear,
the petition for relief and the opposition thereto will be
deemed submitted for resolution.
9. Throughout the months, Velez’ counsel made postponements
with the possibility of an amicable settlement.
10. Finally, Velez’ counsel informed the court that chances of
settling the case amicably were nil.
11. The Court then issued an order denying Velez’ petition for
relief and motion for new trial and recon.
12. In support of his motion for new trial and reconsideration,
Velez asserts that the judgment is contrary to law. That there
is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing an action for
breach of promise to marry.
ISSUES
Whether Francisco Velez is liable for damages pursuant to
Article 21 of the Civil Code.
RULING
YES. Velez is correct in saying that mere breach of promise to marry
is not an actionable wrong. HOWEVER, acts not contrary to law which
may be perpetrated with impunity is not limitless for Article 21 of CC
provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage."
In this case:
● The parties obtained a license to contract marriage.
● Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954.
● Invitations were printed and distributed to relatives, friends
and acquaintances.
● The bride-to-be's trousseau, party dresses and other apparel
for the important occasion were purchased.
 14
● Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared.
● A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
● Bridal showers were given and gifts received.
● And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant
simply left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone
wedding — My mother opposes it ... "
● He enplaned to his home city in Mindanao, and the next day,
the day before the wedding, he wired the plaintiff: "Nothing
changed rest assured returning soon."
● But he never returned and was never heard from again.

Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As

stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony
is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 aforesaid.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Lower Court ruling affirmed. P15,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
 15
CASE # 49
ISSUES
Estremos v Ephan
W/N Virgilio should be held liable for damages because of him
CV No. 68300 | TOPIC: Breach of Promise to
disappearing 2 days before the arranged marriage with Erlinda
Marry (No)

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE RULING

● Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
● The Court first explained that there is no specific provision
wrong.
authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry. A mere
FACTS
breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong.
● Virgilio Ephan and Erlinda Estremos are neighbors, both
However, there is an exception. In the case of Wassmer v Velez
residents of Bansalan, Davao del Sur. Virgilio was graduating
the Court held that Art. 21 of the Civil Code may be raised as a
from the Harvadian University while Erlinda is from University of
basis for the breach of promise to marry to be an actionable
Mindanao. They went home together on the same bus.
wrong.
However, upon reaching Bansalan bus station, they separate
● However, the Court held that their pronouncement in the case
from each other to avoid suspicion of their relationship from their
of Wassmer v Velez is not applicable with the current case. In
families.
the former case, it was the parties themselves that entered into
● It is also admitted that Virgilio had carnal knowledge of Erlinda,
the agreement to marry. In the present case, it was the parents
with the latter’s consent. Eventually, Erlinda found out that she
of Virgilio who arranged the marriage in order for Erlinda to be
is 4 months pregnant. She then revealed her situation to her
saved from “shame” to their neighbors and friends.
mother. Erlinda also mentioned the same to Virgilio’s parents.
● The Court further explained that the parties in a marriage should
● Because of this, Virgilio’s and Erlinda’s parents arranged their
be more responsible morally and face the consequences of their
wedding. This was opposed by Virgilio saying that he is not yet
conduct before entering the said marriage. Virgilio Ephan has
ready, but his father insisted. It was agreed that their wedding
suddenly realized that marriage is not for him, at least for a
would take place on July 21, 1976. So the mother of Erlinda and
moment. The Court does not believe in making him go through
the father of Virgilio went to the Local Civil Registrar to apply for
a lifetime of marriage which he felt in the first place, he was not
a marriage license.
prepared for.
● However, 2 days before the said wedding, Virgilio sent a letter
● The Court held that making him go through with it against his
to Mrs. Estremos (mother of Erlinda), through a pedicab driver,
will would in the long run make him a bitter husband and
saying that he was not going through the wedding and
consequently an inept father, factors which do not make for a
disappeared.
good family life, where there should be no recriminations. We
● Even the parents of Virgilio knew nothing of his whereabouts.
do not consider what Virgilio did as covered by the case of
The Ephans did not prepare for the celebration. Because of this,
Wassmer vs. Velez case in view of the difference in facts and
the Estremos filed a complaint for damages against Virgilio
circumstances.
(initially it was against the parents since Virgilio was still a minor)
 16

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby amended
deleting the moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The other portions of the dispositive portion will remain.

CASE # 50

Tanjanco v. CA
GR No. L-18630 | TOPIC: Breach of Promise to
Marry

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Article 21 of the Civil Code is inapplicable in cases
where there is voluntariness and mutual passion.
FACTS
● Petitioner Apolonio Tanjanco courted respondent Araulli
Santos, he expressed and professed his undying love
and affection towards her which she eventually
reciprocated.
● For one year from Dec. 1953 to Dec. 1954, petitioner
succeeded in having carnal access to her, because of
his protestation of love and promise of marriage.
● She got pregnant, for which she resigned from her work
as IBM secretary to avoid embarrassment.
● He refused to marry her or to give support.
● Thus, she filed for an action before the trial court to
compel him to recognize the unborn child and provide
support.
● The complaint was dismissed for failure to state the
cause of action. Upon appeal, the CA ruled that cause
of action existed for damages as premised on Art. 21.
ISSUES
Whether or not refusal to marry or give support after a year of
voluntariness and mutual passion would result in an
actionable wrong under Art. 21
RULING
● The case under Art. 21, cited as an example by the Code
Commission, refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, which
in law is more than sexual intercourse, or a breach or
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
17
confidence on the part of the seducer, to which the
woman has yielded.
Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age
maintained an intimate sexual relationship with a man,
such conduct is incompatible with the idea of
seduction.
Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion.
Hence, no case is made under Art. 21, and no other
cause of action being alleged, no error was committed
by CFI in dismissing the complaint.
● In US v. Bustamante, 27 Phil 121: To constitute
seduction, there must in all cases be some sufficient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she
consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction. Decision of
CA reversed; that of CFI affirmed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of
Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is
affirmed. No costs.
CASE # 51
PAÑGANIBAN v. BORROMEO
GR No. (none. Administrative case) | TOPIC: Not
Subject to Stipulation
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

A contract between spouses allowing each other to commit
concubinage and adultery is contrary to law, morals, and public
order, and as such is not judicially recognizable.
FACTS
Complainant: Jose R. Panganiban.
Respondent: Elias Borromeo
1. Nov 25, 1931. Sps Alejandro Pablo and Juana Mappala
subscribed a contract before Borromeo, a notary public,
prepared by the municipal secretary of Isabela.
a. The contract was an agreement between the
spouses permitting the husband to take a
concubine, and the wife to live in an adulterous
relationship with another man without opposition
from each other.
b. Atty. Borromeo had some knowledge of the
contents of the contract but may not have been
fully informed because it was in a different
dialect.
2. A disbarment case was filed against Atty. Borromeo.
3. Borromeo admitted to legalizing the document in his
capacity as a notary public, and that the contract was
contrary to law, morals and good customs but by way of
defense disclaims any previous knowledge of the illegal
character of the document.
ISSUES
Whether or not the contract allowing a husband to take a
concubine and the wife to have an adulterous relationship with
another man sanctioned an illicit and immoral purpose (YES)
RULING
The court ruled that the contract contained provisions contrary
to law, morals, and public order, and as a consequence is not
judicially recognizable.
18
● The consent given by an offended party bars prosecution
for adultery or concubinage. As such, no prosecution of
either party can be expected.
○ The contract was entered into under the Spanish
Penal Code but the Court decided to apply the
more liberal RPC.
● Regardless, it is not the Legislature’s intention to legalize
adultery and concubinage. They still remain crimes.
● Even if consent of the other spouse bars prosecution of
said crimes, this consent is a matter of future
contingency, not legalization. Thus, the contract is not
judicially recognizable
● Borromeo was found guilty of misconduct and was
punished with severe censure.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
It now becomes necessary to pronounce sentence. As mitigating
circumstances, there may be taken into consideration (1) that the attorney
may not have realized the full purport of the document to which he took
acknowledgment, (2) that no falsification of facts was attempted, and (3) that
the commission of the respondent as a notary public has been revoked.
Accordingly, we are disposed in this case to exercise clemency and to confine
our discipline of the respondent to severe censure. So ordered.
 19
CASE # 52 public order. Marriage is an inviolable social institution that cannot
be made inoperative by the stipulations of the parties.

In re Santiago, 70 Phil. 66 June 21, 1940

70 Phil. 66 | TOPIC: Not Subject to stipulation

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE:

A document prepared by a lawyer allowing a husband and wife to
remarry is void as it is contrary to law, good morals and public order.

FACTS:

Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife
Soledad Colares for 9 years, sought the legal advice of the
respondent for a possible second marriage.

They prepared the document. Baniquit then asked, "Would

there be no trouble?" The respondent points to his diploma
and said: "I would tear that off if this document turns out not
to be valid."

Hence, he contracted a second marriage. Respondent realized

that he had made a mistake for the timeline of the separation
of husband and wife, and for that reason, he immediately sent
for the contracting parties to sign the deed of cancellation of
the document.

ISSUES: W/N the document authorizing the husband and wife

to remarry prepared by the lawyer is valid? NO.

RULING: Atty. Santiago was suspended from practice of law for a

year on the ground of ignorance of the law or being careless for
giving legal advice by trying to dissolve the marriage through a
private contract. The document is contrary to law, good morals and

CASE # 53
Saturnino SELANOVA v. Alejandro MENDOZA
A.M. No. 804 CJ, May 19, 1975 | TOPIC: NOT
SUBJECT TO STIPULATION
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
1. Selanova charged Judge Mendoza of Mandaue City for
gross ignorance of the law for having prepared and
raffled a document (DOCUMENT IN QUESTION),
extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of
the complainant and his wife, Avelina Ceniza.
a. CONDITION of the Liquidation: Either spouse, as
the case may be, may withdraw the complaint
for adultery or concubinage which each had filed
against each other and that they waived their
right to prosecute each other for whatever acts
of infidelity.
2. Judge Mendoza, in his comment, purposed to convey
the impression that he was aware of the invalidity of
the agreement but nevertheless ratified it and gave it
his nihil obstat on the assurance of the spouses that
they would ask the CFI of Negros Oriental (where they
were residing) to approve the agreement.
a. Judge Mendoza relied on the provision of Art. 191,
Par. 4 of the NCC) that “husband and wife may
agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to
judicial approval.
20
b. To give the prohibition against an extrajudicial
liquidation of the conjugal partnership during the
marriage would render nugatory Art. 191, par 4 of
NCC. Citing Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson, as
authority for the propriety of an extrajudicial
agreement for the dissolution during the
marriage of the conjugal partnership as long as
the agreement is subsequently approved by the
Court.
c. Selanova’s complaint was instigated by a lawyer
whose case was adversely decided by the Judge.
This was DENIED by petitioner, who also belied
Judge Mendoza’s version that the complaint that
was filed, together with his wife and their
parents, came to Judge Mendoza to solicit his
help.
3. Petitioner alleged that: respondent OVERLOOKED the
ruling and that judicial sanction for the dissolution of
the conjugal partnership during the marriage should be
“secured beforehand”.
a. Selanova alleged, in 1972, his was father was
already dead and his mother was 91 years old.
They could not have possibly come to Judge
Mendoza’s office.
4. Judge Mendoza retired on Feb. 27, 1975, when he
reached the age of 70.
a. 43 years of service (career in 1932 as a police
and became justice of the peace in 1954)
b. Financial predicament occasioned by delay in
retirement pay.
5. The case was NOT referred to a Judge of CFI for
investigation because there was no factual issue that
necessitated a hearing and presentation of evidence.
a. Judge Mendoza admitted responsibility for the
execution of the questioned document.

b. In the document, he divided the 2 pieces of
conjugal assets of the spouses by allocating to
the husband a 13 hectare riceland and to the
wife, a residential house and lot. The last
paragraph of the document, which licensed
either spouse to commit any act of infidelity,
was in effect a ratification of their personal
separation.
ISSUES:
W/N a judge should be held administratively liable for
ratifying a document that contains void stipulations
RULING:
YES.
The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the
following provisions of the Civil Code:
ART. 221. The following shall be void and of no effect:
(1) Any contract for personal separation between husband and
wife;
(2) Every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains or of the
absolute community of property between husband and wife;
xxx xxx xxx
Even before the enactment of the new Civil Code, this Court
held that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal
partnership without judicial approval was void
21
In the instant case, respondent Judge, due to his unawareness
of the legal prohibition against contracts for the personal
separation of husband and wife and for the extrajudicial
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, prepared the said void
agreement which was acknowledged before him as "City Judge
and Notary Public Ex-Officio". (Because he was admitted to the
bar in 1948 and, consequently, he did not study the new Civil
Code in the law school, he might not have been cognizant of its
aforecited article 221).
Taking into account that circumstance and his apparent good
faith and honest desire to terminate the marital conflict
between the complainant and his wife, we are of the opinion
that a drastic penalty should not be imposed on him. But he
deserves a severe censure for his mistake in preparing and
notarizing the aforementioned immoral and illegal agreement.
Such severe reprimand should not be an obstacle to his
enjoyment of retirement privileges, assuming that there are no
causes for depriving him of such benefits.
WHEREFORE, the respondent is severely censured.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 22
CASE # 54

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 55
Republic v. Orbecido III, 472 SCRA 114, October
5, 2005
G.R. No. 154380. | Special Rule in Marriages
Exceptions, FC 26 in relation to FC 35 (1), (4)(5),
36-38
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
● Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva
at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in
Lam-an, Ozamis City, on May 24, 1981. They had two
children. Lady Myros left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer in 1986. After few years,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized
as an American citizen.
● Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree sometime in 2000 and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley and lived in
California.
● He then filed with the trial court a petition for authority
to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in
the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic,
herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was
denied. Orbecido filed a petition for review of certiorari
on the Decision of the RTC
ISSUES
23
Does Art. 26 apply to a case to a “divorced” Filipino spouse
where, there’s a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens,
and one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry?
RULING
YES.
● In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino
citizens when they got married. The wife became a
naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by
way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his
naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under
Philippine law and can thus remarry.
● Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph
2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of
them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.
● A statute may therefore be extended to cases not
within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.
● In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for
the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
 24
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The
reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.

● In this case, when Cipriano's wife was naturalized as

an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her
to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

● However, since Orbecido was not able to prove as fact

his wife’s naturalization, he was still barred from
remarrying.
● Petition GRANTED.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 56
GARCIA-RECIO V. RECIO
GR No. 138322 | TOPIC: Law Governing Validity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized
in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. However,
the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the
alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven.
Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce
decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
● At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles
as the take-off points for our discussion. Philippine law
does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts
cannot grant it.
○ A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be
dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad,
because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code.
○ In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a
foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the
former to contract a subsequent marriage in case
the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."
○ A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are
both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.
FACTS
25
1. Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to
Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal,
on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and
wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce,
purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an
Australian family court. On June 26, 1992, respondent
became an Australian citizen and was married again to
petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a Filipina on January 12,
1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a
marriage license, respondent was declared as “single”
and “Filipino.”
2. Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent
lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage. On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly
dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
Grace.
3. On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s
wedding and while the suit for the declaration of nullity
was pending, respondent was able to secure a divorce
decree from a family court in Sydney, Australia because
the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
4. The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of
Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the
couple thus there was no more marital union to nullify
or annul.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven.

2. Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally
capacitated to marry petitioner.
RULING
1. The Court ruled in the negative. The Supreme Court ruled
that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of
respondent’s marriage to Samson is insufficient. Before
a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it. Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent
and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one
issued by an Australian family court. However,
appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be
demonstrated.
2. The Court ruled in the negative. Australian divorce
decree contains a restriction that reads: “1. A party to a
marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the
offence of bigamy.” This quotation bolsters the Court’s
contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may
have been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his
legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial
court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to
remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that
respondent, who was then a naturalized Australian citizen, was
legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12, 1994. We
agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in
finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent
with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to
26
adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law
governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal
capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage
to respondent null and void on the ground of bigamy. After all,
it may turn out that under Australian law, he was really
capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce
decree. Hence, we believe that the most judicious course is to
remand this case to the trial court to receive evidence, if any,
which show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner.
Failing in that, then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the
parties' marriage on the ground of bigamy, there being already
in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were both
obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated
March 1, 1987 and the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January
12, 1994.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence. The Court mentioned that
they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to
respondent null and void because of the question on latter’s
legal capacity to marry.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and
substantial justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for
the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in
that, of declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of
bigamy, as above discussed. No costs.

CASE # 57
Republic v. Manalo
GR No. 221029 | TOPIC: b. Exceptions, FC 26 in
relation to FC 35 (1), (4)(5), 36-38
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly
obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that
the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the
proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted.
FACTS
1. That respondent is previously married in the Philippines
to a Japanese national named YOSHINO MINORO as
shown by their Marriage Contract
2. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by
respondent in Japan and a divorce decree was rendered
by the Japanese Court
3. That respondent prays, among others, that together
with the cancellation of the said entry of her marriage,
that she be allowed to return and use her maiden
surname, MANALO.
ISSUES
WON a Filipino citizen has the capacity to remarry under
Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and
27
obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse
who is capacitated to remarry. YES.
RULING
Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209. As modified, Article 26 now
states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4),
(5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine
courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a
Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.
It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign
divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not
allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the
merits because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.
Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a
valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality, but
the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of
the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce
decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to
remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be
to sanction absurdity and injustice.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows: There is a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and A valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship
at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce x x x validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry. " Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision,
it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained
abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not
distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the
respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding.
Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce
proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage
bond and capacitating his or her alien spouse to remarry will
have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be
without a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign
28
divorce proceeding is in the same place and in "like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an
alien initiated proceeding.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous.
Such principle, found under Article 15 of the Civil Code, is not
an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mere existence of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may
provide for an exception thereto
Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving
the pertinent Japanese law validating it, as well as her former
husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her.
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among
those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by
reason of their judicial function.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The September 18, 2014 Decision and October 12, 2015
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076,
are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of
origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence as to
the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

CASE # 58
Juego-Sakai v. Republic
July 23, 2018 | Peralta, J. | Article 26 of FC
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The general purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is specifically
to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree
that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse.
FACTS
1. Petitioner Stephen I. Juego-Sakai and Toshiharu Sakai
got married on August 11, 2000 in Japan pursuant to the
wedding rites therein. After two (2) years, the parties, by
agreement, obtained a divorce decree in said country
dissolving their marriage.
2. Thereafter, on April 5, 2013, petitioner filed a Petition for
Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40, Camarines Norte.
3. The RTC granted the petition and recognized the divorce
between the parties as valid and effective under
Philippine Laws. CA affirmed this.
4. However, the CA revisited its findings and recalled and
set aside its previous decision. According to the
appellate court, the second of the following requisites
under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing:
a. there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
b. a divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
5. This is because the divorce herein was consensual in
nature, obtained by agreement of the parties, and not by
Sakai alone. Thus, since petitioner, a Filipino citizen, also
obtained the divorce herein, said divorce cannot be
29
recognized in the Philippines. In addition, the CA ruled
that petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies
of the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the second requisite for the application
of the second paragraph of article 26 of the family code
is not present because the petitioner gave consent to the
divorce obtained by her Japanese husband – YES.
2. Whether or not there is no substantial compliance with
requirement on the submission of authenticated copies
of [the] Civil Code of Japan relative to divorce as required
by the rules – NO.
RULING
First issue – application of the second requisite of Art. 26
1. The court observed that to interpret the word "obtained"
to mean that the divorce proceeding must actually be
initiated by the alien spouse would depart from the true
intent of the legislature and would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which is, specifically, to avoid
the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was
rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
2. Consequently, since her marriage to Toshiharu Sakai had
already been dissolved by virtue of the divorce decree
they obtained in Japan, thereby capacitating Toshiharu
to remarry, petitioner shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
Second issue – recognition of foreign divorce judgment.
1. As to the issue of evidence presented, petitioner explains
that the reason why she was unable to present
 30
authenticated copies of the provisions of the Civil Code
of Japan relative to divorce is because she was unable
to go to Japan due to the fact that she was pregnant.
2. She also went to the library of the Japanese Embassy to
photocopy the Civil Code. There, she was issued a
document which states that diplomatic missions of
Japan overseas do not issue certified true copies of
Japanese Law nor process translation certificates of
Japanese Law due to the potential problem in the legal
interpretation thereof. Thus, petitioner maintains that
this constitutes substantial compliance with the Rules
on Evidence.
3. HOWEVER, the Court did not grant petitioner's Petition
for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment for she has
yet to comply with certain guidelines before our courts
may recognize the subject divorce decree and the effects
thereof.
4. Time and again, the Court has held that the starting point
in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated March 3,
2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 104253
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

CASE # 59

Dela Cruz Morisono v. Morisono
GR No. 226013 | TOPIC: Exceptions, FC 26 in
relation to FC 35(1), (4)(5), 36-38
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Foreign divorce decrees obtained to nullify marriages between
a Filipino and an alien citizen may already be recognized in
this jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses
initiated the divorce; provided, that the party petitioning for
the recognition of such foreign divorce decree - presumably
the Filipino citizen - must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
FACTS
1. Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono was married to private
respondent Ryoji Morisono in Quezon City on December
8, 2009.
2. They lived together in Japan for 1 year and 3 months
but were not blessed with a child.
3. During their married life, they would constantly quarrel
due to Ryoji’s philandering ways, in addition to the fact
that he was much older than Luzviminda.
4. As such, she and Ryoji submitted a “Divorce by
Agreement” before the City Hall of Mizuho-Ku, Nagoya
City, Japan on July 1, 2012.
5. Luzviminda filed a petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree obtained by her and Ryoji before the
RTC so that she could cancel the surname of her
former husband in her passport and for her to be able
to marry again.
6. After complying with the jurisdictional requirements,
the RTC set the case for hearing but nobody appeared
to oppose her petition except the government.
31
7. The RTC denied the petition. It held that while a divorce
obtained abroad by an alien spouse may be recognized
in the Philippines - provided that such decree is valid
according to the national law of the alien - the same
does not find application when it was the Filipino
spouse who procured the same.
ISSUES
W/N a divorce decree obtained by a Filipino spouse against an
alien spouse according to the national law of the alien spouse
may be recognized in the Philippines? - YES.
RULING
1. The rule on divorce prevailing in this jurisdiction can be
summed up as follows:
a. First, Philippine laws do not provide for absolute
divorce, and hence, the courts cannot grant the
same;
b. Second, consistent with Arts. 15 and 17 of the
Civil Code, the marital bond between 2 Filipino
citizens cannot be dissolved even by absolute
divorce obtained abroad;
c. Third, an absolute divorce obtained abroad by a
couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with
their respective national laws; and
d. Fourth, in mixed marriages involving a Filipino
and a foreigner, the former is allowed to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the
absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
marry.
2. The fourth rule is encapsulated in Art. 26(2) of the
Family Code which reads: Where a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
 32
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the of her “Divorce by Agreement” obtained in Japan and
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the its conformity with prevailing Japanese laws on divorce.
Filipino spouse shall likewise, have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. DISPOSITIVE PORTION
3. Essentially, the second paragraph of Art. 26 provided WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or dated July 18, 2016 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
her marriage to the alien spouse considered as Branch 105 in SP. PROC. NO. Q-12-71830 is hereby REVERSED
dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the instant case is REMANDED to
4. This inclusion in Art. 26 provides the direct exception to the court a quo for further proceedings, as directed in this
this rule and serves as a basis for recognizing the Decision.
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse
and his or her alien spouse.
5. Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph
of Art. 26 is not limited to the recognition of the foreign
divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree
capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated
to contract another marriage.
6. Pursuant to Republic v. Manalo, foreign divorce decrees
obtained to nullify marriages between a Filipino and an
alien citizen may already be recognized in this
jurisdiction, regardless of who between the spouses
initiated the divorce; provided of course, that the party
petitioning for the recognition of such foreign divorce
decree - presumably the Filipino citizen - must prove
the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.
7. In this case, the ground relied upon by the RTC in
denying the recognition of the divorce decree (that
Luzviminda, the Filipino spouse, was the one who
initiated the divorce proceedings), had been rendered
nugatory.
8. However, the Court cannot just order the grant of
Luzviminda’s petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree, as Luzviminda has yet to prove the fact

CASE # 60
Racho v. Tanaka,
G.R. NO. 199515 | June 25, 2018 | J. LEONEN
Topic: Special rule in marriage
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE: Judicial recognition of a
foreign divorce requires that the (1) national law of the foreign
spouse and (2) the divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a
fact before the RTC. The Filipino spouse may be granted the
capacity to remarry once our courts find that the foreign
divorce was validly obtained by the foreign spouse according to
his or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national
law considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be
absolute.
FACTS
1. Rhodora Ilumin Racho and Seiichi Tanaka were married
on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City and lived together for
9 years in Japan, but did not have any children.
2. On December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the
divorce was granted. Racho secured an authenticated
Divorce Certificate which she later tried to register with
the Civil Registry of Manila but was denied since there
was no court order recognizing it.
3. When she tried renewing her passport, the DFA told her
that Racho needed to secure a proper court order
recognizing her divorce abroad. Thus, after proper
advise, Racho secured a Japanese Law English Version
of the Civil Code of Japan 2000 Edition in the Japanese
Embassy and later filed a petition for Judicial
Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry with
the RTC.
33
4. The RTC denied and dismissed Racho’s petition on the
grounds that an authenticated Divorce Certificate issued
by the Japanese Embassy was insufficient to prove the
existence of a divorce decree because it was not the
decree itself.
5. On MR, Racho argued that under Japanese Law, a divorce
by agreement becomes effective by oral notification, or
by a document signed by both parties and by two (2) or
more witnesses but this was still denied by the RTC on
the ground that Racho failed to present the notice of
divorce and its acceptance.
6. Hence this petition where the SC initially deferred action
on her petition pending her submission of a duly
authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification
of divorce to which Racho eventually complied by
submitting a duly authenticated Certificate of
Acceptance of Report of Divorce obtained in Japan.
(“2nd Certificate”)
7. Arguments: Racho reiterated her arguments in the RTC
and added that her Divorce Certificate is sufficient proof
of her divorce decree and that under Art. 728 of the
Japanese Civil Code, her marriage is now terminated by
divorce, thereby entitling her to remarry.
8. The OSG avered that the improperly authenticated
Divorce Certificate had no probative value but the OSG
did not object to the admission of the duly authenticated
Certificat of Acceptance of Report of Divorce which
Racho submitted to the SC. However, the OSG pointed
out that Racho only mentioned in her MR with the RTC
that her divorce was by virtue of a divorce by agreement;
thus, failing to prove that her divorce was not obtained
by her alien spouse. The OSG insists that such divorce is
not the one contemplated by Article 26 of the Family
Code.
ISSUES

1. WON a divorce by agreement obtained by a Filipino
spouse against her alien spouse is a divorce
contemplated under Article 26 of the Family Code? Yes
2. WON the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce was
validly obtained by the petitioner and respondent? Yes
3. WON the divorce decree obtained by the petitioner and
the respondent was valid, thereby entitling Racho to
remarry? Yes
RULING
1. Yes, recent jurisprudence (e.g. Republic v. Manalo) holds
that a foreign divorce may be recognized in this
jurisdiction as long as it is validly obtained, regardless of
who among the spouses initiated the divorce
proceedings .
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino
spouse from initiating or participating in the divorce
proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino
woman to be prohibited by her own national laws from
something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically,
the prohibition on Filipinos from participating in divorce
proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
2. While Racho initially failed to present sufficient evidence
before the RTC that her divorce was validly obtained
according to the national law of her foreign spouse; upon
her appeal with the SC, she submitted a Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce, certifying that the
divorce has been accepted on December 16, 2009.
Moreover, the seal on the document was duly
authenticated by a Japanse Consulate.
34
Thus, under Rule 132, Section 24, the said Certificate is
admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between
petitioner and respondent
Since the RTC has already established that according to
the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement
"becomes effective by notification." Considering that the
2nd Certificate was duly authenticated, the divorce
between petitioner and respondent was validly obtained
according to the respondent’s national law.
3. Yes the divorce decree obtained was valid. In this case,
respondent's nationality was not questioned since the
RTC duly admitted petitioner's presentation of
respondent's national law.
Article 728 of the Japanese Civil Code states that:
1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce.
2. The same shall apply also if after the death of
either husband or wife, the surviving spouse
declares his or her intention to terminate the
matrimonial relationship.
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision
contains no other qualifications that could limit either
spouse's capacity to remarry. The national law of the
foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship
is terminated by divorce. The 2nd Certificate does not
state any qualifications that would restrict the
remarriage of any of the parties. Thus, there can be no
other interpretation than that the divorce procured by
petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely
terminates their marital tie.
 35
Even under our laws [Art. 40 FC], the effect of the
absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both
parties the legal capacity to remarry.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED.

The RTC’s Decision and Order are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By
virtue of Article 26, 2nd paragraph of the FC … petitioner Racho
is declared capacitated to remarry.

OTHER NOTES: Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only

in issues on the validity of remarriage. It cannot be the basis for
any other liability, whether civil or criminal, that the Filipino
spouse may incur due to remarriage.
 36
CASE # 61 6. Plaintiff and his witnesses explained that no celebration of
the marriage was held inspite of the prominence of the
contracting parties because plaintiff was then busy
PUGEDA v. TRIAS 4 SCRA 849, March 31, 1962 campaigning for the office of Member of the Provincial Board
GR No. L-16925 | TOPIC: Essential Requisites and Maria C. Ferrer was already on the family way.
7. The defendants denied the existence of the marriage and
introduced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages in
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
the municipality of Rosario, Cavite, in the month of January,
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
1916, which showed that no record of the alleged marriage
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
existed therein; but this absence was explained by the
the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization
Justice of the Peace that perhaps the person who kept the
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage
register forgot to make an entry of the marriage in the
registry.
FACTS
ISSUES
1. Maria Ferrer and Mariano Trias were husband and wife. When
the latter died, Maria contracted marriage with Fabian
Whether or not the absence of a marriage record in the registry
Pugeda. Now, there have been conflicting claims of the said
renders the marriage void?
lands between Pugeda and Maria’s children with his first
husband when Maria passed away.
RULING
2. Plaintiff Pugeda prayed that the properties, acquired as
No.
conjugal properties, be partitioned and one-half thereof be
The judge who heard the evidence, after a review of the testimonial
given as share of his since he contracted a lawful marriage
and documental evidence, arrived at the conclusion that plaintiff
with Maria.
Fabian Pugeda was in fact married to Maria C. Ferrer on January 5,
3. One of the issues raised in the present case is the alleged
1916, this conclusion being borne out not only by the chain of
existence of a marriage of Fabian Pugeda and Maria C. Ferrer.
circumstances but also by the testimonies of the witnesses to the
4. Plaintiff and his witness Ricafrente (who solemnized the
celebration of the marriage, who appeared to be truthful, as well as
wedding) testified that in the afternoon of January 5, 1916, on
by the fact that plaintiff and deceased Maria C. Ferrer lived together
the eve of Epiphany or Three Kings, plaintiff and the
as husband and wife for eighteen years (1916-1934) and there is a
deceased Maria C. Ferrer went to the office of the Justice of
strong presumption that they were actually married.
the Peace, who was then witness Ricardo Ricafrente, to ask
the latter to marry them.
Art. 53. — As to marriages contracted subsequently, no proof other
5. Accordingly Ricafrente celebrated the desired marriage in the
than a certificate of the record in the civil register shall be admitted,
presence of two witnesses; that after the usual ceremony
unless such books have never been kept, or have disappeared, or the
Ricafrente asked the parties to sign two copies of a marriage
question arises in litigation, in which cases the marriage may be
contract, and after the witnesses had signed the same, he
proved by evidence of any kind. (p. 27, Civil Code) .
delivered one copy to the contracting parties and another to
the President of the Sanitary Division, which officer was at
Testimony by one of the parties to the marriage, or by one of the
that time the keeper of the records of the civil register.
witnesses to the marriage, has been held to be admissible to prove
 37
the fact of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization
is also competent to testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage

The Court cited Madridejo v. De Leon: The mere fact that the parish
priest who married the plaintiff's natural father and mother, while
the latter was in articulo mortis, failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate
said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity were not present, and the
forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate not being one of said
requisites.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
FOR ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the plaintiff's
complaint is hereby dismissed, and the judgment of the Court of
First Instance of Cavite, Hon. Antonio C. Lucero, presiding, decreeing
the division of the properties of the deceased Maria C. Ferrer among
her eight children and plaintiff, is hereby modified in the sense that
all of her properties be divided among her eight children at the rate
of one-eight per child. As thus modified, the judgment of Judge
Lucero is hereby affirmed. Without costs.

CASE # 62

SISON v. TE JAY LI
GR No. | TOPIC: ESSENTIAL REQUISITES –
Parental Consent
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Mere words without any corresponding intention will not create
the marriage relation. Notwithstanding that the formalities
indicating consent have been complied with, there is no valid
marriage where the parties do not intend to enter the marriage.
FACTS
In accord with the custom of the Chinese, Juanita and
respondent were arranged to be married but this was only
brought up to the former two weeks before the celebration and
that Te Lay Li never wooed (seek and gain the love and support).
However, Juanita (the bride) did not want to get married with
the Te. She would always oppose the impending marriage but
her father whips and threatens her every time she would do so.
Two days before the wedding, Juanita ran away and went to the
office of the Fiscal. Her father convinced her to go back home
with a promise that he will no longer forcer her to marry the
respondent against her will. After such return, she was kept
locked in the house and on the morning of her wedding day, her
father handed her a knife and made her choose between losing
her life or his if she did not marry Te and because of this,
Juanita consented to marry Te Lay Li.
There were two weddings that transpired. The First was
celebrated by Judge Hofilena and the second wedding was
solemnized by the Chinese consul Mih in conformity with the
Chinese rites. Moments before the first wedding, Juanita
approached Judge Hofilena and told him that she was only
being compelled by her father to marry the groom to be. A
certain Mr. Teng also corroborated this testimony that during
the marriage ceremony, he saw that the Judge was irked by the
hesitant attitude displayed by the bride. Mr. Teng also testified
38
that when they went to get Juanita from the Fiscal’s office,
Juanita’s Father confessed that Juanita did not want to marry
Te.
After the marriage, Juanita always considered her husband to
be a stranger. She was kept a prisoner in their house and they
never shared the same bed (she slept in a chair). They never
had sexual intercourse except when a time when she was
forced by her husband holding a knife to submit to his wishes.
Because of this mustered courage and escaped
ISSUES
Whether or not the consent to marry given by Juanita was
obtained through force and intimidation
Whether or not even supposing that that marriage was void
due to lack of consent, that it was ratified through
cohabitation
RULING
- YES. Based on the testimonies given by the petitioner and
the Judge as corroborated by Mr. Teng, it is evident that
Juanita did not want to marry Te but only did so due to
force, threat and intimidation given by her father. Te Lay
Li and Juanita’s father did not deny nor refute Juanita's
claim of objection to the marriage (Father was never
presented as witness). Mere words without any
corresponding intention will not create the marriage
relation. Notwithstanding that the formalities indicating
consent have been complied with, there is no valid
marriage where the parties do not intend to enter the
marriage.
- NO. While a marriage effected by force or intimidation
may be ratified and confirmed by cohabitation, such
cohabitation must be voluntary. It is clear from Juanita’s
testimony that there was no voluntary cohabitation on
her part and she was never acquiesced to the status of
wife.
 39

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 40
CASE # 63 that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could not
be declared elected to take his place.

Vilar v. Paraiso · After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the
GR No. L-8014 | TOPIC: Solemnizing Officer; How office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his
Authorized proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring
petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE From this decision both parties have appealed, respondent from that portion
the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite resignation devolves, not finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he cannot be
upon respondent, but upon the head of his organization or upon the official declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so
charge of such registration, upon proper showing of the reason for such ISSUES
cancellation, because the law likewise imposes upon the interested party the
Did the mere resignation as minister of the United Church of
duty of effecting such cancellation. who in the instant case is the respondent Christ by the petitioner makes him eligible to hold office
himself.
RULING
FACTS
No. The respondent never ceased as minister of the order to which he
belonged and that the resignation he claims to have filed months before the
· In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V. Vilar
date of the elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of
and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered and
the law regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office.
voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija.
If the respondent intended to resign as minister of the religious organization
· After the canvass was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso
for the purpose of launching his candidacy, he should resign in due form and
garnered 1,509, and as a result the municipal board of canvassers
have the acceptance of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public
proclaimed the latter as the mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41
Libraries.
votes.
The purpose of registration is twofold: to inform the public not only the
· However, contending that Paraiso was ineligible to hold office as
authority of the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep
mayor because he was then a minister of the United Church of Christ in
it informed of any change in his religious status. This information is
the Philippines and such was disqualified to be a candidate under section
necessary for the protection of the public.
2175 of the Revised Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo
warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
It is no argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the
assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null
requisite resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his
and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal,
organization or upon the official charge of such registration, upon proper
Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law likewise imposes
upon the interested party the duty of effecting such cancellation. who in the
· Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that he
instant case is the respondent himself.
resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines on
This he failed to so. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of
August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his
candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well that
church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951, and
a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
 41
The documents Paraiso presented to show his alleged resignation were held
to be self-serving and appeared to have been prepared haphazardly, leading
the court to believe that these were made only to cure his ineligibility to hold
office.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement
as to costs.

CASE # 64
Aranes v. Occiano
GR No. A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390 | TOPIC: Formal
Requisites; Absence of Authority
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license
is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license
cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the
marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage
license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage.
FACTS
On Feb 17, 2000, Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of
the MTC Balatan, Camarines Sur solemnized the marriage of
Mercedita Mata Arañes and Dominador B. Orobia without the
requisite marriage license at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
When Orobia died, the petitioner’s right to inherit the “vast
properties” of Orobia was not recognized because the
marriage was null. She also cannot claim the pension of her
husband who is a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.
Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent
judge for his illegal acts and unethical misrepresentations
which allegedly caused her so much hardships,
embarrassment and sufferings.
Respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain
Juan Arroyo on 15 February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of
the parties on 17 February 2000. He was assured that all the
42
documents were complete, thus he agreed to solemnize the
marriage in his sala.
However, on 17 February 2000, he acceded to the request of
Arroyo that he solemnize the marriage in Nabua because
Orobia had a difficulty walking and could not stand the rigors
of travelling to Balatan.
Before starting the ceremony he discovered that the parties
did not possess the requisite marriage license, thus he
refused to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting
to another date. After earnest pleas, he proceeded to
solemnize the marriage out of human compassion. He also
feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the
physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke.
After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure
to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner and
Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the
license to him in the afternoon.
Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the
contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and
embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to her own
fault and negligence.
On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of
Desistance dated 28 August 2001 confessing that she filed the
complaint out of rage, and she realizes her own shortcomings.
She attested that respondent judge initially refused to
solemnize her marriage and that it was because of her
prodding and reassurances that he eventually solemnized the
same.

From the records, petitioner and Orobia filed their Application
for Marriage License on 5 January 2000 to be issued on 17
January 2000. However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed
it.
ISSUES
Whether or not Judge Salvador Occiano, Presiding Judge of
the MTC Balatan, had the authority to solemnize the marriage
ceremony celebrated at at Nabua, Camarines Sur without the
requisite marriage license.
RULING
No. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129,
the authority of the regional trial court judges and judges of
inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their
territorial jurisdiction as defined by the Supreme Court.
An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages,
regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are
complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific
jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas
and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside
his court’s jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the
formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating
official to administrative liability.
In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge
is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act
of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua,
may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly
solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
43
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on
marriage.
Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a
marriage without the requisite marriage license. Marriage which
preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that
the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or
even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases
provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage.
Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he
solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect,
respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.
Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of
Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has consistently held
in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does
not necessarily have the legal effect of exonerating respondent
from disciplinary action
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE,Judge Salvador M. Occiano, is fined P5,000.00
pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
 44
CASE # 65 not appearing that the essential requisites required by law for
its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding of
a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential
Madridejo vs. Deleon
requisites.
G.R. No. 32473 | TOPIC: Formal Requisites;
Marriage Certificate
DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, the judgment is reversed, the
complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved with costs
DOCTRINE: [Short discussion only re: topic. There was another against the appellee without prejudice to any right he may have
discussion on legitimation but it’s not part of our topic] The mere to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son
fact that the parish priest who married the plaintiff's natural of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez. So ordered.
father and mother, while the latter was in articulo mortis, failed
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not
appear that in the celebration thereof all requisites for its
validity were not present, and the forwarding of a copy of the
marriage certificate not being one of said requisites.

FACTS: On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door,

was married to Pedro Madridejo by the parish priest of Siniloan,
Laguna. She died on the following day.

It, however, appeared that the parish priest who married Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.

CFI: The marriage between Pedro and Flaviana is valid.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of the priest (or solemnizing

officer) to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the
municipal secretary invalidates the marriage. (No)

RULING: No. The mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan,
Laguna, who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez failed
to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal
secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it

CASE # 66
Macua v. Avenido
G.R. No. 173540 | TOPIC: Marriage Ceremony
(Place)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence
of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive
evidence of marriage. Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of
marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate
may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
FACTS:
● Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November
1998, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
against Peregrina Macua Vda. de Avenido (Peregrina) on
the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio).
● Tecla alleged that her marriage to Eustaquio was
solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol but
because of World War II, records were destroyed, no
Marriage Contract could be presented and only a
Certification was issued by the Local Civil Registrar.
● Tecla and Extaquio had 4 children. In 1954, Eustaquio left
his family and his whereabouts was not known.
● In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got
married to another woman by the name of Peregrina,
which marriage she claims must be declared null and
void for being bigamous – an action she sought to
protect the rights of her children over the properties
acquired by Eustaquio.
45
● RTC denied Tecla’s petition of Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage.
● Tecla appealed the case to CA and CA revered RTC’s
decision saying the RTC erred in disregarding the
testimonials and documentary evidence presented
● Peregrina petitioned the case to SC, but SC denied it and
affirmed CA’s decision declaring the her marriage Null
and Void
ISSUES: Whether or not the evidence presented during the trial
proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio. YES.
RULING:
● While a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole
and exclusive evidence of marriage.
● Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be
proven by relevant evidence other than the marriage
● certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth certificate may
be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage
between his parents.
● In the present case, due execution was established by
the testimonies of Adela Pilapil, who was present during
the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself as a
party to the event.
● The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and
the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana,
as relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since
the due execution and the loss of the marriage contract
were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence–testimonial and documentary–may
be admitted to prove the fact of marriage
● The loss was shown by the certifications issued by the
NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol.
 46
● These are relevant, competent and admissible evidence.
Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary –
may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.
● Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract,
but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance
of which the public is deeply interested.
● Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward
legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to
be in fact married.
● The reason is that such is the common order of society,
and if the parties were not what they thus hold
themselves out as being, they would be living in the
constant violation of decency and of law.
● A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage. Semper – praesumitur pro
matrimonio – Always presume marriage
● In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of
marriage was completed by the testimonies of Adelina,
Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications of
marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy
Trinity Cathedral of Talibon, Bohol.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED.
The marriage between petitioner Peregrina Macua Avenido and
the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby declared NULL and
VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.

CASE # 67
Keuppers v. Judge Murcia
A.M. No. MTJ-15-1860 | April 3, 2018 |
Bersamin, J. | Duties of solemnizing officer; effect
of irregularity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
A municipal trial judge who solemnizes a marriage outside of
his territorial jurisdiction violates Article 7 of the Family Code,
and is guilty of grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the
best interest of the service. He should be properly sanctioned.
FACTS
● On May 12, 2008, Rosilanda Keuppers and her husband,
Peter Keuppers, went to the Local Civil Registrar's Office
(LCRO) of Davao City to apply for a marriage license
because they wanted to get married before Peter's
departure on May 22, 2008.
● An employee of the LCRO told them it would be virtually
impossible to solemnize their marriage before May 22,
2008 because of the requirement for the mandatory 10-
day posting of the application for the marriage license.
She then advised the couple to proceed to the office of
DLS Travel and Tours to look for a person who might be
able to help the couple.
● In the office of DLS Travel Tours, Siega, the owner,
charged higher processing fees and assured that the
couple would immediately get the original as well as the
NSO copies of the marriage certificate;
● Siega then required the couple to fill up forms but
instructed the couple to leave the spaces provided for
the address and other information blank.
47
● On May 19, 2008, the respondent Judge solemnized the
marriage in the premises of the DLS Travel and Tours.
● On the following day, the couple was surprised to find
erroneous entries in their marriage certificate as well as
on the application for marriage license.
○ the certificate stating "Office of the MTCC Judge,
Island Garden City of Samal" as the place of the
solemnization of the marriage although the
marriage had been solemnized in the office of the
DLS Travel and Tours in Davao City.
○ the statement in the application for marriage
license that she and her husband had applied for
the marriage license in Sta. Cruz, Davao City on
May 8, 2008 although then had accomplished their
application on May 12, 2008 in the office of the
DLS Travel and Tours; and
○ the statement in their application for marriage
license on having appeared before Mario Tizon,
the Civil Registrar of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur,
which was untrue.
● Report & Recommendation of the Investigating Justice:
respondent is guilty of solemnizing a marriage outside of
his territorial jurisdiction under circumstances not falling
under any of the exceptions as provided for in Article 8
of the Family Code. The wedding was indeed held in the
premises of DLS Travel and Tours Corporation, Sandawa
Road, Matina, Davao City, and was solemnized by the
respondent.
ISSUES
Whether the place of solemnization was a violation of Article 7 of the Family Code
- YES

RULING
Such place of solemnization was a blatant violation of Article 7
of the Family Code, which pertinently provides: Art. 7. Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction; x x x x
Also, Article 8: The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the
chamber of the judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or
temple or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-
consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except in cases
of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both
of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in by
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or
placed designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
Article 8 of the Family Code contains the limiting phrase and
not elsewhere, which emphasizes that the place of the
solemnization of a marriage by a judge like him should only be
in his office or courtroom. The only exceptions to the limitation
are when the marriage was to be contracted on the point of
death of one or both of the complainant and her husband, or in
remote place in accordance with Article 29 of the Family Code,
or where both of the complainant and her husband had
requested him as the solemnizing officer in writing to solemnize
the marriage at a house or place designated by them in their
sworn statement to that effect.
Respondent Judge is thus guilty of grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for
solemnizing the marriage of the complainant and her husband
outside his territorial jurisdiction, and in the office premises of
the DLS Tour and Travel in Davao City.
48
Respondent Judge's explanation of having done so only out of
pity for the complainant after she has supposedly claimed that
her German fiance was soon returning to Germany and wanted
to bring with him the certified copy of the marriage certificate
does not diminish his liability, but instead highlighted his
dismissive and cavalier attitude towards express statutory
requirements instituted to secure the solemnization of
marriages from abuse. By agreeing to solemnize the marriage
outside of his territorial jurisdiction and at a place that had
nothing to do with the performance of his duties as a Municipal
Trial Judge, he demeaned and cheapened the inviolable social
institution of marriage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS respondent JUDGE
VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, the former Presiding Judge of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, in the Island Garden
City Samal, Davao del Norte GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT
and CONDUCT PREJUDICIAL TO THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
SERVICE; and ACCORDINGLY, DECLARES as forfeited all his
retirement benefits, except his accrued leaves, with prejudice
to his appointment in government service.

CASE # 68
PALMA AND MERCADO v. JUDGE OMELIO
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223 |
TOPIC: EFFECT OF IRREGULARITY
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
"No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State." Marriage should not be
trivialized, especially by the solemnizing officers themselves.
FACTS
● Filipina Mercado (Mercado) sent an email to the SC PIO
regarding an alleged "marriage scam" in Davao City
perpetrated by MTCC Judges Omelio and Ferraris.
○ Mercado claimed to have personal knowledge of
the illegal activities of the said judges as she was
once a "fixer".
● Florita Palma sent an email to the SC complaining
about the alleged dishonorable conduct of Judge
Omelio and his wife, Clerk of Court Florida Omelio,
relative to the solemnization of the Echeverrias’
marriage.
● The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dispatched
an investigating team.
● The OCA found that both Judge Murcia and Judge
Omelio solemnized the marriage of the Echeverrias. But
it is Judge Murcia whose name and signature appear in
the Certificate of Marriage, while there are also pictures
to show that Judge Omelio also married the couple.
○ Judge Murcia claimed that he solemnized the
subject marriage in his courtroom; that the
contracting parties, as well as their witnesses,
49
appeared before him; and that all the documents
in support of said marriage were presented
before him.
○ Judge Omelio, on the other hand, argued that the
Echevarrias requested that he solemnize their
marriage. But since they wanted a beach
wedding, he suggested that they see Judge
Murcia whose court has jurisdiction over the
Island Garden City of Samal. Later on, the
Echevarrias invited him to dinner at their house
for those who were not able to attend their son's
wedding. During said dinner, the Echevarrias
requested him to “reenact the wedding for
purposes of picture taking and posterity,” to
which he acceded.
● The Investigating Justice submitted a report.
○ As regards Judge Omelio, the Investigating
Justice found him to have trifled with marriage
as a social institution and held him
administratively liable.
○ As regards Judge Murcia, the Investigating
Justice found no infraction on his part in
solemnizing the subject marriage. Instead, his
liability consisted in failing to collect the
necessary solemnization fees.
○ Similarly, the Investigating Justice found CoC
Omelio administratively liable for failing to
collect the solemnization fees.
● The Court however noted that, in the Report submitted
by the Investigating Justice, it was unclear as to "who
between respondent Judges Murcia and Omelio
[actually] solemnized the marriage of the Echevarrias,
where was the marriage solemnized — in Davao City or
in the Island Garden City of Samal, and when was the
marriage solemnized x x x.

● The Court resolved to refer the Final Report of the
Investigating Justice to the OCA for evaluation, report
and recommendation.
● The OCA found all three respondents to have violated
Administrative Order No. 125-2007: (1) Judge Omelio for
solemnizing the marriage without signing the Marriage
Certificate; (2) Judge Murcia for affixing his signature in
the Marriage Certificate without actually performing the
marriage; and (3) CoC Omelio for failing to collect the
solemnization fee (but she died during the pendency of
the administrative matter so the complaint against her
was dismissed).
ISSUES
1. W/N a judge may solemnize a marriage without signing
the Marriage Certificate - NO
2. W/N a judge may affix his signature in the Marriage
Certificate without actually performing the marriage -
NO
RULING
● AO 125-2007 dated August 9, 2007 provided for the
Guidelines on the Solemnization of Marriage by the
Members of the Judiciary and laid down the rules "to
enable the solemnizing authorities of the Judiciary to
secure and safeguard the sanctity of marriage as a
social institution."
● Records show that Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio
both violated AO 125-2007. Although both judges were
clothed with authority to solemnize marriages, in this
instance however, they overstepped the bounds of their
authority.
● As correctly found by the OCA, Judge Murcia affixed his
signature in the Marriage Contract of Julius and
Khristine without actually solemnizing their marriage.
50
○ Judge Murcia's claim that the contracting parties
personally appeared before him was belied by
the groom himself, Julius. When confronted by
the investigating team from OCA, Julius denied
knowing or appearing before Judge Murcia;
moreover, he asserted that he was not married in
the sala of Judge Murcia in the Island Garden
City of Samal, but at their residence in Davao
City. Julius also narrated that it was Judge
Omelio, and not Judge Murcia, who acted as the
solemnizing officer. Julius even presented
pictures which were taken during the wedding at
their residence showing Judge Omelio as the
solemnizing officer.
○ What further militates against Judge Murcia's
version was the fact that he claimed in his
Comment to have examined "all x x x
document[s] in support for a valid marriage
under the Family Code and the corresponding
receipt of payment for marriage solemnization;"
he also attested that "all the documents were in
place and x x x the appropriate fees were paid."
○ However, during the hearing conducted by the
Investigating Justice, Judge Murcia could no
longer recall whether there was a receipt issued
by the court to the payment of the solemnization
fee.
○ In addition, it was unearthed during the
proceedings that no solemnization fee was
received by the court, no receipt was issued
corresponding therefor, and no remittance to the
Judiciary Development Fund pertaining to said
solemnization fee was made.
○ In fine, it was established that by signing the
Certificate of Marriage, Judge Murcia made it
 51
appear that he solemnized the marriage of Julius Marriage should not be trivialized, especially by the
and Khristine without the contracting parties and solemnizing officers themselves.
their witnesses personally appearing before him ● Unfortunately, respondents Judges Omelio and Murcia
and sans payment of the solemnization fee. trifled with this sacred social institution. While they
● On the other hand, Judge Omelio's contention that he have the authority to solemnize marriages, they clearly
merely re-enacted the wedding ceremony of Julius and overstepped the bounds of that authority.
Khristine upon the request of the groom's parents was
similarly debunked by Julius' admission that it was DISPOSITIVE PORTION
actually Judge Omelio who solemnized his marriage ACCORDINGLY,the complaint against respondent Clerk of
with Khristine on February 28, 2008 at their residence Court Florida C. Omelio, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Island
in Davao City. Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte, is
○ Interestingly, although Judge Omelio DISMISSED.Respondent Judge George E. Omelio, Regional Trial
acknowledged said "marriage" as a sham, he Court, Branch 14, Davao City, Davao del Sur, is found GUILTY
insisted that it was not contrary to law as the of gross misconduct and FINED in the amount of P40,000.00
same was conducted only for picture-taking to be deducted from the money value of his accrued leave
purposes because they were not able to do so in credits. Respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal Trial
the sala of Judge Murcia. Court in Cities, Branch 2, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao
○ As a duly-authorized solemnizing officer, Judge del Norte, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in
Omelio is expected to know that marriage should the amount of P40,000.00.
not be trifled with, and its sanctity and
inviolability should never be undermined,
especially by such a lame ground as picture-
taking.
○ Worse, although he was supposedly merely doing
a re-enactment, Judge Omelio claimed to have
allowed additional witnesses/godparents to affix
their signatures in the marriage certificate that
was issued and signed by Judge Murcia.
○ Finally, all the guests were deceived into
believing that Judge Omelio was solemnizing a
real marriage and not just a mere re-enactment.
● "No less than our Constitution declares that marriage,
as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State."

CASE # 69
Abbas v. Abbas
GR No. 183896 | TOPIC: Marriages exempt from
license requirement
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
A marriage contract providing the marriage license number
pertaining to another couple cannot be considered as the
marriage license issued to the parties signing said marriage
contract. Evidence to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license.
A marriage is generally void ab initio if celebrated without a
marriage license. Here, the marriage between Syed and Gloria
without the requisite marriage license should be declared null
and void.
FACTS
● Syed, a Pakistani citizen, met Gloria, a Filipino citizen,
in Taiwan in 1991 and they were married on August 9,
1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan.
● Syed filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Gloria with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasay City.
● Syed testified that on January 9, 1993, he was at his
mother-in-law’s residence and was told that he was
going to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but was
not told of the nature of said ceremony.
● During the ceremony he and Gloria signed a document.
Syed claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
52
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply
for a marriage license, and that he had never resided in
that area.
● In July of 2003, Syed went to the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage
license, and was asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.
● The Municipal Civil Registrar (Encarnacion) issued a
certification to the effect that the marriage license
number appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967, was the
number of another marriage license issued to a certain
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan.
● For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf and
presented Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez,
Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
● Gloria testified that Syed is her husband, and presented
the marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.
She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of
the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and
said that he will get the marriage license for them, and
after several days returned with an application for
marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license,
they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to
Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that
she and Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.
● Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with
Syed, born on June 15, 1993.
● The RTC held that no valid marriage license was issued
in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra

Mabilangan and the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed. Further, taking
into account the fact that neither party was a resident
of Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License
No. 9969967 was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Family Code. As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack
of a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9,
1993 was void ab initio.
● Gloria appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending
that the lower erred in declaring the marriage between
the Syed and Gloria as null and void due to the absence
of a marriage license despite evidence clearly showing
that there was one.
● The Court of Appeals gave credence to Gloria’s
arguments and granted her appeal, on the ground that
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed
to categorically state that a diligent search for the
marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted, and
thus held that said certification could not be accorded
probative value. The CA ruled that there was sufficient
testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.
Moreover, it gave weight to the fact that Syed had
admitted to having signed the marriage contract.
ISSUES
Considering that evidence submitted by Gloria establish the
fact of the marriage ceremony, is the marriage valid even
without a valid marriage license issued for the couple?
RULING
53
NO. The Court ruled that evidence to show that a wedding
ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage
license. Pursuant to Article 4 of the Family Code, "the
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article
35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a
marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement
under Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.
The marriage between the parties cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having been solemnized
without a marriage license, is void ab initio.
In this case, Gloria failed to present the actual marriage
license or a copy thereof. She relied on the marriage contract
as well as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove the
existence of said license. However, this was rebutted by the
certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite that no such marriage license for Gloria and
Syed was issued, and that the serial number of the marriage
license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a
disputable presumption that an official duty has been
regularly performed, absent contradiction or other evidence to
the contrary. However, in this case, the presumption stands,
as no such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal
Civil Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the
records of their office. Proof that a diligent search having
been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was located
and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said
license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does
 54
not overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a
diligent search of the records of her office.

Gloria failed to present their marriage license and failed to

explain why the marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided.
She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the
best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said
license. Neither could the other witnesses she presented
prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them
applied for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother,
Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as to the contents of the
license, having admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas
Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task
of applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin,
who could have testified as to how the license was secured
and thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar as well as the testimony of her representative. As
Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City
dated October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM
annulling the marriage of petitioner with respondent on
January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.

CASE # 70
Ninal v. Bayadog
GR No. | TOPIC: (5) Marriages exempt from
license requirement, FC 27-34
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it
cannot be said that they have lived with each other as husband
and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From
the time Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had
elapsed. Even assuming that Pepito and his first wife had
separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent
had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It
should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under
the law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of the
marriage contract.
FACTS
1. Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974 and they had five children who are
the petitioners in this case.
2. Twelve years later (1985), Pepito shot Teodulfa which
resulted in her death.
3. A year and 8 months after the said death (Dec. 1986),
Pepito married the respondent Norma Badayog without
a marriage license claiming that they were exempt from
the requirement because they had already cohabited
with each other for five years as husband and wife.
4. Pepito died in a car accident in February 1997 galvanizing
petitioners, the children from his first marriage, to file a
55
declaration of nullity of the subsequent marriage
claiming that it was void for lack of a marriage license.
ISSUES
Whether or not the five year cohabitation as husband and wife
in this case can be considered to have sufficiently met the
requirement to be exempt from acquiring a marriage license.
RULING
No. The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of
the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though
they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at
least 5 years because from the time of Pepito‘s first marriage
was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only
about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife
had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma
had started living with each other that has already lasted for
five years, the fact remains that their five-year period
cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot
be the source of rights. It can be questioned even after the
death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.

CASE # 71
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO v JUDGE ROQUE
R SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan
A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 | TOPIC: Marriage
Exempt from License Requirement
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Mere cohabitation as husband and wife for the period of 5 years
is merely a ground for exemption from the marriage license
requirement. It does not severe previous marriages still
subsisting.
FACTS
● Borja-Manzano (petitioner) filed a complaint against Judge
Sanchez (respondent), charging the latter with gross ignorance
of the law. The petitioner averred that when the respondent
judge solemnized the marriage of her lawful husband, David,
and Luzviminda, he knew or ought to know that the same was
void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that
both were “separated”.
● In his defense, the respondent judge claimed that he only relied
on the joint affidavit of David and Luzviminda stating that both
of them had been living together as husband and wife for seven
years without the benefit of marriage.
● Moreover, there are two separate affidavits of David and
Luzviminda which shows that both of them are married.
However, despite this, the respondent judge solemnizes their
marriage in accordance with Art. 34 of the Family Code.
56
ISSUES
W/N the respondent judge was correct to solemnize the marriage
of David (husband of the petitioner) and Luzviminda, in
accordance with Art. 34 of the Family Code, despite knowing that
both parties are married and that the marriage contract only states
that they are only “separated”. (No)
RULING
● The Court explained that the respondent judge was wrong in
solemnizing the marriage of David and Luzviminda in
accordance with Art. 34 of the Family Code and ruled that the
respondent judge was guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
● In this case, the Court explained that the following requisites
must concur for the applicability of Art. 34 of the Family Code:
○ The man and woman must have been living together as
husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
○ The parties must have no legal impediment to marry
each other;
○ The fact of absence of legal impediment between the
parties must be present at the time of marriage;
○ The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they
have lived together for at least five years [and are
without legal impediment to marry each other]; and
○ The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement
that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their
marriage.
● The Court held that not all of the requisites are present in this
case. The respondent judge should have known that both
parties have prior existing marriage since their marriage
contract only indicated that they are “separated”. The affidavits
also showed that both parties are married, hence, the
respondent judge had knowledge of the existing marriage of
both parties.
 57
● Moreover, the Court held that mere separation with the
legitimate wife does not severe the marriage bonds.
Furthermore, Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry
each other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage
license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent Judge
to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment
of a prior existing marriage.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is
hereby ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to
be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.

CASE # 72

Republic v. (Liberty) Albios
GR No. 198780 | TOPIC: Marriages exempt from
license requirement
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
In a case where there was a marriage for immigration
purposes, where consent was freely given and they entered
into the marriage willingly and deliberately, the marriage
entered into is valid because they knew the benefits and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage.
FACTS
● On October 22, 2004, Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer), an
American citizen, and Liberty Albios (Albios) were
married.
● Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage with Fringer.
● She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because
they never really had any intention of entering into a
married state or complying with any of their essential
marital obligations. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
● Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his
answer. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to conduct an investigation and determine
the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the
Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she
could not make a determination for failure of both
parties to appear at the scheduled investigation. At the
pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor
appeared.
● RTC was of the view that the parties married each
other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
58
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire
American citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she
agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the
ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that
Fringer returned to the United States and never again
communicated with her; and that, in turn, she did not
pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her
petition for citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when
marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the
establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
● CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the
essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA
stated that the parties clearly did not understand the
nature and consequence of getting married and that
their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into
the marriage contract and never intended to live as
husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that
their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is,
for Albios to obtain foreign citizenship, and for Fringer,
the consideration of $2,000.00.
● The OSG that both parties freely gave their consent to
the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered
into that marriage and knew the benefits and
consequences of being bound by it. According to the
OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive.
ISSUES
Whether or not a marriage contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000 is
void on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING

The Court resolves in the negative.
● Fringer and Albios both consented to the marriage. In
fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated
nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
● Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be
(1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately
enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the
sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by
any of the vices of consent under Articles 45 and 46 of
the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and
undue influence. Consent must also be conscious or
intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of
intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the
beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Their understanding should not be affected by insanity,
intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.
● That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately
contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to
enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully
comply with the requirements of an application for
citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which
was necessary to accomplish their goal.
● Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred
institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with
Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize
this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare
such a marriage void in the event the parties fail to
qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed
59
of its benefits, or simply have no further use for it.
These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to
use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent
schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to
enter into a marriage of convenience; she should not be
allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
● No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as
an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State. It must,
therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices
of the contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the
impression that marriage may easily be entered into
when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29,
2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414
is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for
utter lack of merit.
CASE # 73
CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
 60

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 74
Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97
PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
FACTS
1. In a suit to annul an Extrajudicial Partition, petitioners,
heirs of the children in the first marriage of Lucio
Perido, claim that the CA erred in declaring that the
children of the second marriage were legitimate
children of Lucio and his second wife.
2. They claim that the children were illegitimate as the
first three were born out of wedlock even before the
death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two
were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized
by their parents before or after their marriage.
3. To prove this, they presented certificates of title in
1923 which shows that Lucio Perido was still a
widower, and that he married his second wife
Marcelina, only in 1925.
ISSUE
W/N the said certificates validly prove that Lucio was a
widower in 1923 thereby rendering the children of the second
marriage illegitimate?
RULING
NO. The CA correctly held these were not conclusive to show
he was not actually married to Marcelina.
Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together husband and wife
are married to each other.
61
This presumption, especially where legitimacy is involved, as
in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the
part of those who allege the illegitimacy.
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized
world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is
not only a civil contract, but… an institution… which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any…
evidence… to be in fact married… such is the common
order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living
in the constant violation of decency and of law.
A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is
"that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage." (Sec.
334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always
presume marriage."
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

CASE # 75
People v. Mendoza
95 Phil. 845 | TOPIC: Bigamous & Polygamous
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE:
OLD RULE: No need for a judicial declaration of nullity for a
VOID marriage.
NEW RULE: Under the Family Code, a judicial declaration of
nullity is required even for a VOID marriage.
FACTS:
August 1936, Jovita de Asis and Arturo Mendoza got married in
Marikina. During their marriage, Arturo was married to Olga
Lema in Manila. When Jovita died, Arturo contracted another
marriage with Carmencita Panlillio in Laguna.
This last marriage gave rise to his prosecution for bigamy.
Arturo contends that his marriage with Lema is null and void,
therefore non-existent at the time he married Jovita.
Then his 3rd marriage was valid also because it occurred after
the death of Jovita. Solicitor General argues that, even
assuming that Arturo's marriage to Lema is void, he is not
exempt from criminal liability in the absence of judicial
annulment of said bigamous marriage.
ISSUES:
1.W/N the the defendant is guilty of bigamy? NO.
2. W/N a previous court order declaring the past(second)
marriage null and void is necessary in order to validly contract
another marriage(the third)? NO.
62
RULING
1. No, Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy, for when he married
Carmencita, he had no previous valid marriage. His first
marriage (to Jovita) had been already been dissolved by
Jovita’s death in 1943.
2. It is admitted that appellant's second marriage with Olga
Lema was contracted during the existence of his first
marriage with Jovita de Asis.
Section 29 of the marriage law (act 3613), in force at the time
the appellant contracted his second marriage in 1941, provides
as follows:
Illegal marriages. — Any marriage subsequently contracted by
any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;
(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or the
absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be
so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such
subsequent marriage, the marriage so contracted being valid in
either case until declared null and void by a competent court.
His second marriage (to Olga) cannot be counted inasmuch as
it was VOID AB INITIO, having been contracted while Jovita was
still alive. Said second marriage needed no judicial declaration
to establish its invalidity because it was bigamous, and void
 63
from the beginning, as distinguished from a merely voidable or
annullable marriage.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 64
CASE # 76

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 77
People v. Proceso Aragon
GR No. L-10016, Feb. 28, 1957 | TOPIC: Void
Marraiges
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS:
1. On Sep. 28, 1925, the accused, under the name Proceso
Rosima contracted marriage with a certain Maria Gorrea
in the Philippine INdependent Church in Cebu.
2. While his marriage with Maria Gorrea was subsisting,
the accused, contracted a canonical marriage with
Maria Faicol on August 27, 1934, in the Sta. Teresita
Church in Iloilo City.
3. The sponsors of the accused and Maria Faicol were
Eulogio Giroy, employee of Office of Municipal
Treasurer of Iloilo, and a certain Emilio Tomesa, a clerk
in the said office.
a. After the marriage, the accused and Faicol
established residence in Iloilo. As the accused
was then a travelling salesman, he commuted
between Iloilo where he maintained Faicol, and
Cebu where he maintained his first wife, Maria
Gorrea, who died in Cebu City, on Aug. 5, 1939.
b. After Gorrea’s death, accused brought Faicol to
Cebu City in 1940, where she worked a teacher-
nurse.
c. Accused and Faicol did not live a happy marital
life in Cebu. In 1949 and 1950, Faicol suffered
injuries to her eyes because of physical
maltreatment by the accused. On Jan 22, 1953,
65
Faicol was sent to Iloilo for treatment for her
eyesight.
d. During her absence, accused contracted a third
marriage with a certain Jesusa Maglasang on Oct.
3, 1953, in Sibonga, Cebu.
e. Accused admitted marrying Maglasangin in
Sibonga, Cebu, on Oct. 3, 1953. Although the
accused made an attempt to deny his marriage
with Faicol (2nd marriage), the Court believes the
attempt is futile for the fact of the said second
marriage was fully established not only by the
marriage certificate but also by the testimony of
Faicol and Giroy, sponsors of the wedding.
4. CFI of Cebu found Aragon guilty of bigamy.
a. Even in the absence of an express provision in
Act. 3613 authorizing the filing of an action for
judicial declaration of nullity of a marriage void
ab initio, defendant could not legally contract
marriage with Maglasang without dissolution of
marriage to Faicol, either by death or judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage, at the instance
of Faicol.
ISSUES
W/N a husband can contract a subsequent marriage without
the dissolution of his previous marriages by death or by
judicial declaration of the nullity of such marriages
RULING:
YES.
(Basically what happened was that Accused had a subsisting
marriage with Gorrea when he contracted a marriage with
Faicol. Thus, the marriage with Faicol is void, hence, no need
 66
for judicial declaration of nullity, as per Sc. 29 of the Marriage
Law or Act 3613), which states no judicial decree is necessary
to establish its invalidity). Thus, the marriage with Maglasang
is valid.)

Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the

rule enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial
declaration of nullity of ab initio void marriages been within
the contemplation of the legislature, an express provision to
that effect would or should have been inserted in the law. In
its absence, we are bound by said rule of strict interpretation
already adverted to.

It is to be noted that the action was instituted upon complaint

of the second wife, whose marriage with the appellant was
not renewed after the death of the first wife and before the
third marriage was entered into. Hence, the last marriage was
a valid one and appellant's prosecution for contracting this
marriage can not prosper.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from

is hereby reversed and the defendant-appellant acquitted,
with costs de oficio, without prejudice to his prosecution for
having contracted the second bigamous marriage. So ordered.

The statutory provision (section 29 of the Marriage Law or Act

No. 3613) plainly makes a subsequent marriage contracted by
any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and
void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary
to establish its invalidity, as distinguished from mere
annullable marriages.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 67
CASE # 78
RULING
WIEGEL v. SEMPIO-DY, 143 SCRA 499 Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first
August 19, 1986 marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void
GR No. | TOPIC: Bigamous marriages but merely voidable(Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is valid
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is
clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void.
It was not necessary for the respondent to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on Lilia's
but merely voidable(Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is valid prior marriage for then such marriage though void still needs a
until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is judicial declaration before she can remarry. Accordingly, Karl
clear that when she married the respondent, she is still validly and Lilia’s marriage are regarded void under the law.
married to her first husband.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
FACTS
● Karl Heinz Wiegel before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Caloocan City filed for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lilia Oliva
Wiegel on the ground of Lilia’s previously existing
marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion.
● Lilia, while admitting the existence of the said prior
subsisting marriage claimed that the said marriage was
null and void as she and first husband Eduardo Maxion
was forced to enter the said marital union.
● In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue agreed upon by
both parties was the status of the first marriage
(whether the said prior marriage is void or merely
voidable). Lilia contested the validity of the pre trial
order asking for respondent court for an opportunity to
present evidence.
ISSUES
W/N it was not necessary to prove that the prior marriage is
void before deciding on the validity of the subsequent
marriage between respondent and petitioner?

CASE # 79
DONATO V. LUNA
GR No. L-53642 | TOPIC: Void Marriages
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial
questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be
considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by
means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to
establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an
involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the
basis for conviction.
FACTS
● On January 23, 1997, the City Fiscal of Manila filed an
information for bigamy against herein petitioner Leonilo
C. Donato, for having obtained a second marriage with
Paz Abayan while there is still a subsisting first marriage
with a certain Rosalinda Maluping.
● Donato and respondent Paz Abayan married on
September 26, 1978, without license as allowed in Article
76 of the New Civil Code (now Article 34. Of the Family
Code) which dispenses marriage license for a man and
woman who have cohabited for a least 5 years.
● Before Donato’s arraignment for Bigamy, Paz Abayan
filed a civil case for annulment of marriage before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila. She
alleged that Donato obtained her consent to marry
through deceit, as Abayan did not know about Donato’s
subsisting first marriage.
68
● In his answer, Donato claimed that his marriage with
respondent Paz Abayan was done without marriage
license and that his consent was obtained through force,
intimidation, undue influence and violence.
● Before the trial of the Bigamy case against, Donato filed
a motion to suspend the Proceedings based on
prejudicial question. Judge Luna denied his motion
based on the case of Landicho vs. Relova, which states
that a person who marries again assumes the risk of
bigamy. Petitioner Donato filed an MR but to no avail,
hence this Rule 65 petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES
Whether or not the annulment case pending before the
Domestic Relations Court of Manila raises a prejudicial question
in relation to the criminal case of Bigamy against Donato.
RULING
1. The Court ruled in the negative. The Supreme Court said
that there is no prejudicial question.
2. A prejudicial question is a question based on a fact
distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately
connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the
criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case,
the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily
be determined.
3. Donato claims that there is a prejudicial question based
on the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito. SC did not agree.
In that case, it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was
charged with bigamy and dela Cruz was also the one who
filed for annulment on the ground of duress, as
 69
contradistinguished from the present case wherein it
was Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a
complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Also in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in
the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was
null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the
present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil
case.
4. In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently
shown that his consent to the second marriage has been
obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
5. Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs.
Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of
marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to
the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved
that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation
in order to establish that his act in the subsequent
marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same
cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.

CASE # 80
Terre v. Terre
211 SCRA 6 | TOPIC: Bigamous and polygamous
marriages FC 35 (4), 39, 40, 41, 44, RPC 349
Subsequent marriage upon reappearance of
absent spouse FC 41 in relation to FC 42-44;
NCC 390 – 391, FC 55 (9), FC 101
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free
to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the
first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential.
FACTS
Complainant Dorothy B. Terre charged respondent Jordan
Terre, a member of the Philippine Bar with "grossly immoral
conduct," consisting of contracting a second marriage and
living with another woman other than complainant, while his
prior marriage with complainant remained subsisting.||| (Terre
v. Terre, A.C. No. 2349 (Resolution).
In his Answer, Atty. Terre averred that he had contracted
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre upon her
representation that she was single; that he subsequently
learned that Dorothy was married to a certain Merlito A.
Bercenilla; that when he confronted Dorothy about her prior
marriage, Dorothy drove him out of their conjugal residence;
that Dorothy had mockingly told him of her private meetings
with Merlito A. Bercenilla and that the child she was then
carrying (i.e., Jason Terre) was the son of Bercenilla; that
believing in good faith that his marriage to complainant was
70
null and void ab initio, he contracted marriage with Helina
Malicdem at Dasol, Pangasinan.
ISSUES
WON the 2nd marriage of respondent was a bigamous
marriage. YES.
RULING
When the second marriage was entered into, respondent's
prior marriage with complainant was subsisting, no judicial
action having been initiated or any judicial declaration
obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage of respondent
with complainant.
Respondent Jordan Terre sought to defend himself by
claiming that he had believed in good faith that his prior
marriage with complainant Dorothy Terre was null and void ab
initio and that no action for a judicial declaration of nullity
was necessary.
The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent
Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the first place,
respondent has not rebutted complainant's evidence as to the
basic facts which underscores the bad faith of respondent
Terre. In the second place, that pretended defense is the
same argument by which he had inveigled complainant into
believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A. Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being
allegedly first cousins to each other), she was free to contract
a second marriage with the respondent.
Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer, knew or should have
known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing
case law of this court which holds that for purposes of
 71
determining whether a person is legally free to contract a
second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage
was null and void ab initio is essential. 8 Even if we were to
assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that
mistaken belief in good faith, the same result will follow. For
if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first
marriage to complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid,
with the result that his second marriage to Helina Malicdem
must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent
Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of
Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the
personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar
Confidant's Office. A copy of this resolution shall also be
furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be
circularized to all the courts of the land.||| (Terre v. Terre, A.C.
No. 2349 (Resolution), [July 3, 1992], 286 PHIL 81-87)

CASE # 81
REPUBLIC V. GRANADA
G.R. NO. 187512 | 13 JUNE 2012 | SERENO, J. |
Subsequent marriage upon reappearance of
absent spouse
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Even if the RTC erred in ruling that the respondent was able to
prove her “well-founded belief” that her absent spouse was
already dead, such order already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed. Indeed, “[n]othing is more settled in law
than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it
becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer
be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact
or law.”
FACTS
1. Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida
Electric Company, got married in 1993.
a. Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric
Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment.
b. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not
receive any communication from her husband,
notwithstanding efforts to locate him.
c. Her brother testified that he had asked the
relatives of Cyrus regarding the latter’s
whereabouts, to no avail.
2. After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to
have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the RTC
Lipa City.
3. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision
declaring Cyrus as presumptively dead.
72
4. On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Decision.
a. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert
earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to
prove her well-founded belief that he was already
dead.
5. The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case
on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda filed a Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction
over the appeal.
a. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the
Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding,
in which the judgment is immediately final and
executory and, thus, not appealable.
6. The appellate court granted Yolanda’s Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Citing Republic v.
Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Rule 41 of the
Family Code is a Summary proceeding. Thus, judgment
thereon is immediately final and executory upon notice
to the parties.
7. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
Hence, the present petition under Rule 45.
ISSUES
1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding
for the declaration of presumptive death is immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties and,
hence, is not subject to ordinary appeal. (Procedural).
YES
2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s grant of the
petition for declaration of presumptive death based on
evidence that respondent had presented. NO
RULING

PROCEDURAL:
The declaration of presumptive death is final and immediately
executory. Even if the RTC erred in granting the petition, such
order can no longer be assailed.
1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse for the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage
under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
“as provided for” under the Family Code. Taken together,
Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a
summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall
be immediately final and executory no longer subject of an
appeal.
In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in
a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
SUBSTANTIVE:
2. Petitioner Republic also assails the RTC’s grant of the Petition
for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the absent spouse of
respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the
evidence required to establish a well-founded belief that her
absent spouse was already dead.
THE FOUR REQUISITES FOR THE DECLARATION OF
PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER THE FAMILY CODE are as follows:
1 That the absent spouse has been missing for four
consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred (additional) where there is
danger of death under the circumstances laid down in
Article 391, Civil Code;
2 That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
73
3 That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that
the absentee is dead (THIS ELEMENT WAS ABSENT IN
THIS CASE)
4 That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for
the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee.
The present spouse has been able to prove the existence of a
"well-founded belief" that the absent spouse is already dead,
the Court in Nolasco cited United States v. Biasbas, which it
found to be instructive as to the diligence required in searching
for a missing spouse.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under
the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must institute a
summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without
prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse
has been absent and that he has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may
contract a subsequent marriage.
BELIEF IS A STATE OF THE MIND OR CONDITION PROMPTING
THE DOING OF AN OVERT ACT
It may be proved by direct evidence or circumstantial evidence
which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry
or assist to a determination probably founded in truth.
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper
and honest to goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain the
whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent
spouse is still alive or is already dead. Whether or not the
spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a
great many circumstances occurring before and after the
disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent
of the inquiries made by present spouse.
 74
In the case at bar, and applying the foregoing standards to the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions of
present case, petitioner points out that the Court of Appeals dated 23 January 2009 and 3 April 2009
in CA-G.R. CV No. 90165 are AFFIRMED.
a. respondent Yolanda did not initiate a diligent search to
locate her absent husband
b. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio testified to having
inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the
latter’s relatives, these relatives were not presented to
corroborate Diosdado’s testimony.

In short, the respondent was allegedly not diligent in her search

for her husband.

Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought

information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance
from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines.
She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she
did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republic’s arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are

constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC’s ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able

to prove her "well-founded belief" that her absent spouse was
already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him
presumptively dead is already final and can no longer be
modified or reversed.

Indeed, "nothing is more settled in law than that when a

judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable
and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is
perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law."

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 82
Republic v. Cantor
GR No. 184621 | TOPIC: FC 41 in relation to FC
42-44
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
1. Maria Fe Cantor and Jerry Cantor were married on
September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling in South Cotabato.
2. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent
quarrel brought about by:
a. The respondent’s inability to reach “sexual
climax” whenever she and Jerry would have
intimate moments; and
b. Jerry’s expression of animosity toward the
respondent’s father.
3. After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and
this was the last time the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard
anything from Jerry or about his whereabouts.
4. More than 4 years from the time of Jerry’s
disappearance, the respondent filed before the RTC a
petition for her husband’s declaration of presumptive
death.
5. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that
Jerry was already dead.
a. She alleged that she had inquired from her
mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-
in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but
to no avail.
75
b. She also allegedly made it a point to check the
patients’ directory whenever she went to a
hospital.
6. The RTC granted the petition and declared Jerry
presumptively dead, without prejudice to the effect of
the reappearance of the absent spouse.
a. It concluded that the respondent had a well-
founded belief that her husband was already
dead since more than 4 years had passed
without the former receiving any news about the
latter or his whereabouts.
7. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
8. Hence, this petition.
a. The petitioner posits that the respondent did not
have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husband’s presumptive death.
b. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct
the requisite diligent search for her missing
husband.
ISSUES
1. W/N the requisite diligent search was conducted
warranting a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of presumptive death? - NO.
RULING
1. Under Art. 41 of the Family Code, there are 4 essential
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
a. That the absent spouse has been missing for 4
consecutive years, or 2 consecutive years if the
disappearance occurred where there is danger of
death under circumstances laid down in Art. 391
of the Civil Code;
b. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

c. That the present spouse has a well-founded
belief that the absentee is dead; and
d. That the present spouse files a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.
2. The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to
show that all the requisites are present.
3. Art. 41 imposes a strict standard. Thus, mere absence
of the spouse, lack of any news that such absentee is
still alive, failure to communicate or general
presumption of absence would not suffice.
a. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that
Art. 41 places upon the present spouse the
burden of proving the additional and more
stringent requirement of “well-founded belief”
which can only be discharged upon a showing of
proper and honest-to-goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s
whereabouts but, more importantly, that the
absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.
4. To prove “well-founded belief” depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must
prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent and
reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries,
he/she believes that under the circumstances, the
absent spouse is already dead. It requires exertion of
active effort, not merely a passive one.
5. In this case, the efforts by the respondent fell short of
the “stringent standard” and degree of diligence
required by jurisprudence for the following reasons:
a. First, the respondent did not actively look for her
missing husband. She did not purposely
undertake a diligent search for her husband as
76
her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily
directed to look for him.
b. Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the
police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities
to look for him.
c. Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s
relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse,
these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named.
d. Lastly, there was no other corroborative
evidence to support the respondent’s claim that
she conducted a diligent search. Neither was
there supporting evidence proving that she had a
well-founded belief other than her bare claims.
6. In sum, the Court ruled that respondent merely
engaged in a “passive search” where she relied on
uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors,
and friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search
because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead.
7. Strict Standard Approach is consistent with the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen marriage. Moreover,
such approach is also to protect the present spouse
from criminal prosecution of bigamy.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision
dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed
the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 25, Koronadal, City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F.
Cantor presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
CASE # 83
 77
Jones v. Hortiguela
G.R. No. 43701. March 6, 1937| J. Conception
Void Marriages

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
This court reverses the appealed order of March 14, 1935, in so
far as it set aside the order of January 10, 1933, relative to the
administrator's fees and the order of June 26, 1933, approving
the final account and the project of partition, and in so far as
said order of March 14, 1935, required the presentation of a new
project of partition; denies the appointment of Angelita Jones'
husband as administrator; affirms the order of May 9, 1932,
relative to declaration of heirs; and holds it unwarranted to
make a finding as to whether or not the properties of this
intestate estate are paraphernal properties of the deceased
Marciana Escaño, reserving to the parties the right to discuss
which are paraphernal and which are conjugal properties. So
ordered.

CASE # 84
IN RE SZATRAW 49 OG 243
GR No. L-1780 | TOPIC:
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The presumption may arise and be invoked and made in a case,
either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is tried or
heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent court.
Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding. Independently of such
an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot
be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding.
FACTS
1. Consuelo Sors prays that her husband, Nicolai Szatrow be
declared dead and that her parental authority over her
child, should the latter be alive and later on appear, be
preserved.
2. Pleading under oath, she alleged:
a. That she is the lawful wife of Nicolas Szatraw, a
Polish citizen, to whom she was married in Manila,
whom she bore a child named Alexis Szatraw, with
whom she had lived from the time they were
married until February, 1940;
b. That when her husband, on the pretext that he
would call on some friends, departed from the
conjugal abode carrying the child along with him
and never returned,
c. That she made inquiries from among her husband's
friends and countrymen and learned that her
husband and child had left for Shanghai, however,
78
from information obtained from Polish citizens who
had arrived from that place, he and the child had
not been seen and could not be found;
d. That all her efforts to know the whereabouts of her
husband and child were in vain; and that, because
of her husband's absence for more than seven
years during which she has not heard any news
from him and about her child, she believes that he
is dead
3. the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that it
is not for the settlement of the estate of the absentee,
and because the rule of evidence establishing the
presumption that a person unheard from in seven years is
dead, does not create a right upon which a judicial
pronouncement of a decree may be predicated. The
petitioner has appealed
ISSUES
Whether or not a a petition for judicial pronouncement/
declaration of presumptive death is necessary if there is no
right to be enforced nor remedies prayed for - No
Whether or not a petition for judicial pronouncement of
presumptive death because a person had been unheard from
in seven years will be be granted - No
RULING
The petition is not for the settlement of the estate of Nicolai
Szatraw, because it does not appear that he possessed property
brought to the marriage and because he had acquired no property
during his married life with the petitioner.
The rule invoked by the latter is merely one of evidence which
permits the court to presume that a person is dead after the fact
 79
that such person had been unheard from in seven years had been
established. This presumption may arise and be invoked and made
in a case, either in an action or in a special proceeding, which is
tried or heard by, and submitted for decision to, a competent
court. Independently of such an action or special proceeding, the
presumption of death cannot be invoked, nor can it be made the
subject of an action or special proceeding. Independently of such
an action or special proceeding, the presumption of death cannot
be invoked, nor can it be made the subject of an action or special
proceeding.

In this case, there is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy

prayed for by the petitioner against her absent husband. Neither
is there a prayer for the final determination of his right or status
or for the ascertainment of a particular fact, for the petition does
not pray for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is dead,
but merely asks for a declaration that he be presumed dead
because he had been unheard from in seven years.

The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner's husband is

presumptively dead. But this declaration, even if judicially made,
would not improve the petitioner's situation, because such a
presumption is already established by law. A judicial
pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would
still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is
for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial
pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter
involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

The order appealed from is affirmed. No pronouncement as to

costs is made, because no adverse party appeared in this Court
and in the court below.

CASE # 85
REPUBLIC v. CA and MOLINA
GR No. 108763 | TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
see ruling
FACTS
Roridel married Reynaldo Molina on April 14, 1985 and they
had a son. After a year, Reynaldo showed signs of immaturity
and irresponsibility, as he preferred to spend more time with
friends on whom he squandered his money, he depended on
his parents for aid and was never honest with Roridel
regarding finances, resulting to frequent quarrels between
them. Sometime in 1986, he was relieved of his job and Roridel
became the sole breadwinner. In October 1986 the couple had
a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship
was estranged. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City, and a
few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had
since then abandoned them.
Roridel filed a petition for declaration of nullity of her
marriage on the ground that Reynaldo was psychologically
incapable of complying with essential marital obligations.
In his answer, Reynaldo alleged that their quarrels were due
to Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties
such as cooking and running the household, and her failure to
handle their finances.
The trial court declared the marriage void. CA affirmed,
concluding that psychological incapacity as a ground for
80
annulment is a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct
which, considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to
self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of
marriage. Thus, there is enough reason to leave the spouses to
their
individual fates.
Hence this appeal by the Republic represented by the Solicitor
General, contending that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to Psychological Incapacity.
ISSUES
Whether or not the marriage should be declared void on the
ground of Psychological Incapacity — NO
RULING
There is no clear showing that the psychological defect is an
incapacity. It appears to be more of a "difficulty," if not
outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations. Mere showing of “irreconcilable
differences'' and "conflicting personalities" in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity.
It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential
that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to
some psychological (not physical) illness. The evidence
adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her
husband could not get along with each other.
The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable
psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological
incapacity (she testified that the spouses are not unfit for
other partners or for their professions). There is no showing
that Reynaldo's alleged personality traits were constitutive of

psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage
celebration.
Through the help of amici curiae Oscar Cruz of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines and Justice Ricardo Puno, member of the Family
Code Revision Committee, the Court handed down the
following guidelines: (Molina doctrine)
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be
(a) medically or clinically identified,
(b) alleged in the complaint,
(c) sufficiently proven by experts and
(d) clearly explained in the decision.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration” of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against every one of
the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about
the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will.
81
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68-71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article
36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code
of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and
which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature."
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 86
Choa v.Choa
GR No. 143376 | TOPIC: Psychological
Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
Petitioner and respondent were married on March 15, 1981. Out of
this union, two children were born, Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. On
October 27, 1993, respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Negros Occidental, Branch 51, a Complaint for the
annulment of his marriage to petitioner. Afterwards he filed an
Amended Complaint dated November 8, 1993 for the declaration of
nullity of his marriage to petitioner based on her alleged
psychological incapacity.
Respondent claims that the filing by petitioner of a series of charges
against him are proof of the latters psychological incapacity to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. These charges
included Complaints for perjury, false testimony, concubinage and
deportation. According to him, the filing and the prosecution of
these cases clearly showed that his wife (herein petitioner) wanted
not only to put him behind bars, but also to banish him from the
country. He contends that this is very abnormal for a wife who,
instead of protecting the name and integrity of her husband as the
father of her children, had acted to the contrary.
82
Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
RULING
We do not agree. The documents presented by respondent during
the trial do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity
of his wife. It is the height of absurdity and inequity to condemn her
as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations,
simply because she filed cases against him. The evidence presented,
even if taken as true, merely establishes the prosecution of the
cases against him. To rule that the filings are sufficient to establish
her psychological incapacity is not only totally erroneous, but also
grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity.
In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by respondent merely
shows that he and his wife could not get along with each other.
There was absolutely no showing of the gravity or juridical
antecedence or incurability of the problems besetting their marital
union. Sorely lacking in respondent’s evidence is proof that the
psychological incapacity was grave enough to bring about the
disability of a party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed CA
Decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the case for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on the alleged psychological incapacity of petitioner
is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.

ISSUES

CASE # 87
BARCELONA v. CA
GR No. 130087 |
TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that “expert
opinion need not be alleged” in the petition is that there is
also no need to allege the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and
behavioral sciences are competent to determine the root
cause of psychological incapacity.
FACTS
● Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally
married union begot five children. On 29 March 1995,
private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (―respondent
Tadeo) filed a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against
petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (―petitioner Diana).
● The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the
celebration of their marriage to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity
subsists up to the present time. The petition alleged
several non-complied marital obligations.
● During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to
their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich
family, was a disorganized housekeeper and was
frequently out of the house. She would go to her sister ̳s
house or would play tennis the whole day.
83
● When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages
suffered by respondent and the sickness of a child,
respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused
to speak to her husband.
● On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months
pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-
evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling.
● In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard
the respondent ̳s pregnancy, the petitioner was
compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling.
● The respondent at the time of the celebration of their
marriage was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligation of marriage and such
incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time.
Such incapacity was conclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the
● Petitioner Diana claims that petition falls short of the
guidelines stated in Molina case and there is no cause
for action.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Petition for Annulment of Marriage filed
against the wife is defective for failing to allege he root cause
of the alleged psychological incapacity.
RULING
No. What the new Rules require the petition to allege are
physical manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity.
Second petition of Tadeo complies with this requirement
The second petition states the ultimate facts (as already stated
above) on which respondent bases his claim in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court.
 84
A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties
were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the
essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the
celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations,

if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time
of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not
be alleged. (Emphasis supplied)

Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the

time of their passage. The obvious effect of the new Rules
providing that “expert opinion need not be alleged” in the
petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of
the psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of
neurological and behavioral sciences are competent to
determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since the
new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion
on the psychological incapacity, it follows that there is also no
need to allege in the petition the root cause of the psychological
incapacity.

The second petition states a cause of action since it states the

legal right of respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of
petitioner Diana, and the act or omission of petitioner Diana in
violation of the legal right.
In rendering this Decision, the SC is not prejudging the main
issue of whether the marriage is void based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. The trial court must resolve this issue after trial
on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove
their respective allegations and defenses.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 85
CASE # 88 falling short of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove
any severe and incurable personality disorder on the part of Toshio,
in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
G.R. No. 149498 | TOPIC: Void Marriages; ISSUE: Whether or not mere abandonment by Toshio of his family
Psychological Incapacity and his insensitivity to them constitute psychological incapacity. (No)

DOCTRINE: Mere abandonment of family does not constitute RULING: No. In Molina, the Court came up with guidelines in the
psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. The
to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some by the Court in Santos: "psychological incapacity must be
psychological, not physical, illness. characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence and (c)
incurability." The foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In
FACTS: Respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
fact, the root cause may be “medically or clinically identified.” What
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano,
is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish
a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
the party’s psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
common-law relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines
need not be resorted to.
for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there
for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, Lolita gave birth to their child.
In this case, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented
fell short of proving that Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M.
assume his marital responsibilities. Toshio’s act of abandonment was
Balderia of the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite. Lolita alleged that, unknown to
doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
her, Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified
responsibilities, which incapacity became manifest only after the
on how Toshio abandoned his family, no other evidence was
marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan
presented showing that his behavior was caused by a psychological
and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with
disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual medical
his family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio
examination, it would have greatly helped respondent’s case had she
stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several times but he
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness.
never responded. Sometime in 1991, respondent learned from
This could have been done through an expert witness. This respondent
her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did not bother
did not do.
to see her and their child.

We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal

The Republic, represented by the OSG, contends, however, that mere
separation. There was no showing that the case at bar was not just
abandonment by Toshio of his family and his insensitivity to them did
an instance of abandonment in the context of legal separation. We
not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His behavior
cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact that Toshio
merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse
 86
abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the
marriage. As we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no proof of a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates a
person from accepting and complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.

Also, in proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction

between an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient
in the application of the rules merely because the spouse alleged to
be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a foreign national. The
medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity were
formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general.
Hence, the norms used for determining psychological incapacity
should apply to any person regardless of nationality.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby

GRANTED.

CASE # 89
Republic v. Encelan
G.R. No. 170022 | TOPIC: Psychological
Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE:
Sexual infidelity and abandonment of he conjugal dwelling are
grounds for legal separation.
FACTS:
● Respondent, Cesar Encelan married Lolita on August 25,
1979. The union bore two children. Beginning in 1984,
Cesar worked as an OFW in Saudia Arabia.
● While there, he learned that Lolita had been having an
affair with an Alvin Perez. Then sometime in 1991, Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home to live Alvin, taking their
children with her. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been
separated.
● On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a petition
against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his
marriage based on Lolita’s psychological incapacity
under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
● Lolita denied having an affair with Alvin. She claimed
that they were just business associates. She insisted
that she was not psychologically incapacitated and that
she left their home because of irreconcilable differences
with her mother-in-law.
● At the trial, Cesar presented the psychological evaluation
report on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Flores of the
National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores stated in
her report that Lolita was not suffering from any form of
major psychiatric illness, but had been unable to meet
the expectations of her for a good and lasting marital
87
relationship. Lolita’s frequent transferring of jobs
showed “interpersonal problems with co-workers as
well as her impatience in attaining her ambitions;” and
“her refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family
relationship.”
● The RTC, in its decision, declared the marriage void on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
● Originally, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the RTC and held that abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling and infidelity were not serious cases
of psychological illness or of any personality disorder,
and therefore not a ground to declare the marriage void
under Art. 36, FC.
● But upon reconsideration, the CA set aside its original
decision and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA
found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s serious
psychological incapacity that resulted in her gross
infidelity: 1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to perform her
marital obligations; and 2) Lolita’s willful and deliberate
act of abandoning the conjugal dwelling.
● The Office of the Solicitor General filed this present
petition for review on certiorari challenging the decision
of the CA.
ISSUES: Whether or not sexual infidelity and abandonment of
the conjugal dwelling is sufficient basis to nullify the marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. (No)
RULING:
● No sufficient basis exists to annul Cesar’s marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
However, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
● conjugal dwelling are grounds for legal separation.
 88
● Marriage is an inviolable social institution. And any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its existence and
continuation and against dissolution and nullity. It
cannot be dissolved at the whim of the parties, nor by
transgressions made by one party to the other during the
marriage.
● To constitute psychological incapacity, it must be shown
that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are
manifestations of a disordered personality that
completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging
the essential marital obligations. Moreover, such
disordered personality must be grave, incurable and
must have existed at the time of the celebration of the
marriage (juridical antecedence).
● The evidence on record presented by Cesar were his own
testimony on Lolita’s infidelity and abandonment, as well
as the psychological evaluation report of Dr.
● Flores. Such evidence is insufficient to prove
psychological incapacity because it did not show any
proof of a disordered personality. In fact, the report of
Dr. Flores actually established that Lolita did not suffer
from any major psychiatric illness

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we DISMISS respondent
Cesar Encelan's petition for declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Lolita Castillo-Encelan.

CASE # 90
Lontoc-Cruz v. Cruz
G.R. No. 201988m October 11, 2017, Del Castillo,
J. | TOPIC: Psychological Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE:
. but wished only to satisfy himself;
FACTS:
● Marivi and Nilo were sweethearts, and while Nilo was
working in Hong Kong, he prodded Marivi to marry him so
she could join him there. Marivi agreed. The couple
married in a civil ceremony on October 21, 1986 followed
by a church wedding on February 8, 1987. The marriage
produced two sons: Antonio Manuel and Jose Nilo.
● On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa
City a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on psychological incapacity. She averred that it
had been medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering
from "inadequate personality disorder related to
masculine strivings associated with unresolved oedipal
complex." Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary
emotional, psychological, and physical support. While
Marivi herself was found to be suffering from a
"personality disorder of the mixed type, histrionic,
narcissistic with immaturity x x x."
● Marivi claims:
○ that Nilo committed infidelity (affair with an
unmarried female officemate) and he continued
to act like a bachelor,
○ that Nilo would make decisions on financial
matters without consulting or considering her
suggestions,
89
○ that there was lack of sexual contact for more
than a decade. While they tried to have sex twice,
Nilo failed to have an erection. After, Nilo would
refuse to have sex with her which made her
question his sexual orientation, so much so that
Nilo physically hurt her when she questioned his
virility.
○ that Nilo would not engage in foreplay during sex,
○ that Nilo would engage in anal sex and would only
stop when she complained that it was painful;
that Nilo would thereafter sleep, leaving her
feeling "used," and
○ that Nilo was impulsive, daring, and adventurous.
● In his Answer, Nilo claimed
○ that at the start of their relationship, both he and
Marivi would exhibit negative personality traits
which they overlooked; that he believed that both
he and Marivi were suffering from psychological
incapacity;
○ that Marivi demanded that he behave in ways he
was not accustomed to or inconsistent with his
career position,
○ that Marivi was jealous of his friends and would
often make hasty conclusions that he was having
an affair with other women,
○ that she is impusive and would exhibit volatile
temperament if things did not go her way, a
“prima-donna” attitude, being her father's
favorite daughter;
○ that she lacked respect towards him. Worse, Nilo
was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting to
her whole clan his inadequacies during their
intimate sexual relations. Since then, he did not
feel any sexual excitement and attraction toward

her when they were together. Instead of
discussing the problem with him candidly, she
accused him of being gay
● The trial court rendered a Partial Decision approving the
parties' Compromise Agreement pertaining to custody,
support, and dissolution of the properties. Trial on the
issue of the nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity ensued.
● Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a
psychiatrist, and Dr. Ruben Encarnacion (Dr.
Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist, to support her
claim of psychological incapacity.
● According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate
each others' weaknesses and that the incapacities of the
parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their
own needs rather than to give in to the other's needs.
Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his masculinity,
and Marivi Cruz had overindulgence and over attention
of her parents in a prolonged manner carried over to
adult adjustments.
● Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis, that
there was no chance of a successful marriage in a
dysfunctional union when there is double psychological
incapacity.
● In its October 13, 2008 Decision, the RTC denied the
Petition. RTC did not entirely appreciate the expert
witnesses' attribution of a double psychological
incapacity to Marivi's nature of being a "father figure
woman," and to Nilo's "oedipal complex."
● Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA agreed with the RTC in
rejecting the alleged existence of psychological
incapacity pointed out by Dr. Villegas and by Dr.
Encarnacion.
90
ISSUES: Whether the psychological conditions of the parties fall
under Article 36 of the Family Code to warrant the declaration
of nullity of marriage - NO
RULING:
● Article 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
● Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such
that the party would be incapable of carrying out
the ordinary duties required in a marriage);
(b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage); and(c) incurability (i.e., it
must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved).
● Well-settled guideline:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological
- not physical, although its manifestations and/or
symptoms may be physical.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the
time of the celebration' of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot
be accepted as root causes
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel
for the state.
● Mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and
'conflicting personalities' as in the present case, in no
wise constitutes psychological incapacity. Nor does
failure of the parties to meet their responsibilities and
duties as married persons amount to psychological
incapacity.
● Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations
and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the
performance of marital obligations or ill will. This
incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to
commit oneself to the essentials of marriage; (b) this
91
inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential
obligations of marriage: the conjugal act, the community
of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of offspring; and (c) the
inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he must be shown to be
incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.
● SC ruled that the conclusions reached by these expert
witnesses do NOT irresistibly point to the fact that the
personality disorders which plague the spouses
antedated the marriage; that these personality disorders
are indeed grave or serious; or that these personality
disorders are incurable or permanent as to render the
parties psychologically incapacitated to carry out and
carry on their marital duties.
● What can be inferred from the totality of evidence, at
most, is a case of incompatibility. For a personality
disorder to be declared clinically or medically incurable
or permanent is one thing; for a spouse to refuse or to
be reluctant to perform his/her marital duties is another.
● Nilo’s breakdown of his relationship with Marivi was not
necessarily attributable to his so-called "psychological
disorder" but can be imputed to his work and marital
stress, and his ordinary human failings.
● Marivi failed to substantiate Nilo's penchant for
womanizing as a manifestation of his psychological
incapacity. She grew up in a well-functioning, supportive,
and emotionally healthy family environment. Even Nilo
himself attested that she was a good wife and a good
mother to their children. Her demand for attention, time,
love, and fidelity is normal for a wife. The anger she felt
within her is also a legitimate reaction. Yet the
 92
psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged that
Marivi's so-called psychological incapacity is curable.
● Therefore, SC finds that the spouses are simply unwilling
to work out a solution for each other's personality
differences, and have become overwhelmed by feelings
of disappointment or disillusionment toward one
another. Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not
a null and void marriage.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.

CASE # 91
GARLET v. GARLET
GR No. 193544 | TOPIC: PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Failings as husband and father are not tantamount to
psychological incapacity which renders the marriage void from
the very beginning.
FACTS
● Yolanda Garlet (petitioner) and Vencidor Garlet
(respondent) met each other sometime in 1988.
○ They became intimately involved and as a result,
petitioner became pregnant.
○ Petitioner gave birth to their son, Michael Vincent
Garlet, out of wedlock on 9 Nov. 1989. In 1994,
petitioner and respondent eventually got
married.
○ Their union was blessed with another child,
Michelle Mae Garlet, on 23 January 1997. -
○ Petitioner and respondent, however, started
experiencing marital problems. In 2001 [7 after
their marriage] petitioner and respondent
separated.
● On May 2005, petitioner filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of respondent’s
psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital
obligations to petitioner and their children.
● At the pretrial, the parties admitted the following facts:
○ The respondent is aware that the petitioner is
working in Japan as an entertainer
93
○ The petitioner has custody and the one
supporting the children from the time the
respondent lost communication with the children
as he does not exert effort to see them.
○ The petitioner was not subjected to
psychological examination by the psychologist
sought by the petitioner with qualification that
respondent was given several opportunities to
attend the psychological evaluation but failed to
do so.
○ The clinical psychologist, Ms. De Guzman,
cleared petitioner of any psychological disorder,
saying that petitioner has the capacity to
understand and comply with her marital
obligations. In contracts, Ms. De Guzman found
respondent to be suffering from a narcissistic
type of personality disorder.
ISSUES
1. W/N respondent is psychologically incapacitated to
perform his essential marital obligations. - NO
2. W/N the Court is bound by
RULING
Respondent is not psychologically incapacitated to perform
his essential marital obli.
● The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
● In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It
should refer to “no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of

the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage.”
● In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is
on “all fours” with another case. The trial judge must
take pains in examining the factual milieu and the
appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
● In the present case:
○ It appears that respondent took on several jobs.
As indicated in Michael’s Certificate of Live Birth,
the respondent's occupation was listed as a
“vendor.” Respondent was also in-charge of the
mini grocery store which he and petitioner put
up. Most recently, the respondent worked as a
jeepney driver.
○ As for respondent’s alleged drinking and
gambling vices, petitioner herself had no
personal knowledge of the same, relying only on
what relatives relayed to her while she was in
Japan.
○ There is utter lack of factual basis for
respondent’s purported sexual infidelity. Aside
from petitioner’s bare allegations, no concrete
proof was proffered in court to establish
respondent’s unfaithfulness to petitioner.
Petitioner failed to provide details on
respondent’s supposed affairs, such as the
names of the other women, how the affairs
started or developed, and how she discovered
the affairs.
○ The Court already declared that sexual infidelity,
by itself, is not sufficient proof that a spouse is
suffering from psychological incapacity. It must
94
be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which
makes the spouse completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
○ That respondent delegated the care for the
children to Marites, petitioner’s sister, does not
necessarily constitute neglect. While it is truly
ideal that children be reared personally by their
parents, in reality, there are various reasons
which compel parents to employ the help of
others, such as a relative or hired nanny, to
watch after the children. In the instant case, it
was actually petitioner who brought Marites
from Bicol to Manila to care for Michael, and also
later on, for Michelle.
○ A perusal of the aforequoted verbal exchange
between petitioner and respondent in the
Kasunduang Pag-aayos, though, reveals that
respondent only hid petitioner’s money and
jewelry as a desperate attempt to stop petitioner
from leaving him, taking with her the children.
○ Petitioner asserts too that she had been
physically abused by respondent, but offers no
substantiating evidence, such as details on the
instances of abuse, pictures of her injuries,
medico legal report, or other witness’ testimony.
○ While the Court does not hold respondent totally
without blame or free of shortcomings, but his
failings as husband and father are not
tantamount to psychological incapacity which
renders their marriage void from the very
beginning.
SC is not bound by Ms. De Guzman’s Psychological Report
 95
● While the Court previously held that “there is no
requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined
by a physician,” yet, this is qualified by the phrase, “if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain
a finding of psychological incapacity.”
● Much in the same way, the Court finds herein that Ms.
De Guzman’s sources and methodology is severely
lacking the requisite depth and comprehensiveness to
judicially establish respondent’s psychological
incapacity. Ms. De Guzman relied on the information
given by petitioner; Avelino, respondent’s brother; Ramil
Ereve, petitioner’s brother; an anonymous female
cousin of petitioner; and the couple’s neighbors who
refused to give their names.
● On the basis thereof, Ms. De Guzman is saying that
respondent was a spoiled child, and while it can be said
that respondent has grown up to be a self centered and
self-indulgent adult, it still falls short of establishing
respondent’s psychological incapacity characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability, so as to
render respondent’s marriage to petitioner void ab
initio.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between YOLANDA EREVE GARLET and VENCIDOR
TAEP GARLET held at the Office of the Mayor, Morong, Rizal
on March 4, 1994, as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO on [the]
ground of psychological incapacity of the respondent to
perform the essential marital obligations in accordance with
Article 36 of the Family Code, with all the legal effects
thereon.

CASE # 91
CASE TITLE: Teresita YAPTINCHAY v. Hon.
Guillermo TORRES
GR No. L-26462 | TOPIC: Art. 147-148 FC
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS:
1. On July 13, 1965, petitioner Teresita Yaptinchay sought
in the CFI Rizal, her appointment as special
administrator and then as regular administrator of the
estate of Isidro Yaptinchay, who died in Hongkong on
July 7, 1965.
a.
b. Petitioner alleges that he lived with the decedent
continuously for 19 years in Taft, 1 year in Pasay
City;
c. Decedent died without a will and left an estate
with properties in PH and HK with a value of
P500,000
d. Decedent left 3 daughters, all of age
e. Yaptinchay applied for special administrator to
take custody and care of the interests of the
deceased pending appointment of a regular
administrator.
2. Court appointed Yaptinchay as the special
administratrix of the estate upon a 25k bond.
3. Josefina Yaptinchay, the alleged legitimate wife, and
their children filed an opposition to Teresita
Yaptinchay’s petition on the ground that Teresita is not
an heir and had no right to institute the case to settle
the estate, much less to procure appointment as an
administratrix thereof. The fact that they had cohabited
96
for a number of years does not make her qualified to
serve as administratrix of the estate.
4. The probate court set aside its order appointing
petitioner Teresita as special administratix. Virginia
Yaptinchay, was eventually appointed as special
administratrix.
5. Respondent Virginia Yaptinchay submitted a preliminary
inventory of assets of the estate which included a
residential house in North Forbes Park, Makati.
6. Amidst all of that, herein petitioner filed in another
branch (Pasig Branch) of the CFI of Rizal an action for
replevin and for liquidation of the partnership supposed
formed during the period of her cohabitation with the
decedent and for damages.
7. Herein Respondent Judge Guillermo Torres of Pasig
issued an order on Aug. 17, 1965 temporarily restraining
the herein respondents from disposing the properties in
the complaint and interfering with petitioner’s rights
and possession over the house in North Forbes Park,
Makati.
8. Defendants resisted the action, opposed the order of
Judge Torres on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction
over the settlement of the estate was already vested in
the CFI of Rizal, Pasay Branch and the case was still in
dispute.
9. Thus, defendants prayed the Court for a writ of
preliminary injunction to direct petitioner to cease and
desist and to transfer the North Forbes Park property
to the defendant Virginia Yaptinchay and to enjoin
petitioner from entering the said house and interfering
or disturbing the exercise of Virginia Yaptinchay’s rights
and powers of administration over the assets in the
name of the decedent.
10. On June 15, 1966 and Aug. 8 1966, Judge Torres ruled in
favor of the defendants. The North Forbes Park

property was transferred to herein private respondents
Virginia Yaptinchay, as the special administratrix of the
estate.
ISSUES:
W/N an illegitimate wife may claim ownership over properties
acquired by either or both of them and be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
RULING:
NO.
Nor can petitioner's claim of ownership presumably based on
the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code be decisive. Said
Article 144 says that: "When man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership." .
But stock must be taken of the fact that the creation of the
civil relationship envisaged in Article 144 is circumscribed by
conditions, the existence of which must first be shown before
rights provided thereunder may be deemed to accrue. One such
condition is that there must be a clear showing that the
petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-
ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the
property in controversy cannot be considered the "present
right" or title that would make available the protection or aid
afforded by a writ of injunction. For, the existence of a clear
97
positive right especially calling for judicial protection is wanting.
Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future rights;
nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties
would be better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes
Park property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in
the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to
the control of the probate court.
Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the
herein petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ
of preliminary mandatory injunction issued by this Court is
hereby dissolved and set aside.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
NOTES:
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
household.
 98
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his
or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation and
owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after
the termination of their cohabitation.

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith,

the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default
of or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such
share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the
forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
(144a)

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the

preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her

share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if

both parties are in bad faith

CASE # 92
Bakunawa v. Reyes- Bakunawa
G.R. No. 217993 | TOPIC: Psychological
Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
ART. 36. A marriage contracted oy by party who, athelime on
he celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest
only after its solemnization.
FACTS
Manuel and Nora got married on July 1975 while both of them
were still college undergraduates. While Nora was able to
graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help his father in
the family’s construction business. Manuel was assigned to
provincial projects and came home only during weekends.
However, whenever Manuel came back home, he chose to
spend his limited time with friends instead of his family. THis
was the cause of their quarrels.
Later on, Manuel observed Nora’s passiveness and laziness.
Thus, Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their
verbal quarrels escalated to physical violence.
On June 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to compy with the essential
obligations of marriage. Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr.
Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Manuel has Intermittent
Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and aggressive
behavior that is not proportionate to the cause. Dr. Villegas
diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive Personality Disorder,
99
marked by a display of negative attitude and passive
resistance in her relationship with Manuel.
ISSUES
Whether or not the totality of evidence was sufficient to prove
that the parties are psychologically incapacitated to comply
with their marital obligations with one another.
RULING
The Court ruled in the negative. It affirmed the CA in its
pronouncement that the totality of evidence presented by
Manuel is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with
Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and the
parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did not err
in not according probative value to her psychological
evaluation report and testimony. In Republic of the Philippines
v. Galang, the Court held that “if the incapacity can be proven
by independent means, no reason exists why such
independent proof cannot be admitted to support a
conclusion of psychological incapacity, independently of a
psychologist's examination and report."
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas aside
from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation was
Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable witness to
establish the psychological incapacity of his parents in
 100
relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he could not
have been there at the time his parents were married.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED. The Decision
dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated April 22, 2015 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.

CASE # 93
Kalaw v. Hernandez
G.R. No. 166357 | TOPIC: 4. Psychological
incapacity: FC 36, cf FC 68- 73
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The Molina Doctrine as a guideline is too rigid. In order to
establish Psychological Incapacity, the court must not interpret
it too strictly nor too literally in order to adopt the intent of the
drafter of the Family code of applying Psychological Incapacity
in a case to case basis. The courts may also use the opinion of
experts in order to establish Psychological Incapacity.
The petitioner carries the burden to prove the nullity of the
marriage, however the respondent could also establish the
psychological incapacity of her spouse if she raised the matter
in her answer.
FACTS
1. Valerio Kalaw filed a petition to annul his marriage with
Elena Fernandez by reason of Psychological Incapacity.
2. Kalaw claims that Fernandez is unable to fulfill her
obligations as a mother to their children due to her
constantly playing mahjong.
3. Kalaw had three professionals review her behavior and
all three had agreed that she had shown to have a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder and Antisocial Disorder.
4. Fernandez defends herself by arguing that Kalaw was the
one experiencing psychological incapacity.
5. Valerio’s psychological incapacity was shown when the
testimony of the medical professional, Dr Dayan, stated
that both parties were acting immaturely and that Kalaw
101
only entered into the marriage after knowing that
Fernandez was pregnant. Dr Dayan also claims that
Kalaw’s concept of marriage was not duly stable.
ISSUES
1. W/N the marriage is void by psychological incapacity.
YES.
2. W/N the court may use other methods aside from the
Molina Doctrine order to establish Psychological
Incapacity. YES.
RULING
1. YES. The court stated that the determinant of
psychological incapacity for this situation was not
Fernandez’ obsessive gambling habits but her failure to
appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood.
Based on the testimony of the eldest child. Fernandez
brought her children to the mahjong sessions. Her
actions of willfully exposing her children to the culture
of gambling on every occasion was a grave and serious
act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires.
Fernandez revealed her wanton disregard for her
children's moral and mental development. This disregard
violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect
her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and
Article 220 of the Family Code.
Article 209: Pursuant to the natural right and duty of
parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and
responsibility shall include the caring for and rearing of
such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and
 102
the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.
Article 220: The parents and those exercising parental
authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:
1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means

2. YES. The Molina Doctrine as a guideline is too rigid. In

order to establish Psychological Incapacity, the court
must not interpret it too strictly nor too literally in order
to adopt the intent of the drafter of the Family code of
applying Psychological Incapacity in a case to case basis.
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological
incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with
expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity
rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves
to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for
Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the
decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the
marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on
November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to Article 36
of the Family Code.

CASE # 94
Concepcion Singson v Benjamin Singson
GR No. 210766 | TOPIC: Psychological
Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● The nullity of a marriage based on Art. 36 (psychological
incapacity) of the Family Code must be grave, has juridical
antecedence, and incurable.
FACTS
● Concepcion Singson (petitioner) filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage from his husband, Benjamin Singson
(respondent), based on Art. 36 of the Family Code.
(Psychological Incapacity)
● The petitioner averred that the respondent was unable to
perform his marital obligations. Moreover, at the time of the filing
of the petitioner, the respondent was confined in Metro Psych
Facility, and that Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio was the attending
psychiatrist.
● According to his attending psychiatrist, the respondent was
diagnosed to be suffering from Pathological Gambling
● The petitioner averred that this illness stemmed from the
respondent’s “dysfunctional” childhood. And that it was
unknown to her that even as a high school student, the
respondent was already betting on jai alai.
● In response, the respondent argued that the allegations and the
evidence presented by the petitioner did not characterize him
having “psychological incapacity”. That the allegations
presented did not characterize his “psychological incapacity” as
grave and serious, has juridical antecedence, and it was
incurable.
● Moreover, the respondent alleged that he did not fail in
rendering support, help or assistance to the petitioner and the
103
family. That the family home that they were staying in is in fact
his own capital property. And that he had a job as a bank
employee before being confined in the Psych Facility.
● The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner holding that because of
the totality of evidence, it was shown that the respondent is
suffering from a psychological condition that is grave, incurable,
and has juridical antecedence.
● Upon appeal, the CA overturned the RTC. The CA held that the
evidence presented by the petitioner failed to establish the
alleged psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations of the respondent. The petitioner failed to establish
that the respondent’s illness was grave or serious, much less
incurable, and that it was existing at the time of the marriage.
ISSUES
W/N the petitioner’s evidence failed to establish that the
respondent’s “psychological incapacity” is grave, incurable, and
that it was existing at the time of the marriage pursuant to Art. 36
of the Family Code (Yes)
RULING
● The Court explained that the Psychological Incapacity under
Art. 36 contemplates an incapacity to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will. It is not enough to prove that a spouse
failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it
is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of
doing so because of some psychological, not physical, illness.
● The Court held that the petitioner failed to prove that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations because she failed to establish that such
incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the time
of the marriage, and that it is incurable.
 104
● The Court explained that the records did not establish that
respondent’s psychological incapacity was grave and serious.
The respondent had a job, provided money for the family from
the sale of his property, and provided land where the family
home was built on. Moreover, he lived in the family home
alongside the petitioner and their children.
● Moreover, the records also did not establish that the
psychological incapacity of the respondent was present and
existing at the time of the marriage. There is also no showing of
any history that may be traced for the existence of the
respondent’s illness.
● The Court explained that the testimonies of the petitioner and
the expert witness did not specifically identify the root cause of
the respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The
allegation that the respondent was gambling during his high
school is hearsay since the witness that testified did not have
personal knowledge of the said fact.
● The said “dysfunctional” family of the respondent was not even
corroborated by other evidence. Moreover, the expert witness
did not make and found that this is even the origin of the alleged
inability of the respondent to appreciate his marital obligations.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013
Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.

CASE # 95
Espina-Dan v. Dan
GR No. 2019031| TOPIC: Psychological
Incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
See underlined portion
FACTS
● Petitioner Abigael An Espina-Dan and respondent Marco
Dan — an Italian national — met “in a chatroom [o]n
the internet” sometime in May, 2005. They soon
became “chatmates” and “began exchanging letters
which further drew them emotionally closer to each
other” even though the petitioner was in the Philippines
while the respondent lived in Italy.
● In November 2005, respondent proposed marriage. The
following year, he flew in from Italy and tied the knot
with petitioner on January 23, 2006.Soon after the
wedding, the couple lived together in Italy.
● In April 2007, petitioner left respondent and flew back
into the country.
● In September 2007, she filed a Petition for declaration
of nullity of her marriage in the RTC based on the
following evidence:
○ In their chat messages and letters, respondent
was sweet, kind and jolly. He was romantic
although sometimes, he was impatient and easily
got irritated. o He was not circumcised
○ He asked petitioner where to find marijuana
while they were in the Philippines o He depended
on his mother to do or to decide things for him,
such as where they should live and how the
house should be arranged.
105
○ He’s a videogame addict that even on work days,
it’s the first thing he does in the morning and the
last thing he does in the evening, that they never
got to spend quality time together
○ He is extremely lazy that he doesn't help with
the chores.
○ He has extremely poor hygiene the he seldom
takes a bath and brushes his teeth. She had to
put deodorant on his underarms for he would
not do it himself. He refused circumcision.
○ He was caught using marijuana in their house o
When they lived separately from respondent’s
mother, the video game and drug addiction
worsened. He would often invite his friends to
their house for pot sessions, to her extreme
fright and discomfort.
○ When she flew back to the Philippines, there was
no communication between them. She took this
as lack of interest on his part to save their
marriage
○ She further stated that respondent only gave her
money for food and the rest of his income was
spent for videogames. If they ran out of food, it
was her mother-in-law who supported them.
● The clinical psychologist found respondent to have
Dependent Personality Disorder with Underlying Anti-
Social Trait, by his parasitic attitude, allowing other
people to be the handler of his own personal
sustenance, even hygienic wise, which somehow
distorted the notion on how to handle marital
obligations in terms of mutual understanding,
communication and emotional intent. Such Disorder is
grave and incurable; however, these findings were all
based on the information given by the petitioner and
the latter’s mother.

ISSUES
WON the claim of addiction to video games and cannabis,
among others, is sufficient to establish psychological
incapacity OR/// WON the totality of evidence petitioner
presented is sufficient to establish Marco’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his marital obligations
RULING
The court held in the negative.
● Psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify a
marriage should refer to mental -not merely physical-
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of
the basic marital covenants that must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the marriage. It should
refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly showing an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
● Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be characterized by a) gravity- it must be
grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
a marriage; b) juridical antecedence- it must be rooted
in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and c) incurability- it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would
be beyond the means of the party involved.
● Petitioner’s evidence is insufficient. It consisted mainly
of her judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial
affidavits and testimonies of her mother and Dr. Tayag;
and Dr. Tayag's psychological, evaluation report on the
psychological condition of both petitioner and
respondent. The determination of respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity was based solely on
106
petitioner's account and that of her mother, since
respondent was presumably in Italy and did not
participate in the proceedings.
● Petitioner admitted that before and during their
marriage, respondent was working and giving money to
her; that respondent was romantic, sweet, thoughtful,
responsible, and caring; and that she and respondent
enjoyed a harmonious relationship. This belies her claim
that petitioner was psychologically unfit for marriage.
As correctly observed by the trial and appellate courts,
the couple simply drifted apart as a result of
irreconcilable differences and basic incompatibility
owing to differences in culture and upbringing, and the
very short period that they spent together prior to their
tying the knot. As for respondent's claimed addiction to
video games and cannabis, these are not an incurable
condition, and petitioner has not shown that she helped
her husband overcome them - as part of her marital
obligation to render support and aid to respondent.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated
December 13, 2018 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
12099 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
December 13, 2017 and the Writ of Execution dated May 2,
2018 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 44
in Civil Case No. 2015-15007 are declared NULL and VOID.
CASE # 96

Republic v. Javier
GR No. 210518 | TOPIC: psychological
incapacity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
See underlined portion
FACTS
1. Nov 20, 2008. Martin Javier filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity Marriage and Joint Custody of
Common minor Children, alleging that he and his wife,
Michelle were both psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
2. Martin testified on his own behalf and presented the
psychological findings of Dr. Adamos.
a. In the Psychological Impression Report, Dr.
Adamos diagnosed Michelle with Narcissistic
Personality Disorder.
b. In the Psychological Evaluation Report, Michelle
suffered the same disorder.
c. This disorder was considered, grave, incurable,
and rendered the spouses incapacitated to
perform essential obligations of marriage.
3. For Michelle’s Psychological impression, she was not
present. Instead, informants were presented: Martin and
a common friend of the spouses, Jose Vicente.
4. RTC: dismissed the petition for failure to establish
sufficient basis.
5. CA: reversed the RTC ruling.
6. The Republic filed a certiorari before the SC arguing that
there was no basis for the granting of the petition. It saw
the testimony of Martin as self serving, and argued that
no other witnesses were presented that could testify on
Michelle’s behavior.
107
ISSUES
Whether the expert testimony of a physician who has not
personally examined one of the spouses may be sufficient
evidence to grant a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage (YES but not on its own)
RULING
Psychological incapacity of a spouse must be characterized by
(1) gravity; (2) judicial antecedence, and (3) incurability.
On Michelle’s incapacity.
● Marcos v. Marcos: for purposes of establishing the
psychological incapacity of a spouse, it is not required
that a physician conduct an actual medical examination
of the person concerned. It is enough that the totality of
evidence is strong enough to sustain the finding of
psychological incapacity. In such case, however, the
petitioner bears a greater burden in proving the gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability of the other
spouse's psychological incapacity.
● While Michelle was not personally examined by Dr
Adamos, this does not mean that only the basis of the
findings was solely on the interview of Martin. Even if
that were the case, the findings of the psychologist are
not immediately invalidated for this reason alone.
Because a marriage necessarily involves only two
persons, the spouse who witnessed the other spouse's
behavior may "validly relay" the pattern of behavior to
the psychologist.
● Still, the court concluded that there was not enough
evidence to find that Michelle was psychologically
incapacitated. Dr. Adamos’ report cannot be relied upon
alone.
● There were no other independent evidence establishing
the root cause or juridical antecedence of Michelle's
alleged psychological incapacity. While the SC didn’t
discount Martin’s first-hand observations, it is highly
 108
unlikely that they were able to paint Dr. Adamos a
complete picture of Michelle's family and childhood
history.
On Martin’s incapacity
● Martin was found psychologically incapacitated.
● He was subjected to several psychological tests and was
personally interviewed by Dr. Adamos, going to more
than 10 counseling sessions from 2008 to 2009. As a
result, Martin was diagnosed with Narcissistic
Personality Disorder, with tendencies toward sadism.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
PARTIALLY GRANTED insofar as the psychological incapacity of respondent
Michelle K. Mercado-Javier is concerned. The Decision dated July 10, 2013 and
Resolution dated November 28, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 98015 are MODIFIED to the extent that the marriage of the respondents
on February 8, 2002 is declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO due to the
psychological incapacity of respondent Martin Nikolai Z. Javier, pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code. SO ORDERED.

CASE # 97
Republic v. Mola Cruz,
G.R. No. 236629 | July 23, 2018
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
FACTS
1. Respondent filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage under Article 36 against his wife Liezl.
2. They were married on August 30, 2002 in Bacolod City.
Later on they both went to Japan for work.
3. However, Liezl began going out of the house without
respondent’s permission and started giving him the cold
treatment. Liezl also started getting angry at
respondent for no reason (GASLIGHTER). The couple
later returned to the Philippines after Liezl was
released from detention due to overstaying in Japan.
4. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent her
romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite this, Liezl
did not end the illicit relationship, which caused
respondent such stress that he was hospitalized.
Respondent would give Liezl a chance but found out
that Liezl already cohabited with her lover.
5. The RTC relied on the psychological report of (Dr.
Tudla) a clinical psychologist. Dr. Tudla found that Liezl
was afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, a
pervasive pattern of behavior characterized by
excessive emotionality and attention seeking. They
tend to be perceived by others as selfish, egotistical
and unreliable; seeking immediate gratification...
ISSUES
WON the acts of Liezl constituted psychological incapacity
which could be the basis for the declaration of the nullity of
her marriage with respondent?
109
RULING
YES. To entitle a petitioner spouse to a declaration of the
nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must
sufficiently prove that the [psychological incapacity] was
grave, incurable and existing prior to the time of the marriage,
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage…
The disorder was found by the CA to have begun when Liezl
was an adolescent and continued well into adulthood. It fully
appreciated Liezl’s psychological evaluation that revealed her
unconsciousness of her disorder. It is true that sexual
infidelity and abandonment are grounds for legal separation.
However, the courts a quo duly connected such aberrant acts
of Liezl as actual manifestations of her histrionic personality
disorder. These traits were especially reflected in Liezl's
highly unusual acts of allowing her Japanese boyfriend to stay
in the marital abode, sharing the marital bed… and introducing
her husband as her elder brother, all done under the threat of
desertion. Such blatant insensitivity and lack of regard for the
sanctity of the marital bond and home cannot be expected
from a married person who reasonably understands the
principles… of marriage.
The Court has to affirm the declaration of respondent's
marriage as void ab initio... Clearly, Liezl does not recognize
the marital responsibilities that came when she married
petitioner. The severance of their marital vinculum will better
protect the state's interest to preserve the sanctity of
marriage and family, the importance of which seems utterly
lost on respondent.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED…

CASE # 98
DOCTRINE: Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the
like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a
person’s refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
FACTS:
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became
sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol discovered that
Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The
couple’s relationship turned tumultuous after the revelation.
With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled.
They got married and were blessed with two children.
However, after thirteen years of marriage, Felipe resumed
philandering.
Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling
and stopped any communication with him.
Felipe’s irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another
woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their
children for a period of not less than ten years without any
reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.
110
Mirasol v. Republic
G.R.No.214064 | TOPIC: Psych Incapacity
Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage
which was granted by the trial court. On appeal, the CA
reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES: W/N irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or
perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility
constitute psychological incapacity? NO.
RULING:
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological
incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must be
established as a manifestation of a disordered personality,
completely preventing the respondent from discharging the
essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof
of a natal or supervening disabling factor that effectively
incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be
faithful to his spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link,
medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did
not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s
allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that
Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged
personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable.
 111
The Court is not persuaded that the natal or supervening
disabling factor which effectively incapacitated him from
complying with his obligation to be faithful to his wife was
medically or clinically established.

Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by

evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations are
not evidence.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 100
MINORU FUJIKI vs MARIA PAZ GALELA
MARINAY
GR No. 196049 | TOPIC: Who can invoke nullity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife" — it refers to the husband
or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35 (4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the
beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
FACTS
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well
with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife
to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
112
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay
and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City,
Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However,
Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She
left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in JAPAN which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy.
On 14 January 2011, Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared
void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41 of the Family Code
of the Philippines; 5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family
Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the
Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the
National Statistics Office (NSO)
RTC dismissed. the RTC took the view that only "the husband
or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file
the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriages. —
(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
the wife.
Fujiki argued A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is
a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a
right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action. Fujiki also
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on
bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.
ISSUES
Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
RULING
Yes. The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating
to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be
more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be
admitted in evidence and proven as a fact.
113
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects
the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties.
However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory
laws. 60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad."
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof
of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3
of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is
aremedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right,
or a particular fact."
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in
anyact, event, order or decree concerning thecivil status of
persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file
a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a
petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage

between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and
material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage.
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
Constitution, but a spouse's right in a marriage extends
further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights
and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family
Code. 73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the
integrity of his marriage. 74 In any case, Section 2 (a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting
the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a
spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a
subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the
contrary, when Section 2 (a) states that "[a] petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed
solely by the husband or the wife" 75 — it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35 (4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from
the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband
or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has
the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC.
114
Article 35 (4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous
marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy.
Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate
prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in
the prosecution.
If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, there is more
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife
of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share
in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he
is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is
violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore
interested in the judgment of the suit.
Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the
aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens
the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse." 80 Being a real party in interest, the prior
spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous
marriage void.
For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially
declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more
impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in
the civil registry.
 115

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31

January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No.
Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial
Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further
proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

CASE # 101
GARCIA-QUIAZON v. BELEN, G.R. No. 189121
July 31, 2013 |Who may invoke nullity; FC 50-54
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place,
thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void
marriage can be questioned even beyond the lifetime of the
parties to the marriage.
FACTS
● Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12
September 1994.
● Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City claiming that she is the
natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born
at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other.
● Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to
marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having
been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s
marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
● To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among
others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by
Eliseo as her father.
● Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her
late father’s estate.
● Petitioners (heirs of the alleged Wife/Amelia) opposed
on the ground that the venue of the petition was
116
improperly laid. That the petition should be filed in
Tarlac City and not in Las Pinas.
● RTC issued the letters of administration to Elise and
such decision is affirmed by the CA.
● Petitioners now thus, appeal, having been denied of its
Motion for Reconsidenseration.
ISSUES
W/N a naturalized child (Elise) whose successional rights
would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of
her father.
RULING
Yes. Unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to Eliseo as void
ab initio.
● In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken
place, thus, it cannot be the source of rights. Any
interested party may attack the marriage directly or
collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.
● It must be pointed out that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the
law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family
Code, making the ruling in Niñal v. Bayadog applicable
four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in
no uncertain terms, allowed therein petitioners to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s
marriage to therein respondent after the death of their
father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable
marriages, to wit: Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but
voidable marriages can be assailed only during the
 117
lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in
which case the parties and their offspring will be left as
if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the
action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike
voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any
proper interested party may attack a void marriage.
● It was emphasized in a void marriage, no marriage has
taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such
that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may
be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.
● Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise,
whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence
of such marriage even after the death of her father. The
said marriage may be questioned directly by filing an
action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by
raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement
of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the
case at bar.
● Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of
either party to the said marriage does not extinguish
such cause of action.

CASE # 102
DISPOSITIVE PORTION

REPUBLIC V. OLAYBAR
GR No. 189538 | TOPIC: Procedure in Action for
Declaration of Nullity
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an
entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action
to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
○ Among these safeguards are the requirement of
proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses
and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and
the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion.
● A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of
the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family
Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition
for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where
the corresponding civil registry is located. In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by
the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
FACTS
1. Respondent requested from the National Statistics
Office a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of
the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
five years.
118
2. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was
already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean
National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice.
3. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed
that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not
appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the
signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
hers.
4. On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision
granting the petition in favor of Olaybar. The Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries
in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract.
5. Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of
the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was
no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the
provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2)
granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio.
6. In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
7. The RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance
of cases for correction of entries even on substantial
errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required.
ISSUES
1. Whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
marriage contract which in effect nullifies the marriage
may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
RULING
 119
1. The Court ruled in the affirmative. Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings
may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary.
If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. The Court held
that as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108
are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding
to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries
of the civil register.
2. In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule
108, respondent complied with said procedural
requirements.
3. Moreover, with the evidence presented, it was
established that no such marriage was celebrated.
Respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even
aware of such existence. Respondent then sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such
marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence
presented. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction
of the subject certificate of marriage by canceling the
wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way,
declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
speak of.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5,
2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-
CEB, are AFFIRMED.

CASE #103
Republic v. Cote
G.R. No. 212860 | TOPIC: A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
Rhomel Gagarin Cote (Rhomel) and respondent Florie Grace
Manongdo-Cote (Florie) were married in Quezon City. At the
time of their marriage, the spouses were both Filipinos and
were already blessed with a son born in Hawaii.
Rhomel filed a Petition for Divorce before the Family Court of
the First Circuit of Hawaii on the ground that their marriage
was irretrievably broken. This was granted. Divorce decree
was issued.
Seven years later, Florie commenced a petition for recognition
of foreign judgment granting the divorce before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). RTC declared [Florie] capacitated to remarry
pursuant to Article 26 paragraph 2 of the Family Code, in view
of the Divorce Decree which had been validly obtained abroad
by her American spouse, dissolving their marriage solemnized
on 31 July 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines.
Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal. However, the RTC,
believing that the petition was covered by A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, applied
120
Section 20 of said Rule and denied the appeal because the
notice was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration
Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
claiming that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion.
The CA denied the petition.
ISSUES
Whether or not the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies
in a case involving recognition of a foreign decree of divorce.
NO.
RULING
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
The confusion arose when the RTC denied petitioner's appeal
on the ground that no prior motion for reconsideration was
filed as required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Petitioner posits that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC do not cover cases
involving recognition of foreign divorce because the wording of
Section 1 thereof clearly states that it shall only apply to
petitions for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages, viz.:
Section 1. Scope - This Rule shall govern petitions for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages and
annulment of voidable marriages under the Family Code
of the Philippines. [Underscoring Ours] Rule 41 of the

Rules of Court applies; Motion for Reconsideration not
a condition precedent to the filing of an appeal
A decree of absolute divorce procured abroad is different
from annulment as defined by our family laws. A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC only covers void and voidable marriages that are
specifically cited and enumerated in the Family Code of the
Philippines. Void and voidable marriages contemplate a
situation wherein the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or
at the time of the marriage. It treats the marriage as if it never
existed. Divorce, on the other hand, ends a legally valid
marriage and is usually due to circumstances arising after the
marriage.
It was error for the RTC to use as basis for denial of
petitioner's appeal Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Since
121
Florie followed the procedure for cancellation of entry in the
civil registry, a special proceeding governed by Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court, an appeal from the RTC decision should be
governed by Section 3[21] of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court and
not A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Although the Court agrees with petitioner that the RTC
erroneously misapplied A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, such error does
not automatically equate to grave abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The Decision dated January 21, 2014 and Resolution
dated June 11, 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
122313 are hereby AFFIRMED.

CASE # 106
TENEBRO v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR No. 150758 | TOPIC: Requisite for a Valid
Remarriage
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
A marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage
is automatically void
Vitug, J: Sep. Opinion: By virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code,
a person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage
is ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second
marriage is contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of
nullity of the prior marriage.
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed
that the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked
"on the basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
FACTS
1. Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted
marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April
10, 1990. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously
and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously
married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on November 10, 1986.
2. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage
contract between him and Villareyes.
3. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas,
stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
4. Petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a
certain Nilda Villegas (third)
122
5. When Ancajas (2nd wife) learned of this third marriage,
she verified from Villareyes (1st wife) whether the latter
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter
Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro,
was indeed her husband.
6. Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.
7. Tenebro presents a two-tiered defense, in which he (1)
denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes, and
(2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which
is an alleged indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks
the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date
on which the second marriage was celebrated.
ISSUES
Whether or not the judicial declaration of the nullity of a second
or subsequent marriage, on the ground of psychological
incapacity, affects an individual’s criminal liability for bigamy.
(NO)
RULING
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio
completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or
incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal
liability for bigamy. Pertinently, Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code criminalizes "any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
 123
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting of the permanent character of the special bond between
a second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
valid marriage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated
on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first
marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated.
To our mind, there is no cogent reason for distinguishing between
a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a
second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that
is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity, at
least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The
State’s penal laws protecting the institution of marriage are in
recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special contract
between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard

CASE # 107
CAPILI v. PEOPLE
GR No. 183805 | TOPIC: Requisites for a Valid
Marriage
DOCTRINE
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab
initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS
Petitioner, James Capili, was charged with the crime of
bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City., and without said
marriage being legally dissolved, contracted a second
marriage with Shirley Tismo. Petitioner filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings alleging that 1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before
the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Medina- Capili
(married on September 1999); 2) in the event that the
marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him
from the charge of bigamy; and 3) the pendency of the civil
case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
The RTC of Antipolo declared the voidness or incipient
invalidity of the second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent on the ground that a subsequent
124
marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of
the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter,
petitioner accused filed his Manifestation and Motion (to
Dismiss) praying for the dismissal of the criminal case for
bigamy filed against him, which the RTC granted. Private
respondent filed an appeal with the CA, which reversed the
RTC’s decision. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the
second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the criminal case
for bigamy.
RULING
NO. The elements of the crime of bigamy, therefore, are:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of the
crime of bigamy were present when the Information was
filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner
and private respondent was contracted on December 8, 1999
during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between
petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili contracted on
September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself
declared the bigamous nature of the second marriage
 125
between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second marriage for
being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused
may still be charged with the crime of bigamy, even if there is
a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage,
so long as the first marriage was still subsisting when the
second marriage was celebrated.
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of
nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner's assertion would only delay the prosecution of
bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the
criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or
voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a
judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy. Thus, the finality of the judicial
declaration of nullity of petitioner's second marriage does not
impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against him.
126

CASE # 108
People v. Odtuhan
GR No. 191566 | TOPIC: Requisites for a Valid
Remarriage
DOCTRINE
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS
On July 2, 1980, respondent married Jasmin Modina (Modina).
On October 28, 1993, respondent married Eleanor A. Alagon
(Alagon). Sometime in August 1994, he filed a petition for
annulment of his marriage with Modina. On February 23, 1999,
the RTC of Pasig City, Branch 70 granted respondent’s petition
and declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for lack of
a valid marriage license. On November 10, 2003, Alagon died. In
the meantime, in June 2003, private complainant Evelyn
Abesamis Alagon learned of respondent’s previous marriage
with Modina. She thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit8 charging
respondent with Bigamy.
On April 15, 2005, respondent was indicted in an Information9
for Bigamy committed as follows:
That on or about October 28, 1993, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused being then legally married to
JASMIN MODINA and without such marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage with
ELEANOR A. ALAGON, which second/subsequent marriage has
all the essential requisites for validity.
127
The CA applied the conclusion made by the Court in Morigo v.
People, and held that there is cogent basis in looking into the
motion to quash filed by respondent, for if the evidence would
establish that his first marriage was indeed void ab initio, one
essential element of the crime of bigamy would be lacking.
The appellate court further held that respondent is even better
off than Morigo which thus calls for the application of such
doctrine, considering that respondent contracted the second
marriage after filing the petition for the declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and he obtained the favorable declaration
before the complaint for bigamy was filed against him. The CA
thus concluded that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in
denying respondent’s motion to quash the information,
considering that the facts alleged in the information do not
charge an offense.
ISSUE
Will the case on bigamy prosper when respondent contracted
the second marriage after filing the petition for the declaration
of nullity of his first marriage and he obtained the favorable
declaration before the complaint for bigamy was filed against
him
RULING
Yes. What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when
he contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it
 128
be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the allegations in the information are matters of defense which may
presumption is that the marriage exists. be raised only during the presentation of evidence.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the

judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the In view of the foregoing, the CA erred in granting the petition
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. If we allow respondent’s for certiorari filed by respondent. The RTC did not commit
line of defense and the CA’s ratiocination, a person who grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash and
commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution by immediately to allow him to present evidence to support his omnibus
filing a petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier motion.
marriage and hope that a favorable decision is rendered therein
before anyone institutes a complaint against him. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals Decision dated December 17, 2009 and Resolution
Respondent claims that because he obtained the declaration of dated March 4, 2010 in CA-G.R. SP No. 108616 are SET ASIDE.
nullity of marriage before the filing of the complaint for bigamy Criminal Case No. 05-235814 is REMANDED to the Regional Trial
against him the motion to quash should be granted. Again, we Court of Manila, Branch 27 for further proceedings.
cannot sustain such contention. In addition to the discussion
above, settled is the rule that criminal culpability attaches to
the offender upon the commission of the offense and from that
instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided
by law and that the time of filing of the criminal complaint or
information is material only for determining prescription.

Thus, as held in Antone:

To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of the

marriage between petitioner and respondent only after the
latter contracted the subsequent marriage is, therefore,
immaterial for the purpose of establishing that the facts alleged
in the information for Bigamy does not constitute an offense.
Following the same rationale, neither may such defense be
interposed by the respondent in his motion to quash by way of CASE #109
exception to the established rule that facts contrary to the

Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan
GR No. 201061 | TOPIC: Requisites for Valid
Marriage
DOCTRINE: The certification from the local civil registrar is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and
absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys
probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the
law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a
marriage license.
FACTS: On September 10, 1973, Benjamin Bangayan married
Azucena Alegre in Caloocan City. They had 3 children. In 1979,
Benjamin had a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan.
In 1982, Azucena left for US. In 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived
together as husband and wife.
On March 7, 1982, Sally and Benjamin signed a purported
marriage contract to appease her father who was against the
relationship. Sally assured Benjamin that it would not be
registered because of the latter’s marital status. The
relationship between Sally and Benjamin ended in 1994 when
the former went to Canada with their children.
Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using the simulated marriage
contract as evidence.
Benjamin filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial
court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous
and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
129
Benjamin asked the Trial court for the partition of properties
acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for him to be the administrator of the properties and for
the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children.
A total of 44 properties became the subject of partition.
The trial court gave weight to the certification dated July 21,
2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar that the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and
Sally. Trial Court ruled that:
· the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office because it
could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting
marriage with Azucena.
· the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first
marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the
lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case.
The trial court denied Sally’s claim for spousal support because
she was not married to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a bigamous marriage when, in
the 2nd marriage, only a purported marriage contract was signed
by the parties and without any marriage license.
RULING: No, not bigamous. Under Article 35 of the Family Code,
a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered
by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from
the beginning.”
 130
In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no
marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers
issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article
35 which made their marriage void ab initio.

The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-

existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent
contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which
are absolutely simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void
from the beginning.”

The second marriage was void not because of the existence of

the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the
lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed
in this case.

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must

have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a
purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The
supposed marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived
together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

appeal is PARTLY GRANTED

CASE # 110
Jocson v. Robles
GR No. L-23433 | TOPIC: Procedure in Action
for Declaration of Nullity; No Confession of
Judgment
DOCTRINE: The rendition of a decree of annulment of a
marriage in a summary judgment upon a stipulation of facts or
a confession of judgment is prohibited.
FACTS: Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court an action for the annulment of her marriage to
Ricardo R. Robles on the ground that it was bigamous. It was
alleged in the amended complaint that previous to his marriage
to plaintiff, defendant Robles had contracted a first marriage
with Josefina Fausto, who had instituted a criminal action for
Bigamy against the same defendant.
In his answer, defendant Robles also assailed the validity of the
marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents with having
compelled him by force, threat, and intimidation to contract
that marriage with her, notwithstanding their knowledge that
he is a married man. Thereafter, Robles filed a motion for
summary judgment on the ground that no genuine issue of fact
is involved in the case. It was claimed that defendant's
contention, that his consent to the marriage was secured by
force and intimidation employed upon his person by the
relatives of plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the joint
affidavit of plaintiff's father and brother.
Court of Domestic Relations: defendant's motion for summary
judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it can pass
131
upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when
he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had a
previous and subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary
requirement to establish these facts, according to the court,
was not met in the motion for summary judgment. Defendant's
plea to have his marriage declared as having been brought
about by force and intimidation was also denied, the court
finding indications of collusion between the parties in their
attempt to secure the nullification of said marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a decree of annulment of marriage can
be rendered in a summary judgment upon a stipulation of facts
or a confession of judgment. (No)
RULING: No. The Court is satisfied that the Court of Domestic
Relations correctly denied the motion for summary judgment
pursuant to the Civil Code of the Philippines that expressly
prohibits the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The
affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods not countenanced by the
Civil Code.
DISPOSITIVE: FOR THE FOREGOING, this proceeding is hereby
dismissed.

CASE # 111
Tolentino v. Villanueva
No. L-23264 | TOPIC: No Confession of
Judgement
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE:
The investigation by fiscal is a prerequisite to annulment of
marriage where defendant has defaulted, thus it is sufficient
for the dismissal of the said case.
FACTS:
● The Petitioner and Respondents marriage was said to
have been solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R.
Virtucio on Sept 28. 1959.
● On April 26, 1962, petitioner filed a suit for the annulment
of his marriage (Civil Case No. 43347) with the
respondent (Helen Villanueva) alleging that his consent
was obtained through fraud and that he discovered after
the marriage celebration that the respondent was
pregnant even though they didn't have any sexual
relations prior to the said marriage celebration nor did
they live immediately as husband and wife.
● Despite the serving of summons and the copy of
complaints, Helen (respondent) failed to file a responsive
pleading thus resulting in Romulo’s (petitioner) filing on
June 13, 1962, a motion to declare the defendant in
default and in order to set the date for the presentation
of his evidence.
● On June 28, 1962, Judge declared the private respondent
(Helen Villanueva) in default but referred the case to the
City Fiscal of Manila for an investigation to determine
whether there a collusion between the parties in
accordance to Art. 88 and 101 of the new civil code.
132
● On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, Romulo (petitioner)
submitted to the City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
The City Fiscal then issued a subpoena to the petitioner’s
counsel to bring Romulo before him as well as the copies
of other documents in connection with the annulment
case on August 27, 1962 at 10:00 AM. In a letter dated
August 24, 1962, Romulo’s counsel informed the
Assistant City Fiscal he could not comply with the
subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his evidence.
● A motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner,
thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the
date for the reception of his evidence on the ground that
the City Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings
despite the lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962,
when he submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the
complaint.
● On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the
aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself
for interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to
report whether or not there is collusion between the
parties.
● The court ordered on July 29, 1963, to dismissed the said
complaint in the view of the fact that the petitioner is
not willing to submit himself for interrogation by the City
fiscal pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph
of Article 101 of the New Civil Code.
● His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid
order having been denied on July 29, 1963, and on April
11, 1964, petitioner now files his petition to annul the said
order of July 29, 1963, and to compel the respondent
Judge to receive his evidence.
ISSUES: Whether or not the non-compliance of the petitioner
of the interrogation by the City Fiscal as part of the
 133
investigation to ascertain if there is a collusion between parties, ● The Supreme Court has thus affirmed the order dated
may be used as a ground for the dismissal of the Annulment July 29, 1963, and dismissed the petition with costs
Case (Yes) against the petitioner.

RULING: ● The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the

● The investigation by fiscal is a prerequisite to annulment stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by
of marriage where defendant has defaulted, thus it is non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that
sufficient for the dismissal of the said case. marriage is more than a mere contract between the
● The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
non-appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to
marriage is more than a mere contract between the preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds
parties; and for this reason, when the defendant fails to
appear, the law enjoins the court to direct the
prosecuting officer to intervene for the State in order to
preserve the integrity and sanctity of the marital bonds.
● As stated by the Court, Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Code of the Philippines expressly prohibit the rendition WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS HEREBY
of a decision in suits for annulment of marriage and legal AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. WITH
separation based on a stipulation of facts or by COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
confession of judgment and direct that in case of
nonappearance of defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not collusion
between the parties exists, and if none, said prosecuting
attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent
fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff.
● Thus, Articles 88 and 101 state: “ART. 88. No judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment.
● “In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the
provisions of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed.”
● “ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession
of judgment.
 134
CASE # 112
RULING:
● The allegation of the plaintiff that he had not even
suspected the pregnant state of the defendant being in
Buccat v. Buccat
a very advanced pregnant condition (7th month), is
G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941, Horrilleno, J. |
implausible. Therefore, there is no place to estimate the
TOPIC: Voidable Marriages
fraud that the plaintiff speaks of. What he alleges in the
sense that it is not uncommon to find people with a
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE: developed abdomen, seems to us to be childish to
Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is the foundation on deserve our consideration, all the more so since the
which society rests. To annul it, clear and reliable evidence is plaintiff was a first-year law student.
necessary. ● Marriage is a most sacred institution: it is the foundation
on which society rests. To annul it, clear and reliable
FACTS: evidence is necessary. In this matter there is no such
● The plaintiff Godofredo Buccat met the defendant Luida evidence.
Mangonon de Buccat in March 1938. After several
interviews, both became engaged on September 19 of the
same year. On November 26, 1938, the plaintiff married DISPOSITIVE PORTION
the defendant in the Catholic cathedral of Baguio City. Finding the appealed sentence adjusted to law, it must be
● After living together maritally for 89 days, the defendant CONFIRMED, as we hereby confirm it, in all its parts, with the
gave birth to 9-month-old child on February 23, 1939. As costs to the appellant. So it is ordered.
a result, the plaintiff abandoned the defendant and did
not return to marital life with she.
● The plaintiff requests the annulment of his marriage with
the defendant on November 26, 1938, in the City of
Baguio, on the ground that he consented to said marriage
because the defendant had assured him that she was
virgin.
● Defendant did not appear despite having been duly
summoned, allowing the plaintiff to present his
evidence. The lower court ruled the matter in favor of
the defendant. Hence this appeal.

ISSUES: Whether or not the plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient

to annul the marriage - NO

Case #112
Aquino v. Delizo
G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960, Gutierrez David,
J. | TOPIC: Voidable Marriages
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE:
Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage (Art. 85, par. (4) in relation to Art. 86,
par. (3)).
FACTS:
● Petitioner Fernando Aquino filed a complaint for
annulment of his marriage with respondent Conchita
Delizo on the ground of fraud, it being alleged that
Conchita, at the date of her marriage to Fernando on
December 27, 1954, concealed from the latter that fact
that she was pregnant by another man, and sometime in
April 1955, or about four months after their marriage,
gave birth to a child.
● In her answer, Conchita claimed that the child was
conceived out of lawful wedlock between her and the
plaintiff.
● Only the petitioner testified on trial and the only
documentary evidence presented was the marriage
contract between the parties. Respondent neither
appeared nor presented any evidence despite the
reservation made by her counsel that she would present
evidence on a later date.
● Trial court: noting that no birth certificate was
presented to show that the child was born within 180
135
days after the marriage between the parties, and holding
that concealment of pregnancy as alleged by the plaintiff
does not constitute such fraud sa would annul a
marriage — dismissed the complaint.
● On appeal: CA held that there has been excusable
neglect in petitioner’s inability to present the proof of
the child's birth, through her birth certificate, and for
that reason the court a quo erred in denying the motion
for reception of additional evidence.
● On the theory, however, that it was not impossible for
petitioner and respondent to have had sexual
intercourse during their engagement so that the child
could be their own, and finding unbelievable petitioner’s
claim that he did not notice or even suspect that
respondent was pregnant when he married her, the CA
nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
● Petitioner filed a motion for new trial to which petitioner
attached as annexes the following documents:
○ Affidavit of Cesar Aquino (Annex A) (defendant's
brother-in-law and plaintiff's brother, with whom
defendant was living at the time plaintiff met,
courted and married her, and with whom
defendant has begotten two more children, aside
from her first born, in common-law relationship)
admitting that he is the father of defendant's first
born, Catherine Bess Aquino, and that he and
defendant hid her pregnancy from plaintiff at the
time of plaintiff's marriage to defendant;
○ Affidavit of defendant, Conchita Delizo (Annex
"B") admitting her pregnancy by Cesar Aquino, her
brother-in-law and plaintiff's own brother, at the
time of her marriage to plaintiff and her having
hidden this fact from plaintiff before and up to the
time of their marriage;

○ Affidavit of Albert Powell (Annex "C") stating that
he knew Cesar Aquino and defendant lived
together as husband and wife before December
27, 1954, the date of plaintiff's marriage to
defendant;
○ Birth Certificate of defendant's first born,
Catherine Bess Aquino showing her date of birth
to be April 26, 1955;
○ Birth Certificate (Annex "D") of Carolle Ann
Aquino, the second child of defendant with Cesar
Aquino, her brother-in-law;
○ Birth Certificate (Annex "E") of Chris Charibel
Aquino, the third child of Cesar Aquino and
defendant; and
○ Pictures of defendant showing her natural
plumpness as early as 1952 to as late as
November, 1954, the November, 1954 photo itself
does not show defendant's pregnancy which must
have been almost four months old at the time the
picture was taken.
● plump", he could hardly be expected to know, merely by
ISSUES: Whether respondent committed fraud in concealing
her preganancy to petitioner, which is a ground for annulment
of their marriage - YES
RULING:
● Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife of
the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage (Art. 85,
par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3).
● In the case of Buccat vs. Buccat, plaintiff's claim that he
did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant
was held to be unbelievable, it having been proven that
136
the latter was already in an advanced stage of pregnancy
(7th month) at the time of their marriage. That
pronouncement cannot apply to this case.
● Here the respondent wife was alleged to be only more
than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage
to petitioner. At that stage, her pregnancy was NOT
readily apparent, especially since she was "naturally
plump" or fat as alleged by petitioner.
● According to medical authorities, even on the 5th month
of pregnancy, the enlargement of a woman's abdomen is
still below the umbilicus, that is to say, the enlargement
is limited to the lower part of the abdomen so that it is
hardly noticeable and may, if noticed, be attributed only
to fat formation on the lower part of the abdomen.
● It is only on the 6th month of pregnancy that the
enlargement of the woman's abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness of the
abdomen more general and apparent. (See Lull, Clinical
Obstetrics, p. 122)
● If, as claimed by petitioner, respondent is "naturally
looking, whether or not she was pregnant at the time of
their marriage more so because she must have
attempted to conceal the true state of affairs.
● Even physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the woman
herself who shows and gives her subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim positive diagnosis of
pregnancy in 33% at five months. and 50% at six months.
(XI Cyclopedia of Medicine, Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p.
10).
● CA stated it was not impossible for petitioner and
respondent to have had sexual intercourse before they
got married and so the child could be their own.
HOWEVER, this statement is purely conjectural and finds
no support or justification in the record.
 137
● On other hand, the evidence sought to be introduced at
the new trial, taken together with what has already been
adduced would be sufficient to sustain the fraud alleged
by petitioner. CA should not have denied the motion
praying for new trial simply because respondent failed
to file her answer. Such failure of the respondent cannot
be taken as evidence of collusion, especially since a
provincial fiscal has been ordered of represent the
Government precisely to prevent such collusion.
● As to the veracity of the contents of the motion and its
annexes, it can best be determined only after hearing
evidence. Hence, there should be a new trial for this
case.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, the decision complained of is set aside and the case
REMANDED to the court a quo FOR NEW TRIAL. Without costs.

CASE # 113
W/N the non-disclosure to the wife by her husband of a
premarital relationship with another woman constitutes fraud
ANAYA v. PALAROAN
as a ground for annulment of marriage? - NO
GR No. L-27930 | TOPIC: VOIDABLE MARRIAGES
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
(highlighted)
FACTS
● Petitioner (Aurora Anaya) and Respondent (Fernando
Palaroan) were married on Dec 7, 1953. Less than a
month later, respondent filed an action to annul their
marriage on the ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The action was
dismissed in 1959.
● However, during the pendency of the action,
Respondent had to admit to petitioner that several
months prior to their marriage, respondent had a
relationship with a close relative, and this fact doomed
the marriage before it had even began.
● Because of such revelation, the petitioner filed another
action for annulment this time claiming that because
respondent had not told her about his pre-marital
relationship, her consent was obtained by FRAUD under
par 4 of Art 85 of the NCC.
● Respondent denied all allegations of petitioner. And
said that he would never live with petitioner, since he
escaped from her and her family the day after their
marriage. And that the action was a malicious filing of
suit.
● The Lower Court dismissed the complaint on account
that the allegation of fraud was legally insufficient to
invalidate the marriage. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
138
RULING
● NO. Non-disclosure of a husband’s pre-marital
relationship with another woman is not one of the
enumerated circumstances that would constitute a
ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the
last paragraph of the article, providing that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to . . . chastity" shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage.
● Fraud, as a vice of consent in marriage, may be a cause
for its annulment. Article 85, No. 4, of the Civil Code
provides:
○ "ART. 85. A marriage may be annulled for any of
the following causes, existing at the time of the
marriage:
xxx xxx xxx
"(4) That the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards,
with full knowledge of the facts constituting the
fraud, freely cohabited with the other as her
husband or his wife, as the case may be;"
● This fraud, as vice of consent, is limited exclusively by
law to those kinds or species of fraud enumerated in
Article 86, as follows:
○ "ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances
shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of
the preceding article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of
the contracting parties;
(2) Non-disclosure of the previous conviction of
the other party of a crime involving moral

turpitude, and the penalty imposed was
imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a
man other than her husband.
"No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, rank, fortune or chastity shall
constitute such fraud as will give grounds for
action for the annulment of marriage."
● The intention of Congress to confine the circumstances
that can constitute fraud as ground for annulment of
marriage to the foregoing three cases may be deduced
from the fact that, of all the causes of nullity
enumerated in Article 85, fraud is the only one given
special treatment in a subsequent article within the
chapter on void and voidable marriages.
● If its intention were otherwise, Congress would have
stopped at Article 85, for, anyway, fraud in general is
already mentioned therein as a cause for annulment.
But Article 86 was also enacted, expressly and
specifically dealing with "fraud referred to in number 4
of the preceding article," and proceeds by enumerating
the specific frauds, making it clear that Congress
intended to exclude all other frauds or deceits.
● While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of
premarital lewdness or feel having been thereby
cheated into giving her consent to the marriage,
nevertheless the law does not assuage her grief after
her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she
entered into an institution in which society, and not
herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker’s intent being
plain, the Court’s duty is to give effect to the same,
whether it agrees with the rule or not.
Additional eme
139
● But plaintiff-appellant Anaya emphasizes that not only
has she alleged "non-divulgement" of the pre-marital
relationship of her husband with another woman as her
cause of action, but that she has, likewise, alleged in
her reply that defendant Fernando paid court to her
without any intention of complying with his marital
duties and obligations and covertly made up his mind
not to live with her. Plaintiff-appellant contends that
the lower court erred in ignoring these allegations in
her reply.
○ This second set of averments which were made
in the reply (pretended love and absence of
intention to perform duties of consortium) is an
entirely new and additional "cause of action."
○ On the merits of this second fraud charge, it is
enough to point out that any secret intention on
the husband's part not to perform his marital
duties must have been discovered by the wife
soon after the marriage: hence her action for
annulment based on that fraud should have been
brought within four years after the marriage.
○ Since the petitioner’s wedding was celebrated in
December of 1953, and this ground was only
pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already
barred.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed order is hereby
affirmed. No costs.
CASE # 116

W/N Ruiz was intimidated and threatened into marrying Pelagia for
Jose Ruiz v Pelagia Atienza
the purposes of awarding the annulment of their marriage (No)
GR No. 5986 | TOPIC: Grounds for Annulment
(Force, intimidation, and undue influence.
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
● Mere intimidation in the celebration of the marriage does
not invalidate it. Clear violence or duress upon the consent
of one party must be present to annul a marriage on the
ground of duress.
FACTS
● Jose Ruiz (plaintiff) and Pelagia Atienza (defendant) are
sweethearts. Thereafter, their relationship resulted in Pelagia
being an unmarried mother.
● After the birth of their child, Pelagia’s father, Jose, and her
cousin-in-law, Atty. Villavicencio, and three other persons,
visited Ruiz at his boarding house. They requested him to come
and convinced him to marry Pelagia. Ruiz agreed and thereafter
he was married to Pelagia.
● However, Ruiz alleged that he was forced into wedlock.
● According to Ruiz, the father of Pelagia threatened him with a
balisong and that Atty. Villavicencio also mentioned that Ruiz
would have difficulty in taking the bar examination if he did not
marry Pelagia. Since he may be rejected admission to the bar
on the grounds of immorality. Atty. Villavicencio also promised
that he would be “safe” if he came with them.
● It was then found out, through the admission of Ruiz, that he
cannot marry Pelagia since he is already a married man. This
angered the father of Pelagia and grabbed Ruiz in the necktie.
● Four days after the wedding, Ruiz filed this action for the
annulment of the said marriage saying that he was threatened
and forced into wedding Pelagia by her father.
ISSUES
140
RULING
● The Court held that there was insufficient evidence showing that
Jose, the father of Pelagia, actually threatened the life of Ruiz.
Moreover, the threat of obstruct his admission to the Bar, by
filing charges against him for immorality, the authorities are
unanimous that it is not such a duress as to constitute a reason
for annulling the marriage, since if a man marries under the
threat of, or constraint from, a lawful prosecution for seduction
or bastardy, he cannot avoid the marriage on the ground of
duress.
● Moreover, the fact that he would only be “safe” if he comes with
Atty. Villacencio was not appreciated by the Court. Ruiz had
companions in the house and the policeman was even nearby.
Based on his allegations, he made it appear that he was being
kidnapped until the said wedding. However, there are several
instances that he could’ve escaped, which he did not do.
● In this case, the Court held that the law presumes strongly for
the validity of marriage once all formal ceremonies are
completed. Despite Ruiz feeling that he was forced into the
marriage, evidence presented does not warrant a
pronouncement that his consent was obtained through force or
intimidation.
● The Court held that the provision of the Marriage Law (sec 30,
Act No. 3613) which, referring to "force “or "violence", does not
seem to include mere intimidation, at least where it does not in
legal effect amount to force or violence.
● The Court concluded that based on the relevant facts and
evidence presented neither violence nor duress attended the
marriage celebration between Ruiz and Pelagia. Hence, the
Court ruled to deny the action for annulment.
 141

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Judgment affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered

 142
CASE # 117
RULING
● Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase ‘physically
Sarao v. Guevara
incapable of entering into the married state’ as
GR No. 47063 | TOPIC: Impotence
incapacity to procreate.
● However, impotency is not the inability to procreate but
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE the inability to COPULATE. The defect must be one of
Impotency refers to the person’s physical condition where copulation and not of reproduction. Barrenness will not
sexual intercourse with a person of the opposite sex is invalidate the marriage. The removal of the organs
impossible. It does not refer to mere sterility. rendered respondent sterile but it by no means made
It refers to the inability to copulate, not procreate. her unfit for sexual intercourse.
● Further, to constitute fraud, the concealed impotency
FACTS must exist at time of marriage, and be continuous and
● Plaintiff and respondent were married. incurable. If incapacity can be remedied or is removable
● On their wedding day, plaintiff (husband) tried to by operation, not annullable
consummate the marriage. However, respondent (wife)
showed reluctance and begged him to wait until DISPOSITIVE PORTION
evening. Although he found the orifice of her vagina *could not find full text, if you can find it please copy and
sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains paste the dispositive portion here. Thank you!!
in her vagina later that night.
● Plaintiff also noticed oozing of some purulent matter
offensive to the smell coming from defendant’s vagina.
● Upon the physician’s advice, respondent’s uterus and
ovaries were removed due to the presence of a tumor.
The removal of said organs rendered her incapable of
procreation.
● Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the
operation, he lost all desire to have sex with his wife
and thus filed this complaint for annulment of marriage
on the ground of impotency.

ISSUES
WON their marriage can be annulled on the ground of
impotency due to inability to procreate (No) CASE # 118

JIMENEZ v. CAÑIZARES,
GR No. L-12790 | TOPIC: Impotence, FC 45 (5),
47 (5)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically
incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder
the ties that have bound them together as husband and wife.
FACTS
Petitioner: Joel Jimenez. Respondent: Remedios Canizares.
1. June 7 1955. Joel Jimenez prayed for a decree annulling
his marriage with Canizares before at the CFI of
Zamboanga. He alleged:
a. that the orifice of her vagina was too samll to
allow the penetration of a penis for sex.
b. that the condition existed at the time of their
marriage and continues to exist.
2. Canizares filed no answer, and the city attorney of
Zamboanga was directed to inquire if there was collusion
between the spouses.
3. The Court ordered that Canizares submit to a physical
examination by a competent physician to determine her
capacity for copulation. She was warned that non-
compliance would be deemed lack of interest on her part
in the case. She did not go.
4. After hearing without Canizares, the court entered a
decree annulling the marriage.
5. The city attorney filed an MR on the ground that the
impotency had not been satisfactorily proved as required
by law. MR denied.
CASE #119
143
ISSUES: Whether or not a decree of annulment on the ground
of impotency of a wife can be granted based solely on the
testament of the husband that claimed such impotence (NO)
RULING
● The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that
must be proved to exist by indubitable evidence, to annul
a marriage.
● Here, the annulment was based on the sole testament of
the husband that sought said decree.Whether the wife is
really impotent cannot be deemed to have been
satisfactorily established as she has not been examined or
participated in the proceedings.
● The SC ruled that although her refusal to be examined or
appear in court may show indifference on her part, the
court, this is not suppression of evidence as the Court took
into consideration that “women of this country are by
nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a
physical examination unless compelled to by competent
authority”.
● This the Court may do without doing violence to and
infringing upon her constitutional right. A physical
examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not
charged with any offense. She is not being compelled to be
a witness against herself. Impotency being an abnormal
condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in
favor of potency.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without
pronouncement as to costs.
 144
CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 121
 145
Lukban v. Republic marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
98 Phil 574 | TOPIC: Marriage when one spouse spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the
is absent time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not
know his or her former spouse to be living, that each former
spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE: For the purposes of the civil present so believes at the time of the celebration of the
marriage law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse marriage.
judicially declared an absentee. (old civil code)
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
FACTS: Lourdes G. Lukban, Petitioner herein, contracted
marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December 10, 1933 at the
Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same
year, Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since
then he has not been heard from despite diligent search made
by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and
friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She
has no knowledge if he is still alive, his last known address
being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he is
already dead because he had been absent for more than
twenty years, and because she intends to marry again, she
desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may
be relieved of any liability under the law.

ISSUES: Whether or not, Lourdes G. Lukban needs to secure

declaration of presumptive death before she can remarry. NO.

RULING: The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure
declaration of presumptive death of her husband because Civil
Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It provides that
“for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary
to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee. CASE # 122
The declaration of absence made in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable
the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration
of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil
 1

In the matter of petition for the declaration of

William Gue presumptively dead. Angelina Gue
v. Republic
GR No. L-14058 | TOPIC: Marriage when one
spouse is absent

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS:

1. On Nov. 20, 1957, Angelina Gue filed a petition in the CFI of Manila, alleging that she was married to William
Gue. That they also have a child named Anthony Gue.
a. On Jan 5. 1946, her husband left Manila where they were residing and went to Shanghai, China, but since
then, he had not been heard of, neither had he written to her, nor in any way communicated with her as
to his whereabouts.
b. Despite efforts and diligence, she failed to locate him and that they had acquired any property during the
marriage.
c. Thus, asking the Court for a declaration of presumptive death of William Gue, pursuant to Art. 390 of
Civil Code.
2. Trial Court dismissed the petition
a. Trial Court cited the case of Petition for the Presumption of Death of Nicolai Szatraw:
b. There is no right to be enforced nor is there a remedy prayed for by the petitioner for the final
determination of his right or status or for the ascertainment of a particular fact for the petition does not
pray for a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is dead, but merely asks for a declaration that he be
presumed dead because he had been unheard from in seven years.
c. The petition is for a declaration that the petitioner’s husband is presumptively dead. But this declaration,
even if judicially made, would not improve the petitioner’s situation, because such a presumption is
already established by law. A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would
still be a prima facie presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the
 2

subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a case,
or upon which a competent court has to pass.
d. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been
unheard from in seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof cannot
reach the state of finality or become final. Proof of actual death of the person presumed dead because
he had been unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such
particular fact finally determined. If a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead, because he
had not been heard from in seven years, cannot become final and executory even after the lapse of the
reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such a presumption is still disputable and
remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless, unnecessary,
superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court should not waste its valuable time and be
made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.
3. In her appeal, Angelina invoked the provisions of Art. 390 of the Civil Code:
a. "ART. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
b. "The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening this succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five, an absence of five years shall be
sufficient in order that his succession may be opened."
c. She further contends that under Art. 191 of the Civil Code: “After thirty years have elapsed since
disappearance of the absentee, or since he was last heard from, or from ninety years from his birth, the
judgment upon the petition of any party lawfully interested, shall make an order declaring that such
absentee is presumed to be dead.”
d.

ISSUES:

W/N a person can file a petition to render a judicial decree that one is merely presumed to be dead

RULING:

No.
 3

A person could be declared presumptively dead, but that said legal provision was repealed by the Code of Civil
Procedure and continued to be repealed by the Rules of Court. Consequently, only a mere disputable presumption of
death was available to any party, and that the case of Nicolai Szatraw, cited by the trial court, was decided on the law
then existing, namely, the Code of Civil Procedure, and later the new Rules of Court. However, according to appellant,
with the promulgation of the New Civil Code in 1950, particularly, Article 390 thereof, the Courts are now authorized
to declare persons presumptively dead.

We believe that the petition at bar comes within the purview of our decision in the case of Nicolai Szatraw, wherein it
was held that a petition for judicial declaration that petitioner’s husband is presumed to be dead cannot be
entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceedings
similar to the present, much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must
of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the court can declare upon proper evidence, but not
to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead.

A judicial pronouncement to that effect, even if final and executory, would still be a prima facie presumption only. It is
still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the
only question or matter involved in a case, or upon which a competent court has to pass . . . It is, therefore, clear that
a judicial declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final."cral aw

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

We deem it unnecessary to further discuss the merits of the case. The appealed order dismissing the petition
is hereby affirmed, with costs.

DIGEST FORMAT DO NOT DELETE

CASE #
 4
CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 5
Matute v. Macadaeg 43
LEGAL SEPARATION Laperal v. Republic 45
Albano v. Gapusan 7
Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng 46
CASE TITLE 8
CASE TITLE 48
Garcia-Recio v. Recio, 9
Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno v Angel Cuaderno 49
Goitia v. Campos – Rueda 11
Abella vs.COMELEC 50
People v. Zapata 13
Matabuena v. Cervantes 53
CASE TITLE 15
CASE TITLE 54
CASE TITLE 16
Spouses Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica 56
CONTRERAS V. MACARAIG 17
Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo 58
Lapuz v. Eufemio 18
Torela v. Torela 60
Matubis v. Praxedes 21
PNB v. CA 62
CASE TITLE 22
CASE TITLE 64
YANGCO v. ROHDE 25
Cuenca v. Cuenca 66
De la Viña v. Villareal 27
Dela Pena v. Avila. 68
Araneta v. Concepcion 29
Andrade v. Tan, 70
CASE TITLE 31
CASE TITLE 72
Lerma v. CA 33
Efren and Inocencia Mendoza vs. Ponciano Reyes and CA 73
People v. Sensano, 58 Phil. 73 34
CASE TITLE 76
CASE TITLE 35
JOCSON V. CA 77
Bugayong v. Ginez, 36
CASE TITLE 79
Brown v. Yambao | 39
Castro v. Miat 80
Ocampo v. Florenciano 41
PNB v. Quintos 82
 6
Laperal v. Katigbak 84 Garcia v. Manzano, 103 Phil. 798 123

Berciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53 86 Maxey v. CA 125

Veloso v. Martinez 88 Case Title 127

CASE TITLE 89 Case Title 128

CASE TITLE 90 Gomez v. Lipana 129

Manotok Realty v. CA 91 Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS 131

PALANCA V. SMITH-BELL 93 Case Title 133

CASE TITLE 94 Case Title 134

CALIMLIM v. FORTUN 97 GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN 136

Maramba v. Lozano 99 Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda 141

Petrona Javier v. Osmena 101 Alfonso Lacson v. Carmen San Jose-Lacson 144

CASE TITLE 103

DBP v. Adil 104

Luzon Surety v. de Garcia 105

BA Finance v. CA 161 SCRA 608 107

CASE TITLE 108

People v. Froilan Lagrimas 109

CASE TITLE 111

FELIPE V. HEIRS OF ALDON 112

CASE TITLE 114

De la Cruz v. De La Cruz 115

Beumer v. Amores 118

Santero v. CFI 121


Albano v. Gapusan
AM No. 1022-MJ | TOPIC: Agreement to
separate
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
There is no question that the covenents contained in the said
separation agreement (contract for personal separation and
extrajuducial liquidation of the conjugal partnership) are
contrary to law, morals and good customs; therefore, void.
FACTS
● Alabano filed a verified complaint against Respondent
Judge Gapuson of Ilocos Norte with Incompetence and
Ignorance of the law for having prepared and notarized
a document providing for the tile personal separation of
the husband and wife and the extraudicial liquidation of
their conjugal partnership and with having allegedly
influencing Judge Zacarias A Cripin of the CFI Ilocos
Norte in 2 crim cases.
● Back in 1941, Respondent Judge Gapusan notarized a
document for the personal separation of the spouses
Valentina Andres and Guillermo and for the
extrajudicial liquidation of their conjugal partnership. In
that document, it was stipulated that if either spouse
should commit adultery or concubinage, as the case
7
CASE # 1
may be, then the other should refrain from filing an
action against the other.
ISSUES
Whether or not the extrajudicial agreement on dissolution of
the conjugal partnership without judicial sanction is valid? -
NO, it is void.
RULING
● No. There is no question that the covenents contained
in the said separation agreement are contrary to law,
morals and good customs. Those stipulations
undermine the institutions of marriage and the family,
"Marriage is not a mere contract but an inviolable social
institution". "The family is a basic social institution
which public policy cherishes and protects." (Arts. 52
and 216, Civil Code). Marriage and the family are the
bases of human society throughout the civilized world.
● To preserve the institutions of marriage and the family,
the law considers as void "any contract for personal
separation between husband and wife" and "every
extrajudicial agreement, during the marriage, for the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership" (Art. 221, Civil
Code). Before the new Civil Code, it was held that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership
without judicial sanction was void.
● Respondent Gapusan as a member of the bar should be
censured for having notarized the void separation
agreement already mentioned.
 8

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 9
CASE # 2

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 10
CASE # 3

ISSUES
Garcia-Recio v. Recio,
Was the divorce decree obtained by Recio in his first marriage an
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001; J. Pangilinan
absolute divorce?
Topic: Distinguished from absolute divorce;
Divorce decreed abroad, FC 26
RULING
No, there was no proof in this case which type of divorce was procured
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE by respondent.
The two basic divorces are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii
Rederick presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree — a
and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates
conditional or provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same
the marriage, while the second suspends it and leaves the bond in full
as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
force.
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no
reconciliation is effected. Even after the divorce becomes absolute,
FACTS the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still restrict
1. [1ST MARRIAGE] March 1, 1987 - Rederick Recio, a Filipino remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited
citizen, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on
They lived together in Australia.
the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying again. The
2. [1ST DIVORCE DECREE] May 18, 1989 - An Australian family
court issued a decree of divorce. court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
● June 26, 1992 - Recio obtained Australian citizenship.
3. [2ND MARRIAGE] January 12, 1994 - Recio and Grace Garcia, a On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a
Filipino citizen, got married. They lived together in Australia. restriction that reads: "1. A party to a marriage who marries again
● October 22, 1995 - They lived separately without prior before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party has died)
judicial dissolution of their marriage. commits the offense of bigamy." This quotation bolsters our
● May 16, 1996 - Their conjugal assets were divided in
contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
accordance with the Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia. restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry
4. March 3, 1998 - Garcia filed a Complaint for Nullity of Marriage according to his national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling
on the grounds of bigamy. She claimed that Recio was of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
incapacitated to marry her because of his prior marriage to divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite
Editha Samson. the paucity (scarcity) of evidence on this matter.
● However, Garcia argued that he was legally capacitated
to marry Recio because he knew that his first marriage
had been validly dissolved.
5. [2ND DIVORCE DECREE] July 7, 1998 - Recio obtained a divorce
decree from a Sydney family court. He then filed a motion to
dismiss. OSG agreed.
6. RTC decided that the marriage was dissolved on the ground
that the divorce issued in Australia was valid and recognized
in the Philippines.
 11
DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, xxx we REMAND the case declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as
xxx for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show above discussed. No cost
respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of

CASE # 4
Goitia v. Campos – Rueda
GR. No. 11263 | TOPIC: Sexual Infidelity or
Perversion
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
1. Eloisa Goitia de la Camara and Jose Campos Rueda were
legally married in the city of Manila on January 7, 1915, and
immediately thereafter established their residence at 115
Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together for about a
month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her
parents.
2. It was alleged that Campos-Rueda demanded her to
perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs.
The plaintiff spurned the obscene demands of the
defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal
and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing,
defendant maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting
injuries upon her lips, face and different parts of her body;
and that, as Goitia was unable by any means to induce her
husband to desist from his repugnant desires and cease
from maltreating her, she was obliged to leave the conjugal
abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
3. Goitia filed a complaint against defendant for support
outside the conjugal home. The CFI ruled in favor of
defendant Rueda and held that the defendant cannot be
compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his own house,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a
divorce or separation from the defendant. The plaintiff
appealed.
ISSUES
12
WON the wife has a good and sufficient cause for living separate
from her husband?
WON the husband, on account of his conduct toward his wife,
lose the option given to him in Art 149 and be compelled to pay
the pension even if the wife refuses to live with him at home?
RULING
Marriage is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested. It is a relation for life and
the parties cannot terminate it at any shorter period by virtue of
any contract they may make .The reciprocal rights arising from
this relation, so long as it continues, are such as the law
determines from time to time, and none other.
ART. (149) 49. The person obliged to give support may, at his
option, satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed
or by receiving and maintaining in his own home the person
having the right to the same.
Article 152 of the Civil Code gives the instances when the obligation
to give support shall cease. The failure of the wife to live with her
husband is not one of them.
The SC of Spain ruled:
The option, which article 149 grants - to pay a pension or
maintain the wife in his house, is NOT ABSOLUTE. If the
person entitled to enjoy support has a justifiable or moral
cause to refuse to be maintained in his household, the the
right of selection must be understood to be restricted.
Situation 1: Voluntary Separation, the spouses mutually agreed
to separate

Effect: The duty to live together and support each other
remains. Because to rule otherwise would disregard the
marriage bond and the spouses would be able to separate
from each other on their own free will.
Situation 2: Willful abandonment of a spouse, without any
cause whatsoever
Effect: neither spouse can be compelled to support the other
outside of the conjugal abode
Situation 3: Abandonment of conjugal home due to
justifiable/moral cause
Effect: duty/obligation of guilty spouse remains, the option to
choose as per Art 149 is limited.
The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal abode by her
husband without fault on her part, may maintain an action
against the husband for separate maintenance when she has no
other remedy, notwithstanding the provisions of article 149 of the
Civil Code giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the
option to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving
and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to the
same.
Argument against support given to spouse when one leaves
the conjugal home for justifiable cause:
To grant support in an independent suit is equivalent to granting
divorce or separation, as it necessitates a determination of the
question whether the wife has a good and sufficient cause for
living separate from her husband; and, consequently, if a court
lacks power to decree a divorce, as in the instant case, power to
grant a separate maintenance must also be lacking.
SC’s answer to the argument:
The weakness of this argument lies in the assumption that the
power to grant support in a separate action is dependent upon a
13
power to grant a divorce. That the one is not dependent upon the
other is apparent from the very nature of the marital obligations
of the spouses. The mere act of marriage creates an obligation on
the part of the husband to support his wife. This obligation is
founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the
contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the
husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital
concern to the state itself that the laws will not permit him to
terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek
protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate
maintenance is not due and payable either as damages or as a
penalty; nor is it a debt in the strict legal sense of the term, but
rather a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made
specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from
necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the
purity of the wife; as where the husband makes so base demands
upon his wife and indulges in the habit of assaulting her. The pro
tanto separation resulting from a decree for separate support is
not an impeachment of that public policy by which marriage is
regarded as so sacred and inviolable in its nature; it is merely a
stronger policy overruling a weaker one; and except in so far only
as such separation is tolerated as a means of preserving the public
peace and morals may be considered, it does not in any respect
whatever impair the marriage contract or for any purpose place
the wife in the situation of a feme sole.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The foregoing are the grounds upon which our short opinion and
order for judgment, heretofore filed in this case, rest.

CASE # 5
People v. Zapata
GR No. L-3047 | TOPIC: Sexual infidelity or
perversion
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a complaint for
adultery was filed by Andres Bondoc against Guadalupe
Zapata, his wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour, for
cohabiting and having repeated sexual intercourse during the
period from the year 1946 14 March 1947, the date of the filing
of the complaint, Dalmacio Bondoc knowing his codefendant
to be a married woman (criminal case No. 426).
The defendant wife entered the plea of guilty and was
sentenced to suffer four months of arresto mayor which
penalty she served. In the same court, on 17 September 1948,
the offended husband filed another complaint for adulterous
acts committed by his wife and her paramour from 15 March
1947 to 17 September 1948, the date of the filing of the second
complaint.
On 21 February 1949, each of the defendants filed a motion to
quash the complaint of the ground that they would be twice
put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial
court upheld the contention of the defendants and quashed
the second complaint
The trial court held that the adulterous acts charged in the
first and second complains must be deemed one continuous
14
offense, the defendants in both complaints being the same
and identical persons and the two sets of unlawful acts
having taken place continuously during the years 1946, 1947
and part of 1948, and that the acts or two sets of acts that
gave rise to the crimes of adultery complained of in both
cases constitute one and the same offense, within the scope
and meaning of the constitutional provision that "No person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense."
ISSUES
Whether or not the adulterous acts charged in the first and
second complaints must be deemed one continuous crime?
Whether or not it violates the double jeopardy clause of the
constitution?
RULING
1. NO. For it to exist there would be plurality of acts
performed seperately during a period of time; unity of
penal provision infringed upon or violated; and unity of
criminal intent or purpose, which means that two or
more violations of the same penal provision are united
in one and the same intent leading to the perpetration
of the same criminal purpose or aim (Ibid. p. 520).In the
instant case the last unity does not exist, because as
already stated the culprits perpetrate the crime in
every sexual intercourse and they need not to another
or other adulterous acts to consummate it. After the
last acts of adultery had been committed as charged in
the first complaint, the defendants again committed
 15
adulterous acts not included in the first complaint and
for which the second complaint was filed. It was held
by the Supreme Court of Spain that another crime of
adultery was committed, if the defendants, after their
provisional release during the pendency of the case in
which they were sent to prison to serve the penalty
imposed upon them.
2. NO. The second complaint charging the commission of
adulterous acts not included in the first complaint does
not constitute a violation of the double jeopardy clause
of the constitution is that, if the second places
complaint the defendants twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense, the adultery
committed by the male defendant charged in the
second complaint, should he be absolved from, or
acquitted of, the first charge upon the evidence that he
did not know that his codefendant was a married
woman, would remain or go unpunished. The defense
set up by him against the first charge upon which he
was acquitted would no longer be available, because at
the time of the commission of the crime charged in the
second complaint, he already knew that this defendant
was a married woman and he continued to have carnal
knowledge of her. Even if the husband should pardon
his adulterous wife, such pardon would not exempt the
wife and her paramour from criminal liability for
adulterous acts committed after the pardon was
granted because the pardon refers to previous and not
to subsequent adulterous acts.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 16
CASE # 6

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 17
CASE # 7

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 18
CASE # 8
● Early December 1963, Elena with her 2 children went to see
Cesar and to beg him to return to his legitimate family but
CONTRERAS V. MACARAIG Cesar said that he could no longer leave Lily Ann and refused
33 SCRA 222, May 29, 1970 | TOPIC: Legal to return.
Separation; When may Petition be Filed ● On December 14, 1963, Elena filed the petition for legal
separation. CFI: dismissed the petition because the 1 year
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE period to file action has already lapsed
Action for legal separation should be filed within 1 year from the
date of discovery of the cause; not mere rumors or hearsay. ISSUES
Whether the period of one year provide for in Article 102 of the Civil
FACTS Code should be counted from September 1962 (when she first heard
● On March 16, 1952, Elena Contreras married Cesar Macaraig. rumors about her husband’s infidelity) or from December 1963 (when
Cesar was employed at MICO Offset owned by Elena’s father, she went to his husband to beg him to return home)
where he met Lily Ann Alcala
RULING
● After elections of 1961, Cesar resigned at MICO to be a
The 1-year prescription started on December 1963. Court is
special agent at Malacanang. He was rarely home thereafter
persuaded that in the eyes of the law, the only time when appellant
due to “series of confidential missions”
really became cognizant of the infidelity of her husband was in the
● On September 1962, Avelino Lubos, the family driver, saw
early part of December 1963. It was only on the occasion mentioned
Cesar living with Lily Ann
when her husband admitted to her that he was living with and
● On October 1962, Elena refrained from verifying Lubos’ report
would no longer leave lily ann to return to his legitimate family that
in her desire not to anger Cesar
appellant must be deemed to be under obligation to decide whether
● On April 1963, rumors that Cesar was seen with a woman
to sue or not for legal separation and it was only then that the legal
already on the family way
period of one year must be deemed to have commence.
● On May 1963, Elena again refrained from asking so as not to
precipitate a quarrel and drive Cesar away
● Elena received reports that Lily Ann had already given birth. She only heard rumors in Sept 1962 but no proof. Hearsay
To verify the report Elena sent Mrs. Felicisima Antioquia, her information would not have been legally sufficient as a basis for
father’s employee legal separation.
● Felicisima saw Cesar carrying a baby in his arms. She went
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
to the parish priest and inquired about the child of Cesar and
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is set aside and another is
Lily Ann. Lucilo Macaraig, Cesar’s father, interceded to
hereby rendered holding that appellant is entitled to legal separation
convince Cesar to go back to his wife, but to no avail.
as prayed for in her complaint.
● Mrs. Enriqueta Majul, Cesar’s older sister, arranged a meeting
between Lily Ann and Elena, and Lily Ann said that she was
willing to give up Cesar but Cesar did not want to give up the
relationship.

Lapuz v. Eufemio
G.R. No. L-30977 | TOPIC: Legal Separation;
When may Petition be Filed
Doctrine: An action for legal separation which involves nothing
more than the bed-and-board separation of the spouses is
purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines recognizes
this by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else) to
19
CASE # 9
claim legal separation; and by providing that the spouses can,
by their reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even
rescind a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being
personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to
the action causes the death of the action itself — actio
personalis moritur cum persona.
Facts: On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition
for legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging, in the
main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and

canonically on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together
as husband and wife continuously until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired
properties during their marriage; and that she discovered her
husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on
or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree
of legal separation, which, among others, would order that the
defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be deprived of his share
of the conjugal partnership profits.
On the other hand, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio
counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his
marriage with Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior
and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law
and customs, with one Go Hiok.
But before the trial could be completed, petitioner Carmen O.
Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident. Thus, respondent
Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" on
two (2) grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation
was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102
of the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the
action for legal separation.
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila: dismissed the
case for legal separation on the ground that the death of
plaintiff Carmen O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the
pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as the
action itself.
Issue: Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the action. (Yes)
Ruling: Yes. An action for legal separation which involves
nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
20
spouses is purely personal. The Civil Code of the Philippines
recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent
spouse (and no one else) to claim legal separation; and in its
Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind
a decree of legal separation already rendered. Being personal in
character, it follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself — actio personalis moritur
cum persona.
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between
spouses shows that they are solely the effect of the decree of
legal separation; hence, they cannot survive the death of the
plaintiff if it occurs prior to the decree. From the resulting
changes in property relations between spouses after a decree
of legal separation, it is apparent that the right to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or of the
absolute community of property), the loss of right by the
offending spouse to any share of the profits earned by the
partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by
intestacy from the innocent spouse as well as the revocation of
testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse made
by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the
very terms of the Civil Code article, are vested exclusively in the
persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or
transmissible. Hence, a claim to said rights is not a claim that
"is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by
the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved, is
that these rights are mere effects of a decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of
a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death
supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can
 21
be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims
would necessarily remain unborn.

As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a

declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage to Carmen Lapuz,
it is apparent that such action became moot and academic
upon the death of the latter, and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property
rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines could be resolved and determined
in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the
heirs of the appellant.

Dispositive: ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the

Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is hereby
affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.

CASE # 10
Matubis v. Praxedes
GR No. L-11766 | October 25, 1960
TOPIC: FC 57, compare with NCC 102 NCC 99
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Under NCC 102, action for legal separation should be filed
within 1 year from the date of discovery of the cause.
FACTS
● Socorro Matubis filed a complaint for Legal Separation
and change of surname against her husband, Zoilo
Praxedes, alleging abandonment and concubinage at the
CFI of Camarines Sur.
● During trial, the plaintiff alone introduced oral and
documentary evidence alleging the following:
○ The spouses were married on Jan 10, 1943 at Iriga,
Camarines Sur. May 30, 1944, they agreed to live
separately due to failure to agree how they should
live as spouses.
○ April 3, 1948. They entered an agreement where:
■ They both relinquished their rights over
each other as husband and wife
■ They consented to let each other live and
mate with other people as husband and
wife, without the other spouse filing for
adultery or concubinage…
○ 1955. Praxedes began cohabiting with another
woman, Asuncion, who gave birth to their child.
● The CFI held that the defendants acts constituted
concubinage and were grounds for legal separation.
However, it dismissed the petition for the following
reasons:
22
○ Under NCC 102, action for legal separation should
be filed within 1 year from the date of discovery
of the cause. The plaintiff became aware of the
illegal cohabitation in January 1955 but the
complaint was filed on April 24, 1956. Thus the
action was filed out of time and BARRED.
○ Under NCC 100, legal separation can only be filed
by the innocent spouse when there is no
condonation or consent. Here there is clear
consent.
ISSUES
Whether or not a complaint for legal separation filed by an
innocent spouse beyond one year after they become cognizant
of the cause of the legal separation can prosper under the NCC
(NO)
RULING
● The complaint was filed outside the period provided for
by the NCC. Petitioner admitted that she came to know
the ground (concubinage) for the legal separation in
January, 1955. She instituted the complaint only on April
24, 1956.
● Petitioner expressly gave her consent and condonation
to her husband’s concubinage. Thus the dismissal is
proper.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Conformably with the foregoing, we find that the decision appealed
from is in accordance with the evidence and the law on the matter.
The same is hereby affirmed, with costs.

CASE # 11
Bugayong v. Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033 | December 28, 1956 | TOPIC:
Who can ask for legal separation?
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Condonation deprives offended spouse of action for legal
separation.
FACTS
● Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the US Navy, was
married to defendant Leonila Ginez on August 27, 1949,
at Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave.
● Before Bugayong left to report back to duty, he and his
wife came to an agreement that Leonila would stay with
his sisters who later moved to Sampaloc, Manila.
● After some time, or about July, 1951, Leonila Ginez left
the dwelling of her sisters-in-law and informed her
husband by letter that she had gone to reside with her
mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, from then she later
moved to Dagupan City to study in a local college there.
● Also around July 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began
receiving letters from Valeriana Polangco (his sister-in-
law) and some from anonymous writers informing him of
alleged acts of infidelity of his wife.
● As early as July, 1951, Benjamin Bugayong began receiving
letters from Valeriana Polangco (plaintiff's sister-in-law)
and some from anonymous writers (which were not
produced at the hearing) informing him of alleged acts
of infidelity of his wife which he did not even care to
mention.
● On cross-examination, plaintiff admitted that his wife
also informed him by letter that a certain "Eliong" kissed
23
her. All these communications prompted him to seek the
advice of the Navy Chaplain as to the propriety of a legal
separation between him and his wife on account of her
alleged acts of infidelity.
● In August 1952, plaintiff went to Asingan, Pangasinan,
and sought for his wife who was with her godmother.
She came along with him and both proceeded to the
house of Pedro Bugayong, a cousin of the plaintiff-
husband, where they stayed and lived for 2 nights and 1
day as husband and wife. Then they repaired to the
plaintiff's house and again passed the night therein as
husband and wife.
● On the second day, Benjamin Bugayong tried to verify
from his wife the truth of the information he received
that she had committed adultery but Leonila, instead of
answering his query, merely packed up and left, which
he took as a confirmation of the acts of infidelity
imputed on her.
● After that and despite such belief, plaintiff exerted
efforts to locate her and failing to find her, he went to
Bacarra, Ilocos Norte, "to soothe his wounded feelings".
● On November 18, 1952, Benjamin Bugayong filed in the
CFI of Pangasinan a complaint for legal separation
against his wife, Leonila Ginez, who timely filed an
answer vehemently denying the averments of the
complaint and setting up affirmative defenses.
● After the issues were joined and convinced that a
reconciliation was not possible, the court set the case
for hearing. Plaintiff's counsel announced that he was to
present 6 witnesses but after plaintiff-husband finished
testifying, counsel for the defendant orally moved for
the dismissal of the complaint.
● The motion to dismiss was predicated on the following
grounds: (1) Assuming arguendo the truth of the

allegations of the commission of "acts of rank infidelity
amounting to adultery", the cause of action, if any, is
barred by the statute of limitations; (2) That under the
same assumption, the acts charged have been condoned
by the plaintiff-husband; and (3) That the complaint
failed to state a cause of action sufficient for this court
to render a valid judgment.
● CFI granted the motion and ordered the dismissal of the
case on the ground of condonation.
● Plaintiff appealed to CA, but CA certified the case for SC
resolution for being purely a question of law.
ISSUES
Whether there is condonation by plaintiff which is a ground to
dismiss the complaint for legal separation -
RULING
● Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in
I Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the
"conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or
wife, of a matrimonial offense which the latter has
committed".
● However, in defendant's answer she vehemently and
vigorously denies having committed any act of infidelity
against her husband, and even if We were to give full
weight to the testimony of the plaintiff, We would have
to conclude that the facts appearing on record are NOT
sufficient to establish the charge of adultery, or, as the
complaint states, of "acts of rank infidelity amounting to
adultery" preferred against the defendant.
● Certainly, the letter that plaintiff claims to have received
from his sister-in-law Valeriana Polangco, which was not
produced in evidence; nor the anonymous letters which
plaintiff also failed to present; nor the alleged letter that,
24
according to plaintiff, his wife addressed to him
admitting that she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose
identity was not established, do not amount to anything
that can be relied upon.
● We have to consider plaintiff's line of conduct under the
assumption that he really believed his wife guilty of
adultery. What did he do in such state of mind. Now, do
the husband's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2
nights despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful
to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and
supposed adulterous acts?
● Under Art. 100 of the Civil Code, legal separation may be
claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has
been no condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage.
● Although no acts of infidelity might have been
committed by the wife, We agree with the trial judge that
the conduct of the plaintiff-husband above narrated
despite his belief that his wife was unfaithful, deprives
him, as alleged the offended spouse, of any action for
legal separation against the offending wife, because his
said conduct comes within the restriction of Article 100
of the Civil Code.
● If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be
to constitute condonation? The Court relied on US
jurisprudence:
○ Single voluntary act of marital intercourse
between the parties ordinarily is sufficient to
constitute condonation, and where the parties
live in the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
○ A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery
where the parties continue to live together after
it was known, or there is sexual intercourse after
 25
knowledge of adultery, or sleeping together for a
single night, and many others.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order

appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant.
It is so ordered.

CASE # 12
YANGCO v. ROHDE
GR No. 996 | TOPIC: Support and Custody
Pendente Lite
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
This Code only grants the right to alimony to a wife.
FACTS
● Yangco filed a petition for writ of prohibition, alleging
that a
● complaint had been filed by Victorina Obin before
Judge Rohde. In the complaint, Obin prayed that she be
declared he lawful wife of Yangco, and that she be
granted a divorce, an allowance for alimony, and
attorney’s fees during the pendency of the suit; the
demurrer filed by petitioner Yangco was overruled.
● Judge Rohde ruled that “I am of the opinion that the
marriage alleged in the complaint is valid under the
laws in force, although the question is not clear nor
without doubt. The facts alleged in the complaint
compel me to resolve the doubt in favor of the
plaintiff.”
● He then ordered petitioner Yangco to pay Victoria, in
advance, a monthly allowance of 250 mexican pesos
from and after March 11, and to pay on August 1 all
accrued allowances, amounting to 1,500 pesos.
● Yangco contends that Judge Rohde acted in excess of
his jurisdiction in attempting to oblige petitioner Yangco
to pay to the said Victorina Obin the said allowance,
and to direct that a writ of prohibition be issued against
Judge Rohde and prohibit him from attempting to
compel Yangco to pay the said amount.
26
● Judge Rohde argues that “Victorina Obin acquired a
right to all conjugal rights, and in particular to the
allowance of alimony pendente lite." And upon this
supposition he cited articles of the Civil Code as to
rights enjoyed by a married woman by virtue of the
marriage, and those which she may further exercise by
reason of divorce pending litigation and those granted
to her finally in case of a favorable judgment.
ISSUES
Whether or not Obin had the right to obtain allowance for
alimony from Yangco - NO
RULING
● NO. The court below had jurisdiction to try the divorce
suit, but he was without jurisdiction to grant alimony
when the right to claim alimony had not accrued in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code. This
Code only grants the right to alimony to a wife.
● Under article 1591 of the old Code, any person believing
himself entitled to that provisional alimony or support
was required to file with the complaint documents
proving conclusively the title by virtue of which the
same was sued for.
● If the title was based upon a right created by law, it
was necessary to present the documents establishing
the bond of relationship between the plaintiff and
defendant or the circumstances which gave a right to
the alimony, such evidence to be completed by the
testimony of witnesses if necessary.
● The judge, under article 1592, could not admit the
complaint unless the documents referred to in the
preceding article were submitted.
● It is evident from this that under the provisions of the
law then in force, a suit for alimony could not prosper
 27
upon the mere opinion of the judge expressed in an and sues for divorce or separation. In this case, the
interlocutory order which has no other purpose than to legal evidence raises a presumption of law; in the
facilitate the continuance of the trial. former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a
● The necessity of founding the action for support or mere allegation — a fact in issue — and a simple fact in
alimony on a title, and a title supported by issue must not be confounded with an established right
documentary evidence, is a consequence of the recognized by a final judgment or based upon a legal
precepts of article 143 of the Civil Code cited by the presumption.
respondent judge himself. In this article the right to
support is granted DISPOSITIVE PORTION
○ (1) to spouses inter se; The motion and demurrer are overruled and the defendant is
○ (2) to legitimate descendants and ascendants authorized to answer the complaint within twenty days from
inter se; this date.
○ (3) to parents and certain legitimated and
acknowledged natural children;
○ (4) to other illegitimate children, and
○ (5) to brothers and sisters.
○ In all these cases it is a civil status or a juridical
relation which is the basis of the action for
support — the civil status of marriage or that of
relationship.
● In the present case, the action for the support or
alimony is brought by a woman who alleges that she is
a wife; therefore it is necessary for her to prove
possession of the civil status of a spouse — that is, a
marriage, without which one has no right to the title of
husband or wife. Marriages celebrated before the
adoption of the Civil Code must be proven by the means
established by the former laws (art. 53).
● This evidence being lacking, and the civil status of
marriage being in litigation, it is evident that nothing
can be taken for granted upon the point in issue. There
is no law or reason which authorizes the granting of
alimony to a person who claims to be a spouse in the
same manner as to a person who conclusively
establishes by legal proof that he or she is such spouse,

De la Viña v. Villareal
GR No. L-13982 | TOPIC: Cooling-off period
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Exception to the cooling-off period: Where the guilty spouse
abuses his administrator powers.
As long as this harmonious relation, as contemplated by law,
continues, the wife cannot and should not interfere with the
husband in his judicious administration of the conjugal
property. But when that relation ceases and, in a proper action,
the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to partition the
conjugal property, it is but just and proper, in order to protect
the interests of the wife, that the husband’s power of
administration be curtailed, during the pendency of the action,
insofar as alienating or encumbering the conjugal property is
concerned.
FACTS
● Narcisa Geopano filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Iloilo against Diego de la Viña,
alleging, among other things:
○ that she was a resident of Iloilo while respondent
is a resident of Oriental Negros,
○ that she was the legitimate wife of defendant and
they have 9 children,
○ that they have acquired property which are now
under the administration of husband,
○ that husband had been committing acts of
adultery with Ana Calog,
28
CASE # 13
○ that husband ejected her from conjugal home and
thus she established her residence in Iloilo,
○ that she had no means of support and was only
living at the expense of one of her daughters.
● She prayed for divorce, a partition of the conjugal
property, and alimony pendente lite in the sum of
P400/month.
● She also prayed for a preliminary injunction restraining
her and prohibiting her husband from conjugal property
since the defendant was trying to alienate or encumber
said property.
● CFI granted preliminary injunction but respondent
appealed claiming that CFI Iloilo has no jurisdiction since
wife should follow his domicile and that the judge has
exceeded his power in granting the preliminary
injunction.
ISSUES
1. WON a married woman ever acquire a residence or
domicile separate from that of her husband during
the existence of marriage?
2. WON the wife, in an action for divorce brought by her
against the husband, in which the partition of the
conjugal property is prayed for, may obtain a
preliminary injunction against the husband restraining
and prohibiting him from alienating or encumbering
any part of the conjugal property during the pendency
of the action
RULING
 29
1. YES. As a general principle of law, the domicile of the preliminary injunction against the husband, prohibiting the
wife follows that of her husband. However, this is not an latter from alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal
absolute rule. The wife may acquire another and property during the pendency of the action.
separate domicile from that of her husband where the
theoretical unity of husband and wife is dissolved, as it It follows from all of the foregoing that the respondent, the
is by the institution of divorce proceedings; or where the Honorable Antonio Villareal, as Auxiliary Judge sitting in the
husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a Court of First Instance of the Province of Iloilo, had jurisdiction
separation of the parties by agreement, or a permanent to hear and determine the action for divorce instituted in said
separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband court by the respondent Narcisa Geopano, and that he did not
or attributable to cruel treatment on the part of the exceed his power and authority in issuing a preliminary
husband; or where there has been forfeiture by the wife injunction against the defendant, prohibiting him from
of the benefit of the husband’s domicile. alienating or encumbering any part of the conjugal property
during the pendency of the action.
2. YES. The law making the husband the sole administrator
Therefore, the petition should be and is hereby denied, with
of the property of the conjugal partnership is founded
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
upon necessity and convenience as well as upon the
presumption that, from the very nature of the relating
between husband and wife, the former will promote and
not injure the interests of the latter. So long as this
harmonious relation, as contemplated by law, continues,
the wife cannot and should not interfere with the
husband in his judicious administration of the conjugal
property. But when that relation ceases and, in a proper
action, the wife seeks to dissolve the marriage and to
partition the conjugal property, it is just and proper, in
order to protect the interests of the wife, that the
husband's power of administration be curtailed, during
the pendency of the action, insofar as alienating or
encumbering the conjugal property is concerned.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

We conclude, therefore, that in an action for divorce brought by

the wife against the husband, in which the partition of the
conjugal property is also prayed for, the wife may obtain a

CASE # 14
Araneta v. Concepcion
G.R. No. L-9667 | TOPIC: Cooling-off period FC 58
Note: Case was ruled on July 31, 1956 (Civil Code)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The mandatory cooling-off period does not have the effect of
overriding other provisions such as the determination of the
custody of the children and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstances
FACTS
1. Legal battles ensued between the Petitioner Luis Araneta
and respondent Emma Araneta.
a. Luis sought for legal separation on the ground of
adultery while Emma sought, through an omnibus
petition, to secure custody of their three minor
children, a monthly support of P5,000 for herself
and said children, and the return of her passport,
to enjoin Luis from ordering his hirelings from
harassing and molesting her.
2. Respondent judge then granted the omnibus petition of
Emma.
3. Upon refusal of the judge to reconsider the order,
Petitioner Luis filed the present petition for certiorari
and for mandamus to compel the Respondent judge to
require the parties to submit evidence before deciding
the omnibus petition.
a. The main reason given by the judge, for refusing
Luis’ request that evidence be allowed to be
introduced on the issues, is the prohibition
contained in Article 103 of the Civil Code, which
reads as follows:
30
“ART. 103. An action for legal separation shall in
no case be tried before six months shall have
elapsed since the filing of the petition.”
b. According to the respondent judge, the
introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits
of the case or on any incident, is prohibited.
ISSUES
Whether or not the mandatory “cooling-off” period prohibits
the introduction of any evidence, be it on the merits of the case
or on any incident.
RULING
● NO. The respondent Judge should have ruled on the
determination of the custody of the children and alimony
and support pendente lite.
● It is conceded that the period of six months fixed therein
Article 103 (Civil Code) is evidently intended as a cooling
off period to make possible a reconciliation between the
spouses.
● BUT this does not have the effect of overriding other
provisions such as the determination of the custody of
the children and alimony and support pendente lite
according to the circumstances (Article 105, Civil Code.)
The law expressly enjoins that these should be
determined by the court according to the circumstances.
If these are ignored or the courts close their eyes to
actual facts, rank in justice may be caused.
● In this case, why should the court ignore the claim of
adultery by Luis in the face of express allegations under
oath to that effect, supported by circumstantial evidence
consisting of letters the authenticity of which cannot be
denied. And why assume that the children are in the
custody of the wife, and that the latter is living at the
conjugal dwelling, when it is precisely alleged in the
 31
petition and in the affidavits, that she has abandoned the
conjugal abode? Evidence of all these disputed
allegations should be allowed that the discretion of the
court as to the custody and alimony pendente lite may
be lawfully exercised.
● The rule is that all the provisions of the law even if
apparently contradictory, should be allowed to stand and
given effect by reconciling them if necessary.
○ Consequently, each part of a section should be
construed in connection with every other part or
section so as to produce a harmonious whole.
Thus it is not proper to confine interpretation to
the one section to be construed.
● Thus the determination of the custody and alimony
should be given effect and force provided it does not go
to the extent of violating the policy of the cooling off
period. That is, evidence not affecting the cause of the
separation, like the actual custody of the children, the
means conducive to their welfare and convenience
during the pendency of the case, these should be
allowed that the court may determine which is best for
their custody.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Respondent judge or whosoever takes his place is ordered to
proceed on the question of custody and support pendente lite
in accordance with this opinion. The court’s order fixing the
alimony and requiring payment is reversed.
 32
CASE # 15

W/N Article 103 of the Civil Code (now Art. 58 of the Family Code)
Somosa-Ramos v Vameta
prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the
GR No. L-34132 | TOPIC: Cooling Off Period lapse of six months from the filing of the petition, would likewise
preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary remedy to such a
● The petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary suit. (No)
injunction regarding the property of both parties may be
RULING
heard by the lower court despite the prohibition provided
under Art. 103 of the Civil Code (now Art. 58 of the Family
● The Court first explained Art. 103 of the Civil Code (now Art. 58
Code)
of the Family Code), or the cooling off period, which prohibits
FACTS
the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of
six months from the filing of the petition. According to the Court,
● Lucy Somosa-Ramos (petitioner) filed an action for legal
such provision is present since an action for legal separation
separation against his husband, Clemente Ramos (private
must be distinguished from an ordinary suit.
respondent). She also sought for the issuance of a writ of
● Said petition involves a relationship in which the law for the best
preliminary injunction for the return of her paraphernal and
of reason would attach quality permanence. The said provision
exclusive property, which was then under the administration
is present so that both parties in a suit for legal separation may
and management of her husband, Clemente Ramos.
have ample time to reconcile their differences before they
● Clemente Ramos opposed the hearing for such motion (writ of
separate.
preliminary injunction), arguing that based on Art. 103 of the
● The Court held that the separation of the husband and wife does
Civil Code (Now Art. 58 of the Family Code) there should not be
not serve the public interest as well between the two of them.
any hearing for six months after the action for legal separation
More importantly, if they have children, the union between the
was filed.
two is much more imperative.
● Clemente contends that if the motion for mandatory injunction
● However, despite this “cooling off period” there is an exception.
is heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would
The issue regarding the management of the spouses’
become even more dim.
respective property may be resolved despite the “cooling off
● The Judge Vamenta (respondent judge) granted the motion of
period” provided by law. An administrator may even be
Clemente in suspending the hearing of the petition for a writ of
appointed for the management of the property of the conjugal
preliminary injunction.
partnership. The absolute limitation from which the court suffers
● Hence, this petition was filed by Lucy.
under the preceding article is hereby eased. The parties may in
ISSUES the meanwhile be heard.
● The Court held that the respondent judge should not have
ignored the injunction filed by the petitioner. There is all the
 33
more reason for this response from the respondent Judge,
considering that the husband whom she accused of
concubinage and an attempt against her life would in the
meanwhile continue in the management of what she claimed to
be her paraphernal property, an assertion that was not
specifically denied by him.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the plea of petitioner for a writ of certiorari is
granted, and the order of respondent Court of August 4, 1971,
suspending the hearing on the petition for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is set aside. Respondent Judge is directed
to proceed without delay to hear the motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction. Costs against respondent Clemente G.
Ramos.

CASE # 16
Lerma v. CA
GR No. L-3352 | TOPIC: Cooling-off period FC
58
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Adultery is recognized as a defense for support.
FACTS
● Around May 1951, Lerma (petitioner) and Diaz (private
respondent) got married.
● On August 1969, Lerma filed a complaint for adultery
vs. Diaz and her lover Teodoro Ramirez.
● By November 1969, respondent files for legal separation
and / or separation of properties, custody of children
and support pendente lite (during pendency of action)
for youngest son, Gregory on the grounds of
concubinage and attempt against her life.
● The CFI said that respondent is entitled to support
pendente lite from the date of respondent ̳s filing of
the complaint, and that the amount would be a
monthly support of Php1,820. Petitioner raised the case
to the CA.
● The CA, initially issuing a preliminary injunction on the
decision of the lower court to give the respondent the
opportunity to present evidence to the lower court, the
CA dismissed the petition after the respondent asked
for a reconsideration saying that he were not asking for
a chance to present evidence to the lower court. On
1972, the CFI ruled that respondent and Ramirez are
convicted of adultery, this decision was appealed to the
CA. Petitioner then files a new case of adultery against
34
respondent and her new lover, Manila policeman Jose
Gochangco.
● Petitioner raises the petition against the giving support
pendente lite to the SC, claiming, among others, that
respondent did not ask for the enforcement of the CFI
orders until he filed a second adultery charge against
her.
ISSUES
Whether or not respondent can still claim for support even
though she has already been convicted of adultery --No
RULING
Adultery is recognized as a defense for support.
CC Article 303 - obligation to give support shall cease "when
the recipient, be he a forced heir or not, has committed some
act which gives rise to disinheritance.
CC 921 - one of the causes for disinheriting a spouse is "when
the spouse has given cause for legal separation‖. If allowed
one would only need to file a case of legal separation no
matter how groundless in order to get support.
Mere filing would not set Art 292 of FC to action. Still
preclude loss of such right in certain cases.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the resolution of respondent Court of Appeals of
January 20, 1971 and the orders of respondent Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court herein complained of, dated
December 24, 1969 and February 15, 1970, all are set aside and
their enforcement enjoined, without prejudice to such
judgment as may be rendered in the pending action for legal
separation between the parties. No pronouncement as to
costs.

CASE # 18
People v. Sensano, 58 Phil. 73
G.R. No. L-37720, March 27, 1933 J. BUTTE
Consent; Defense in Legal Separation
FACTS
1. Ursula Sensano and Mariano Ventura were married on
April 29, 1919. They had one child. Shortly after the
birth of his child, the husband left his wife to go to the
Province of Cagayan where he remained for three years
without writing to his wife or sending her anything for
the support of herself and their son.
2. Poor and illiterate, she struggled, until she met the
accused Marcelo Ramos who took her and the child to
live with him.
3. On the return of the husband (in 1924), he filed a charge
against his wife and Marcelo Ramos for adultery and
both were sentenced to four months and one day of
arresto mayor.
4. After completing her sentence, the accused left her
paramour. She begged his pardon, but he refused and
said that he would have nothing more to do with her,
and she could do as she pleased.
5. Abandoned for the second time, she and her child went
back to her coaccused Marcelo Ramos (this was in the
year 1924) and they have lived with him ever since. The
husband, knowing that she resumed living with her
codefendant in 1924, did nothing to interfere with their
relations or to assert his rights as husband. Shortly
thereafter he left for Hawaii where she remained for
seven years completely abandoning his said wife and
child.
35
6. On his return, he presented the second charge of
adultery here involved with the sole purpose of being
able to obtain a divorce under Act No. 2710.
ISSUES
W/N the husband has condoned the acts of the wife allegedly
constituting the second crime of bigamy?
RULING
YES. The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution… if he shall have consented or pardoned the
offenders. Apart from the fact that the husband in this case
was assuming a mere pose when he signed the complaint as
the "offended" spouse, we have come to the conclusion that
the evidence in this case and his conduct warrant the
inference that he consented to the adulterous relations
existing between the accused and therefore he is not
authorized by law to institute this criminal proceeding.
We cannot accept the argument of the Attorney-General that
the seven years of acquiescence on his part in the adultery of
his wife is explained by his absence from the Philippine
Islands during which period it was impossible for him to take
any action against the accused. There is no merit in the
argument that it was impossible for the husband to take any
action against the accused during the said seven years.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The judgment below is reversed with costs de oficio.
 36
CASE # 19

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 20
Bugayong v. Ginez,
G.R. No. L-10033 December 28, 1956 | TOPIC:
When may petition be filed; FC 57 compare
with NCC 102, NCC 99
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
A divorce suit (or legal separation in this case) will not be
granted for adultery where the parties continue to live
together after it was known or there is sexual intercourse
after knowledge of adultery or sleeping together for a single
night, and many others. The resumption of marital
cohabitation as a basis of condonation will generally be
inferred, nothing appearing to the contrary, from the fact of
the living together as husband and wife, especially as against
the husband.
FACTS
1. On Aug. 27, 1949, Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in
the US Navy, was married to defendant Leonila Ginez at
Asingan, Pangasinan, while on furlough leave.
Immediately after marriage, they lived with the sisters
of the husband in said municipality, before Bugayong
had to report to duty.
2. They had an agreement that Leonilla would stay with
the sisters but then they moved to Manila. But
eventually, she informed her husband that she would
stay with her mother in Asingan, Pangasinan, then later
moved to Dagupan City to study college.
37
3. As early as July 1951, Bugayong received letters from his
sister in law and other anonymous writers that his wife
was committing acts of infidelity.
4. In August, 1952, Bugayong tried to confront his wife by
meeting her at her godmother’s house where they
stayed therein for a couple of nights but to no avail as
she merely packed up and left upon confrontation,
which he took as confirmation of the acts of infidelity
imputed on her.
5. On Nov. 18, 1952, Bugayong filed in CFI of Pangasinan for
legal separation against his wife.
6. Leonilla Ginez filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the cause of action is barred by the statute of
limitations, the acts charged have been condoned by
Bugayong and that the complaint failed to state a cause
of action.
7. Court dismissed the action. MR was denied.
ISSUES
W/N the acts of a husband sleeping together with his wife
months after knowledge of the acts of infidelity allegedly
committed by the wife constitute condonation?
RULING
YES.
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense
constituting a ground for legal separation or, as stated in I
Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, p. 585, condonation is the
"conditional forgiveness or remission, by a husband or wife of
a matrimonial offense which the latter has committed".
The alleged letters from Bugayong’s sister in law, which must
have been too vague and indefinite as to Ginez’s infidelity to

deserve its production in evidence; nor the anonymous letters;
nor the alleged letter that Gines addressed to Bugayong that
she had been kissed by one Eliong, whose identity was not
established, do not amount to anything that can be relied
upon.
Do Bugayong’s attitude of sleeping with is wife for 2 nights
despite his alleged belief that she was unfaithful to him,
amount to a condonation of his previous and supposed
adulterous acts?
Art. 97 of the NCC states that:
A petition for legal separation may be filed:
(1) For adultery on the part of the wife and concubinage on
the part of the husband as defined in the Penal Code.
Art. 100 of the Civil Code states that:
“The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or consent
to the adultery or concubinage. Where both spouses are
offenders, legal separation can not be claimed by either of
them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal separation
shall cause the dismissal of the petition.”
Based on the testimony of Bugayong, especially the provisions
above, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the part
of the husband. THe act of Bugayong in persuading Ginez to
come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and
consented to be brought to the house of his cousin and
together they slept as husband and wife for a couple of
nights, and thus, the Court states that a reconciliation
38
between them was effected and that there was a condonation
of the wife by the husband. This reconciliation occurred
almost 10 months after knowledge of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery.
Although no acts of infidelity might have been committed by
the wife, We agree with the trial judge that the conduct of the
plaintiff-husband above narrated despite his belief that his
wife was unfaithful, deprives him, as alleged the offended
spouse, of any action for legal separation against the
offending wife, because his said conduct comes within the
restriction of Article 100 of the Civil Code.
The only general rule in American jurisprudence is that any
cohabitation with the guilty party, after the commission of the
offense, and with the knowledge or belief on the part of the
injured party of its commission, will amount to conclusive
evidence of condonation; but this presumption may be
rebutted by evidence
If there had been cohabitation, to what extent must it be to
constitute condonation?
Single voluntary act of marital intercourse between the parties
ordinarily is sufficient to constitute condonation, and where
the parties live in the same house, it is presumed that they
live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation.
A divorce suit will not be granted for adultery where the
parties continue to live together after it was known (Land v.
Martin, 15 South 657; Day v. Day, 80 Pac. 974) or there is
sexual intercourse after knowledge of adultery (Rogers v.
Rogers, 67 N. J. Eq. 534) or sleeping together for a single night
(Toulson v. Toulson, 50 Atl 401, citing Phinizy v. Phinizy, 114 S.
E. 185, 154 Ga. 199; Collins v. Collins, 193 So. 702), and many
 39
others. The resumption of marital cohabitation as a basis of
condonation will generally be inferred, nothing appearing to
the contrary, from the fact of the living together as husband
and wife, especially as against the husband.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing, the order

appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellant. It is so ordered.

CASE # 21
Brown v. Yambao |
GR No. L-10699; Oct. 18, 1957 | TOPIC:
Recrimination FC 56 (4); Collusion FC 60, 56 (3) (5)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Collusion in matrimonial cases is the act of being married
persons in procuring a divorce by mutual consent whether by
preconcerted commission by one of a matrimonial offense, or
by failure in pursuance of agreement to defend divorce
proceedings. It bars a party from claiming legal separation by
express provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
FACTS
● On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed a suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal
separation from his wife Juanita Yambao.
● He alleged under oath that while interned by the
Japanese invaders, from 1942 to 1945, at the UST
internment camp, his wife engaged in adulterous
relations with one Carlos Field of whom she begot a
baby girl that Brown learned of only in 1945, upon his
release from internment. They have lived separately
thereafter and executed a document liquidating their
conjugal partnership and assigning certain properties to
the erring wife as her share.
● Brown prayed for confirmation of the liquidation
agreement; for custody of the children issued of the
marriage; that the wife be declared disqualified to
succeed the husband; and for their remedy as might be
just and equitable. For failure to answer in due time
despite service of summons, the court declared
Yambao in default.
40
● The City Fiscal or his representatives were directed to
investigate in accordance with Article 101 of the Civil
Code if collusion exists between both parties. cross-
examined plaintiff Brown.
● Upon cross-examination, it was found that that after
liberation, Brown had lived maritally with another
woman and had begotten children by her.
● Thereafter, the court rendered judgment denying the
legal separation asked, on the ground that, while the
wife's adultery was established, Brown had incurred in
a misconduct of similar nature that barred his right of
action under Article 100 of the new Civil Code providing:
"ART. 100 The legal separation may be claimed only by
the innocent spouse, provided there has been no
condonation of or consent to the adultery or
concubinage. Where both spouses are offenders, a legal
separation cannot be claimed by either of them.
Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition."
that there had been consent and connivance, and
because Brown's action had prescribed under Article
102 of the same Code.
ISSUES
W/N the petition for legal separation should be granted? No,
since there’s collusion between the parties.
RULING
● NO. Article 100 of the Civil Code provides that “Where
both spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot
be claimed by either of them.” In the case at bar,
Brown and Yambao are both offenders so they cannot
be granted a legal separation.
● Collusion in matrimonial cases being "the act of
married persons in procuring a divorce by mutual
 41
consent, whether by preconcerted commission by one DISPOSITIVE PORTION
of a matrimonial offense, or by failure, in pursuance of Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs
agreement to defend divorce proceedings", it was against appellant.
legitimate for the Fiscal to bring to light any
circumstances that could give rise to the inference that
the wife's default was calculated, or agreed upon, to
enable appellant to obtain the decree of legal
separation that he sought without regard to the legal
merits of his case.
● One such circumstance is the fact of Brown's
cohabitation with a woman other than his wife, since it
bars him from claiming legal separation by express
provision of Article 100 of the new Civil Code.
● Wherefore, evidence of such misconduct, and the
failure of the wife to set it up by way of defense, were
proper subject of inquiry as they may justifiably be
considered circumstantial evidence of collusion
between the spouses.
● The policy of Article 101 of the new Civil Code, calling
for the intervention of the state attorneys in case of
uncontested proceedings for legal separation (and of
annulment of marriages, under Article 88), is to
emphasize that marriage is more than a mere contract;
that it is a social institution in which the state is vitally
interested, so that its continuation or interruption can
not be made to depend upon the parties themselves. he
court below also found, and correctly held, that the
appellant's action was already barred, because Brown
did not petition for legal separation proceedings until
ten years after he learned of his wife's adultery, which
was upon his release from internment in 1945.
● Brown’s action was also barred because he did not
petition for legal separation until 10 years after he
learned of his wife’s adultery.

CASE # 22
Ocampo v. Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553 | TOPIC: Collusion: FC 60; FC
56 (3), (5), compare with NCC 101 and 231 (3)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Where there is evidence of the adultery independently of the
defendant’s statement agreeing to the legal separation, the
decree of separation should be granted, since it would not be
based on the confession but upon the evidence presented by
the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively on defendant’s confession.
Article 101 of the new Civil Code does not exclude, as
evidence, any admission or confession made by the defendant
outside of the court.
Collusion may not be inferred from the mere fact that the
guilty party confesses to the offense of adultery, desires the
divorce and makes no defense.
FACTS
Action for legal separation by Jose de Ocampo against his wife
Serafina, on the ground of adultery with 2 men. The court of
first instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding there was confession of judgment,
plus condonation or consent to the adultery and prescription.
Because the defendant made no answer, the court defaulted
her, and pursuant to Art. 101 NCC, directed the provincial fiscal
42
to investigate whether or not collusion existed between the
parties. The fiscal examined the defendant under oath, and
then reported to the Court that there was no collusion. The
plaintiff presented his evidence consisting of the testimony.
When the plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with the 2nd man, plaintiff signified his intention of
filing a petition for legal separation, to which defendant
manifested her conformity provided she is not charged with
adultery in a criminal action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed a
petition for legal separation
ISSUES
WON the decree of legal separation should be granted in spite
of the alleged collusion that occurred. YES - but on the basis
of the evidence presented.
RULING
CA ruled that this meant a confession of judgment thus under
Art. 101, legal separation could not be decreed.
SC said Art. 101 does not exclude, as evidence, any admission
or confession made by the defendant outside of the court. It
merely prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens when the
defendant appears in court and confesses the right of the
plaintiff to judgment or files a pleading expressly agreeing to
the plaintiff’s demand. This did not occur.
Yet, even supposing that the above statement of defendant
constituted practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as
there is evidence of the adultery independently of such
 43
statement, the decree may and should be granted, since it consequent effects. Costs of all instances against Serafina
would not be based on her confession, but upon evidence Florenciano. So ordered.
presented by the plaintiff.

The mere circumstance that defendant told the Fiscal that

she "liked also" to be legally separated from her husband, is
no obstacle to the successful prosecution of the action. When
she refused to answer the complaint, she indicated her
willingness to be separated. Yet, the law does not order the
dismissal. Allowing the proceeding to continue, it takes
precautions against collusion, which implies more than
consent or lack of opposition to the agreement.

In this case, there would be collusion if the parties had

arranged to make it appear that a matrimonial offense had
been committed although it was not, or if the parties had
connived to bring about a legal separation even in the absence
of grounds therefor. Here, the offense of adultery had really
taken place, according to the evidence.

We do not think plaintiff’s failure actively to search for

defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him)
constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations with Orzame (2nd man). It will be remembered that
she "left" him after having sinned with Arcalas (1st man) and
after he had discovered her dates with other men.
Consequently, it was not his duty to search for her to bring
her home. Hers was the obligation to return.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband’s
petition we hereby reverse the appealed decision and decree a
legal separation between these spouses, with all the

CASE # 23
Matute v. Macadaeg
GR No. L-9325 | TOPIC: FC 63 (3)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Children over ten (10) years of age, whose parents are
divorced or living separately, may choose which parent they
prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take
charge of their care by reason of “moral depravity, habitual
drunkenness, incapacity or poverty”.
FACTS
● An action for legal separation was brought by Armando
Medel against Rosario Matute upon the ground of
adultery committed with his brother and her brother-
in-law, Ernesto Medel.
● In that case, the Court found rosario guilty of the
charge against her, decreed the legal separation, and
awarded the custody of their four (4) minor children.
● Thereafter, Armando went to the US, leaving the
children in Davao City under the care of his sister, in
whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be
with her children.
● Armando returned to the Philippines in 1954. At the
close of the current school year, during which the
children were enrolled in a school in Davao (March
1955), they joined their father in Cebu.
● With his permission, Rosario brought the children to
Manila to attend the funeral of her father.
● Armando alleges that he consented thereto on
condition that she would return the children to him
within two (2) weeks.
44
● However, Rosario did not do so. Instead, she filed in the
civil case a motion to issue an order awarding the
custody of the children to her and to order Armando to
support said children.
● The motion was denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
ISSUES
W/N the custody of the children should be awarded to
Rosario? NO.
RULING
● Rosario merely obtained Armando’s permission to bring
the children to Manila, for the purpose of attending the
funeral of their maternal grandfather.
● Thus, she obtained and has the physical possession of
the minors in a precarious manner. She holds it in the
name, on behalf and by authority of Armando, whose
agent she, in effect, is.
● He may, therefore, demand their return at any time, and
she is bound to comply immediately with such demand.
● It is conceded that children over ten (10) years of age,
whose parents are divorced or living separately, may
choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the
parent chosen is unfit to take charge of their care by
reason of “moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity or poverty”.
● The facts remains that Rosario is without means of
livelihood and, according to her own admission, she
lives on the charity of her brothers. She has no home of
her own to offer to her children, but only she would
shelter them under the roof of her brothers.
 45
● Poverty rendered her unfit to take charge of her
children or made it unwise to place them under her
care.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, without prejudice to such appropriate action as
Petitioner may deem fit to take for the purpose of securing a
review of the order of Respondent Judge of June 29, 1955, or a
modification of the award made in the decision of November
6, 1952, relative to the custody of the children, or both, the
petition is denied and the case dismissed. The writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued is hereby dissolved,
with costs against the Petitioner. It is SO ORDERED.

CASE # 24
Laperal v. Republic
G.R. No. L-18008. October 30, 1962; J. Barrera
Topic: Use of surname
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
A woman's married status is not affected by a decree of legal
separation, there being no severance of the vinculum, and
under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she must continue
using the name and surname employed by her before the
separation.
FACTS
1. Elisea Laperal, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was
married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.
2. However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued
to the spouses. Aside from that, she ceased to live with
Enrique.
3. During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L.
Santamaria. She filed this petition to be permitted to
resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.
4. This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the
ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.
5. She was claiming that continuing to use her married
name would give rise to confusion in her finances and
the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.
46
RULING
The SC held that in legal separation, the married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum. Thus, the finding that Elisea’s continued use of her
husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances
was without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of
the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had
automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there
could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets.
With regard to the change of surname, the SC held that applying
Rule 103 was not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the
name of Elisea. To hold otherwise would be to provide for an
easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the order of the lower court of December 1, 1960,
granting the petition, is hereby set aside and the petition
dismissed. Without costs. So ordered.

ISSUES
WON Rule 103, which refers to change of name in general, will
prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code
with regard to married woman legally separated from his
husband? NO.
CASE # 25

Atilano v. Chua Ching Beng
GR No. L-11086 | TOPIC: Obligation to Live
Together
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
In May 1951, Chua Ching Beng and Pilar Atilano were married in
Zamboanga City. After their marriage, they went to Manila and live
with Chua's parents. In October 1951, the couple went to
Zamboanga to visit Pilar’s parents. Chua returned to Manila with
the understanding that Pilar would follow him, but she did not.
In 1953, Pilar filed a complaint for support against Chua alleging
that they have been living separately for two years due to constant
fights and Chua's inability to provide a home for themselves apart
from his parents.
Chua stated that he was willing to support his wife but only if she
lives in Manila with him. He was also willing to establish a conjugal
dwelling separate from his parents.
Meanwhile, Pilar filed a petition for alimony pendente lite. The
court rendered judgmentgranting the Pilar’s allowance after finding
that the latter's refusal to return was caused by her aversion to
stay with the parents of Chua after she had experienced some
previous in-law troubles.
Chua filed a petition electing to fulfill his obligation as thus fixed
by the court by receiving and maintaining Pilar at his residence in
Pasay, which was, apart, from that of his parents and that if the
Pilar refuses, he will not be compelled to remit allowance to her
in Zamboanga.
47
His petition was denied, thus this case.
ISSUES
Whether or not a wife is entitled to support when she
establishes residence apart from his husband without
justifiable cause (No)
RULING
Art. 299 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 299. The person obliged to give support may, at his option,
fulfill his obligation either by paying the allowance fixed, or by
receiving and maintaining in his house the person who has a right
to receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in
this case there is a moral or legal obstacle thereto.
The aforeqouted provision of the law is clear enough to require any
further elucidation. In giving the obligor the option to fulfill his
duty, it provides for only one occasion when the second alternative
could not be availed of i.e., when there is a moral or legal obstacle
thereto.
The law, in giving the husband authority to fix the conjugal
residence (Art. 110, New Civil Code) does not prohibit him from
establishing the same at the patriarchal home, nor is it against any
recognized norm of morality, especially if he is not fully capable of
meeting his obligation as such head of a family without the aid of
his elders.
Although the husband and the wife are obliged to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and
assistance (Art. 109) and that the wife is entitled to be supported,
our laws contain no provision compelling the wife to live with her
husband where even without legal justification she establishes her
residence apart from that provided for by the former, yet and in
 48
such event there is no plausible reason why she should be allowed
any support from the husband.

We would see no plausible reason why she should be allowed

any support from the husband. It appearing that defendant
husband availed of the option granted him by Article 299 of the
Civil Code and there being no legal or moral hindrance to the
exercise of the second alternative as elected by him, the answer
to the question presented by this appeal is certainly obvious.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby modified by giving
the defendant husband Chua Ching Beng the option of supporting
his wife at their conjugal dwelling apart from the home of the
parents of the husband. Should plaintiff wife refuse to abide by
the terms of this decision, then defendant-appellant shall be
considered relieved from the obligation of giving any support to his
wife. Without pronouncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

CASE # 26
 49
CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 27

Lourdes Ramirez-Cuaderno v Angel Cuaderno
GR No. L-20043, November 28, 1964 |
TOPIC: Obligation to Live Together
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The Court cannot order the spouses to live together after their
de facto separation.
FACTS
● Plaintiff wife, Lourdez Ramirez- Cuaderno, filed a
complaint for support against her husband Angel
Cuaderno after living separately since she suffered
maltreatment and abandonment from the latter. The
wife claimed that after inflicting physical injuries, the
husband took and left her to her mother’s house.
● The Juvenile and Domestic Relations court granted the
wife’s demand and ordered the defendant-husband to
provide a monthly support of P150.00 from the date of
the filing of the complaint including attorney’s fees.
● Defendant appealed that his wife is not entitled to
receive support for she was the one who left the
conjugal dwelling. Upon reviewing the findings of the
trial court, the Court of Appeals set aside the prior
decision and rendered that the spouses’ cohabitation is
not yet impossible hence, they were admonished to live
together as husband and wife.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Court can order the spouses to fulfill their
obligation to live together after the husband inflicted physical
injuries on the wife thereby causing their de facto separation?
50
RULING
No. The Court cannot order the spouses to live together after
their de facto separation. For while marriage entitles both
parties to cohabitation or consortium, the sanction therefore
is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and
wife and not any legal mandate or court order. This is due to
the inherent characteristic and nature of marriage in this
jurisdiction.
Here, the Court established that the de facto separation of
the spouses has been brought about by the husband after
inflicting physical injuries and leaving her to her mother’s
home.
The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her
husband and desisted from accepting any later, because
according to the latter, she was demanding for more, only
indicates that even before the filing of the present case, the
defendant-husband was already providing something for the
separate maintenance.
Considering that the wife has no income of her own, while the
husband has an employment, the sum of P150.00 fixed by the
trial court for the wife’s monthly support does not seem to be
unreasonable.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside
and that of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court is
hereby revived, without costs. So ordered.

Abella vs.COMELEC
G.R. No. 100710 & 100739 | TOPIC: Rights and
Obligations of Spouses; Family Domicile
Doctrine: Husband and wife as a matter of principle live
together in one legal residence which is their usual place of
abode. In this case, Larrazabal did not present evidence to show
51
CASE # 28
that she and her husband maintain separate residences, she at
Kananga, Leyte and her husband at Ormoc City.
Facts: Petitioner Benjamin P. Abella was the official candidate
of the Liberal Party for provincial governor of Leyte in the local
election held on February 1, 1988. The private respondent is the
wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the
Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban who was disqualified by the
Commission on Elections for lack of residence. On the day
before the election, she filed her own certificate of candidacy

in substitution of her husband. The following day, however, one
Silvestre de la Cruz, a registered voter of Tacloban City, filed a
petition with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte to
disqualify Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the
ground that she misrepresented her residence in her certificate
of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she was in
fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier
disqualified from running for the same office.
The COMELEC ruled against Larrazabal. It found that petitioner
Larrazabal was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte nor a
registered voter thereat.
Larrazabal, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is
erroneous when it relied on the provisions of the Family Code
to rule that she lacks the required residence to qualify her to
run for the position of governor of Leyte. She opines that under
"the Election Law, the matter of determination of the
RESIDENCE is more on the principle of INTENTION, the animus
revertendi, rather than anything else." In this regard, she states
that "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc
City thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her
Kananga residence, for as long as she had the ANIMUS
REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of
returning there in the course of the years, although she had
physically resided at Ormoc City."
Issue: Whether or not Larrazabal’s residence is the same with
her husband. (Yes)
Ruling: Yes. Her attempt to purportedly change her residence
one year before the election by registering at Kananga, Leyte to
qualify her to run for the position of governor of the province
of Leyte clearly shows that she considers herself already a
resident of Ormoc City. In the absence of any evidence to prove
52
otherwise, the reliance on the provisions of the Family Code
was proper and in consonance with human experience.
Larrazabal did not present evidence to show that she and her
husband maintain separate residences, she at Kananga, Leyte
and her husband at Ormoc City.
The Supreme Court, then, quoted the decision of the COMELEC:
Arts. 68 and 69 of the Family Code provide that – “Art. 68. The
husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In
case of disagreement, the court shall decide. The court may
exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter
should live abroad or there are other valid and compelling
reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not
apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the
family.”
Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one
legal residence which is their usual place of abode.
As regards the principle of ANIMUS REVERTENDI, it has been
ruled that mere absence from one's residence or origin —
domicile — to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice
his avocation, is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or
loss of such residence. The determination of a person's legal
residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which
may be inferred from his acts, activities and utterances. The
party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his
residence or origin must show and prove preponderantly such
abandonment or loss.
In this case, there is no evidence to prove that the petitioner
temporarily left her residence in Kananga, Leyte in 1975 to
 53
pursue any calling, profession or business. What is clear is that
she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband
and considers herself a resident therein. The intention of
animus revertendi not to abandon her residence in Kananga,
Leyte therefor, is not present. The fact that she occasionally
visits Kananga, Leyte through the years does not signify an
intention to continue her residence therein. It is common
among us Filipinos to often visit places where we formerly
resided specially so when we have left friends and relatives
therein although for intents and purposes we have already
transferred our residence to other places.

CASE # 29
Matabuena v. Cervantes
GR No. L-28771. March 31, 1971
TOPIC: Donations in Common law Marriages
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a "donation
between the spouses during the marriage," policy
considerations the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship
FACTS
● Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes, for a period of
time lived together maritally without the benefit of
marriage.
● Felix donated a parcel of land to Petronilla during this
time and before their eventual marriage.
● Cornelia Matabeuna, the sister of the now deceased
Felix, argued that the donation her brother made to
Petronilla before their marriage was void (under NCC
133).
● Lower Court: A donation under NCC 133 is void when it is
between spouses during their marriage. The donation
made in 1956 was executed before the marriage in 1962,
and thus was valid.
ISSUES
Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during
marriages under NCC 133 applies to common-law relationships
(YES)
RULING
● Buenaventura v. Bautista (1954) - A donation between
common-law spouses falls within the prohibition and is
“null and void as contrary to public policy”.
54
● While Art. 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a
"donation between the spouses during the marriage,"
policy considerations of the most exigent character as
well as the dictates of morality require that the same
prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship.
● If the policy of the law is "to prohibit donations in favor
of the other consort and his descendants because of fear
of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the
donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our ancient law then
there is every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy
to persons living together as husband and wife without
the benefit of nuptials.
● For it is not to be doubted that assent to such irregular
connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence of
one party over the other, so that the danger that the law
seeks to avoid is correspondingly increased.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965
dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned
donation is declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and
defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property in question
recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court for its
appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

CASE # 30
Ko et al. vs. Arambulo, et al.
G.R. No. 190995 | 09 August 2017
TOPIC: Presumption of Absolute Community of
Property
CORAZON’S DEFENSE
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
● Respondent Virginia Dy Aramburo is Corazon Aramburo
Ko's sister-in-law, the former being the wife of the
latter's brother, Simeon Aramburo. Corazon and Simeon
have another sibling, Augusto Aramburo, who
predeceased them. Virginia's co-respondents are the
heirs of Augusto, while the petitioners are the heirs of
Corazon who substituted Corazon after she died while
the case was pending before the CA.
● On November 26, 1993, Virginia, together with her co-
respondents, filed a Complaint for Recovery of
Ownership with Declaration of Nullity and/or
Alternatively Reconveyance and Damages with
Preliminary Injunction against Corazon for seven parcels
of land in Tabaco, Albay with corresponding TCTs.
RESPONDENTS’ ALLEGATIONS
● The complaint alleged that Virginia and her husband
Simeon, together with Corazon and her husband Felix,
acquired the subject properties from Spouses Eusebio
and Epifania Casaul (their uncle and aunt) through a
Deed of Cession.
● Spouses Simeon and Virginia and Spouses Felix and
Corazon executed a Deed of Cession in favor of
55
Augusto's heirs, the one-third pro-indiviso portion of the
subject properties. However, with the use of falsified
documents, Corazon was able to have the entire subject
properties transferred exclusively to her name, depriving
her co-owners Virginia and Augusto's heirs of their pro-
indiviso share.
● Corazon admitted having acquired the subject properties
through cession from their uncle and auntie, Spouses
Eusebio and Epifania, but she claims that the properties
were, in truth, owned by their parents, Spouses Juan and
Juliana Aramburo. Said properties were ceded only to
her and Simeon.
● Corazon alleged that she and Simeon thought of sharing
a third of the subject properties with the heirs of their
brother Augusto who predeceased them, hence they
executed a Deed of Cession but later on decided to recall
and not implement the same. Corazon insisted that only
she and Simeon share one-half portion each of the
subject properties.
● Corazon further alleged that on December 14, 1974,
Simeon sold and conveyed his entire one-half share in
the co-owned properties in her favor. Hence, Corazon
became the sole owner thereof and consequently, was
able to transfer the titles of the same to her name.
Corazon argued that the subject properties belong to
Simeon's exclusive property, hence, Virginia's
conformity to such sale was not necessary.
● RTC ruled that without the conformity of Virginia,
according to the trial court, Simeon cannot alienate or
encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership.
● CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES
1. Whether Simeon’s ⅓ share in the property is conjugal -
YES
2. Whether the sale between Simeon and Corazon without
Virginia’s consent is void - NO, voidable
RULING
1. Article 160 of the Old Civil Code, which is the applicable
provision since the property was acquired prior to the
enactment of the Family Code as stated above, provides
that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This
presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable, but
only with a strong, clear and convincing evidence; there
must be a strict proof of exclusive ownership of one of
the spouses, and the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting it.
● Here, the subject properties, having been acquired
during the marriage, are still presumed to belong to
Simeon and Virginia's conjugal properties. Unfortunately,
Corazon, or the petitioners, failed to adduce ample
evidence that would convince this Court of the exclusive
character of the properties.
● That Virginia's name was merely descriptive of Simeon's
civil status is untenable. If proof obtains on the
acquisition of the property during the existence of the
marriage, as in this case, then the presumption of
conjugal ownership remains unless a strong, clear and
convincing proof was presented to prove otherwise. In
fact, even the registration of a property in the name of
one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature. What is
material is the time when the property was acquired.
2. As to the one-third portion commonly-owned by
Spouses Simeon and Virginia, Simeon's alienation of the
56
same through sale without Virginia's conformity is
merely voidable. Article 166 of the Old Civil Code
explicitly requires the consent of the wife before the
husband may alienate or encumber any real property of
the conjugal partnership except when there is a showing
that the wife is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or
in like situations.
● In this case, Virginia vehemently denies having
conformed to the sale in favor of Corazon. In fact, during
trial, NBI already found that Virginia's signature
appearing on the said Deed of Absolute Sale is a forgery.
The forgery, as found by the RTC, is evident from the
admitted fact of strained marital relationship between
Simeon and Virginia and the fact that at the time the
question Deed of Absolute Sale was executed, Simeon
had been living with Corazon in Tabaco City, Albay, while
Virginia and her children were living in Paco, Manila.
● Accordingly, without Virginia's conformity, the Deed of
Absolute Sale between Simeon and Corazon is voidable.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY
GRANTED. The Decision dated September 22, 2009 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89611, affirming the Decision dated
February 16, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City,
Branch 15, in Civil Case No. T-1693 is hereby AFFIRMED in all
aspects EXCEPT insofar as it ordered the cancellation of the
titles of the entire subject properties.

CASE # 31
Spouses Abrenica v. Law Firm of Abrenica
GR No. 180572 | TOPIC: What is excluded from
ACP, FC 92; FC 197: FC 95
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
community property the property acquired before the
marriage of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property.
FACTS
● Petitioner Atty. Erlando A. Abrenica was a partner of
individual respondents, Attys. Danilo N. Tungol and
Abelardo M. Tibayan, in the Law Firm of Abrenica,
Tungol and Tibayan ("the firm").
● In 1998, respondents filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) two cases against
petitioner.
○ 1st case: for Accounting and Return and Transfer
of Partnership Funds With Damages and
Application for Issuance of Preliminary
Attachment, where they alleged that petitioner
refused to return partnership funds representing
profits from the sale of a parcel of land in
Lemery, Batangas.
○ 2nd case: also for Accounting and Return and
Transfer of Partnership Funds where
respondents sought to recover from petitioner
retainer fees that he received from two clients of
the firm and the balance of the cash advance
that he obtained in 1997.
57
● Judgment was rendered as follows:
○ 1st case: Ordering the respondent Atty. Erlando
Abrenica to render full accounting of the
amounts he received as profits from the sale and
resale of the Lemery property in the amount of ₱
4,524,000.00;
○ 2nd case: Ordering Atty. Erlando Abrenica to
render a full accounting of the amounts he
received under the retainer agreement between
the law firm and Atlanta Industries Inc. and
Atlanta Land Corporation in the amount of ₱
320,000.00.
● Petitioners Erlando and Joena later on filed with the
Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Annulment of
Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order.
○ We note that petitioners were married on 28 May
1998. The cases filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) on 6 May 1998 and
15 October 1998 were filed against petitioner
Erlando only. It was with the filing of CA-G.R. SP
No. 98679 on 24 April 2007 that Joena joined
Erlando as a co-petitioner.
● CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed again
another Petition for Annulment on the ground of
extrinsic fraud. This was again denied. Petitioners filed
MR.
● While the motion was pending, petitioner Erlando filed
an Urgent Omnibus Motion, alleging that the sheriff had
levied on properties belonging to his children and
petitioner Joena.
○ In addition, Erlando alleged that the trial court
still had to determine the manner of distribution

of the firm’s assets and the value of the levied
properties.
● On the same day, Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party
Claim, alleging that she and her stepchildren owned a
number of the personal properties sought to be levied.
○ She also insisted that she owned half of the two
(2) motor vehicles as well as the house and lot
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
216818, which formed part of the absolute
community of property.
○ She likewise alleged that the real property, being
a family home, and the furniture and the utensils
necessary for housekeeping having a depreciated
combined value of one hundred thousand pesos
(₱ 100,000) were exempt from execution
pursuant to Rule 39, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court.
○ Thus, she sought their discharge and release and
likewise the immediate remittance to her of half
of the proceeds, if any.
ISSUES
Whether the personal properties sought to be levied is owned
by Joena and thus should be exempt from execution - NO
RULING
● It appears from the records that petitioner Erlando was
first married to a certain Ma. Aline Lovejoy Padua on 13
October 1983. They had three children: Patrik Erlando
(born on 14 April 1985), Maria Monica Erline (born on 9
September 1986), and Patrik Randel (born on 12 April
1990).
● After the dissolution of the first marriage of Erlando, he
and Joena got married on 28 May 1998. In her Affidavit,
Joena alleged that she represented her stepchildren;
58
that the levied personal properties – in particular, a
piano with a chair, computer equipment and a
computer table – were owned by the latter. We note
that two of these stepchildren were already of legal age
when Joena filed her Affidavit. As to Patrik Randel,
parental authority over him belongs to his parents.
Absent any special power of attorney authorizing Joena
to represent Erlando’s children, her claim cannot be
sustained.
● Petitioner Joena also asserted that the two (2) motor
vehicles purchased in 1992 and 1997, as well as the
house and lot covered by TCT No. 216818 formed part of
the absolute community regime. However, Art. 92, par.
(3) of the Family Code excludes from the community
property the property acquired before the marriage of a
spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
property. Neither these two vehicles nor the house and
lot belong to the second marriage.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Petition is denied.

CASE # 32
Vda. de Delizo v. Delizo
GR No. L-32820-21 | TOPIC: For marriages
before FC, FC 104
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court, on grounds of equity and justice,
considered a homestead acquired (perfected) during the
second marriage, but applied for and initial compliances done
during the first marriage, as being conjugal property of both
marriages.
FACTS
● April 1891 – Dec 1909 – first marriage of Nicolas Delizo
to Rosa Vllasfer who died (18 years)
● Oct 1911 – May 1957 – second marriage to Dorotea de
Ocampo until Nicolas Delizo died (46 years)
● Petitioners and respondents are fighting over
the land owned by Nicolas whether it belongs to the
conjugal property of the first or second marriage
● TC first partitioned the land to the first marriage‘s heirs
since there was no liquidation of conjugal property of
first marriage thus the co conjugal partnership was
converted into one of co-ownership between Nicolas
Delizo and his children of the first marriage but was
appealed by petitioners from second marriage
● CA: ruled that Caanawan lands were acquired during the
first marriage and the fact that lands were registered
under ―Nicolas married to Dorotea‖ is merely descriptive
of his civil status.
○ Did not agree with the partition of TC held that 1⁄2
of conjugal property from first marriage is
59
husband‘s own separate property when he
remarried again.
○ Also held that since it was at the time of the 2nd
marriage that the land was cultivated, it is is
entitled to reimbursement for the increase in
value of the 47 hectares
■ Thus 1⁄2 that is given to the first marriage‘s
heirs must be deducted by the
improvements made by the 2nd marriage.
○ Declared partition as follows: One- half of the
Caanawan property to share of Rosa Villafer or 1/6
thereof for each child of the first marriage; and
20% of all the other properties or 1/15 thereof for
each such child. 1⁄2 to Nicolas Delizo descending
to his heirs both in the 1st and 2nd marriage.
ISSUES
1. WON partition of lands made by CA is correct. NO
2. To which conjugal partnership do the Caanawan lands
belong?
○ The second conjugal partnership w/ Dorotea.
However, as a matter of equity (since 20 hectares
were cultivated during the first marriage), the
children from the first marriage should share in
the Caanawan lands.
RULING
The decisive factor in the determination of whether a parcel of
land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the
first or the second marriage is not necessarily the time of the
issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the
fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the
acquisition of such right to the patent.
 60
Having received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion hereby modified as herein indicated. The records of these cases
of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the should be, as they are hereby, remanded to the trial court for
law, in 1909. Considering, however, that about 20 hectares were further proceedings in accordance with this judgment. No costs.
cultivated and rendered productive during the period from 1905
to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said
properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the
extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had
been complied with during the existence of each conjugal
partnership.

The total mass of the properties should be divided between the

conjugal partnerships in proportion to the duration of each
partnership. Therefore the second conjugal partnership is
entitled to 46/64 of the total mass of properties and the second
conjugal partnership is entitled to 18/64. The share of the estate
of Nicolas Delizo is 1⁄2 pro indiviso of the net remainder of the
conjugal partnership gains of the first and second marriages
which is equivalent to 1⁄2 of the whole estate. This will be
distributed equally to his children of both marriages and his
widow will have a share equivalent to one child. Additionally,
De Ocampo is also entitled to 1⁄2 of the net remainder of the
second conjugal partnership and Villasfer’s share is equivalent
to 1⁄2 of the net remainder of the first conjugal partnership
therefore these would amount to 23/64 and 9/64 respectively.

Computation of Sharing: (Whole Estate 64/64)

Share of Rosa Villasfer = 9/64 to be divided among three children
Share of Each Child of 1st marriage (3 children) = 9/64 +1/26 = 142/1664
Share of Dorotea de Ocampo = 23/64 +1/26 = 662/1664
Share of Each Child of 2nd marriage (9 children) = 1/26 = 64/1664
Whole Estate = 32/64 + 13/26 = 1664/1664

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 33
Torela v. Torela
GR No. L-27843 | TOPIC: Presumption of CPG
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Party invoking presumption that property is conjugal must first
prove that the same was acquired during the marriages.—While
it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to be
conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua
non for the application of the presumption.
FACTS
● On Dec. 31, 1929, CFI of Negros Occidental issued Decree
440157 in favor of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana
Gallego, decreein that he is the owner of a certain parcel
of land. OCT was issued in favor of Felimon. Felimon filed
for a petition for reconstitution on Dec. 28, 1953 because
the OCT was either lost or destroyed during the last
world war. A new OCT was issued in lieu of the lost
and/or destroyed one.
● On March 5, 1958, Felimon Torela filed a motion ex parte
alleging that the lot was acquired by him by way of
inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife,
Graciana. He prayed that the status appearing on the
OCT be changed, 'from Felimon Torela, married to
Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torela, married to Marciana
Gepanago'. Having no opposition from his daughter from
the first marriage Clara, the court granted the motion.
● On March 4, 1958, Felimon executed a deed of sale in
consideration of P3000 and sold the lot to Marcos
Mahilum and Maria Luna Mahilum. He stated in the deed
61
of sale that he was a widower by his first marriage and
now married to Marciana. TCT was issued to the Mahilum
spouses.
● According to Clara and Silveria (daughters from the first
marriage with Graciana), the lot is conjugal property of
Felimon and Graciana having been cleared by their
parents as it was then a forestead. They were deprived
of their share of the property sold.
ISSUES
WON the lot is the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana
(first wife). NO
RULING
In the light of the foregoing, the property in question is not one
of those enumerated in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On
the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents
and brought to the marriage with his first wife, the same is
deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For
these reasons, defendant Felimon Torela had lawfully disposed
of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first
marriage. Accordingly, plaintiffs' complaint was correctly
dismissed by the court below.
Petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals failed to take into
account Article 1407 of the Spanish Civil Code, which now
correspond to Article 160 of the New Civil Code, and which
reads as follows:
Art. 1407. All property of the spouses shall be deemed
partnership property in the absence of proof that it
belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
 62
Petitioners claim that since the lot in question was registered
in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it DISPOSITIVE PORTION
must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the
Graciana so that one-half thereof should be adjudicated to Court of Appeals, the same is hereby affirmed without any
them as their inheritance from their mother. special pronouncement as to costs.

While it is true that all property of the marriage is presumed to

be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invokes
the presumption must first prove that the property was
acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua
non for the application of the presumption. (Cobb-Perez vs.
Lantin, L-22320, May 22, 1968, 23 SCRA 637; Ponce de Leon vs.
RFC, L-24571, Dec. 18,1970; 36 SCRA 289.)

In the instant case there is nothing in the record to show that

the lot in question was acquired during the marriage of Felimon
Torela and Graciana Gallego. On the contrary, the factual finding
of the Court of Appeals is to the effect that Felimon acquired
the land through inheritance and this conclusion is bolstered
by that fact that one of the petitioners herein, Clara Torela, gave
her conformity to her father's Ex-Parte Motion of March 5, 1958,
wherein it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon Torela had
acquired the property by way of inheritance prior to his
marriage to his first wife, Graciana Gallego.

The circumstance that Decree No. 440157 of the Court of First

Instance of Negros Occidental which confirmed the ownership
of Felimon Torela over the land in question described him as
married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil
status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that the land
was acquired during their coverture. The further circumstance
that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in
itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage
for land registration under Act No. 496, as amended, does not
confer title; it merely confirms a title already existing and which
is registrable.

CASE # 34
PNB v. CA
G.R. No. L-57757 August 31, 1987 | TOPIC: E. Conjugal
Partnership of Gains
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only
and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired
by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs
exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article
160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the
name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties
are involved.
FACTS
1. Clodualdo Vitug’s two marriages:
a. His first wife was Gervacia Flores with whom he
had 3 children, namely, Victor, Lucina and Julio all
surnamed Vitug.
b. The second wife of Clodualdo Vitug was Donata
Montemayor with whom he had 8 children.
2. Clodualdo Vitug died intestate on May 20, 1929 so his
estate was settled and distributed wherein Donata
Montemayor was the Administratrix.
3. Several properties of Donata Montemayor were
mortgaged to PNB.
a. On November 28, 1952, she mortgaged to PNB
several parcels of land to guarantee the loan
granted by the PNB to Salvador Jaramilla and
Pedro Bacani in the amount of P40,900.
b. On December 1, 1963, she also mortgaged in favor
of PNB certain properties to guarantee the
63
payment of the loan account of her son Salvador
Vitug in the amount of P35,200.
4. However, the loans were never paid so PNB foreclosed
all the mortgaged properties.
a. PNB as the highest bidder, purchased the lots, and
subsequently sold the same to the Vitugs and the
Fajardos on September 2, 1969.
5. Meanwhile, Donata executed a contract of lease over a
lot in favor of her sons Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug.
6. On March 21, 1970 Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug
filed an action for partition and reconveyance with
damages against the PNB, the Vitugs, the Fajardos, and
Marcelo Mendiola, the special administrator of Donata’s
intestate estate.
a. They claimed that the 30 parcels of land form part
of the conjugal property of the spouses Donata
and Clodualdo and that they are entitled to a
share interest of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof.
b. They also assailed the mortgage of said properties
to the PNB and the subsequent public auction.
c. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Montemayor, L-
5297 decided on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action
for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels
of land wherein the properties were found to be
conjugal in nature.
ISSUES
Whether or not the subject lands form part of the conjugal
property of the spouses Donata and Clodualdo Vitug.
RULING
● NO. When the subject properties were mortgaged to the
PNB they were registered in the name of Donata
Montemayor, widow.
 64
● Article 160 of the Civil Code provides as follows: ○ Thus they leased the properties from their mother
Art. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed Donata Montemayor for many years knowing her
to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be to be the owner. They were in possession of the
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband property for a long time and they knew that the
or to the wife. same were mortgaged by their mother to the PNB
○ The presumption applies to property acquired and thereafter were sold at public auction, but
during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this they did not do anything. It is only after 17 years
case, it appears on the face of the title that the that they remembered to assert their rights.
properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor Certainly, they are guilty of laches.
when she was already a widow. When the
property is registered in the name of a spouse DISPOSITIVE PORTION
only and there is no showing as to when the The subject decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
property was acquired by said spouse, this is an hereby REVERSED and set aside and another decision is hereby
indication that the property belongs exclusively rendered DISMISSING the complaint
to said spouse. And this presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when
the title is in the name of only one spouse and the
rights of innocent third parties are involved.
● In processing the loan applications of Donata
Montemayor, the PNB had the right to rely on what
appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its
face the properties are owned by Donata Montemayor, a
widow.
● Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug are thus estopped from
questioning the title of Donata Montemayor to the said
properties.
○ They never raised the conjugal nature of the
property nor took issue as to the ownership of
their mother, Donata Montemayor, over the same.
○ They were among the defendants in said two
cases wherein in their answers to the complaint
they asserted that the properties in question are
paraphernal properties belonging exclusively to
Donata Montemayor and are not conjugal in
nature.
 65
CASE # 35
petitioner filed to stay the execution alleging that the subject
property is part of the conjugal property of Martin and hers. She
Magallon v Montejo
asserts that the title was issued during the time of their
GR No. 73733 | TOPIC: When CPG commences
marriage, without any legal impediments, hence, she should not
and applies
be bound by the decision of the lower court. (Note: The
petitioner did not give any evidence as to the existence of her
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE marriage with Martin Lacerna)

FACTS ISSUES

● A case was instituted by the private respondent to compel the W/N the decision of the lower court, which was final, as to the
partition of a parcel of land which Martin Lacerna had perfected ownership of ½ of the subject property, binds the petitioner after
a claim by homestead. The respondents claimed that they are she alleged that since the certificate of title states that she was the
the common children of Martin and his wife, Eustaquia, who wife of Martin when the same was issued, hence, part of their
died in 1953. They assert that they have the right to one-half of conjugal property (No)
land as their mother’s share in the conjugal partnership with
Martin. RULING
● Martin denied having contracted marriage with Estaquia, that
● The Court discussed that the decision of the lower courts is now
they only lived together without the benefit of a marriage and
binding upon the decision of the Court, which rightfully pertained
thereafter he allegedly abandoned him. However, the trial court
to the conjugal partnership of Martin and Eustaquia, should
did not give credence to his assertions.
have been titled in the names of the said spouses, not with the
● The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the
petitioner. The Court explained that through fraud or mistake,
homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during
the registered names of Martin Lacerna and petitioner Epifania
his coverture with Eustaquia. On the basis of these findings, the
were indicated in the issued certificate of title.
plaintiffs were declared entitled to half of the land claimed by
● Because of this, the subject property should be regarded as
them. This was affirmed by the IAC which decision became
held by the petitioner by constructive trust in favor of the
final.
respondent who are rightfully entitled thereto.
● During the time that the case was filed, there is no certificate of
● The Court held that it is evident that the petitioner relies mainly,
title to the subject property in the name of Martin. The certificate
if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land
of title was only issued while Martin’s appeal was pending
carries her name as the "wife" of the owner named therein,
before the IAC.
Martin Lacerna. As already mentioned, such entry on the
● However, under the certificate of title, it states that Martin
certificate of title has been established by evidence no longer
Lacerna was married to Epifania, the petitioner in this case.
disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not
● When the respondents filed for the writ of execution, the writs
procured through fraud. Moreover, on the authority of Litam vs.
were served on both Martin and the petitioner. However, the
 66
Rivera and Stuart vs. Yatco, the phrase "married to Epifania
Magallon" written after the name of Martin Lacerna in said
certificate of title is merely, descriptive of the civil status of
Martin Lacerna, the registered owner, and does not necessarily
prove that the land is "conjugal" property of Lacerna and
petitioner herein.
● Moreover, the petitioner cannot invoke the presumption
established in Article 160 of the Civil Code that property
acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal
partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to
Martin Lacerna except that which arises by implication from the
aforestated entry in the certificate of title and for the far more
compelling reason that the homestead claim on the land was
shown to have been perfected during Martin Lacerna's marriage
to Eustaquia Pichan, mother of the private respondents.
● The Court cited the case of Maramba vs. Lozano which
provides that the presumption does not operate where there is
no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired applies with even greater force here.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the writ of execution complained of is set aside
and annulled. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent
Trial Court is ordered to effect the partition of the land in
question in accordance with the terms of its now final and
executory decision and the provisions of Rule 69 of the Rules
of Court. No pronouncement as to costs in this instance.

CASE # 36
Cuenca v. Cuenca
GR No. 72321 | TOPIC: Suppletory rules, FC 108
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Presumption under Art. 160 NCC cannot prevail when the title
is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved.
FACTS
● Respondents were legitimate children of Agripino
Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased, owners of
the subject parcels of land.
● They allege that some of the parcels are exclusive
property of Maria while all others are conjugal.
● They also allege that Engracia Basadre and Agripino
were not legally married because at the time they lived
together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa
Pagar.
● Petitioners denied legitimacy of the marriage between
Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the
respondents.
● They claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia
Basadre were legally married and that they are the
legitimate children thereof. They also contend that
subject parcels of land are conjugal properties of
Agripino and Engracia.
● The Appellate Court held Agripino, in his lifetime,
expressed in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate
of Maria Bangahon, proofs that properties in question
belong exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property.
Tax declarations presented by petitioners are not real
evidence to prove ownership or possession.
67
● Petitioners wanted to present new evidence to prove:
that Engraciaand Agripino were legally married; that
other petitioners were the legitimate children, and; that
subject parcels of land were conjugal properties of
Agripino and Engracia.
ISSUES
Whether or not the subject parcels of land were conjugal
properties of Agripino and Engracia --No
RULING
● Art. 160 of NCC: all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or the wife.
● The presumption refers only to the property acquired
during marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was
acquired.
● Documents sought to be presented do not show that
the claims to the subject parcels consisting of
homestead lands were perfected during the marriage of
Agripino and Engracia.
● Presumption cannot prevail when the title is in the
name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved. Documents show that 5 out
of 8 parcels covered are titled in the name of either
respondent Meladora or Retituto Presumption cannot
prevail, therefore petition was dismissed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The
questioned resolutions of the appellate court are AFFIRMED.
For non-compliance with this Court's Resolution dated March
2, 1988, ordering him to show cause for his failure to file a
 68
memorandum within the period given to him, Atty. Cipriano C.
Alvizo, Sr. is fined Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos. If he fails to
pay the fine within ten (10) days from notice of this decision,
he shall be imprisoned for five (5) days.

CASE # 37
Dela Pena v. Avila.
GR No. 187490., Feb. 8, 2012
TOPIC: Suppletory Rules, FC 108
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Under Art. 160 of the NCC, all property in the marriage is
presumed to belong to the CPG unless proved otherwise.
HOWEVER, proof of acquisition during the marriage is an
essential condition for the operation of the presumption in
favor of conjugal partnership.
FACTS
● A 277 sqm parcel of residential land + improvements in
Marikina was registered in a TCT under the name of
Antonia Dela Pena, “married to Antegono A. Dela Pena.
● May 7, 1996. Antonia obtained a P250k loan from Aguila
pursuant to a P.N. She executed a Deed of Real Estate
Mortgage over the property in favor of Aguila securing
the loan.
○ The deed provided that it was “for a period of
three (3) months from the date of the instrument.
● Nov. 1997. Antonia executed a notarized absolute deed
of sale over the property in favor of respondent Gemma
Avila for P600k.
○ The TCT under Antonia’s name was cancelled and
a new one was issued in Gemma’s name.
● Gemma executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of Far East Bank and Trust Company (now BPI)
● March 1998. Antonia filed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim
on the property claiming to be the be the owner of the
property.
○ She claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale was
simulated.
69
○ The Adverse Claim was inscribed on Gemma’s
TCT.
● Gemma failed to pay loans to FEBTC-BPI, and thus the
bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the REM
over the property. The bank won the bid for the property
at a public auction and a new TCT was issued in its name.
● Antonia and her son, the petitioner in this case, filed a
case against Gemma for annulment of the deed of sale
at the RTC.
○ Antonia claimed that the deed of REM she
executed with Aguila was not consented to by her
husband, who by then had already died.
○ Despite its intended 1998 maturity date, the due
date of the loan secured by the mortgage was
shortened by Gemma who, taking advantage of
her "proximate relationship" with Aguila, altered
the same to 1997;
○ The Deed of Absolute Sale in was executed by
Antonia who was misled into believing that the
transfer was necessary for the loan the former
promised to procure on her behalf from FEBTC-
BPI.
○ In addition to the annulment of said Deed of
Absolute Sale for being simulated and derogatory
of Alvin's successional rights, the Dela Peñas
sought the reconveyance of the property as well
as the grant of their claims for moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and the costs
RTC: the property was conjugal in nature. Thus, the Deed of
Absolute Sale Antonia executed was void as a disposition
without liquidation required under Art. 130 of the FC.
Reconveyance was ordered to the Dela Penas.

CA: Upon appeal of FEBTC-BPI the CA REVERSED the RTC
ruling.
● the property was paraphernal in nature for failure of the
Dela Peñas to prove that the same was acquired during
Antonia's marriage to Antegono.
● Having misled Gemma into believing that the property
was exclusively hers, Antonia is barred from seeking the
annulment of the 4 November 1997 Deed of Absolute
Sale
● The bank was a mortgagee in good faith and for value.
ISSUES
Whether or not the Absolute Deed of Sale entered into by a wife
without consent of the husband or liquidation of the CPG upon
his death pursuant to Art. 130 of the FC can be voided despite
absence of proof the property was acquired during the
marriage (NO)
RULING
● Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of
the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
● Proof of acquisition during the marriage is an essential
condition for the operation of the presumption in favor
of conjugal partnership.
70
● Petitioners did not present any evidence that Antonia
was already married when the property was acquired.
● Considering that the presumption of conjugality does not
operate if there is no showing of when the property
alleged to be conjugal was acquired the SC found that
the CA cannot be faulted for ruling that the realty in
litigation was Antonia's exclusive property.
● The phrase “married to” is merely descriptive of the civil
status of the wife and cannot be interpreted as to mean
that the husband is also a registered owner.
○ It is possible that the property was acquired by
the wife while she was still single and registered
only after her marriage.
● Thus, The CA correctly ruled that the sale was valid, and
no liquidation under Article 130 of the Family Code was
needed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for
lack of merit and the assailed CA Decision dated 31 March
2009 is, accordingly, AFFIRMED in toto. SO ORDERED.

CASE # 38
Andrade v. Tan,
G.R. No. 171904 and 172017 August 7, 2013
Suppletory Rules in CPG, PERLAS BERNABE
FACTS
1. Rosario Vda. De Andrade was the registered owner of
four parcels of land in Cebu City (subject properties)
which she mortgaged to and subsequently foreclosed
by one Simon. When the redemption period was about
to expire, Rosario sought the assistance of Bobby Tan
who agreed to redeem the subject properties.
Thereafter, Rosario sold the same to Bobby and her
son, Proceso Andrade, Jr. (Proceso, Jr.), for ₱100,000.00
as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale9 dated April
29, 1983 (subject deed of sale).
2. On July 26, 1983, Proceso, Jr. executed a Deed of
Assignment, ceding unto Bobby his rights and interests
over the subject properties. Bobby extended an Option
to Buy the subject properties in favor of Proceso, Jr.
When Proceso, Jr. failed to do so, Bobby consolidated
his ownership over the subject properties, and the TCTs
therefor were issued in his name.
3. On October 7, 1997, Rosario’s children, the Andrades,
filed a complaint for reconveyance and annulment of
deeds of conveyance and damages, where they alleged
that the transaction between Rosario and Bobby
(subject transaction) was not one of sale but was
actually an equitable mortgage which was entered into
to secure Rosario’s indebtedness with Bobby.
4. They also claimed that since the subject properties
were inherited by them from their father, Proceso
Andrade, Sr. (Proceso, Sr.), the subject properties were
71
conjugal in nature, and thus, Rosario had no right to
dispose of their respective shares therein. In this light,
they argued that they remained as co-owners of the
subject properties together with Bobby, despite the
issuance of the TCTs in his name.
ISSUES
W/N the subject properties are conjugal properties and thus
Rosario had no right to dispose of them?
RULING
Article 160 of the Civil Code which states that "[a]ll property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to
the husband or to the wife." For this presumption to apply,
the party invoking the same must, however, preliminarily
prove that the property was indeed acquired during the
marriage. As held in Go v. Yamane: the presumption in favor of
conjugality does not operate if there is no showing of when
the property alleged to be conjugal was acquired.
In this case, records reveal that the conjugal partnership of
Rosario and her husband was terminated upon the latter’s
death on August 7, 1978 while the transfer certificates of title
over the subject properties were issued on September 28,
1979 and solely in the name of "Rosario Vda. de Andrade, of
legal age, widow, Filipino."
Other than their bare allegation, no evidence was adduced by
the Andrades to establish that the subject properties were
procured during the coverture of their parents or that the
same were bought with conjugal funds. Moreover, Rosario’s
declaration that she is the absolute owner of the disputed
parcels of land in the subject deed of sale was not disputed
 72
by her son Proceso, Jr., who was a party to the same. Hence,
by virtue of these incidents, the Court upholds the RTC’s
finding46 that the subject properties were exclusive or sole
properties of Rosario.

Due to the above-stated reasons, Bobby’s petition in G.R. No.

171904 is hereby granted.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby (a) GRANTS the petition of

Bobby Tan in G.R. No. 171904; and (b) DENIES the petition of
Grace Andrade, Charity A. Santiago, Henry Andrade, Andrew
Andrade, Jasmin Blaza, Miriam Rose Andrade, and Joseph
Andrade in G.R. No. 172017. Accordingly, the Decision dated
July 26, 2005 and Resolution dated March 3, 2006 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71987 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the April 6, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 19 in Civil Case No. CEB 20969 is
REINSTATED.
 73
CASE # 39

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 40
Efren and Inocencia Mendoza vs. Ponciano
Reyes and CA
GR No. L-31618, August 17, 1983 | TOPIC: What
are included FC 117
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal
property. There is no question that the disputed property was
acquired by onerous title during the marriage.
FACTS
1. Ponciano Reyes and Julia De Reyes were married in 1915.
The properties in question consisting of Lots 5 and 6,
Block No. 132, situated at Retiro St. Quezon City - plus
the buildings erected thereon, were bought from JM
Tuason & Co, represented by Gregorio Araneta on
installment basis by the spouses.
2. The spouses were always in arrears in the payment of
the installments due to lack of money so they borrowed
money from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation
(RFC).
3. They jointly obtained a loan for 12k from the RFC for
exclusive purposes:
a. To complete the construction of 1-storey
residential building on 9th St., La Loma, QC, and
to pay the balance of the price of the lot offered
as security which is Lot 5.
4. The corresponding deed of sale was executed and the
vendee named is Julia De Reyes. Her signatures appear
74
over the caption and those of Ponciano under the phrase
“with my marital consent”.
5. As a result of these sales, TCT issued for Lots 5 and 6,
in the name of Julia De Reyes married to Ponciano Reyes.
6. As promised to the RFC, the spouses built a house and
later a camarin on the two lots. The camarin was leased
as a school building to the QC Elementary School of La
Loma for two years at 500 pesos a month. When the
school transferred, the camarin was leased on Dec. 10,
1952 to Mr. and Mrs. Mendoza, plaintiffs herein, for 10
years at 600 pesos a month for the first year and 700 for
the remaining 9 years. It was converted into a movie
house by the plaintiffs.
7. In spite of the good rentals they have been receiving for
the building, the spouses failed to pay their obligations
to RFC, so, as late as Nov. 28, 1958, they had ask for an
extension of 5 years form the DBP, as successor of the
RFC, for the payment of outstanding balance of 7,876.13.
8. On March 3, 1961, while Ponciano was absent attending
to his farm in Arayat, Pampanga, Julia sold absolute the
lots in question, to plaintiffs Mendoza for the sum of 80k
without the knowledge and consent of Ponciano. At the
time, the spouses were living separately and were not in
speaking terms.
9. Ponciano filed for annulment of deed of sale of two
parcels of land contending that said properties were
conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she
had sold them to petitioners all by herself without his
knowledge or consent.
10. Petitioner Mendozas alleged that the properties wre
paraphernal properties of Julia and that they bought in
good faith. Julia testified that she bought the land on
installment basis and that the first payment came from
her personal funds.

11. CFI declared that the properties are exclusive and
paraphernal properties of Julia and ruled that she could
validly dispose of the same without the consent of her
husband.
ISSUES
W/N a spouse can annul a deed of sale over properties sold by
the other spouse without the former’s knowledge and consent
RULING
YES.
The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 153. The following are conjugal partnership property:
(1) That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage
at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition
be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;
xxx xxx xxx
The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must
also be overcome by one who contends that the disputed
property is paraphernal Article 160 provides:
ART. 160. All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
The presumption is a strong one.
As stated in Camia de Reyes v. Reyes de Ilano (63 Phil. 629, 639),
"it is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during
75
the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal
property." And in Laluan v. Malpaya (65 SCRA 494, 504) we
stated, "proof of acquisition of the property in dispute during
the marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption
operative."
There is no question that the disputed property was acquired
by onerous title during the marriage. But were the funds used
to buy the lot and build the improvements at the expense of
the common fund?
The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by
the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under
Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted
by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership are liabilities of the partnership.
To rebut the presumption and the evidence of the conjugal
character of the property, the petitioners have only the
testimony of Julia de Reyes to offer.
Mrs. Reyes testified that she bought the two parcels of land on
installment basis and that the first payment of a little less than
P2,000.00 came from her personal funds.
It is sufficient to prove that the property was acquired during
the marriage in order that the same may be deemed conjugal
property. There is no question that the disputed property was
acquired by onerous title during the marriage.
Records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the
spouses. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the
partnership.
 76

Julia’s claim of exclusive ownership is belied by the Income Tax

Returns which she herself prepared and filed in behalf of the
conjugal partnership wherein she made the statement that the
rentals paid to her were income of the conjugal partnership,
and she made to appear the properties in question as capital
assets of the conjugal partnership.

Property acquired during a marriage is presumed to be conjugal

and the fact that the land is later registered in the name of only
one of the spouses does not destroy its conjugal nature. If the
fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in
the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal
nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petitions for review on certiorari are hereby

DENIED for lack of merit. The judgment of the Court of Appeals
is affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
 77
CASE # 41

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 42
W/N the property registered under the name of “Emilio
JOCSON V. CA
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is conjugal property or
G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989
exclusive property. - NO
TOPIC: What are included in CPG
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine
qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership.
FACTS
● Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and
wife. The wife died first intestate then the husband
followed. Moises and Agustina are their children.
Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.
● The present controversy concerns the validity of three
(3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during his
lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by
sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what apparently
covers almost all of his properties, including his one-
third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife.
● Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and
prays that they be declared null and void and the
properties subject matter therein be partitioned
between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their
deceased parents. Petitioner claimed that the
properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the
unliquidated conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot
validly sell. They say it is conjugal properties of Emilio
Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were
registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to
Alejandra Poblete”.
78
ISSUES
RULING
● No, it is exclusive. Article 160 of the CC provides that
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to
the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it
pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
● The party who invokes this presumption must first
prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition
during the coverture is a condition sine qua non for the
operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal
ownership.
● It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly
invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must first
present proof that the disputed properties were
acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however,
upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
● The fact that the properties were registered in the
name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”
is no proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title and registration
thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that
registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing.
● It may be that the properties under dispute were
acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor
but were registered only after his marriage to Alejandra
Poblete, which explains why he was described in the
certificates of title as married to the latter.
 79
● Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title
show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This
is so because the words “married to’ preceding
“Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil
status of Emilio Jocson.
● In other words, the import from the certificates of title
is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the
same having been registered in his name alone, and
that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

Petition dismissed.
 80
CASE # 43

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 44
Castro v. Miat
G.R. No. 143297 | TOPIC: What are included in
CPG FC 117
SPOUSES VIRGILIO and MICHELLE CASTRO, MOISES B. MIAT
and ALEXANDER V. MIAT, petitioners
ROMEO V. MIAT, respondent.
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Property that was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the common fund is part of the conjugal
property.
FACTS
1. Father of two children, Moises, widower (wife died in
1978), originally intended his two properties, one in
Paco and the other in Paranaque for his offspring but
reverted to keeping the latter for himself while in
Dubai, UAE. He modified the original agreement upon
return to the Philippines in 1984.
a. Proof of this was given by Moises’ brother,
CerefinoMiat, who said testified the original
agreement that Paco would go to Moises’ sons.
This was reiterated at the death bed of Moises’
wife and affirmed upon Moises’ return to the
Philippines.
2. The Paco property, being the land in dispute, was paid
for on an installment basis from May 17, 1977 to
December 14, 1984. Full payment was made on the
latter date and title was secured under Moises name as
widower.
81
3. Romeo and Alexander, sons of Moises, lived on the
property with their wives and paid its realty taxes and
fire insurance premiums. Alexander and his wife,
however, left the property in August 1985 for personal
reasons.
4. February 1988, Romeo learns from godmother of his
wedding that son of godmother, Virgilio Castro (VC,
petitioner), who happens to be Romeo’s neighbor, that
the Paco property was being sold to VC. A thirty
thousand peso downpayment was made by godmother
to Moises for her son.
5. April 1988, Alexander agrees to sell his share of the
Paco property for P42,750.00; a partial payment was
made in the sum of P6,000 by Romeo but Alexander did
not execute a deed of assignment in favor of his
brother because “he had lots of work to do and the
title was already in Romeo’s possession.”
a. Downpayment information corroborated by
VirgilioMiat (brother of Moises) and Pedro
Miranda (who worked with Moises in two hotels:
Bayview Hotel and Hotel Filipinas) but Alexander
later said that he did not consider the money to
be a downpayment but a personal debt due to
Romeo.
6. Romeo had possession of the title because he
borrowed it from his father when he mortgaged the
land to his friend Lorenzo. But when Moises ran into
financial difficulties, he mortgaged for P30,000.00 the
Paco property to parents of petitioner VC.
7. December 1, 1988, Romeo and VC met in MTC Manila to
discuss status of Paco property. On the 16th, a letter
from petitioner’s lawyer informed Romeo that the Paco
property had been sold to VC by Moises by virtue of a
deed of sale dated Dec. 5, 1988 for P95,000.00. Buyer,

petitioner, VC admitted that the title of the property
was with Romeo but bought it anyway on the assurance
of Moises that he’d be able to retrieve it from his son.
8. Romeo files in the RTC action to nullify sale and compel
Moises and Alexander to execute deed of
conveyance/assignment. RTC ordered (1) Alexander to
pay the remaining balance due his brother, (2) Romeo
to recognize sale made by Moises, (3) dismissal of
defendant’s counterclaim and (4) defendants to pay the
costs of suit. Both parties appealed to the CA which
modified the decision by saying that: (1) the deed of
sale was nullified, (2) Moises and Alexander had to
execute a deed of conveyance, and (3) for defendants
to pay cost of suit (as applied for by the petitioner). VC
subsequently brings the action to the SC.
ISSUES
82
New Civil Code. It provides that “all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be
proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.” This article does not require proof that the property
was acquired with funds of the partnership. The presumption
applies even when the manner in which the property was
acquired does not appear.
In the case at bar (as opposed to petitioner’s reliance on
Lorenzo v. Nicolas), Moises and Concordia bought the Paco
property during their marriage — Moises did not bring it into
their marriage, hence it has to be considered as conjugal.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the appellate court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 43053 is affirmed. Costs against petitioners.

WON Paco property is conjugal or capital. CONJUGAL.

RULING
Although petitioners allege that property was paid for by
Moises and at the time it was paid, his wife had long been
dead, the SC disagrees on the grounds of the new Civil Code
(which was applicable because marriage was celebrated
before FC):
“The following are conjugal partnership property: (1)
Those acquired by onerous title during the marriage at
the expense of the common fund, whether the
acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the
spouses; x xx.”

Records show that property was acquired by onerous title

during the marriage out of the common fund. It is clearly
conjugal property. Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the

CASE # 45
PNB v. Quintos
GR No. | TOPIC:What are included in CPG FC
117
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The conjugal partnership is liable for obligations contracted
during marriage, and in default of conjugal property, the
spouses are jointly liable therefor with their private properties,
unless by express stipulation, they shall have bound
themselves solida
FACTS
1. Defendants Ansaldo and Quintos, husband and wife, took
out a loan amounting to P31,284 from plaintiff PNB, and
as security, mortgaged and pledged to PNB the following:
(1) Shares of stock of the Bank of Philippine
Islands;
(2) Shares of stock of the Compania Naviera;
(3) Shares of stock of the Compania Mercantir;
and
(4) Shares of stock of the Davao Agriculture and
Commercial Company.
2. The bank later made several demands upon the spouses
to pay the debt, because the securities were found
insufficient. However, they defaulted and failed to give
additional securities demanded. PNB thus instituted the
instant complaint against the spouses.
3. The defendants maintain that their obligation to PNB is
not solidary, since there is nothing in the agreement that
expressly states that it is solidary in character.
4. They thus argue that the debt is binding upon them only
to the extent that it has benefited them individually. In
this vein, Quintos alleged that she only received P10,000
of the amount borrowed.
83
5. The lower court held that it is not necessary to
determine whether the obligation is solidary or joint,
because the debt is, ultimately, chargeable to the
defendant spouses’ conjugal partnership. The
defendants were consequently held liable to PNB for the
full amount of the loan, plus interest.
ISSUES
1. Whether the spouses executed the contract of pledge as
husband and wife.
A: IMMATERIAL. Since the defendants are husband and
wife, and the debt was contracted during their marriage,
it must be paid from the conjugal partnership.
2. Whether in default of the conjugal partnership, the
spouses may be held liable with their separate property.
A: YES. If the properties of the conjugal partnership are
insufficient, the spouses are jointly liable for the debt
with their separate property.
RULING
1. The conjugal partnership is liable for the debt, in default
of the pledged property.
The Court held that it could not alter the lower court’s
findings that, first, the defendants were husband and
wife, and second, the debt with PNB was contracted
during their marriage. Hence, the conjugal partnership of
the spouses is liable for the debt. This was the essence
of the decision.
Resolving, however, the spouses’ motion for
reconsideration, the Court expanded upon its ruling by
discussing the nature of the conjugal partnership. The
 84
conjugal partnership consists of the following debt. In default of the partnership, however, the spouses
properties, as per Art. 1401 of the Civil Code: are jointly liable for the debt.
(a) Those acquired by onerous title during the
marriage at the expense of the common property
whether the acquisition is made for the DISPOSITIVE PORTION
community or for only one of them;
(b) Those obtained by the industry, salary or labor of
Taking into account that the contract of pledge signed by the
the spouses or any of them; and
defendants does not show that they have contracted a solidary
(c) The fruits, rents or interest received or accruing obligation, it is our opinion, and so decide, that the properties
during the marriage, from the common or the given as pledge being insufficient, the properties of the conjugal
private property of each of the spouses. partnership of the defendants are liable for the debt to the
plaintiff, and in default thereof, they are jointly liable for the
However, the Court emphasized that the partnership payment thereof.
does not make a merger of each spouse’s properties.
Notwithstanding the partnership, they each continue It being understood that the judgment appealed from is
to be the owner of what they each had before modified in the sense above stated, the motion of the
contracting marriage. The capital account remains appellants is denied. So ordered.
the separate property of the spouses; it is the
account of benefits that pertains to the conjugal
partnership. This means that there can be no
presumption of solidarity with regard to the spouses’
separate property.

2. The separate property of the spouses may be charged

jointly with the debt, in case the pledged property and
the conjugal partnership both are in default.

If the pledged property and the conjugal partnership are

both in default, then it is the spouses’ separate property
that should be liable. However, since solidarity is not
presumed with regard to such property, their individual
liability cannot extend beyond the interest that they each
may have in the debt, proportional to their share.

In conclusion, since the pledged properties in this case

are insufficient, the conjugal partnership is liable for the

CASE # 46
Laperal v. Katigbak
GR No. No. L-16991 | TOPIC: Bought as exclusive
property, FC 109 (1)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
● The Laperals instituted a civil case against Katigbak and
Kalaw, seeking recovery of P14,000 evidenced by various
promissory notes executed in favor of Laperals by
Katigbak.
○ They also demanded for the return of jewelry
valued at P97,500, delivered by the Laperals to
Katigbak for sale on commission, or a total of
P111,500.
● The trial court rendered judgment against Katigbak
ordering him to pay the Laperals.
● About a month after the decision was rendered, Kalaw
filed a complaint against her husband Katigbak, for
“judicial separation of property and separate
administration”.
● The Court granted such prayer.
● The Laperals filed another complaint seeking the
annulment of the “judicial separation of property and
separate administration” to enforce the judgment
secured by the Laperals in the first Civil Case on the
fruits of Kalaw’s paraphernal property, and to secure a
ruling declaring the real property covered by TCT No.
57626 as conjugal property of Katigbak and Kalaw.
● The Court found that the real property was
paraphernal.
85
○ Spouses Katigbak and Kalaw were married in
1938 and neither of them had brought properties
unto the marriage.
○ The property in question was registered in the
name of “Evelina Kalaw-Katigbak, married to
Ramon Katigbak”.
○ Evelina declared that her mother Pura Villanueva
was the one that had bought property for her
and had placed it only in her name as the
practice of her mother is buying properties
placing them directly in the names of her
children.
○ Ramon Katigbak has no interest in the property.
● Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
W/N the subject real property belongs to the conjugal
property of Katigbak and Kalaw? NO.
RULING
● There is no denying that all properties acquired during
the marriage are, by law, presumed conjugal.
● The presumption, however, is not conclusive but merely
rebuttable, for the same law is unequivocal that it
exists only “unless it be proved that it (the property)
belongs exclusively to the husband or the wife.”
● The facts in this case sufficiently and convincingly
disproved such presumption because:
○ The deed to the disputed land is in the name of
the wife.
○ At the time of its purchase, the property was
already of such substantial value as admittedly,
the husband, by himself could not have afforded
 86
to buy, considering that singular source of
income then was his P200 a month salary.
○ Furthermore, it was established during the trial
that the purchase price was furnished by her
mother, and that it was the practice of the
parents to so provide their children with money
to purchase realties for themselves.
● Hence, the presumption is rebutted. The subject real
property is paraphernal property.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the lower Court
declaring the property covered by TCT No. 57626 of the
Register of Deeds of Manila as paraphernal is hereby affirmed,
with costs against the appellants.

CASE # 47
Berciles v. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53
G.R. No. 57257. March 5, 1984; J. Guerrero
TOPIC: Brought as exclusive property, FC 109 (1)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
(mahaba ung case pero ito last ung importante)
The retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00 is presumed
conjugal property because there is no proof that the premiums
were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge
(Article 160, New Civil Code). Such being the case, 1/2 of the
amount belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal
partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the
deceased Judge which shall in turn be distributed to his legal
heirs.
FACTS
1. On August 21, 1979, Judge Pascual G. Berciles died while
in office. He had a GSIS pension for serving in the
government for 36 years, 26 years of which were in
judiciary. He was also entitled to other benefits from his
employer as well as return of the premium paid to GSIS.
2. Petitioners and private respondents herein are now
claiming the retirement benefits and return of premiums
paid to GSIS. Petitioner “Iluminada” Ponce and her four
children filed an application for survivor’s benefit as the
legal spouse and legitimate children of the late judge;
while respondents Flor Fuentebella and her 4 children
filed their families claim together with supporting
documents.
3. The matter of these 2 conflicting claims was resolved as
an Administrative Matter.
87
4. All in all the petitioners were able to adduce the
following to support their claim:
a. Marriage certificate;
b. Birth Certificates of the children indicating the
late judge as their father.
c. Income Tax Returns; and
d. Insurance applications listing petitioner and her
childrens as the beneficiaries.
5. On the other hand, respondents only gave the following
evidences to support their claim:
a. Civil Registrar Certificate of Non-availability of
Marriage Record in Iloilo (as these were allegedly
lost, burned, or destroyed during the Japanese
Occupation);
b. Baptismal Certificates
c. Birth Certificate of Pascual Voltaire Berciles with
an unsigned indication that the late judge was his
father;
d. Type-written letter of the late judge disclaiming
the existence of his other family (supposedly
petitioners herein); and
e. Family Pictures
f. Some sworn affidavits and testimonies.
6. The GSIS eventually ruled to divide the petition between
the 2 families, recognizing petitioners family was the
legitimate ones and the respondents as the illegitimate
family. It held that the retirement benefits in the total
amount of P311,460 (retirement benefits of P301,760 +
returned retirement premiums of 9,700) as partly
conjugal and partly exclusive in nature.
7. Hence, this petition, assailing the grave abuse of
discretion of the GSIS.

ISSUES:
WON the retirement premiums are conjugal property? Yes
RULING
Yes, the retirement premiums totalling P9,700.00 is presumed
conjugal property, there being no proof that the premiums were
paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased Judge (Article
160, New Civil Code). Such being the case, one-half of the
amount belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal
partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the
deceased Judge which shall in turn be distributed to his legal
heirs.
SIDE ISSUE: WON Flor and her children are entitled to the GSIS
retirement benefit of the late Judge Pascual Berciles?
RULING: No, Flor and her children are not entitled to the GSIS
retirement benefit of the late judge.
First, the birth certificate of Pascual Voltaire Berciles, alleged
acknowledged natural child, is not signed by the late judge. It
is ruled that he “did not intervene” (i.e. there was no voluntary
acknowledgement on his part) and the mere putting of his name
by the mother or doctor is null and void. Secondly, the birth
certificates of the other children of the respondents: Maria,
Mercy and Rhoda were also had no intervention. Birth
certificates, to evidence acknowledgement, must under Section
5 of Act 3753, bear the signature under oath of the
acknowledging parents. Thirdly, the sworn statement of
Coronacion Berciles, sister in law of the late judge, that her and
her husband lived with the judge and his wife Flor during the
Japanese Occupation, was no proof that there was filiation of
the children of Flor with the late judge. Fourly, the pictures of
Flor, the late judge and the children do not prove family filiation.
At most, the show the picture of a family without the sanction
88
of marriage. Fifth, the letter of the late judge to Mercy, her
daughter with Flor, indicating that it’s only her mother Flor and
no other woman deserve scant consideration since the late
judge could not be expected to admit there was another family.
Moreso, the typewritten letter signed by the father is not an
authentic writing. Sixth, the testimony of Flor is self-serving;
the testimony of Concepcion Gonzales of her presence during
the marriage of Flor and Pascual, is deficient because she is
blind; and the affidavit of Judge Rafael Lavente being present
in the wedding of Flor and Pascual was repudiated. Lastly, Flor
had been living abroad since 1972 and Iluminada and the
deceased have been living together at the time of the death of
the judge.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Iluminada Ponce Berciles is the
surviving spouse of the late Judge Pascual G. Berciles and that
petitioners Ilona, Ellery, England, and Ione P. Berciles are the
legitimate children of the said deceased Judge. We REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the finding that Pascual Voltaire Berciles is an
acknowledged natural child and that Maria Luisa, Mercy, and
Rhoda Berciles are illegitimate children of the deceased CFI
Judge Pascual G. Berciles. The claims of the petitioners as legal
heirs are hereby APPROVED and the GSIS is hereby ordered to
pay immediately to each and every petitioner the various sums
hereunder indicated opposite their names, as follows:
In petitioner’s favor Iluminada - Wife Children
Retirement Gratuity
P60,352 P60,352 each
(1/5 each)
Return of Premium:
970 970 each
As legal heir (1/5 each)
Return of Premium:
4,850 0
As conjugal share
CASE # 48

Veloso v. Martinez
GR No. 8715 | TOPIC: Acquired by gratuitous title
during marriage
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same.
(Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and
management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to
her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the
husband might administer it properly.
FACTS
Veloso and Martinez were married. Mariano Veloso (Plaintiff)
commenced an action in CFI Cebu to recover from Lucia Velasco
(defendant) personally and as administratrix of the estate of Domingo
Franco, deceased, the possession of a certain parcel of land
Defendant answered: First. Of a counterclaim in the sum of P18,500,
as attorney's fees for services rendered by the deceased, Domingo
Franco, to the plaintiff; and, second, for the recovery of certain
jewelry, of the value of P6,000, particularly described in the answer
of the defendant, alleged to be in the possession of the plaintiff.
The lower court found that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the
possession of the land in question Also found that the defendant was
entitled to the possession of said jewelry, and ordered the plaintiff to
return the same to her and in case of the plaintiff's failure to return
said jewelry to the defendant, then and in that case, he shall pay to
the defendant, for such failure, the sum of P6,000.
From the judgment of the lower court, each of the parties, plaintiff
and defendant, appealed to this court.
During the trial of the cause the plaintiff attempted to show that the
jewels in question were pawned to him by Domingo Franco, with the
full knowledge and consent of the defendant. And not only that, the
89
plaintiff further attempts to show that after the death of Domingo
Franco, the defendant promised to pay the amount for which the said
jewels were pawned. The defendant positively denies that she knew
that her husband had pawned her jewels or that she promised to
redeem the same by paying the amount due.
ISSUES
Whether or not the jewels acquired from her mother were the
sole and separate property of the wife? (YES)
RULING
In view of the fact, however, that the record shows that the jewels
were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her
mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that
they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such
paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article
1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of
the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before
a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it
properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that
she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or
for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the
same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without
compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the defendant is entitled to
the possession of said jewels, or to their value, amounting to P6,000.
 90
CASE # 49

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 91
CASE # 50

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 51
Manotok Realty v. CA
G.R. No. L-45038 | TOPIC: Conjugal Partnership of Gains;
Administration of Exclusive Property; By the other spouse
Facts: The private respondent Felipe Madlangawa claims that
he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de
Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission
being obtained from the overseer of the subdivision, with the
understanding to eventually buy the lot. On April 2, 1950, the
owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate,
including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot
occupied by the private respondent were placed under custodia
legis.
On April 22, 1950, the private respondent made a deposit for
the said lot in the sum of P1,500.00 which was received by
Vicente Legarda, husband of the late owner. There remained an
unpaid balance of P5,700.00 but the private respondent did not
pay or was unable to pay this balance because after the death
of the testatrix, Clara Tambunting de Legarda, her heirs could
not settle their differences.
On April 28, 1950, Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a
special administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private
respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.
Subsequently, the petitioner Manotok Realty, Inc, became the
successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting-Legarda
Subdivision. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the
sale. However, private respondent refused to vacate the lots
they were occupying, so that on April 26, 1968, the Manotok
Realty filed an action to recover the said lot.
92
Manotok Realty argues that the sale by Don Vicente Legarda in
favor of the private respondent is not valid, binding, and
enforceable. It contends that since there is no dispute that the
property in question was the paraphernal property of Clara
Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had no
authority whatsoever to sell the said property to the private
respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was appointed as
administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August
28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could not have bound
Clara Tambunting's estate because the vendor Vicente Legarda
neither acted as the owner nor the administrator of the subject
property when the alleged sale took place.
Issue: Whether or not the sale by the husband of the wife’s
paraphernal property is valid. (No)
Ruling: No. It is an undisputed fact that the lot in dispute is the
paraphernal property of Dona Clara Tambunting and that at the
time of the sale thereof, the owner was already dead. It is also
undisputed that the probate court appointed Don Vicente
Legarda as administrator of the estate only on August 28, 1950,
more than three months after the questioned sale had taken
place.
We are, therefore, led to the inevitable conclusion that the sale
between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is
void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor
administrator of the subject property.
Section 1, Rule 89 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the
procedure on how a property in custodia legis can be disposed
of by sale: "Order of sale of personalty. — Upon the application
of the executor or administrator, and on written notice to the
 93
heirs and other persons interested, the court may order the
whole or a part of the personal estate to be sold, if it appears
necessary for the purpose of paying debts, expenses of
administration, or legacies, or for the preservation of the
property."

After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator

of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied
before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed
property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court
approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have
been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the
respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of
the administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of
procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests
or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed
administrator.

Manotok Realty, however, should return the P1,500.00 received

by Mr. Legarda, with legal interest, to the respondent.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the

private respondent is ordered to SURRENDER the material and
physical possession of the subject lot to Manotok Realty, Inc.
and to pay the latter the rentals until he surrenders the said
lot. Manotok Realty, Inc. shall reimburse the private respondent
the amount of P1,500.00 with legal interest.

CASE # 52
PALANCA V. SMITH-BELL
GR No. L-3695. October 16, 1907.
TOPIC: Encumbrance / disposition of exclusive
property. FC 111-112, of FC 236, Amended by RA
6809
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
When a loan is negotiated by a husband upon property
belonging to his wife, with the consent of the latter, the money
becomes conjugal property, and if the funds are invested in the
construction of a house the building is likewise conjugal
property and is liable for the debts of the husband.
FACTS
● Respondent, Smith, Bell & Co. obtained a CFI judgment
against Emiliano Boncan for an amount of money.
● Respondent obtained an execution out of the CFI which
was levied upon a property known as No. 16, situated in
an alley toward the old Santa Mesa race track.
● Petitioner, Alejandra Palanca (wife of Boncan)
commenced an action at the CFI of Manila against
respondent asking that said court dictate a sentence
declaring her to be the only and exclusive owner of the
property described in the complaint, with a right to
possess the same, and that the attachment be dissolved.
● The CFI denied the petition. Thus Alejandra appealed to
the SC
ISSUES
Whether property owned by a wife, but used by the husband
as a guaranty for a loan with the wife’s consent can be
considered part of their conjugal property (YES)
94
RULING
● Evidence shows that Alejandra was the owner of the
No. 16 property.
● Emiliano, with the consent of his wife, used the property
as guarantee for the payment of a sum of P14,000.00
that he borrowed from the International Banking
Corporation.
● With the money, Emiliano constructed the house in
question, and later, conveyed it to the plaintiff and
appellant herein as a guaranty for the payment of the
debt to the International Banking Corporation, for the
guaranty of the payment of which the said plaintiff and
appellant had given her private property.
● This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan
upon the credit of the property of his wife, became
conjugal property (paragraph 3, art. 1401, Civil Code), and
when the same was reinvested in the construction of a
house, the house became conjugal property and was
liable for the payment of the debts of the husband. (Art.
1408, Civil Code.)
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect answer the
assignments of error made by the appellant, and without discussing
the same in detail, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So
ordered.

CASE # 53
Lim Queco v. Cartagena
G.R. No. 47507 | Diciembre 19, 1940 | TOPIC:
Encumbrance / Disposition of Exclusive
Property
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Article 1384 of the Civil Code provides that the administration
of the woman's paraphernalia must be in her hands, except
when she has delivered it to the husband before a Notary
Public, with the intention that he administer it.
A loan cannot be considered as community property if the
spouse obtained the loan by putting his/her own paraphernalia
as security for payment.
FACTS
● The two defendants, Elena De Cartagena and Rodolfo
Schneckenburger, are husband and wife and lived
together from the time they contracted a valid marriage
in March 1926 until shortly after August 1933.
● Because of incompatibility of character, the defendants
separated shortly after the sale contract was granted;
and in the last formal agreement that the two celebrated
with the intervention of a Notary, on May 25, 1935, they
stipulated, among other things, the following:
"That the appearing parties agree to dissolve and
hereby consider dissolved the community property that
has been established between them, by virtue of the
contracted marriage, which community property is
deemed to be entirely liquidated between both of them
and they agree and bind themselves to renounce the right
95
that the matrimonial bond may have created over the
property of one and the other; and to this effect they
stipulate and agree that any kind of property that each
of the grantors acquires in the future, will not be
considered as marital property, but as property owned
and exclusive to whoever acquired them."
● Barely a month later, on June 15, 1935, without leaving
the Philippines, Schneckenburger obtained a divorce
decree against Elena, in the Court of the City of Juarez,
State of Chinhuahua, Mexico, and a year later he
contracted a second marriage in the Malabon Justice of
the Peace of the Province of Rizal, with a woman named
Julia Medel y Pinzon with whom he has been living since
then to this day. Knowing this, Elena accused him of
concubinage in the CFI of Manila, not saying, however, in
the decision appealed, how the case ended.
● While they were living in harmony, the defendants had a
house built in the four urban estates, but it was
necessary for her to request and obtain from "El Ahorro
Insular" which is a mutual construction and loan
company, on February 24, 1933, a loan of P3,500. He did
not, however, receive from this sum, but only the amount
of P2,884.10 because the rest had been invested in the
advance payment of interest, and in that of certain
premiums and of other incidental expenses of the
transaction. To guarantee the payment of the
aforementioned loan, Elena mortgaged to its creditor "El
Ahorro Insular" with her husband Rodolfo’s consent, its
four aforementioned properties.
● Elena, with the marital consent of Rodolfo, sold her
properties, together with the house that was built on
them, to the plaintiff Lim Queco, under these conditions:
that The P7,500, agreed price of said properties, the
plaintiff would pay when signing the deed, as in effect

payment, the amount of P500; and that the remainder,
amounting to P7,000, plus interest at the rate of 10 per
cent per annum, would be paid for her in monthly
installments, giving P92.54 each month until her entire
obligation is completely satisfied.
● From the following month the buyer fulfilled her
obligation regularly until April 20, 1935; but, since then
and by agreement between the defendants and the
plaintiff, and "El Ahorro Insular", the payments were
made in this other way: P49.35 to "El Ahorro Insular", and
P43.19 to the defendants.
● From October 30, 1933 to May 25, 1935, it was Elena who
was receiving from the plaintiff the amounts, which
should have been delivered to the appellee, thus taking
advantage of said amounts alone, which, by the way, set
up exactly to P820.61. The payments that the plaintiff
made in April 1935 and May 1936 were received by the
appellee; and the monthly payments made between said
two months were made entirely to The Mercantile &
Credit Agency, Inc., whom the appellant and the appellee
named as their trustee.
● As of the month of May 1936, the monthly installments
were paid in the following way: those that corresponded
to "El Ahorro Insular", to said corporation; and the rest,
that is, those that corresponded to the appellee were
deposited in the Notary Public of the CFI of Manila, to be
subject to the results of the lawsuit between the two
interested parties.
● The plaintiff Rosario Lim Queco, not knowing to which
of the two defendants to make the payments of certain
monthly installments she was obliged to make by virtue
of a contract that she entered into with them on August
11, 1933, filed this case in the Manila CFI, in accordance
with the provisions of article 120 of Law No. 190, to
request that they be forced to prove in court which of
96
them has the best right to receive said payments.
[interpleader]
● After the trial, the court declared that the defendant
Elena had a better right to receive the payments. The
defendant Rodolfo, who was not satisfied with the
Court's ruling, filed an appeal against it.
● Elena claims that since the four parcels were exclusively
hers because she had them while still single, they should
be considered as paraphernalia, and that for that reason
the payments should be made to her. Rodolfo also
separated already from her, obtained a divorce from her,
and is currently living maritally with Julia Medel and
Pinzon.
● Invoking Article 1412 of the Civil Code, Rodolfo claims
that the payments must be made to him because, being
a husband, he has the right to manage the assets of the
community property; and it also says that the house that
was built in the four urban estates of Elena, as well as
its rents, are community property.
ISSUES
1. Whether Elena’s properties sold to plaintiff form part of
the community property - NO, exclusive
2. Whether Rodolfo can claim the payments from the sale
of the properties - NO
RULING
● Rodolfo starts from the assumption that there is still a
marital property that must be administered by him, as
husband; but such assumption does NOT exist because
the couple does NOT appear in the records to have
contributed more than a part of the P795.90 with which
he and Elena completed the cost price of the house in
question; and said house has already been alienated to
 97
the plaintiff, with full knowledge and with the express DISPOSITIVE PORTION
consent of Rodolfo. Therefore, we affirm the decision and the appealed judgment,
● Article 1384 of the Civil Code provides that the with the costs to the appellant Rodolfo.
administration of the woman's paraphernalia must be in
her hands, except when she has delivered it to the
husband before a Notary Public, with the intention that
he administer it.
● No evidence has been presented to show that Elena ever
handed over the administration of her paraphernalia to
Rodolfo. On the contrary, it is inferred from the mortgage
and sale deeds that Elena granted with the consent of
Rodolfo, that she herself had the administration of her
assets and that she did not deliver them to Rodolfo.
● The loan from "El Ahorro Insular" cannot be considered
as community property. It is paraphernalia of Elena,
because if she obtained it, she was putting her own
paraphernalia as security for her payment; and of these
the law says that they are all those goods that the
woman contributes to the marriage without including
them in the dowry, and those that she acquires after the
same is constituted without adding them to it.
● The amount expressed in the sale is NOT a fruit of
paraphernalia of Elena, because strictly speaking it is
not, in the sense in which the phrase "fruits" is used in
articles 1385 and 1401 of the Civil Code.
● Since defendants dissolved their joint venture, and that
Rodolfo, upon receiving for his own and exclusive
benefit, the amount of P820.61 of the monthly payments
that plaintiff had been paying from October 1933 to May
1935, on account of her contract, of sale with Elena, he
received more than by far what he had contributed to
fully pay the cost of the construction of the house that
has been discussed, demonstrates how untenable and
unjustified the appeal of Rodolfo is.

CASE # 54
CALIMLIM v. FORTUN
GR No. L-57499 | TOPIC: Improvements on CPG
property
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Both the land and the building belong to the conjugal
partnership but the conjugal partnership is indebted to the
husband for the value of the land.
FACTS
1. Petitioner MERCEDES Calimlim-Canullas and
FERNANDO Canullas were married on December 19,
1962. They begot five children. They lived in a small
house on the residential land in question with an area
of approximately 891 square meters, located at
Bacabac, Bugallon, Pangasinan. After FERNANDO's
father died in 1965, FERNANDO inherited the land.
2. In 1978, FERNANDO abandoned his family and was living
with private respondent Corazon DAGUINES. During the
pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of
concubinage in a judgment rendered on October 27,
1981 by the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
Branch II, which judgment has become final.
3. On April 15, 1980, FERNANDO sold the subject property
with the house thereon to DAGUINES for the sum of
P2,000.00. In the document of sale, FERNANDO
described the house as "also inherited by me from my
deceased parents."
4. Unable to take possession of the lot and house,
DAGUINES initiated a complaint on June 19, 1980 for
quieting of title and damages against MERCEDES. The
latter resisted and claimed that the house in dispute
98
where she and her children were residing, including the
coconut trees on the land, were built and planted with
conjugal funds and through her industry; that the sale
of the land together with the house and improvements
to DAGUINES was null and void because they are
conjugal properties and she had not given her consent
to the sale,
5. In its original judgment, respondent Court principally
declared DAGUINES "as the lawful owner of the land in
question as well as the one-half () of the house erected
on said land."
ISSUES
Whether or not the construction of a conjugal house on the
exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the land the
character of conjugal property
RULING
The determination of the first issue revolves around the
interpretation to be given to the second paragraph of Article
158 of the Civil Code, which reads:
xxx xxx xxx
Buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership
during the marriage on land belonging to one of the
spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of
the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns
the same.
Pursuant to the foregoing provision, both the land and the
building belong to the conjugal partnership but the conjugal
partnership is indebted to the husband for the value of the
land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a creditor of the
 99
conjugal partnership for the value of the lot, which value
would be reimbursed at the liquidation of the conjugal DISPOSITIVE PORTION
partnership. WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Judge, dated
October 6, 1980, and his Resolution of November 27, 1980 on
It is true that in the case of Maramba vs. Lozano, relied upon petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby set aside
by respondent Judge, it was held that the land belonging to and the sale of the lot, house and improvements in question,
one of the spouses, upon which the spouses have built a is hereby declared null and void. No costs.
house, becomes conjugal property only when the conjugal
partnership is liquidated and indemnity paid to the owner of
the land. We believe that the better rule is that enunciated by
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Padilla vs. Paterno, 3 SCRA 678, 691
(1961), where the following was explained:

As to the above properties, their conversion from

paraphernal to conjugal assets should be deemed to
retroact to the time the conjugal buildings were first
constructed thereon or at the very latest, to the time
immediately before the death of Narciso A. Padilla that
ended the conjugal partnership. They can not be
considered to have become conjugal property only as of
the time their values were paid to the estate of the
widow Concepcion Paterno because by that time the
conjugal partnership no longer existed and it could not
acquire the ownership of said properties. The acquisition
by the partnership of these properties was, under the
1943 decision, subject to the suspensive condition that
their values would be reimbursed to the widow at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership; once paid, the
effects of the fulfillment of the condition should be
deemed to retroact to the date the obligation was
constituted (Art. 1187, New Civil Code) ...

The foregoing premises considered, it follows that FERNANDO

could not have alienated the house and lot to DAGUINES since
MERCEDES had not given her consent to said sale.

CASE # 55
Maramba v. Lozano
GR No. L-21533 | TOPIC: Improvements on CPG
property
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
It has been held by this Court that the construction of a house
at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the
spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.
It is true that in the meantime the conjugal partnership may
use both the land and the building, but it does so not as owner
but in the exercise of the right of usufruct.
The ownership of the land remains the same until the value
thereof is paid, and this payment can only be demanded in the
liquidation of the partnership
FACTS
● In November 1948, the Maramba filed an action against
Nieves de Lozano and her husband Pascual Lozano for
the collection of a sum of money. Trial court ruled in
favor of Maramba. Lozano filed an appeal with the CA
but this was dismissed.
● After the record of the case was remanded to the court
a quo, a writ of execution was issued and a levy was
made upon a parcel of land covered by transfer
certificate of title No, 8192 of Pangasinan in the name of
Nieves de Lozano.
○ The notice of sale at public auction was published
in accordance with law and scheduled.
● Nieves de Lozano made a partial satisfaction of the
judgment and requested for an adjournment of the sale
100
○ Later, she filed an amended motion alleging that
during the pendency of the case, Pascual Lozano
died and that the property levied upon was her
paraphernal property, and praying that her liability
be fixed at one-half (1/2) of the amount awarded
in the judgment and that pending the resolution
of the issue an order be issued restraining the
Sheriff from carrying out the auction sale.
● On that date the sale proceeded anyway, and the
property of Nieves de Lozano which has been levied upon
was sold to the judgment creditor.
● Trial court granted the motion of Lozano and modified
the writ of execution.
ISSUES
WON the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds
of the properties sold at public auction in view of the
presumption that it is conjugal in character although in the of
only one of the spouses? NO.
RULING
The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property
acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is
no showing as to when the property in question was acquired
and hence the fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is
determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his
brief that the property in question is paraphernal.
However, it has been held by this Court that the construction
of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one
of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal.
It is true that in the meantime the conjugal partnership may
use both in the land and the building, but it does so not as
 101
owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. The
ownership of the land remains the same until the value thereof
is paid, and this payment can only be demanded in the
liquidation of the partnership (Coingco vs. Flores, 82 Phil. 284;
Paterno vs. Bibby Vda. de Padilla, 74 Phil. 377; Testate Estate of
Narciso Padilla, G.R.No. L-8748, Dec. 26, 1961).

The record does not show that there has already been a
liquidation of the conjugal partnership between the late Pascual
Lozano and Nieves de Lozano. Consequently, the property
levied upon, being the separate property of defendant Nieves
de Lozano, cannot be made to answer for the liability of the
other defendant.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The foregoing petition of May 18, 1967 alleges facts which
occurred after the perfection of the present appeal and which
should therefore be submitted to and passed upon by the trial
court in connection with the implementation of the order
appealed from, which is hereby affirmed, with costs.

CASE # 56
Petrona Javier v. Osmena
G.R. No. L-9984 March 23, 1916 | TOPIC: 8. Charges
upon and obligations of CPG, FC 121
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
The fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of the assets
of the conjugal partnership, and are liable for the payment of
the marriage expenses.
FACTS
1. Petrona Javier was the only daughter of Felix Javier and
Matea Corunan.
a. When Matea died, Felix married Pascuala Santos.
b. Felix later died as well, and as an inheritance to
their only daughter, Petrona, she was given two
urban properties.
c. For the purpose of consolidating her full
ownership in and to both properties, Petrona
Javier acquired from her Pascuala (the second
wife), the latter's usufructuary right in Felix’
estate for the sum of P3,000.
d. Florentino Collantes married Petrona Javier in
1890.
2. Florentino Collantes became indebted to the estate of
Tomas Osmeña in the sum of P26,467.94.
3. These properties that were inherited by Petrona Javier
from her parents, and the usufructuary rights, were
those levied upon by the sheriff in the execution of the
judgment against Florentino Collantes, and
notwithstanding her protests, the sale was carried out.
a. Petrona Javier claimed that her husband Collantes
had no rights whatsoever in said two pieces of
102
property or in the usufructuary interest acquired
by her.
4. The CFI annulled only the sale of the two properties and
ordered the cancellation of their registration in the
property registry.
5. Thus, Defendant Osmena Estate appealed.
ISSUE
Whether or not the sum owed by the husband, Florentino
Collantes, to the Osmeña estate should be paid out of the fruits
and revenues of the two aforementioned parcels of land that
exclusively belong to the wife, Petrona Javier.
RULING
YES. The fruits and revenue from the two properties belonging
to the wife are liable for the payment of the debt owed by the
husband, the judgment debtor.
According to article 1384, the wife shall have the management
of her paraphernal property. Pursuant to article 1412, the
husband is the administrator of the community property of the
conjugal partnership and of the conjugal capital in general, and
the fruits of the paraphernal property form a part of the assets
of the conjugal partnership (art. 1385).
Nature of the debt: The debt arose out of the business
conducted by her father and subsequently by her husband.
When Felix Javier retired from the commission business in
1902, it appears that he was indebted to Tomas Osmeña in the
sum of four or five thousand pesos, and that this debt was
assumed by his successor Florentino Collantes. How this debt
originated, the record does not show. It must be observed that
there is the natural presumption of fact that whatever he
 103
(Collantes) may have contributed toward defraying the appealed from, are liable for the payment of the debt owing by
expenses of his family, was contributed by him out of what he the husband, the judgment debtor, and that there is no need for
earned by the commission which paid him for the services he the appointment of a receiver. Without special finding as to
rendered to his clients as a broker (as commission merchant). costs, it is so ordered.
- The debts contracted for and in the exercise of such
industry or profession cannot be considered as his
personal and private debts, nor can they be excepted
from payment out of the products or revenue of the
wife's own property, which, like that of her husband's, is
liable for the discharge of the marriage liabilities.

It is decisive and conclusive that the debt must be paid out of

the community property of the marriage, since article 1408 of
the Civil Code provides:

The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:

1. All the debts and obligations contracted during the

marriage by the husband,
xxx xxx xxx
5. The support of the family . . . .

According to article 1385, "the fruits of the paraphernal property

form a part of the assets of the conjugal partnership, and are
liable for the payment of the marriage expenses", hence it
follows that the creditor of the husband may bring his action,
not against the paraphernal property, but against the fruits and
revenues of this private property of the wife.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The lower court having failed to make any ruling on the
declaration and the appointment prayed for by appellant, the
judgment appealed from is reversed in so far as regards this
omission, and we hold that the fruits and revenue from the two
properties belonging to the wife, described in the judgment
 104
CASE # 57
claiming that she has the existing right over ½ of the subject
property.
Vda. Sta. Romana v PCIB
GR No. L-56479 | TOPIC: Charges upon and ISSUES
obligations of the CPG
W/N the decision of the lower court, which ordered the rescission
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE of the contract to sell between Ramon and C.N Hodges, should
bind the petitioner despite her not being a party to the suit filed,
FACTS since she was the wife of Ramon. (Yes)

● Ramon Sta. Romana purchased the subject property from C.N RULING
Hodges under a Contract to Sell, which was presumably for the
● The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court and ruled that
benefit of the conjugal partnership.
the petitioner is bound by the said decision.
● When Ramon failed to pay the purchase price of the subject
● The Court held that, first, the liability incurred by the husband,
property, PCIB (respondent bank), acting as the administrator
Ramon, involving an obligation contracted by him for the benefit
of the estate of C.N Hodges, filed a civil case for the rescission
of the conjugal partnership is chargeable against the conjugal
with damages and for the recovery of the subject property.
partnership assets.
● The respondent bank filed a motion for a writ of preliminary
● Second, the inclusion of the wife as party defendant in a suit
attachment which was then issued and that the subject property
against the husband to enforce an obligation either pertaining
was levied upon.
to him alone or one chargeable against the conjugal partnership
● The trial court rescinded the Contract of Sale and ordered
in order to bind the conjugal property is not necessary since the
Ramon to return the possession of the subject property to the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal property.
respondent bank as well to pay rentals and damages.
● Moreover, the Court also ruled that the present civil action filed
● This decision was affirmed by the CA, which became final and
by the petitioner is already barred by res judicata.
executory. A writ of execution was then issued.
● When Ramon died intestate, his wife, Socorro Sta. Romana DISPOSITIVE PORTION
(petitioner) filed a motion to quash the writ of execution alleging WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the Orders of the
that the case before the lower courts did not affect her rights
respondent Judge issued in Civil Case No. 13533 dated March 5,
and interests over the subject property since she was not a party
1980 and May 15, 1980 are hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against
to the said action.
the petitioner.
● This was, however, denied by the trial court and a public auction
was held. The reconsideration was also denied.
● Instead of filing an appeal, the petitioner filed a civil action for
the annulment of the execution sale of the subject property
 105
CASE # 58
● In this case, respondent Confesor signed the second
promissory note for the benefit of the conjugal
DBP v. Adil
partnership. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for
GR No. L-48889 | TOPIC: Charges upon and
this obligation.
obligations of CPG, FC 121 (with consent)

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the petition is reversed
and set aside and another decision is hereby rendered
FACTS reinstating the decision of the City Court of Iloilo City of
● Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte December 27, 1976, without pronouncement as to costs in this
obtained an agricultural loan from the DBP in the sum instance. This decision is immediately executory and no
of P2,000.00 in a promissory note whereby they bound motion for extension of time to file motion for reconsideration
themselves jointly and severally to pay the account in shall be granted.
ten (10) equal yearly amortizations.
● The obligation remained outstanding and unpaid.
● Confesor, who was by then a member of the Congress
of the Philippines, executed a second promissory note
on April 11, 1961 expressly acknowledging said loan and
promising to pay the same on or before June 15, 1961.
● They defaulted in payment, prompting DBP to file a
complaint.
● Inferior court ordered payment but the CFI of Iloilo
reversed the order.

ISSUES
Whether or not conjugal partnership may be used to pay debt
in promissory note when husband was the only one who
signed it - Yes
RULING
● Article 165 of the Civil Code, the husband is the
administrator of the conjugal partnership. All debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership, are chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.

CASE # 59
Luzon Surety v. de Garcia
GR No. L-25659. October 31, 1969
TOPIC: Charges upon and obligations of CPG,
FC 121; b. Without consent
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership under
NCC 161 (and FC121(2)) is liable only for such "debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership." There must be the requisite showing
then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare
of the spouses.
FACTS
● A certain Chavez as principal, and petitioner surety
company executed a surety bond in favor of PNB,
Victorias Branch, to guaranty a crop loan granted by the
later to Chavez worth P 9,000.
● Vicente Garcia, with Chavez and one Lacson, as
guarantors signed an indemnity agreement which bound
themselves jointly and severally
○ to indemnify the petitioner against any and all
damages and expenses it may incur in becoming
guarantor upon said bond.
○ to pay interest at 12% per annum computed and
computed quarterly until fully paid.
○ To pay 15% of any litigation fees.
● PNB filed a case at the CFI of Negros Occidental against
Chavez and Luzon Surety to recover P4,577.95 pesos, in
interest, attorneys fees, and cost of suit.
● Petitioner filed a third-party complaint against Chavez,
Lacson, and Garcia based on the indemnity agreement.
106
● The CFI issued a writ of execution against Vicente Garcia
for the satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum
of P 8,839.97 pesos.
○ A writ of garnishment was issued levying and
garnishing the sugar quedan of the now
respondent-spouses Garcia from their Sugar
plantation, registered in both their names.
● The Garcias filed an injunction against the writ of
garnishment arguing that the sugat was owned by the
conjugal partenrship.
CFI & CA: Ruled in favor of the respondent spouses. The
garnishment was contrary to Art. 161 of the NCC.
● Art. 161. The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1)
All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those
contracted by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the
cases where she may legally bind the partnership;; xxx
xxx
● FOR COMPARISON FC 121: Art. 121. The conjugal
partnership shall be liable for: (2) All debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership of gains, or by both spouses or by
one of them with the consent of the other;
ISSUES
Whether or not a conjugal partnership, in the absence of any
showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to
accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company. (NO)
RULING
● The SC reiterated the CA ruling.
 107
● "It is true that the husband is the administrator of the
conjugal property pursuant to the provisions of Art. 163
of the new Civil Code. However, as such administrator the
only obligations incurred by the husband that are
chargeable against the conjugal property are those
incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession
or business with the honest belief that he is doing right
for the benefit of the family.
● This is not true in the case at bar for we believe that the
husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in
an indemnity agreement as that involved in this case did
not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Such
inference is more emphatic in this case, when no proof is
presented that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or
guarantor received consideration therefor, which may
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership."
● In the most categorical language, a conjugal partnership
under NCC 161 (and FC121(2)) is liable only for such
"debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership."
● There must be the requisite showing of some advantage
which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
There is none in this case.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals of
December 17, 1965, now under review, is affirmed with costs
against petitioner Luzon Surety Co., Inc.

CASE # 60
BA Finance v. CA 161 SCRA 608
G.R. No. L-61464 May 28, 1988
Charges on CPG, J. GUTIERREZ
FACTS
1. On July 1, 1975, private respondent Augusto Yulo
secured a loan from the petitioner in the amount of
P591,003.59 as evidenced by a promissory note he
signed in his own behalf and as representative of the A
& L Industries. Respondent Yulo presented an alleged
special power of attorney executed by his wife,
respondent Lily Yulo, who manages A & L Industries and
under whose name the said business is registered,
purportedly authorizing Augusto Yulo to procure the
loan and sign the promissory note. About two months
prior to the loan, however, Augusto Yulo had already
left Lily Yulo and their children and had abandoned
their conjugal home. When the obligation became due
and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed to pay the same.
2. On October 7, 1975, the petitioner filed its amended
complaint against the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo on
the basis of the promissory note. It also prayed for the
issuance of a writ of attatchment alleging that the said
spouses were guilty of fraud in contracting the debt
upon which the action was brought.
ISSUES
W/N the attached properties are deemed conjugal and may be
charged for the obligation to petitioner?
RULING
108
NO. While it is true that A & L Industries is a single
proprietorship and the registered owner is respondent Lily
Yulo, the said proprietorship was established during the
marriage and its assets were also acquired during the same.
Therefore, it is presumed that this property forms part of the
conjugal partnership of the spouses Augusto and Lily Yulo and
thus, could be held liable for the obligations contracted by
Augusto Yulo, as administrator of the partnership.
However, for the said property to be held liable, the obligation
contracted by the husband must have redounded to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the
Civil Code. In the present case, the obligation which the
petitioner is seeking to enforce against the conjugal property
managed by the private respondent Lily Yulo was undoubtedly
contracted by Augusto Yulo for his own benefit because at the
time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his
family and had left their conjugal home. Worse, he made it
appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A &
L Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner. Clearly,
to make A & L Industries liable now for the said loan would be
unjust and contrary to the express provision of the Civil Code.
We, therefore, rule that the petitioner cannot enforce the
obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against his conjugal
properties with respondent Lily Yulo. Thus, it follows that the
writ of attachment cannot issue against the said properties.
 109
CASE # 61

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 62
People v. Froilan Lagrimas
GR No. L- 25355 | TOPIC: August 28, 1969
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
1. On Feb. 19, 1960, an information was filed against the
accused, Froilan Lagrimas, for murder committed on
Feb. 15, 1960 in Pambujan, Samar.
2. The heirs of Pelagio Cagro, the murdered victim, filed a
motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment on the property of the accused, which was
granted.
3. Trial court found the accused guilty of the crime
charged and sentenced to reclusion perpetua plus
damages.
4. A writ of execution to cover the civil indemnity was
issued by the lower court upon motion of appellants. A
levy was had on 11 parcels of land in the province in the
name of the accused.
5. The sale was scheduled Jan. 5, 1965, but on Dec. 29,
1964, the wife of the accused, Mercedes de Aguirre de
Lagrimas, filed a motion to quash the writ of
attachment as well as the writ of execution on the
ground that the property levied upon is conjugal
property and therefore, could not be held liable for the
pecuniary indemnity the husband was required to pay.
6. Lower Court granted the motion declaring null and void
the order of attachment and writ of execution, in
accordance with Art. 161 of NCC.
110
7. Another judge of the same lower court set aside such
order, sustaining the legality of the preliminary
attachment and writ of execution.
8. A third judge revived the original order declaring such
attachment and writ of execution issued as null and
void.
9. Hence, this appeal by the heirs of the murdered victim.
ISSUES
W/N conjugal properties may be enforced against the
pecuniary indemnity incurred by either of the spouse.
RULING
YES.
Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife
"may be enforced against the partnership assets after the
responsibilities enumerated in article 161 have been covered, if
the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or
if it should be insufficient.
The law speaks of "partnership assets." It contemplates that
the responsibilities to which enumerated in Article 161,
chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. It
is thus obvious that the termination of the conjugal partnership
is not contemplated as a prerequisite. Whatever doubt may still
remain should be erased by the concluding portion of this
article which provides that "at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership such spouse shall be charged for what has been
paid for the purposes above-mentioned."
The accused, Froilan Lagrimas, was, as noted, found guilty of
the crime of murder and sentenced to reclusion perpetua as

well as to pay the indemnification to satisfy the civil liability
incumbent upon him. If the appealed order were to be upheld,
he would be in effect exempt therefrom, the heirs of the
offended party being made to suffer still further.
111
conjugal assets, forms the exception to the general rule, it is
incumbent upon the one who invokes this provision or the
creditor to show that the requisites for its applicability are
obtaining."

It would follow, therefore, that the Civil Code provision, as
thus worded, precisely minimizes the possibility that such
additional liability of an accused would be rendered nugatory.
In doing justice to the heirs of the murdered victim, no
injustice is committed against the family of the offender. It is
made a condition under this article of the Civil Code that the
responsibilities enumerated in Article 161, covering primarily
the maintenance of the family and the education of the
children of the spouses or the legitimate children of one of
them as well as other obligations of a preferential character,
are first satisfied. It is thus apparent that the legal scheme
cannot be susceptible to the charge that for a transgression
of the law by either husband or wife, the rest of the family
may be made to bear burdens of an extremely onerous
character.
The next question is how practical effect would be given this
particular liability of the conjugal partnership for the payment
of fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or
wife? In the brief for appellants, the heirs of Pelagio Cagro,
they seek the opportunity to present evidence as to how the
partnership assets could be made to respond, this on the
assumption that the property levied upon does not belong
exclusively to the convicted spouse.
Considering that the obligations mentioned in Article 161 are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife
whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof required
of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the most
exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the
husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the
conjugal partnership, may find the temptation to magnify its
obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the
family of the offended party. That result is to be avoided. The
lower court should be on the alert, therefore, in the appraisal
of whatever evidence may be offered to assure compliance with
this codal provision.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of August 7, 1965 is set aside
and the case remanded to the court of origin for the reception
of evidence in accordance with this opinion. With costs against
appellee Mercedes Aguirre de Lagrimas.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION

In Lacson v. Diaz, which deals with the satisfaction of the debt

contracted by husband or wife before marriage by the
conjugal partnership, likewise included in this particular
article, it was held: "Considering that the enforceability of the
personal obligations of the husband or wife, against the
 112
CASE # 63

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 64
FELIPE V. HEIRS OF ALDON
GR No. L-60174 | TOPIC: Disposition and
encumbrance FC 124-125
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Contract entered into by wife, without the consent of the
husband is voidable. Disposition of conjugal assets by wife
without the consent of the husband is void.
FACTS
● Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara in 1936. The
spouses bought several pieces of land in 1948-1950. In
1960-1962, said lands were partitioned into 3 lots
● In 1951 – the wife sold the lots to the petitioners without
the consent of her husband
● On April 26, 1976, the heirs of Aldon (wife and children)
filed a complaint against the petitioners alleging that
they had orally mortgaged the said properties to the
Felipes and that an offer to redeem the properties was
made but they refused.
● RTC ruled in favor of Felipe, declaring that they were the
rightful owners of the lots in question.
● CA reversed the decision on the ground that the sale
instituted by the wife was invalid since the properties
were conjugal in nature and the sale was done without
the consent of the husband
ISSUE
Whether or not the sale of the properties in question was
valid even without the consent of the husband? - NO
RULING
113
● No. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. Subject to certain exceptions, the husband
can not alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. And the
wife can not bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law. In
the instant case, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging
to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the
husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase
"except in cases provided by law." Therefore, the sale
made by Gimena is a defective contract falling within the
category of a voidable one, as contracts entered by the
wife without the consent of the husband when such
consent is required, are annullable at his instance during
the marriage and within 10 years from the transaction
questioned.
● The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to
annulment by her husband only during the marriage
because he was the victim who had an interest in the
contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the
defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children
could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract
while the marriage subsisted because they merely had
an inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of
the marriage and the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership by the death of Maximo Aldon did not
improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do
during the marriage, she could not do thereafter. The
case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the
death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the
defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their
hereditary rights in their father’s share in the lands. The
father’s share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their
 114
share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3)
pertaining to the widow.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
 115
CASE # 65

CASE TITLE
GR No. | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

FACTS

ISSUES

RULING

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

CASE # 67
De la Cruz v. De La Cruz
G.R. No. L-19565 | TOPIC: Effect of
abandonment, FC 128 (cf. FC 101)
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
To constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there
must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties
and rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
FACTS
1. The plaintiff Estrella de la Cruz filed a complaint
alleging in essence that her husband, the defendant
Severino de la Cruz, had not only abandoned her but as
well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership
properties, and praying for (1) separation of property, (2)
monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the
action, and (3) Atty’s fees.
2. The plaintiff and the defendant were married in
Bacolod City, had 6 children, and during their coverture
they acquired seven parcels of land of the Bacolod
Cadastre and three parcels of the Silay Cadastre. They
are also engaged in varied business ventures.
3. Petitioner’s evidence:
a. The defendant started living in Manila in 1955,
although he occasionally returned to Bacolod
City, sleeping in his office at the Philippine
Texboard Factory in Mandalagan, instead of in
the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Since 1955
the defendant had not slept in the conjugal
dwelling although in the said year he paid short
visits during which they engaged in brief
conversations
116
b. After 1955 up to the time of the trial, the
defendant had never visited the conjugal abode,
and when he was in Bacolod, she was denied
communication with him.
c. He has abandoned her and their children, to live
in Manila with his concubine, Nenita Hernandez.
4. Defendant argued:
a. The defendant, for his part, denied having
abandoned his wife and children, but admitted
that in 1957, or a year before the filing of the
action, he started to live separately from his
wife. When he transferred his living quarters to
his office in Mandalagan, Bacolod City, his
intention was not, as it never has been, to
abandon his wife and children, but only to teach
her a lesson as she was quarrelsome and
extremely jealous of every woman
5. It will be noted that the plaintiff does not ask for legal
separation. The evidence presented by her to prove
concubinage on the part of the defendant, while
pertinent and material in the determination of the
merits of a petition for legal separation, must in this
case be regarded merely as an attempt to bolster her
claim that the defendant had abandoned her, which
abandonment, if it constitutes abandonment in law,
would justify separation of the conjugal assets under
the applicable provisions of article 178 of the new Civil
Code
ISSUES
WON the separation of the defendant from the plaintiff
constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation
of the conjugal partnership properties. NO.

RULING
The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by article 178
when she has been abandoned by the husband for at least
one year are the same as those granted to her by article 167 in
case of abuse of the powers of administration by the husband.
To entitle her to any of these remedies, under article 178,
there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. 1
The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement
but also amount to financial and moral desertion.
The concept of abandonment in article 178 may be
established in relation to the alternative remedies granted to
the wife when she has been abandoned by the husband,
namely, receivership, administration by her, or separation of
property, all of which are designed to protect the conjugal
assets from waste and dissipation rendered imminent by the
husband's continued absence from the conjugal abode, and to
assure the wife of a ready and steady source of support.
Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of
the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary
departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the
management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give
support to his wife. The word "abandon", in its ordinary sense,
means to forsake entirely; to forsake or renounce utterly.
To constitute abandonment of the wife by the husband, there
must be absolute cessation of marital relations and duties and
rights, with the intention of perpetual separation.
The defendant did not intend to leave his wife and children
permanently. The record conclusively shows that he
continued to give support to his family despite his absence
117
from the conjugal home. This fact is admitted by the
complainant, although she minimized the amount of support
given, saying that it was only P500 monthly. There is good
reason to believe, however, that she and the children received
more than this amount, as the defendant's claim that his wife
and children continued to draw from his office more than
P500 monthly was substantially corroborated by a witness.
The fact that the defendant never ceased to give support to
his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to
return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties
and rights.
[concubinage allegation] We believe, contrary to the findings
of the court a quo, that the evidence on record fails to
preponderate in favor of the plaintiff's thesis. The proof that
Nenita Hernandez was the concubine of the defendant and
that they were living as husband and wife in Manila, is
altogether too indefinite. No evidence.
[allegation that the defendant had mismanaged the conjugal
partnership property] There is absolutely no evidence to show
that he has squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the
contrary, he proved that through his industry and zeal, the
conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a
value of over a million pesos.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo, insofar as it decrees
separation of the conjugal properties, is reversed and set
aside. Conformably to our observations, however, the
defendant is ordered to pay to the plaintiff, in the concept of
support, the amount of P3,000 per month, until he shall have
rejoined her in the conjugal home, which amount may, in the
meantime, be reduced or increased in the discretion of the
 118
court a quo as circumstances warrant. The award of
attorney's fees to the plaintiff is reduced to P10,000, without
interest. No pronouncement as to costs.

CASE # 68
Beumer v. Amores
G.R. No. 195670 Dec 3, 2012 | TOPIC: EFFECT
OF DISSOLUTION
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and
non-citizens in owning Philippine land, hence, a foreigner may
not seek its reimbursement from a former Filipina spouse in a
petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership
FACTS
- Beumer, a Dutch National, and Amores, a Filipina, married
in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC declared the
nullity of their marriage in November 10, 2000 decision on
the basis of Article 36 FC.
- Petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal
Partnership on December 14, 2000 praying for the
distribution of the following described properties claimed
to have been acquired during the subsistence of their
marriage:
By Purchase:
● Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144
& 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, containing an
area of 252 sq.m., including a residential house
constructed thereon.
● Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, containing an
area of 806 sq.m., including a residential house
constructed thereon.
● Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, containing an
area of 756 sq.m.
119
● Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144
& 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, containing an
area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
● 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre
containing an area of 2,635 sq.m. (the area that
appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45
sq.m.).
● 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre
containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the area that
appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).
- Respondent averred that, with the exception of their two
(2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she and petitioner
did not acquire any conjugal properties during their
marriage, the truth being that she used her own personal
money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her
personal funds (her earnings from selling jewelry and other
products) and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way of
inheritance.
- She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and
petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased Lot 2142
and the improvements thereon using her own money. She
further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their
marriage in 1996, petitioner transferred to their second
house and brought along with him certain personal
properties, consisting of drills, a welding machine, grinders,
clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment
have a total cost of P500,000.00.
- During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845
and 4 were registered in the name of respondent, these
properties were acquired with the money he received from
the Dutch government as his disability benefit. He also

claimed that the joint affidavit they submitted before the
Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article
89 of the Family Code, hence, invalid.
- RTC: Dissolving the parties’ conjugal partnership, awarding
all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal
properties; the tools and equipment in favor of petitioner
as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on
Lots 1 and 2142 as co-owned by the parties.
● Regardless of the source of funds for the
acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner
could not have acquired any right whatsoever
over these properties as petitioner still
attempted to acquire them notwithstanding his
knowledge of the constitutional prohibition
against foreign ownership of private lands.
● Petitioner’s plea for reimbursement for the
amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing
properties on the basis of equity was likewise
denied for not having come to court with clean
hands.
- CA: Affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC.
ISSUES
W/N a foreigner may seek reimbursement from a former spouse
in a petition for dissolution of conjugal partnership?
RULING
IN THIS CASE, petitioner’s statements regarding the real source
of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of land dilute
the veracity of his claims:
- While admitting to have previously executed a joint
affidavit that respondent’s personal funds were used to
purchase Lot 1, he likewise claimed that his personal
disability funds were used to acquire the same.
120
- Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness.
Thus, as petitioner has come before the Court with
unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any
equitable refuge.
- In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of
equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties
by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and
will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because
of public policy, cannot be done directly.
- Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the
law is null and void, vests no rights, creates no obligations
and produces no legal effect at all. Corollary thereto,
under Article 1412 of the Civil Code, petitioner cannot have
the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to
recover the money he had spent for the purchase thereof.
- The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or
agreement; it leaves the parties where it finds them.
Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an
unconstitutional transaction knowingly entered into.
In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena
Buenaventura Muller v. Helmut Muller:
- the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement
of the value of purchased parcels of Philippine land
instituted by a foreigner against his former Filipina spouse.
- It held that Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and
knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition
against foreign ownership of Philippine land enshrined
under Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
 121
Beumer openly admitted that he "is well aware of the
constitutional prohibition" and even asseverated that, because
of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject
properties in the latter’s name. Clearly, petitioner’s actuations
showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional
prohibition. On the basis of such admission, the Court finds no
reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and
accordingly, deny petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.

Neither can the Court grant petitioner’s claim for

reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment. As held in
Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking
monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase of
Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not
apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution. Nor would
the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his
foreign citizenship.

Precisely, it is the Constitution itself which demarcates the

rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To
be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only
to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements
built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and
2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned by the
parties subject to partition.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed

October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.

CASE # 69
Santero v. CFI
GR No. L-61700 | TOPIC: Support during CPG
liquidation, FC 133
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
● Princesita Santos-Morales, Frederico Santero and Willie
Santero (petitioners) are children of the late Pablo
Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel Santero (respondents) are 4 of
the 7 children by Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz.
● Both sets of children are the natural children of the
late Pablo since neither of their mothers was married to
their father.
● Pablo was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero
and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero.
● The issue in this case springs from the Motion for
Allowance filed by Respondents through their guardian,
Anselma in 1981 wherein the ground cited for support
which included educational expenses, clothing and
medical necessities, which was granted.
● Again, Respondents filed a Motion for Allowance in
1982, citing the same grounds.
○ Petitioners opposed and contended that the
wards for whom allowance is sought are no
longer schooling and have attained majority age
so that they are no longer under guardianship.
○ They likewise allege that the administrator does
not have sufficient funds to cover the said
allowance because whatever funds are in the
hands of the administrator, they constitute funds
122
held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be
adjudges as owners of the Kawit property from
which said administrator derives the only income
of the intestate estate of Pablo.
● In the reply to the Opposition filed by Anselma, she
admitted that some of her children are of age and not
enrolled for the first semester due to lack of funds but
will be enrolled as soon as they are given the requested
allowances, citing Art. 290 of the Civil Code and Sec. 3,
Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
● CFI granted the allowance of P2,000 each to the
Respondents.
● While the case was pending in the SC, Respondents
filed another Motion for Allowance to include Juanita,
Estelita and Pedro Santero as children of Pablo with
Anselma praying that an order be granted directing the
administrator to deliver P6,000 to each of the 7
children as their allowance.
○ CFI granted again but Petitioners asked the CFI
to reconsider.
● An Amended Order was issued directing Anselma to
submit her clarification or explanation as to the
additional 3 children included.
○ Anselma stated that in her previous motions,
only the last 4 minor children were included and
her first 3 who were then of age should have
been included since all her children have the
right to receive allowance as advance payment of
their shares in the inheritance of Pablo under Art.
188 of the NCC.
● CFI issued another Order directing the administrator to
get back the allowance of the 3 additional recipients or
children of Anselma.

● Petitioners argue that Respondents are not entitled to
any allowance since they have already attained
majority, 2 are gainfully employed and 1 is married as
provided for under Sec. 3, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.
● Petitioners also allege that there was misrepresentation
on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for
tuition fees, book and other school materials and other
miscellaneous expenses for school term 1982-83
because these wards have already attained majority age
so that they are no longer under guardianship.
123
procedural rule. (Note: spouse, however, must be
legitimate spouse.)
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforementioned
circumstances, the instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and
the assailed judgment is AFFIRMED.

ISSUES
W/N allowance should be granted to Respondents despite the
fact that all of them are not minors and all are gainfully
employed with the exception of Miguel? YES.

RULING
● The controlling provision of law is not Rule 83, Sec. 3
but Arts. 290 and 188 of the NCC.
● The fact that Respondents are of age, gainfully
employed, or married is of no moment and should not
be regarded as the determining factor of their right to
allowance under Art. 188.
● While the RoC limits the allowances to the widow and
minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the
NCC gives the surviving spouse and his/her children
without distinction.
● Hence, Respondents are entitled to allowances as
advances from their shares in the inheritance from their
father Pablo.
○ Since the provisions of the NCC, a substantive
law, gives the surviving spouse and to the
children the right to receive support during the
liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such
right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 which is a

CASE # 70
Garcia v. Manzano, 103 Phil. 798
G.R. No. L-8190. May 28, 1958; J.B.L. Reyes
TOPIC: Judicial Separation of Property
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Highlighted in the Ruling
FACTS
1. Plaintiff Gonzalo Garcia filed a suit for judicial
declaration of separation of conjugal property against his
wife defendant Consolation Manzano.
2. Garcia alleged that he and his wife had been living
separately since 1948, and that every attempt at
reconciliation between them has failed.
3. Moreover, Garcia was employed at a slaughter house in
Manila, while his wife, with his knowledge and consent,
was engaged in the business of slaughtering and selling
fresh cattle meat in Manila – as a result of their joint
efforts, they were able to acquire real and personal
properties.
4. However, upon their separation de facto, her wife
assumed complete management and administration of
their conjugal partnership and has been since then
enjoying their conjugal property, its fruits, and its
accessions to the prejudice of the plaintiff Garcia.
5. Furthermore, defendant Manzano allegedly arranged a
fictitious transfer or alienation of majority of the
conjugal properties in favor of 3rd persons and has since
then neglected to file any income tax returns.
6. Thus, Garcia filed this case. However, the CFI ruled in
favor of the motion to dismiss by Manzano because the
complaint has failed to state a cause of action.
124
7. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
WON Garcia has a cause of action to file for the judicial
separation of their conjugal property? No
RULING
No, the complaint does not establish a case for separation of
property. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a régime of
separation – as not in harmony with the unity of the family and
the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses – the
Civil Codes (both old and new) require that separation of
property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in
marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by
formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage
(Article 190, new Civil Code; Article 1432, old Code); and in the
latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes
specified in Article 191 of the Civil Code:
"ART. 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and
it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner, [1] has been sentenced
to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or [2] has been declared
absent, or [3] when legal separation has been granted.
In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
property of the husband, or in case of abandonment by the husband,
separation of property may also be ordered by the court according to the
provisions of articles 167 and 173 No. 3.
In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been
entered against the guilty or absent spouse.
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors
of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall
be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing
to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the
creditors and other third persons.

After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Arts 214 and
215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition
stated in Arts. 498 to 501 shall be applicable."
The above enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view
of the Code's restrictive policy.
—---------------------------------------------------------
SIDE ISSUE
May Articles 167 and 178 of the NCC apply to Garcia – in cases
of maladministration and mismanagement of the conjugal
properties by the wife – despite the express mention in these
articles to be the wife’s exclusive remedy? NO
SIDE RULING
No, Garcia’s contention ignores the philosophy underlying the
provisions in question. The wife is granted a remedy against the
mismanagement or maladministration of the husband because
by express provision of law, it is the husband who has the
administration of the conjugal partnership pursuant to Art. 165
and 172 of the NCC. In the system established by the Code the
wife does not administer the conjugal partnership unless with
the consent of the husband, or by decree of court and under its
supervision (Arts. 168, 196) "with such limitations as they (the
courts) may deem advisable" (Art. 197 in relation to Article 196).
Thus, the wife can not mismanage the conjugal partnership
property or affairs, unless the husband or the courts tolerate
it. In the event of such maladministration by the wife
(disregarding the case of judicial authorization to have the wife
manage the partnership because such a case is not involved),
the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation
of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and
resume the administration of the community property and the
conduct of the affairs of the conjugal partnership.
Garcia may enforce his right of possession and control of the
conjugal property against his wife and seek such ancillary
125
remedies as may, be required by the circumstances, even to the
extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations
or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For
this reason, the articles 165 and 172 contemplate exclusively
the remedies available to the wife (who is not the legal
administrator of the partnership under the NCC) against the
abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can
commit such abuses.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against appellant. So ordered.
OTHER NOTES:
"ART. 167. In case of abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership
property by the husband, the courts, on petition of the wife, may provide for a
receivership, or administration by the wife, or separation of property."
"ART. 178. The separation in fact between husband and wife without judicial approval,
shall not affect the conjugal partnership, except that:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live therein, without
just cause, shall not have a right to be supported;
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other is required
by law, judicial authorization shall be necessary;
3. If the husband has abandoned the wife without just cause for at least one
year, she may petition the court for a receivership, or administration by her
of the conjugal partnership property, or separation of property."
CASE # 71

Maxey v. CA
GR No. L-45870 | TOPIC: Unions under Art. 147
FACTS
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living together in
1903. Their children claim that their parents were united in 1903 in
a marriage performed "in the military fashion". Both the trial court
and the appellate court rejected this claim of a "military fashion"
marriage.
The couple had several children. Except for the youngest son, all
the children were born before the disputed properties were
acquired.
The disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and 1912 before the
1919 church marriage. Regina Morales Maxey died in 1919 sometime
after the church wedding. The husband remarried and in 1953, his
second wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney,
sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and Mrs. Beato
C. Macayra.
The children instituted the present case praying for the annulment
of the documents of sale covering the subject parcels of land and
to recover possession thereof with damages from the herein
defendants-spouses, alleging, among others, that the aforesaid
realties were common properties of their parents, having been
acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and
capital; and that the sales of the of the said lands in favor of the
defendants-spouses in 1953, after the death of their mother,
Regina Morales, was executed by their father, Melbourne Maxey,
without their knowledge and consent; and that they came to know
of the above mentioned sales only in 1961.
126
ISSUES: Whether or not the properties were the exclusive
property of Melbourne (husband) - No
RULING
Article 144 of the Civil Code provides that “When a man and a
woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, or their marriage is void, the property acquired by either
of them through their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules of co-ownership.”
The Supreme Court interpreted this to mean that the property
governed by the rules of co-ownership may be acquired by either
or both of them through their work or industry. Even if it is only
the man who works, the property acquired during the relationship
belongs to the two of them. The Supreme Court appreciated the
respective roles expected of a man and woman in a relationship,
particularly at that time. It would be unreasonable to expect that
the woman must make monetary contributions to a relationship
before she has a share in the properties because at that time
women were expected to see to the household, not work outside
of it.
The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property mentioned in
Yaptinchay vs. Torres (28 SCRA 489) must include not only the
earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business
but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual
goods through caring for the children, administering the
household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from
household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties
of a housewife.
Since the parcels of land were property of both Melbourne and the
estate of Regina when they were sold, the petitioners were ordered
to return one half of the purchase price to the respondents and
the respondents were ordered to return one-half of the properties
to the heirs of Regina.
 127

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby

granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and
set aside insofar as one-half of the disputed properties are
concerned. The private respondents are ordered to return one-
half of said properties to the heirs of Regina Morales. No costs.
 128
CASE # 72
FACTS

Case Title
ISSUE
GR No., Date | TOPIC:
RULING

DOCTRINE WHEREFORE
 129
CASE # 73

Case Title
33 SCRA 615 June 30, 1970 | TOPIC: Property
regimes of unions without marriage

CASE # 74
Gomez v. Lipana
33 SCRA 615 June 30, 1970 | TOPIC: Property
regimes of unions without marriage
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
FACTS
● Joaquin P. Lipana, contracted two marriages: the first
with Maria Loreto Ancino in 1930 and the second with
Isidra Gomez y Aquino in 1935.
● At the time of the second marriage the first was still
subsisting, which fact, however, Lipana concealed from
the second wife.
● On December 17, 1943 the spouses of the second
marriage acquired by purchase a piece of land in Cubao,
Quezon City, for the price of P3,000.00.
● The Torrens title for the property was issued on
February 1, 1944, in the name of "Joaquin Lipana
married to Isidra Gomez."
● On July 20, 1958 Isidra Gomez died intestate and
childless, and survived only by her sisters as the
nearest relatives.
● On August 7, 1961 Ofelia Gomez, judicial administratrix
of her estate, commenced the present suit, praying for
the forfeiture of the husband's share in the Cubao
property in favor of the said estate. Reliance is placed
on Art. 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code:
● The partnership company concludes when the marriage
is dissolved or declared void. The spouse who, due to his
bad faith, was the cause of the nullity, will not have a
share in the property.
130
● The trial court, ruling that the second marriage was void
ab initio and that the husband was the one who gave
cause for its nullity, applied the aforequoted provision
and declared his interest in the disputed property
forfeited in favor of the estate of the deceased second
wife.
● In the present appeal by the defendant he attributes
two errors to the trial court: (1) in allowing a collateral
attack on the validity of the second marriage and in
holding it to be bigamous and void ab initio; and (2) in
holding that Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code is
applicable in this case.
NOTE: The second marriage was contracted in 1935 when the
Spanish Civil Code was still in force and terminated in 1958
when the NCC was already in force.
ISSUES
Whether or not the husband, after contracting a second
marriage while his first marriage subsists, forfeits his share in
the conjugal property particularly the purchased in QC during
the second marriage?
RULING
No. Since the defendant's first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first
wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her
husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his
estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting
marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the

husband's share in the property here in dispute, even if it was
acquired during the second marriage, of which interest she
would be deprived if his share should be declared forfeited in
favor of the second wife.
While insofar as the second wife was concerned, she having
acted in good faith, her marriage produced civil effects and
gave rise, just the same, to the formation of a conjugal
partnership wherein she was entitled to an equal share upon
dissolution, no action lies for the forfeiture of the husband's
share in her favor, much less in favor of her estate, with
respect to which there are after all no children, but only
collateral relatives, who are entitled to succeed.
The conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved by the death of the second wife; and there has been
no judicial declaration of nullity except possibly in this very
action, filed after dissolution by death had taken place and
when Article 1417 of the Spanish Civil Code was no longer in
force.
131
said causes that the forfeiture of the guilty spouse
takes place.
● Now then, when did the conjugal partnership formed by
virtue of the marriage of the defendant to the deceased
Isidra Gomez terminate? Obviously when the marriage
was dissolved by the latter's death in 1958. By that time
Article 1417 was no longer in force, having been
eliminated in the new Civil Code, which took effect in
1950.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
complaint is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.

The only just and equitable solution in this case would be to

recognize the right of the second wife to her husband, and
consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal
partnership of the first marriage.

On the applicability of Art. 1417: We believe, however, that it is

not necessary to resolve that question here inasmuch as the
facts do not call for the application of Article 1417. The first
paragraph of this Article states two causes for the termination
of the conjugal partnership: (1) dissolution of the marriage and
(2) declaration of nullity.

● Under the second paragraph of the same Article it is

upon the termination of the partnership by either of

CASE # 75
Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS
G.R. No. L-28093 | TOPIC: Property Regimes of Unions
without Marriage; Unions under 148
Facts: The late Jose Consuegra, at the time of his death, was
employed as a shop foreman of the office of the District
Engineer in the province of Surigao-del Norte. In his lifetime,
Consuegra contracted two marriages, the first with herein
respondent Rosario Diaz on July 15, 1937, out of which marriage
were born two children but both predeceased their father; and
the second, which was contracted in good faith while the first
marriage was subsisting, with herein petitioner Basilia Berdin,
on May 1, 1957 in the same parish and municipality, out of which
marriage were born seven children.
Being a member of the GSIS when Consuegra died on
September 26, 1965, the proceeds of his life insurance were
paid by the GSIS to petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children
who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. Moreover,
having been in the service of the government for 22.5028 years,
Consuegra was entitled to retirement insurance benefits in the
sum of P6,304.47. Consuegra did not designate any beneficiary
who would receive the retirement insurance benefits due to
him.
Respondent Rosario Diaz, the widow by the first marriage, filed
a claim with the GSIS asking that the retirement insurance
benefits be paid to her as the only legal heir of Consuegra,
considering that the deceased did not designate any beneficiary
with respect to his retirement insurance benefits.
132
On the other hand, petitioner Basilia Berdin and her children,
likewise, filed a similar claim with the GSIS, asserting that being
the beneficiaries named in the life insurance policy of
Consuegra, they are the only ones entitled to receive the
retirement insurance benefits due the deceased Consuegra. In
other words, it is their contention that the designated
beneficiaries in the life insurance of the late Jose Consuegra
are also the exclusive beneficiaries in the retirement insurance
of said deceased.
GSIS: ruled that the legal heirs of the late Jose Consuegra were
Rosario Diaz, his widow by his first marriage who is entitled to
one-half, or 8/16, of the retirement insurance benefits, on the
one hand; and Basilia Berdin, his widow by the second marriage
and their seven children, on the other hand, who are entitled to
the remaining one-half, or 8/16, each of them to receive an
equal share of 1/16.
CFI: affirmed GSIS.
Issue: To whom should this retirement insurance benefits of
Jose Consuegra be paid, because he did not, or failed to,
designate the beneficiary of his retirement insurance? [one-half
to the first wife and one-half to the second wife]
Ruling: It cannot be said that because herein appellants were
designated beneficiaries Consuegra's life insurance they
automatically became beneficiaries also of his retirement
insurance. The law creating GSIS clearly indicates that there is
need for the employee to file an application for retirement
insurance benefits when he becomes a member of the GSIS,
and he should state in his application the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance. Hence, the beneficiary named in the life
insurance does not automatically become the beneficiary in the

retirement insurance unless the same beneficiary in the life
insurance is so designated in the application for retirement
insurance.
We see that the GSIS offers two separate and distinct systems
of benefits to its members — one is the life insurance and the
other is the retirement insurance. These two distinct systems
of benefits are paid out from two distinct and separate funds
that are maintained by the GSIS.
In the case of the proceeds of a life insurance, the same are
paid to whoever is named the beneficiary in the life insurance
policy. As in the case of a life insurance provided for in the
Insurance Act, the beneficiary in a life insurance under the GSIS
may not necessarily be an heir of the insured. The insured in a
life insurance may designate any person as beneficiary unless
disqualified to be so under the provisions of the Civil Code. And
in the absence of any beneficiary named in the life insurance
policy, the proceeds of the insurance will go to the estate of
the insured.
Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of
the employee — to provide for his old age, or incapacity, after
rendering service in the government for a required number of
years. If the employee reaches the age of retirement, he gets
the retirement benefits even to the exclusion of the beneficiary
or beneficiaries named in his application for retirement
insurance. The beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only
claim the proceeds of the retirement insurance if the employee
dies before retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked to
state the beneficiary of his retirement insurance, the
retirement benefits will accrue his estate and will be given to
his legal heirs in accordance with law, as in the case of a life
insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.
It is Our view, therefore, that the respondent GSIS had correctly
acted when it ruled that the proceeds of the retirement
133
insurance of the late Jose Consuegra should divided equally
between his first living wife Rosario on the one hand, and his
second wife Basilia Berdin his children by her, on the other; and
the lower court did not commit error when it confirmed the
action of the GSIS, it being accepted as a fact that the second
marriage of Jose Consuegra to Basilia Berdin was contracted in
good faith. In the recent case of Gomez vs. Lipana, this Court,
in construing the rights of two women who were married to the
same man — a situation more or less similar to the case of
appellant Basilia Berdin and appellee Rosario Diaz — held "that
since the defendant's first marriage has not been dissolved or
declared void the conjugal partnership established by that
marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or
relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under
the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such
putative heir she has an interest in the husband's share in the
property here in dispute.. " And with respect to the right of the
second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second
marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity,
"[t]he only just and equitable solution in this case would be to
recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half
in the property acquired by her and her husband, and consider
the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the
first marriage."
 134
CASE # 76

Case Title
GR No. Date Ponente
TOPIC:

CASE # 77
Carino v. Carino
G.R. No. 132529 | February 2, 2001 | TOPIC:
Unions under FC 148 of FC50 in relation to FC
43 (2) and FC50
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the
property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine,
relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, the
properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively.
Then too, contributions in the form of care of the home,
children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are
excluded in this regime.
FACTS
● SPO4 Santiago Carino contracted two marriages.
○ First, with petitioner Susan Nicdao with whom he
begot two (2) children
○ Second, during the subsistence of the first, was
with respondent Susan Yee with whom he had no
issue.
● SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to
diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He
passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of
Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses.
135
● Petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary
benefits and financial assistance from various
government agencies. Petitioner collected P146,000 from
MBAI, PCCUI, commutation, NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig,
while respondent collected P21,000 from GSIS and SSS.
● Respondent, in an action for collection, sought to
recover half the amount collected by petitioner. She
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous
marriage with petitioner and presented evidence that the
previous marriage was contracted without the necessary
marriage license. Judgment was rendered by the trial
court in favor of respondent, affirmed on appeal by the
CA. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUES
RULING
ON THE TWO MARRIAGES
● The marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the
marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio. The absence
of a marriage license, as a general rule, renders the
marriage void ab initio. However, for purposes of
remarriage, a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage must be obtained. For other purposes
no such judicial action is required. Otherwise, the second
marriage would also be void.
● It does not follow, however, that since the marriage of
petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the
"death benefits" would now be awarded to respondent
Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
 136
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous the other half shall pass by to petitioner's children as the
marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a decedent's legal heirs.
second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would
also be void. The fact remains that their marriage was DISPOSITIVE PORTION
solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the
declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the
the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering
Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab initio. petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus
ON THE BENEFITS attorney's fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and
● Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is
and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous
marriage then presumed to be valid, Article 148 applies.
● Article 148 of the Civil Code governs the property regime
of bigamous marriages. Only the properties acquired by
the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him
or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the form of
care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or
moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.
● While union of parties who are legally capacitated and
not barred by any impediment to contract marriage is
governed by co-ownership under Article 147 of the Civil
Code.
● Thus, the P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI, commutation,
NAPOLCOM and Pag-Ibig earned by the deceased, in the
absence of evidence that respondent contributed
money, property or industry in the acquisition of these
monetary benefits, is owned by the deceased alone and
respondent has no right whatsoever to claim the same.
● However, petitioner is entitled to one-half of the subject
"death benefits" as her share in the property regime and

CASE # 78
GO-BANGAYAN v. BANGAYAN
GR No. 201061 | TOPIC: Unions under FC 148 of
FC50 in relation to FC 43 (2) and FC50
DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE
*check underlined
FACTS
● Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or
declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC
Manila.
○ Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he
married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan
City.
○ They had three children, namely, Rizalyn,
Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
● In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship
with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in
the auto parts and supplies business owned by
Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for
the United States of America. In February 1982,
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife.
Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March
1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they
signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the
marriage contract would not be registered.
● Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two
children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
137
cohabitation, they acquired the following real
properties:
○ (1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
○ (2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin, married to
Sally;
○ (3) properties under Condominium Certificate of
Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the
name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
○ (4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.
● The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994
when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley
with her.
● She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and
falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence.
● Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a
non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage before the trial court on the ground that his
marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage.
○ Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally
in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of
the properties during the pendency of the case,
and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as
illegitimate children.
○ A total of 44 registered properties became the
subject of the partition before the trial court. 7

were named by Benjamin in his petition + the
other 37 were named by Sally in her Answer.
● Trial court: in favor of Benjamin
○ The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The second marriage was void not because
of the existence of the first marriage but because of
other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this
case.
○ On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that
Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in
her answer as part of her conjugal properties with
Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not
legally married to Benjamin.
○ The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad
faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to
Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the
trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties
covered under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor
of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
● CA: partly granted the appeal
○ The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations
of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only
the properties acquired by the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contribution. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed
by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
○ As regards the seven properties claimed by both
parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him
exclusively because he was able to establish that they
were acquired by him solely.
138
○ The Court of Appeals found that the properties under
TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in
the absence of proof of Benjamin’s actual
contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be
owned by them in common, to be shared equally.
However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the
conjugal partnership under his existing marriage with
Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the
absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
ISSUES
Whether or not the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code and thus the 44
registered properties cannot be owned by them equally - YES.
Sally cannot claim the 37 properties she named in her Answer
because only the properties acquired by Benjamin & Sally through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. As to the 7 properties named by Benjamin in his
petition, the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner & do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either
or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership over said properties.
RULING
● First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September
1973 was duly established before the trial court,
evidenced by a certified true copy of their marriage
contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a
purported marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and
subsisting.
● On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, the
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of

Pasig City testified that there was no valid marriage
license issued to Benjamin and Sally.
○ Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into
a marriage contract, the marriage was void from
the beginning for lack of a marriage license.
○ It was also established before the trial court that
the purported marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office.
● As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally "was made only in jest" and "a
simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended
to cover her up from expected social humiliation
coming from relatives, friends and the society
especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives." In short, it was a fictitious marriage.
● We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent.
○ Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage
solemnized without a license, except those
covered by Article 34 where no license is
necessary, "shall be void from the beginning."
○ In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was solemnized without a license. It was
duly established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-
07568 did not match the marriage license
numbers issued by the local civil registrar of
Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
○ The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
139
simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void
from the beginning."
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
● The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property
relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article
148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence
of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same
rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money
and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith.
● Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions.
Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by
Sally which were given by Benjamin’s father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that
 140
"Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses
which included Sally x x x."

● As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that

the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord
with the evidence on record.
○ Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.
○ The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860
were in the name of Benjamin with the
descriptive title "married to Sally."
○ The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were registered in the name of Sally with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the
properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681
were registered in the name of Sally as a single
individual.
● We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding
the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil
status of the registered owner. Such words do not
prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be
no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the
14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94226.
 141
CASE # 79
 142

Ventura, Jr. v. Spouses Abuda

GR No. 202932 | TOPIC:

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE

In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship
shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order
to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.

FACTS
Socorro and Esteban were married in 1980. They never had common children, but both
of them had children from prior marriages. Esteban had a daughter named Evangeline
(respondent), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto (petitioner).

Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas when
she married Esteban, and the marriage was not annulled. Crispin was alive at the time
of Socorro’s marriage to Esteban. On the other hand, Esteban’s prior marriage was
dissolved by the death of his wife in 1960.

Petitioner states that Esteban purchased a portion of a lot in Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas
Property). The remaining portion was purchased by his daughter, Evangeline on her
father’s behalf. Esteban and Evangeline also operated small business establishments
in Deplan, Tondo, Manila (Deplan Property). In 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Deplan
properties to respondents. Esteban passed away 5 days later, while Socorro passed
away in 1999.

After the discovery of the sale, Edilberto filed a petition for the Annulment of Deeds
of Sale. He alleged that the sale of the properties were fraudulent because Esteban’s
signature was forged. Respondents contended that because of Socorro’s prior marriage
to Crispin, her subsequent marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro
not her heirs can claim any right or interest over the said properties.

RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit, ruling that the marriage of Socorro and
Esteban was null and void. It also ruled that the properties are not conjugal, and are
governed by Articles 144 and 485 of the Civil Code, which states that:

“Art. 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they
are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property
 143

acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

Art. 485. The share of the co-owners, in the benefits as well as in the charges,
shall be proportional to their respective interests. Any stipulation in a contract to
the contrary shall be void. The portions belonging to the co-owners in the co-
ownership shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proved”

RTC concluded that Soccoro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the
properties. Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner and her heirs cannot claim
and rights over the properties.
On appeal, CA sustained the decision of the RTC. However, CA ruled that the RTC
should have applied Article 148 of the Family Code rather than Articles 144 and 485 of
the Civil Code. Article 148 states that:

“. . . only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common
in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal.”

CA found that petitioner failed to prove that Socorro contributed to the purchase of
the properties and was unable to provide documentation evidencing Socorro’s alleged
contribution. After petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied, petitioner
appealed to the SC.

ISSUES
Whether or not Petitioner Edilberto has any claim or interest in the Delpan and Vitas
properties. NO.

RULING

In unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship
shall be based on the actual contribution of the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order
to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal
contribution do not apply.

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry
each other], only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them
in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
 144

presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint
deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The properties can be considered common property if:

1. these were acquired during the cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and
2. there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties’ actual
joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

Petitioner argues that the certificate of title shows that the land is co-owned by
Esteban and Socorro because it was issued several months after their marriage and
the title stated that it was issued to “Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married to Socorro
Torres.”

SC disagrees. The title itself shows that the properties are owned by Esteban alone.
The phrase “married to Socorro Torres” is merely descriptive of his civil status, and
does not show that Socorro co-owned the property. Records also show that the
properties were acquired prior to Esteban’s marriage to Socorro.

Petitioner also claims that Esteban's actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan
property was not sufficiently proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the
amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro jointly contributed to
the acquisition of the Delpan property.

SC cannot sustain the claim. Both lower courts found that the property was acquired
before the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the
purchase price of the Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was
made on behalf of her father. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any evidence
showing Socorro's alleged monetary contributions.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 March 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92330 is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
 145

CASE # 80

Alfonso Lacson v. Carmen San Jose-Lacson

GR No. 202932 | TOPIC: 2. Unions under FC 148 of
FC50 in relation to FC 43 (2) and FC50

DOCTRINE/LESSON OF THE CASE = in blue

FACTS
1. Alfonso Lacson and Carmen Lacson were married on February 14, 1953. They had
4 children.
2. On Jan. 9, 1963, Carmen left their conjugal home in Bacolod and resided in
Manila.
3. On March 12, 1963, she filed a petition for the custody of all of their children as
well as support for them and herself.
4. However, the spouses entered into an amicable settlement and they filed their
joint petition. This was approved by the CFI judge.
a. In compliance with paragraph 4 (e) of their mutual agreement (par. 3[e]
of the compromise judgment), the petitioner spouse delivered all the four
children to the respondent spouse and remitted money for their support.
5. On May 7, 1963, Carmen filed a motion wherein she alleged that she entered into
and signed the Joint Petition as the only means by which she could have
immediate custody of the minor children.
a. Alfonso opposed the said motion and moved to dismiss the complaint
based, among other things, on the grounds of res judicata and lis pendens.
b. The lower court agreed with Alfonso.
6. CA: ruled that the compromise agreement violates article 363 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE
Whether the compromise agreement entered into by the parties is valid.

RULING
Partially valid only. The compromise agreement and the judgment of the CFI grounded
on the said agreement are valid with respect to the separation of property of the
spouses and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership.

The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. Thus the new
Civil Code provides:
 146

In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the

separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
save in virtue of a judicial order. (Art. 190, emphasis supplied)

The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of
the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be
notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the
creditors and other third persons. (Art. 191, par. 4, emphasis supplied).

In this case, the spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property
and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership. It is likewise undisputed that the
couple have been separated in fact for at least five years - the wife's residence being
in Manila, and the husband's in the conjugal home in Bacolod City. Therefore, inasmuch
as a lengthy separation has supervened between them, the propriety of severing their
financial and proprietary interests is manifest.

However, this Court does not give recognition nor is legalizing the de facto separation
of the spouses.

As to the question of the custody and support of the children:

The Civil Code specifically commands in the second sentence of its article 363 that
"No mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the
court finds compelling reasons for such measure."

The order dated April 27, 1963 of the CFI, insofar as it awarded custody of the two
older children who were 6 and 5 years old, respectively, to the father, is null and void.

HOWEVER, since five years have elapsed since the filing of these cases in 1963, the
ages of the four children should now be as follows: Enrique — 11, Maria Teresa — 10,
Gerrard — 9, and Ramon — 5. Therefore, the issue regarding the award of the custody
of Enrique and Maria Teresa to the petitioner spouse has become moot and academic.
The passage of time has removed the prop which supports the respondent spouse's
position.

At least one of the children is now eleven years of age and should be given the choice
of the parent he wishes to live with. This is the clear mandate of sec. 6, Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court which, states, inter alia:
 147

When husband and wife are divorced or living separately and apart from each
other, and the question as to the care, custody, and control of a child or children
of their marriage is brought before a Court of First Instance by petition or as an
incident to any other proceeding, the court, upon hearing testimony as may be
pertinent, shall award the care, custody and control of each such child as will
be for its best interest permitting the child to choose which parent it prefers to
live with if it be over ten years of age, unless the parent so chosen be unfit to
take charge of the child by reason of moral depravity, habitual drunkenness,
incapacity, or poverty

The rights of every child should not be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the
whims and caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the parents'
say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case, the parents are already
separated in fact, the courts must step in to determine in whose custody the child can
better be assured the right granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present
evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
G.R. L-24259 is hereby remanded to the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental
for further proceedings. the decision dated May 11, 1964 and the resolution dated July
31, 1964 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 32384-R (subject matter of G.R. L-23482),
and the orders dated May 28, 1963 and June 24, 1963 of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court (subject matter of G.R. L-23767) are affirmed.